

Giving civil society a stake in Ukraine's recovery

How government, citizens
and donors can work together
to embed trust in reconstruction

Summary

- Ukraine and its international partners should not waste the opportunity to draw on the skills, motivation and resilience of the country's citizens and communities when designing the institutions and mechanisms of recovery. Planning work is well under way, but a clear framework to ensure the meaningful inclusion of citizens and civil society is still lacking.
- A Chatham House survey of Ukrainian civil society organizations reveals that although citizens' groups have been deeply involved in reconstruction and relief work since the outset of the war, many consider themselves sidelined by both national and regional authorities from planning and delivering the recovery.
- Ukraine's citizens need to trust that their government is genuinely there to serve the public interest, and its international partners need to be confident that the resources they pledge are allocated to the greatest benefit of the country and its people. Alongside Ukraine's EU candidate status and work towards a green transition, a culture of trust could be one of the main facilitators of a successful and durable recovery.
- Over the last decade, Ukraine has clearly shown that successful cooperation between the state and civil society can deliver transformative reforms. Building on this record, Ukraine and its international donors should now embed a framework that enables citizens and communities to contribute across all recovery tracks, from the grassroots to the highest levels. This paper offers actionable steps towards this goal.

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


Introduction

The purpose of this briefing paper is to provide a perspective on the role Ukraine’s citizens and civil society can and should play in shaping the country’s recovery. It is directed at civil society organizations (CSOs), the Ukrainian government and the country’s Western partners, with the aim of raising awareness of the key role of citizen engagement in recovery and suggesting ways to better integrate both citizens and CSOs into the process. Most of the analysis is related to what can be done now, even as the war goes on in Ukraine. The work draws principally on insights from a survey of CSOs conducted by Chatham House researchers in November–December 2022.¹ The paper is also informed by discussions held internationally, particularly a Chatham House roundtable hosted in partnership with USAID’s Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) initiative in June 2022, a high-level expert conference convened in Berlin in October 2022, and a Chatham House research roundtable on the role of CSOs and communities in recovery held in March 2023.²

The scale of the recovery challenge

Figure 1. War damage in numbers



Sources: Center for Economic Strategy; Damaged in ua; World Bank; Kyiv Independent; *Ukrainska Pravda*; UNHCR; Kluge and Habicht. For full references, see page 21.

¹ To conduct the survey, Chatham House partnered with the International Renaissance Foundation, the Initiative Center to Support Social Action (ISAR Ednannia), and three CSO coalitions (RISE Ukraine, the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform and Ecoaction Center for Environmental Initiatives). The survey, conducted (via SurveyMonkey) in Ukrainian and made up of 12 structured questions and one ‘open’ question, was circulated to 519 registered CSOs. Of these, 173 groups completed the survey (a response rate of 33 per cent). The geographical distribution of CSOs who completed the survey was: Kyiv-based groups operating only or chiefly at national level (54); regional-level groups (53); and groups working at both national and regional level (66). For each of the 12 structured questions, respondents were asked to pick from a range of responses, with a specific direction depending on the question (single choice; choose three; all relevant choices). For several questions, there was also a free-text field for ‘other’ responses. The structured responses are available via the Chatham House website at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/2023-06-15-chatham-house-survey-ukraine-csos-ukraine-forum.pdf>.

² For a recording of the March 2023 event, see Chatham House (2023), ‘Ukraine’s recovery: What is the role of civil society and local communities?’, research roundtable, 29 March 2023, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/ukraines-recovery-what-role-civil-society-and-local-communities>.

Ukraine's citizens, infrastructure, environment, housing stock, energy sector, hospitals, schools and cultural institutions have all suffered enormous damage since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Millions of people have been displaced, with many fleeing Ukraine; thousands are dead or wounded; and many towns have been razed to the ground. Children's education has been severely disrupted, and young people are suffering stress, anxiety and in some cases severe trauma as a consequence of constant air raids, news about the loss of family members and separation from their parents. Businesses have lost their assets or been forced to relocate, and many of those that have survived have had to find ways to adapt to the loss of external trade routes.

Cities in the west of the country already need to integrate large numbers of IDPs and expand their social infrastructure, while liberated areas and communities in the east may need to rebuild from scratch.

The active phase of the war is far from over, and it will be some time before the full costs – not just in terms of the military effort and physical reconstruction needs, but also in terms of the hardships suffered by Ukraine's citizens – are fully understood. While it can be expected that the experience of the conflict may have some levelling effects and facilitate greater social mobility, it may also create new vested interests around the defence sector, in the awarding of contracts for reconstruction work, or as areas of the economy currently under state control are transferred to private operators. What is already clear is that different regions of Ukraine will have different recovery challenges. Cities in the west of the country already need to integrate large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) and expand their social infrastructure. Liberated areas and communities in the east may need to rebuild from scratch; their priorities are to build new infrastructure, revive the local peacetime economy and create the right conditions for people to return.

Planning post-war recovery now

Ukraine and its international partners are already working to put in place a robust set of interventions to both sustain Ukraine's home front and plan for post-war reconstruction. Key institutions and initiatives that are emerging to underpin recovery efforts include:

- Ukraine Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform – designed to ensure funds are delivered in a transparent, accountable and coordinated manner. With planned secretariats in Kyiv and Brussels, the platform brings together G7 countries, the European Commission, the government of Ukraine and leading international financial institutions.³

³ The White House (2023), 'Readout of Inaugural Meeting of Ukraine Donor Coordination Platform Steering Committee', 26 January 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/26/readout-of-inaugural-meeting-of-ukraine-donor-coordination-platform-steering-committee>.

- Ukrainian National Recovery Plan⁴ and National Recovery Council⁵ – established to plan for post-war Ukraine.
- Ukrainian State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructural Development – tasked with leading construction work within Ukraine.⁶
- United24 – official fundraising platform for charitable donations to Ukraine.⁷
- Fund for the Liquidation of the Consequences of Armed Aggression – intended to finance reconstruction of critical infrastructure, housing for IDPs and compensation for destruction of property.⁸
- Rapid damage and needs assessment monitoring by the World Bank and the Kyiv School of Economics.
- New Ukrainian civil society coalitions, most prominently RISE Ukraine.⁹

Several critical components that will underpin the recovery are not yet in place. These include clear tools for internal and external oversight, a domestic recovery coordination unit, mechanisms for engaging civil society and local communities, and – crucially – a legislative and institutional framework for seizing and managing Russian sovereign and private assets in support of Ukraine's reconstruction.¹⁰ More thought needs to be given as to whether Ukraine will need a specific recovery facilitation unit. Such a platform could showcase the best policy solutions, accumulate data to inform planning decisions and bring together various stakeholders (including the private sector, CSOs, donors, academia and think-tanks) to ensure that Ukraine's recovery meets its citizens' expectations and is in line with the EU integration process as a candidate country.

Furthermore, it is yet to be decided what should be the vehicle for implementation. So far, most assistance has been channelled via existing private and public institutions. Leading international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD – which allocated some €1.7 billion to Ukraine in 2022, mainly in the form of loans¹¹) have been directly financing state-owned companies and some municipalities to help them adapt to the challenges of the war, often related to energy disruption, bank quarantines for export-import financing, damage to equipment or loss of liquidity.

⁴ Ukraine Recovery Conference (2022), 'Recovery Plan', <https://www.urc-international.com/urc2022-recovery-plan>.

⁵ Government of Ukraine (undated), 'National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War', <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/national-council-recovery-ukraine-war>.

⁶ Tarasovskiy, Y. (2023), 'Мустафа Найем очолив новостворене Агентство відновлення та інфраструктурних проєктів' [Mustafa Nayem to head the newly created agency for reconstruction and infrastructure projects], *Forbes Ukraine*, 27 January 2023, <https://forbes.ua/news/mustafa-nayem-ocholiv-novostvorene-agentstvo-vidnovlennya-ta-infrastruktturnikh-proektiv-27012023-11362>.

⁷ UNITED24 (2023), 'Official Fundraising Platform of Ukraine', <https://u24.gov.ua>.

⁸ Transparency International Ukraine (2023), 'Will the Fund for the Liquidation of the Consequences of Armed Aggression Work?', 17 March 2023, <https://ti-ukraine.org/en/blogs/this-measure-does-not-apply-to-purchases-related-to-weapons-and-state-secrets>.

⁹ RISE Ukraine (2023), 'About us', <https://www.rise.org.ua/about>.

¹⁰ European Council (2023), 'Statement by the Members of the European Council', press release, 23 February 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/23/statement-by-the-members-of-the-european-council>.

¹¹ Bennett, V. (2023), 'EBRD on track to deliver €3 billion to Ukraine in 2022-23', European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, <https://www.ebrd.com/news/2023/ebrd-on-track-to-deliver-3-billion-to-ukraine-in-202223.html>.

Rebuilding not just infrastructure

Recovery will require enormous human and financial resources, and will impact every sphere of public life. Rebuilding physical bridges and buildings may be more straightforward than repairing other deep scars of war. So a successful recovery must encompass not just rebuilding Ukraine's physical infrastructure and other 'hardware', but also its 'software' (including through the reform of institutions, helping people and their communities recover from the hardships of war, and restoring and protecting the environment). It is the latter endeavour, if undertaken well, that will have the most transformative effect on the country.

Ukrainians want to be involved. In a national survey conducted for the National Democratic Institute in January 2023, almost 80 per cent of respondents stated that they would personally be willing to contribute to the reconstruction process,¹² so it is key that civil society is understood and approached in the broadest possible sense of this term. This means ensuring that local community groups, independent media, NGOs, volunteers, local charities, philanthropists, business associations, social enterprises, and educational and religious institutions all have the opportunity to play a meaningful role.

When thinking about Ukraine's recovery and the engagement of civil society, it is useful to consider the specific roles that citizen groups could play along six recovery tracks:

Summary table. Involving civil society in Ukraine's recovery

Recovery tracks					
Institutions	Human capital	Infrastructure	Community revival	Environment	Economy
Tasks					
Institutional reforms (banking, courts, regulatory agencies, tax and customs), fulfilling EU candidate-status requirements, transitional justice, investigating and prosecuting war crimes, compensating victims of aggression	IDPs, refugees, veterans, reskilling, mental health support	Roads, bridges, rail and energy systems	Strategic and spatial planning, housing, public spaces, schools, cultural institutions	Demining, restoring natural resources, water purification, Black Sea biodiversity and environment	New jobs, revival of post-industrial regions, local economic development, investment climate, cutting red tape
How civil society can contribute					
Policy design, monitoring and co-implementation, war crimes evidence collection, advocacy for a special tribunal	Policy design, service provision (veterans, IDPs, children), needs assessment, awareness-building	Civic oversight, quality-control, promoting the green agenda, accessibility of public spaces	Inclusion of citizens, needs assessment, consultations and dispute mitigation, design and innovative solutions, civic oversight, quality-control	Policy design, monitoring, awareness-building, service provision	Job-creation via social enterprises, strategy development, crowdfunding, policy monitoring

Source: Author's analysis, based on discussions with expert groups and stakeholders.

¹² National Democratic Institute (2023), *Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition*, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/January_2023_Ukraine_wartime_survey_ENG.pdf.

Why civil society matters in Ukraine's recovery

Both within Ukraine and internationally, officials at the highest levels consistently state that citizens must be an integral part of the rebuilding of Ukraine. The joint statement of the February 2023 EU–Ukraine summit, for instance, acknowledged ‘the crucial role civil society, local administrations and private actors will play in Ukraine’s reconstruction’.¹³ And three of the seven guiding principles for recovery (the ‘Lugano Principles’) agreed at the July 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference are directly related to citizen engagement: democratic participation, multi-stakeholder engagement, and gender equality and inclusion.¹⁴ Ukrainian officials have emphasized that recovery must consider the needs of communities. But little has been said or done to identify how the engagement of civil society could take shape.

Up to now, civil society has chiefly been engaged in planning for the recovery on an ad hoc basis, or around high-profile international events. Ukrainian think-tanks and experts were invited to contribute ideas to the National Recovery Plan. The RISE coalition helped the new State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructural Development set up its integrity procedures. Experts from think-tanks working on transparency and anti-corruption helped design operational procedures, rules governing the allocation of funding, and best practice for governance of public agencies. The coalition has also been commissioned by Ukraine’s digital transformation ministry to design a new digital recovery management system called DREAM (Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management).¹⁵ Many CSOs have repurposed their spending to address war-related needs. But a more systematic approach to ensuring inclusion and wide engagement is still lacking.

Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Ukraine’s civil society was already recognized – including in research published by Chatham House¹⁶ – as one of the key factors contributing to the country’s resilience to Russian aggression. The following characteristics were evident:

- **An active network of CSOs and a vibrant volunteer movement.** This has been important in helping to overcome the Soviet-era legacy of a low-trust society. In 2020, around 30 per cent of Ukrainians considered that most of their fellow citizens could be trusted, compared with 23 per cent in 2011. Charitable and humanitarian organizations were trusted by around 58.5 per cent of Ukrainians in 2020.¹⁷

¹³ European Council (2023), ‘Joint statement following the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit’, press release, 3 February 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/joint-statement-following-the-24th-eu-ukraine-summit>.

¹⁴ The other four principles are partnership, reform focus, transparency, accountability and rule of law, and sustainability. Ukraine Recovery Conference (2022), ‘Outcome Document of the Ukraine Recovery Conference URC2022 ‘Lugano Declaration’’, press release, 5 July 2022, https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/621f88db25fbf24758792dd8/62c68e41bd53305e8d214994_URC2022%20Lugano%20Declaration.pdf.

¹⁵ Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine (2023), ‘DREAM — digital ecosystem for reconstruction management’, <https://dream.gov.ua/en>.

¹⁶ Boulègue, M. and Lutsevych, O. (2020), *Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression*, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/06/resilient-ukraine>.

¹⁷ Shurenkova, A. et al. for World Values Survey (2020), *Ukraine in World Values Survey 2020: Resume of the Analytical Report*, Kyiv: NGO Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, http://ucep.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/WVS_UA_2020_report_ENG_WEB.pdf.

- **A prevailing culture of non-hierarchical links between citizens** as a main organizing feature of society, reinforced by an effective policy of decentralization. Community is a main building block of governance.¹⁸
- **Previous successful social mobilization** – most recently the Euromaidan protests and Revolution of Dignity in 2013–14, and efforts to resist Russian aggression since the annexation of Crimea – which has strengthened a sense of solidarity among Ukrainians. CSOs have been active in countering disinformation, fighting corruption, helping to reintegrate veterans, supporting IDPs and developing community journalism.

Ukraine's resilience has been further underpinned by institutional reforms undertaken since 2014, which increased the role of citizens in governance and helped strengthen trust in local authorities. The establishment of bodies such as the High Anti-Corruption Court and National Anti-Corruption Bureau has also gone some way in reinforcing the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state.¹⁹ EU candidate status, granted to Ukraine in June 2022, will provide a blueprint for further reforms and can be expected to catalyse deeper change.

Mobilization of civil society has intensified since the 2022 invasion, with the sector adapting quickly to meet the enormous new challenges of the war and engage more segments of society. In one survey conducted by the Zagoriy Foundation within Ukraine in mid-2022, 86 per cent of citizens stated that they were involved in charitable activity in support of the resistance.²⁰ The number of registered charities has increased eightfold since the start of the war.²¹

Civic grassroots initiatives also proliferated in the early months of the war. These, primarily involving local non-profit groups, focused on assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces (e.g. supplies of food, protective gear, drones and communications equipment) and helping IDPs (housing, assistance for children, mental health support). Many such initiatives continue to operate, mainly as volunteer hubs, training organizations and housing coordination centres for displaced people. Around a fifth of these groups have officially registered as a charity or CSO.²²

Through their mass engagement in grassroots activities since the Russian invasion, millions of Ukrainians now have experience of crisis management, teamwork, fundraising, cross-sectoral cooperation and partnerships that will prove invaluable in post-war reconstruction. These same citizens will demand a greater say in politics – beyond voting in elections – at national and regional levels, and will expect vibrant self-governance and strong accountability. By the beginning of 2023,

¹⁸ Romanova, V (2023), *Ukraine's resilience to Russia's military invasion in the context of the decentralisation reform*, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, <https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Ukraines-resilience-to-Russias-military-invasion.pdf>.

¹⁹ Huss, O. (2022), 'What Makes Ukraine Resilient in the Asymmetric War?', *Global Cooperation Research – A Quarterly Magazine*, 4(1), <https://www.gcr21.org/publications/gcr/gcr-quarterly-magazine/qm-1/2022-articles/qm-1-2022-huss-what-makes-ukraine-resilient-in-the-asymmetric-war>.

²⁰ Zagoriy Foundation (2022), *Charity in times of war*, Kyiv: Zagoriy Foundation, <https://zagoriy.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/charity-in-times-of-war.pdf>.

²¹ Ednannia (2023), "Громадянське суспільство України в умовах війни-2022" – звіт за результатами дослідження' ["Civil society of Ukraine in the conditions of war 2022" – a report based on the results of the study], <https://ednannia.ua/news/nashi-novini/12447-gromadyanske-suspilstvo-ukrajini-v-umovakh-vijni-2022-zvit-za-rezultatami-doslidzhennya>.

²² Centre of United Actions (2023), *Спільноти воєнного часу: Дієві та вчасні* [Wartime communities: Effective and timely], https://centreua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Spilnoty_Viy-ny-1.pdf?utm_source=eSputnik-promo&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletter_05.04.2023&utm_content=353099712.

94 per cent of respondents to the National Democratic Institute survey considered it either very important or important for Ukraine to become a functioning democracy, compared with 71 per cent in 2021.²³

This energy and ambition must be channelled into efforts to rebuild the country. The depth of civic participation will clearly differ from region to region, but opportunities must be created across the country for citizens to fund, create and deliver recovery projects and shape the policies and norms of post-war Ukraine. Some regions, especially around large cities and in areas towards the west, will likely retain a more highly skilled population and vibrant civic life that will help drive the recovery, while communities closer to the front lines of the war are at much higher risk of depopulation and stagnation. But across the country, and regardless of differences in capacity between regions, Ukraine will need to shift from a focus on its citizens being predominantly 'consumers' and beneficiaries of laws and regulations to a culture in which they are empowered to co-design and shape the policies that affect them.

If properly undertaken, the engagement of citizens and civil society will strengthen Ukraine's social capital, with positive impacts for national and local governance, social trust, public health and well-being.²⁴ Sustaining and giving new purpose to the connections forged between citizens during the war – including those that transcend social, ethnic, religious and other divides – has the potential to give a strong impetus to reconstruction and enable a faster and more inclusive recovery.²⁵ Evidence from other countries already shows that civic connection matters both for local economic growth and for building a sense of optimism within communities.²⁶ Citizen participation in post-war recovery could make Ukraine a global test case for reinvigorating democracy and building participatory institutions.

Insights from the Chatham House survey of Ukraine's CSOs

This section presents some of the key findings from the survey of Ukrainian civil society organizations conducted by Chatham House researchers in late 2022.²⁷

Better CSO–state engagement is needed

Ukrainian civil society is not waiting for the war to end before getting involved in the recovery. In all, 64 per cent of CSOs who responded to the Chatham House survey stated that they are already actively engaged in rebuilding Ukraine, and 33 per cent said that they plan to get involved. For the groups already involved, the principal activities are: providing support to IDPs; discussing the recovery

²³ National Democratic Institute (2023), *Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition*.

²⁴ Field, J. (2016), *Social Capital*, third edition, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

²⁵ Performance and Innovation Unit (2002), 'Social Capital: A Discussion Paper', <https://ntouk.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/socialcapital.pdf>.

²⁶ Knight Foundation (2023), 'About Knight Soul of the Community', <https://knightfoundation.org/sotc/about-knight-soul-community>.

²⁷ The survey methodology is summarized in footnote 1; for more detailed survey data, see <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/2023-06-15-chatham-house-survey-ukraine-csos-ukraine-forum.pdf>.


with the national government and regional authorities (although many CSOs are dissatisfied with the current level of genuine engagement); channelling assistance to vulnerable groups, especially children affected by the war; and providing mental health support. The level of engagement is higher among Kyiv-based groups working only or chiefly at the national level (70 per cent) than for regional-level groups (55 per cent).

Respondents rated the current efforts of the Ukrainian government to engage them in planning for the recovery quite poorly. Overall, only 30 per cent of all CSOs who completed the survey stated that they are engaged or actively engaged by the relevant state authorities. Among Kyiv-based groups, the chief reason given as to why state–CSO engagement is weak is a lack of political will at the highest level (78 per cent). Groups working at regional level also pointed to the lack of political will, along with a lack of information about state recovery planning: just 19 per cent considered themselves well informed about the National Recovery Plan that had been presented at the July 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano. Across all levels, 47 per cent of respondents viewed the war itself and the need for crisis management at a time of active conflict as obstacles to engagement. Some spoke of a reluctance to share power on the part of government officials at both national and regional levels, who often see civil society leaders as competitors. In cases where CSOs had been invited to contribute, the quality of engagement was perceived by respondents as more of a tick-box exercise than meaningful contact.

Civil society can add value to the recovery

Ukraine's CSOs expressed confidence that they have the experience, skills, capacity and reach that will add significant value to rebuilding efforts. Figure 2 summarizes the areas in which respondents believe they can make a positive contribution.

Figure 2. Responses to survey question 12: What is the main value added of civil society engagement in Ukraine's recovery? [multiple choice] (107 respondents, Kyiv-based and regional CSOs)



Source: Chatham House Ukraine Forum survey of Ukrainian CSOs, November–December 2022.

Promoting integrity and trust in institutions

Ukrainian civil society is confident it can play a positive role in reducing the risk of corruption during the recovery process. Across national and regional organizations, the majority of respondents considered that independent civic oversight is their main added value. That so many identified their potential to contribute in this area is not unexpected, given that CSOs see the number-one risk to reconstruction as being corruption and misuse of funds (see Figure 4). Notably, around half of the CSOs who responded to the survey were concerned that new vested interests could emerge around reconstruction funds.

Ukraine already has a strong network of anti-corruption activists who have played a pivotal role in pushing for new anti-corruption agencies, increased transparency and judicial reform. But even with modern digital tools such as the ProZorro public procurement platform²⁸ and the newly commissioned DREAM, there is much work still to be done to dismantle entrenched monopolies and root out a culture of 'crony capitalism' that has historically favoured politically connected business interests.²⁹ For some years, Ukrainian civil society and investigative journalists have been working to expose corruption via the dedicated monitoring portal Dozorro,³⁰ drawing on data from open registers as well as using laws on access to public information. This was already an uphill struggle, and access to data is often now restricted under the conditions of martial law imposed in response to the February 2022 invasion.

Ensuring the recovery is free of corruption matters for legitimacy, and for maintaining the energy that will ensure a strong economic rebound after the war.

The people of Ukraine need to have confidence in the reconstruction process in order to engage with it, and civic oversight can play an important role both in rebuilding the country and in building trust. Ensuring the recovery is free of corruption matters for legitimacy, and for maintaining the energy that will ensure a strong economic rebound after the war.

Fostering and sustaining resilience

Among Kyiv-based CSOs, 56 per cent of respondents considered they can add value to the recovery by contributing to social cohesion and resilience. This share is even higher among regional-level groups (79 per cent). The war has had a very powerful mobilizing effect, but CSOs will have a key role to play in further nurturing and strengthening Ukraine's resilience during the recovery phase – above all by building confidence among citizens they have control over their future. More than a year after the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians maintain high levels of hope and believe that

²⁸ ProZorro, developed jointly by CSOs, business and government, is a digital procurement system that allows for competitive and transparent administration of public tenders. Since its launch in 2015, use of the platform is estimated to have saved over \$1 billion in public funds.

²⁹ For a detailed discussion, see Lough, J. (2021), *Ukraine's system of crony capitalism: The challenge of dismantling 'systema'*, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/07/ukraines-system-crony-capitalism>.

³⁰ Dozorro (2023), 'Громадський контроль держзакупівель' [Public Control of State Procurement], <https://dozorro.org>.

their country can successfully repel Russia's aggression. But if they are to endure a prolonged war and still maintain the energy they will need for the difficult period to come, it is critical that citizens are brought to the table and can help design solutions from the outset.

Depopulation, poverty and environmental damage is likely to affect some communities for years after the war is ended. In the autumn of 2022, the World Bank estimated that 25 per cent of Ukraine's population would be living in poverty by the end of that year, and as many as 55 per cent by the end of 2023.³¹ Large groups have been deeply affected by the war, among them veterans, children, women and IDPs, and it has been estimated that a mental health crisis could impact as many as 10 million people in the coming decade.³² All of these factors will create challenges for social cohesion. There are some grounds for optimism in that around a third of survey respondents identified their capacity to consider the needs of vulnerable groups as one of the ways they can add value to Ukraine's recovery.

A more worrying indicator from the survey is that just 9 per cent of CSOs pointed to gender integration as an area in which they can add value. This may be partially explained by the fact that the survey did not specifically target groups working on gender. Rates of sexual and gender-based violence, including domestic violence, were already rising after 2014, and a 2017 report by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine found that a lack of capacity within Ukraine's justice system meant that there was often impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence while victims were unsupported and denied justice.³³ Amnesty International highlighted in March 2023 that the impacts of Russia's war on Ukraine are having a detrimental effect on women's mental, physical, and sexual and reproductive health.³⁴ Planning and budgeting for the recovery must allow for gender-sensitive analysis, and dedicated efforts will need to be made to ensure women's participation in decision-making processes.

Challenges will additionally arise in reintegrating young men and women who have served in the armed forces. Ukraine will have around 1 million veterans and their families to support.³⁵ Many service personnel, along with civilians, have suffered serious injuries, and will need to heal, reskill and rebuild their lives. The situation will be further complicated by the need to fully reintegrate territories occupied by Russia. If Ukraine re-establishes territorial integrity at its post-1991 borders, citizens who have lived under Russian occupation for around a decade will require a special approach. CSOs could be invaluable partners in designing programmes for these groups, especially given their prior experience in confidence-building

³¹ Honchrenko, A. (2022), 'Через війну рівень бідності в Україні зріс вдесятеро – Світовий банк' [Due to the war, the level of poverty in Ukraine increased tenfold – World Bank], TSN.ua, 17 October 2022, <https://tsn.ua/groshi/cherez-viynu-riven-bidnosti-v-ukrayini-zris-vdesyatero-svitoviy-bank-2181331.html>.

³² Kluge, H. and Habicht, J. (2022), 'Ukraine's mental health crisis could impact generations to come. Here's how the country is responding', World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/10/ukraine-mental-health-crisis-world-mental-health-day>.

³³ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017), 'Ukraine conflict: End impunity for sexual violence, UN report urges', <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/02/ukraine-conflict-end-impunity-sexual-violence-un-report-urges>.

³⁴ Amnesty International (2023), 'Ukraine: Women face grave risks as Russia's full-scale invasion enters its second year', 8 March 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/ukraine-women-face-grave-risks-as-russias-full-scale-invasion-enters-its-second-year>.


³⁵ ZN.ua (2022), 'Мобілізація в Україні: скільки буде ветеранів після війни' [Mobilization in Ukraine: How many veterans will there be after the war], 5 November 2022, <https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/mobilizatsija-v-ukrajini-skilki-bude-veteraniv-pislja-vijni.html>.

efforts and in providing support for people living under occupation in Crimea and parts of Donbas after 2014. This means also engaging civic groups in upholding the framework for transitional justice that will necessarily form part of the reintegration effort.

Civil society priorities: modernization and innovation

Ukrainian civil society has a strong modernization agenda. Across all respondents to the survey, 71 per cent identified modernizing the country’s institutions – including by tackling crony capitalism, dismantling monopolies and eliminating the remnants of post-Soviet inefficiency and red tape – as the top priority for the recovery. It should be noted that modernization was identified as a greater priority by Kyiv-based groups (85 per cent), whereas for regional activists the chief recovery priority was rebuilding of physical infrastructure (62 per cent, compared with 55 per cent for institutional reform). This is understandable, as many CSOs based in the capital have a strong track record of reform advocacy, and in the years since the Revolution of Dignity civil society has often proved itself to be a driver of transformation and not just a watchdog over government. Many reforms implemented after 2014 have been successful because of strong engagement, intellectual contributions and pressure from Ukrainian civil society. Reforms around decentralization, anti-corruption and public procurement have all benefited from the engagement of experts from outside the state system.³⁶

Figure 3. Responses to survey question 5: Please select three priorities for post-war rebuilding (107 respondents, Kyiv-based and regional CSOs)



Source: Chatham House Ukraine Forum survey of Ukrainian CSOs, November–December 2022.

The modernization agenda demands innovation, too. Ukrainians understand that building back creates an opportunity for a leap forward in how education, healthcare, urban life and other services are delivered. As shown in Figure 2, survey respondents considered they can offer solutions and policy innovation. Again, Kyiv-based groups had the greatest confidence that they are able to add value in this regard (65 per cent, compared with 45 per cent among regional CSOs). A strong focus on the environment among regional-level groups (51 per cent


³⁶ Lutsevych, O. (2017), ‘Civil Society’, in Ash, T. et al. (2017), *The Struggle for Ukraine*, Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/10/struggle-ukraine-0/civil-society>.

of which identified environmental recovery, including demining, as a priority – Figure 3) could ensure the integration of a green agenda across reconstruction efforts, particularly in energy, urban planning, conservation and climate security.

Risks to the recovery

As already discussed, survey respondents overwhelmingly identified corruption as the principal area of risk. But the survey showed other areas of perceived risk, too. There was concern, particularly among regional groups (60 per cent), about the capacity of regional governments to implement the recovery (see Figure 4). Ukraine’s CSOs are aware that reconstruction will require enormous effort and strategic vision, as well as speed of project design and implementation. They fear that a lack of appropriately qualified people, together with the weakness of local institutions and an erosion of decentralization efforts under conditions of war, will all impact local capacity. Such concerns are apparently confirmed by the findings of a survey conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2021: at that time, a quarter of municipalities felt they lacked the capacity to design a local development strategy.³⁷ The problem is especially critical in smaller towns and cities, many of which are particularly severely affected by the destruction of war.

Figure 4. Responses to survey question 6: What are the three top risks for rebuilding Ukraine? (107 respondents, Kyiv-based and regional CSOs)



Source: Chatham House Ukraine Forum survey of Ukrainian CSOs, November–December 2022.

Civil society groups made a notably sober assessment of the sector’s own vulnerabilities and risks. Among additional risks described, 74 per cent of respondents stated that there are risks related to CSOs’ own engagement in rebuilding.³⁸ These are mainly related to funds flowing to groups affiliated with local or national governments

³⁷ OECD (2022), ‘Turning to regions and local governments to rebuild Ukraine’, <https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/turning-to-regions-and-local-governments-to-rebuild-ukraine-9510f490/#section-d1e118>.

³⁸ Survey question 13, based on analysis of text responses to open question ‘Do you see any risks or challenges related to civil society engagement in recovery?’.

(mentioned by 40 per cent of respondents), a low level of professionalism (18 per cent) and perceived corruption in the sector itself.³⁹ Respondents expressed concern that local governments in particular may be tempted to create 'pocket' CSOs as a proxy for genuine engagement, or engage only loyal groups to endorse inefficient decisions and obscure potentially corrupt schemes. To a lesser degree, respondents also pointed to the possibility of business interests attempting to lobby or influence the recovery by creating or hiring CSOs to work on their behalf.

CSOs want genuine engagement in rebuilding Ukraine

Ukraine is not starting its recovery from scratch. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Ukrainian civil society was already engaged in work to integrate citizens' feedback within existing governance structures and processes. Since 2010, provision has been made for public consultations on the design of all new national- and regional-level policies and legislation. Cities have embedded various participation tools in their charters, including community consultations, public hearings and participatory budgeting, which allows citizens to use digital technology to vote for projects that they want to be funded by their municipalities. The Transparent Cities initiative, launched in 2017,⁴⁰ has pushed local governments to operate more openly, including by reporting on all spending, livestreaming council discussions, and publishing all laws and regulations. Active youth and volunteer councils are now working to support job creation for IDPs and provide assistance for displaced young people. And the recent experience of the crisis response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which showed that cooperation between CSOs, the private sector and local government can be highly effective,⁴¹ allowed for a rapid mobilization of support for civilians immediately after Russia launched its full-scale invasion.

Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Ukrainian civil society was already engaged in work to integrate citizens' feedback within existing governance structures and processes.

The responses to the Chatham House survey underscore that Ukrainian civil society wants a collaborative approach to planning and implementing the recovery. Priority areas for CSOs' engagement, highlighted in Figure 5, range from recovery design to delivery, with an overwhelming majority of respondents expressing willingness to join advisory groups and assist in designing local recovery plans. The fact that 55 per cent of regional CSOs are interested in bidding for contracts to deliver social services to various groups is also a positive sign and could allow for burden-sharing. But civil society is wary of participation that is shallow, seeing this as another tick-box exercise. Many groups commented that their contribution is frequently ignored, and that existing mechanisms for public consultation are weak. Instead, they want

³⁹ Ibid.


⁴⁰ Transparent Cities (2023), 'Research of transparency and accountability', <https://transparentcities.in.ua/en>.

⁴¹ Lutsevych, O. (2020), 'Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way', Chatham House Expert Comment, 28 April 2020, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/fighting-covid-19-ukrainian-way>.


to have opportunities for comprehensive and genuine partnership in rebuilding Ukraine. Regional CSOs are keen for the government to harness the power of the volunteer groups that have emerged to support the frontline since 2022. Such networks could be invaluable in providing support to veterans and families who have suffered as a result of the war.

Figure 5. Responses to survey questions 9 and 10: What three models of effective engagement of civil society in recovery would you propose at present (under martial law) at national/regional level? (107 respondents, Kyiv-based and regional CSOs)

Kyiv-based CSOs see the following top three ways to engage:



Regional CSOs propose the following top three ways to engage:



Source: Chatham House Ukraine Forum survey of Ukrainian CSOs, November–December 2022.

There is no need to wait until the fighting is over. Already, there is potential for Western donors to foster effective partnerships between Ukrainian civil society and state institutions. Ukrainian CSOs believe that the most effective way to ensure civic engagement in the recovery will be conditionality of funding from the country's Western partners. Some 57 per cent of survey respondents were in favour of conditions being attached to the release of recovery-related funding by all Western donors, who should therefore expressly require that the Ukrainian authorities create a framework for the formal inclusion of civil society as a partner in the recovery. CSOs also called for dedicated, direct funding streams to be established for recovery work undertaken by CSOs. This could be done either via international financial institutions or through bilateral agencies and mechanisms such as USAID, GIZ (Germany), Sida (Sweden) or the UK's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Almost half of the respondents considered it crucial for donors to reserve a portion of funding for civic monitoring of rebuilding projects implemented by the national and regional governments, and for all recovery funding to be contingent on independent civic oversight of anti-corruption compliance.

Conclusions

Planning for Ukraine's recovery is under way, even as the destruction of the war continues. It has started inside Ukraine, with various groups discussing its principles and challenges. It has started internationally, via donor conferences and the G7. Ukrainian civil society is clear about its ambition to be better integrated in the reconstruction process from the very beginning, and is not satisfied with the current level of engagement.

Ukraine's CSOs have a crucial role to play across all six tracks of the recovery. Whether in ensuring the integrity of procurement for infrastructure projects via anti-corruption monitoring, working with children impacted by war, or supporting veterans, IDPs and returning refugees, civil society engagement will help strengthen the country's resilience and social cohesion, ward against corruption, and provide innovative solutions to the many challenges facing Ukraine.

Ukraine has the capacity to fully own the reconstruction process. It has a successful track record of cooperation between the state and civil society in the design and implementation of transformative reforms. Its citizens have demonstrated great courage and strong agency in the face of existential threat. It is paramount that future recovery efforts build on these strengths and diminish the risks that could undermine Ukraine's post-war future.

Policy recommendations for a recovery built on trust

Alongside Ukraine's EU candidate status and green transition, trust could ultimately be one of the main facilitators of a successful recovery. The country's citizens need to trust that their government is genuinely there to serve the public interest, and Ukraine's international partners need to be certain that the resources they pledge are allocated to the greatest benefit of the country and its people. To prepare for a recovery in which Ukraine's citizens and partners can all have confidence, the following policy actions are recommended:

For the Ukrainian government

- **Embed resilience principles throughout recovery planning.** This means modernizing all Ukraine's institutions – at both state and regional level – to ensure they are able to learn, diversify, adapt and self-regulate. The contribution of civil society is key to achieving resilient governance at all levels, and in the post-war period efforts will be need to be redoubled to replenish Ukraine's resilience capital. Civil society has shown its remarkable mobilization capacity during the war, and will have valuable networks, knowledge, human capital and vision that can help ensure that Ukraine 'builds back better', and that all communities have the resources they need to withstand future shocks.
- **Set up a working group with representatives of Ukraine's CSOs to develop a robust civil society engagement framework** that outlines mechanisms for civil society engagement both during and after the war. The mechanisms involved will depend on the challenges and risks to recovery within each sector. In the near term, while Ukraine remains under martial law, these mechanisms may include permanent civic recovery advisory offices within government

ministries, and mandatory civic oversight and digital portals to track the progress and integrity of recovery projects in real time and report suspected instances of fraud. Following the international Ukraine Recovery Conference co-hosted by the UK and Ukrainian governments on 21–22 June 2023, the framework should be further elaborated and made operational, drawing on the principles set out in the OECD's Recommendation on Effective Public Investment Across Levels of Government (especially as regards stakeholder engagement),⁴² as well as on international experience of rebuilding after disasters and post-industrial regeneration.

- **Recognize civil society as a contributor to and not just a beneficiary of the recovery.** Carving out a space for the participation of national and regional CSOs in the monitoring and implementation of recovery-related projects should start now. To ensure fair inclusion, Ukraine's cabinet of ministers should lead on expanding the National Recovery Council to include coalitions and networks of CSOs as permanent members. The government should work with civil society to co-create new forums (both digital and in-person) for participatory democracy that give citizens a voice and enable conflicting positions to be addressed respectfully and democratically. Such mechanisms might include advisory citizen assemblies or juries, with participants selected by ballot to consider specific issues. A dedicated liaison office could be established at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau to regularly engage with civil society at the grassroots level to address loopholes that may allow for abuse of funds by contractors or public authorities, as identified by investigative reporting or civic monitors.
- **Establish an independent cross-sectoral recovery facilitation unit.** This body would bring together key stakeholders (government, Western donors, business and civil society) to support and strengthen the quality of the recovery by sharing knowledge and data, strategic communication and capacity-building. Connecting and pooling global expertise in this way has potential benefits not just for rebuilding Ukraine. The lessons learned may give rise to innovative and effective solutions that can be replicated in other countries and regions.
- **Communicate openly to increase public awareness of post-war recovery planning.** If the security situation permits, both national and local governments should host town hall-style meetings and conduct media outreach on the vision for Ukraine's future. These forums could be used to outline and consult on plans for rebuilding, and on the role cities, communities and people can play in the recovery process. Allowing citizens to visualize what the National Recovery Plan might mean for them via an interactive platform could also drive interest and engagement, and could be an effective way to engage young people and encourage them to contribute ideas.⁴³

⁴² OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Effective Public Investment Across Levels of Government*, <https://www.oecd.org/regional/regionaldevelopment/Principles-Public-Investment.pdf>.

⁴³ The Futurescape of London project is an example of one such platform. Developed by Chatham House in 2020–21, it was designed to encourage conversations about how effective policy decisions can help societies achieve a more sustainable future. For background and a link to the interactive product, see Lee, B. (2021), 'A journey into London's future shows a better world', Chatham House Expert Comment, 14 April 2021, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/journey-londons-future-shows-better-world>.

- **Consider appointing a special liaison official for civil society within the office of the president.** Such an initiative would create a contact point for the sector, enable feedback and promote cooperation. This could help overcome a widespread perception that there is a lack of political will among Ukraine's senior leadership to engage with civil society.
- **Ensure the recovery is community-based and community-driven.** In all of Ukraine's regions, specific efforts will be needed to secure meaningful engagement for local groups in designing regional and city recovery plans. Positive experiences of participatory budgeting should be built on to ensure citizens have a say in shaping recovery priorities. A 'future councils' model could be piloted, with a view to establishing permanent regional bodies tasked with identifying important questions about, and potential solutions to, communities' future needs.⁴⁴ Human resources will need to be dedicated to drafting principles of community-based recovery – including understanding what this means and the mechanisms of engagement entailed – and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of local civil society. After the war ends, the government must ensure decentralization reforms resume and are taken through to completion, including legislative changes applicable to local referendums, state oversight of local decision-making, and new civil service laws applicable to local government officials.

For Ukrainian civil society

- **Draw on examples of EU best practice to promote citizen engagement.** Ukrainian civil society should consider how it can amplify its voice in relation to the comprehensive reforms needed for Ukraine as an EU candidate country. Many of these reforms (e.g. related to the rule of law, anti-corruption, transport and the green transition) will define the quality of recovery projects and influence the flow of foreign direct investment to Ukraine. CSOs could consider bringing fresh energy to the existing EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform⁴⁵ by inviting new groups to join. They could also institute citizens' panels, in line with the EU model,⁴⁶ to bring people together to discuss policy proposals related to the recovery; and advocate for the adoption of the EU's code of conduct on partnership principles, which describes and mandates how local authorities and government engage stakeholders in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of cohesion programmes.⁴⁷
- **Actively find ways to strengthen integrity within the civil society sector.** Ukraine's CSOs must recognize the risk that non-independent or bogus organizations may proliferate in the context of war and post-war, and consider what due diligence measures need to be put in place to identify and expose illegitimate practices. A critical question is whether self-regulation within the

⁴⁴ Nanz, P. and Leggewie, C. (transl. Harrison, D. and Roche, S.) (2019), *No Representation without Consultation: A Citizen's Guide to Participatory Democracy*, Toronto: Between the Lines.

⁴⁵ European Economic and Social Committee (undated), 'The EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform', <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/sections-other-bodies/other/eu-ukraine-civil-society-platform>.

⁴⁶ European Commission (2023), 'European citizens' panels', https://citizens.ec.europa.eu/index_en.

⁴⁷ European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2014), *The European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European structural and investment funds*, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/49637>.

sector is sufficient, or whether additional measures are required to diminish the risks. Civil society must therefore be proactive in inviting Ukrainian government representatives along with Western donors to discuss this issue and propose ways forward. Together, they should determine if a new regulatory body (along the lines of the Charity Commission in the UK⁴⁸) could appropriately be established, or if this function could be performed by Ukraine's ministry of justice. These discussions should also cover how best to institute a vetting process for CSOs involved in bidding for recovery funding. And a clear firewall, or delineation, between groups responsible for monitoring public spending and those to whom work is subcontracted must be put in place.

- **Devise strategies for harnessing citizen activism.** Fatigue, burnout and disillusionment, along with long-term migration from Ukraine, all risk impeding the recovery process. Many survey respondents expressed concerns that the sheer effort to survive will inevitably absorb people's energy, meaning they do not have the time or the resources to dedicate to civic affairs. The vast scale of the recovery task may alienate an already depleted people and disempower them once the war is over. CSOs have an important role to play in finding ways to ensure citizens are heard and their needs understood, as these factors will be key to generating cohesion in communities severely affected by the conflict. For the recovery to be successful, people must have the authority to 'own' the change they want to see, rather than feel they are having ready-made solutions imposed on them. Civil society can help build capacity to run effective public consultations across Ukraine. The experience of USAID's Engage Project⁴⁹ for the country could offer good lessons as to what does and does not work in the Ukrainian context. Internationally, too, the Participedia network offers tools for dialogue-based forms of public participation.⁵⁰

For Western donors

- **Consider inviting representatives of civil society to join the Ukraine Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform.** The sector could initially have a consultative role, and, as the platform develops over time, expand its own mandate to include contributing to recovery-needs assessment, delivering feedback on the implementation of recovery projects, and communicating to wider society about the international effort to rebuild the country.
- **Ensure civil society has a powerful role in safeguarding the integrity of Ukraine's recovery process.** Dedicated funding should be earmarked for civic monitoring, investigative journalism and digital solutions aimed at increasing transparency. To reinforce accountability, Ukraine's partners should invest in projects that promote collective action, from the grassroots up, for community-led oversight of public procurement, private sector involvement in recovery work, and the quality and sustainability of project delivery.⁵¹

⁴⁸ GOV.UK (undated), 'Charity Commission for England and Wales', <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission>.

⁴⁹ Pact (2023), 'Ukraine', <https://www.pactworld.org/country/ukraine>.

⁵⁰ Participedia (undated), 'Welcome to Participedia', <https://participedia.net/about>.

⁵¹ For more recommendations related to the integrity of Ukraine's reconstruction, see Jackson D. and Lough, J. (2022), 'Accountability in Reconstruction: International Experience and the case of Ukraine', Lugano Ukraine Recovery Conference pre-read, Chatham House Ukraine Forum, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/EUACI_Lugano_Paper_1%20July_0.pdf.

- **Encourage Ukraine's government and CSOs to work together on a civil society engagement framework**, as outlined above. All assistance directed to the recovery should have conditions set requiring citizen engagement. This applies at all levels, including the operations of the newly established State Agency for Recovery and Infrastructural Development.
- **Design dedicated programmes to fund and support direct civil society contributions to the recovery.** Bilateral development assistance agencies should recognize the impact of war on the voluntary and civil society sector. Ukraine's civil society, like all other parts of the economy, has been severely affected by the displacements and disruption of active conflict, including the loss of people and expertise. The sector has shown great resilience under conditions of war, but CSOs will need additional support if they are to play a full part in the recovery. Survey respondents emphasized the need for dedicated training related to recovery projects. Donors should go beyond working with those organizations they are already familiar with, to also engage with newcomers that will require smaller, more flexible grants to enable them to thrive.
- **Support large-scale intensive training to build skills for the recovery** by financing special professional development programmes, drawing on the expertise of representatives of government, civil society, business and media. These cross-sectoral programmes should offer fast-track, practical modules in areas including strategic recovery planning, project management, public finance, citizen engagement, dispute mediation, integrity, working with new digital systems to track recovery, and delivery of services to veterans, IDPs and children. Ukraine has almost 1,500 local communities, so even a relatively modest ambition to train 15 people per community would mean the model needs to reach over 20,000 participants. To implement skills development on this scale will require an extensive 'training the trainers' effort, and will have to involve an extensive network of state and private training institutions able to deliver high-quality education programmes. Investment could also be considered in expanding the EU's New European Bauhaus initiative to train more people in sustainable reconstruction.⁵²

⁵² European Commission (2023), 'Rebuilding Ukrainian cities: new Phoenix initiative to mobilise expertise and at least EUR 7 million', press release, 2 February 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/rebuilding-ukraine-2023-02-02_en.

Note to Figure 1

The numbers given in Figure 1 are taken from the following sources: Center for Economic Strategy (2022), 'Економіка України під час війни: грудень 2022 та підсумки року' [The economy of Ukraine during the war: December 2022 and the results of the year], <https://ces.org.ua/economy-of-ukraine-during-the-war-december-amndhe-results-of-the-year>; Damaged in Ua (2023), 'Damage Assessment', <https://damaged.in.ua/damage-assessment>; World Bank (2023), *Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022 – February 2023 (English)*, Washington, DC: World Bank Group, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099184503212328877/P1801740d1177f03c0ab180057556615497>; Kyiv Independent (2023), 'Minister: Russia's war has caused damage worth \$35 billion to environment', 2 January 2023, <https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/minister-russias-war-has-caused-damage-worth-35-billion-to-environment>; *Ukrainska Pravda* (2023), 'Ukraine needs US\$37 billion for humanitarian mine action', 4 April 2023, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/04/4/7396446>; UNHCR Operational Data Portal (2023), 'Ukraine Refugee Situation', <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>; Kluge, H. and Habicht, J. (2022), 'Ukraine's mental health crisis could impact generations to come. Here's how the country is responding', World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/10/ukraine-mental-health-crisis-world-mental-health-day>.

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Cover image: Volunteers with the Kyiv-based NGO Brave to Rebuild start work on a bombed building in Irpin on 25 February 2023.

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