National service with a European purpose: the case for shared defence preparedness and Erasmus-style exchanges

Policy Paper

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Summary

— Europe must continue to invest in hard defence. Military readiness and defence-industrial capacity remain indispensable as threats increase, and as Europe assumes greater responsibility for its own security.

— But hard defence requires stronger societal foundations. Hybrid threats increasingly exploit vulnerabilities far from the battlefield. Citizens and civilian institutions will need to assume a more active role in preparedness.

— Europe also needs a stronger common strategic culture. National threat assessments will keep varying from one state to another, but Europeans need to understand why vulnerabilities elsewhere on the continent can affect their own security and require collective action.

— This paper proposes the establishment of a comprehensive defence and civil-preparedness framework among willing European states – both within and outside the EU. The multi-stranded initiative would combine compulsory national service for citizens of participating countries with wider societal resilience elements and civil contingency planning. Institutionalized cooperation between countries would be built into the scheme.

— The national service strand would involve basic military and civil-defence training, a period of military or civilian service, a substantial mandatory placement in another participating country, and a subsequent obligation to remain in readiness as part of a military or civilian reserve body. The foreign-placement component would be analogous in some respects to the education and training exchanges provided for by the EU's long-running Erasmus+ scheme – notwithstanding the difference that participation in Erasmus+ is voluntary.

— A wider preparedness architecture would link communities and organizations in participating countries to a permanent European civilian reserve network, and would facilitate cooperation between public authorities and operators of essential services.

What is the problem?

The current debate on the future of European defence is rightly focused on hard-security questions: ammunition stocks, air and missile defence, drones, intelligence, cyber capabilities, defence-industrial production, NATO burden-sharing, long-term support for Ukraine, etc. None of this is optional. It will make European rearmament costly and politically demanding. But it is a strategic imperative.

The problem is that military capability alone will not ensure Europe's long-term security. European societies have become increasingly exposed to direct targeting.[1] Cyberattacks, critical-infrastructure sabotage, supply-chain disruptions, disinformation and efforts to undermine popular trust in public institutions, among other threats, have all noticeably proliferated across the continent in the past decade. Europe's adversaries – and, at times, even its traditional ally, the US – have sought to weaponize weaknesses outside the purely military domain, with the results variously seen in energy supply disruptions, food supply vulnerability and, in the case of the US in particular, economic coercion.

Military capability alone will not ensure Europe's long-term security. Cyberattacks, critical-infrastructure sabotage, supply-chain disruptions, disinformation and efforts to undermine popular trust in public institutions have all proliferated in the past decade.

The security threats Europe now faces pose a complex challenge as they remain, in most cases, below the threshold of armed conflict and are difficult to respond to in conventional military ways. The topography of security, so to speak, is changing. The traditional battlefield remains central – as Russia's war against Ukraine reminds people every day – but a country can now be seriously weakened far behind the front line.

This creates a gap in societal preparedness, one largely overlooked by policymakers across the continent. In most European countries, citizens still tend to be treated as *beneficiaries of security* rather than as *participants in resilience* – the phenomenon is more obvious as one moves westwards across the continent, further from Russia's borders (citizens of Spain or France, for instance, tend to be much less included in resilience mechanisms than is the case in Sweden or Finland, whose comprehensive-security models are the most advanced in Europe). The problem extends beyond matters of citizens' individual preparedness. Local authorities and mayors are often the first to respond to a crisis, yet in many cases they remain only loosely connected to national security planning, if involved at all. Most governments depend on private operators to keep essential infrastructure functioning under pressure, yet too often such operators are involved only episodically in strategic consultations rather than being integrated into preparedness systems and crisis planning.

Considerable differences in how European states understand security add to the complexity of the problem. Threat perceptions vary from one country to another. These differences shape strategic policy direction and budget planning. They influence which risks populations consider credible. The ability to take collective action is impaired because a particular crisis may not fit every country's established understanding of security. This makes what could be termed a common European 'grammar' of security and threat difficult to agree upon.

A further challenge is that public finances are under strain across the continent. Governments have committed to spending more on defence, but they cannot answer every security challenge through professional armed forces and national procurement alone. Fragmented voluntary military service schemes at national level, such as those being developed in France and Germany, risk duplicating costs without creating the scale or cross-border experience needed for a genuinely European strategic culture.[2]

1 NATO (2026), 'Countering hybrid threats', updated 29 January 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/countering-hybrid-threats.
2 France has announced a new voluntary military service, beginning with 3,000 volunteers but set to expand later. Germany's new model remains voluntary, though with registration and medical evaluation obligations for men born from 2008 onwards. These are useful comparators for the limitations of nationally confined voluntary schemes.

Why does it matter?

A credible European defence posture depends on more than higher budgets and stronger military capabilities. It requires (a) societies able to sustain themselves under pressure, and (b) a common political culture capable of turning different national security concerns and perceptions into a willingness to act together.

When it comes to the first of these two factors, the approach taken by Finland is perhaps the most instructive. The country's comprehensive-security model does not treat resilience as a substitute for hard defence. Military defence remains one of the Finnish model's foundations. But this is embedded in a wider system in which government, businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens share responsibility for safeguarding vital societal functions.

The Finnish government's 'Security Strategy for Society' is currently the most advanced blueprint for preparedness in Europe.[3] As such, it presents a potentially useful template for a common European framework for comprehensive security, describing all vital societal functions that ought to be safeguarded through collaboration between authorities, the business community, NGOs and citizens. At the heart of the system is a national Security Committee,[4] which coordinates and includes members from government departments, local authorities, emergency services and the business community. In addition, a National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) works with private companies and public authorities to secure supply chains and critical services, and to ensure continuity in the event of a crisis.[5]

Defence is more credible when civil preparedness agencies, local authorities, private operators and citizens are included in security planning.

What makes the Finnish model notable is that it is designed as a whole-of-society system. It encompasses provision of civil defence shelters, household preparedness guidance, media literacy, national defence training for civilian leaders, the use of voluntary preparedness organizations, and structured cooperation with 1,500 critical companies through sectoral preparedness networks coordinated by the NESA. Obviously, this does not mean that every country in Europe can or should replicate the Finnish model. The main lesson here is that defence is more credible when civil preparedness agencies, local authorities, private operators and citizens are included in security planning.

Yet even if other countries successfully developed similar models, doing so in isolation would be to miss the opportunity for more effective preparedness that pan-European coordination could offer. Sure, Europeans might be better able to respond to a crisis developing at home, but they would still have only a limited understanding of the security realities facing other countries. Moreover, the potential benefits of shared expertise, pooled resources and collective resilience would go unrealized. At a time when national governments are increasingly obliged to cooperate more closely on matters of hard security, the need for an accompanying common approach to civil preparedness seems more compelling than ever.

3 Finnish Government (2025), *Security Strategy for Society: Government resolution*, 16 January 2025, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/0126122a-1e8a-4ffa-9868-6286292efc01.
4 Finnish Government (undated), 'The Security Committee', https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-committee (accessed 30 Jul. 2026).
5 National Emergency Supply Agency (undated), 'The National Emergency Supply Agency', https://www.huoltovarmuuskeskus.fi/en/organisation/the-national-emergency-supply-agency (accessed 30 Jul. 2026).

This is where the Erasmus analogy potentially comes in. Since its launch in 1987, the scheme (subsequently expanded and renamed Erasmus+) has enabled millions of Europeans to study and work abroad.[6] Even though its main purpose was originally educational, it has evolved to cover wider areas of exchange and cooperation. The scheme has facilitated the mobility of generations of Europeans across the continent, allowing young people to experience another culture and society at first hand, and strengthening mutual understanding. Erasmus+ has contributed to a shared sense of European belonging.

But if the scheme can be said to have helped create a generation that *learnt* together, Europe now needs an equivalent initiative to help a generation *prepare* together. The analogy, of course, has one obvious limit. Erasmus+ is voluntary, whereas the national service and reserve network proposed here would be compulsory. Rather, what a 'defence Erasmus' scheme would borrow is the principle of educational cross-border mobility.

An instructive, if limited, precedent already exists. The European Security and Defence College (ESDC), an autonomous EU body, runs what it informally refers to as a 'Military Erasmus' – officially, the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers (EMILYO) – to enable young officer cadets to train and study across European borders. Part of EMILYO's aim is to strengthen defence interoperability and foster a shared European security and defence culture.[7]

The proposal in this paper is to draw on the cooperative spirit of EMILYO and Erasmus+ respectively, but in a new format with a remit that both extends beyond the former's relatively small professional military cohort and covers very different functional areas from those of Erasmus+. In short, the new programme would apply similar principles of cross-border exchange and organizational integration, but to critical security challenges and at a societal scale.

It is important to underline from the outset that establishing such a scheme would not mean militarizing European society or bypassing individual countries' sovereignty over their defence. The proposal here is simply to institute a common European framework for defence and preparedness, beginning with a period of basic military and civil-defence training for all medically eligible participants – subject to exemptions under national law. In a second stage of service, participants would then pursue either a military or civilian service track, which would include a placement in another participating European country.

Cross-border experience would be particularly valuable at a time of rising distrust in public institutions and growing fragmentation of the media environment. Although governments can seek to explain to citizens why security threats differ across Europe, official assessments – often questioned in the media and by the public – will rarely carry the same weight as direct experience. A young Spaniard spending a period of service in Poland, for example, would see at first hand how the country's proximity to Russia shapes preparations for conflict (and how Poland consequently works to ensure essential services are capable of functioning under pressure). Conversely, a Polish participant serving in southern Europe would observe vulnerabilities (e.g. to illegal maritime migration) that feature less prominently in Poland's security debate.

6 Erasmus was established in 1987 as a system of cross-border student interchange, and has since expanded into what is now called Erasmus+, covering education, training, youth and sport. Official EU material states that more than 16 million people have taken part since the start of the programme. See European Commission (2025), 'Erasmus to Erasmus+: history, funding and future', last updated 28 February 2025, https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/about-erasmus/history-funding-and-future.

7 EMILYO was established in 2008, explicitly describing itself as 'inspired by Erasmus'. The scheme aims to foster a common military culture, the interoperability of systems across European armies, and the harmonization of education across participating national military academies. European Security and Defence College (undated), 'Military ERASMUS', https://www.esdc.europa.eu/configurations/military-erasmus_en.

Greater familiarity with another country's security environment should not be confused with convergence in threat assessment – nor should that be expected. Differences in threat perceptions across Europe often reflect genuine differences in geography, strategic culture, risk exposure and national vulnerability. A French participant, for instance, may understand perfectly well why Poland regards the prospect of Russian military aggression with particular urgency, yet may judge the likelihood of direct kinetic action by Russia against France very differently. Rather than erasing those differences, the purpose of a shared strategic culture should be to make them intelligible enough across borders so that they do not prevent common decisive action at European level when a crisis emerges.

That still leaves a politically sensitive question: why should the security of one European country be regarded as part of the security of another? The answer cannot rest on a claim that Europeans face identical threats. As outlined above, they do not. It rests instead on the extent to which security has become interconnected. Alliance commitments can turn an attack on one country into an obligation for others to answer or replicate.[8] Disruption to infrastructure or supply chains can spread rapidly across borders. A crisis on NATO's eastern flank, for example, would affect countries further west even if their own territory were not under immediate military threat.

Threats to Europe have at times prompted discussion of the controversial question of whether European or EU states should consolidate their armed forces to create a joint European army. But before Europe can credibly have this debate, which would be politically highly contentious, there needs to be a common strategic culture rooted in mutual responsibility and preparedness – a culture capable of translating different national threat perceptions into European solidarity and action when required.

Policy options and trade-offs

European governments face four broad options.

The first is to focus primarily on higher defence spending and military capability. This will remain very much necessary, but it is insufficient to address Europe's security challenges. The most burning question, at this stage, is not so much whether Europe needs more hard power, but whether it can credibly assume the growing defence burden left by a disengaging US. The war in Ukraine has exposed how far Europe still falls short in terms of production capacity and ability to sustain high-intensity warfare. Yet higher defence spending alone will not ensure that European societies can absorb prolonged disruption – or, for that matter, that different national threat perceptions are understood across borders.

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The second option is to revive national service schemes separately. This is the current direction of travel in several countries. France has announced a new programme of voluntary military service for young people,[9] while Germany's new military service model remains essentially voluntary, although mandatory

8 The North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5, 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty; Treaty on European Union, Art. 42(7), consolidated version, *Official Journal of the European Union* C 202, 7 June 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_42/oj/eng.

9 Élysée Palace (2025), 'Déplacement au sein de la 27e Brigade d'Infanterie de Montagne de Varces' [Visit to the Varce 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade], 27 November 2025, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/11/27/deplacement-au-sein-de-la-27e-brigade-dinfanterie-de-montagne-de-varces.

registration and medical screening are being reintroduced for young men.[10] These efforts may have national value, but they illustrate exactly the risks Europe should avoid: a patchwork of domestically focused schemes would mainly attract the already motivated, would remain too limited in scale to be effective against substantial threats, and would fail to build a common European strategic culture. These national schemes are also emerging at a difficult fiscal moment, when higher defence expenditure is competing with many other intensifying demands on public budgets. National service schemes should, in any event, be designed from the outset to plug into a common European framework, so that the fulfilment of national obligations contributes both to domestic military capacity and to shared European preparedness.

The third option is to create a fully EU-wide compulsory service scheme. But this would be politically unrealistic in the short term. Military and civilian service obligations alike are closely tied to concepts of national sovereignty and remain politically sensitive. Any attempt to introduce an EU-wide model would risk prolonged legal and political contestation in member states. It could also provoke opposition from citizens who might see it as an imposed federal instrument (another *machin*, to borrow de Gaulle's famous criticism of the UN) rather than as a national obligation with a European dimension. Moreover, it would exclude non-EU European states with valuable contributions to make.

The fourth option – and the one advocated in this paper – is a coalition-based European resilience agenda. A group of willing states would retain national responsibility for compulsory service obligations, but would agree on common minimum standards and develop four shared instruments: training modules; cross-border placements of citizens; local resilience structures; and a civilian reserve network with interoperability between participating states. The framework should be open to non-EU partners such as the UK and Norway. This option is the most practical route. It could be put into place faster than EU-wide legislation, would respect national sovereignty, and would still create a European layer of strategic education.

Several trade-offs would need to be addressed.

The first would be between voluntary and compulsory participation. Voluntary schemes are easier to launch, but they tend to attract the already convinced. Such initiatives would be unlikely to create the shared civic foundation necessary for a minimum level of preparedness across society. If the aim is to build a strategic culture, the principle should be universal participation with clearly defined exemptions.

The second would be between military and civilian service. A purely military scheme would be too narrow and politically harder to scale, while a purely civilian model would contribute too little to defence readiness. As mentioned, all medically eligible participants should therefore undertake an initial period of basic military and civil-defence training before entering either a military or civilian service track. This would establish a common defence baseline while allowing the respective tracks to reflect different skills and needs.

The third trade-off would be between national legitimacy and European cohesion. The service obligation should remain national in scope, but a substantial cross-border placement should be mandatory. This would preserve national

10 Federal Government of Germany (2025), 'Military service is being modernised', 27 August 2025, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/new-draft-military-service-law-2381698.

responsibility for compulsory service while giving the programme its genuinely European character. Without a meaningful period of service abroad, the 'Erasmus-inspired' dimension of any scheme would remain largely rhetorical.

The fourth trade-off would be whether operation of the scheme should be the sole responsibility of central governments, or whether aspects of its administration should be devolved to local and private providers. National governments would establish the framework, with the armed forces of each country overseeing military training. But implementation should also involve municipalities and operators of essential services. These are often the institutions and entities expected to maintain continuity during crises. They should therefore have a formal role in how preparedness is planned and exercised.

The fifth trade-off would be between ambition and fiscal realism. The French and German cases already underline the fiscal burden of rebuilding national military service schemes, even on a limited and voluntary basis. France has budgeted €2.3 billion for its new military service programme between 2026 and 2030, with participation expected to rise from 3,000 people in 2026 to 10,000 a year by 2030. Of the amount budgeted, €1.46 billion has been allocated to infrastructure alone.[11] The figures are instructive: most of the projected expenditure lies in creating the capacity to host and train participants, rather than in their remuneration. Germany's new military service framework is likewise expected to require additional federal expenditure of around €495 million in 2026, rising to €849 million in 2029.[12] The two systems differ in design and accounting, and their headline figures are therefore not directly comparable. They nevertheless show how quickly accommodation, training, administration and support impose substantial costs on national budgets.

A compulsory national defence and preparedness scheme operating at much broader scale would inevitably require significant public investment. The French and German examples therefore strengthen the argument for identifying from the outset which elements must remain national, and which can sensibly be organized collectively. Shared curriculums and certification, cross-border placements, specialized training infrastructure, joint exercises and interoperable reserve arrangements could reduce unnecessary duplication while ensuring that national expenditure builds capacity across borders. The European Commission's proposed allocation of €131 billion to defence, security and space under the 2028–34 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) creates a timely opportunity to finance parts of this European layer.[13] Individual governments would retain responsibility for the costs associated with compulsory national service. At the same time, European funding could support elements that provided clear cross-border added value, and could alleviate some of the additional pressure on national budgets.

The proposed Erasmus-type scheme for defence would offer a concrete mechanism for UK–European reassociation after Brexit, giving the UK a structured role in Europe's wider security and preparedness.

The sixth trade-off would be between EU integration and post-Brexit European security. The UK should not be treated as an external partner to a predominantly EU initiative. Britain has relevant and advanced capabilities in intelligence, cyber technology, maritime security, civil contingency planning, expeditionary operations, defence training and NATO planning, all of which are crucial to European defence and security. The proposed Erasmus-type scheme for defence would offer a concrete

11 Perrin, C. (2026), *Projet de loi actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2024 à 2030 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense* [Military Programming Law Update Bill for the years 2024 to 2030], Rapport no. 666 (2025–2026), Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, Sénat, 27 May 2026, chap. II, art. 24, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l25-666/l25-66616.html.
12 German Federal Government (2025), *Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Wehrdienstes (Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz –WDModG)* [Military Service Modernization Draft Act], Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/1853, 29 September 2025, pp. 4, 58, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/018/2101853.pdf.
13 European Commission (2026), 'Protecting Europe', last reviewed 15 January 2026, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/budget/eu-budget-2028-2034-explained/protecting-europe_en.

mechanism for UK–European reassociation after Brexit, giving the UK a structured role in Europe's wider security and preparedness. As Andy Burnham's government is reopening the debate over Britain's relationship with the EU, such cooperation would offer enough flexibility of association without tying the hands of either party and prejudging the subsequent question of eventual membership.

Recommendations

1. Establish a compulsory European national service scheme built around cross-border exchanges – an 'Erasmus for defence', as it were – among willing states.

Participating governments should introduce compulsory service for a defined age cohort, or – where conscription already exists – modify or extend schemes to fit the cross-border cooperation model proposed here. The service obligation would remain national, with a mandatory foreign-experience component built into the programme. A practical pilot scheme could begin with a common period of basic military and civil-defence training for all medically eligible participants, followed by a specialized military or civilian service track and a three- to four-month placement in another participating country. The placement should provide genuine immersion in another security environment and provide exposure to that country's approach to preparedness.

Those undertaking military service could spend several months training alongside the armed forces of another participating country. Civilian participants would undertake placements with civil-protection agencies, municipalities, ports, hospitals and other key strategic operators.

The service obligation should include, at a minimum, the following options: service in the armed forces, civil protection, emergency medicine, cyber resilience, infrastructure security, energy supply continuity, food security, telecommunications, logistics, transport, local crisis management and strategic communication. The cross-border element should be clearly operational, not merely symbolic: in other words, participants should be placed in real institutions. Those undertaking military service could spend several months training alongside the armed forces of another participating country (though it is important to note that these military placements would be supervised training attachments rather than operational deployments). As for civilian participants, they would undertake placements with institutions spanning, at the very least, civil-protection agencies, municipalities, transportation hubs (ports, airports, etc.), hospitals and other key strategic operators (energy suppliers and logistics providers in particular).

Completion of the period of service should normally be followed by a subsequent obligation to remain on standby as a member of a national reserve. Those completing a military track would enter the relevant national military reserve; participants in the civilian track would join the civilian preparedness reserve described below.

2. Create a European civilian reserve network.

The civilian track of the compulsory national service scheme should feed into a European civilian reserve network, organized nationally but with interoperable functions across participating states. The network should combine national service participants with other citizens who possess crisis-relevant professional expertise, so that anyone with the necessary skills can be called upon for refresher training, exercises or mobilization.

The network should be built around the professions required to maintain essential services and support crisis response. Relevant personnel should include medical professionals, engineers, energy specialists, cyber experts, logistics managers, food-sector operators, telecoms technicians, transport planners, water and waste specialists, local government officials, emergency communicators and civil society coordinators. A digital register, protected against cyberattacks, should record members' training status, verified expertise and availability. The wider framework should include rules on periodic refresher training, employment protections for people who are called up, and clear procedures for activating the reserve in a crisis.

3. Develop a common European 'preparedness curriculum'.

Participating states should agree on common training curriculums for both the military and civilian components of compulsory national service. Basic military training would remain a national-level responsibility, but participating governments should agree on minimum training objectives and standards, in cooperation with their armed forces. Civilian modules should cover basic defence awareness, civil protection, first aid, cyber hygiene, media literacy, crisis communication, emergency logistics, infrastructure resilience, household preparedness and local-government crisis response.

4. Create 'local resilience compacts' with local governments and essential-service operators.

Participating governments should designate pilot regions for the establishment of 'local resilience compacts' that would bring together municipal and regional authorities with civil-protection bodies, universities, NGOs, and private enterprises responsible for essential services.

The compacts should focus primarily on services whose disruption would have the greatest immediate impact on society and crisis response. Priority sectors should include energy, water, food distribution, transport hubs, data infrastructure, telecommunications, hospitals, waste management, logistics and payment systems.

5. Launch the scheme with a coalition of willing states, with the UK invited from the outset.

The initiative should be established by a coalition of willing European governments rather than as an EU-wide or EU-exclusive programme. A credible founding group would combine eastern front-line states (e.g. Poland, Ukraine), countries with established traditions of total or comprehensive defence (e.g. Finland, Sweden), major military powers (France, Germany, the UK), and states with significant civilian resilience capabilities (Switzerland, the Baltic states). The UK should be involved from the initial design stage. EU institutions could provide funding and technical support where appropriate. Service obligations, mobilization and national preparedness would remain the responsibilities of national governments. The proposed 2028–34 MFF offers an immediate opportunity to finance the common European layer of the initiative, particularly in relation to cross-border mobility, shared training infrastructure and reserve interoperability.

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