Institutional Corruption? Incentives, 'Political Money' and Markets for Access in the US and the UK
This meeting will see the launch of a Chatham House-CAGE briefing paper with title Institutional Corruption? Incentives, 'Political Money' and Markets for Access in the US and the UK. The paper investigates the rise of special interest influence in the US and UK by examining evidence on lobbying, campaign contributions and the 'revolving door' between government and business. It raises the question whether special interest influence is contributing to institutional corruption – that the money associated with special interest influence is affecting the incentives of politicians and subverting the making of public policy. The author will argue that greater political regulation in the form of transparency and disclosure laws is needed as a first step in defending against institutional corruption.
This briefing paper is the 14th publication in the Chatham House-CAGE series, published in partnership with the Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) at the University of Warwick.
Attendance at this event is by invitation only.