Turkish politics has been predictable for more than a generation. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP Justice and Development Party, who came to power after the 2002 election, have centralized decision-making and control over state institutions to an extent unprecedented since the founding of the modern republic in 1923.
In the first five years of his tenure, Erdogan enacted reforms to initiate European Union accession negotiations, adopted a conciliatory stance on the Kurdish question, and implemented an International Monetary Fund restructuring programme negotiated by the previous government.
Abroad, he pursued a ‘zero problems with the neighbours’ policy and pushed for the reunification of Cyprus under a United Nations peace plan that was ultimately rejected by the Greek Cypriots.
In 2007, however, Erdogan began to deploy ideology, both religious and nationalist, to curry favour with an electorate, 70 per cent of whom are traditionally conservative, while boosting growth through credit-fuelled consumption and construction – the ‘Triple C’ economy. As this spending spree powered ahead and he improved public service delivery to the poor, he managed to keep global financial markets onside to fund a gaping current account deficit.
His confrontational leadership style took advantage of the many divisions plaguing the country: Turkish nationalism versus Kurdish nationalism; sectarian in the form of Sunni Islam versus Alevi Islam; and ideological in the form of Islam versus secularism. According to a GMF/Istanbul Bilgi University 2017 survey, 78 per cent of respondents disapproved of their daughter marrying a supporter of the ‘other party’, while 91 per cent thought that supporters of ‘their own political party’ were ‘honourable’.
All this was helped by the parlous state of the opposition parties, riven by distrust and factionalism. Officialdom easily prevented any coordination among opposition parties that could threaten the AKP’s hold over the legislature, executive branch and judiciary.
Unsurprisingly, Erdogan secured stunning victories in local and national elections. He championed popular causes such as lifting the headscarf ban in government offices, expanded the profile of religion in daily life, railed against perceived injustices in the Middle East and sought to bolster his country’s regional influence. All the while real incomes increased by nearly 70 per cent between 2003-2016.
This potent mix of populism, a Triple C economy and a divided opposition fortified the president in office. But now a new political paradigm is taking shape, marked by more political pluralism and decentralization of authority.
Fatigue with populist ideology is evident. Turkey’s conversion of Hagia Sofia into a mosque, the invasion of northern Syria last October to crush a Kurdish statelet, military intervention in the Libyan quagmire, muscle-flexing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the backing of Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the whipping up of sentiment over the French Charlie Hebdo cartoon affair have led, at most, to minor and fleeting blips in presidential approval ratings.
So vigorously has Erdogan pursued a religious-nationalist agenda that he has unwittingly addressed the gripes once harboured by conservatives and in the process dramatically curtailed their efficacy in Turkish politics.
Nothing signifies the declining appeal of this agenda more than the change in attitudes among the millennial generation which comprises a quarter of the electorate. The median age of the Turkish population is 30.
Konda, a Turkish pollster, carried out a 2019 survey of 5,800 people showing that Turkish millennials are less likely than the wider population to describe themselves as ‘religious conservative’ or to state that they pray or fast regularly, or for women to admit covering their hair. It found that a younger generation – aged 15-29 – was less conservative than the same age group a decade ago. Furthermore, Turkey’s religious establishment is concerned at the accelerating spread among young people of deism – the belief in a spiritual non-interventionist Divine, which contradicts Islamic teachings.
A faltering economy is speeding up these changes. Today, the Triple C model is undermining prosperity, leading to reduced incomes, rising unemployment, ballooning budget deficits, a depreciating lira and narrowing access to public services.
Worryingly, Turkey’s foreign exchange borrowings from its banks has more than doubled from $75 billion to over $150 billion in the past two years, with only $40 billion of reserves, $15 billion of which is in Qatari rials sourced in a swap agreement from Qatar’s central bank. That these foreign exchange loans are likely to continue rising reminds market watchers of the 1994 Mexican currency crisis and this year’s Lebanese financial meltdown.
Populism fatigue and a weakening economy have enabled newly vigorous rivals to make alliances and pry open political space.
The chief opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, defied expectations by creating a formal alliance with the right-of-centre Good Party (Iyi Partisi) and the pro- Islam Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) for the 2018 general elections and the 2019 local elections to match the AKP’s partnership with the National Movement Party.
The Republican People’s Party then widened the circle to include two parties set up by heavyweight AKP renegades, the former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu and ex-economy minister Ali Babacan. In 2019, its candidates defeated the AKP mayors in Ankara and Istanbul in spite of incessant campaigning by the president. These mayors have since grown in stature due to their competent administrations,and rapid response to the COVID-19 crisis, to the chagrin of central government.
Unsurprisingly, Erdogan’s and the ruling alliance’s popularity is steadily declining given their unwillingness to adapt to changing circumstances. Turkish society, particularly the younger cohorts but also the secular and conservative middle classes, is embracing a live-and-let-live tolerance of various lifestyles and aspiring for greener cities, modern education, accountable government and free speech.
The diverse opposition parties from the centre-left to the Islamist right proclaim policy agendas barely distinguishable from each other. In general, they advocate more liberal values while being mindful of the AKP’s conservative base. For example – when in power Babacan, the former economy minister, imposed onerous taxes on alcoholic drinks in successive budgets but now says those levies are ‘unacceptable’.
Unsurprisingly, a consensus is evolving on several issues, such as the need for a new constitution, a return to parliamentary democracy from the recently introduced presidential system, the implementation of market reforms, the widening of freedoms and the need to depoliticize the Religious Affairs Directorate that regulates Sunni Islam. Erdogan’s devotion to statism is, paradoxically, producing greater political pluralism. Polarization still exists in society, but its intensity is subsiding to such an extent that this barrier to strengthening democracy and the rule of law is now seen as surmountable.
As Can Selcuki, co-founder of Istanbul Economy, a polling firm, has noted: ‘The politics of polarization is losing ground in Turkey ... As the demands of its electorate change, the AKP can no longer resort to ideological polarization. This could allow for shifts in the political landscape.’
Turkey is on its way, notwithstanding any volatility in the short term, to one day assuming its rightful role as an inspirational example to its regional neighbours in Europe and the Middle East.