http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183375 Following the protests after the parliamentary elections in December 2011, much attention was focused on the cracks in Putin’s system and the political opposition. While the situation has quieted down, the underlying problems remain. After his inauguration on 7 May, Putin will appoint a new government. The government is likely to face a number of key challenges in the short- to medium-term, and its approach to them will have repercussions for Russia’s relations with other countries. This event will look at the main issues on Russia’s domestic, economy and foreign policy agenda. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183375 Thu, 17 May 2012 13:54:27 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183351 The nature and extent of corruption in Russia are well known, but the effects of financial and constitutional abuse on economic growth, on society, and on political life are less well understood. With the old growth model no longer working well, the panel will discuss whether Russia can return to the strong economic growth it enjoyed between 1998 and 2008 without tackling corruption and the weak rule of law. They will explore what the tipping point for reform may be, where it may come from, and what Russia could become if it were able to achieve better rankings in global corruption indexes. For more information please contact the Members Events Team     http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183351 Wed, 16 May 2012 14:14:55 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/video-resource/183275 Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group takes a sprint round the world asking 'if not the US, who?' stopping off in the China, Russia, the EU and more. 10 May 2012 at Chatham House http://www.chathamhouse.org/video-resource/183275 Fri, 11 May 2012 13:51:02 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/183267 Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group takes a sprint round the world asking 'if not the US, who?' stopping off in the China, Russia, the EU and more. At Chatham House on 10 May 2012   Subscribe to the Chatham House Podcast in iTunes | via RSS          Subscribe to Chatham House event audio in iTunes | via RSS http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/183267 Fri, 11 May 2012 10:54:50 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/183261 This is a summary of an event held on 23 April 2012 at Chatham House. Anders Åslund, a Senior Associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, discussed Ukraine’s current economic situation. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/183261 Thu, 10 May 2012 17:54:55 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183251 Following the presidential election in October 2011, many of Kyrgyzstan’s old problems returned to the fore. Much needed economic development is complicated by continuing inter-ethnic tensions as well as difficult relations with other states in the region. Former president Roza Otunbayeva will discuss the challenges facing Kyrgyzstan today and likely future developments. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183251 Thu, 10 May 2012 16:22:27 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183249 Throughout history, migrants have fuelled the engine of human progress. Their movement has sparked innovation, spread ideas, relieved poverty, and laid the foundations for a global economy. Cheap travel and easy communication allows today's migrants to create extensive and intimate cross-border networks, in a way that was in the past unthinkable. The speakers will argue that the way in which these networks speed up the flow of ideas across borders has profound consequences for business, technology and politics. They will put forward new approaches for governance that embrace international mobility. For more information please contact the Members Events Team http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183249 Thu, 10 May 2012 15:24:11 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/183219 This is a summary of an event held on 23 February 2012 at Chatham House. Alexey Gromyko, Deputy Director, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that the EU’s attempts to engage Russia in areas beyond trade have achieved little success. The discussion focussed on the future direction of EU-Russia relations. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/183219 Wed, 09 May 2012 17:06:33 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183195 This event will look at the key aspects of Turkey-Armenia rapprochement. Prospects for the normalization of relations between the two countries look as bleak as ever following the collapse of the October 2009 protocols. Although the civil society contacts continue, little effort to resurrect the process has been observed at the official level. Are the 2009 protocols dead? What could restart the process and who or what are the main obstacles? What practical steps have been taken to encourage a shift in public opinion? Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183195 Wed, 09 May 2012 10:47:41 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/183167 There are those, not least in the West, who hope or even suppose that Vladimir Putin's reincarnation on 7 May as President of Russia will mean a fresh start. On the face of it, he is well placed to make one. The new Duma is structured for subservience, the Russian economy is doing pretty well, and the protest movement has lost the momentum it enjoyed from December 2011 to March this year. Putin's personal dominance over the small group of his associates that rule the country has been reinforced. That also means of course that his answerability for the future course of events has increased too. It would be unusual for any man embarking on what in effect is his fourth term of office to change his underlying ideas. Dimitry Medvedev, who used a different vocabulary, has been set aside as a tame Prime Minister in waiting. It is probable that the next administration President Putin sponsors will for the most part be a reshuffle of well-used cards. Putin’s campaign offering was stability, not change. The 2011/2012 electoral cycle was nonetheless a stage in a continuing process which has increased the gap between the ruling group and substantial sections of Russian society – not just the urban middle class. Putin's hold as a national leader beyond mere politics has been damaged. He will need to show purpose and convey a sense of renewal if he is to regain his previous authority, and certainly so if he plans to return yet again to the Kremlin in 2018.  Economic Road Map: Without the Politics? The thrust of Putin’s proposals, which are to be set out in detail in the implementation road map that he has promised to issue, appear to rely on the state to take the lead in diversifying and reinvigorating the economy. Putin has called for the private sector to do more, for an investment surge, and he has recognized areas of past weakness like corruption – yet again. The Ministry for Economic Development has put forward alternative outlooks, one of continued reliance on natural resources, or innovation; in other words a conservative and ambitious growth strategy. If the Ministry’s assumptions are justified, Russia will be doing better than many in terms of GDP growth under either scenario over the next few years. None of this threatens Putin's 'power vertical'. The various discussion groups sanctioned recently, such as the extensive and well qualified body which put forward a revised strategy for development up to 2020, were firmly instructed to keep off the political grass. There is room for improvement if some of their ideas were to be implemented. Going beyond the piecemeal and realizing some of the more ambitious targets that Putin has set would be difficult even if state leadership were the best way of achieving them: the machinery is corrupted and incompetent. Investment rates are unlikely to improve radically - as Putin has demanded - without transparency, accountability, the rule of law and secure property rights. This is universally acknowledged but expected by no one. Significant structural change would depend on the establishment of such principles, and would threaten the interests of both those at the summit of the so-called vertical and those charged with implementing its policies. Such change would be difficult, too, for a substantial number of Russia’s ordinary citizens, and nothing has been done to prepare them for it. 'Innovation' and 'modernization' are of course favourite words for everyone, and Putin not least. They are also usefully ambiguous. They carry a heavy bias towards technological improvement in the official political discourse, including through foreign direct investment and existing enterprises. That restrictive approach will neither upset the status quo nor provide for Russia’s longer term evolution towards flexible and accountable government. Nor will it answer to the next President's need to recapture his hold over the Russian imagination.  Making Concessions Both political and economic change are interlinked; and dangerous and necessary if Russia is to develop as it deserves. Putin and Medvedev were shocked by the recent protests, but have apparently recovered their poise. The systemic concessions as to gubernatorial and municipal elections have been modified so as to subject them to a considerable degree of central control. If such control cannot be maintained tensions with regional or municipal leaders with their own legitimacy would have to be secured either by compulsion or reinvented and trusted constitutional mechanisms. (The Kadyrov model of devolved tyranny is a dangerous singularity).  Putin appears to have no new ideas which might enable him to re-establish himself as the director of events. That does not necessarily doom the next administration but it does make him and Russia more vulnerable to the unexpected. The questions of what or who may follow Putin together with what reliable institutions there may be to allow for fruitful evolution will become more urgent than ever. The sense that Russia is headed in the wrong direction is well established in the national consciousness. If you would like to comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback  http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/183167 Fri, 04 May 2012 13:06:38 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183119 Marie Mendras will discuss the evolution of the Russian state and society since 1991 and the impact it continues to have on Russia’s relations with the outside world. In her new book, Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State, she contends that the Russian state has become weak and ineffective because Vladimir Putin has dismantled and undermined most public institutions.  Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Copies of the book will be available for purchase at the event. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183119 Wed, 02 May 2012 11:58:08 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183039 The recent protests in Russia have brought the possibility of political reform in the country back into focus. Some of the debate has focused on the need for constitutional reform to improve the checks on power within the Russian system. Vladimir Pastukhov will offer his perspective on aspects of the Russian constitution, ways forward for the political system and the extent of its entanglement with the rule of law in Russia. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/183039 Thu, 26 Apr 2012 14:34:51 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182989 This is a summary of an event held on 26 March 2012 at Chatham House. Bobo Lo discussed the key areas in Russian foreign policy and likely future developments. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182989 Tue, 24 Apr 2012 12:52:20 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182935 With the upcoming London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the speakers will consider: Can hosting the Olympics help the host engage new and emerging powers? How is a country’s image and 'brand' affected by hosting international sporting events or by the success or failure of its sports team? Can or should international sport be used to support political change? For more information please contact the Members Events Team.    http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182935 Fri, 20 Apr 2012 11:36:19 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182921 Georgia faces a complex regional environment. As international attention focuses on Iran and Syria, there have been concerns about the effect this may have on so-called 'frozen conflicts' in the Caucasus. Georgia continues to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan, as well as closer integration with the EU, while Vladimir Putin's pre-election rhetoric underlined Russia's continued opposition to the NATO presence in the former Soviet states. Giorgi Bokeria will offer his perspective on the challenges Georgia is facing in its neighbourhood. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182921 Thu, 19 Apr 2012 16:03:06 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182897 The speaker will discuss Ukraine’s current economic situation. After winning the presidential election in February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych proclaimed an ambitious programme for economic reform. The government outlined plans for a tax and pension reform, and progress was being made towards an Association Agreement with the EU. However, many assert that the implementation of reforms has been partial and slow and there has been notable lack of progress, even regression, in the fight against corruption and reform of the judiciary. In addition, there have been concerns about Ukraine’s external debt repayment and stalled negotiations with the IMF. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182897 Wed, 18 Apr 2012 15:44:52 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182895 Russia was one of the signatories of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in 1994, but it has not ratified the document to date, and in 2009 the Russian government terminated the provisional application of ECT. The aim of the Energy Charter is to establish a legal framework to promote long-term cooperation in the energy sector.  Andrei Belyi will discuss possible future developments in Russia’s energy policy and the country’s relationship with this key regime to promote trade, investment and reliable transit. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182895 Wed, 18 Apr 2012 15:35:49 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182893 This is a summary of an event held on 7 February 2012 at Chatham House. Alexander Lukin, from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, discussed the ways in which Russia is responding to a changing geostrategic landscape in Asia. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182893 Wed, 18 Apr 2012 14:50:22 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182881 This is a summary of an event held on 20 February 2012 at Chatham House. Stephen Blank, from the Strategic Studies Institute, discussed the evolution of Russia's security policy and the impact of structural changes to the country's security forces. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182881 Wed, 18 Apr 2012 10:42:25 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182842 This is a summary of an event held on 7 March 2012 at Chatham House. The seminar, which was held under the Chatham House Rule, analysed the politics of drugs at their source and in transit. The speakers also discussed the effects of the drug trade on the wider region and aim to provide recommendations for the international community. Event details. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182842 Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:03:41 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/World-energy-markets 'Rebalancing the World Energy Markets: The role of China, Russia and Central Asia' will study the interplay of factors shaping the world’s energy markets. Examining China, Russia and Central Asia’s demand drivers, it will assess the impact of unconventional energy sources, and discuss the feasibility of developing new fields in the context of oil and gas transport options.  This two-day conference will provide a unique platform for policy makers, governments, commentators and key industry figures to assess the current situation and ask what lies ahead. Questions surrounding the domestic political context and business environment in which investments are likely to be made will be central to the conference debates.  What effect is China’s rapidly rising domestic energy consumption having on global oil and gas supplies? How will internal and external energy demand affect China’s investment decisions? Will international oil companies be able to make significant investments in China’s expanding energy sector? What role for Gazprom in the context of the ‘Shale Gas Revolution’ and China’s alternative gas sources? What are the short- and medium-term plans for investment in production expansion in Russia, Central Asia and China?   Registration Register by Friday 28 September to benefit from the early booking rate.   http://www.chathamhouse.org/World-energy-markets Wed, 11 Apr 2012 16:18:15 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182670 Ukraine’s EU integration progress appears stalled following the result of Yulia Tymoshenko’s trial in October 2011, and other perceived democratic backsteps. The Ukrainian government continues to tread a fine line between encouraging signs from the EU - such as the initialling of the Association Agreement on 30 March - and strong overtures from Russia to join the Eurasian Customs Union. Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi will discuss the possible future developments in Ukraine’s relations with the EU. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova. http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182670 Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:30:48 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/182654   Revolutionary fervour is hard to come by in Moscow these days. If one drops by the Jean-Jacques café or Mayak, once unofficial headquarters of the protest movement, a visibly shrunken group of activists and media types is discussing whether ‘the revolution’ died with Vladimir Putin’s victory in the March 4 presidential elections, the enthusiastic expressions gone from their faces.  This is not the case with the faces of portfolio investors in Russia. They are smiling as they anticipate Putin’s triumphant return to the Kremlin in May. The consensus is that Putin’s third term will mean more ‘business as usual’ – albeit with a slightly different composition of government. Both the activists and the investors are wrong. Russia has changed irreversibly and the question is only how long and how smooth the decline of the current political regime will be.  Events unfolding since the massively rigged State Duma elections brought tens of thousands of people to the streets of Moscow are a classic example of a legitimacy crisis. This became palpable after the September 24, 2011, announcement that Vladimir Putin was planning to return to the presidency. I remember very distinctly how the ‘Is Uruguay still taking immigrants?’ mood soon gave way to an ‘It’s our country!’ sentiment.  When Putin was publicly humiliated for the first time by the audience’s booing at a martial arts match last November, Alexei Navalny, the blogger turned anti-corruption crusader, wrote in his online diary: ‘This is the beginning of the end’. This happened three weeks before the first in a series of rallies, held at Bolotnaya Square, Moscow, made headlines around the world. I think Navalny’s remark is still true. Although there will be fewer rallies, the reasons that led to them in the first place have not disappeared. Putin is still facing the growing discontent of the people I’d prefer to call the ‘independent class’, rather than the ‘middle class’ referred to by the western media. They are mostly city professionals aged between 20 and 50 who have learnt to live in the new, sometimes harsh conditions of Russia’s capitalism. They are used to making independent decisions regarding their private lives, their professional careers, their lifestyle and consumer choices. They do not need a benevolent but strict father figure in the Kremlin to ‘stabilise’ the country for them. They are just fine stabilising their lives themselves. What they do lack is the ability – though not the formal right – to make a free political choice.  Not all of us are on the take Curiously, many of these ‘independents’ are not private entrepreneurs or bohemians, but civil servants sick of the corrution of the Putin system. An acquaintance, the deputy head of a department in the Moscow Mayor’s Office, told me he was stunned to see his colleagues go to opposition gatherings en masse. ‘Not all of us are on the take,’ he said. ‘We have eyes and ears and are as disgusted as everyone else. Many of us want to make careers in a normal, transparent fashion. It’s our fight too.’  The problem the Kremlin faces is that it cannot use either bribery or intimidation to quell this mood. Bribery won’t work because the demands of the protesters are not economic. And intimidation doesn’t allow much scope because fear is gone from Russian society. Only an Alexander Lukashenko-style wave of repressions could buck the trend. For this the Kremlin has neither the resources nor the stomach.  Count on forgiveness  While the opposition doesn’t appear to have one leader whom everyone would support, in fact it has. Mikhail Khodorkovsky , the jailed former tycoon, is the only public figure in Russia who has the sympathies of both westernising, Right-leaning liberals and the gradually evolving and modernising Left. For the former, he is the icon of Russian capitalism and a relentless critic of Putin; for the latter, he is the only Russian oligarch who, through his long stint in prison, has redeemed the real and perceived sins of Russia’s controversial privatisation of the 1990s.  More importantly, Khodorkovsky is consistently challenging the Kremlin on moral grounds, decrying the cynicism and the mistrust of value-based politics that the Putin era has brought with it. This is something that opposition supporters clearly identify with. It may seem like a long shot, but the former billionnaire is the closest example Russia has to a Nelson Mandela or a Vaclav Havel. His Dostoevskian plight is so Russian in style that I can almost visualise him walking through the Kremlin gates.  Khodorkovsky himself has chosen a different novel as a reference for his situation – Alexandre Dumas’ The Count of Monte Cristo, whose hero is falsely imprisoned, escapes and takes vengeance on his persecutors. With his now famous statement ‘I am no Count of Monte Cristo, I will not seek revenge’, Khodorkovsky may eventually provide the best opportunity for Russia’s current leaders to make a graceful exit.     http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/182654 Wed, 28 Mar 2012 16:09:40 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182548 After his return to the presidency in May, Vladimir Putin will officially take charge of Russia's foreign policy again. While his election campaign suggested that the main directions of foreign policy will remain the same, Russia is likely to face several challenges in the changing global environment. Bobo Lo will discuss the key areas in Russian foreign policy and likely future developments. Attendance at this event is by invtation only. For more information please contact Lubica Pollakova http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/182548 Thu, 15 Mar 2012 12:35:31 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/182537 NATO's 2012 Chicago Conference according to Andrew Dorman, and a look at the review articles with Deputy Editor Sabine Wolf. http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/182537 Wed, 14 Mar 2012 12:34:36 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/182495   Russia's 2011/2012 electoral cycle has been a stage in a process, not the resolution of the country's future course. The principal actors will have to adapt to new realities.  The Duma opposition parties are headed by politicians whose time is up. Neither Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Gennady Zyuganov would be remotely credible in a future presidential contest. Both their parties will have to reconsider what they are for, and who should lead them, if they are not to decline further. United Russia has taken a hit. Vladimir Putin has deserted them. So have the voters, except where coerced. The next government will need them as voting fodder, and for their regional dominance, but the steam has gone out of them, even as a career weapon for the ambitious. Reinventing them or replacing them will be a tough ask for the Kremlin. The 'non-systemic' opposition have had a splendid three months. Putin's hold over crucial parts of the Russian electorate, particularly in Moscow, has been broken. In the longer run, it may be as well that the protest movement, while covering most tendencies, has yet to generate a party structure or structures. The movement is too disparate to submit to disciplined leadership and Russia has, in any case, suffered too long from 'strong men'. Time is needed for the various elements opposing Putin to form longer term purposes and instruments. The problem for these groups is what to do now? Protesting about falsification and demanding Putin’s ouster will have a limited shelf life. Putin's tasks are to make himself fully legitimate, and to decide how to deal with Russia’s social and economic problems. Both the Duma and the presidential elections were seen as fraudulent. The scale of the protests went beyond what Russia's rulers expected. Putin avoided campaigning as far as he could, preferring to rely on promises of future largesse and warnings that there would be chaos without him. Russian political life will in principle become more public now, and – again in principle – more changeable. That will not suit the ruling elite. Putin's instinctive preference for the media to be subject to strict control has been confirmed over the past several months. Pressures on the more independent minded radio stations and print media will probably increase. The internet is less easy to control, and more liable to spread exaggerated ideas.  Putin's tolerance level will be closely monitored, along of course with his attitude towards independent political movements. He held no dialogue with the protestors before his reelection to the Presidency. Nor did he engage in debate with othercandidates, preferring a series of gnomic essays on where he thought Russia should head. His pronouncements on international relations were similarly declaratory, with hostility towards the West in general and the United States in particular featuring quite strongly – and going well beyond what might be put down simply to pre-electoral posturing. What to Expect The proposition that a Putin.2 will emerge rests therefore more on the logic of hope than the evidence to date. The latter signals Putin.4, meaning more of the same in what will in effect be Putin's fourth term. Greater openness and accountability would be essential if Putin were to pursue a significant attempt to modernise the Russian economy. The risks of such an effort would be considerable, and there is no present compulsion for the next government in Moscow to do more than work around the issue. Nothing in what Putin said or wrote during the pre-electoral period suggested that he had major ambitions for structural reform. His promises of extra expenditure from an already committed budget were a hostage to fortune. And the Russian public has not been prepared for the stresses of structural change. The next step will be for Putin to nominate a Prime Minister, and for a new government to be formed. It is unlikely that the 10 March opposition demonstration will do much to influence that. If it is large, it is likely to incline Putin more towards the bunker than towards conciliation. He may in any case be too late for weight to be given to any promises he shall give, for instance to attack corruption. What he says is no longer credited by a goodly slice of his domestic audience.  If you would like to comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback Report Putin Again: Implications for Russia and the WestChatham House ReportPhilip Hanson, James Nixey, Lilia Shevtsova and Andrew Wood, February 2012 http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/182495 Sat, 10 Mar 2012 12:48:42 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/182479 Pushed by the realities of domestic politics to proceed with plans to deploy a US missile defense (MD) capability in Europe, the Obama administration has made cooperation on MD a key element in its strategy for engaging both NATO and Russia. While addressing many of the shortcomings of the Bush administration’s approach, the current US vision underestimates both the technical and political obstacles ahead. European states and NATO see MD as a lower priority, particularly in the aftermath of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, and are unlikely to commit the resources necessary to making a shared NATO MD architecture a reality. Russia’s cautious support for MD cooperation is based on a desire to create a more inclusive model of European security, an idea that has limited support in Washington and the European capitals. By trying to do too much with MD cooperation, the Obama administration risks the whole effort collapsing. Given domestic constraints, the administration cannot pull back from its European MD plans, but should nudge them off centre stage in its conversations on security with both NATO allies and the Russians. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/182479 Thu, 08 Mar 2012 18:47:03 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182426 This is a transcript of an event held on 29 February 2012 at Chatham House, marking the launch of a Chatham House Report, Putin Again: Implications for Russia and the West. The authors of the Report discussed the structural challenges facing Russia, the outlook for the Russian economy and the implications of domestic developments for the country’s foreign policy. Event details, audio and Q&A. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182426 Mon, 05 Mar 2012 17:52:41 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/node/182407 http://www.chathamhouse.org/node/182407 Fri, 02 Mar 2012 15:04:37 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia http://www.chathamhouse.org/node/182393 http://www.chathamhouse.org/node/182393 Thu, 01 Mar 2012 17:06:01 +0100 Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia