Since Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the narrative around Baltic security among alliance members has been almost triumphant. The Baltic Sea has been described as a ‘NATO lake’ and various Baltic countries have celebrated the increase in their security.
However, Russia’s recent activity in the Baltic shows that NATO members need to remain vigilant in the region, and even strengthen their defences.
Increasingly paranoid about NATO’s intentions, Russia is likely to push back against the alliance in the Baltic. In the process it could significantly increase the risk of escalation, as it uses its hybrid playbook to test NATO’s defences – and conduct acts of sabotage where there is plausible deniability.
Political geography
The political geography of the Baltic area has shifted significantly in the last 20 years. Despite a growing Russian threat profile since 2014, the Sea has become increasingly crowded, as an important shipping route with high volumes of cargo traffic.
It is also the location of important energy and telecommunications infrastructure for several countries, including offshore wind farms, tidal and wave energy converters, gas pipelines and undersea communication cables.
The security outlook has been transformed over the last 30 years. In 1990, only Denmark and Germany were NATO member-states. Today, eight out of nine countries bordering the Baltic Sea are alliance members, with Russia the only exception. The Swedish island of Gotland served an important strategic role during the cold war and Sweden’s government is preparing to increase military presence there as a deterrent to a Russian attack.
These developments have many positives from NATO’s perspective: troop movements are easier and faster over contiguous allied territory, and the Baltic Sea itself is much easier to control.
But the Baltic remains of crucial importance to Moscow, too. Ports like St Petersburg and Primorsk are important for Russia’s oil exports and imports of consumer goods including food.
Without its Baltic Sea ports, Russian cargo would travel significantly longer, around Norway and Finland, unloading much further away from major Russian metropolitan areas.
The Baltic also matters to Russia’s military. The Kaliningrad exclave is home to the Baltic fleet, and to nuclear weapons. It is also an important transport hub, being Russia’s only Baltic port which remains ice-free year-round. Tensions between Russia and the EU over access to Kaliningrad continue to build.
Protecting assets and reducing risk
A more crowded and strategically important Baltic Sea increases the likelihood of accidents if there is a higher level of naval show of force. It also provides several potential attack vectors for Russian sabotage.
The Baltic Sea has been a relatively stable region for the last decade, with a focus on building energy cooperation. As a result, some of infrastructure in the region is not as well secured as it could be – highlighted by incidents of suspected sabotage on Nord Stream 1 and 2 in September 2022, and on Balticonnector in October last year. As the deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (Marcom) said last week: ‘all of our economy under the sea is under threat’.
NATO will therefore have to anticipate more frequent attacks on this infrastructure as Russia tries to exert its influence, and take steps to protect these assets and reduce the risk of escalation.
First, governments should conduct thorough risk audits of their Baltic Sea infrastructure and share their findings with neighbours and NATO partners, helping to increase understanding of the Baltic risk environment, and how it might have changed since Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession.
These new NATO members can also teach other alliance members important lessons, being accustomed to Russian hybrid activity, and having developed a range of countermeasures.
This best practice exchange could also feature contributions from NATO members responsible for other shorelines on the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic.