Israel’s strikes in Iran and Lebanon don’t hurt Hamas and Hezbollah much

But they move Israel and the ‘axis of resistance’ closer to a wider war – a conflict that each side knows it cannot win.

Expert comment Updated 1 August 2024 3 minute READ

Events in the Middle East during July point to a striking paradox: Israel and the Iran-led ‘axis of resistance’ are inching closer to a catastrophic regional war – yet the war remains unlikely, because neither side wants it. Is that mutual apprehension enough to prevent the worst from happening? 

Even the most seasoned observer of the region can’t answer that question with confidence. But one thing everyone can agree on is that Israel’s alleged killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, and its assassination of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Lebanon do nothing to lower the temperature. 

The elimination of Haniyeh doesn’t hurt Hamas much…he had no say over the group’s willingness and ability to fight.

It will seriously disrupt and delay negotiations between Israel and Hamas over a ceasefire, and therefore the release of Israeli hostages. And it will ensure the continuation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.

To make matters worse, the elimination of Haniyeh doesn’t hurt Hamas much. He was a politician based in Qatar, running the group’s messaging and finances. His killing is hugely symbolic, no doubt, and a political win for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but he had no say over the group’s willingness and ability to fight. That remains the prerogative of Yahya Sinwar, the group’s leader who is based in Gaza and has been calling all the shots since 2017. 

As far as Hezbollah is concerned, the organization has a deep bench. It has been able to replace far more influential commanders than Shukr, including Imad Mughniyeh and Mustafa Badreddine. Its military capacity remains intact.

Iran’s strategy

Since Hamas’s 7 October attack against Israel (and even before), Iran has sought to impose a new strategic reality on Israel, in order to overwhelm it. The intention is to surround the country by threats from multiple directions, which force it to fight not one, but all members of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ – which Iran has built patiently over decades. An attack against Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Iraqi militias, Hamas, the Syrian regime, or Iran itself, would be considered as an attack against all.  

Hezbollah and the Houthis, and to some extent the Iraqi militias, have done their part to reinforce this reality. On 8 October, Hezbollah opened a front against Israel in support of Hamas.

Its chief, Hassan Nasrallah, has repeatedly stated that his group will stop its cross-border attacks as soon as a ceasefire in Gaza is reached – leaving no doubt about the interconnectedness of the fights in Gaza and along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Shortly after Hezbollah launched its attacks, the Houthis began their campaign to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, and lately upped the ante by attacking Tel Aviv using an Iranian-made, long-range drone. 

Israel’s response

Diplomacy has yet to be seriously incorporated into Israel’s security strategy. It has chosen a purely military response since 7 October. But this has shown that there is a limit to what brute force can do to ameliorate its security situation – and what it could expect to achieve in a wider confrontation. 

Netanyahu may feel empowered by the standing ovations he received during his speech in the US Congress.

Yet Netanyahu has no qualms about extending and expanding the conflict – likely for narrow political reasons. He knows that the moment bullets stop flying, he will have to answer to an angry Israeli public that blames him for undermining Israeli democracy and failing to anticipate the 7 October attacks.

Netanyahu may feel empowered by the standing ovations he received during his speech in the US Congress. All US politicians are preoccupied with the presidential elections. All lack a coherent approach to prevent the region from exploding. 

Despite the Biden administration’s stated preference to achieve regional de-escalation, not one US leader has firmly communicated red lines to Israel’s prime minister.

It’s true that US officials have told Netanyahu that they won’t support an Israeli-instigated all-out war. 

But could he drag the US into such a conflict despite its wishes? It’s uncertain that either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris could survive politically if they were to withhold aid to Israel during what Netanyahu would certainly depict as a war for Israel’s survival. 

How things could develop

How will things develop from here? The increasingly dangerous tit-for-tat between Israel and the Iran-led Axis will continue. Hezbollah will certainly respond to the killing of Shukr. So too will Iran, whose leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has already promised revenge. 

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But will this lead to an all-out war between Israel and the Axis? If a wider war does break out, it won’t be because of a deliberate decision by either side. It will more likely be that attempts at a measured response get out of control. Accidents and miscalculations can escalate the confrontation, as always.

Such a war would have no possible military solution and neither side could possibly win. 

But even then, the likelihood is that the US will immediately move to contain the situation. Both Israel and Iran have more to lose than gain from a vicious confrontation. 

Such a war would have no possible military solution and neither side could possibly win. Even the most radical politicians in either camp understand that. Or at least, we must hope they do.