Ben Bland
Welcome, everybody, to Chatham House, and welcome to everyone joining us online around the world. Good afternoon or good morning, good evening, wherever you may be. I’m really delighted to see so many people here, and online as well, for this discussion on “the China–India relationship.” For those of you who don’t know me, my name is Ben Bland, I’m the Director of the Asia–Pacific Programme here at Chatham House.
When I joined Chatham House three years ago, I wanted to make sure that we were asking the big questions about the future of the region, joining the dots across countries and issues, and challenging conventional wisdom. And I’m pleased to say that the paper we’ve just published on the China–India relationship does all of that and more. China and India, as I’m sure everyone here knows, account for almost 40% of the global population, with the second largest, and soon to be third largest, economies. Both countries are vying for influence and leadership in an emerging multipolar world, and yet, despite the importance of this bilateral relationship, I think it’s very poorly understood outside the two countries, and within China and India, it’s often seen from a very one-sided perspective.
The sometimes violent border clashes between these two great Asian powers have been a key driver of their ties, but there are many other areas that are vital, where we see them both diverging and, although it’s less commented on, converging as well. I think our new paper elucidates these complexities really well and tries to paint a picture of where this epoch-defining relationship is heading. So, if you haven’t done already, please check out the paper on our website.
We’re going to be discussing the paper and much more with the two Authors, Chietigj Bajpaee, at the end, who is our Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, and next to him, Yu Jie, who’s our Senior Research Fellow for China. And I’m also delighted that joining us virtually from Washington we have Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao, who is the former Foreign Secretary of India. As a veteran Diplomat, she served all over the world, including as Ambassador to the US and China, among many other postings, and since retiring, she’s held many distinguished research positions and she’s written a very good book on India, China and Tibet called “The Fractured Himalaya.”
Before we get going, a final reminder that this event is on the record and it is being livestreamed and recorded. If you ask the wrong question, you may lose your job, apparently, depending on which government you represent and who’s watching. I’ll quiz our panellists for about 40 minutes and then open up to questions from our audience, in person, and online. If you’re online on Zoom, please use the Q&A function, and just one ground rule, as well, there might be a lot of interest in what’s happening at the moment between India and Pakistan, we’re not going to be delving into that today because we’ve got another event coming up very soon on specifically that issue. So, today, we really want to focus on India and China.
So, with that, I’m going to turn to Chietigj first. This paper was your brainwave. I know the India–China relationship has been on your mind for a long time, professionally and personally, so just tell us, Chietigj, what sparked you to write this paper?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, thank you, Ben. Hello, everyone, it’s a pleasure to be talking about the other relationship with which India maintains a – well, another country with which India maintains a difficult relationship, given that the focus is very much right now on India–Pakistan. So, as an Indian who grew up in China, I’ve always been fascinated with the China–India relationship, these two self-proclaimed civilizational states, two countries that are seeking to be leadership or a voice of the Global South, and they’re both seeking a more equitable distribution of power in a multipolar global system.
And what I really wanted to do with this with this paper is challenge some of the misconceptions about the bilateral relationship. The tendency to see it through the prism, or the narrow prism of the border issue, I think that’s one misconception. The tendency to view India as some, sort of, bulwark or counterbalance against the rise of China, which has been, you know, particularly prominent in the US, but other Western capitals, as well. And then, finally, a tendency to overlook the areas of convergence, so the shared worldviews that both countries have on various issues of global governance. So, I think that has been, I think, the primary motivation by the – behind the paper, and essentially, to bring out some of the nuances in the relationship.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chietigj, and Ambassador Rao, I know you’re in Washington to give a lecture on the China factor in Indian foreign policy, so, I mean, can you explain to us how important is the China relationship to India?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Thank you so much, Ben, and so happy to join this seminar or conference online from Washington D.C. You know, India and China just very recently marked the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. And as Chietigj just mentioned, this is a relationship between two of the world’s oldest civilizations, and therefore, this milestone is not just about a date in the calendar. It’s a mirror that reflects decades of co-existence, conflict, co-operation and competition. So, when you see it through that glass, it’s clear that the India–China relationship is not just a bilateral matter. It’s a prism through which we understand the world being repurposed, in many ways, by power struggles and shifting alliances and competing national interests.
So, that’s the stage in which this relationship is set, the geopolitical geoeconomic stage, in which we exist today. And I think in this situation of flux and geopolitical stress, I think India is focusing on its ability to remain flexible and multi-aligned, strategic autonomy is definitely a North Star for us. And we’re walking a strategic tightrope, including with China, because it’s a delicate balance that prevails in our relationship, and China has been termed the “single biggest factor” shaping Indian foreign policy today. And we seek neither to appease nor to escalate, but build a, kind of, layered resilience, military, economic and diplomatic, with China.
Ben Bland
Thanks Ambassador Rao, and Yu Jie, I’ll come to you next. You’re just back from Beijing and Shanghai, I believe. I mean, where do you think India ranks on China’s list of foreign policy priorities? ‘Cause we often see China towards the very top of India’s list, but I wonder how it’s seen from Beijing’s perspective.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, it’s really seeing from Beijing – oh, by the way, sorry, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. Really delighted to co-author this report, together with probably one of the best Indian hand in this country, over here. Now, regarding to answer your question, Ben, from Beijing, I think the view over there is this is a extremely tricky relationship Beijing will have to manage. Now, this – whatever China does with India or with its neighbours come back to a quite particular character of the Chinese foreign policy, that is focusing on its own neighbourhood.
So, if we do remember, after – right after Liberation Day, when Donald Trump imposing on the tariff, and one thing that Xi Jinping immediately convened was convened a important conference that dealing with China’s neighbourhood, and that also including the all members of Politburo, as well as all the Ambassadors stationed abroad. So, obviously neighbourhood relationship is one of the key element for China’s diplomatic priority, and that is including China’s relationship with Russia, but also the second largest neighbour – second largest nuclear neighbour, India. So, it’s quite significant, so that sense of neighbourhood. Whether we have good neighbours or bad neighbours, China have to take this rather transactional approach to manage it.
Now, I think that secondly in here what we have to say is that I think Ambassador Rao was absolutely right, China view its relationship with India, or with many other countries in the world, through the prisms of China–US relations, so that is very much US-centred foreign policy, and China basically, in most of the cases, consider India would be really a close – having this sense of a close alignment with United States. So, whatever India does and China might come with a certain suspicion, that’s second thing.
Now, thirdly, I think in here, it’s also that sense of trust deficiency between the two countries over the last 75 years, even though the diplomatic relationship has been established back to 75 years ago, but what we can say is this diplomatic relationship has never really been a smooth ride. It has always been topsy-turvy in a way, and try to manage one way to another. So, it’s a bit of the zigzag, I think I would say, yeah.
Ben Bland
I mean, I get the sense…
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Ben Bland
…and I’ll come to you on this, Chietigj, in a second, that, you know, in New Delhi, you know, leaders do lie awake at night to some extent thinking about China, but in Beijing, Yu Jie, is that the same? Is it not quite a lot lower down China’s list of, sort of, security and foreign policy priorities?
Dr Yu Jie
It’s interesting you say that, but then, however, if we look around the Chinese Ambassadors to all this major powers, I think India was ranking extremely high. So, at the moment, we actually had the former Vice-Foreign Minister of China now stationed as the Chinese Ambassador to India. So, obviously, even though it may sound like that China less concerned about India, but by having that very important diplomatic setup, it actually shows the importance that Beijing view this relationship with India these days. And I think particularly this also pushed by the factor that given Donald Trump came to power, and again, Beijing come back with this rather transnational – transactional approach that as long as they can work with this country, it does not necessarily need to be – agree with every single thing India says.
Ben Bland
Okay.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Ben Bland
Chietigj, I want to go back to some recent history, just to, kind of, lay the ground for the rest of our discussion. Because I remember, I was living in China in 2018 when Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and Chinese Leader, Xi Jinping, had this, sort of, informal tea summit in Wuhan. And it seemed to many people in both countries and outsiders to presage this new, sort of, path towards greater co-operation and partnership between China and India. But it all seemed to fall apart with these border disputes in 2020. What went wrong, and do you think this, sort of, era of contestation is now irrevocable, or could you envisage us going back to, sort of, another Modi–Xi tea summit and a love-in any time in the foreseeable future?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Well, it’s not out of the realm of possibility, but I frankly think that after the cla – the border clashes that took place in 2020, the relationship has been in a new normal and it remains in that new normal. So, despite the conclusion of this border agreement that was announced last October, and several actions, the resumption of the Special Representative Framework in December, the talk of resuming people-centric engagement, you know, direct flights, the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage, the relationship is clearly in a new normal. I think what existed from 1988 to 2020, where both sides basically agreed, “Let’s shelve the border issue and work on other aspects of the bilateral relationship,” and we saw these with these informal summit meetings, that ship has sailed, at least from New Delhi’s perspective.
And there has been – it’s not something which happened overnight with the border clashes in 2020. There has been, I think, a gradual deterioration over at least the last decade. I mean, perhaps we can go back from 2007 onwards, we – where we saw these instances of cyclical provocation along the border, where essentially, you know, China was probing or testing India’s position. Both sansi – countries maintain a, you know, a high – a very strong military presence along the border. They’ve upgraded their infrastructure along the border.
In terms of what happened in 2020, I mean, I think that’s open – still open to a degree of speculation, but it ranges from, you know, China seeking to take advantage of India being in a weakened position during the COVID pandemic, China’s response to India’s decision to rescind the special autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, deepening relations between India and the US. There’s almost, I would argue, an inverse relationship between India–China relations and India–US relations.
So, since the conclusion of the US–India nuclear deal in the mid-2000s, in 2008, since that period you’ve seen a deepening of the US–India Strategic Partnership, and that’s coincided with the deterioration of the India–China relationship. So, I think several potential factors come into play, but I, yeah, I frankly think that, you know, while there has been, you know, a degree of optimism surrounding the relationship since the conclusion of the border agreement, what we’ve seen is an – a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic reset to the bilateral relationship.
Ben Bland
And then, Ambassador Rao, if I can come to you on this question. So, I mean, how far do you think the border dispute between China and India defines the bilateral relationship? I mean, so long as that border dispute is not settled, is it going to be impossible for India and China to really co-operate in a meaningful way, or do you think, you know, you can see ways in which India and China can move ahead without resolving it?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, Ben, it’s a very long border that we share with China. It’s one of the longest land borders in the world and it’s an unsettled border. And the “line of actual control,” as we call it, spans about 3,488 kilometres of very rugged Himalayan terrain. Even the length of that line of actual control is disputed between India and China. At this moment, of course, after the disengagement took place at the disputed points along the LAC, in Ladakh, between India and China, last fall, the situation is “sensitive but stable,” as our Army Chief called it earlier this year. And – but there are 60,000 troops from our side on the LAC at the moment, and so it’s a highly militarised line of separation between the two countries.
But given all this, and I understand the difficulty of resolving these problems between India and China, and there are in many – they are in many ways quite central to the bilateral relationship today, but the challenge with China isn’t just playing out in the Himalayas. It’s in our wallets, it’s in our smartphones, it’s in our digital infrastructure, because China is India’s largest trading partner. And so, it’s a, kind of, strange duality that prevails today. We deter on the border, but we are, in a sense, dependent in the marketplace. So, it’s that duality that precisely makes China such a complicated challenge for Indian foreign policy today.
Ben Bland
And just as a follow-up, obviously you worked in Beijing as India’s, sort of, leading diplomatic res – representative, and you’ve worked on China issues in many other guises as a Diplomat and a Researcher. I mean, what do you think are the, kind of, biggest misperceptions of India about China and China about India?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, I really think there is very little in-depth understanding between the people of either country about each other. There are a lot of stereotypes, a lot of prejudices and very minimal scholarship about each other, given the state of political relations. So, this is really a moment, the 75th anniversary in diplomatic relations, is really a moment for strategic reflection. And given the fact that we are walking this tightrope, I’d say that our policy – India’s China policy is really defined by competitive co-existence. And the view from the amphitheatre, as it were, is quite refracted by these beliefs about China in India, and very often founded in the reality of what has happened on the ground in the relationship. All, you know, the disputes, the fallout of the Galwan tragedy from 2020. So, as I said earlier, duality is in many ways the doctrine in this case.
Ben Bland
And Chietigj, I might come to you on some of these other areas of divergence. Ambassador Rao mentioned technology, but what do you think are the other drivers of tension in the relationship, beyond the border disputes?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, I think there are two key aspects, one – there’s an economic dimension, and there’s a geopolitical dimension. The economic dimension, as Ambassador Rao has alluded to, you know, is, I think, rooted in the trade imbalance which exists between both countries. Over 100 billion trade deficit in China’s favour, New Delhi has attributed this to Beijing’s use of non-tariff barriers and India has been, you know, the leading country in terms of launching anti-dumping investigations against China. Over 30 in 2024, over 300 between 1995 and 2023. So, I think that is one key grievance.
The other aspect is perhaps somewhat more esoteric, is this geopolitical dimension, this quest for, I would call it maybe ‘civilizational supremacy’. You know, since their emergence as independent nation states in the ear – late 1940s, both countries have competed for regional and global leadership. You know, this is not a new competition, we saw it play out in the Bandung Conference in 1955, both countries seeking leadership of then – what was then known as the ‘Third World’. But as we see more – these countries acquire more tools and platforms to interact with each other, you’re going to increasingly see that play out in regional and global forums and on issues of global governance.
Within Asia, you see that India has chi – challenged a Sinocentric vision of the regional order. You know, India is – has not endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the Chinese side, we’ve seen that China has been apprehensive – you know, one of the reasons for ins – apprehensive about India playing a larger role in the regional architecture, so one of the reasons for which India has been apprehensive about the Indo-Pacific concept, or strategic geography, is it essentially elevates India from a South Asian power to a broader Asian power.
So, I think this is a relationship which will increasingly play out in regional and global forums. We’ve seen instances or example of that. You know, China not in – supporting India’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, India not endorsing China’s Belt and Road Initiative. You know, China not – or being apprehensive about India joining the East Asia Summit in 2005, for instance. India exiting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Parsh – Partnership, RCEP, in 2019. A lot of these initiatives are related to this underlying, you know, sort of, civilizational rivalry between China and India.
Ben Bland
And obviously, we know, Yu Jie, that China’s economy is far bigger, China’s military is bigger, and its military is expanding at a much more rapid rate. And we also know that, sort of, in diplomatic terms, the Chinese Government has often been reluctant to acknowledge India as, sort of, a ri – an equivalent Asian power. In this recent – after a recent meeting, I think India said it wanted to work with China on a multipolar Asia, and China said it would work with India on a multipolar world, but not a multipolar Asia, presumably implying China can be the only pole in Asia. So, to what extent do you think Beijing doesn’t really see India as a worthy rival?
Dr Yu Jie
Well, I mean, I think I’ll come back to this – China’s foreign policy setting that is very much viewed through the prisms of US–China relations.
Ben Bland
Hmmm.
Dr Yu Jie
And there’s a long sense of suspicion that India will be really the bulwark against counterbalance of China’s regional influence, and I think that’s the key reason that China has always been quite hesitant to admit the role of India within larger region. But also, I think whe – very interestingly, the two countries have the huge difference in terms of its foreign policy orientation. China is obsessed with its neighbours, whereas India is obsessed by its global status, so that seems to be this two standing contrast against each other. So, that sense of obsession and that also determined that India, even though it want to become a regional power, where China would not allow to be. So, then, secondly, that India want to become – having this global outrage, where China is also trying to somehow counterbalance India’s influence.
Now, also, I think qui – what is quite revealing is also, if we come back to earlier, when you asking about the diplomatic importance, that sense of asymmetry, if we just look around, I mean, Chietigj and I, we actually find out this very interesting pattern. By the way, that was in the report, so feel free to have a look into. That in the last 30 years or so, almost every single Foreign Secretary of India have actually worked as – stationed as Ambassador to Beijing, probably also as Ambassador to United States. And however, if we counting through all the previous Chinese Foreign Ministers, I think ever since 1989, not a single one has actually stationed in India. So, that actually to demonstrate to you, that sense of diplomatic asymmetry that each other and how they see each other.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Just to…
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah, hmmm hmm.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…add to that point.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, I think that the point that we make in the report is there’s a material and a perceptual asymmetry. So, the material asymmetry is well recognised, you know, the Chinese economy being five times larger than that of India. But the perceptual asymmetry is the fact that – is – as what Yu Jie was alluding to, is that, you know, the Indians care far more about China than China cares about India. The fact that five of the last Indian Foreign Secretaries have served as Ambassador to…
Ben Bland
Including Ambassador Rao.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
…to China, including Ambassador Rao, is reflective of that, and it’s almost as many that – as have served as Ambassador to United States. And also, this is reflected in public opinion, you know, that the Indians regard China as the most significant threat to India. Whereas it’s almost, I would say, a degree of ambivalence in – when you look at India – Chinese public opinion towards India and what role it has to play in the world.
Ben Bland
And Ambassador Rao, I wonder, how did you feel that played out when you were working in China and on China? Do you feel this, kind of, asymmetry in how you were treated, or how the Indian side was received by the Chinese side over the years?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, I wouldn’t say that I saw that in the way I was treated. You know, the Chinese have, you know, their set procedures and approaches in dealing with all foreigners, and – including Diplomats stationed in Beijing. There is a, kind of, scripted way in which they handle diplomacy. But I’d like to refer to what Yu Jie said about India being obsessed by global status, and I – reading through the paper, Yu Jie’s and Chietigj’s paper, I would completely agree that sovereignty and status are at the heart of this relationship, and – you know, from both sides, because they regard each other – regard themselves as civilizational states.
Secondly, you know, India’s neighbourhood is very important to it, and if you draw concentric lines about how – India’s strategic worldview, the neighbourhood comes first. And the neighbourhood policy that India pursues is the Neighbourhood First Policy, and that’s just not a shibboleth, it’s not just a slogan, it’s not just a mantra. It’s important for India, it’s very vital and, you know, South Asia is essentially meant to be an integer and South Asia is meant to be more regionally integrated and connected. However, the, you know, problems leftover from history continue to complicate the situation as far as that is concerned.
So, to answer your question in brief, yes, when I was in Beijing, I really didn’t feel disadvantaged in any way, and there was a substance – there is a substance to the India–China relationship that provides the fuel, really, for us to take this forward. And – but what has happened in the last few years, especially since Galwan, is a very, very obvious and palpable, tangible trust deficit between the two countries, which is really what is the problem we deal with today.
Ben Bland
Thanks. Chietigj, I want to ask you about, sort of, how, you know, the UK, Europe, the US, views India, and how far that’s through – refracted through the lens of China. ‘Cause it’s interesting what Yu Jie was saying about how China sees India through a US lens. I mean, do you think much of the, kind of, love-in we’ve seen in the last few years between Western governments and India has really been about the, sort of, search for bulwarks or counterbalance against China?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, I think there has – and this is – you know, there has been this tendency to look at India through the prism of the West, and particularly the United States’ own strategic rivalry with China. So, whether it be of India as some, sort of, alternative market or a manufacturing cha – centre, or a engine of global growth, or as – in broader geopolitical and strategic terms. But I think this overlooks three key points, which have already been alluded to some degree.
First is India’s economic dependence on China. The second is India’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. Which essentially means it engages all major polls of influence in the international system, including countries with which the West has a history of difficult relations. So, it includes Russia, Iran, but also China, and then the fact that these are two countries which have similar world views. So, I think as a result of these, you know, these, there’s a tendency to, sort of, misperceive what role India can play as a potential counterbalance or bulwark against the rise of China.
Ben Bland
And Ambassador Rao, you’re in Washington now. I mean, do you think – do you get a sense that in the US, and in the West, more generally, people understand India’s relationship with China, or do you think there’s a degree of, sort of, wishful thinking or misreading of the extent to which India might be willing to align with the West and against China?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, I completely agree with what has been said in the paper, that it – the India–China relationship is very poorly understood, in general, and perhaps more so in the West. Well, from my perspective here in Washington, one can obviously sense and observe and note that the return of President Trump has sharpened US–China rivalry, particularly on the trade and tariff front, and the general impression may be that India is under pressure to align more closely with Washington. But as you are probably aware, we are very clear, and I think that’s the sense you’ll get if you speak to Delhi, is that strategic autonomy isn’t up for negotiation.
And secondly, I think both President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi have spoken about, you know, ensuring that there’s more stability in the relationship between India and China, and there’s talk of ‘healthy competition’, which is – which are the words that Mr Modi used, and – when he spoke in a recent podcast with Lex Fridman. And there is always, of course – and I spoke about the ‘scripted nature’ of the diplomacy between China and the rest of the world, and particularly with India, there’s all this talk about ‘civilizational heritage’. So, at this moment, I think both countries are trying to see how more stability can be introduced into the relationship. Is there a thaw? I wouldn’t say so. Perhaps, yes, but we’re walking with our eyes open.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah, maybe I can just add in here. We seems to – focusing so much on the divergence, like, while we’re sitting here, or we’re sitting among the G7 countries, to look into China and India. However, from what we have understand so far, it seems to be there’s loads of convergence between the two countries, as well. I mean, I just want to give a one very interesting number, which I even found surprising myself. So, throughout 2023, if you look into the vote within the UN General Assembly, that China and India actually have that sense of alignment together, so around 81% of all the votes that China and the India voting around the same pattern. Whereas how much US and India aligned, only around 36%.
So, this actually indicate to you the world view that actually China and India has shared so much in common. I mean, for example, the right to development that China has been advocated quite extensively within the UN and that also shared with India, and so together with many other elements of the global governance. So, I think that sense of a convergence, and if the West really truly want to understand India and then that sense of convergence to be pay attention to.
Ben Bland
Well, Yu Jie, you’re obviously such a prescient Analyst that you pre-empted my next question…
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
If I may…
Ben Bland
…just digging a bit deep…
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
If I may come in here, Ben, just momentarily. I think what we have to understand is that, you know, there is perhaps a reason why we talk about ‘divergence’. Because when you focus on public discourse in either country, and I believe that’s the sense we get from the grassroots in China, also, that the relationship is more about sovereignty when it comes to territorial disputes. It’s about trying to maintain the dialogue, no doubt, but there are certain beliefs and certain attitudes and certain approaches that people in both countries share about each other, and I think we have to tackle that, you know. And there is also that political consensus that we see in India about, you know, being firm about our disputes with China, and that’s how the atmosphere, and that’s how the situation has developed over the last few years, and we have to contend with these realities.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Just to add to that…
Ben Bland
Yeah, I was just going to…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah.
Ben Bland
…say, could you maybe dig a bit deeper, Chietigj, into some of the other areas of convergence? ‘Cause Yu Jie talked a bit about it, but I think there’s more to say, right?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, I mean, Yu Jie referred to their voting patterns in the United Nations. I think it’s an important to capture the nuance of this, that both of these countries, while they’re pursuing, you know, maybe overlapping positions, they’re pursuing them in parallel, rather than in convergence. So, you can see in a lot of areas, the right to development taking precedence over climate concerns, for instance. Their position on freedom of navigation, both countries impo – oppose, to a degree, the innocent passage of military vessels through their exclusive economic zone without prior consent. Both, I think are – I won’t say openly oppose, but maintain similar positions on issues of humanitarian intervention, of the responsibility to protect. We can see this in their relations with non or weak democratic regimes, whether it be Iran, whether it be Russia, Myanmar, for instance. So, I think there’s a high degree of overlap, but there’s not, I would say, explicit co-ordination or co-operation between both countries in these positions on these issues.
Ben Bland
So, what about in institutions like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where India and China are both present? You know, these organisations, in some senses, explicitly or implicitly, are, sort of, anti-Western. What – I mean, what are the countries actually doing together inside these organisations? Is it all just hollow talk, or is there there’s something to it, from the India–China perspective?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I frankly regard that as a, you know, a potential faultline in the bilateral relationship, and you see a growing, I think, divergence, to a degree. You know, India is trying to promote a non-Western but not an explicitly anti-Western worldview. So, I think it’s increasingly out of sync with countries like China and Russia in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. I mean, take that as an example, in 2023, India hosted the G20 Summit, it was a very high profile presidency it held of the G20. The same year it held the presidency of the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was very row – low profile, it was a virtual summit. Last year’s SCO summit, Prime Minister Modi did not attend. I think – when I was in New Delhi, doing research for this paper, I mean, I was talking to, you know, a lot of Scholars and former policymakers on this issue. I mean, they – there is, for instance, a shared concern by India and China about the weaponisation of the dollar, particularly in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
But in terms of the approach to address that concern, I think there’s a divergence. You know, one of the people I quoted, they said, “We don’t want to, you know, replace a dollar-denominated international system with a renminbi or yuan-dominated system.” So, there are also concerns about the trajectory of the BRICS that may – perhaps India’s influence has being diluted to some degree with the BRICS’ expansion. India sees the BRICS primarily through the – through an economic prism, and it doesn’t see it – and perhaps China and Russia look – regard it more through a geopolitical prism and a means through which China can promote its global development, global security, global civilization initiative. So, there this is a degree, although India and China are part of these initiatives, you know, non-Western initiatives, there is a degree of divergence, even within these forums.
Ben Bland
I’m going to ask one more question before I turn to questions from the audience, so put your thinking caps on. And I’m going to ask about, you know, the Pakistan factor in the…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Sure.
Ben Bland
…India–China relationship, and maybe I’ll come to you first, Ambassador Rao. So, how important is the Pakistan relationship for India and China, and how far do you think, you know, that is an important driver of where the relationship goes in the next few years?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
And this is where the neighbourhood comes in, and the China–Pakistan relationship, as you know, is – has been very strong, it has endured, it is resilient. To what extent, you know, China is an active backer of Pakistan in the current state of tensions between India and Pakistan, one really can’t say. This is a situation that is developing as we speak. I know that militarily, or at least from the defence and security point of view, China and Chinese arms, have flowed into Pakistan. There is very much of a strong defence relationship there that we cannot discount.
But as I said, I mean – and, also, on the issue of Kashmir, which, as you know, has been at the centre of the dispute as far as Pakistan is concerned, with India particularly, the Chinese have essentially backed the Pakistani case. And the fact that they have – are building the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, they built the Karakoram Highway in the late 70s in that disputed area of Kashmir, which is currently occupied by Pakistan. So, these are all issues that continue to complicate the relationship and exactly refer to the neighbourhood policy that we spoke of earlier in this discussion.
So, China’s influence, essentially, and I think this is something that the discussion should take note of, its influence in South Asia has definitely risen over the last couple of decades. And at the same time, you know, China would like to see India confined to South Asia, and that’s something that has been mentioned, I think, in the paper too. Whereas India is looking at its presence in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific and of course, as a leader of the Global South. So, so many contradictions in this relationship today that we have to juggle with at the same time.
Ben Bland
Yeah, we haven’t actually discussed the ‘string of pearls’ yet, which is interesting. Yu Jie, and then…
Dr Yu Jie
Sure.
Ben Bland
…Chietigj.
Dr Yu Jie
It’s just, I mean, really for me, back down the bigger question is, can China actually assume that sense of global leadership when it come to the moment of a crisis? And if we look into what has happening in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, and that would be naturally – China will be the natural mediator and come in to get involved. And however, I think Beijing has continuously to decide to actually practice its foreign policy based on economic statecraft but not based on security statecraft. So, I think, overall, that really, for me back – now the bigger question is, with all this heavy investment that has been deeply entrenched within Pakistan in the past few years, and China obviously that would require to have a very strong security role to be present within the region, but is China firstly able to do so, but more importantly, is China willing to do?
Ben Bland
I’m not sure India would regard China as a natural mediator with Pakistan, but…
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
No, I…
Ben Bland
…Chietigj, last word on this to you.
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
…don’t believe so.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
I think far from it, but I think that’s an interesting point. I mean, China has also had its frustrations with Pakistan in recent years. I don’t think it’s got its return on investment through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. I mean, looking at the most – the current instabilities that are going on in the India-Pakistan relationship, officially, of course, right, Beijing maintains a neutral position. It’s called both sides to exercise restraint, but clearly, it’s leaned in Pakistan’s favour, through its statements. It’s referred to it as its ‘ironclad friend’. It said that it understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. Looking at this in a broader context, over 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports over the last five years have come from China. China has blocked India’s efforts at placing Pakistan-based terrorists on UN sanctions lists, and as we’ve heard, Chi – you know, China is also a party to the Kashmir dispute through its claim in Aksai Chin, eastern Ladakh, and the slice of territory that Pakistan handed over to China in 1963.
So, I think, you know, China’s position is far from neutral. In terms of what its actions will be in the coming days, weeks and months, I think much depends on how evel – developments unfold. If we si – see signs of this tensions between India and Pakistan, sort of, escalating to a broader conventional conflict, or even a potential nuclear conflict, I think it will play a more hands-on role. And just to – you know, finally, just to note that I think from India’s perspective, or in terms of looking at it – perspective from Indian military planners, the worst-case scenario for it is to fra – face a potential two-front war, dealing with both China and Pakistan at the same time. I think this is frankly very unlikely. The last time we saw a situation of that magnitude was during the 1971 war. So, I think, yeah, you know, China’s position is complex. I think India would not really accept it as a neutral mediator.
But just perhaps one last point. It’s interesting to note that the day that India launched these military strikes into Pakistan, the same day, India announced the conclusion of a free trade agreement with the United Kingdom. So, I think we often talk about a “geopolitical risk premium” when we talk about, you know, doing business in China. There’s a geopolitical risk premium when it comes to India given its unstable periphery.
Ben Bland
Thanks, Chietigj. Alright…
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
I’d like to…
Ben Bland
…over to you – sorry…
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
I’d like…
Ben Bland
…Ambassador Rao.
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
…to say that I see, you know, what Chietigj has been just observing. And, you know, when it comes to China, as far as Kashmir is concerned today, to use corporate jargon, China is very much a related party in this. Because it is in occupation, as India sees it, of territory in Ladakh, which is – which forms, as you know, the – part of the historic region of Jammu and Kashmir. And also there is this whole dispute with Pakistan for the fac – or based on the fact that it handed over territory which is disputed between India and Pakistan in Kashmir to China in 1963, under the so-called ‘Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement.’ So, China, it really cannot, as again, to use corporate jargon, execute any arm’s length transactions in this regard.
Ben Bland
Okay, thanks for that, Ambassador Rao. So, yeah, over to you, please raise your hand if you have a question, and tell us who you are and make it a question, not a statement, please. Let me see, where should I start? Maybe over there, at the back, the lady with the glasses and the white shirt.
Caroline
Oh.
Ben Bland
Just wait for mic to come to you, please.
Caroline
Okay, thank you. Hi, my name is Caroline, I’m a student at SOAS. Both China and India share a border with Myanmar, and Myanmar has often acted as a buffer state between the two states, both with China and India. Is there a possibility that with the ongoing civil war happening in Myanmar that either India or China will try to assert control or dominance onto the country to control the buffer between these two states?
Ben Bland
Ambassador Rao, do you have a view on that, or Chietigj?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, I’d just like to say that Myanmar is a particularly difficult challenge for India today. And I know that – we’re aware that the China–Myanmar economic relationship has continued to expand, even despite all the changes in Myanmar, and Beijing is engaging both military leaders and armed rebel groups. So, it’s a, kind of, dual track approach that allows China to hedge its bets and secure its interests, regardless of who holds power in Naypyidaw. But for India, the stakes are very high, and because we share a border with Myanmar and instability there spills over into our very sensitive northeast. So, we are trying to find ways to engage more deeply with Myanmar, not just to counter China, but to ensure peace and stability in our own backyard, and that, into my mind, requires unconventional diplomacy and very difficult conversations.
Ben Bland
Great, and next round, maybe one at the front here.
Domenic Carratu
Thank you. Domenic Carratu, member of Chatham House. Thank you very much, very interesting discussion. You teased out some of the complexities of the situation, and certainly, to me, that whole region of Asia is going to be so important for the coming decades, more than Europe. The question – we’ve talked about the US and the role and the inverse relationship, what about Russia? So, historically, India had close ties. Of late, you’ve got this, sort of, partnership between China and Russia. To what extent is relationships with Russia going to help determine the Indian-Chinese bilateral relationship?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
So, I think Russia is – it’s an – has an interesting role. It’s both a subject and an object of the bilateral relationship. So, I mean, it’s interesting to note, with present tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, we’ve seen reports that, you know, China has poten – has been expediting the delivery of defence platforms to Pakistan, and Russia is perhaps doing the same with India. So, you can see that there’s not a meeting of the minds between Russia and China, you know, despite claims of their so-called “no limits partnership.”
I think Russia has, on occasion, tried to mediate, maybe informally, in tensions between both countries, through their – you know, the Russia–China–India Trilateral Forum. We saw the BRICS Summit that took place last year, it was interesting to note that the border agreement that was reached was concluded shortly before the BRICS summit, which took place in Kazan, and there’s a precedent of this taking place. When we had previous border tensions in 2017 in Doklam, again, that took pl – they were resolved shortly before the BRICS summit took place. So, I think, you know, Russia has a, you know, a vested interest in trying to stabilise relations between both countries.
At the same time, I think India has maintained – continue – you know, regards Russia as a key strategic partner. Part of this is because of its heavy dependence on Russian-made defence platforms, it’s heavily – dependence on discounted Russian crude, but there’s also a strategic component to it. It wants to ensu – you know, whereas the – large parts of the West, you know, may regard Russia as a lost cause, I don’t think that’s the view from New Delhi. They see that maintaining that relationship with Moscow offers Russia strategic options and ensures that it doesn’t become completely beholden to Beijing. Which is why for a – you know, India, I think has been among the most positive, or least concerned by the emergence of the, you know, the second Trump administration and its outreach to Russia, ‘cause it sees it as a means of reducing Russia’s strategic dependence on Beijing.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm hmm.
Ben Bland
We know that Xi Jinping is in Moscow right now. Yu Jie, I mean, does China feel it gets a harsh ride compared to India on its relationship with Russia, ‘cause India has, sort of, maintained quite extensive economic relations, but is seen as a friend of the West, and China is seen as the enabler?
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah, I mean, seeing – really seeing it from Beijing, I’ve heard numerous – that sense of annoyance from the Chinese senior policymaker, by saying Beijing and New Delhi actually taking very similar position regarding Russia’s invasion towards Ukraine, and the wider collective West choose to remember China’s fault, but not necessarily for India’s fault. So, that seems to be that sense of annoyance actually further complicated China–India relationship in here.
And I think, obviously, on the other hand, and what we also have in here is the border issue between China–Russia, which I have alluded in the previous Chatham House event. I don’t need to spend time to talk about in here, but I think nevertheless, what we’re going to say is that I think both China and India has taken rather transactional approach when it come to diplomacy. And that is the very similar approach that we will not see in this part of world, but that sense of by being transactional is something being commonly shared between Beijing and New Delhi, yeah.
Ben Bland
And Ambassador, I think you served in Russia, as well. How much would – should India be worrying about the, you know, the deepening partnership between China and Russia?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Obviously, we cannot ignore that deepening partnership between Russia and China, which is why I believe that India has maintained very strong ties with Russia, because India, in many ways, is an omnidirectional country, as I say. It faces every direction, north, south, east and west. That’s the way we are, you know, that is the gift of geography to us. And when it comes to our relationship with China and the huge land border that we share with China, this is a border that is very much oriented towards the Central Asian landmass and the areas of influence for Russia, as we know, historically. So, it is important to maintain those channels of communication with Russia.
And I believe when it comes to our policy of multi-alignment and the fact that strategic autonomy defines our approach to the world, we have maintained those ties with Russia because they serve our geopolitical and security interest, and also enable us to ensure a, kind of, balance and equilibrium when it comes to the situation we face on our borders and in terms of the world around us.
Ben Bland
Great, thank you. Next question. Yeah, maybe a question over here at the front. We haven’t taken one from this side yet [pause].
Saddam Hakim
Hi, my name is Saddam Hakim from Politics with Hakim. My question is to the Ambassador and Chietigj. How do you assess, given the current hostility between Pakistan and India, the potential implication for regional stability, particularly for Afghanistan, which shares both historical and strategic ties with both countries? What do you suggest how the current interim government of Taliban should take this for their national interest? Thank you.
Ben Bland
Thanks for the question. Ambassador Rao, do you want to go first on Afghanistan?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
I think that’s a difficult question, because one really doesn’t know how the current dispensation in Afghanistan views the tensions between India and Pakistan. But traditionally, you know, Pakistan has played both Afghanistan and India as far as its foreign policy is concerned, and there has been a lot of involvement in terms of, you know, what we see as the fallout of the actions of terror groups operating from Pakistani soil, both in Afghanistan and in India. So, in that sense, for both Afghanistan and India, this aspect of Pakistan deploying proxies against both our countries continues to be a matter of very grave concern.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Yeah, just to add my two cents. So, I think what we see is that the geopolitics of South Asia is in flux. I mean, we see, in some ways, Afghanistan is, to some degree, moving closer to India, while distance itself from Pakistan. We’ve seen several border skirmishes between both sides. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, had met the Afghan Foreign Minister earlier this year. In November the Taliban appointed a Acting Consul General in Mumbai and India reopened its embassy in 2022.
So, I mean, you can see – and you could say the flipside of that is what’s happening in the Bangladesh–India relationship, where the relationship has been deteriorating since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted last August, while the relationship has been deepening between Bangladesh, or Dhaka and Islamabad. So, I think that, you know, it just reflects this is broader regional instability and the fact that the geopolitics is in a degree of flux.
Ben Bland
There’s been a couple of interesting questions online from Meera Gopal and Anna Lamont, which I’ll try and combine. So, you know, we’ve talked about how China and India do see eye to eye on some issues, like the right to development, climate change, to a certain extent, freedom of navigation. What would it take for China and India to meaningfully co-operate on these kinds of questions? You know, if they actually want to shift global norms, they’re probably going to need to work together on these questions. So, what would it take for meaningful international co-operation on these areas of convergence, as opposed to just working on these issues in parallel?
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Well, I think you can, again, look to the past, and I’m sure Ambassador Rao might have some insights. So, look at the issue of climate, for instance. So, at one point in time, you know, India and China were very much in sync on their climate positions. If you look during the Copenhagen summit in 2009, with the – through the grouping of the basic group of countries, which was Brazil, South Africa, India and China. But I think we’ve seen a growing divergence over time by both countries.
I mean, they still – you know, there’s a degree of overlap, they talk about phasing down, rather than phasing out, coal. They talk about common but differentiated responsibilities for emerging countries and advanced economies. But I think we’re also seeing India increasingly distancing itself from China’s position. I think that it reflects the fact that there are differing stages of development. I think it also reflects that India has growing willingness to co-operate with Western countries on climate initiatives, so the International Solar Alliance with France, for instance, the Global Biofuels Alliance. So, I think the relationship is actually, frankly, moving in reverse, reflecting their, you know, their di – the differing stages of development.
Dr Yu Jie
I mean, just to add, I think it’s also, from the beginning, like – but having China so-called “challenging the existing international order,” it’s not really the challenge as a wholesale manner, but it’s really to adding extra chairs on the table. Of that time, I think it was actually quite convenient to have India and China to work together. I think we’re really bypassing that stage for now. So, by letting the two co-ordinate together within systems, like within the UN, so on and so forth, that would actually require very strong external forces, the third country that completely changing its position. For example, if United States decided to retreat from certain UN agencies, and that perhaps would provide – if both Beijing and New Delhi seized the opportunity to taking the share leadership, and that would actually persuade both side work together, yeah.
Ben Bland
So, if the UK really wants India on the UN Security Council, we might – if we offer them our seat, China might be okay with that, but they’re not going to add an extra seat for India.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Just to add to that. I mean, I think the Trump administration’s, you know, erratic foreign policies, it has created more space in the international system for countries like China and India to step up, but it’s also creating a competition between both countries for control of that space. So, I still don’t see that convergence really emerging.
Ben Bland
Ambassador Rao.
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Yeah, you know, this is where competitive co-existence comes in and, you know, China, the question we need to answer – I mean, there’s a lot of sweet talk that comes up from China when they talk about relations between India and China, and how we represent 40% of the world’s population, and all that kind of thing. But the fact is, you know, in terms of leadership of the Global South, China and India, vie which – with each other. They are competitors, and the core question of expansion of the permanent seats on the UN Security Council, the number of permanent seats, and this is where China is very distinctly opposed to India getting a seat. So, I think there are very basic questions to be addressed in this regard, and these are the truths that China has to face and answer.
Ben Bland
Thanks. Okay, we’ve probably got time for one or two more, so I might just take two. Maybe the lady here at the front, and then the gentleman at the back with a very high hand. We’ll go to him first, he’s there.
Ifti Haq
Thank you so much. Ifti Haq, Department for Business and Trade. It was interesting to listen to all the three panellist. The question I wanted to ask is the Bangladesh question. Bangladesh has – now has exported a lot of humans into Europe and Canada and Australia and the UK traditionally, and they have a influence in terms of what is happening in Bangladesh currently. China recently has signed a contract with Dr Yunus for a huge amount of grant and funding. Has India dropped the ball on how much influence it has in terms of regional partners, ‘cause in two years’ time you’ll have a Lord Mayor from a Bangladeshi heritage in the UK?
Ben Bland
Yeah, and…
Ifti Haq
Thank you.
Ben Bland
…at the front, we’ll just take this question as well at the same time. Yeah, so just wait for the mic.
Dr Yu Jie
Just wait for the mic.
Ben Bland
Yeah, just wait for the mic.
Massoumeh Torfeh
Okay.
Ben Bland
It’s coming, okay.
Massoumeh Torfeh
Masuma [inaudible – 56:32] London School of Economics. I want to go back to this Russia question. President Xi in Moscow today is celebrating Second World victories with Russia. This is, I think, a very potent statement against the West, if you like, or some, kind of, a statement against the West. Russia–China also have a lot of interest in this parallel financial system that could be detrimental, too. I want to know what India thinks about that financial system. I know that they are not objection – objecting to it, but I want to know how involved they are in that question.
Ben Bland
Yeah, and you should go back – we had Mr Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister, here, he was asked a few questions about de-dollarisation, so have a look at that, as well. But maybe, Ambassador Rao on Bangladesh, and then, Chietigj, do you want to…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
Sure.
Ben Bland
…talk about the financial question?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
Well, I’m…
Ben Bland
So, has India dropped the ball on Bangladesh vis-à-vis China?
Ambassador Nirupama Menon Rao
No, I don’t think we dropped the ball, as far as I’m aware, because India and Bangladesh, I mean, it’s such a crucial, vital relationship that we share, regardless of political changes there, or the current developments that one has witnessed. I think the challenge for Indian foreign policy today is to see how this relationship with Bangladesh moves forward, and likewise, for Bangladesh. And I assume that the orientation and the intention is that we should, as soon as possible, restore stability in this relationship, because it’s just so bounded by shared borders and the fact that these borders are porous, and the people to people relationships. And the fact that India’s national security is so, so connected, so intimately connected, to what happens in this region. And therefore, we will – we cannot afford to drop the ball, to answer your question.
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
You know, I may just slightly disagree with the Ambassador’s earlier points on this. You know, I know that India maintains this – officially maintains this Neighbourhood First Policy, but the reality is I think – and I had actually posed this question to Minister Jaishankar when he had spoke here – spoken here in March, is can India, you know, rise without its region? Can it rise when it faces three countries in its periphery which are in the midst of IMF bailouts, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan? You have two countries which could be regarded as failed, or near failed states, you know, Myanmar and Afghanistan, and two countries with which it maintains active territorial disputes, you know, China and Pakistan, and I would argue, no.
And what we see is, you know, a very low level of institutional and particularly economic integration within South Asia. Intra-regional trade in South Asia is among the lowest in the world, it may be the lowest in the world. I think it’s five to 7% of total ra – trade is intra-regional trade, compared to, say, about 25% for Southeast Asia. So, I think, you know, when one talks about India, and when – in particular, we tend to talk more about its global aspirations, its relations with major powers, its G20 presidency, its space programme, and the region sometimes tends to fall off the radar.
I was just at the Raisina Dialogue in March, they discussed everything under the sun, no discussion about what developments – in its neighbourhood. And, you know, a week later, I was at the Boao Forum in China, and it was all about the neighbourhood. So, again, you know, so, I think there is a degree of perhaps, you know, perhaps benign neglect, which has seeped into India’s neighbourhood relationship.
Ben Bland
And we’ve just got 30 seconds left on this financial question about, sort of, I guess, alternatives to the dollar and China–India co-operation or competition.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah…
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee
No, go on.
Dr Yu Jie
…sure. I think this de-dollarisation is more of a Russia initiative rather than a China initiative, because China clearly knows that, you know, the exuberant privilege of US dollars is no way to be discounted, given what is happening. So, really, it will be something of fair-fetched [means far-fetched] dream for Russia’s end, it’s not necessarily for India and China on this. But what they could have is they could have that sense of currency bilateral swap between either China–Russia or India and Russia, as such. So, that is the mechanism that has been set up. But we’re talking about BRICS currency, it’s perhaps something quite in a distant dream.
Now, if we come back to the Bangladesh question in here, it’s more to do with – I mean, that we’re questioning the sense of the economic statecraft. Fine, we have this big power, China–India in here, but to what extent both powers will be able to effectively utilise its economic statecraft, I think for that point China’s still quite well ahead of India on that regard.
Ben Bland
Okay, well, we’re out of time for today’s discussion, but do keep an eye out on future events. As I said, we’ve got one coming up in the next two weeks on the crisis in India–Pakistan relations. We’ve also got another event looking at how Trump is impacting Asia’s economies, featuring the Malaysian Trade and Investment Minister, which should be great. But for now, thank you for joining us, and please join me in a round of applause for all our great participants [applause]. Thanks.
