Chatham House Meetings and Speeches
Transcription from audio recording 22/5/13[AMS]

Title: The Future of South Africa: The ANC View
Speaker: [Blank]
Chairman: Unknown
Meeting Location: Chatham House, London, UK
Date: Tuesday, 29th October 1985
Duration: 67.40 minutes
Q & A session: Yes [starts 36.59]
Page Range: 1-15
Language(s): English
Reference No.: RIIA/8/4577
Quality of Audio: Poor

Chair: Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me very great pleasure to introduce [Blank]

UNDER CHATHAM HOUSE RULE

that we are all looking forward with the keenest anticipation to what you have to say to us this afternoon. It’s perfectly true of course that the present government in this country is rather unwilling to speak to [Blank] unofficially, I hope Chatham House will forgive me if I say that speaking to an audience at Chatham House, [Blank] is probably the next best thing (laughter).

May I, ladies and gentlemen, though you all look old hands to me, remind you that our meeting is being conducted under Chatham House rules. I’ll read the rule, this meeting is private and off the record, you may use the information given by the speaker, but should not attribute it to him or to Chatham House. May I also, in anticipation, ask you, when the time comes for discussion, to keep your comments and questions as brief as possible. We want, on an occasion like this, to make the best possible use of the time available. At two-thirty or so I think we shall have to bring the meeting to an end because [Blank] has to be at the House of Commons later this afternoon. So, without more ado let me introduce our speaker, [Blank] who is going to speak about the future of South Africa, the African National Congress view. [Blank] (applause).
Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I need hardly say what a singular experience and what a great honour it is for me to have been invited to address this meeting at Chatham House. As you say sir, since the British Government does not as yet seem to be disposed to talking to the ANC, whatever might come out of such talking, to which the British people, opinion makers, the leaders of this country, is the best thing to happen in the circumstances and we are very grateful that you have come in such large numbers to hear what we would like to tell you about South Africa. Now, we are waiting today because we are all concerned to do something about the South African issue. We would like to assume that we are all interested to see an end to the apartheid system. We are all interested to contribute what we can to the birth of a democratic and non-racial South Africa. Something our people have striven for over many decades now. We would like to assume that you are with us in the desire to see the emergence of an era of peace, not only in South Africa but in the whole region of southern Africa, in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana. All these countries have known no peace since their independence and the one single reason for that has been the apartheid system which helped Portuguese colonialism, which fought side by side with the Ian Smith regime and which, after that regime collapsed, took over as the dominant destabiliser, waging what was described by the leaders of southern Africa as an undeclared war against each of them.

Peace appeared to be coming with the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the African National Congress understanding what the objectives, the true objectives of the South African regime were, did not think the signing of the Nkomati Accord was the beginning of an era of peace. We thought it would make no difference and we all know it has made no difference. When Piet Botha came to this country and to other European countries he appeared to be carrying a message of peace from southern Africa, that message has evaporated, it has disappeared. There is no peace. There can be no peace while apartheid endures. What we are certain to debate therefore is not whether the apartheid system should be abolished or abandoned or ended, but the ways and means to achieve these results.

And in our brief presentation today we will concentrate on some of those questions that have emerged in the course of the worldwide discussion of what should be done to abolish the apartheid system, because that is the centre issue. We might usefully begin by posing and answering the question: is the Botha regime an instrument of democratic change? To broaden the question, can the ruling national party transform itself from a party of Afrikaners and white minority
domination into a force for a non-racial and democratic society? I think it is common knowledge among all of us here that the answer the ANC would give to these two questions is no. We do not believe, the ANC does not believe that the party of racist rule in South Africa can transform itself into a party of democracy.

The raison d'être of this party is the promotion and defence of white privilege, the exclusive advancement of white interests at the expense of the black majority. The current leadership of the party has not hesitated to restate these objectives many times and in unequivocal terms. Consequently we cannot accept as meaningful any strategy for change based on the thesis that Botha has embarked on a reform process which will gradually knock down the edifice of white minority domination and privilege, brick by brick and erect a new political and economic reality in its place. The so-called reform programme which Botha and his supporters paint in such glorious colours is a set of measures elaborated and implemented in the context of Pretoria’s doctrine of national security. These measures have the sole aim of helping to defuse the explosive situation in the country, with a view to ensuring the permanence and security of the apartheid system of white minority domination. By their very nature these reforms must emanate from the top, they are an expression of the ideas of the ruling group, acting in its own interests. They are not the translation into policy of the wishes of the oppressed majority. The outer limits of this so-called reform programme are defined by the requirement that everything is subject to amendment, provided that such change will extend the life of the apartheid system in its most fundamental essentials. Apartheid is being, as it is said, reformed in order to tame the system of oppression and not to abolish it. That is the long and the short of that story about reform. In any case, we maintain that the notion that a criminal practice can be reformed or amended gradually into something other than a felony cannot be taken as a serious proposition.

If apartheid is a crime against humanity, a crime against its victims, it is incapable of reform. It should only be ended and the issue is therefore again not how to amend, how to reform it, but how to put an end to it as a crime. It ought to be self-evident that the principal agents of change in South Africa must be those sections of our population who stand to benefit from the abolition of the apartheid system. Recognising the correctness of this rather mundane and obvious thesis, it ought also to be a straightforward matter of logic to arrive at the conclusion that those outside our country who seek change in South Africa are obliged to support those whom the apartheid system dispossesses and not those who are the beneficiaries of the practice of racism and human degradation. The standard response to this will
be, “Yes of course we support you, we support your effort to end the apartheid system, but we do not agree with the methods you are using to achieve your objectives.” That’s the idea that is gaining currency, that we must modulate our pressure on the Pretoria regime as a prerequisite to the acquisition of our liberty in all its fullness. In terms of our strategy, this amounts to advising us that we must abandon both the arms struggle and economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa. The most sophisticated argument in favour of these positions is once more based on the thesis that we must rely on the Botha regime to institute the process of change. It is then proposed that we must conduct our affairs in such a way that we avoid two consequences, that it is suggested that we conduct our struggle in such a manner that the Pretoria regime does not lose its supporters to its right wing.

Secondly, it is said that a determined all round offensive against this regime would drive the white population into a lather and make the process of change that much more difficult. But clearly we cannot predicate our conduct on the maintenance of order in power as the first argument suggests. Our task is to remove the white minority regime from power, whatever the guise it assumes, whether so-called reformist or right wing. The latter thesis puts forward a perspective which in fact does not accord with the reality of what has been happening to the white power bloc over the last few years. As the internal and external offensive against the Pretoria regime has mounted, so have divisions and conflicts within this bloc sharpened. Of course, we are perfectly conscious of the fact that there are large numbers of our white compatriots who will fight to hold on to power and privilege, to the bitter end. That is an inevitable consequence of the history of our country that we have to live with.

And so we come back to the proposition which we have advanced over the years, this is that a people denied constitutional rights cannot be asked to use constitutional means that are unavailable to them, to achieve their liberty. For us this is a matter of practical politics. In practice the Pretoria regime does not recognise that we have any right to an organised expression of our views. Mr Chairman, it is sometimes forgotten that when the ANC was banned in 1960 it had not yet decided on a policy of armed struggle, it was still committed to non-violent struggle. Today, the leadership of the United Democratic Front is facing charges of treason, despite its consistent adherence to a policy of peaceful struggle and if I may say so, only this morning we learned from the news media that more than 100 organisations in the Cape Town area have been banned from holding meetings. What are they to do? It ought to be clear therefore that we
have no alternative but to fight on, not because we love violence, but because the choice we are faced with is to submit or fight. It will be interesting to recall that when the – what subsequently became the South Africa Act, was being debated by the British Parliament, then only as a Bill, one of the participants, Lord Courtney, is quoted to have predicted in relation to the Act that was under debate, that the government of a large non-white majority by a relatively small white minority would lead to unrest, instability and danger. I think it is – it speaks eloquently of the ANC’s commitment to orderly struggle, but 50 years, some 50 years after this statement was made, the ANC was still pursuing a deliberate policy of non-violence. Historians may well observe that since the ANC has been the principal organisation representing our people over a period of 70 years, the fact that unrest, instability and danger have taken some 70 years to emerge on the South African scene, is also a measure of the ANC’s reluctance to move away from non-violence. But, what Lord Courtney said is the reality of today.

Well, exactly because we had no desire to inherit a country that has suffered extensive destruction we have called on the international community to impose sanctions against the apartheid regime. Another demonstration of our attempts to avoid violence on limited scope, this is a peaceful method of struggle desired to weaken this regime and make the transition to a democratic society that much quicker and less destructive of people and property. No sensible person could seek chaos and destruction for their own sake. We do not seek these either. The argument for sanctions is also one against chaos and destruction. The argument against sanctions, did I say the argument against sanctions? The argument for sanctions is also an argument against chaos and destruction. The argument against sanctions, the failure to impose effective sanctions has inevitably led to greater obduracy on the part of the apartheid regime, as well as the availability to the regime of the material resources to run the apartheid system and to wage war against our people and the peoples of southern Africa. Therefore we shall continue to argue that a strategy which seeks the most peaceful change or, if you like, the least violent possible, must include sanctions. Our people are determined to liberate themselves.

During the debate that I have referred to in the House of Lords, the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop R T Davidson, discussing the colour bar clauses of the South African Constitution, felt that the House of Lords should accept the principle that for the present, that is at that time, it was justifiable to impose on the South African native, restrictions and limitations and quote, “Which correspond to those which we impose on children.” Needless to say, this view
prevailed. That is how we end the situation we now live in. But, he also went on to express a hope, he believed that, again I quote, “The larger, sounder and more Christian principles will in the long run prevail in South Africa, as years advance.” Well, those larger, sounder and more Christian principles have not prevailed some 80 years after that statement was made. We are still subjected to limitations and restrictions such as are fit for children only. That is why, by the mid eighties, our people can be expected to fight with great determination, especially surrounded as they are by a continent of free peoples, people who were not free when we started. Regardless of what happens, our political and military struggles will continue and will intensify because at all costs we must remove the crime that bedevils our lives. It is unfair to expect us to be less determined to remove our version of Nazism than the peoples of this country, of Europe, the rest of the world were to remove Nazi Germany as the threat which it was to every nation. And I should like to recall that the great inspiration behind the apartheid system was, of course, not just national socialism, but Hitler’s style. We are still confronted in South Africa with that problem.

The people of Namibia, the people of South Africa, cannot as I have said, be expected to accept anything less than what the rest of Africa has achieved in the period since the Second World War. We cannot be expected to pursue with less determination the goals which were sought by the peoples of the world during the Second World War. We therefore would ask the world community to support that struggle. It is fair to say that there are many countries, many peoples around the world who are not happy about the violent aspect of our struggle. Some prefer not to comment on that, but in spite of that they give us assistance and support and I’m not talking just about the socialist countries, I’m talking about countries around the world, including many countries in Europe. We have no doubt of their support, which is expressed in material terms. Countries which are firm on the issue of sanctions, countries which seek to impose pressures on the South African regime, pressures which would make it difficult for that regime to operate its criminal system.

We therefore ask that you support us in our efforts to transform our country into a democratic and peaceful entity. We believe that in expressing your support you should amongst other things, join the campaign for the immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners. The British prime minister has expressed herself in these terms, we appreciate that. Demand that the Botha regime lifts the state of emergency, removes the army and the police from the black townships, abandon all political trials and release the
detailees. We find that there is a tendency to put the onus of the conflict on the African National Congress not on those who have their army deployed in the streets and shooting at children, unarmed children.

The desire to break the cycle of violence swings to become a desire for the ANC, or an insistence that the ANC stops its violence. We think the problem is not with the ANC, the problem is with the Botha regime, the apartheid system. The ANC is helpless in that situation. Violence was thrust down our unwilling throats and we had to swallow it, after a very determined struggle to resist it, at least for 50 years. But certainly for a whole decade of the apartheid era we are helpless, we have only one duty to ourselves and to humanity and that is to do everything, to use every method to put an end to this crime, to this scurse on the conscience of mankind. We are helpless. The onus should shift from the ANC to Botha. What is he doing about violence? He is spreading his violence, he is intensifying it and naturally there is escalation. And as I have said, there is no way of interrupting that escalation unless two things happen, that at some levels of this conflict the apartheid system ceases to function or, before those levels are reached, international pressures are so strong that again, the apartheid system ceases to be operational. It's the only alternative there is. If there's a third alternative it is that we abandon our struggle and surrender. That is inconceivable. So we ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to urge the British government to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa as a concrete contribution to the struggle to remove a system which this government, as well as the people of Britain, has denounced and continues to denounce as being abhorrent. Thank you very much (applause).

Chair: Well, ladies and gentlemen, the speaker has indicated a willingness to take questions and comments on what he has said. We have about 20 minutes and I do press upon you the importance of keeping your questions and comments very, very short indeed so that as many people as possible can take part in our discussion. So may I now have the first question? I've got to master the technology first, thank you. Right, I think I...

Question and Answers

Participant: Until recently the ANC has directed its military actions against symbolic targets of the regime, of apartheid and therefore people on the outside and whites inside South Africa could justify their support of the ANC because it was not a terrorist organisation in terms of rabid, undirected terrorism, but recently there
have been some directives from the ANC suggesting that employees, black employees steal guns from their employers, that attacks be launched at unnamed people in holiday resorts and this sort of thing. I wonder, is the ANC not concerned that this may discredit those whites in South Africa, like [unclear 39.48] the business community and others, who have been urging in negotiations with the ANC, won't this discredit them if the ANC goes ahead with that sort of action?

And the second part of my question is, is the ANC concerned with retaining the support of those whites who make up probably what, a third of the white community, who are in favour of negotiations with the ANC?

Chair: May I just ask if you would to identify yourself, I know who you are myself, but if you would just...

Participant: I'm [redacted]

Chair: May I ask everyone who speaks to explain who he is or she is and then identify the institution or company from which they come. [redacted]

Speaker: It is true, I think, that most people would be happy if the ANC confined itself to what is called a peaceful struggle or demonstrations. But that would not solve our common problem. We tried this for ten years, as I have said. We failed to communicate with our white compatriots at the time, we failed completely. What we got was violence on an increasing scale, leading up to [Shedvale? 41.27].

Now, we had thought that there would be some response to our non-violence, we were being shot at, we were being arrested, we've been banned, all sorts of things were happening and so we failed. The next phase was to go for selective sabotage actions. When we started other liberation movements were also taking up to violence.

Now, for two decades now we have been using these selective sabotage actions, for two long decades and it has made no difference. Now, if it is an armed struggle, if we want to fight we must fight, this must be accepted. If what we are confronted with is an armed conflict then let's have an armed conflict and this is the demand today, that we can't go on for another two decades either in the methods that we've used. So we say we've got to intensify this and we recognise that we are now moving into an area of killings, very reluctantly for the ANC. Who else, what other organisation has taken so much trouble to avoid hurting people? And during these two decades there have been hundreds, perhaps thousands of
sabotage actions. In each case no-one hurt, no casualties. This was not by accident, it was deliberate. So we are hoping that although people continue to be unhappy with heightened levels of violence on both sides, they also understand that it has taken us all this time to reach a point where we must now relax our caution and we will continue to, of course, to avoid killing children like the apartheid regime does. We won't go into cinemas and blast people there. We are still bound by some morality of our own. But, we hope our friends and supporters will understand. Now, as far as the business community is concerned, the people who came to see us, I think they also notice that Botha does not want peace anyway. He doesn't want them to talk to us. He doesn't want Afrikaner students to come and talk to our youth.

What better dialogue can you have then between the leaders of the future, the people they are concerned about. He will not allow ministers of religion to come and talk to the ANC. He is bent on war. And I think that they should understand that. What is our alternative if we can't talk to anybody? So although not only in our country but internationally, there may be displeasure at what the ANC is doing, we hope that people will be as understanding as those who have been understanding, even about the measure of violence that we have been involved in now. It's a matter of struggle escalating and about which the Botha regime has been warned, that unless they change before it is too late, that they are going to see disaster. Well, I think it is too late.

Chair: Well, thank you very much [redacted] the gentleman on the left here I think wanted to speak.

Participant: Yes, [redacted]. You mentioned in the course of your talk that the onus for the violent conflicts, which again [unclear 45:43] from the ANC on [unclear 45:46] and you also mentioned during your talk that the state of emergency should be called off and the police and army should be moved out of the townships. What other violent aspects of the South African system are you referring to when you say that the onus is on Botha to [unclear 46:07] the violence?

Speaker: [Unclear 46:08] because the whole apartheid system is an act of violence. It is an act of violence; it can't operate without [break in recording 46:28-46:33].

Participant: ...the commonwealth mission of eminent persons to try and provoke dialogue in South Africa, will you for your part be prepared to co-operate with the mission if it
comes about and do you take a view that it is on the whole preferable it should be a mission of people in government or people ex-government?

Participant: 

Speaker: Well, this would never have been our idea if we had been consulted beforehand, because our memories of the contact group on Namibia are much too fresh for us to look with anything but alarm at the prospect of another group being introduced into the South African situation. So we are basically sceptical. Of course we have said that well, if the leaders of the Commonwealth want to do something about the South African situation and this is one of the few things that they can do, let them try, we will see how the thing relates to the ANC. I mean we don’t know what this dialogue is going to turn out to be. We ourselves would of course have preferred that it should be people outside the government who can act without restraint, who don’t have to be bound by government policy. But, this is a detail we have not addressed. We can also be uncomfortable and uneasy about who is on this group of eminent persons, that could be a matter of concern naturally because we are affected by the way different countries and governments approach our situation.

Chair: Thank you very much. 

Participant: looking to the future, what economic structure would the ANC like to see in South Africa?

Speaker: Well, this is the question that we had to discuss with the leaders of the business community who come to meet us in Lusaka. They were naturally interested in this. So we produced the Freedom Charter. In terms of the Freedom Charter, if I may summarise it, you would really have a mixed economy with the major industries controlled by the state. We explained our reasons for this, that we are the representatives of a people who are denied economically, who are poor, who are starved. The country is very wealthy, tremendous wealth, which is concentrated in the hands of a few, not a few whites, but a few multinational conglomerates, a few. Now – and that situation cannot remain like that, something has to be done about it, there’s got to be a certain amount of redistribution of this wealth so that the bulk of the people benefit.

Our difference with the business community was how this should be done. They did not think nationalisation would work, they felt other methods can be found, but
at least they accepted that the imbalance has to be corrected and we don’t believe that any government which came to power in South Africa, representing – in a democratic South Africa, could leave this question unaddressed and stay in power. It couldn’t, because the people have lived in this sort of situation for decades and part of this struggle is to correct their economic life. Raising the standards of living of course might be open to various methods, but this is what our people have seen as the best to nationalise the major industries. How that will be done, over what kind of period or whether it will be done at all, must ultimately depend, in a democratic society, on what the people want and we lay ourselves open to the decisions of the people.

Participant: Thank you very much.

Chair: There was a gentleman I think here, on my right, yes.

Participant: [Unclear 52.39] European Parliament. What minimum changes would you regard as sufficient to call off the violent struggle? Do you think you would be prepared to negotiate with the present government? And secondly, what ultimate constitutional setup would you see for South Africa? What for instance will the KwaZulu – what stake will they have and so on?

Speaker: On the question of what our minimum requirements would be, we have really resisted an answer to this question, because it subjects us to treatment as an exception to the general rule. In practice, negotiations start while the state of hostilities exists and we have the example of Zimbabwe when the Lancaster House Conference took place, there was a war going on in Zimbabwe, it stopped only when they reached agreement. In Mozambique, it’s the same position in Vietnam. Angola, when the Lusaka Agreement was signed, this was after protracted discussions and negotiations and during those negotiations the South African army was in Angola. The Nkomati Accord, the famous Nkomati Accord was arrived at a year after meetings between South Africa, Mozambique and the government started and so that’s the general rule.

And we say in South Africa, in fact if Botha is ready for serious negotiations then those don’t have to await a suspension of what is called ANC violence, or even of their violence. So we have said the evidence before us is that Botha is not ready for this kind of negotiation, not yet. Now, the second part of the question, yes, now we – apartheid found our people united under the ANC. They – it separated them out into ethnic minorities, first of all to achieve majority for the white
population. We were reduced into small minorities, that's apartheid. So we are not planning to base anything on this apartheid structure. The undue emphasis on the Zulus and so on creates a problem for us of course. It's as divisive as the apartheid system itself. But we regard Zulu people, those who speak Zulu, as South Africans, those who speak Sutu and Tswana, they're all South Africans and we will build, we will have a constitutional structure which treats South Africans as individual South Africans, citizens of South Africa, whether they are white or black. We are not going to base ourselves on the apartheid institutions and structures. That must go all together. So Kwazulu will not -- or anything else, will not have a place as a unit, except as part of a government structure, in a unitary state. And that applies to any other [unclear 56.57] we may think of [unclear 56.68] and [Lisboa? 57.01], there are many of these little things. We don't think that the Portuguese community now numbering one million in South Africa, should be gathered together and made a separate ethnic group and -- or that the English speaking, Afrikaans speaking, white populations should be separated out into ethnic groups. We think they are one people and we can all be one people as South Africans. But that's the basis of our constitutional reflections.

Chair: It's half past two, do you want to call it a day or do you want another ten minutes?

Speaker: Let's have another ten minutes.

Chair: [unclear 162.28] and I have both decided to risk imprisonment in the tower for keeping Sir Anthony Kershaw waiting at the House of Commons and he has happily agreed to another ten minutes of questioning, for which I am sure you are very grateful. It was the lady over here.

Participant: My name is [unclear 205.7]. My question is a little bit of a follow-up from the last one, so you may have a rather short answer. There seems to be a sort of procession of people lining up inside South Africa to make appointments with you and your colleagues in Lusaka, I wonder where you think that might lead and whether there are any people or groups that you would not be prepared to talk to in that way?

Chair: Thank you very much Mrs Legion. [unclear 215.32]

Speaker: I think there's a mutual interest between us and various sections of the South African community to talk, the ANC welcomes the opportunity to explain itself, especially to the white community who have been screened off from what the
ANC is and stands for and who have been misinformed. I think you may recall that when the businessmen returned from Lusaka they said that they had seen an aspect of the ANC which had always been concealed from them. That they had always been told a lot of untruths about the ANC. Now, South African propaganda is quite misleading about what the ANC is and in refusing to allow people to see the ANC, Botha wants to maintain this deception, this untruth. But, otherwise the ANC welcomes the opportunity of getting across to the white population and we are fairly certain that if they heard us, if they were exposed to us, some of their fears would be allayed. Now then, are there any groups there that we would not want to talk to? Well, do you have in mind Inkatha. (laughter) because Inkatha - there's a very real difference between Inkatha and Gatsha Buthelezi, a very real difference. And we have met Chief Gatsha Buthelezi several times over the years, until 1979 when he brought 17 of his central committee members to a meeting with the ANC, a very good meeting, very successful, except that he overturned it immediately he left us.

And since then he has been taking very consistent positions against anything the ANC stands for and is campaigning against sanctions, largely I think because the ANC is for sanctions. And at the present moment, he is one of our people and is so closely allied to the South African positions and the South African regime that Botha has gone out of his way to, on two public occasions, to call him an ally. That creates a lot of problems. But, I would not say that there will never in the future be any meeting between the ANC and even Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, but I'd make a distinction between Inkatha, I think there's nothing really wrong with Inkatha, with the people. We think they support us in fact and some of the opinion polls demonstrate that we have a lot of support in the area which would be expected to stand firmly behind positions of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

Participant: Professor [unclear 62.09]. It seems that the American businessman has realised where he stands now by virtue of the advertisements that appeared in the South African press this week, the death of apartheid. I'm wondering whether you've discovered a similar attitude on the part of the British business people interested in South Africa and also what they're prepared to do about it if they have had a change of heart?

Speaker: I can't say that I have detected a change of heart. I have found that there's a lot of sympathy with our positions and perhaps many business people at least appreciate what the ANC seeks to do. But, I shouldn't be surprised if there are others who have had no change of heart at all. I don't think that we have been
sufficiently exposed to the business community here, to make a judgement.

Chair: I shall take one more question right at the back and then, ladies and gentlemen, I regretfully have to bring the meeting to an end, please. Your name and...

Participant: My name is [redacted]; I write and talk about South Africa. I'm leaving for South Africa tonight, [unclear 63.43] for [redacted] would like to do but is unable to. I'd just like to ask you whether you feel that the role of South Africa as a strategic bastion in the west, as it's described by the Pretoria regime, is exaggerated. And do you believe that the strategic minerals that South Africa have would continue to be available for trade with the West should the ANC come to power?

Chair: Thank you very much.

Speaker: Yes I think that South Africa has sought to exploit this argument in this area, this sensitive area in the politics of the world; has sought to put South Africa and therefore southern Africa, as central to any strategic planning by the West. But there are obvious exaggerations. I mean what they make for instance of the Cape Sea route, the Cape Sea route is no longer as important as it may have been in the past. The strategic minerals, the ANC would be interested in selling the strategic minerals in the interests of our economy. The idea that the ANC would switch and sell the strategic minerals exclusively to the socialist countries, of course, is totally unfounded. I think we would be interested in maintaining good trade relations with the rest of the world and we would sell our commodities for mutual benefit with those who buy them. And I can see no reason why we would want to transfer them from the United States if the United States, for instance, continues to pay good value for them. The position of South Africa has quite clearly been exaggerated by largely a desire on the part of South Africa, to win the support of the West and they have used everything they can.

Chair: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you would wish me on your behalf to thank [redacted] for an extremely interesting, perceptive and helpful talk. We are, if I may say so [redacted], profoundly grateful to you for taking time out of what is clearly a very busy schedule, to come and talk to us so frankly and so usefully about your perception of South Africa's future and I'm sure everyone in this room will join me in wishing you well. May I also perhaps offer a word of thanks to Chatham House, to Keith Kyle and his colleagues, for having the foresight and the good sense to arrange this meeting at what is clearly a very appropriate moment. And may I just finally ask you, ladies and gentlemen, if you would remain seated
while [redacted] leaves the hall because short of the axe falling on his neck and mine, we have to get him to the House of Commons very quickly. Thank you very much for coming and for your very attentive and helpful questions (applause).

[Recording ends]