11 February 2014
Andrew Monaghan
Dr Andrew Monaghan
Former Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme


Russian opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov speaks during a news conference on 'Corruption and Abuse in Sochi Olympics' 30 January 2014 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images.
Russian opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov speaks during a news conference on 'Corruption and Abuse in Sochi Olympics' 30 January 2014 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images.


Russia’s leaders are not ignoring the serious damage that endemic corruption does to the country. But the sheer scale and entrenched nature of the problem mean a dedicated, system-wide fight remains one of Vladimir Putin’s most daunting tasks.

Allegations of corruption on a colossal scale have provided one of the main stories surrounding the Winter Olympics in Sochi. Opposition figures, such as Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalniy, have asserted that the games have been a ‘thieves’ caper’ with as much as half of an overall $50 billion expenditure lost to kickbacks, levelling accusations of complicity at those at the highest levels of power. The International Olympic Committee’s Gian Franco Kasper suggested that one third of the budget was lost to corruption, and contracts went to a ‘construction mafia’.

Senior Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, have rejected these allegations, stating that the figures are misleading since they confuse the total expenditure for the development of Sochi and the specific spending on the Olympic facilities. They also counter that if the accusers have serious evidence, they should submit it to the law enforcement agencies.

But in the past the leadership has acknowledged that a problem exists, illustrated not least by its attempts to address it. In 2010, then-president Dmitri Medvedev ordered the prosecutor general to investigate Sochi-related corruption. Criminal proceedings were opened and a number of contractors and officials dismissed, even from positions in the Kremlin. Citing sources in the Kremlin, Russian media suggested that Nikolai Mikheev, head of the Main Control Directorate of the Presidential Administration, and his deputy Sergei Sysolyatin were dismissed (though the connection with corruption was officially denied). More recently, in February 2013, during a visit to Sochi, Vladimir Putin delivered a series of public rebukes for delays and cost overruns, and Akhmed Bilalov, vice president of the Russian Olympic Committee, was fired.

The scale of the allegations relating to the games in Sochi is remarkable indeed. But corruption goes well beyond Sochi, and so pervades Russian life that author Dmitri Bykov has suggested that it is a ‘tradition’. Officials also acknowledge this, asserting the need to ‘create a public climate that rejects corruption’.

There are several other prominent ongoing corruption scandals. Large sums were embezzled, for instance, from the budget of the preparations for the APEC summit held in the Russian Far East in 2012. Investigations and arrests followed, including of Roman Panov, the prime minister of Perm territory and ex-minister of regional development. Another is the Oboronservis fraud case involving the illegal sale of Ministry of Defence property, the investigation of which has engulfed Anatoly Serdyukov, a member of Putin’s leadership team, leading to his dismissal as minister of defence and subsequent criminal charges being brought against him.

But corruption goes much wider and can be said to strike at the very core of the Russian leadership’s own strategic agenda. In 2009, Dmitri Medvedev stated that officials ‘almost openly’ steal a significant portion of money allocated to the North Caucasus, and Chief Military Prosecutor Sergei Fridinsky has suggested that some 20 per cent of the state arms procurement budget is misappropriated. The housing and utilities development programme is another high priority that Putin himself acknowledges is hampered by significant corruption.

Addressing this widespread problem will therefore be central to achieving the aims Putin set out in his May 2012 edicts. In particular, expenditure needs to be more efficient to meet the extraordinary costs of building the range of infrastructure the country needs while economic growth remains much slower than the required five per cent.

Putin has also sought to reinvigorate a broader, long-running anti-corruption drive throughout the country. This drive includes three main elements. First is the reorganization of the relevant official bodies, including the creation of an anti-corruption directorate in the Presidential Administration, which centralizes the work previously done by several directorates.

Second, a plethora of new legislation has raised the salaries of ministers and other officials while obliging them to declare personal information on incomes and property, and forbidding foreign banking arrangements. New legislation also covers tenders for state contracts and expenditure.

Third, senior figures such as Sergei Ivanov, Igor Sechin and Alexander Bastrykin have led major audits of government structures, state companies and law enforcement bodies. Nearly 3,000 civil servants are now subject to legal liability, and 200 have been dismissed, including five from federal executive agencies and some 160 from regional offices of federal government.

So far, this attempt appears to be having some success, acknowledged by an improvement in Transparency International’s ratings. But legislation, dismissals and arrests are one thing, while punishment has remained another. Vyacheslav Dudko, an ex-regional governor and member of United Russia, was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison, but he remains in a small minority: just eight per cent of those found guilty of taking bribes are in jail.

Given the scale of the problem, the anti-corruption campaign will take considerable persistence to succeed. It will also require careful balancing in three ways. First, it will require the balancing of resources since the (necessarily) large scale of the campaign absorbs much of the leadership’s time and resources that are also required elsewhere. Second, it requires careful political balancing: as so often with such projects, it offers opportunities to settle scores and build bureaucratic empires.

Finally, corruption sits on the heart of the Russian body politic. Previous anti-corruption drives have run aground in part because they have so constricted that heart of that system that the economy has stopped: the operation was successful, but the patient died. How to operate successfully and keep the patient alive is the difficult but central task of the Russian leadership.

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