The Baltic Sea is far from a ‘NATO lake’ – the alliance must strengthen its defences

Alliance countries need better understanding of the risks to their undersea infrastructure, and improved signalling to deter Russian sabotage and hybrid attacks.

Expert comment Published 22 April 2024 3 minute READ

Since Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the narrative around Baltic security among alliance members has been almost triumphant. The Baltic Sea has been described as a ‘NATO lake’ and various Baltic countries have celebrated the increase in their security.

However, Russia’s recent activity in the Baltic shows that NATO members need to remain vigilant in the region, and even strengthen their defences.

Increasingly paranoid about NATO’s intentions, Russia is likely to push back against the alliance in the Baltic. In the process it could significantly increase the risk of escalation, as it uses its hybrid playbook to test NATO’s defences – and conduct acts of sabotage where there is plausible deniability.

Political geography

The political geography of the Baltic area has shifted significantly in the last 20 years. Despite a growing Russian threat profile since 2014, the Sea has become increasingly crowded, as an important shipping route with high volumes of cargo traffic. 

The Kaliningrad exclave is home to the Baltic fleet, and to nuclear weapons. It is also an important transport hub, being Russia’s only Baltic port which remains ice-free year-round.

It is also the location of important energy and telecommunications infrastructure for several countries, including offshore wind farms, tidal and wave energy converters, gas pipelines and undersea communication cables.
 
The security outlook has been transformed over the last 30 years. In 1990, only Denmark and Germany were NATO member-states. Today, eight out of nine countries bordering the Baltic Sea are alliance members, with Russia the only exception. The Swedish island of Gotland served an important strategic role during the cold war and Sweden’s government is preparing to increase military presence there as a deterrent to a Russian attack.

These developments have many positives from NATO’s perspective: troop movements are easier and faster over contiguous allied territory, and the Baltic Sea itself is much easier to control.

But the Baltic remains of crucial importance to Moscow, too. Ports like St Petersburg and Primorsk are important for Russia’s oil exports and imports of consumer goods including food. 

Without its Baltic Sea ports, Russian cargo would travel significantly longer, around Norway and Finland, unloading much further away from major Russian metropolitan areas.

The Baltic also matters to Russia’s military. The Kaliningrad exclave is home to the Baltic fleet, and to nuclear weapons. It is also an important transport hub, being Russia’s only Baltic port which remains ice-free year-round. Tensions between Russia and the EU over access to Kaliningrad continue to build.

Protecting assets and reducing risk

A more crowded and strategically important Baltic Sea increases the likelihood of accidents if there is a higher level of naval show of force. It also provides several potential attack vectors for Russian sabotage.

The Baltic Sea has been a relatively stable region for the last decade, with a focus on building energy cooperation. As a result, some of infrastructure in the region is not as well secured as it could be – highlighted by incidents of suspected sabotage on Nord Stream 1 and 2 in September 2022, and on Balticonnector in October last year. As the deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (Marcom) said last week: ‘all of our economy under the sea is under threat’.

NATO will therefore have to anticipate more frequent attacks on this infrastructure as Russia tries to exert its influence, and take steps to protect these assets and reduce the risk of escalation.

First, governments should conduct thorough risk audits of their Baltic Sea infrastructure and share their findings with neighbours and NATO partners, helping to increase understanding of the Baltic risk environment, and how it might have changed since Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession.

These new NATO members can also teach other alliance members important lessons, being accustomed to Russian hybrid activity, and having developed a range of countermeasures. 

This best practice exchange could also feature contributions from NATO members responsible for other shorelines on the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic.

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NATO must also improve its messaging and signalling to Moscow. One of the reasons why Russia likes using grey zone activities to exert its influence is that it perceives its own risk appetite to be higher than that of NATO countries. It also believes that grey zone activities are relatively low-cost given the difficulty in attribution and the level of plausible deniability involved. 

Not all Baltic states have (IncSea) agreements with Moscow, and existing agreements do not cover newer technologies such as offshore energy infrastructure, or undersea drones.

NATO should build on its success using strategic signalling over Russia’s nuclear threats to refine its messaging and signals on Baltic security, to ensure Russia understands that grey zone activities will carry a cost. 

In the longer term, mutual interests in the Baltic Sea could become a conduit for risk reduction. 

For example, bilateral Incident at Sea (IncSea) agreements (which cover a range of risks which could occur at sea) were signed between some NATO member-states and Russia in the 1970s and 80s.

Until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia took those agreements seriously and used the notification processes in them. Not all Baltic states have such agreements with Moscow, and existing agreements do not cover newer technologies such as offshore energy infrastructure, or undersea drones.

Once risk reduction conversations are of mutual interest and politically feasible again, updating and extending IncSea agreements could provide a useful framework for dialogue – though such productive, cooperative conversations currently seem very far off.