The evidence suggests Putin is not grooming Alexei Dyumin as his successor

Speculation that Dyumin could succeed Putin has been considerable. But there is no reason to suppose Russia’s president will signal his intentions regarding his replacement.

Expert comment Published 18 June 2024 3 minute READ

Nikolai Petrov

Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Alexei Dyumin as Secretary of the State Council on 29 May, replacing Igor Levitin, a respected and influential (if not high-profile) figure who held the post since September 2012. (Levitin has since been appointed advisor to the president – a much less powerful and prestigious position).

Since Dyumin’s appointment there has been increased speculation that Putin might be lining him up to assume the presidency after him. But who is Dyumin, and why should succession chatter focus on him?

A well-trained loyalist

Dyumin is sometimes described as a ‘wardrobe’, both in physical appearance and demeanour. He was formerly Putin’s bodyguard, a duty which included playing hockey with the president in the Night League, keeping the opposition goal and ensuring that Putin always scored.

He then served as a deputy minister of defence (albeit only for a month), before becoming governor of Tula region from 2016 to 2024. 

In that position he was not involved in direct management of regional issues, instead acting like a ‘wedding general’ – a Russian expression for somebody who has formal status and all of the symbolism associated with it – but plays a largely decorative role.

More intriguingly, he allegedly played a crucial part in both the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (as head of special operations forces) and helped negotiate a peaceful conclusion to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s 2023 putsch attempt.

All in all, he can be regarded as a well-trained Kremlin bureaucrat who shows complete loyalty to Putin.

The promotion

Dyumin’s promotion represents the second most serious personnel change as part of Putin’s reshuffle of elites, second only to the replacement of Sergei Shoigu as defence minister by Andrei Belousov. (Shoigu in turn replaced Nikolai Patrushev as secretary of Russia’s Security Council).  

His promotion is part of a pattern that has seen Putin increasingly rely on members of his ‘praetorian guard’ to fill important posts. 

Putin created the State Council in 2000 as a consultative organ, bringing together executive officials, including regional heads, to discuss broad strategic issues.

Around the time of Russia’s 2020 constitutional changes, there was much speculation that the Council might provide an institution that would allow Putin to continue to oversee governance after stepping down from the presidency.

The position of secretary does not provide power as such. Rather, it is an opportunity for the post-holder to play complex bureaucratic games by selecting staff, influencing the agenda of the Council, and overseeing the implementation of decisions.

The replacement of Levitin with Dyumin, while undoubtedly a significant step up for the former bodyguard, constitutes the weakening of the institution: Dyumin lacks the skills or support necessary to play the bureaucratic game as successfully as Levitin did.

His promotion is part of a pattern that has seen Putin increasingly rely on members of his  ‘praetorian guard’ to fill important posts – as the only people he can completely trust. 

Dyumin is not the only member of Putin’s personal circle who has received a notable promotion immediately before or during the war on Ukraine.

Indeed, Putin’s reshuffling is continuing, with various other ministry of defence posts changing hands in recent months as Shoigu’s team is replaced. But Dyumin is not the only member of Putin’s personal circle who has received a notable promotion immediately before or during the war on Ukraine.

Dmitry Mironov was appointed an aide to the president in October 2021; Alexander Kurenkov was appointed minister of emergency situations in May 2022; and Valery Pikalev was appointed head of the Federal Customs Service in May 2024.

That Dyumin was appointed after them suggests that Putin does not consider him the best among them. In short, Dyumin has never been Putin’s first choice and it is unlikely that his new appointment indicates any kind of special status in the Russian president’s thinking regarding his succession.

Keeping them guessing

Instead, Dyumin’s inclusion in lists of possible successors to Putin appears to be the result of a special information campaign by the Kremlin. The goal of this campaign remains unclear.

Putin could appoint anybody he wants to succeed him; there are no norms or rules constraining him – and he is likely not to signal his choice obliquely before making it.

More fundamentally, Putin could appoint anybody he wants to succeed him; there are no norms or rules constraining him – and he is likely not to signal his choice obliquely before making it.

Putin retains even more power by keeping elites and allies guessing, unsure who is in favour and who is not. The speculation about who might succeed Putin once again underscores the nature of the political regime as a personalist autocracy without an institutionalized succession plan.

The rumours themselves play a part in sowing more uncertainty, defending the president’s position and preventing effective planning that might undermine or threaten his retirement.

In the unlikely event that Dyumin were to assume the presidency it is reasonable to assume that he would serve much as he did as governor of Tula – with all the trappings of power but no real oversight or understanding.

And that would mean that somebody else would be calling the shots in Russia’s government.