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## Africa Summary

# Navigating the Nexus: The Interplay of EU Security and Development Policies in Africa

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## INTRODUCTION

This is a summary of a workshop held at Chatham House on 3 June 2013 in association with the University of Warwick and University of Glasgow. The workshop received funding from the Politics and International Studies Department and Institute of Advanced Studies at the University of Warwick, and the Scottish Jean Monnet Programme based at the University of Glasgow. The topic for discussion was the 'Security–Development Nexus', and the purpose of the workshop was to explore the link between the theoretical and practical policy debates in EU foreign policies.

Instability in the Sahel and the crises in Mali, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have provoked a re-evaluation of approaches to insecurity in Africa, both within and outside the continent.

This workshop brought together officials and practitioners from within the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission with academics and civil society groups to discuss the linking of security and development policies, and its implications for sustainable security and peace in Africa. It provided an opportunity for constructive dialogue on the EU's Africa foreign policy-making.

The event was held on the record. The following summary is intended to serve as an *aide-mémoire* for those who took part and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not. A copy of the agenda (with details of the speakers' affiliations) can be found in the Appendix.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Wolfram Vetter from the Development Cooperation Coordination Division of the EEAS outlined the relevance, response and future outlook of the security–development nexus from the point of view of the European Union (henceforth EU).

Mr Vetter stated that the security–development nexus discourse in the EU originated in 2000. At that time the EU was starting to become more involved as an actor on the international scene, although initially there was a contrast between the security programmes and the aid and development programmes, which was institutionally and politically difficult. It was recognized that development needed to accommodate security.

The European Security Strategy 2003 acknowledged that security is required for development, and also that state failure is an international threat. The 2005 Development consensus also noted that there is no development without security.

Mr Vetter argued that this policy rhetoric was demonstrated in practice in the 2003 Artemis and 2006 EUFOR interventions. In these cases there was a desire to make the EU relevant and to use the security instruments that were being created. The EU then used these efforts to create institutions on which states could agree.

Mr Vetter said that as a response to the recognition of a security–development nexus the EU wanted to respond and be more involved in confronting these challenges. Most notably, it was requested that \$10 million be put at the disposal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Little had happened in response to this request as issues such as where the money would come from were raised.

The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2001 made it clearer that the EU has a strong interest. Mr Vetter said that at first many people falsely assumed the AU was no different from the OAU. Once the difference was apparent, the EU realized that the AU was not in fact a mirror of the EU and was a lot more focused on security. The EU realized that on many of these security issues it was unable to respond. This resulted in the decision to ‘catalyse the nexus’ and become more involved.

The EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa was mandated to talk to the AU on political matters, and increasingly became a real partner and interlocutor on the AU peace and security architecture.

Mr Vetter stated that the current High Representative and Vice President of the Commission had been able to bring the two sides of the community together, emphasizing the primacy of policy. The security and development policies are no longer driven by the policy-making instruments but are now at the point where political objectives are discussed. This includes the consideration of external interests.

Mr Vetter stated that there are clear proposals on security as well as development. These can be seen in the EU's strategy for the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa.

Change has also occurred within the internal departmental structure. Previously there were separate thematic and geographical departments, which often made it unclear who had the last word. Now, the geographic desk brings everyone together.

Mr Vetter proceeded to give his view of the future outlook of the European External Action Service. He stated that the EEAS was moving towards conflict prevention. This has been in demand for many years and is increasingly becoming a priority for the EEAS. There have been efforts to try to bring together all stakeholders including EU institutions and member states to analyse the situations of various countries and get agreement on what the problems are and what can be achieved in different countries. Mr Vetter cited the project in the Sahel as an example of a thorough analysis of the situation.

Mr Vetter also noted that the EEAS is increasingly focusing on countries that are not in crisis, but that might slip into crisis. He said that what this meant in practice was that his colleagues with a security mandate would also need to address development in a long-term manner.

Mr Vetter concluded that the EU was very good at bringing together things that seem difficult to reconcile. Over the last 10 years it had brought security and development together in a very productive way, and this is now top of the lists of political objectives and achievements.

In the discussion following the presentation Mr Vetter emphasized that the African Peace Facility is a demand-driven funding vehicle. The purpose of the facility is to support rather than to dictate.

## **SESSION 1: DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

The first session, chaired by Dr Alex Vines, Research Director, Chatham House Africa Programme, emphasized the complexities and contradictions in trying to define the security–development nexus, and the policy implications that can arise from divergent definitions. Prof. Maria Stern, professor in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Gothenburg noted that although there is consensus over the existence of a security development nexus, there are often ambiguities in determining what the nexus looks like, what can be achieved, and for whom. Dr Kamil Zwolski, lecturer in Global Politics and Policy at the University of Southampton spoke on the institutionalization of the security–development nexus in the EU, highlighting the successful coordination between security and development policies through EU institutions such as the External Action Service.

### **Dr Maria Stern**

Prof Stern questioned whether it is possible to achieve development, security, peace and justice at the same time. Furthermore, she noted that for each of these it must be asked: for whom and when?

She noted that there are different perspectives on security and development. Those in Western policy circles have a different understanding of these concepts from those on the ground whose lives are affected by insecurity and underdevelopment. Assuming a homogeneous understanding of these concepts may have consequences. She explained that the concepts and practices of ‘development security’ are contested, with no consensus around their meanings. Nor is there consensus among those who are charged with implementing policy about what these concepts and the practices enacted to achieve them imply. Prof Stern argued that such issues become even more complicated when these concepts are thought of as interlinked or interdependent or even as different names for the same thing.

Prof Stern claimed that many in the global policy community commonly refer to a ‘security–development’ nexus, in recognition of the linkages between these complex problems, but this implies consensus. While there is agreement on the desire to achieve security and development, there are often contradictions and debates over what is necessary to achieve these ideals, and even what the result should ideally look like.

She argued that the terminology should be unpacked to assess for whom, and by whom it is used, and to what the nexus refers. She also questioned to

what end the nexus refers: prosperity, modernity, survival? And what practices have occurred, justified by these ends?

National and global policy moves forward, as *if* we collectively understood the context and consequences of the workings of a 'security–development nexus', or alternatively as if 'it' (as a desirable policy goal) were a recognizable and simple thing to achieve. There is a curious absence of attempts to understand what different people and policy texts mean when they talk of a nexus, and the familiar uneasy relationship between intellectual enquiry and policy formulation becomes particularly fraught in the ways in which it has become almost a mantra or catch-all phrase. The nexus could be a means of justifying perpetual interventionism, bolstering fragile states from within, as in the case of Afghanistan. It could also be a political process rather than a concept, and used to rationalize the saving of certain lives, while others are rendered dispensable.

Prof. Stern argued that clearly in people's minds and experiences security and development are related. However the 'content' or form of the 'nexus' is not clear; yet as the 'nexus' is seemingly recognizable and comprehensible, a vast range of practices can be pursued in its name. It is therefore open to all kinds of (illicit) use under the guise of progressive and ethically palatable politics.

Prof. Stern concluded that there is a pressing need to engage in the difficult – and often overlooked – questions of methodology: how can we creatively study the different ways in which the 'nexus' is being practised, negotiated and resisted in distinct sites – and to what effect? This requires paying some attention to the logics that underwrite prevailing discourses about security and development; the ways in which the concept is being imbued with meaning in these discourses; and its various effects on the lives of people and the planet.

In the discussion, one point raised was that the presentation deconstructed the problem and outlined some of the problems, but it did not present any alternative. Prof. Stern answered by stating the difficulty in coming up with a universal ideal. The questions of 'for whom' and 'from what', as well as who benefits and who does not, are issues for policy-makers.

There was further discussion on situations where development is occurring in places of insecurity, seemingly undermining the nexus, as well as on African agency in determining the nexus.

## Dr Kamil Zwolski

In the second presentation of the session Dr Kamil Zwolski spoke about how the security–development nexus relates to EU policy, and to what extent the concept of the nexus has been institutionalized within the EU.

He stated that the EU has produced a range of publications and studies on the interplay between security and development, and that the EU's security and development goals are complementary. He argued that the EU has been trying to institutionalize this by adopting a comprehensive and holistic approach, of which there are two elements:

### *Incorporating non-military complementary elements*

Dr Zwolski argued that the EU has adopted an inclusive security policy, looking at non-traditional security problems as well. He stated that many would put this down to the fact that the EU is a weak military power. He said that one example of the EU focusing on non-traditional problems is its approach to climate change.

### *Encompassing policies that go beyond the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*

Dr Zwolski said the EU has been very vocal in emphasizing how its approach to security goes beyond the CSDP, such as EU NAVFOR Atalanta, the counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast. This has been building long-term resilience and is an instrument for stability. It has also bridged the gap between the CSDP and the geographic instruments for development. This demonstrates a geographic rather than a thematic approach.

Dr Zwolski noted that in the academic discourse on the security–development nexus there are different approaches and schools of thought on what is and what is not security. This is reflected to an extent in the different perspectives of security within the EU. Some have a more traditional territorial focus, while others have a broader notion of what constitutes security.

He argued that the EU lacks a grand overarching strategy that will guide and define policy. He said that policy is determined by the instrument and the objective, rather than by a cohesive strategy.

Dr Zwolski concluded that the institutionalization and implementation of the security–development nexus within the EU is not contested. He predicted that the role of the EEAS will grow, and as it does it will take more responsibility away from the European Commission. He said that development depends on

political factors and the EEAS is not about diverting money to politically driven processes; it is about delivery.

During the discussion it was asked whether the security–development nexus is institutionalized, given that there is a problem of definition, with different departments having a different understanding of what it is. Dr Zwolski said that it was institutionalized at the level of policy discourse, but in practice it may mean different things. It was further questioned whether it matters if it is institutionalized or not.



## **SESSION 2: IMPLEMENTING SECURITY, ESTABLISHING DEVELOPMENT: AFRICAN CASE STUDIES**

In the second session, chaired by Dr Norman Sempijja, a visiting Lecturer at Rouen University, a range of case studies was used to demonstrate how EU instruments engage with the security–development nexus in Africa. Mr Oliver Blake from Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, spoke on the priorities and objectives of EuropeAid, the Directorate-General responsible for EU development policies. Thomas Henökl, Research Fellow from the University of Agder discussed CFSP policies implemented by the EEAS in the Horn of Africa, and noted that shared competences between the EEAS and EuropeAid have occasionally led to policy mistakes. Dr John Kotsopoulos from Africa 21 a think tank based in Switzerland and an EU-Africa relations specialist examined the AU perspective, EU–AU relations, and the security and development lessons the AU can learn from EU experience in Africa.

### **Oliver Blake**

Oliver Blake presented a range of case studies demonstrating how the security–development ‘nexus’ is operationalized on the ground through the work of the new Directorate General titled Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) – EuropeAid which is a branch of the EU Commission in Africa. [perhaps clearer to explain it’s a Directorate General?]

Mr Blake referred to the question posed by Dr Stern in the first session: security for whom? He stated that the focus for EuropeAid is the security of the population of a specific country against violence. Civilian security is a developmental issue, related to the safeguarding of human rights and is a prerequisite for other development-related programmes, such as service provision. Integration, peace and reconciliation can only occur when there is a secure environment.

A key partner of EuropeAid is the African Peace Facility (AFP), an instrument through which EU funds are channelled in line with the priorities of the Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa–EU strategy. The AFP submits funding requests to which EuropeAid responds, since the latter operates in line with AU rather than EU directives.

Mr Blake gave some examples of the security–development nexus in Africa, where EuropeAid works via the AFP – in the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Niger and the greater Sahel region.

The Séléka rebel coalition in the CAR lacks sovereignty and authority, so there is a need for the immediate external support of international actors. AFP funds have been allocated to assist institutional rebuilding and to subsidize government revenues, including salaries. In the longer term, support will be needed on the road towards political transition.

EuropeAid is working to assist state rebuilding in Somalia, reflecting EU support for the AMISOM mission. The CSDP operates three institutional roles in Somalia: training the national army, combating piracy using an in-country (as opposed to a sea-based) approach, and maritime security.

In the DRC a lack of institutional capacity and geographic problems fuel a continuation of armed conflict. There is a need to improve state resources and functions, and for a renewed focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to improve life for the civilian population. Development funds and the CSDP will support security-building in the long term, with peace-keeping operations and EU missions to support elections in the short term.

Security and development issues are linked throughout the Sahel region. Here and in Niger, the EU's Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel has two lines of operation: road-building, good governance and the rule of law in Niger, and budget support and food security in the wider region.

Mr Blake noted that EuropeAid's work in Niger raises the question of how to fairly allocate resources in areas of marginal population. In the short term, the security dimension and institutional handover is significant in Niger, while the European Development Fund (EDF) will be active in the long term.

The role of the CSDP in development intervention is to provide high-level political support, with the aim of establishing security for civilian populations. The issue of time is relevant to CSDP intervention; whether to provide long-term or short-term provision and how to manage the eventual transition to national forces, although crises often necessitate immediate action, such as in Mali or CAR.

Mr Blake added that it is important to note that development assistance does not necessarily entail a security component; for example, development programmes in the Sahel are not automatically linked to counter-terrorism operations.

A variety of questions were brought up in the discussion following Mr Blake's presentation. One was how the issue of good governance fits into EuropeAid's approach to security and development. Mr Blake responded that good governance is at the heart of EuropeAid's work on both the

developmental and the economic side; good governance is central to development, as is internal security. Implementing security is a short-term goal in EuropeAid intervention, whereas the achievement of good governance takes time and is thus always a longer-term project.

Another question was how EuropeAid allocates funding for different countries. Mr Blake stated that funding options are discussed among EU member states in response to requests from the AU. Criteria for funding include looking at levels of development and population size, and in-depth risk assessments are carried out (including evaluating the risk of inaction). The political process of funding involves sending an inter-service mission to the area in question and liaising with the relevant national authority to come up with a combined policy mission. Discussion then takes place in the different forums in Brussels until approval is reached.

In response to a question on the capacity of the CSDP's development funds, Mr Blake replied that it has a separate budget for security, provided by member states through ATHENA, the mechanism which administers the financing of common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications on behalf of EU member states. It was noted that the point at which security meets development in the nexus is ambiguous, and Mr Blake stated that there is no need to categorize exactly where security becomes development.

### **Thomas Henökl**

Thomas Henökl discussed his research on EU humanitarian action and development policy in the Horn of Africa. The research investigated the practical implications of internal changes brought about by EU policy implementation in Somalia in particular.

The question guiding the research was how to develop a comprehensive framework addressing security issues and priorities of humanitarian aid and development policy. The research included both interviews with officials and survey data.

Mr Henökl stated that the EU's 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa combined security and developmental aspects. This strategy was coordinated by the EEAS and the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. However, the main focus of the framework was on political and security issues, and less on development. This leads back to the question: what is development?

A Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) was created, including the EU's Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience (SHARE) initiative and Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR). The AGIR–Sahel Alliance is a long-term strategy for building resilience in the Sahel region and involves representatives from over 30 countries.

In 2010, the EEAS was launched as a hybrid institution for inter-institutional collaboration. It is responsible for implementing CFSP and works in collaboration with the Commission. Security matters that sit alongside government policy goals are prioritized, as decision-making in the EEAS is strongly influenced by the interests of member states and the Foreign Affairs Council. This has complicated cooperation and decision-making between the EEAS and DEVCO. The EEAS is taking the lead in policy implementation, resulting in a reduced role for DEVCO as an implementing partner.

Mr Henökl concluded that shared competences have led to contention in development policy between EEAS and DEVCO. In the Somalia context, this has led to policy mistakes, such as being too restrictive without taking into account the complexities of the region. Strict policies have sometimes had negative consequences, such as the strengthening of al-Shabaab, which took over control of the charcoal trade after an EEAS ban. However, the EU is positive about working with the new Somali government and is further exploring the JHDF approach and investing in SHARE as a means of intervention and enhancing resilience.

There was debate over the EEAS/DEVCO issue during the discussion. It was noted that DEVCO was set up to implement development policy and in certain aspects there are joint competencies, especially in programming. It was also mentioned that EEAS is the leading policy implementation instrument for country programmes, with DEVCO used for specific themes.

### **John Kotsopoulos**

John Kotsopoulos spoke about the perspective of the African Union in EU–AU joint strategic planning. He noted that a definition of the security–development nexus is still a contested concept in academia. Different understandings of this nexus lead to different policies. Is the security–development nexus prescriptive rather than descriptive?

Dr Kotsopoulos mentioned some critical approaches to the security–development nexus. Does the rhetoric of the nexus influence policy implications, thereby reinforcing the hegemony of Western values in the

African context? Does a focus on the security–development nexus in fact lead to a kind of anti-foreign policy, with too many responses and no clear consensus or action?

He stated that the approach of the security–development nexus is not new. The 1991 Kampala Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa highlighted the need for foreign policy to address both insecurity and security and development. With the creation of the African Union, the security–development nexus became more explicit. The AU was showing itself to be a different institution from the OAU, with an African-driven approach.

The AU as a security–development actor possesses many strengths: undertaking security missions and co-leading or brokering talks, improving its coordination role and providing multilateral and regional responses to security issues instead of national solutions. However, there have also been weaknesses: funding has been dependent upon a few members with their own peace and security agenda (such as Libya and Sudan). There have been institutional weaknesses and a lack of intra-institutional policies, a lack of cooperation between regional economic communities and a problematic relationship with civil society. Civil society in Africa has been a crucial developmental link, especially in post-conflict situations.

Dr Kotsopoulos suggested some policy recommendations for the AU's role in the security–development nexus; namely that the AU should encourage freedom for civil society, improve regional cooperation and learn from the EU's experience in African peace and security issues.

During the discussion, it was noted that the AU approach of 'African solutions for African problems' is problematic, as it implies that certain conflicts are endemic or exclusive to Africa, which is not the case. Another question was on how the EU could support African civil society beyond the donor–client relationship. Dr Kotsopoulos replied that a neutral, impartial approach on the part of the EU is important to encourage better governance and freer systems, and thus independent civil society actors.

It was mentioned that the EU could support the AU through capacity-building to improve the focus on security, and to increase intra-state cooperation in the AU and institutional linkages. It was noted that the AFP has a big component for capacity-building, and the EU wants to empower the AU through a development approach to building security.

It was asked whether a focus on the security dimension weakens other partnerships in EU–Africa relations. Dr Kotsopoulos replied that the AU

Commission recognized that the organization's strength lay in the field of peace and security, which specifically refers to the nexus. There has been a commitment to dialogue on this, which has not necessarily taken away the focus from other areas of engagement. It was noted that as its structures have developed, the AU has been able to tackle broader issues.

### **SESSION 3: THE FUTURE OF SECURITY–DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC (ACP) STATES**

The focus of the final session, chaired by Dr Toni Haastrup, Fellow in International Security, University of Warwick was the future for security and development policies between the EU and ACP states. Cristina Barrios from the EU Institute for Security Studies discussed the interplay between the EU's security and development policies in Africa, giving examples of the security–development nexus at work. Maurizio Carbone, professor of International Relations and Development at the University of Glasgow spoke on the evolution of EU development policy in relation to changes in the institution, including the Treaty of Lisbon, and changes in the contemporary configuration of the 'developing' world. This has entailed a shift from consensus on regional aid policies to poverty differentiation within counties, with notable consequences for aid effectiveness.

#### **Cristina Barrios**

Cristina Barrios spoke about the theory of the security–development nexus and the future of cooperation between security and development policies in regard to the EU and the ACP states.

She noted that implementation of security policies can be a controversial issue, as using a 'comprehensive approach' implies a military component to EU member states. When investigating the security–development nexus, it is important to consider how actors refer to specific terms.

There is controversy over 'development' becoming the responsibility of the EEAS; delegations are under-staffed, and there is no military component. There are few experts working in delegations looking at security issues (there is, for example, only one officer for West Africa).

Dr Barrios discussed the future of the EU–ACP relationship. Following the Cotonou Agreement, security became part of the ACP agenda. However, there is no ACP unit in the EEAS. Dr Barrios posed the question: will the EU–ACP relationship be replaced by relationships between regions? What will happen to the security–development nexus as the ACP focus turns towards development and poverty reduction?

Dr Barrios noted the interplay between EU security and development policies in Africa: using regional strategies as a way to link the security–development nexus and special representatives to implement the nexus.

The EU's roles in Somalia and Mali are examples of the implementation of the security–development nexus. According to international agreements, the EU played an important role in security and development in Somalia, with a focus now on Somalia's 'Transition Compact' which brings together different action plans and budget lines. The EU has faced 'classic' problems in Somalia such as EU visibility, confusion over the EU's role in security, and UNDP policing funded by EU money. Dr Barrios noted the case of AMISOM which is supported by the EU but is concerned strictly with security, separate from development.

In Mali the EU is implementing the nexus through budgetary aid to support state-building. In this case development projects play a crucial role; upcoming elections and the political process add democracy to the nexus. The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) follows the security side of security and development policies in Mali, and the EU is supporting the takeover of the ECOWAS African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). However, after less than successful experiences in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, there has been some reluctance from member states constraining policy development and implementation.

Dr Barrios stated that EU policies in Africa are appreciated when they are involved in the security–development nexus; however, some of the ACP countries are slowly disappearing from the nexus and their role is not being replaced by the AU.

From the EU's perspective, security policy is seen as a non-interventionist, soft policy and as an enabler for development. The EU supports the AU and local civil society, and does not see itself as a substitute for the AU or local administrative systems. There is a focus on support, with the potential to develop EU early warning systems in development and security issues. The logic of the security–development nexus follows the directives of DEVCO and the politics of member states; the implication is that missions can become opportunities to work in partnership.

The meaning of the nexus was questioned during the discussion, given the difficulty of recognizing intricately related issues and the scope of related concerns. Dr Barrios replied that there is no contradiction within the security–



development nexus, but it is complicated and acceptance of this is needed to move on from academic discourse and implement effective policies.

It was asked what the EU expects from the AU side when involved in the security–development nexus. Dr Barrios noted that it is not for the EU or other external partners to demand anything from the AU; regional policies are more important than EU impact and influence. There are issues specific to different governments within the AU related to democratization, about which the EU cannot make judgments, although this can be problematic for EU–AU relations.

One question raised was whether current politics in the EU may affect relations with the AU. Dr Barrios responded that different policy evaluations are carried out by different country leaders; sometimes this has hindered progress, as in the case of security-sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire, when member states could not agree on a coherent policy. Another point raised was whether crises or themes have engendered a set of procedures to be followed, making it easier for the EU to operate. Dr Barrios replied that there is not enough consistency for this to happen, and issues around capabilities remain as well.

### **Maurizio Carbone**

Maurizio Carbone discussed the evolution of EU development policy. He noted that so far there has been little mention of development or the MDGs, such as poverty reduction, in the security–development nexus framework.

Prof. Carbone stated that EU development policy has changed owing to changes in the global arena. Where there used to be consensus in international development (such as on the MDGs) with norms constructed by donors working towards poverty reduction, there has been a rise of new actors and new programmes throughout Africa.

There have also been changes in the developing world: a new generation in Africa capable of engaging internationally on issues such as trade, climate change and security issues without a 'colonial inferiority complex'. There is a new geography of poverty as 60 per cent of people living under the poverty line reside in middle-income countries.

The Treaty of Lisbon has led to change in the EU. Discourse on the implementation of security studies is very different now than it was five years ago. There is a changing rationale for foreign aid: from reforming the EU's

supranational programme to federating development policies of member states.

Prof. Carbone stated that in the last decade, the focus has shifted from the volume of aid to aid effectiveness. There has been a shift from the European Consensus on Development, with its clear view on development and poverty reduction, to the Agenda for Change, which highlights impact and sustainable growth as well as emphasizing poverty differentiation within countries instead of using a regional approach. This has meant that previous aid bureaucracy sustained by groups of donors has given way to implementing policies on the ground, the impetus for which can quickly be lost. Prof. Carbone emphasized that there are many nexuses discussed in the academic literature. As well as the security–development nexus, there is the trade–development nexus and the migration–security nexus.

There are tensions and contradictions for EU policy in the security–development framework in Africa. The constant redefining of what constitutes the ‘African’ world affects EU–African relations. Incoherent policies and asymmetrical relationships could mean the EU is losing relevance in Africa. Also, the future of the EU–ACP relationship may in fact be strained following the Cotonou Agreement, because of contradictory approaches by the EU and the ACP states, and their different perceptions of the future of the ACP countries. There is also a simplistic view in the EU of the ACP members, which does not separate them into African, Caribbean and Pacific regions.

During the discussion, it was asked whether the shifting parameters of aid and development are to do with the EU evading danger and maintaining its legitimacy. Prof. Carbone replied that the EU Commission is improving its effectiveness, but that most expect too much of the EU. There is an improved development record but a lack of commitment. There has been a trade-off between coordination and an ability to actually get things done.

Another comment made on this topic noted that there had not been any glorious era of development cooperation; the MDGs were imperfect and lessons were learnt from the UN’s failure to achieve them. Prof Carbone stated that this was simply shifting the responsibility for the failure of the MDGs.