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# Angola's Elections: A Democratic Oil Giant?

Indira Campos

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## Summary Points

- On 5 September 2008, Angolans go to the polls for what are first multiparty elections since 1992. Ten parties and four coalitions with 5,198 candidates will contest 220 seats.
- The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been in power since independence from Portugal in 1975 and continues to dominate the political landscape in Angola.
- The National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has officially given up its armed wing and is now an organized political party. Its main source of revenue is a US\$14 million state grant based on parliamentary seats won in 1992. Loss of seats in these elections will have a serious impact on UNITA's finances.
- Technical preparation and voter registration for the elections has been impressive. Over 8 million voters were registered and Angola today boasts the most advanced electoral roll in Africa.
- Low voter turnout, unequal access to the media, recent allegations of voter intimidation and the use of state resources by the MPLA for partisan purposes could affect the credibility of these elections.
- These elections represent a milestone in Angola's post-conflict transition and mark the end of the power-sharing agreement between the MPLA and UNITA in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation established by Lusaka Protocol signed in 1994. They are also part of a process with presidential elections scheduled for 2009 and municipal elections in 2010.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

On 5 September 2008, Angola will hold its first parliamentary elections in sixteen years, only the second in the country's history. The first democratic and multiparty elections took place in 1992 but ended inconclusively as the main opposition party, UNITA, ultimately refused to accept the results. This refusal led to a resumption of the civil war which ended in 2002.

Although the legacy of three-decades of armed conflict presents many obstacles for the forthcoming elections, the circumstances this time around are entirely different. It is expected that these elections will be carried out peacefully. The elections will mark the return to non-violent political contest through the ballot box.

Since the war ended in 2002, Angola has been mostly at peace, with the exception of Cabinda province. The demobilization of nearly 300,000 ex-combatants has been completed; some 4 million internally displaced people have resettled in their homeland, while more than 450,000 refugees in neighbouring countries returned to the country.<sup>2</sup>

With increased oil prices and production, the economy has experienced two-digit growth rates, emerging as a hugely important player in continent and surpassing Nigeria as the first oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa in early

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<sup>1</sup> This briefing note is based on a workshop held at Chatham House on 11 July 2008 sponsored by Observatoire de l'Afrique and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and subsequent interviews with Angolan analysts and political party members. It also builds on a conference held at Chatham House on 'The Challenges for Free and Fair Elections in Angola' on 4–5 July 2005. For a report of this conference refer to [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3285\\_bafelections.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3285_bafelections.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Ministério da Assistência e Reinserção Social, Angola (2008); <http://www.angola-portal.ao/minars>.

2008. The economic boom has attracted billions of dollars in foreign direct investment and has provided the authorities with the opportunity to scale up public spending to improve the war-torn infrastructure.

However, while physical reconstruction of war damage has progressed well the substantial revenues from the booming economy have yet to translate into human and social development for the majority of the population, which continues to live in poverty.

## **Preparing for elections**

The legacy of the war presents many obstacles for the elections, including poor transportation and communications links. The government of Angola has taken important steps to ensure that some of the structural, physical and human conditions are in place to hold elections.

## **A new legal framework**

A first step was the creation of a new package of electoral laws establishing the framework for elections. The package, which incorporates laws relating to nationality, political parties, electoral roll and electoral conduct, was the result of a consultative process involving civil society as well as all political parties. The Inter-ministerial Commission for the Preparation of the Elections (CIPE) is the organ in charge of the technical implementation of the process. In addition, a National Electoral Commission (CNE) was established to govern the conduct of elections and voter registration. In the process of establishing the CNE, priority was given to the training of people to work for the CNE in the provinces, but also to training geared towards political parties, journalists and civil society.

### Increased security

One of the failures to prevent the resumption of the war after the 1992 elections resulted from the slow implementation of the disarmament and demobilization plan established by the Bicesse Accords<sup>3</sup>.

Since the end of the war in April 2002, the government has led an official process of demobilization and disarmament of about 300,000 men under arms from the country's former rival warring sides. In March 2004, the government mounted a campaign to disarm civilians, who remain heavily armed since the war. Around 2–2.5 million small arms and light weapons are estimated to be in the hands of civilians.<sup>4</sup> With the exception of some civil society initiatives, the process was slow to pick up and in early 2008, the government re-launched the campaign ahead of the elections. The topic became emotive when the MPLA accused UNITA of hiding weapons amid mounting calls for major disarmament campaign. As of July 2008, 30,000 weapons had voluntarily been handed in by civilians across the entire country.<sup>5</sup>

The government is also funding a paramilitary Civil Defence Organization to reduce the risk of violence during the election process. This organization has

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<sup>3</sup> Peace accords signed in May 1991 between the government of Angola and UNITA, which ratified the ceasefire and called for UNITA forces to be integrated along with the government's armed forces into a new military body known as the Angolan Armed Forces.

<sup>4</sup>Capelo, M. and Netswera, E. (2006), *Small Arms and Social Development: A Survey in Angola*, Angola2000, Luanda.

<sup>5</sup> Jornal de Angola, *Desarmamento: Trinta mil armas entregues no país*, 23 July 2008.

however been accused of engaging in violence.<sup>6</sup> An increased police presence in Luanda but also throughout the provinces is already visible. A large number of new recruits have been hired, in particular women, giving a rather different image to the police force.

### **Voter registration**

Voter registration was impressive. In two phases that combined lasted 12 months, over 8 million voters were registered in mobile registration centres set up in each of the country's 18 provinces. The registration was carried out by the CIPE, the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Electoral Process. The logistical operation involved more than 500 brigades coordinated by Provincial Executive Commissions in every province.<sup>7</sup> In some remote areas, where communities are not connected by roads, the brigades arrived by helicopter.

Angola today boasts the most advanced electoral roll in Africa, and possibly in the world. The mobile registration teams verified voters' biographical and biometric fingerprint data, which, along with digital photographs, were printed and encoded on the spot on credit card-size voter cards. This information was then stored on the National Data Centre to centralize the data and prevent any attempted fraud of multiple registrations.

### **Women's participation**

Perhaps as a result of the war, but also because of their low levels of literacy and high levels of poverty, women have barely been visible on Angola's political scene, with only few holding senior party positions. In early 2008, the

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<sup>6</sup> Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 'The Political Parties in Angola', presentation at the Angolan elections workshop at Chatham House, 11 July 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (2008); [www.cne.ao](http://www.cne.ao)

government launched a plan to increase the number of women involved in politics. This gender equality plan, still to be ratified, imposes a 30 per cent quota for female participation in both government and political structures. Although it should be applauded that nearly a third of candidates in Angola's upcoming parliamentary elections are female, it is below 50 per cent threshold established in 2005 by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It would be a real achievement if women were elected by local people especially at the municipal and local level.

### **Civil society participation and election observation**

Civil society in Angola has in the last few years acquired greater political and societal space. Through the Electoral Platform of Civil Society for Elections (PNASCAE), civil society organizations were very active throughout the electoral registration process. The Platform trained 473 observers who monitored the electoral registration process, covering 110 of the 164 municipalities of the country. The Platform also conducted community meetings, talks and radio debates reaching over a million citizens across the country.

For the first time, Angolan civil society will also participate in the observation of the elections. They aspire to be able to cover at least 50 per cent of the 12,400 voting booths that will be in place on the day across the entire county. The PNASCAE alone aims to deploy around 3000 observers and 500 civic educators. Other national observers will include Busca de Entendimento Comum, Universidade Católica de Angola, Development Workshop, Open Society and the Centro Nacional de Aconselhamento.<sup>8</sup>

In addition, foreign observers have been invited to monitor the elections. The various missions will be deployed in the capital as well as provinces in order to observe voting and counting processes. The EU elections observer mission will deploy 100 observers, 40 long-term and another 60 short-term, from 20

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<sup>8</sup> Amundsen, I. and Weimer, M. (2008), *Opposition Parties and the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections in Angola*, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen.

EU countries. The SADC will be deploying around 200 observers representing all the member states. Furthermore, international observer missions from the Pan-African Parliament, the Community of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and diplomatic missions including the US Embassy also intend to send observers.



## Challenges facing free and fair elections

### Convergence of state and ruling party

According to some observers, the credibility of the process could still be undermined. The perceived homogeneity between the state and the MPLA, giving the incumbent regime an unfair advantage over other political parties, is one such issue. Several provincial governors are also MPLA first provincial secretaries, making it sometimes difficult to distinguish between their party and state activities. It is also common to see senior party members inaugurating public infrastructure financed with public money.

A recent report by the Angolan Political and Social Observatory, OPSA, condemns the abuse of state and parastatal resources by the ruling party for partisan purposes.<sup>9</sup> By law the election campaign is restricted to 30 days prior to the set election date. The MPLA, however with its access to state resources, has been campaigning for over six months through large public parades and festivals as well as numerous radio and television publicity. This is not possible for opposition parties which face many obstacles when it comes to getting access to broadcast time and funding.

### Access to the media

The playing field for the political contest is particularly unequal in access to media. Although, the private media in Angola is largely independent of party politics and is often critical of government, the state very much dominates the only daily national newspaper, *Jornal de Angola*, and the only non-satellite Angolan Public Television (*TPA*). Opposition parties often complain that they experience censorship when trying access the state media, through

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<sup>9</sup> Agência Lusa, *Observatório critica imprensa estatal*, 9 August 2008.

manipulated reporting and editorial alignment. According to the aforementioned OPSA report, in 91 issues of the *Jornal de Angola* between April and June 2008, the MPLA is featured on the cover 22 times, as opposed to UNITA only three times and FNLA once.

Radio broadcasting, which is the medium accessible to most of the population, remains government-controlled throughout most of the country. The Catholic Church's broadcaster, *Rádio Ecclésia*, is currently the most accessible source of independent news in the capital. For years the Church has tried to get permission to broadcast nationally; however in 2006 it was barred from doing so by a new media law that dictates that only state-owned media can broadcast nationally.

Another recent example of the difficult operational context for the media is the temporary suspension of the pro-UNITA radio station *Rádio Despertar* for allegedly broadcasting beyond its transmission permit. Although the government says the suspension is purely a technical matter, the timing is unfortunate. The perception is certainly that the suspension is politically motivated. With private newspapers in short supply outside the capital, action against the station may seriously hinder the dissemination of diverse points of view in the pre-election period.

### Party financing

For most political parties represented in parliament, the main source of party funding comes from the state. These funds are assigned to the various parties based on the proportion of their representation in parliament; hence parties with higher representation receive more money. UNITA receives around US\$14 million a year and the MPLA around US\$23 million.<sup>10</sup> Other sources of financing permitted by law include members' fees, profits from their assets and activities, domestic bank loans and donations by national entities. However, for most parties income from membership and donations is

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<sup>10</sup> Vines, A. et al. (2005), *Angola: Drivers of Change*, Chatham House Report, May 2005.

very low or simply non-existent because of the difficult financial conditions facing members who are often peasants or unemployed. This situation is even more difficult for those parties with no representation in parliament. In the face of such financial restrictions political parties find it extremely difficult to expand their activities outside the provincial capitals.

For the forthcoming elections, the government approved a budget of US\$17 million for campaign financing to be distributed equally among parties competing in the polls. However, after the campaign period had started, several opposition groups complained that the money had not been paid out and that even when it was paid out the amount would not be sufficient to allow them to campaign on equal terms with the MPLA.<sup>11</sup>

### **Impartiality of the electoral bodies**

A major criticism by many observers is that the electoral process is being managed and supervised by two different commissions, CNE and CIPE, both of which are controlled by the government. In March 2007, a delegation of the Parliamentary Forum of SADC found that the composition of and division of responsibility between electoral bodies at both national and local levels raised the question of impartiality.<sup>12</sup>

For instance, the CNE, whose role is that of an independent supervising body for the elections, is made up of three MPLA members: two UNITA supporters and one from the third largest party, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS). Two further members are appointed by Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos; two others from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the Ministry of Social Communication; and a final member, who is also the chair,

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<sup>11</sup> According to the CNE, some parties did not receive their funding on time because they did not meet all the requirements necessary for the funds to be released.

<sup>12</sup> SADC Parliamentary Forum, Voter Registration Mission to the Republics of Angola, 19– 24 March 2007.

is named by the courts, in this case the Vice-President of the Supreme Court. The potential for conflict of interests is clear as there is a definite bias to the incumbency in this instance.

### **Voter education and political intolerance**

According to a survey conducted by the BBC World Service Trust,<sup>13</sup> knowledge of the electoral process varies dramatically, with one in five people feeling they do not know the electoral process. The report also shows that there is a lack of understanding among the respondents of the difference between legislative and presidential elections, and in some instances NGOs are confused with political parties. To many observers this does not come as a surprise as only three months prior to the election the CNE had reportedly not begun its civic education programmes owing to lack of funds and materials to work with. According to a recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, in some areas voter registration began only with the electoral campaign.<sup>14</sup>

Although civil society groups have been involved in numerous civic education initiatives, when one takes into account the lack of access to information in the provinces and the history of political intolerance, the delay in broad civic education programmes poses serious concerns for the achievement of peaceful elections. The HRW report documents recent cases of political violence and intimidation against opposition groups, which does not bode well for the credibility of the elections. For example on 13 August, some UNITA officials in Londuimbali municipality in Huambo in central Angola were attacked by MPLA supporters and the attack only stopped following police dispersing the crowd by firing shots into the air.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> BBC World Service Trust, *Angola Elections Report 2008*, June 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Doubts Over Free and Fair Elections*, August 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Southscan vol.23, no.16, 15 August 2008; Chatham House interview with police, 29 August 2008.

## **Voter turnout**

Perhaps one of the biggest worries in the forthcoming election is the possibility of a low voter turnout. In the 1992 election the turnout was an impressive 90 per cent of registered voters. After the violence that followed the elections, voting came to be associated with war, hence many prefer to stay away from the polling booths on election day. There is also the worry that fatalism – the belief that voting will not make a difference – could play a role. However, recent surveys, including by the BBC World Service Trust, suggest many Angolans plan to vote and in Luanda at least a large number yearn for a change of government.

In March 2007 the government overturned a Supreme Court ruling allowing Angolans living abroad to register to vote at their embassies. The government claimed that it did not have the technical and material conditions to administer overseas registration before the poll. The opposition parties, however, accused the ruling party of lack of political will to register Angolans living abroad for fear that a majority might support the opposition.

## **Last-minute electoral changes**

Adding to concerns over the credibility and transparency of the process was Angolan government's reported intention to extend the voting period from one to two days. Under pressure from civil society groups and opposition groups, parliament rejected this amendment to the law. It did, however, approve a measure to extend the deadline for announcing elections results from ten to fifteen days. This prompted a complaint by the opposition that the period was far too long and that the move was intended to mimic the delaying tactics in the recent elections in Zimbabwe. Amid other last-minute changes to the electoral provisions, the National Assembly also approved changes to election procedures related to complaints, errors and irregularities, appeals against decisions, and vote-counting, all of which opposition parties and in particular UNITA claimed to be unnecessary.

## Angola's political landscape

### The 1992 elections

In the absence of elections since 1992, or even public opinion polls, most of what is known about the political landscape in Angola is based on the results of the 1992 elections, when both presidential and parliamentary elections were held simultaneously. The country has been governed according to these results since then.

Table 1: Election results, 1992

Party*	Presidential Election			Legislative Election		
	Candidate	Vote	%	Votes	%	Seats
MPLA	José Eduardo dos Santos	1 877 052	49.5	1 976 940	54.14	129
UNITA	Jonas Savimbi	1 547 586	40.81	1 258 103	34.45	70
FNLA				84 110	2.3	5
PLD				83 469	2.29	3
PRS				77 605	2.13	6
PRD				30 680	0.84	1
PSD				28 694	0.79	1
AD				27 353	0.75	1
PAJOCA				-		1
FDA				-		1
PDP-ANA				-		1
PNDA				-		1
CNDA				-		
PSDA				-		
PDA				-		
PDLA				-		
PAI				-		
PRA				-		
TOTAL		3 792 037		3 651 728		220

\* For full names of the parties, see Annex 1.

Source: CNE (2008) [www.cne.ao](http://www.cne.ao).

The MPLA and UNITA dominated the contest in both elections, attaining together nearly 90 per cent of all the votes. The historic liberation movement FNLA was the third most voted-for party but nevertheless received less than 3 per cent in the legislative election. It did, however, manage to obtain the only relative majority registered in provincial circles in the province of Zaire where its ethnic power base predominates. In the remaining 17 provinces, the results were marked by a highly accentuated bipolarization, with 13 absolute majorities for the MPLA and four for UNITA.

Despite having achieved slightly fewer votes than FNLA and PLD, PRS emerged as the third largest party in parliament thanks to the rules of composition of the Parliament. With a strong ethnic power base in the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces of Northeast Angola, the party nominated six members of parliament.

In the presidential election, President José Eduardo dos Santos won the first round, officially receiving 49.5 per cent of the votes. Since no candidate attained an absolute majority, according to Angolan law the candidates should have faced a run-off. But Jonas Savimbi rejected the results of the elections as neither free nor fair and refused to participate in the second round.

### **The 2008 elections**

The elections set for 5 September will be legislative only, and are a test run for the presidential polls that are currently planned for 2009, and the country's first municipal elections set for 2010.<sup>16</sup> They will also mark the end of the Lusaka Protocol, signed in 1994, which established the power-sharing agreement between the MPLA and UNITA in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.

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<sup>16</sup> Presidential elections in 2009 will coincide with the 30<sup>th</sup> year in power of the current president, José Eduardo dos Santos.

Voters will cast their ballots for a 220-seat National Assembly elected on a mandate of four years. Of these, 130 members are elected by national count and the remaining 90 are allocated on the basis of proportional representation with a uniform quota of five seats for each province, irrespective of population size. Under Angola's parliamentary system, seats are allocated on a party list system; hence voters select parties rather than individual candidates.

Whereas 18 political organizations put forward candidates in the 1992 legislative elections, this time around there will be a choice 14 – 10 political parties and four coalitions.<sup>17</sup> A total of 5,198 candidates will compete for parliamentary votes. Most of the parties of the outgoing legislature will take part again in the 2008 elections; the three exceptions are PSD and the PNDA, which were rejected by the Angolan Constitutional Court, and the FDA, which is now defunct.<sup>18</sup> The five new entrants are two political parties, PADEPA and *FpD*, and three coalitions, ND, PPE and FOFAC.

During the campaigning period, each party has been granted five minutes on national television each day and 10 minutes on the national radio to present their messages, their government programmes, and their election manifestos.

### The MPLA

Most analysts do not foresee the forthcoming elections resulting in dramatic change to the political landscape of Angola. The MPLA, which has been in power since independence from Portugal in 1975, is expected to retain its majority in parliament. The question that remains is whether it will attain the two-thirds majority, which would enable it to make unilateral changes to the constitution if it so desired.

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<sup>17</sup> Refer to Annex 2 for a list of the political parties and coalitions contesting the forthcoming elections.

<sup>18</sup> A total of 2,173 candidates from 63 parties were rejected by the Court for various legal reasons, including PDA, whose leader, António Alberto Neto, won the third-largest share of votes in the 1992 presidential election.



The MPLA have the advantage of having access to state assets and also of being the only party with governing experience. The party claims credit for the peace and economic stability that the country has experienced over the last six years since the end of the conflict. It also tries to capitalize on having initiated the process of national reconstruction, which has allowed for the rehabilitation and construction of hundreds kilometres of roads, bridges, schools and hospitals throughout the country.

Some observers have raised concerns over the quality and planning of these hundreds of infrastructural projects which have been rushed through for completion prior to the elections. Despite this criticism, the MPLA in its election manifesto pledges to put forward an even more ambitious second phase of post-war reconstruction. This includes the creation of two new cities, and a new railway line running along the coast from Namibe to the enclave of Cabinda, as well as one million new houses across the country by 2012. One wonders, given Angola's limited pool of skilled labour and the current congestion of the ports, how realistic these ambitions are.

## UNITA

Despite having been much weakened by military defeat, the MPLA's main historical competitor, UNITA, remains its only viable opponent in the legislative elections. The former rebel group officially gave up its armed wing in 2002 and has since then focused on developing as a political party. Over the last six years it has worked hard to distance itself from its former reputation of being a ruthless guerrilla movement and has made efforts to restructure itself into a democratic and transparent party.<sup>19</sup> Since 2002, UNITA has held two party congresses and its new leader, Isaiás Samakuva, was elected by secret ballot on a four-year mandate, although this process led to the alienation of some members.

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<sup>19</sup> Pearce, J. (2008), *L'UNITA à la Recherche de « son Peuple »*, in, *L'Angola dans la Paix: Autoritarisme et reconversions*, *Politique Africaine*, no 110, June 2008.

UNITA emphasizes change as the basis for its political message, exploring the fragilities of the last 16 years of governance by the MPLA. It points to social exclusion, poverty, unemployment, the underfunded education system and corruption as the main obstacles to a progressive development of the country. UNITA promises to tackle these issues with an alternative method of governance that promotes a culture of transparency and engages Angolan cadres regardless of their political affiliations. Although these issues resonate with the population at large, the party has never been tested in government and its reputation has been damaged by 16 defections of parliamentarians in the National Assembly (who will finally lose their seats once elections are held) and internal splits. Just recently, one of UNITA's most prominent members, Jorge Valentim, reportedly turned against his party and called Angolans to support the MPLA.<sup>20</sup>

### Other political parties

Many analysts regard other opposition parties as institutionally fragile and as having no solid critical platform. For instance, during the electoral registration process the once-powerful FNLA, the PADEPA, and the PRS all had two different factions which tried to register separately under the same name. In addition, the air time provided on the state television and on the National Radio (RNA) has shown the profile of the parties and demonstrated their lack of ability to formulate policy solutions that appeal to ordinary Angolans.

Perhaps most the important of smaller opposition party still is the PRS, which is present in many of the provinces at the provincial and municipal level and in some even at the level of the communes. It is most influential, however, in the diamond-rich Lundas (Lunda-Norte and Lunda-Sul). The party advocates federalism as a system of government, arguing that in Angola's current conditions, federalism is the only system capable of getting rid of the regional asymmetries and allow for the progressive development of the whole country.

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<sup>20</sup> Jornal de Angola, *Jorge Valentim apela ao voto no MPLA*, 19 August 2008.

Analysts predict the party may retain or gain seats in the forthcoming elections.

Angolan analysts also have high expectations for the small opposition party FpD. It ran in the 1992 elections as part of the AD-coalition but this time is standing alone. It has managed to attract a few prominent Angolan political figures, including from the MPLA, although it lacks a broad support base. The party has a strong links with civil society groups, is very active on opposition platforms and lobbies for a participative approach to democracy.

UNITA's prospects, like those of other, smaller opposition parties, will be largely determined by the peri-urban areas – the slums of Luanda and Lobito. More than one-third of the registered electorate lives in these new urban centres and the populations are ethnically mixed. Whereas in 1992 the MPLA won most of their votes from urban populations, today their traditional loyalties are not guaranteed. In Luanda in particular, there is discontent about living conditions among the poor, the widespread unemployment and the numerous forced evictions to make way for various construction projects.

Although it is hard to determine whether or not this is translating into broad anti-government sentiment, it has certainly led to occasional demonstrations which may favour the opposition parties. Perhaps for this reason UNITA launched its campaign in Luanda and is planning to focus on the other two large cities, Lobito and Lubango, rather than its traditional heartlands of Huambo and Bié. In contrast, however, the MPLA kick-started its campaign in the Kuito capital of Bié, where it is believed to have made substantial positive inroads in the last few years with the inauguration of new schools, hospitals and roads. Straight traditional bipolarization of results in the rural areas as in 1992 is expected.

## Conclusion

On 5 September 2008, Angolans will go to the polls for one of the most eagerly anticipated elections in Southern Africa. With the country today enjoying political and economic stability, these elections represent a critical milestone in its post-conflict transition. The Angolan population is overwhelmingly young; roughly half of the electorate in 2008 is estimated to have been born after 1974 and so a new generation that remembers little of the 1992 elections will be voting for the first time. Civil society and especially women, who in 1992 barely had any voice, now have a small but independent voice.

Despite the numerous calls for tolerance made by the ruling party but also by UNITA and other political and non-political factions, Human Rights Watch's recent accounts of political violence raise concerns over the credibility of the elections – a concern compounded by the fact that the population remains heavily armed. Nonetheless, the incidents seem to reflect perhaps more the failure of civic education programmes to get off the ground than organized intimidation campaigns. A return to civil war is unlikely, and unless there is direct and obvious fraud (or the perception thereof) and the outcomes are close, violence is likely to be restricted to some hotspots particularly in Luanda and in UNITA's core areas of support (Huambo and Bié provinces) and of limited duration.

Although the election process may not be perfect, it provides, for the first time in Angola's post-colonial history, the opportunity for all parties to actively campaign for new leadership. This is a key step in the political and constitutional normalization of the country, but most importantly in the development of mutual tolerance. Elections are also a key part of the process that will allow Angolans to take important steps towards democracy, free speech, the rule of law and improved human rights.

For this to happen, however, it is important that the Angolan people are left feeling that the elections are a valid starting point for pushing forward the

legal, structural, and attitudinal changes required for continued progress. It is also essential that they take place in an atmosphere of peace and that people are free from any form of intimidation so as to restore their faith in elections as a legitimate and effective way of effecting political change.

The achievement of successful inclusive, free and fair elections in Angola will also have a powerful impact throughout the whole of Southern Africa especially given the recent election experience in other African countries. Angola will greatly strengthen its role as a regional leader and set a standard for the rest of Africa if it can provide a model for the conduct of elections. Following these elections, only Swaziland, within the SADC, will not have held multiparty elections over the last twenty years, and the Angolan elections can therefore also play a fundamental role in progress towards lasting regional stability, transparency in government and inclusive economic development.

**Indira Campos** is a research assistant of the Africa Programme at Chatham House









## Annex 1

<b>MPLA</b>	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
<b>UNITA</b>	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
<b>PDA</b>	Partido Democrático Angolano
<b>FNLA</b>	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
<b>PDLA</b>	Partido Democrático Liberal de Angola
<b>PRD</b>	Partido Renovador Democrático
<b>PSD</b>	Partido Social Democrata
<b>PLD</b>	Partido Liberal Democrático
<b>PRS</b>	Partido de Renovação Social
<b>AD</b>	Aliança Democrática: Unificação Democrática Angolana (UDA); Partido Democrático Pacífico de Angola (PDPA); Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses dos Angolanos/Partido da Consciência Nacional (MDIA/PCN); Partido Angolano Liberal (PAL); Partido Nacional Ecológico de Angola (PNEA); Frente Para a Democracia (FPD)
<b>PAJOCA</b>	Partido da Aliança Juventude Operária Camponesa de Angola
<b>FDA</b>	Fórum Democrático Angolano
<b>PDP-ANA</b>	Partido Democrático para Progreso de Aliança Nacional de Angola
<b>PNDA</b>	Partido Nacional Democrático de Angola
<b>CNDA</b>	Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola
<b>PSDA</b>	Partido Social Democrático Angolano
<b>PAI</b>	Partido Angolano Independente
<b>PRA</b>	Partido Reformador de Angola

Source: CNE (2008).

Annex 2

Nº

1	PRS	Partido de Renovação Social	
2	PLD	Partido Liberal Democrático	
3	FpD	Frente para a Democracia	
4	PDP-ANA	Partido Democrático para o Progresso de Aliança Nacional de Angola	
5	PPE	Plataforma Política Eleitoral	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aliança Nacional Democrática (AND);</li> <li>- Partido Democrático Unificado de Angola (PDUA);</li> <li>- Partido Nacional Independente de Angola (PNIA);</li> <li>- União Social Democrática (USD);</li> <li>- Centro Democrático Social (CDS);</li> <li>- Partido Angolano Para Unidade Democracia e Progresso (PAUDP);</li> <li>- Partido da Comunidade Socialista Angolana (PCSA);</li> <li>- Movimento Democrático de Angola (MDA);</li> <li>- Partido de Convenção Democrática e Progresso (PCDP).</li> </ul>	
06	FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola	
7	PAJOCA	Partido da Aliança Juventude Operária Camponesa de Angola	
8	FOFAC	Fórum Fraternal Angolano Coligação	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partido Angolano Conservador do Povo (PACOPO);</li> <li>- Partido Democrático dos Trabalhadores (PDT);</li> <li>- União Nacional para Democracia e Progresso (UNDP);</li> </ul>	

- Frente Nacional de Desenvolvimento Democrático de Angola (FNDDA).

9	ND	<p>Nova Democracia União Eleitoral</p> <p>- Movimento Para Democracia de Angola (MPDA);</p> <p>- Partido Socialista Liberal (PSL);</p> <p>- Partido Social Independente de Angola (PSIA);</p> <p>- Partido Angolano Republicano (PAR);</p> <p>- União Nacional para a Democracia (UND).</p>	
10	MPLA	<p>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</p>	
11	UNITA	<p>União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola</p>	
12	PADEPA	<p>Partido de Apoio Democrático e Progresso de Angola</p>	
13	PRD	<p>Partido Renovador Democrático</p>	
14	AD	<p>Angola Democrática – Coligação</p> <p>- Unificação Democrática Angolana (UDA);</p> <p>- Partido Democrático Pacífico de Angola (PDPA);</p> <p>- Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses dos Angolanos/Partido da Consciência Nacional (MDIA/PCN);</p> <p>- Partido Angolano Liberal (PAL);</p> <p>- Partido Nacional Ecológico de Angola (PNEA).</p>	

Source: CNE (2008).