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Chair: … house and the meetings programmes this evening demonstrates has been flourishing and the research programme has been flourishing and the publications have been going better than ever before and we thought that it was now time to try to do something of a practical nature for our members which is why tonight is something of a first for us. It's a first because after the meeting, as many of you here will know, there's going to be a reception and that means that I must apologise to all those who did apply for tickets and who we were unable to provide them to. Partly, perhaps, that shows that our membership is as enthusiastic about the changes as we are but I suspect, more likely, because of our speaker tonight, Lord Carrington, and, the many people who might not necessarily have come for another speaker, have come for him and I'm very glad that they have.

I suppose there are quite a lot of people, thanks to television, of whom it might be said in British politics, that they are household names or that they need no introduction but what marks Lord Carrington off from, if not all the others, certainly most of the others, is that those words would apply with equal weight and with equal truth in countries other than this one, in the United States, in most of Western Europe and this is not simply because he's Secretary General of NATO and therefore an international figure, but it applies just as much because of the distinction with which he filled the role as, first, of Secretary of State for Defence here in the United Kingdom and then subsequently he was Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It give me very great pleasure to welcome Lord Carrington here, a man I worked closely with in a previous incarnation and a

man who it's a great honour to the Institute to be able to welcome (*applause*).

Speaker: Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it's very nice for me to sit or to stand under the chairmanship of [*unclear* 02:17] and I'm glad that he's taken time off from ensuring my safe air passage from Brussels to London and back, to worry about the safety of rather more important things in the world as chairman of this organisation and I think, if I may say so, we're very lucky to have him.

It's been five years since you last asked me to talk at Chatham House and that was on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which, as the Americans say, I encumbered at the time (*laughter*), I might have encumbered more than a few of the audience that night because I had to explain what it was like to be Foreign Secretary in Her Majesty's Government. Well, since then, I've had to leave this side and home and become international though perhaps some of you haven't noticed much of a change. You will, however, be grateful that although I'm now a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's international staff, I have reluctantly agreed to speak tonight in the NATO official language which my mother spoke better. I'm afraid I'm back to the same old routine. Having told you five years ago about how a foreign secretary spent his day, I thought I might say a few things about the business of the NATO Secretary General, at least how this NATO Secretary General sees his job in the Atlantic community we work in and what, at the present time, are his preoccupations. And frankly, as I've said before, I often feel a bit wet in the job. Not, let me assure you, in the current British political sense of moisture, though I have on occasion been accused of that but, because I'm forever getting drenched trying to operate from my boson's chair in the middle of the Atlantic and, of course, by that figure of speech, I mean any NATO Secretary General must pay equal attention to allies on both shores and I'm particularly mindful of that obligation tonight for in a matter of hours we shall know how near Mr Shultz and Mr Shevardnadze have come to agreement on eliminating all intermediate mid-range missiles. And for some weeks now, signs have pointed towards agreement and I think we can all sense that there is a political will, certainly from the American administration and, I think too, from the Soviet side. And whether the two foreign ministers close the deal or whether the President and General Secretary sign on the dotted line, an INF Treaty does seem now to be emerging. Of course, even odds on favourites or, I think, as the horse racing fraternity call them, moral certainties, can stumble at the last hurdle. But if all goes well, an agreement with solid ratification should be possible next year and it is, for me, at any rate, interesting to compare this state of affairs with that that existed when I

took office in 1984 as Secretary General of NATO.

At that time, no arms talks of any kind were in progress, the MDFR was going on, but otherwise nothing was happening. The two superpowers, as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan, events in Poland, the SS20 Pershing cruise missile controversy, were barely on speaking terms. Peace movements in Western Europe were strongly growing, the anti-nuclear lobbies were active and increasingly influential and the views widely held were that NATO was concerned only with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe and unconcerned and neglectful of its other role of securing a more stable relationship with the Warsaw Pact and security as a lower level of armaments. Well, how much has changed in the comparatively short time? Voices are now raised querying the military wisdom of the current proposals and voicing doubts about their de-coupling effect, suggesting that political expediency has replaced military security as the alliance's policy. Well, to me, both these attitudes were wholly misplaced. It was essential, three or four years ago that we showed allied resolution to deploy the INF in the face of Soviet threats and blackmail and it's equally right that we should, when faced with a new dynamic Soviet leader, test his intentions and seek to reduce the enormous quantity of nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere.

An INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as we see taking shape in Geneva, will change the landscape of European security quite considerably, perhaps as definably as any development in a generation and it's from that changed landscape that we have to look at NATO and European security and, of course, there's no small irony in recognising that much which will determine future European security and I speak as a European, will come from decisions which are taken in Washington and Moscow. Though Washington takes an infinity of trouble consulting its allies, that's a bittersweet fact of life and of history, which not a few eminent Europeans have regretted but nostalgia really doesn't lead us anywhere and we must simply acknowledge that European security is Atlantic security and get on with it and, indeed, be thankful for it, for if it were not so we should sleep less easily in our bed and have to take some very difficult and very expensive decisions. Of course, all that's easier said than done and I will turn in a moment, if I may, of the quite specific challenges which an INF Treaty will set for NATO and for Europe, in particular, as we seek to guarantee our security with fewer nuclear weapons than before. But I should stress at the outset, that an agreement, would be an historic achievement which we ought to welcome.

For the first time in arms negotiating history, there is the prospect of phasing out a whole category of weapons, including the ones which have caused such security concerns for Western Europe over these last years and it will also bring an immense improvement in East-West relations and presage further progress in the arms control field, for example, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and reductions in conventional forces. Complicated though the matter is, both of them would bring even greater benefits to the alliance. Well, it was unthinkable five years ago that the Soviet Union would take up the NATO zero option, let alone be willing to extend that to the worldwide elimination of INF missiles. After all that was the genesis of the twin-track decision and NATO resolve and solidarity have been constant these past five years both at the negotiating table and on the ground and have been instrumental, I think, in bringing that about.

But, of course, in the meantime, quite a lot has changed, in the Moscow scene, in the Soviet scene. After what you might describe as an unsettled succession in Moscow, we now have in Mr Gorbachev a new generation of Soviet leader. A product of his political heritage but very different from his predecessors. Attuned to the Western media, mindful of the sorry state of the Soviet economy and apparently keen to rejuvenate it. In the last year we've seen him recast the Soviet hierarchy, both civilian and military, with people apparently sympathetic to his views and there's reason to expect that he will try to move Soviet external policy in directions that will reduce tensions with the United States and with Western Europe because that would be a natural thing to do and an essential corollary to the reforms he is making at home. After all to revitalise the Soviet economy at the present rate of defence spending in the Soviet Union would be extremely difficult. But, of course, there's also room for scepticism about Mr Gorbachev's foreign policy goals. A few politicians, particularly those in communist societies take sharp tacks off a familiar course and heavy tradition restrains. Russian Soviet history runs thick with unforgettable stories of invasion and suffering caused by foreign powers and that helps us to understand the Soviet paranoia about their own security and we've seen how that fear can be an element, at any way, that drives to excess, ask a Pole or a Czech or an Afghani. One needn't be an unreconstructed cold war warrior to see the boon which a neutralised Western Europe, severed from alliance with the United States, would bring the Soviet Union, still fearful of invasion and encirclement, however implausible that threat may seem to us.

So, the forecasts of Soviet intentions really run two ways, towards greater détente on the one hand, towards seducing us, siren-like, into dropping our guard on the

other. An atmosphere improved by a double zero INF agreement should give us wider scope to test Soviet intentions against their conduct and to see whether we can move to a less confrontational sort of East-West relations because, of course, arms control and perhaps sometimes we talk far too much about it, arms control is only one or should only be one aspect of the wider process of détente. But, of course, all this could also be a test of our own resolve not to be carried away in a wave of euphoria at the first signs of an arms agreement.

Well, you've seen glimmers of this brighter prospect, President Reagan has spoken in Los Angeles of opportunities for better East-West relations, too great to let pass by. His officials have met informally at [Chautauqua? 15:02] with their Soviet counterparts to contemplate scientific and cultural exchanges on a scale which would be unthinkable since the 1960's and for their part, the Soviets have accepted and arranged with alacrity, British and American inspection of military manoeuvres under the Stockholm CDE confidence building measures provisions and all of these are encouraging developments, much to be welcomed. But we haven't yet seen the lions lying down with the lambs or the T-72 tanks being beaten into Ukrainian tractors. So an environment in which there is increased Soviet contact with our Western democracies, should offer the conditions for the growth of mutual trust between East and West and mutual trust is the only basis for truly stable relations, not just between persons but among nations. In fact, mutual trust based on verifiable [*unclear* 16:09] which will enable successful implementation of an INF treaty or any other arms reduction agreement, the Americans and Soviets conclude, is, in my judgement, the key to it all.

And that leads directly to the core of what I want to say tonight. European security if and when an INF treaty has been signed for that will, in effect, be NATO's agenda for at least the next five years and probably for some time thereafter. The alliance foreign ministers, in their meeting at Reykjavik, last June, recognised this by asking the NATO Council in Permanent Session to take a fresh look at how our arms control aspirations fitted the implementation of our overall strategy. There was, I should note, no question in foreign ministers minds that none of them – that NATO's fundamental strategy was in any way compromised by the arms reduction goals we are pursuing. After all that strategy rests solidly on the twin premises of deterrence and détente. Both are tools to preserve European security but it isn't a bad thing, I think, at this juncture in our affairs for the Council to take a fresh look at these new developments. Well, to look ahead, immediately upon an INF treaty's entry into force, we shall confront the need to maintain stability in Europe during the treaty implementation, although I should

hope that the most stringent methods of verification, fully, honestly employed, will take care of that but temporary vulnerability, perhaps, imbalances may arise during implementation and could pose risks which [we'll strive? 18:20] against. And this implementation, whether it be three or five years will give way to a time to prepare for the greater challenges that follow.

If the arms reduction treaty we've been anticipating becomes reality and its terms are faithfully implemented it will, of course, say goodbye to more than 300 American Pershing and ground launched cruise missiles, now actually deployed in Europe. In addition, Chancellor Kohl said that in the event of a US-Soviet treaty, the 72 Pershing 1A's which the Germans have, will not be modernised when their useful lifespan ends in the early 1990's. Well, we should have done pretty well on the other side of the equation, for the Soviet Union will eliminate more than 600 elite intermediate range missiles and launchers, and remember their introduction prompted NATO's 1979 decision to deploy our own missiles, and that's just missiles, that's 600 missiles, if you want to count warheads, the Soviet Union could be removing more than 1,400 nuclear warheads.

So, what we all saw, five years ago, eight years ago, as the most stable – the most destabilising element of the Soviet's threat to Europe, has been put into reverse. So, just to count the kilo tonnes, Europe will become a much less nuclear place. Less nuclear, but not denuclearised and that is as it should and can only be, as far ahead as any of us can see. An INF agreement can enhance stability in Europe but we shouldn't let any euphoria it engenders push to some mythical non-nuclear nirvana. NATO's strategy of flexible response will be as valid after an INF agreement as it is today, and nuclear weapons will remain essential. Essential to implementing the strategy and for me to profess otherwise, would be unrealistic and irresponsible. For anyone to believe that under foreseeable circumstances we can survive without some nuclear weapons would be naïve. And that last sentence wasn't meant to sound like some Buddhist paradox, it simply states the central tenet of deterrence in the nuclear age.

Unfortunately, I think, the recent debate is inclined to blur a distinction, which I think crucial to understanding the point about nuclear weapons. When the – those allied nations which possess them hold them to deter war not to fight war, and in their abhorrent power of mass destruction, the speed, the accuracy, the reliability of their delivery and most important our resolve to use them in self-defence, these weapons are intended to dissuade a political adversary from ever attacking us. An effective deterrence, such as we've enjoyed for 40 years,

doesn't require a magical number of nuclear weapons but it will always require a sufficient number and mix of systems albeit at lower levels than before, if we want to preserve the credibility of the nuclear element in our deterrent posture. Well, within the INF Agreement we will be on our way to reducing NATO's nuclear arsenal and with our own security uppermost, we shall have to look very carefully at the inventory after the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles have been removed. Our military commanders must still be able to do their job and they've assured us that they can to do so, provided certain systems, and I'm thinking particularly of dual capable aircraft, are retained. And we must be sensitive too to the equitable distribution of this inventory among the allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, which bears weak burdens of geography.

[*Unclear* 23.23] effective deterrents within absolute minimum number of nuclear weapons, has long been an alliance goal, after all, you will recall that at Montebello in 1983, defence ministers meeting as the Nuclear Planning Group, decided on drastic reductions in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The number has already shrunk from 7,000 ten years ago to about 4,500 now and could fall further. The defence ministers also – and this was done unilaterally, incidentally – the defence ministers also mandated improvements to NATO's residual weapon stocks to enhance their reliability and to safeguard – and safeguards on their use and that equally important half of the Montebello decision must also be carried out, if we're to preserve the essential minimum of deterrents but in addition to ensuring that we maintain an adequate posture towards the Warsaw Pact, post INF, we shall also have to face up to the implications for the alliance itself, for the relations within the alliance itself.

Some have said that an INF agreement is likely to place greater political strains on the transatlantic relationship and already there are powerful voices arguing that the effects will be de-coupling, will weaken the effectiveness of the defence guarantees which we'll continue to need from the United States and this will be added to the existing catalogue of potential divisive factors, so called US-Continental Drift towards a Pacific rather than Atlantic orientation, sharper trade competition with Europe given tighter world markets, the problems over burden sharing with European allies considered rich enough to contribute more towards their own defence, even perhaps, the feeling that the present NATO defence strategy is tantamount to Americans being held hostage for European security and it's not going to be made easier to manage by pressures on the European side, whether from unilateralists, those who take a more benign view of Soviet intentions than is traditional in the United States or the increased emphasis on

European integration in forums such as the European Community and Western European Union.

The trouble is not one that can be simply swept under the carpet and I wouldn't pretend do to so, to such an audience as I see in front of me this evening but equally I want to make it clear that I do not believe that we are on the slippery slope to decoupling and for a better reason than that's what a Secretary General is under professional obligation to say. To take the issue in its narrowest sense, there is no special magic about INF missiles as such. The alliance manage to operate its flexible response strategy and preserve cohesion for many years without them and the arrangements for their elimination also involve the removal of the far more numerous and destabilising Soviet systems which brought about their introduction in the first place. More generally, I think, the tangible manifestation of the American commitment to the defence of Europe, is not the in-theatre missiles but the presence of 326,000 in-place troops in Europe and their dependents. There can be no greater demonstration of national commitment to the alliance than the readiness of the Americans, the Canadians and the Europeans too, to send their own countrymen to what would be the frontline, bearing the brunt of any initial attack on NATO Europe. I think that flesh and blood counts for more than abstract deterrence concepts.

Of course, this raises another set of questions. Questions about what one might loosely call the non-amendments and pressures from US troop reductions, of why European members of the alliance need improve their own defence contributions, partly to forestall US withdrawal, partly because conventional defence should be enhanced anyway and why we need better use of existing sources through practical measures of co-operation. But I will spare you the conceptual crashing of my verbal gears, which are necessary to turn a corner into that avenue but those of you who are unfortunate enough to be familiar with my standard speeches know that this is one of my abiding themes. The main purpose, today, the main point for my purpose today, is simply that the huge investment of American manpower, money and defence equipment in Europe itself with the necessary nuclear as well as conventional elements is proof of NATO's basic unity. Now, if the Americans rightly think that their contribution was largely charity, a vestigial relic of the Marshall Plan, existing for the sake of Europeans rather than themselves, then I would agree that we are in trouble. There is nothing more unlikely than the survival of this alliance if it were felt by the North Americans that they were doing a favour to Europeans out of friendship and good nature. If that were the basis, the Americans shouldn't and wouldn't stay on but I

don't believe that is the case both sides of the alliance have to be honest about the reasons for their participation and apply the acid test of whether they each have sufficient self-interest to maintain the alliances cohesion and momentum.

Well, for the last forty years, this hasn't been a serious question. The Brussels Declaration of December 1974, for example, states the central point; "The continued presence," it said, "Of Canadian and substantial US forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defence of North America as well as Europe. Similarly, the substantial forces of the European allies serves to defend Europe and North America as well," and I am sure that those responsible or who will become responsible for American policy, if they were to conduct a similar analysis of US interests, would come to the same unexciting but reassuringly similar conclusions. True, the United States has major Pacific and out of area preoccupations, there's nothing new about that, they've always had them, but it doesn't downgrade the importance of Europe or weaken the particular bonds formed by political, economic interests. The Americans cannot be indifferent to the security of Western Europe and the need to provide their indispensable contribution to deterrence and I noted, with pleasure, that in support of this Mr Weinberger said, only last week, "That US forces in Europe are a symbol and guarantee of the fact that the security of Europe is a vital element in America's own security."

Of course, to agree with that doesn't – as a general principle – doesn't mean accepting that the present balance is either right or unreachable, this goes for the balance of interests between any nations in a democratic alliance and not just as between the US and Europe there's room – considerable room for debate - over burden sharing in its widest definition whether it be about resources or force structures or nuclear basing, for example, or about policies such as alliance priorities over arms control but it does suggest, as I firmly believe, that the answers to these questions are to be found by frank discussion within the alliance. Now, that's a point which is clearly acknowledge in our regular activity, an activity which is often criticised for being slow and cumbersome and from the outside, the NATO Council, no doubt, gives the appearance of muddling through and critics may see this as a weakness.

It is, of course, very different from Mr Gorbachev, whose consultation processes, to say the least of it, rather more straight forward than our own. We've watched enthralled, while he has turned policy somersaults, as he did, for example, over the relationship between the SDI and INF in the course of one week, without

demur or consultation with his Warsaw Pact subordinates. But democracies proceed differently. They proceed by consensus and our positions are arrived at by shared analysis and effective consultation. After all, that's the democratic process which we are there to defend and I think that's why the positions that we do arrive at - and perhaps we do sometimes take rather a long time - the positions we arrive at have a strength, which Mr Gorbachev must envy. Of course, from time to time, circumstances evolve in a way which calls for more than just the routine political and military consultation. When there are major developments in the East-West balance or indeed in inter-alliance relations. Looking back over, I think, over 30 years' experience of NATO, I can think of a number of occasions where the preservation of the alliance and solidarity has required particular efforts, sometimes taking the form of creating a new forum, for example, intense and specialised consultation on some things, the creation of Nuclear Planning Group was one example and of the Euro Group, which responded to the particular needs of the late 1960's. Sometimes the response has been in weapons deployment, as in the case of the INF, sometimes it's a matter of developing or rather making explicit in our strategy what is already implicit, but has needed new emphasis.

Well, I don't think we're at that critical stage today but there are developments which we have to look at long and hard in order to meet the challenges which they present and take advantage of the opportunities which they offer. There's the evolution of Soviet defence policy and arms control objectives. There's new weapons technology, in all its forms. There's the question of what the pundits call structural disarmament. The problem of resource constraints and escalating costs. Public attitudes to defence underscore all of these things and above all there is the unprecedented number of arms control discussions and the need for the alliance to have a clear sense of their interrelationship and their priorities. And that, Mr Chairman, brings me back to my original theme. Our overall objective is very easily stated to preserve security and our flexible response strategy at lower levels of forces through mutually advantageous measures of arms control and disarmament. And to achieve this it's going to require some difficult decisions and not just the review which the alliance Prime Ministers asked the Council to do at Reykjavik. The way forwards will require an understanding of a paradox, nonetheless true for that. It's only by showing the determination to maintain deterrent forces that we are able to negotiate a lower level of armaments and exploit to the full the opportunities for a real improvement in East-West relations. An INF agreement would provide clear vindication for that approach.

There are also challenges for the United States but even greater ones for Western

Europe. Among other things in the less nuclear role which may be emerging we will, I expect, in Western Europe need to contribute more and not less to our collective security. I hope I haven't given you the impression that I'm pessimistic about these trends. I hope I've spoken frankly because you expect it and because that's the way the alliance works but, you know, when one compares the Western Europe today with the enfeebled post war wreckage of 40 years ago, it does seem to me, pretty clear, that NATO has provided a framework of security in which Western society has been able to progress and flourish at an unparalleled level. The environment may be changing, it always does but, I'm certain, that we shall need for a long time to come to adapt our security arrangements within the transatlantic partnership if we are going to preserve the continuity of peace (*applause*).

Chair: Ladies and Gentlemen, Lord Carrington has kindly agreed to answer questions. I would, however, ask those who want to put a question to be brief and to give their names, to give their organisations, if they think that is relevant and if they're journalists, not only to give their names and their newspapers but also to mention the name of this institution in the stories that they write about it (*laughter*). I have Robin Edmonds, thank you.

Question and Answers

Participant: Robin Edmonds, no organisation. Lord Carrington said, at the very end of his fascinating talk, that it might well be necessary for the Europeans to spend rather more on helping themselves. I wonder whether you could, at little bit more elaborate, some of the things that you said, not only at the end but also earlier in your discussion about the likely effects of this agreement, assuming it goes through, on the transatlantic relationship, not dramatic effects but, I think, the fact that this is first [*unclear* 40:16] nuclear agreement concluded by the superpowers specifically about Europe, must in the end taken over a period of years, have an effect and if therefore he were able to direct or answer to, perhaps, two, three or four years hence then it would be very helpful, thank you.

Speaker: Well, [under conventional? 40:37] the problem and we all sat here, sat over the years have said that there is a need to strengthen our conventional capability and the newly appointed [*unclear* 40:49] a splendid speech he made the other day, said exactly the same thing. He said "If you want to prevent an escalation into nuclear war, you have got to, not match the Warsaw Pact, but you certainly have to put yourself at less of a disadvantage than you are at the present time." Well,

there are only two ways of doing that, either you improve your conventional forces or you get the Soviet Union to reduce theirs and, we are really, basically trying to do both those things. I think, we should be very wrong to underestimate the enormous complications of conventional arms reduction talks. I mean, they are hideously complicated. After all the ending of our talks were only about Central Europe but only about men and the talks that we're now congregating are from the Atlantic to the Urals and about not just men but weapons and when you consider that the Soviet Union has 50,000 and the Warsaw Pact has 50,000 tanks in round figures and that NATO has 20,000 in round figures, it – you can see the beginnings of a difficulty.

Do you say to the Soviet Union, "You reduce 30,000 tanks and then we will start reducing one on our side?" Not a proposition which would be immediately agreeable, I would have thought, to the Soviet Union. One the other hand, if you start reducing you put yourself at an even greater disadvantage and who do you count anyway? I mean, are you going to count, those countries which are not integrated in the military framework? What – you know, there are endless complications. But what we have to do is seriously to address them and try to get, at any rate, more offensive weapons on both sides reduced and that's one way of doing it. The problem, of course, is the other side of the coin which is to get Western European governments to accept that they will have to spend more on defence, because it's not a popular thing. I mean, one of the things that I have noticed in my life, has been that governments, on the whole, are quite keen to get re-elected and they won't necessarily think that the best way to get re-elected is to spend a lot of money on defence rather than on some of the things which most of the electorate seem to prefer. And, I think, we are going to have difficulty in getting more money for defence and, I think, one of the things that we have to – I try to put over anyway – is the admirable though this agreement, if it comes about, is, it will certainly put more emphasis on conventional weapons and we have to accept that if we are going to be – seriously try to raise the – I don't know if it's raise or lower the nuclear threshold – anyway not use them so early – it will be certainly – it will be necessary for us to do more in terms of both reduction and improving our conventional reduction talks and improving our conventional weapons.

I don't happen to think, I mean, with regard your last question, I don't happen to think that this really an issue about which I feel that the INF agreement is going to make a lot of difference. I think we can talk ourselves into believing that INF agreement is decoupling. It think it perfectly easy to talk yourself into it but I just

don't happen to think it's true. After all, as I said in my remarks, we've got along with the INF until we deployed them first three years ago and any talk about decoupling because they weren't there and in fact we only deployed them because they had deployed theirs and we were worried about it. So they removed theirs and we remove ours. I do not think that is de-coupling. I think, that you could argue in purely military terms, that you have removed one of the ladders of escalation but I think you also have to remember what is left and you've got dual-capable aircraft, you've got other means of delivering nuclear weapons. I don't think anybody who is objective would say, at the present time that there's a scarcity of nuclear weapons in Western Europe and so, I don't happen to think that this is de-coupling. What I think is de-coupling is everybody saying it's de-coupling and going around saying that this what's going to happen and I personally frankly deplore it, I don't think it's true and we – as an alliance – we get ourselves into a position where we talk about it and make ourselves fearful of what's going on and perhaps give a little comfort to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by doing so. But I've no doubt there are different views in this room about what I've just said.

Chair: John [Dickie? 46:11].

Participant: John [Dickie? 46:13] of "The Daily Mail". Lord Carrington, two simple points of clarification. You mentioned a period of, perhaps, temporary vulnerability for the West during the implementation of INF. What sort of risks were you thinking about in that case? Secondly, have you any qualms about the verification procedure enabling Soviet on-site inspection into the Western European territories not only during the dismantling period but subsequent to it. [*Break in recording*] (*laughter*).

Speaker: I don't think that the temporary imbalance is really something which I worry very much about, I mean, I think it could happen, I think we'll just have to watch it and see that it - I'm sure that the first group who watch it will be the Americans. As regards your second – what was it?

Participant: The on-site inspection.

Speaker: Oh, the on-site inspection. Well, on the question of verification, it points back, of course, to the Soviet Union – perhaps not now but certainly before the Shevardnadze-Shultz talks, were really trying to have it both ways. They were – refused to accept the verification proposals of the Americans and when the

Americans modified their verification proposals because instead of leaving 100 warheads on each side, there was going to be zero and that consequently the verification was very much easier because if you are left with 100 on each side, you still have the maintenance problems and the production facilities are probably still there and therefore tighter verification is necessary in the case of the zero option. So when the Americans reduced their specification, their proposals for verification, the Soviet Union came round and said they were prepared to – they didn't understand why the Americans had changed their mind and they thought it a good idea to have the – I don't believe we were over it, frankly – and I think that this is the sort of ploy that you get towards the end of a negotiation but I think that the proposals which are made are perfectly acceptable. You know, one of the things that, I mean, we talk about, I think you talked about American-Soviet talks deciding these things, the Americans really have taken an infinity of trouble about discussing these things and they have gone very deeply with the basin countries into this question of verification and I think that all basin countries are quite happy about it.

Chair: Sir John Graham, now, of the Ditchley Foundation.

Participant: [Oh Lord? 49:00] (*laughter*). I'd like to talk about the subject, the [CSBNs? 49:03] that were put in place after the Stockholm Agreement very recently. Is it too soon to hear a report on how they are working?

Speaker: How what are working in Stockholm?

Participant: The Conference on Security —

Speaker: Well, the Americans have inspected one lot of exercises and we, in Britain, asked for an inspection last week, I think, wasn't it? I think and these went off extremely well and there was no problem at all. They saw what they wanted to. So that seems to be going alright. That is the first occasion, of course, that it's happened as you know better than I do and I think that's quite encouraging.

Chair: [*Unclear* 49:47]

Participant: [*Unclear* 49:48], "The Guardian". I have already written and I have mentioned [*unclear* 49:50] (*laughter*) two questions. One question [*unclear* 49:56] do you intend to testify [instead of ratification? 49:58] debate since you've obviously now made yourself a [*unclear* 50:03] of the IMF agreement and do you look forward to

testifying against General Rodgers? And secondly, Brzezinski [*unclear* 50:12] in an article today has made himself the advocate of the [*unclear* 50:15] free zone in Central Europe and what do you think of that?

Speaker: I have absolutely no intention of testifying in front of the Senate. I have made it an abundant – a firm rule, supported by all members of the Council and [Charlie Brown? 50:33] will recollect that the Secretary General does not appear before any parliament at all to give any evidence of any kind and so the situation which, no doubt, [*unclear* 50:46] would greatly enjoy in "The Guardian" is not likely to arise (*laughter*). I think (*laughter*) I think I read Brzezinski's article today I think that this is – I mean I think it is an interesting proposal, I think you have to look at these things and it's one of the – after all I don't believe that these conventional arms control talks, as I said, are going to be easy and I think that really we have got to use our imagination and be inventive about ways in which we can, without just a number-count, reduce the capacity of either side, as they see it – the Russians see it – either side, to attack the other and so I would look at all these things but I'm not a soldier, I was there for a number of years to get to the rank of major and I think I would leave the actual military side to the generals.

Chair: The lady, I couldn't quite see [*unclear* 51:49] she put her hand up.

Participant: [*Unclear* 51:51] of "The Washington Post". You spoke about the danger of Europe or the alliance being carried away on a wave of euphoria, it seemed to indicate if this agreement was signed that it's time for a breather for NATO strategy and planning to make sure that it keeps pace with arms control. There's been a lot of talk about once the INF agreement is completed, moving very quickly into a strategic reductions agreement and it's been spoken about particularly in the United States. Would you advocate the slowing down of negotiations, I mean, in the nuclear arms control negotiations in general?

Speaker: I think, when I talk about euphoria, I think, that really you're faced with two alternatives. I think if there is an agreement there will be a tendency in some quarters to say "Ah well that's fine, it shows that everything's all right, we really don't have to spend too much money on defence now, there's no threat," I mean, I think that will be there. On the other hand, if there were no agreement, I think, you would find, in a great many countries in Western Europe, a very considerable disillusion and I think that you might find the revival of the peace movements and the anti-nuclear movements which really have, to a very large extent, if not collapsed, at any rate are fairly silent and so I think you are either faced with the

dangers of euphoria or the dangers of disillusion. I'm not sure if faced with the euphoria that I want the disillusion. On what we expect next, I was never – I mean if you read Mr Gorbachev's speech this morning or article really, there was no indication there that he has removed the link between SDI and a start of strategic arms talks, there's no indication of that and that, I think, is something which obviously is going to be the key factor of whether there is going to be a reduction of 50% strategic missiles. On the other – I think it might be possible, conceivably, to get a chemical ban treaty and I don't – that is possible but I think it is all really subject to the intricacies of your constitution and whether or not – which I don't understand (*laughter*) but I would doubt whether you would get very much more through the Senate ratified than the INF Agreement in the time available. But that doesn't mean to say, of course, that the talks are not going to go on. I think and hope they will.

Chair: Percy [Gorgey? 54:42].

Participant: In view of the considerable difficulty, that, which are likely foreseen of achieving a balance in conventional arms following an INF agreement, would you not say then that would really enormously increase difficulty in achieving a balance in strategic missiles and also tactical nuclear weapons? And what is the timescale that you envisage in which an INF agreement could possibly follow or be followed by an agreement on the strategic [*unclear* 55:24] talks? I know that you said Gorbachev has still not severed in his mind the link between SDI and strategic weapons [*unclear* 55:36].

Speaker: I don't think that a conventional imbalance would affect the reduction of 50% in strategic arms, after all, I'd really look at the numbers that there are. I mean, I don't think a 50% reduction would mean that you don't have a nuclear deterrent. So I don't think that in itself would be a factor but I think that one of the things that NATO has to look at very carefully is the fact that there is this very considerable imbalance in conventional forces, I mean, whichever way you count it, there is an imbalance and in some, some more than in others, but there is imbalance and that until such time as that is removed, you certainly have to be very careful indeed about reducing the NATO weapons in Europe, I mean, the denuclearisation of Europe would be a very bad thing indeed because of them.

Chair: Roderick [Lyon? 56:32].

Participant: Lord Carrington, in a situation of improving East-West relations, what scope, if

any, do you see for the development of direct contacts between the two military alliances; NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

Speaker: Well, I think you would find that the member countries of the alliance would not really welcome that. I think that we are a very different alliance from them, after all, you know, we are 16 sovereign countries, we aren't even allowed in NATO to say what NATO policy is, I'm the only guy who's allowed to say what NATO policies [I deal with? 57:22] and I stick my neck out a bit and people can disown me, but there is no such thing as any spokesman for NATO, each country speaks for itself. And, I think, you would find a good deal of hesitation on the part of the Councils of the alliance in suggesting or allowing the alliance as such to talk to the Warsaw Pact which is a very different kind of alliance. After all, it isn't seven sovereign countries, I mean, it's – and I have no counterpart, I mean, they talk about the Secretary General and all the rest of it, but there is no such person, I mean, he is functionary in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, therefore, I think, it's very difficult to equate the two alliances. I think that the Soviet Union would quite like it to happen, in fact, they keep ringing me up and saying they want to deliver messages and things to me and [*unclear* 58:26] but I'm not at all sure that I think it's very good idea. I think that the countries of the alliance would deeply suspicious if SACLANT or [SACU 58:37] or I became embroiled on their behalf in things which they think are bad business.

Chair: John [Roker? 58:47].

Participant: Lord Carrington, do you think that in a period following IMF agreement there would be a relative reduction in United States nuclear weapons in Europe and that Britain and France's allies in Europe would give increasing importance to the continuing existence of those country's nuclear weapons?

Speaker: Yes (*laughter*).

Chair: There's a lady behind you [*unclear* 59:15].

Participant: Margaret [*Unclear* 59:17] in your talk you spoke of tactical relinquishing of the Pershing 1A. A few days later his coalition partner in Bavaria published a ten point paper in which they voiced this fear of the alliance developing into an alliance of different zones of security and that Germany inevitably would re-orientate their policy accordingly. Do you think that the theory is viable and could you comment on the paper?

Speaker: That's really what I meant when I said in my speech that I thought you had to take very special account of Germany's very difficult position because you sit in Germany you will see the result of the INF Agreement is really to remove from a number of European countries the ability of the Soviet Union to hit them with ballistic missiles, though they can still do it with aircraft. Whilst, of course, the Federal Republic remains threatened by the shorter range missile and I think that this – I mean, I think, this is a perfectly fair point. I think that this is very much in the mind of the alliance and certainly it's one of the things that is going to be discussed and is being discussed in NATO at the present time, about what you do on the shorter range missiles but it does, of course, bring into question the whole business of the denuclearisation of Europe. I think the Germans do have a very special problem.

Chair: The man sitting at the left, the man sitting by the door, yes Sir?

Participant: Richard Green from "The Star". Lord Carrington, on the question of decoupling, you said that the key coupling link was the presence of so much American flesh and blood in Europe because as you know, I mean, I wanted to ask you really, how much flesh and blood is necessary [*unclear* 61:27] suggested cuts of 100,000 would that be too deep a cut? And also, [*unclear* 61:34] conventional force reductions, is this a major complicating factor for you, that any significant conventional force mutual reduction result in far fewer Yanks in Europe?

Speaker: Far fewer?

Participant: Yanks, Americans in Europe.

Speaker: Well, I mean, the problem is that any reduction from the present number of United States troops in Europe would, I think, be seen as evidence of a possible further reduction and, therefore, I think it would be worrying, I think the Europeans would be worried about if they saw that happening. There is another point connected with that and if you are seriously talking about conventional arms reductions and you are the 23, of the 16 NATO countries and the seven Warsaw Pact countries are meeting to discuss this, it does complicate matters very considerably, if one of the – the main major ally on one side decides unilaterally to withdraw whatever was said, 100,000 troops from Europe in the middle of discussions about how you're going to get more equal and not less unequal and so I think the way our problems are, I would hope very much that we wouldn't see that happen.

Chair: We're supposed to end at 6.30 and, as I say, there's a reception afterwards and Lord Carrington has some interviews. We're beyond 6.30, I have one more question and I'm afraid he will have to be the last.

Participant: [*Unclear* 63:13] of "Wall Street Journal". Along those lines, Lord Carrington, there's considerable interest in the US on encouraging Europeans to connect areas of their reserve forces. What is the status of that and what do you see as the future of that?

Speaker: What do you mean the better use of them?

Participant: Better [*unclear* 63:34], more structure [*unclear* 63:34].

Speaker: Well, this is a thing which is constantly - and I happen to agree with it, I mean, I think, this is being constantly discussed, of course, some do it better than others. I mean, the Germans do it extremely well, others don't do it so well but, I think that the problem will go further than reserve forces. I mean, I think, that we shall have to look rather deeper than reserve forces and, of course, there are population trends, particularly in Germany, which are going to lead to very considerable difficulty in the alliance and not only in Germany but in other countries as well, which have both conscription and national service. We've got some problems on that line.

Chair: Ladies and Gentlemen, as I can hear rustling newspapers and people preparing to leave in the light of what I said, could I ask you would allow, Lord Carrington and myself to reach the door (*laughter*) and may I, having said that, thank him on your behalf, as well as my own, both for the speech, which is undoubtedly on one of the most important subjects, which we're likely to deal with, coming here and also for the way in which he answered the questions (*applause*).

[Recording ends]