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
Human Security and Resilience

Introduction

In 2002 the UK's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) launched the comprehensive five-year New Security Challenges Programme. Directed by Professor Stuart Croft at the University of Birmingham, it now funds almost 40 projects involving over 120 researchers. Its expansive and multidisciplinary approach seeks to reach beyond war into other important areas of global security. NSC projects explore eight broad themes: (1) the role of military force; (2) the role of international law, international organizations and security regimes; (3) economically driven security challenges; (4) technological aspects of security; (5) gendered dimensions of security; (6) security and civil society; (7) the media and psychological dimensions; and (8) human security.

In a collaborative venture, a series of briefing papers written by project leaders within the NSC Programme is being published by Chatham House (and posted on its International Security Programme web pages) over a two-year period to summarize important research results and emerging discussion points. Previous briefing papers have focused on themes of *Security, Terrorism and the UK* and *The Globalization of Security*. The theme of this third issue is *Human Security and Resilience*. In the first paper Simon Rushton and Colin McInnes explore the constitutive effects of security discourses in UK policy responses to global health challenges. In the second Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill explore the politics of 'natural disasters', seeing them as raising fundamental questions regarding equity, justice and power. In the third paper Jon Coaffee and David Wood highlight how the emphasis on 'resilience' has enhanced processes of militarization and securitization in cities.

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The International Security Programme at Chatham House has a long-established reputation for independent and timely analysis, and for its contribution to the public debate on security and defence. We are especially pleased to be associated with the ESRC's NSC Programme in publishing these Briefing Papers by independent experts that will address both topical issues and the broader intellectual context of security policy.
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NSC
New Security Challenges

UK Policy and Global Health Challenges: Security, Development and Infectious Disease

Simon Rushton and Colin McInnes[1]

Over the past decade the links between health and security have developed internationally into a new policy agenda. However, in the UK policy context health has generally been much more closely associated with international development concerns, and dominated by the Department for International Development (DfID). Health receives little attention at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or the Ministry of Defence (MOD). For its part, the Department of Health (DH) concentrates largely on domestic provision, showing little sustained interest in the international dimensions of health. Despite this development-oriented focus, in some instances the language of 'national security' has been far more evident, with certain health issues being interpreted and presented as potential threats to the UK and its population, and little attendant consideration of the impact upon populations overseas.

This paper will examine two contemporary global health issues which have been treated in markedly different ways by the UK government. In the first – HIV/AIDS, in particular in Africa – the UK has demonstrated a somewhat divergent approach from other major international actors, most notably the US, in focusing upon the disease as a poverty issue and being relatively resistant to a security-based response to the pandemic. In the second – the H5N1 strain of avian influenza – rhetoric in the UK has centred around the protection of national security in the face of perceived 'threats from abroad', with development policy playing a more limited supporting role.

These inconsistent policy responses arise partly from the different types of 'danger' which these global health issues are seen to pose. HIV/AIDS is a disease which is already present in the UK, albeit with relatively low prevalence rates. Its identification as a 'security threat' in the international discourse rests largely on its potentially destabilizing effect upon states in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular emphasis being put on its impact upon military and security forces. It therefore represents a 'security threat' primarily to African states, albeit with the potential to escalate into a regional or even global security issue. The debate over H5N1, by contrast, concerns a disease which (as of the time of writing) is not present in the UK. Its gradual spread across the globe has been seen in much more stark national

security terms: as an external threat to the health and the economy of the UK which must be defended against. So, in part at least, the difference appears to be one of *whose* security is being protected.

These varying approaches also reflect a broader point about the prevailing policy climate. Under the Blair administration the UK's international relations have been approached in a manner which attempts to blend the traditional *realpolitik* of protecting the national interest with an awareness of the country's humanitarian responsibilities. The higher priority which has been afforded international development (including Cabinet-level representation for the first time) has run parallel to a willingness to engage in the business of 'hard security' in protecting the national interest. The tension between these poverty-focused and security-focused elements has been evident throughout the lifetime of the administration, heralded by the furore in its early days over the promised 'ethical dimension' to foreign policy.

HIV/AIDS

In addressing the UN Security Council's January 2000 meeting on HIV/AIDS, Kofi Annan argued that 'AIDS is causing socioeconomic crises which in turn threaten political stability'. Six months later the Security Council passed Resolution 1308, recognizing the security significance of the pandemic in Africa, and in particular the threat posed to peacekeepers. This logic is also reflected in the 2004 US *President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*, which highlights HIV/AIDS as a potential cause of political, social, and economic instability.[2] This link between HIV and insecurity has been widely reproduced in the international policy discourse. Although a considerable amount of international development spending is targeted at HIV/AIDS, the pandemic has become heavily securitized.[3] Indeed, this understanding of the disease as a security issue has played a significant role in placing it so high on the international agenda.

The manner in which HIV/AIDS has been approached within the UK has been somewhat different. DfID has led the way in developing the UK response to the global pandemic,[4] and the UK security policy community has played little or no role in policy development. Indeed the MoD and the FCO have been happy to see DfID take the lead, perhaps influenced by DfID's greater resource base in Africa. Therefore, in contrast to other Western states, UK international policy on HIV/AIDS has not been heavily securitized;

[2] United States Global AIDS Coordinator, *The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief* (Washington DC: United States Global AIDS Coordinator, 2004), p. 15.

[3] Gwin Prins, 'AIDS and global security', *International Affairs* 80(5) (2004), pp. 931–52.

[4] DH oversees the domestic management of HIV/AIDS.

rather it has reflected DfID's concerns in focusing on the pandemic's relationship with poverty.

Some UK policy statements made in the wake of the UN and US activity referred to above seemed to suggest that the UK was beginning to react to the burgeoning international security agenda. Concerns expressed in the UK at that time closely matched those elsewhere: for peacekeeping operations; for security forces in high- prevalence states; and for the destabilizing effects of high HIV/AIDS infection rates. Tony Blair's Foreword to the *UK's Call for Action on HIV/AIDS*, for example, argued that 'unless we act now and decisively, the deepening poverty and instability arising from this appalling epidemic will reach far beyond the parts of the world worst affected'.[5] However, DfID did not follow this through with actions, and the focus of policy has remained rooted in development concerns. Indeed Feldbaum notes that in 2004 a senior DfID official was publicly questioning a direct link between high HIV/AIDS infection rates and social stability – one of the cornerstones of the securitizing move.[6]

H5N1 avian influenza

This treatment of HIV/AIDS primarily as an international development challenge stands in stark contrast to policy on H5N1 avian influenza. In this case the UK has been much more in line with the dominant international discourse which has been couched largely in terms of domestic (health) security, with development considerations remaining subservient to that agenda. This is despite the fact that H5N1 avian influenza seems to be strongly related to poverty and rural livelihood issues, and in particular the contagion threat posed by people living in close proximity with the poultry upon which they depend for food, coupled with the lack of capacity and infrastructure to respond effectively to outbreaks in many developing countries.

In November 2005 George Bush outlined the US administration's response to the threat of an influenza pandemic (including H5N1):

> First, we must detect outbreaks that occur anywhere in the world; second, we must protect the American people by stockpiling vaccines and antiviral drugs, and improve our ability to rapidly produce new vaccines against a pandemic strain; and, third, we must be ready to respond at the federal, state and local levels in the event that a pandemic reaches our shores.[7]

[5] Tony Blair, 'Foreword' in *UK's Call for Action on HIV/AIDS* (London: DfID, 2003).

[6] Harley Feldbaum, *Foreign Policy Case Studies: HIV/AIDS* (London: Nuffield Trust, 2005), *http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/uploadedFiles/HIV_AIDS.pdf.*

[7] White House, 'President outlines pandemic influenza preparations and response', press release, 1 November 2005. *http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051101-1.html.*

Thus the thrust of the US response was almost entirely on 'homeland security'. Even the need to produce new vaccines was justified in terms of protecting the American people rather than as a global public good. There could hardly be a policy statement in which solidarity with the developing world – where almost all those directly affected by H5N1 have been – was less evident.

This prioritization of domestic protection has also characterized the UK response. DH took the lead in preparing for a possible domestic outbreak, working alongside the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Particular emphasis was placed upon surveillance, reporting and isolation of any identified cases, along with ensuring adequate supplies of antivirals and vaccines.[8] Unlike HIV/AIDS, where the focus on poverty put humanitarianism at the forefront, in this case consideration of the domestic threat (to health, to the economy and to the functioning of society) posed by a 'foreign' disease was prioritized. Ensuring adequate domestic responses to the threat initially completely overshadowed more strategic 'upstream' efforts. While H5N1 remained a problem confined to Asia the response from the West was extremely limited: the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization was only able to collect $30 million of an estimated requirement of $175 million in 2005.[9]

This situation seemed to change significantly once cases of human infection in Turkey came to light. Engagement with affected developing countries began to take on greater importance as it became clearer that a 'Maginot line' approach was not a viable policy option. At a meeting of donor countries in Beijing in January 2006 pledges of funding actually exceeded the World Bank's estimate of the funding required. Of the $1.9 billion pledged at the conference, the UK promised $35.5 million of DfID funding. Health Minister Rosie Winterton stated that

> The holding of this meeting recognises that the threats of avian and human pandemic influenza are of truly global significance. In turn, they need a global response; one that helps all countries rise to the challenge; and one that brings all countries together. We cannot hope to deal effectively with these issues through each country working alone.[10]

Even here it is clear that the justification for action is not poverty-focused, but rather 'enlightened self-interest': the understanding that reducing the threat of H5N1 to the UK requires international cooperation.

[8] DH, *UK Health Departments' Influenza pandemic contingency plan* (London: DH, October 2005), *http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/17/44/04121744.pdf.*

[9] Keith Bradsher, 'Poverty and superstition hinder drive to block bird flu at source', *New York Times*, 3 November 2005.

[10] DH, 'UK pledges £20 million to help poorer countries prepare for a flu pandemic', press release 2006/0014, 18 January 2006.

Humanitarianism or the national interest?

In the two cases which have been examined here security and development concerns have been apparent to differing degrees. Whereas the development community in the UK has generally resisted the securitization of HIV/AIDS, in the case of H5N1 it has (belatedly) sought to provide international assistance, but has done so in line with a national security-based policy logic. Even within development policy it is possible to see the tension between humanitarianism and protecting the national interest.[11] Both the 1997 and 2000 International Development White Papers stress the need for a greater commitment to issues of poverty as a moral duty and for reasons of enlightened self-interest. Both can be seen in the varying responses to the global infectious disease challenge.

'Natural' Disasters as Catalysts of Political Action

Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the socio-political and cultural dynamics set into motion at the time of catastrophic 'natural' disasters create the conditions for potential political change – often at the hands of a discontented civil society. A state's incapacity to respond adequately to a disaster can create a temporary power vacuum, and potentially a watershed moment in historical trajectories. This generates (albeit temporarily) a window of opportunity for novel socio-political action at local and national levels. Interventions may include manoeuvres to entrench or destabilize current power-holders, to change power-sharing relationships within recognized sectors, or to legitimize or de-legitimize new sectors. This paper presents initial findings of a study reviewing historical data on the political outcomes of disaster at the level of the nation-state and below. It draws on academic papers, practitioner and media reports of large natural disaster events from 1899 to 2005.

Natural disasters, development and security

Renewed interest in the political and economic aspects of disasters triggered by natural phenomena is part of a wider acceptance that development has failed in many parts of the world and that development failures have led to an accumulation of disaster risks.[12]

Reflecting this understanding, we situate our analysis of disasters within the wider discourse on human security. Rather than approaching disasters as humanitarian crises, we treat them as the products of maladaption between interlocking socio-environmental relations at local, national, international and supranational levels. This reframing raises questions about equity, justice, vulnerability, power relations and whose security is threatened or enhanced by environmental change.[13]

We approach disasters as both political events in and of themselves, and potential producers of secondary political effects (e.g., new alliances, leadership and social critiques). We suggest that a political reading of disaster requires the situating of political action within the wider national and global socio-cultural and historical contexts in which they occur. This supports an analysis of the trajectories of post-disaster popular and elite actions from riots to spontaneous civil society organization, and from states of emergency to martial law. We attempt to assess whether such actions served to entrench or destabilize the sustainability of existing political regimes, support or curtail subversive or novel political action. We compare political outcomes, and assess whether significant patterns arise from within particular state/civil society relationships in the context of international and supranational influences and interventions.

Disasters triggered by environmental phenomena do not *cause* political change; rather they act as catalysts that put into motion *potentially* provocative social processes at multiple social levels. The character of political change is influenced by the nature of the pre-disaster socio-political and cultural milieu, and the actions and reactions of popular and institutional actors involved in disaster response and reconstruction. The analysis is not limited to events associated with party politics, but denotes as 'political' those decisions taken and actions carried out to promote particular outcomes affecting the balance of power between social sectors and actors therein.

Seven hypotheses for disasters and political change

A global security perspective deepens our understanding of a disaster as the product of particular dynamics between socio-political policies (and the cultural milieus in which they obtain meaning) and environmental phenomena. It is necessary to go beyond portraying disasters as discrete, episodic events. Disasters are events occurring in specific socio-ecological zones, where particular types of social

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[11] DfID, *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*, Cm 3789, 1997, p. 16; DfID, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor*, CM 5006, 2000, p. 6.

[12] P. White, M. Pelling, K. Sen, D. Seddon, S. Russell and R. Few, *Disaster Risk Reduction: A Development Concern* (London: DfID, 2005).

[13] K. O'Brien, 'Are we missing the point? Global environmental change as an issue of human security', *Global Environmental Change A* (in press, 2006).

organizations flourish, and where particular types of relationships with external power affect local and national conditions. Seven working hypotheses borne out by our survey are discussed below.

1. Disasters often hit politically peripheral regions hardest, catalysing regional political tension. The Moroccan earthquake of 23 February 2004 led to a rare display of open dissent, with protestors taking to the streets, stopping military and aid convoys and marching to the regional governor's office in northeastern Morocco to protest against the poor response of the government. The demonstrators came from a region with a long history of resistance to a succession of colonial and national rulers, and the earthquake symbolized perceived inequality and partiality in the dominant regime.[14]

2. Disasters are an outcome of development failures and can open to scrutiny dominant political and institutional systems. The spectacle of a multitude of largely African-American, poor and elderly citizens trapped in New Orleans during the catastrophic flooding of the city in 2005, combined with the federal government's astonishingly inept response, sparked the eruption of a national socio-political crisis. The national crisis (as distinct from the crisis experienced by those trapped in the city) was fuelled by the jarring effect that this highly publicized manifestation of race and class discrimination in the United States had on the nation,[15] and was further inflamed by the revelation that cronyism within the Bush administration was a clear precursor to disaster.[16]

3. Existing inequalities can be exacerbated by post-disaster governmental manipulation. Political conflict following disaster often manifests around attempts to redistribute titles or usufructuary rights to land. It is commonplace for developers and speculators to claim rights over low-income settlement space (assessed by government agents as too dangerous for further habitation) with the effect that land is transferred from low- to high-income groups. A recent example comes from Lago de Apoyo, where reconstruction following an earthquake led to the relocation of labourers and the expansion of a luxury lakeside hotel.[17] At a larger scale, the transfer of coastal land

from village to commercial use in Indonesia and Sri Lanka following the Indian Ocean tsunami is also well recognized and a source of local political tension.[18]

4. The way in which the state and other sectors act in response and recovery is largely predicated on the kind of political relationships that existed between sectors before the crisis. The relationship between the form of political regime and disaster risk is complex. Amartya Sen famously observed that in democracies, a free press reduces famine risk (and its attendant instability) through holding government accountable.[19] In polities without a free press other mechanisms can operate to reduce disaster risk (and potential political instability). Cuba has an international reputation for efficient disaster evacuation[20] drawing on highly effective social mobilization. This suggests that political commitment to risk reduction, rather than the level of authoritarianism of a regime, may be a better indicator of how successful a particular state will be in its approach to disaster reduction and response.

5. Regimes are likely to interpret spontaneous collective actions by non-government sectors in the aftermath of a disaster as a threat and respond with repression. There is a host of data on authoritarian and democratic regimes to support this hypothesis. Following the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, the military dictatorship focused rehabilitation on the capital city, ignoring severely damaged rural Maya communities. Abandoned by the state, local organizations adapted to new community needs and continued working past the search and rescue phase to coordinate rebuilding. The government perceived emerging local Maya leaders as a political threat and violently repressed them. The democratically elected Turkish government also repressed (albeit without bloodshed) civil society organizations activated during a disaster. In this case, the state proved incapable of providing assistance during the critical first days following the 1999 Marmara earthquake, and local associations and NGOs stepped in to fill this gap. To regain control, the government froze NGO bank accounts and proclaimed illegal all but select state-authorized NGO activities. The repression was targeted especially at organizations identifying with a religious, Islamic orientation. These examples also point to the need to explain national political action following disaster within the international political

[14] *African Research Bulletin*, 41(2), 1–29 February 2004, published 25 March 2004.

[15] Paul Frymer, Dara Z. Strolovitch and Dorian T. Warren, 'Katrina's Political Roots and Division: Race, Class and Federalism in American Politics', in *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences* (Social Science Research Council), 28 September 2005, *http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/.*

[16] Jon Elliston, 'Disaster in the making', *Independent Weekly*, 22 September 2004.

[17] Professor Michael Redclift, King's College London, personal communication, 2005.

[18] Ian Christoplos, Glemminge Development Research AB, personal communication, 2005.

[19] Amartya Sen and J.H. Dreze, 'Democracy as a universal value', *Journal of Democracy* 10 (1999), pp. 3–17.

[20] Martha Thomson and Izaskun Gaviria, *Weathering the Storm: Lessons in Risk Reduction from Cuba* (Boston, MA: Oxfam America, 2004).

context. Repression in Guatemala unfolded in a Cold War client state. Turkey is caught between the external pressures of EU candidacy and US strategic interests, which magnify internal struggles between political, religious and ethnic groups.

6. In the aftermath of disaster, political leaders may regain or even enhance their popular legitimacy. This hypothesis is exemplified by political responses to a 1966 hurricane in the city of New Orleans[21] and at a larger scale with events surrounding the 1976 Tangshan earthquake in China.[22] In the former case, an incumbent mayor used disaster relief to bolster his public image and was re-elected to office a month later despite being personally responsible for the reallocation of city funds originally destined to shore up the levee. The Tangshan earthquake occurred during a period of enormous political upheaval in China, largely owing to the death of Mao Zedong. Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, expertly portrayed the earthquake as a culturally symbolic event revealing social imbalance and portending great change. He appropriated the disaster, using it to introduce a new leadership, and successfully dismantled the opposing power base controlled by the 'Gang of Four'. Once again, the nature of the regime (democratic/authoritarian) does not appear to have affected the pattern. What these two cases have in common is leaders who successfully manipulated disaster events to maintain or elevate their popular legitimacy within a specific political institutional architecture.

7. The repositioning of political actors in the aftermath of a disaster unfolds at multiple levels. Local as well as national political actors use disaster relief and recovery to extend their influence over development policies and programmes. In Central America local NGOs stepped into the new political space created in the aftermath of the 1988 Hurricane Mitch, while strengthening regional alliances.[23] Such influence may be temporary, lasting only as long as the relief or reconstruction periods, but can potentially lead to a long-term influence and involvement in development planning and thus access to political power. Following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, several prominent activists involved in reconstruction efforts entered city and nationwide politics, the structure of city

government was reconstituted, and the ruling party lost its 70-year hold on the capital city.[24]

Conclusion

Perhaps surprisingly, there are similarities in the ways in which democratic and authoritarian regimes respond to disaster. Political leaders in both systems manipulate disaster recovery to enhance their popular legitimacy. Disasters also open political systems up to scrutiny. In this way events can become symbolically important for politically marginalized groups and can catalyse political organization and dissent. Examples of this process include class- and caste-based and regional protest. Political manipulation and protest occur at local, municipal and national levels.

Political responses are largely determined by pre-disaster social contracts. Suppressed values and associated forms of organization can re-emerge, or predominant institutions can become further entrenched. In reconstruction, power asymmetries can lead to the manipulation of aid and subsequently the distribution of economic power. Where new forms of organization become too effective, they may be perceived as a challenge to the state. It is here that democratic and authoritarian regimes tend to differ in their strategies for survival. The international community has a role to play in setting the incentive structures which states consider when weighing up the comparative risks of internal dissent and international discredit.

The 'Everyday' Resilience of the City

Jon Coaffee and David Wood

In the last twenty years a vast academic literature has developed around the concept of 'militarizing' or 'securitizing' cities and in particular the policy responses to the occurrence of crime, fear of crime and the evaluation of cities as strategic sites for a spectrum of large-scale increasingly destructive interventions from protest and riot to terrorism and war. The work of the RAND Corporation in the United States has also been crucial in setting the terms of military strategic thinking in this area as part of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a vast literature in itself. These bodies of literature have developed alongside an ever-expanding interest in the vulnerability and 'resilience' of cities against natural disasters (which is generally held to include human-induced risk arising from such events).

Lately the three streams have begun to hybridize through consideration of the ability of cities to

[21] G. Abney and L. Hill, 'Natural disasters as a political variable: the effect of a hurricane on an urban election', *American Political Science Review* 60(4) (1966), pp. 974–81.

[22] B. Chen, 'Resist the Earthquake and Rescue Ourselves', in L. Vale and T. Campanella (eds), *The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover From Disaster* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[23] M. Wooster, D. Demeritt, K. Dill and P. Webley, *Enhancing Volcanic Hazard Avoidance Capacity in Central America through Local Remote Sensing and Improved Risk Communication* (London: DfID, 2005).

[24] Carlos San Juan Victoria, *Mexico City, Institutions and Civil Society 1998-1999: Experiences of a City in Transition, Civil Society and Governability in Mexico* (Mexico City: Ford Foundation and the University of Veracruz, 2000).

continue to thrive despite an ever-present threat of terrorism and disorder by building in 'resilient' features to policy processes and practice. Resilience in this sense has physical, economic and social foci – for example, through the development of defensive urban landscapes, the provision of adequate insurance facilities, the development of civic and institutional frameworks to deal with risk management and even individualized responses. At a more practical level, in the UK the Cabinet Office has recently developed a UK Resilience web portal to provide contingency advice and guidance to the public and 'at every level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges'. Furthermore, in London a multi-stakeholder strategic partnership, the London Resilience Forum, has recently been created. This is a governance arena where an institutional capacity can be built that will be capable of being mobilized in response to major terrorist-related attacks. Similar institutional infrastructures have been rolled out around all UK regions and are in various stages of development. However, it would be wrong to assume that the development of such structures is directly linked to 9/11 and new security challenges – rather, contemporary terrorist threats have speeded up a process that began in 2000 with fuel protests and was given further impetus by outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and a number of flooding incidents. The key point here is that lessons from these incidents indicated the need for a new governance of risk management because of ambiguity over 'who was in charge' and who should have coordinated the response.

Strategic military thinking and the everyday city

Many commentators propose that a militarized perspective is now increasingly enveloping urban security agendas in many Western cities, in attempts to display vulnerabilities and enact appropriate measures in order to improve resilience.[25] However, it is argued that processes of militarization in everyday life can be hidden in a 'post-military society'.[26] This perception is further reinforced by the concept of the 'liberal-democratic peace', a hangover from the immediate post-Cold War period which continues to be promoted even as terrorism and the 'war on terrorism' continue their mutually escalatory activities worldwide; and by the nature of change emerging in today's complex technologically dominated polity.

This technological politics reaches across (and is intermingled in) all domains from the mechanical to the biological. A key example is that new genetics metaphors are bound up in the notions of militarization, security and resilience: at the international level this occurs within the discourse of the RMA; and within nations, police and urban planners are adopting neo-Victorian notions of the intrinsic 'threat' from often 'genetically dangerous' classes of people, instead of the previously dominant conception of criminality as individual 'deviancy' from social norms. Because of this tendency for policy-makers and society at large to view the world in terms of categories of menace, there is increasingly a military-style response in the contemporary city where 'form follows fear'. This leads to what might be called 'protectionist reflexes', characterized by regulatory management, fortification and surveillance to categorize, divide and control. Others have argued that such militarization has wider societal effects, whereby our cities become 'control societies' which lack reflection about the appropriateness of counter-responses driven by technical and expert military-political elites.

That said, such proliferation of radical militarized security is not a new urban phenomenon and, as such, the events of 9/11 have merely signalled a surge towards an ever more resilient and militarized city – a trend seen as perhaps 'more appropriate' by society at large and hence more 'achievable' as a policy objective. These include the practices of access restriction, electronic surveillance and contingency planning which have expanded dramatically and radically in the aftermath of 9/11. These changes have occurred and been rigorously documented, most notably in those cities that are regarded as economically and/or strategically important locations, such as London, New York and Washington, but increasingly it is also seen as important to build resilient features into the design and management of more provincial cities.

The urban context: the city as defended target

The recent literature on the militarization of urban space suggests that adopted policy interventions occur in a number of interrelated ways which have expanded in recent years. However, resultant policy responses amount in large part to little more than extrapolations of ongoing trends on reducing the occurrence and perception of crime and terrorism. This has occurred in at least four main ways.

1. Through the extension of electronic surveillance within public and semi-public urban spaces, in particular automated to software-driven systems which, it can be argued, facilitate the automatic production and control of space and the further industrialization of everyday life. 9/11 is also proving to have been a catalytic event for the mass

[25] See, for example, S. Graham, *Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
[26] M. Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

introduction of hi-tech surveillance systems – a surveillance surge entailing the intensification and expansion of existing systems and the adoption of ever more refined technologies. Such an increase in militarized surveillance activity 'surges' is not unprecedented, however. Similar surges occurred in the UK in the early and mid-1990s after a spate of child abductions and the Provisional IRA bombing of the City of London.

2. Through the increased popularity of physical or symbolic notions of the boundary and territorial closure – for example, in closed defensive enclaves around residential gated communities, airports, civic buildings or major financial districts with restricted access and egress. There is also some evidence of a surge in the construction of an 'architecture of fear', the creation of 'exclusion zones' to protect society and particular 'at risk' sites and societies. Since 9/11 many commentators have hypothesized that new security fears linked to the threat of terrorism will speed up the ongoing process of the fragmentation of the city into safe and unsafe zones and have a lasting impact on the way our major cities are planned, run and function.[27]

3. Through the increasing sophistication and cost of security and contingency planning undertaken by organizations and institutions of government, intended to decrease their vulnerability to attack and increase preparedness in the event of attack. Since 9/11 most organizations have reviewed and re-evaluated their individual risk assessment, and local authorities and business coalitions are attempting to become more resilient and create more effective joined-up approaches to disaster recovery. This has increasingly involved the adoption of military threat-response tactics and technologies. Full-scale testing and evaluation of such disaster plans is now increasingly common as the institutional management of any future terrorist attack is given the highest priority.

4. Through the linking of resilience and security strategies to competition for attracting inward investment, particularly from footloose global capital. Many cities are now overtly linking security to regeneration, both in terms of the micro-management of new 'cultural quarters' and gentrification initiatives (CCTV, gated communities etc.) and the macro-management of the urban image through 'city

marketing' schemes which increasingly play on the importance of the 'safety' of cities as places of business and utilize security as a vital 'selling point'.

Analysis

Since the attacks of 9/11 these four categories of urban resilience/militarization (surveillance, territorial control, contingency planning and embedding security within regeneration) have become prominent in policy debates as cities have increasingly been scrutinized through the lens of vulnerability and resilience. Many commentators have argued that how authorities respond to the current 'war on terrorism' could have serious consequences for urban living.[28]

Importantly, the responses to new security challenges have occurred across a range of institutions which all have a role in the governance of urban space. They include the traditional institutions of government, both central and local; long-standing contingency planning organizations; risk management, insurance and reinsurance bodies; newer public–private organizations such as Town Centre Management bodies and Housing Associations; and a whole range of institutions which have a significant role in the governance and social control of cities, such as schools and hospitals. The responses adopted across this range are by no means uniform, nor are they necessarily cooperative or compatible, and these differences need to be specified if we are to avoid over-generalized accounts of urban resilience.

There are also critical questions to ask regarding the relationship between broader resilience policy for dealing with new security challenges and other emergent social polices directed at the civic realm. There are suspicions that government and interest groups are re-appropriating the 'terrorist threat' agenda and constructing a 'climate of fear', in part, to justify policy development and implementation – for example, around countering anti-social behaviour and the current 'respect' agenda, policies to restrict democratic protest, the way in which public spaces are increasingly designed and monitored to exclude the dangerous 'other', and attempts to introduce identity cards. This merging of crime prevention, anti-sociability measures and security within an array of policy agendas, underpinned by the rhetoric that we are living in a changing, uncertain and dangerous world, is leading to serious questions over civil liberties and the extent to which Western democracies are moving towards security states and surveillance societies.

[27] See, for example, J. Coaffee, *Terrorism, Risk and the City* (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003); and J. Coaffee, 'Rings of steel, rings of concrete and rings of confidence: designing out terrorism in Central London pre and post 9/11', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28 (1) (2004), pp. 201–11.

[28] See, for example, T. Swanstrom, 'Are fear and urbanism at war?', *Urban Affairs Review*, 38 (1) (2002), pp. 135–40.