The Role of the Nation-State in Addressing Global Challenges
Japan–UK Perspectives
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About the Second UK–Japan Global Seminar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>John Swenson-Wright</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Adam Roberts</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the NAIIC Report</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kiyoshi Kurokawa</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar: Beyond Pluralism, Towards Democracy?</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>David I. Steinberg</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Summary</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Authors</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Second UK–Japan Global Seminar

The second seminar in the UK–Japan Global Seminar Series was held in Tokyo on 2–3 October 2014 and was titled ‘The Role of the Nation-State in Addressing Global Challenges: Japan–UK Perspectives’. It considered what role individual leadership, public opinion and domestic governmental and non-governmental institutions play in Japan and the UK in contributing to an effective national response to three critical thematic challenges: the problem of failing states; natural and man-made disasters; and complex democratic transitions. It also analysed the suitability of current institutional architectures for addressing critical issues, both globally and regionally, in order to assess their effectiveness and sufficiency in East Asia.

The UK–Japan Global Seminar Series is funded by the Nippon Foundation and is held in partnership with the Nippon Foundation and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation.
Introduction

John Swenson-Wright, Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House

Cooperation in an increasingly fragile world

International relations in early 2015 are especially challenging. In contrast to the optimistic assessments following the end of the Cold War, when policy analysts, academics and editorial writers confidentially predicted the triumph of Western liberal democratic values over the bankrupt authoritarianism of the Soviet Union and its satellite dependencies in eastern Europe, global politics today appears fraught with uncertainty and doubt about the appeal of Western universalism. As Henry Kissinger has recently argued, new world challenges – including intensifying sectarianism, state fragmentation, the spread of radical Islam, terrorism, the emergence of new regional and (potentially) global hegemons such as China, and intensifying political populism fuelled by widening economic disparities and the challenge of mass migration – have undermined established notions of order.1

Indeed, the very basis of a pluralistic, universalistic Westphalian order of independent sovereign states appears under threat. Whether in the Middle East in the challenge posed by Islamic State (IS) or in Europe with the territorial division of Ukraine or in East Asia, where territorial disputes have heightened the risk of conflict between economically complementary but politically antagonistic states such as Japan and China, the forces of disorder and division are in the ascendant. As Kissinger notes, “The result is not simply a multipolarity of power but a world of increasingly contradictory realities. It must not be assumed that, left unattended, these trends will at some point reconcile automatically to a world of balance and cooperation – or even any order at all.”2

Against this shifting and unpredictable backdrop, assessing the relevance of the nation-state as a global actor and its role in offsetting the forces of disorder is especially important. In October 2014, Chatham House convened the second in a series of five annual bilateral seminars assessing the options for cooperation between the UK and Japan in tackling a range of international challenges. The subject of our 2014 deliberations, which took place in Tokyo and involved prominent academics, policy-makers, journalists, NGO representatives and politicians from Japan, the UK and East Asia, was the role of the nation-state in addressing global challenges, with a particular focus on the implications for cooperation between Japan and the UK. Over two days, the seminar considered three key thematic issues: 1) the challenges posed by failed or failing states; 2) how the international community and individual states can best deal with man-made and natural disasters; and 3) the experience of states engaged in making the transition from authoritarian to more democratic forms of governance. Each of these core issues was paired with a case-study: the first with the risk of state failure in an increasingly fragmented and conflict-ridden Syria; the second with the Japanese government’s response to the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and associated tsunami and the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant; and the third with the emergence of a more pluralistic and representative system of government in Myanmar.

This conference report expands on, and provides background material to, several of the topics that the seminar covered. It is not intended to be comprehensive, instead tackling three selected areas in detail. In the first section after this introductory essay, Adam Roberts examines labels such as ‘failing state’, looking at the implications of terminology on diplomacy and decisions about foreign intervention, and at the options for managing the risks such states present. In the second section, Kiyoshi Kurokawa analyses the Japanese policy response to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis, and what can be learnt from it. Moving on to the challenges for democratizing states, the third essay, by academic David Steinberg, looks at the specific example of Myanmar. This former military dictatorship has taken significant strides along the path of political reform, but much more still needs to be done to consolidate democracy, and to erase the legacy of decades of isolation and political atrophy. A summary of the seminar, and of the discussions that took place, is included at the back of this paper, along with an agenda listing the speakers.

Japan and the UK in partnership?

Japan and the UK, economically prominent (the world’s third- and sixth-largest economies respectively measured in terms of GDP3) and with extensive engagement in the post-1945 world, are arguably well suited to facing international challenges. In principle, they have much in common that should enable them to work together well: stable democratic governments; highly trained bureaucracies; technocratic expertise in a diversity of fields; corporate interests with international experience in a wide range of regions and countries; close, historically well-established partnerships with leading international actors, most notably the United States; and publics that are globally aware. But despite these commonalities, as well as a history of bilateral engagement that dates back to the nineteenth century and to the Anglo-Japanese alliance of the early twentieth century, it is not immediately clear how they might best operationalize and develop this cooperation.

Japan’s attitude to disaster management and its reaction to the Fukushima crisis highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese state. Public volunteerism, community solidarity and the close cooperation between US and Japanese defence forces as part of the Operation Tomodachi disaster relief effort were all indicative of the strengths of the national response. On the other hand, as Martin Fackler, Tokyo bureau chief of the New York Times, has argued, the limitations of the Japanese state’s response to the 3/11 crisis may have been concealed given the tendency of the mainstream Japanese media to be insufficiently critical of the government.4 Japan’s governmental oversight role and the state’s regulatory mechanism have, according to this interpretation, been insufficiently robust, whether in ensuring adequate safety provisions in the nuclear power industry or in providing adequate data to localities at risk of exposure to radiation in the aftermath of the meltdown of the Fukushima reactors.

Also, as Kiyoshi Kurokawa, the head of Japan’s influential Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) and responsible for investigating the Fukushima accident, has argued, the Japanese government remains too wedded to a conservative strategy of excessive reliance on fossil fuels when it comes to devising new energy strategies. As a consequence, there has been at best only limited consideration of alternative energy strategies in place of the country’s traditional,

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but increasingly politically controversial, reliance on nuclear power. According to Kurokawa, the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been unwilling to embrace the active development of renewables and has also been too eager to restart Japan’s mothballed reactors at a time when Japanese public opinion, especially at the local level, remains very sceptical about the merits of re-embracing nuclear power. Part of this may be due to poor risk assessment by the Japanese state; part of it may also reflect the dominance of traditional bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Although the government has moved swiftly to establish a new nuclear safety agency in response to the disaster, critics such as Kurokawa question the agency’s institutional independence and worry that there has been insufficient transparency and openness in the debate over energy policy since 3/11.

There is a well-established internationalist constituency in Japan that has strong historical roots, as reflected in the anti-nuclear proliferation initiatives of the 1960s, Japan’s ‘comprehensive security’ doctrine, the strategic aid agenda of the early 1980s and the UN-centred diplomacy of prominent internationalists such as Ichiro Ozawa.

In view of its mixed record in confronting internal problems, Japan may be better able to confront global challenges. Foreign policy might be an area less constrained by domestic public opinion, which is preoccupied with economic issues and minimizing internal risk. It is also a sphere of policy-making dominated by the increasingly confident leadership of Prime Minister Abe, who is eager to develop a self-consciously ‘proactive’ approach to diplomacy. Moreover, there is a well-established internationalist constituency in Japan that has strong historical roots, as reflected in the anti-nuclear proliferation initiatives of the 1960s, Japan’s ‘comprehensive security’ doctrine, the strategic aid agenda of the early 1980s and the UN-centred diplomacy of prominent internationalists such as Ichiro Ozawa.

It remains unclear, however, what the specific objective of this type of internationalism should be. Is the governing Liberal Democratic Party interested primarily in extending Japan’s global reach in order to protect national interests, broadly defined to include access to critical natural resources, economic opportunities, the public safety of Japanese nationals and the country’s sovereign territorial integrity? Or is the prime minister committed to a more disinterested, less nationally focused approach that seeks to offset the risks of disorder and global instability that Kissinger and others have remarked upon? The weakness of state institutions and the challenge of fragile and conflict-afflicted states, whether in Ukraine, Afghanistan or Syria, all present in principle opportunities for constructive policy-making, either alone or with the UK.

But as Adam Roberts notes, generalizing policy options for dealing with failing states remains difficult. The challenges confronted in individual cases are locally distinctive and ill suited to simple, universally applicable principles of intervention. Successful intervention requires deep knowledge of a particular country, informed by linguistic and cultural expertise; and this is an area in which, arguably, both Japan and the UK have fallen short in recent years owing to sharp, across-the-board budgetary retrenchment. Both Japan and the UK have contributed modestly to UN peacekeeping initiatives, currently funding respectively some 10.8 per cent and 6.7 per cent of the cost of

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6 Also see below Adam Roberts, 'Failing States'.
those activities, but how much impact those initiatives have had in offsetting fragility is unclear. Britain’s approach has often been to focus on conflict prevention. By contrast, Japan’s experience in peacekeeping has often been linked to reconstruction and infrastructure development, as in Afghanistan, or occasionally to political mediation, most notably in Cambodia in the 1990s.

Notwithstanding the growing importance of state fragility as a source of international disorder, the Japanese policy-making community’s appetite for engagement with this issue has long been undercut by legal limits on the country’s use of force, most notably by Article 9, the ‘peace clause’ of the 1947 Japanese constitution. Under Prime Minister Abe, this constraint has gradually been relaxed, even though Japanese public opinion remains evenly divided on the rights and wrongs of constitutional revision. The decision in late 2014 to reinterpret the provisions governing Japanese armed forces’ participation in collective self-defence should, at least in principle, allow for much more active Japanese involvement in a range of new security initiatives, not only with the United States, Japan’s chief alliance partner, but also with a wide range of countries with which it shares security concerns. Indeed, it seems increasingly plausible that this more flexible interpretation, likely to be codified in law by spring or summer 2015, will result in situations in which Japan’s Self-Defense Forces find themselves, for the first time since 1945, involved in active combat operations. This development would almost certainly generate vigorous and potentially divisive political debate in Japan and also in neighbouring countries, most notably China and the two Koreas, which remain strikingly wary of Japan’s increased appetite for the use of force.

The limits of Japan’s new-found activism seem most apparent when debate shifts from strategic to political objectives, and specifically to the question of values. Since 2006–07, a series of Japanese leaders, most notably Prime Minister Abe and his deputy prime minister Taro Aso (who himself served as prime minister from September 2008 to September 2009), have talked about the importance of actively promoting democratic principles. Explicit talk of the need to secure an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ in East Asia or the importance, in the words of Abe, of Japan creating a ‘strategic diamond’ of politically congruent partners, including Australia, the United States and India, suggests that promoting democracy and nation-building may feature more centrally in Japan’s foreign policy priorities.

A shift of focus from general goals to specific policy objectives reveals the often striking gap between Japan and its potential partners, for example the UK, as in the case of Myanmar. The British Foreign & Commonwealth Office has tended to emphasize the importance of measures to support opposition groups in Myanmar, particularly those most closely associated with Aung San Suu Kyi. But the Japanese government’s engagement with the leadership in Myanmar has tended to focus more on creating opportunities for promoting Japanese commercial interests, and on offsetting China’s increased economic influence in Myanmar, than on fostering democratic development per se.

Policy options

For now, the options for closer bilateral cooperation between the UK and Japan remain relatively open-ended. Prime Minister David Cameron’s state visit to Japan in 2012 heralded a number of important areas for bilateral cooperation, including joint weapons development, civil nuclear

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cooperation and increased Japanese business investment in the UK. However, there is clearly much more that the UK and Japan could do to address global challenges.

The Chatham House seminar in Tokyo in October 2014 addressed some broad areas for partnership and principles for fostering improved international cooperation beyond the bilateral Anglo-Japanese relationship. It also highlighted some of the difficulties in confronting the challenges of failing states, confronting man-made and natural disasters, and fostering democratic transition. These ideas were partial and preliminary rather than exhaustive, and included:

- Devising a mechanism for prioritizing the needs of critically vulnerable fragile states;
- Careful use of terminology when characterizing the challenges faced by ‘fragile or conflict-affected’ states and cultivation of awareness of the uniqueness of the specific challenges to individual states;
- Using financial resources imaginatively (via off-budget solutions) to promote stability in conflict-ridden states;
- Developing a region-wide education initiative in Asia (an ‘educational Marshall Plan for Asia’) to foster democratic reform and improved relations between authoritarian and democratic governments;
- Improved coordination and discussion between Japan’s newly established National Security Council and Britain’s COBRA cabinet crisis-management-response mechanism;
- Institutional reform to strengthen transnational civil-military cooperation in disaster management;
- Improved risk assessment by Japan in determining the dangers of radiation exposure after nuclear accidents;
- Closer UK–Japan coordination in working with local and NGO communities in countries such as Jordan and Turkey to manage the challenge of displaced refugee communities from Syria, with particular reference to education and health care initiatives;
- Developing an adequate ceasefire implementation and monitoring mechanism to alleviate inter-ethnic conflict in Myanmar; and
- Tax reform as a basis for enhancing federal government structures in Myanmar.

Diagnosing policy problems is often far easier than formulating specific policy prescriptions, particularly in the context of a two-day conference that intentionally sets out to address a number of wide-ranging challenges to the global order. All too often, domestic politics and regional policy crises can expose the limits of bilateral cooperation and the difficulty of sustaining effective discussion between policy-making communities in Japan and the UK. The case for closer bilateral engagement would seem to be more pressing given the current state of the world. As the Asia Programme at Chatham House continues to develop its collaboration with the Nippon Foundation and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation over the coming year, it must be ambitious in exploring opportunities for improved bilateral cooperation between the Japanese and British governments and realistic in assessing the practical constraints.

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Failing States

Adam Roberts, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

Introduction

This is a sobering time in the history of attempts to rebuild failing states and to encourage liberal Western models of how states should relate to their citizens. Those attempts have been the focus of a great deal of international activity, both civil and military, over the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War. They have encountered many problems, as was amply evident from the events of 2014.

In Iraq and Syria, the forces of Islamic State (IS, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS) have captured major areas, just a few years after formal Western military involvement ended in Iraq. In Afghanistan, there is deep uncertainty about what will follow the eventual completion of Western withdrawal. In Egypt, a country that has received remarkably large quantities of foreign military and civil aid, a military regime has assumed control, with strong electoral backing, and has not hesitated to use dubious trials, laws against demonstrations and general repression, including torture, as part of its effort to restore stability. In Ukraine, Western support for internal political change was one of the factors cited by Russia in justification of its interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In Libya, NATO's involvement in the conflict in 2011 has been followed by state collapse.

A striking feature of these and many other situations is the apparently limited capacity of outside powers, especially those of the Western liberal persuasion, to do much about them. The US Secretary of State John Kerry, when he travels to many of the countries mentioned, invariably pleading for more inclusive government and respect for the rule of law, seems to have relatively limited effect. Indeed in countries such as Afghanistan, in particular, the focus of huge Western military involvement and the host of the longest war in American history, the gulf between the ambition and achievement of intervention has at times seemed all too wide.

Of course, the broader picture is far from being uniformly bleak. Although failures in any sphere are often seen as important stimuli for learning lessons, successes can also be instructive. And there have been involvements in failing, or potentially failing, states that have had significant success, for example in Cambodia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Solomon Islands.

Four questions are briefly addressed here:

1. What is meant by the term ‘failing state’ and what are the dangers in its use?
2. How central is the question of failing states in the conduct of international relations?
3. What can be learned from past efforts to address the problem of failing states? In particular, how adequate are the roles of outside states and organizations in addressing this question? What are the respective roles of soft power and hard power?
4. What are the main resemblances and differences between Japanese and UK understandings of failing states and policies towards them?
What is meant by the term ‘failing state’?

Collapsed states, conflict-affected states, failed states, failing states, fragile states, mafia states, war-torn states, countries at risk of instability – there is a bewildering variety of such terms. And their tendency to go in and out of fashion is evidence not only of the conceptual complexity of the whole subject and the variety of situations encountered, but also of the fact that various objections have been raised against each and every one of these terms. One of the most serious objections is that the designation of a country as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ can only too easily be interpreted as a justification for military intervention and consequent military occupation. Another serious objection is that very often, for example in Pakistan, the alleged failure is in specific areas, not in the country as a whole. A third objection is simply that it is insulting. For such reasons, the term ‘fragile state’ is now increasingly preferred. The UK government uses the term ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’.

One of the most serious objections is that the designation of a country as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ can only too easily be interpreted as a justification for military intervention and consequent military occupation.

The Fragile States Index (formerly the Failed States Index), published since 2005 by the US-based Fund for Peace and the journal Foreign Policy, provides evidence for scepticism about the adequacy of either term as a category. To illustrate the point, two examples from this annual list of the top fragile or failed states must suffice. North Korea was consistently listed in the top 20 from 2005 to 2010, and was still hanging in there at 26th in 2014, despite being a monolithic state whose government has maintained effective control through the use of force. Sri Lanka was 25th in 2007 and 20th in 2008, although in reality it was very far from being failed or even failing: it was simply involved in a civil war between a powerful, democratically elected government and state structure, on the one hand, and a strong ethnically and regionally based opposition on the other.

Yet some term is needed to describe the situation in states where several of the following symptoms (one or two certainly do not suffice) amount to a serious breakdown of effective governance: loss of the state’s monopoly of the use of force within its borders; large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees; inability or unwillingness to prevent the activities of pirates, hostage-takers, drug barons; movements involved in planning terrorist attacks elsewhere; failure to provide basic governmental services, for example border control and law and order; breakdown of agriculture, food distribution, water supply, education and public health; and failure to observe central provisions of treaties with other states.

Whatever term is used, it should be accompanied by explicit recognition that each country needs to be understood in the light of its own history and belief systems, and that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to the problem of failing states.

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1 For a simple and spirited critique of the concept of a ‘failed state’, see “Top 5 reasons why “failed state” is a failed concept’ on the website of New York University’s Development Research Institute. Available at http://aidwatchers.com/2010/01/top-5-reasons-why-“failed-state”-is-a-failed-concept/.

2 The Fragile States Index is on the website of the Washington-based NGO Foundation for Peace. Available at http://ffp.statesindex.org.
How central is the question of failing states in the conduct of international relations?

A long tradition of thought on international relations has concentrated on relations between major powers, and has identified war between them as the most important issue. This tradition has been especially strong in the West, where the experience of war in the past century or more has been primarily of international war involving great powers.

But the problems of allegedly failing states have always influenced the conduct of international relations, and have been an important factor in shaping relations between great powers. Asian history provides no shortage of examples: fear of civil war, as distinct from international war, is an enduring concern in China. From European history, one illustration must suffice. It relates to the notion of ‘the sick man of Europe’. In January 1853, Tsar Nicholas I said to the British ambassador:

> Turkey seems to be falling to pieces, the fall will be a great misfortune. It is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding … and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprized. … We have a sick man on our hands, a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made.³

This belief that the problems of allegedly ‘failing states’ can be addressed in a cooperative spirit by great powers persists today, but so do the only-too-familiar factors that destroy such hope. Nine months after the tsar’s statement, the Crimean War broke out. In our own time, we have seen falling-out between major powers about activities that involve elements of state-building, not least in the very same Crimea.

There has been heavy emphasis on the problem of ‘failing states’ in the entire post-Cold War period. This has been reinforced by the fact that the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US originated in a manifestly failing country, Afghanistan. The US National Security Strategy of September 2002 stated: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.⁴’ This White House document was noted most for its advocacy of pre-emptive uses of force. It thus tended to reinforce the perceived link between the language of ‘failing states’ and the use of military force with or without the consent of the states concerned.

The proposition that failing, or potentially failing, states are indeed a central problem of international relations today is reinforced by the number and scope of efforts to reconstruct them. In the post-Cold War era, outside powers have become involved in societal reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania. These activities have often been within a UN framework or with a degree of UN authorization. UN peacekeeping operations have routinely involved tasks relating to civil reconstruction, in some cases going so far as to establish new protectorates. UN Security Council authorizations to states, or coalitions of states, to use force have all pertained to reconstructing ‘failing states’ in one way or another, at least since the initiation of the US-led Somalia operation of December 1992.⁵

This focus of activity is the result of two significant developments in contemporary international politics: the decline in the incidence of international war between major states, and the rise in

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the number of conflicts with a strong element of civil war. This latter development reflects a deep problem: the complex and paradoxical effects of the collapse of empires and the process of decolonization. In the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav republics, and in the post-colonial states in Africa and Asia, the difficulties of constructing a new political order from an old empire are evident. Establishing legitimate systems of government, accepted borders, good relations with neighbours and peace between different ethnic groups – all these tasks and more are by nature difficult.

It is therefore not surprising that external help has frequently been sought by ‘failing’ states, and also by particular groups within them. Yet offering outside help can involve hazards, including for international order. Two particular hazards stand out. Within many post-colonial states, outside involvement, however well intentioned, quickly comes to be seen as colonial interference; and internationally, outside involvement in a state is seen by some powers as a threat to their interests or status. The Russian critique of NATO actions in Kosovo from 1999 onwards and in Libya in 2011 is a worrying example of how Western interventions may be perceived in a hostile light and may in turn provide rhetorical justification for new military interventions, in the Russian case in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.

Indeed, there appears to be an increasing frequency of proxy wars being fought within civil wars. Syria, Libya and Iraq are examples. This adds to the importance, and the difficulty, of addressing problems of fragile and conflict-affected states.

Addressing the problems of failing states

Addressing the problems of failing states is inherently difficult. External powers and international organizations often fail to understand the complexities of conflicts in post-colonial states, or to provide an effective response to the situation on the ground. There is a very real risk of intervention ending in humiliation, as happened when Soviet forces left Afghanistan in February 1989, and when US and UN forces left Somalia in March 1994. There are often disagreements between allies on the most basic issues, such as the following three:

1. Whether to collaborate with ‘warlords’ or to build up new structures of decision-making. This issue was particularly difficult in Afghanistan, with the US and the UN-authorized International Security Assistance Force pursuing contradictory policies, as Kofi Annan noted;6

2. How to address the patterns of corruption that contribute to the failing of many states but that may sometimes be exacerbated, rather than ended, by the sudden influx of donor aid aimed at reforming the country;7

3. Whether or not to get involved in issues such as repressing the manufacture and trade of narcotics, which may or may not be central to the overall mission of achieving social and political stability. As experience in Afghanistan indicates, the counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics agendas have been in conflict.8

In official consideration of how to reform post-conflict societies, optimistic assumptions and simplistic analogies have abounded. A leading example is the belief that the post-1945 occupations of Japan and

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Germany offered a model that was likely to work even in the improbable case of post-Saddam Iraq. In their valuable study *The New Protectorates*, James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira have written of ‘the fleeting nature of the Western hegemonic moment’ and bemoaned ‘the lack of a US or Western grand strategy to make sense of the changed international system’. Their view of liberal approaches is harsh:

> Historically, the building of states has been a violent, difficult and drawn-out process. In protectorates where the state has traditionally been very weak, it is unlikely that strong state institutions can be built in a way acceptable to Western sensibilities. Conversely, Iraq and the states of former Yugoslavia have had previous experiences of strong statehood but these were authoritarian: not the sort of state legacies that internationals want to cultivate.

One could indeed argue that there is genuine merit in some of the essential components of modern state-building efforts. As an occasional international election supervisor/observer, I have witnessed genuine enthusiasm for electoral democracy in post-conflict societies in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rights of women is another area in which external powers can make a major contribution that, in some cases at least, is valued locally. And health is a critically important issue that needs more attention than it has received: health crises are often a symptom of the fragility of a state, and they are also a reason for external action. The Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014–15 is the latest proof of this proposition. Yet anything to do with health must be handled with extreme sensitivity to local cultural norms. Narrowly technical approaches are a danger.

> Anything to do with health must be handled with extreme sensitivity to local cultural norms. Narrowly technical approaches are a danger.

That state-building efforts have many merits does not change the equally clear fact that there are similarities between contemporary attempts to address the problems of ‘failing states’ and the practices of European colonial powers in an earlier era. Many former colonial countries tend to deny any similarities, not least by perpetrating a caricature image of the motives and modus operandi of nineteenth-century colonialists.

A notable doctrinal development of the post-Cold War period, the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, encompasses a commitment to act when national authorities are failing to protect their populations; and it commits states to assist capacity-building in order to protect populations. It can thus involve a commitment to state-building. The resentment of interference that the doctrine has provoked in some government pronouncements, especially from dictatorial rulers, is evidence that popular fears of colonial interference still form a lens through which external involvements in post-colonial states are viewed.

In one respect, contemporary efforts are strikingly different from the caricature image of European colonialism. The common accusation levelled against outsiders in state-building operations is that their cynical concern is to ‘divide and rule’, as their colonial predecessors allegedly did. Actually, the aim of outside states involved in state reconstruction in recent decades has generally been to ‘unite and depart’, and the quicker the better. But this is very difficult to achieve in many countries, and it even creates new hazards.

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Institutional learning from experience

For at least a decade, there has been awareness of the limits of what has been achieved in assisting ‘failing states’, and this has resulted in new approaches to the problem.

The UN has initiated several assessments of work in this area. There have been many ‘lessons learned’ exercises regarding particular operations and types of activity. In December 2005, the UN Security Council and the General Assembly jointly established the Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body intended in part to contribute to institutional memory of how to deal with this problem. Those who have studied its activities have generally reached cautious judgments. For example, one careful examination concluded: ‘it remains to be seen whether the member states and the UN Secretariat, with pressure from civil society and other external actors, will succeed in exploiting the full potential of the Peacebuilding Commission as a generator and disseminator of peacebuilding norms.’

Two caveats apply to operations in a UN framework. Firstly, the UN Security Council is not immune from the tendency, also evident among some of its five permanent members, to set extraordinarily ambitious goals for peace-building operations. The council’s Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 on Iraq, which provided for national and local institutions for representative governance, the protection of human rights, and legal and judicial reform, is an example. Secondly, rebuilding institutions in ‘failing states’ is not only a long-term task but also one requiring tough and fast decisions: multilateral institutions are not always brilliant at providing them.

There have also been many lessons learned by states, whether individually or in collaboration with others. The UK’s and Japan’s lessons will be discussed further below. Many lessons learned by states have been essentially negative – that is, to avoid, where possible, risky and prolonged military and administrative involvements in fragile states. However, a case of a distinctly positive lesson learned by states is the one Australia and its partners drew from earlier experiences when, in their involvement in the Solomon Islands in 2003–13, they emphasized the importance of building up relations of trust with the inhabitants of areas where they were deployed. In this approach, peacekeeping and other forces need to pay more attention to local sources of legitimacy, i.e. to those in the society where the peace operation is deployed. Legitimacy from the top, even from the UN Security Council, may be less important than legitimacy from below – that is, within the country or territory concerned.

The role, and limits, of soft power

One critical issue today is the extent to which soft power is essential to the success of state-building exercises. Clearly it has some role. After 1989, the way in which western Europe influenced events in the Balkans and some countries of eastern Europe is a classic case of attraction, of soft power. The European Union played a critical role in this process, which I have called ‘induction’, in two senses of the word: induction into a club; and the action of bringing about an electric current in one body through its proximity with another, electrified body.

But the application of soft power to state-building faces a major difficulty. The capacity of Western powers to attract has been precisely the problem in many of the countries in which their armies have

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intervened. The resulting rapid Westernization of certain areas of life sometimes causes a deep and violent reaction, exemplified not just in the activities of Al-Qaeda and IS but in many other forces and movements as well. In other words, Western powers make a mistake in thinking in self-congratulatory terms of themselves having this great power of attraction and others being duly attracted. Maybe soft power works best when it is not under the baneful control of governments. This is suggested in *The Art of Attraction*, the British Academy’s new survey of the soft power debate as it affects the UK.14

UK and Japanese approaches: similarities and differences

As two great island civilizations with a long history of overseas involvement and tangled relations with their nearby continental neighbours, Japan and the UK have both been involved in addressing problems of ‘failing states’. Both must do this today against a background of concern about resurgent powers, mainly Russia in the case of the UK and China in the case of Japan.

Obvious differences between Japan and the UK affect their approach to those problems. They include striking differences in the composition of their citizenry: Japan is more homogenous ethnically and culturally. The two countries have had very different experiences of war, leading to different attitudes, constitutional arrangements and force structures. And they have very different alliance relationships, affecting the possibilities and modalities of acting in coalitions.

However, there are similarities in approach too. Part of both Japan’s and the UK’s efforts has been in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. In 2014, they were remarkably close to each other in their quite modest position in the list of countries providing police and military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations: Japan had 271 personnel on such operations; the UK had 287.15 (However, the vast majority of UK troops serve in a single mission, UNFICYP in Cyprus, where the UK has special interests: Japan’s troop contributions are more broadly supportive of UN peacekeeping.) As to financial contributions, Japan pays 10.8 per cent of the total cost of UN peacekeeping; the UK pays 6.7 per cent.16

Japan played a leading role in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992–93, one of the more successful UN peacekeeping operations of the post-Cold War period, followed by a long period of state-building; and it has had numerous other significant involvements in UN peacekeeping operations in weak states, including Mozambique, El Salvador, Timor-Leste, Haiti and South Sudan. The UK has had particularly active roles in operations in former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, all of them with elements of UN authorization and several of them involving combat as distinct from traditional peacekeeping.

Japan and the UK bring to the problem of ‘failing states’ some very different cultural and historical perspectives. It is moot whether Japan’s approach to other cultures tends to be more cautious about the possibilities of inducing change, and more respectful of difference, than the UK’s. What is not in doubt is that the two countries have, for most of the past seven decades, learned very different lessons about overseas involvements and, in particular, about the use of force. Japan’s constitutional framework, and its reluctance to get involved in the use of force overseas, has shaped its attitudes and has coincided at least for a time with an era of remarkable security and economic success. However,
its attitudes to overseas involvement may now be in the process of change, not least because of the nature of the problems faced in the post-Cold War world.

What lessons has Japan learned from its significant involvement in peacebuilding? In a speech in New York in 2012, the then foreign minister, Koichiro Gemba, listed ‘five important lessons learned from our past experience in peacebuilding’. These were:

First, peacebuilding varies greatly depending on a country and region concerned. There is no single model that fits all: flexibility will be required.

Second, peacebuilding is a political process. The underlying causes of conflict, including political issues, must be resolved.

Third, countries concerned and their international partners should agree on shared goals and priorities in their peacebuilding strategy.

Fourth, gaps must be overcome, including gaps in communication between the headquarters and the field, as well as gaps in the attention of relevant actors.

Fifth, individual persons must be protected and empowered – including women and the vulnerable – with a view to ensuring human security. Peoples’ lives must be rebuilt, employment opportunities should become available, and an environment which generates hope for the future must be created. In all this, the ownership of the countries concerned must be respected.\(^\text{17}\)

Of course, these five lessons cannot cover all the tricky issues faced by Japanese peacebuilding efforts in the field. The perennial issue of whether to channel funds through the government of the country or to spend it directly was difficult in post-2001 Afghanistan. The Afghan government had required that the national budget should be a means of policy-making and that aid not in it would be illegal. In the view of some, off-budget aid disbursement carried the risk of compounding corruption and undermining the perceived legitimacy of the recipient country’s government. According to Clare Lockhart, who served as an adviser to the Afghan government in 2001–05, ‘USAID and Japan were the two significant entities that provided large amounts of off-budget aid and preferred not to put money through the Trust Funds.’\(^\text{18}\) The main such fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund established in January 2002, was a World Bank-administered fund through which donors contributed to the Afghan government’s budgetary needs and its priority investment projects. The UK donations were primarily through this fund. Although the two countries had different approaches to it, this issue was not a source of major friction between the UK and Japan. There were and are serious arguments on both sides of this question.

The UK government would, I suspect, agree with all five of the Japanese lessons learned as outlined above. In addition, the UK has learned some hard lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq about the limits of what can be achieved by force. Yet this does not appear to be leading to a general rejection of force so much as to a more discriminating approach and to a growing recognition of the critical importance of understanding the countries in which its armed forces are engaged. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the late 1990s and early 2000s placed less emphasis than before on understanding different countries, cultures and languages. This lapse has been addressed since 2010, particularly under William Hague as foreign minister (2010–14), but there is still a long way to go.


One notable development in the UK is the creation of the ‘Stabilisation Unit’ (SU). Formed in 2007 from the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, it is an interdepartmental agency consisting of the FCO, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. (There are comparable developments in other countries, including Canada, Denmark, Japan and the US.)

The UK National Security Council, an important new body established on 12 May 2010 with responsibility for national security, foreign policy, defence, international relations and international development, resilience, energy and resource security, has slowly exerted its authority over the SU. The UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy articulated a ‘whole of government’ approach embodying a concept of security that looks ‘beyond military effects’ and places ‘greater emphasis on domestic resilience and a stable global environment’.19

The SU has played an important role in the UK’s conceptualization of problems to be addressed and in helping to shape some actual operations, for example in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. Part of the motive for establishing the unit appears to have been the shocking failure of the US and the UK in 2003 to establish an agreed plan for how to manage the occupation and transformation of Iraq. This bespoke a general failure to think strategically and a lazy assumption that once the chains of oppression were removed, all would be well in Iraq. And it also illustrated the very poor level of collaborative planning and organization between different departments in Whitehall. In the 2000s, the deleterious lack of integration of various UK activities in Afghanistan, e.g. security and economic development, was another reason to press for a more integrated approach.

What are the differences between the UK and the Japanese approaches? A simple answer – based on the fact that the UK is now becoming more sober about using force while Japan is moving beyond some of its historic restraints on force – might suggest that a process of convergence is under way. But there are still significant differences, not least in the two countries’ still-contrasting positions on the use of force and the UK’s greater emphasis on conflict prevention. The UK’s membership of the EU and NATO has perhaps made it easier for it to act collaboratively with other states in addressing the problems of ‘failing states’.  


Conclusions

- The term ‘failing state’ should be handled with extreme caution. No single term can adequately capture the nature of the set of problems connected with state weakness that is being addressed in contemporary international politics, and no term can be free from the criticism that it shoves disparate phenomena into a questionable conceptual straitjacket. ‘Fragile and conflict-affected states’ is a less objectionable term.

- A common factor in many of the problems addressed is their post-colonial character, and it may be constructive to refer to them as post-colonial problems – not least to be a reminder that in some cases we are addressing the adverse long-term consequences of past outside involvements in divided societies.

- Two big questions must be asked about all efforts to assist stabilization processes: are they underpinned by an adequate understanding of the society concerned, including its history, culture and languages; and have these efforts been strengthened or weakened by liberal assumptions about the changes sought and the possibilities of achieving them? The human and other resources used have not always been equal to the challenges. A striking feature of many operations of the past two decades has been the rapid turnover of staff and their lack of command of local languages. ‘Gap-year colonialism’ is an apt description.

- There is no simple answer to the question of whether or not efforts to assist failing states are best conducted by nation-states, whether acting individually or in coalitions, or by international bodies. A state acting alone will always be vulnerable to the criticism that it is acting like a colonial power. Thus it is entirely natural that countries contemplating such activities have in most cases sought a degree of UN or regional authorization and have operated as coalitions. On the other hand, states have advantages over international organizations, not least by being able to make fast decisions when necessary, including about the use of force.

- The different Japanese and UK approaches to failing states, and the different lessons learned, need to be explored in a spirit of frankness. This exploration should be free of artificial attempts to produce an agreed doctrine, legal framework or organizational structure. One clear lesson from the attempts throughout the post-Cold War period to address the challenge of bringing stability to troubled societies is that every ‘failing state’ is different but so too is every state addressing the problem.
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the NAIIC Report

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‘Never let a good crisis go to waste.’ – Winston Churchill

Introduction

There are currently about 440 nuclear power plants in operation and 70 under construction in some 30 countries around the world. The need for nuclear energy seems to be increasing, and has been called the ‘nuclear renaissance’. But the 11 March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, one of the two worst nuclear accidents in history, alarmed the world and led many people to reconsider nuclear power as an energy source. The governments and peoples of Germany, Italy and Switzerland chose in 2011 to phase out nuclear energy.

It was a surprise to many that this accident happened in Japan, a nation that has gained trust, admiration and credibility in the international community for its excellence in science, technology, engineering and industrial manufacturing.

The Fukushima nuclear accident was triggered by a huge earthquake, of magnitude 9.0, followed by a massive tsunami, a devastating once-in-a-millennium event. Nonetheless, it was a surprise to many that this accident happened in Japan, a nation that has gained trust, admiration and credibility in the international community for its excellence in science, technology, engineering and industrial manufacturing, and that is known for the high educational attainment and diligent work ethic of its people.

The aftermath of the disaster remains a major problem. Little progress and only vague plans can be discerned about the accumulation of contaminated water; the retrieval of melted core and spent fuel rods; an accumulating uranium stock; and continuing massive leakages of radioactive substances into the environment and the Pacific Ocean, which threaten the health and safety of residents and flora and fauna in the area. When he served as a commissioner to examine the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster, Richard Feynman gave a powerful message: ‘For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.’ This applies to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, as the report of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission by the National Diet of Japan (NAIIC) pointed out. Indeed, NAIIC was a ‘whole body CT scan of the governance of Japan Incorporated’.

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1 The opinions in this paper are not those of the NAIIC but solely the author’s personal views.
3 Sakon Uda, Chief Administrator of NAIIC. Personal discussions with the author.
This essay discusses briefly NAIIC, its background and the core message of the NAIIC report. It then considers some of the lessons from the report regarding the Fukushima disaster. The elements of inertia and change in Japan's nuclear policy and general energy policy are examined, as is the need for a radical new direction in policy. The paper concludes with a look at Japan–UK relations and prospects for their complementary partnership.

The TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

The Fukushima nuclear accident was watched from its onset by the world through various media, both conventional sources such as newspapers, television and radio and a variety of web-based and social media. Within a week or so, it had become clear that the official news and briefings by the government of Japan and TEPCO (the Tokyo Electric Power Company, operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants) were not releasing all available data and facts to the Japanese public and the world. This revealed the poorly organized emergency communications and ‘media control’ in Japan. Newer, web-based communication tools provided live information internationally. The images of the explosions of three of the four power plant units sent a powerful message across the world that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants were in a disastrous state.

On 30 September 2011, the National Diet enacted a law mandating the establishment of NAIIC and selected its 10 commissioners. It began work officially on 8 December 2011, nine months after the disaster, and presented its report4 to both houses of the National Diet on 5 July 2012, in just six months, as mandated. That this independent investigation commission was the first of its kind in the constitutional history of Japan surprised many leaders of advanced democratic countries. Such independent commissions are considered normal for significant government matters, and for assuring the independence of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.

NAIIC operated under the principle of commitment to the people, the future and the world, and its processes were transparent throughout the investigation. All 20 of the commission's meetings, which held hearings with 38 key individuals, included press briefings that were open to the public and media and that were broadcast online with simultaneous English translation. Besides its 20 meetings, NAIIC conducted approximately 900 hours of interviews and hearings with more than 1,000 people. Commission staff analysed numerous documents, surveyed more than 10,000 evacuees and 2,400 plant workers, held three town hall meetings, and visited nuclear plants and three research missions overseas.

In addition to the NAIIC report, which was published as a book and made available online in both English and Japanese in October 2012, a short video animation series5 explaining the NAIIC investigation and report in both languages was created by university students. It can also be viewed online.

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The core message of the NAIIC report: ‘regulatory capture’

The NAIIC report found that even though the accident was triggered by the earthquake and tsunami, it was in many respects a man-made disaster. Many measures to improve the safety of nuclear power plants had been recognized as necessary over the years but had not been properly implemented. Underlying the accident was a structure of ‘regulatory capture’ – involving utility companies led by TEPCO; the government; the regulatory body, the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency; and major media and scientific communities. Indeed, the NAIIC report suggests that several factors rather unique to Japanese society have resulted in a mindset that makes the country’s electric power industry more prone to regulatory capture. These factors include utility companies’ monopoly of both electricity generation and distribution; Japanese social system norms such as lifetime employment in the same organization and hierarchical, seniority-based promotion; and the lack of a sense of accountability among those holding responsible positions. The report also found that transparency, the foundation of good governance for any organization, particularly in today’s hyper-connected world, was insufficient. In essence, the accident revealed the weakness of the very establishments that had supported Japan’s successful economic growth after the Second World War, from 1950 to 1990.

The NAIIC report noted possible damage to the nuclear plant units as a result of the earthquake rather than just the tsunami, although this suggestion was based on indirect evidence. Direct examination of the damaged plant units was not possible, in part because of the high level of radioactivity in the area. This was an important, cautionary finding in view of Japan’s position in one of the most earthquake-prone areas in the world. Many investigative and scientific reports and books, as well as media coverage, online reports and television series, about the Fukushima nuclear accident have appeared in Japan and elsewhere since the report’s issuance in 2012. These have brought attention to technical and engineering deficiencies, in addition to regulatory capture. Unfortunately, most of the publications were written in Japanese and thus not read globally.

Four years after the accident, it seems that many fundamental problems, and also the prevalent Japanese mindset, have changed little. Continuing problems include the handling of water flow through the damaged plants, the accumulation of contaminated water and debris, and leakages into the sea. Transparency and openness remain poor, as evidenced by a reluctance to share information or seek international help for better alternative measures to deal with this unprecedented disaster. In his recent book *3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan*, Professor Richard Samuels, an expert on the politics of Japan, concludes that only small signs of change can be seen in the political process and generally in democracy in Japan.

The Fukushima nuclear accident has lessons that extend beyond either Japan or the nuclear industry. Other countries may not share Japan’s vulnerability to earthquakes or its historically widespread use of nuclear power, but the need to consider whether established disaster-management protocols adequately incorporate the risks of many other types of ‘black swan’ events – large, very rare and unexpected events, with immense consequences – has widespread applicability. As continuing globalization potentially means that disasters in one country more easily affect others, the need for more effective measures to increase preparedness and resilience is growing. Another issue specifically

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6 Regulatory captures describes the process wherein regulatory agencies that were initially formed to protect the public interest can eventually act in ways that benefit the industry they are supposed to regulate, instead of the public.

7 This can lead to ‘groupthink’ – a phenomenon in which a desire for harmony among a group of people can result in irrational decision-making.

8 In Japanese the word ‘accountability’ is used to imply ‘responsibility to explain’; a typical case of ‘lost in translation’.


relating to Japan's nuclear industry but again of concern to the world community is the accumulation of large amounts of spent nuclear fuel with plutonium. Nuclear power plants and the spent-fuel stockpiles have become obvious targets for terrorists via physical as well as cyber-attacks.

For these reasons, the lessons of the Fukushima nuclear accident must be shared among global experts, concerned parties and responsible authorities in the field of nuclear energy. These lessons should also be shared with the wider international community, in order to make nuclear energy safer. This requires international cooperation and support, transparency and openness.

The need for a ‘safety culture’

Fostering a ‘safety culture’, in both the regulation and operation of the nuclear energy industry, has been identified as one of the key factors in improving disaster-preparedness. In response to the Fukushima accident, adaptive measures have been taken in each country that operates nuclear power plants. A report by the US Government Accountability Office in March 2014 examined such measures. Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a three-day workshop in April 2014 that for the first time addressed the significance of ‘national culture’ in the safety of nuclear power plants. A report in August 2014 by the US National Academy of Sciences, entitled Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants, also included a chapter on nuclear safety culture. As a result, at least in part as a response to the NAIIC report, the role of national culture in promoting safety has become more widely recognized.

Inertia and change in Japanese energy and nuclear energy policy: recommendations

The Fukushima accident had the potential to lead to major change in the energy policy of Japan. Unfortunately, this has not happened: the government has not recognized the critical core findings of NAIIC, in part, I believe, because the message from NAIIC's investigations was an ‘inconvenient truth’ to those in power in Japan. The nation currently depends substantially upon the import of fossil fuels. More locally available, renewable and cleaner energy sources must be utilized, for example hydro, solar, wind, biofuels, geothermal and sea waves. Japan has many advanced technology and engineering capabilities, for instance relating to the extraction of the lowest carbon emission rate from coal, and to geothermal energy utilization. These capabilities should be drawn on. In addition, Japan was the inventor of solar panels during the 1970s oil crisis. Yet, the deployment of renewable clean energy, including solar, is the lowest in Japan among the economically and technologically advanced countries. Japan's future energy policy must be based on the principles of decentralization, the use of locally available renewable resources and the visualization of real-time electric usage and currents to make users more mindful of energy use. To progress in this direction, building ‘smart grids’ is critical, and the proper policy changes should be made to this end. However, their creation has been very slow in Japan compared with other leading nations – again owing in part to regulatory capture.

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The Japanese government has been creating new energy policies that welcome more independent and renewable energy producers. However, that pressure to restart nuclear plants has been strong suggests that regulatory capture remains a major issue. Moreover, the weakening of the yen against the US dollar, partly as a result of the stimulatory economic policies – popularly dubbed ‘Abenomics’ – of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has raised domestic prices for imports of fossil fuels (the actual volume of imports has changed little since 2011, despite the loss of nuclear generation after the Fukushima accident, partly owing to lower energy consumption). This suggests that people are responding to the higher cost of energy, and that awareness of the need for energy conservation and renewables is increasing. The recent fall in fossil fuel prices will have significant beneficial effects on Japan’s energy costs, which is a welcome development.

The government must set clear medium- to long-term goals for its energy policy based on the best science available. These should be developed through ‘back-casting’, a form of resource management and planning used in the energy sector and conducted by independent commissions. This framework will enable the formation of suitable short-term policies and budget appropriation. However, the mindset of many Japanese that underlies regulatory capture is one of the obstacles to this policy’s development and implementation. The NAIIC report recommends using an independent task-force such as NAIIC for refashioning energy policy. For now, most policy matters remain under the control of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and other government agencies.

As to the restarting of nuclear power plants, the new Nuclear Safety Agency, which is supposed to be an independent entity, has replaced the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency. However, the new agency has not demonstrated sufficient independence, transparency, openness and effective communication skills to the public and the world. I have personally heard on quite a few occasions the concerns of scientists, experts, civil servants and politicians around the world about these matters. The restarting of nuclear power plants in Japan must be based on the principles mentioned above. The process must follow international standards; must be conducted in a spirit of collaboration, transparency and openness; and must entail effective communication with the public and the world.

Internationally recognized nuclear experts have deemed Japanese nuclear safety regulations on the evacuation of local residents in the event of severe nuclear accidents … as deficient and aberrant from IAEA recommendations.

Engaging the broader public and local community in the decision-making process has become the norm in many countries that operate nuclear energy. But in the current Japanese policy framework for nuclear safety, the local community is neither adequately included in the decision-making process nor provided with sufficient protection by current emergency-response measures. As the NAIIC report pointed out, internationally recognized nuclear experts have deemed Japanese nuclear safety regulations on the evacuation of local residents in the event of severe nuclear accidents, outlined as the last layer of security measures in Japan’s ‘defence in depth’, as deficient and aberrant from IAEA recommendations. Again, it is a matter of developing and nurturing a ‘safety culture’ that goes beyond immediate economic concerns, as we have learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident.

Should a decision to restart the nuclear power plants provoke a critical reaction from interest groups at the local and national levels, the political consequences would be uncertain. Political will and leadership are needed to replace a system prone to regulatory capture with one that prioritizes protection of the public interest and the environment. Indeed, public opinion polls since 3/11 have
repeatedly shown that the majority of people favour denuclearization. Yet powerful vested interests stand in the way of reform. These include the political and executive arms of the government, the major industries, the media and even the scientific community.

Whether or not the present cabinet led by Prime Minister Abe will begin to take steps towards reform of Japan’s energy policy remains to be seen. A paradigm shift would help to regain the trust of the international community, and would reflect the assimilated lessons of the Fukushima nuclear accident. This issue may be closely intertwined with the rigidities of the political process and, more broadly, the challenges of democracy in Japan. The NAIIC team believes that transparency, openness and international collaboration are the key for any policy development and deployment pertaining to nuclear power, because these qualities are linked to a common global agenda and support the greater public good.

Japan’s energy policy must change radically. The process of change must consider political and economic realities but must also be forward-looking. Japan has the potential to develop its available natural resources and already possesses a rich inventory of technologies and engineering capabilities that could enable it to become a leader in energy policies that can address global needs.

**Japan–UK relations in changing times**

International collaboration and information-sharing are essential to developing risk-preparedness in the context of globalization. In this endeavour, Japan and the UK have been unique and complementary partners, and can further consolidate their cooperation. This is not merely because of their historical relations, from the arrival of William Adams in Japan in 1600 to the establishment of Japan–UK diplomatic relations in 1854 and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. The two countries share a common agenda and unique strengths inherited from their past. This agenda is based on the following mutual characteristics: 1) both are medium-sized island nations with sizeable populations but inadequate natural resources to support them; and 2) both are in close proximity to large continents with unique and long geopolitical and historical legacies.

At the same time, the strengths of each country are unique. Japan’s strengths can often be observed in a combination of ingenuity and tenacity that is perfectionist in its attention to detail. This is displayed in the crafting of tangible products, and in their incremental refinement to become better, lighter, thinner and smoother. But a drawback is that Japan is prone to lose sight of the big picture and the larger goals. By contrast, the UK’s strengths seem to lie in its ability to see the big picture and to set standards in abstract matters such as science, democracy, finance and legal rules.

The strengths of Japan and the UK will become more complementary, if harnessed correctly, in addressing the common global agenda during these uncertain times. This annual conference on UK–Japan relations will demonstrate how this relationship can be developed in order to further strengthen our relations and to help our common agendas to be achieved.
Myanmar: Beyond Pluralism, Towards Democracy?

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The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma), inaugurated on 30 March 2011, is changing under its ‘quasi-civilian’ government. It is moving from a centralized administration towards a more pluralistic society and a more representational future, towards a form of modified democratic governance. But its journey is towards a hazy destination, along a tortuous road without adequate maps.

The unitary state

More than 50 years ago, the leadership of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) of Burma decided in effect to perpetuate military control, directly or indirectly, over the country because of extreme disillusionment with its factionalized and ineffective civilian administration. Since independence in 1948, the influence of the military has been profound, even under the early civilian administration. The military saved it from a variety of political and ethnic rebellions almost immediately after independence, and it intervened in a ‘constitutional coup’ in 1958 to prevent a feared civil war between civilian factions of the ruling coalition Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League.

This strong military antipathy towards civilian politics and control has been a prevailing attitude that is just beginning to evolve. It influences contemporary events. The prominence of the military is evident in the glorification in textbooks and public affairs of its role in Burmese history under the expansionist authoritarian kingdoms, and in its almost mythic contribution to the defeat of the Japanese in Burma in the Second World War (after being allied with them). It is also evident in the three huge statues of Burmese warrior kings on the military parade grounds in the capital Naypyitaw.

In the half-century since the military coup of 1962, Myanmar (Burma) has moved from a unitary, totalitarian socialist regime until 1988 to an authoritarian and, recently, more pluralistic governance model. Despite this transition, political life has always been defined within restrictive, military-determined parameters. Whether in uniform or civilian guise, the military has remained firmly in control. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) combined a military dictatorship under General Ne Win with a rigid political and economic ideology, incompetently managed, in which rule was by decree. In 1974, an eastern Europe-inspired single-party socialist dictatorship was instituted under the BSPP. This unitary state ruled, ineffectively, over a wide variety of ethnic minorities who wanted varying degrees of plural, federal authority or who, in some earlier cases, had called for independence.

The coup of 1988 sought to shore up military control in response to the threat of a people’s revolution in the streets. It again brought direct military rule, this time under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1997 the SLORC changed to the State Peace and Development
Council (SDPC), although direct military control and martial law continued. This change was important, none the less, because the political structure moved from being a totalitarian regime with an imposed ideology to one that was authoritarian in nature but no longer defined by political ideology or economic rigidity. Socialism was abandoned and the regime sought foreign investment, albeit with *dirigiste* economic attitudes prevailing.

The media image of an isolated society after 1962 was exaggerated. Japanese assistance in effect kept the state afloat in the 1960s and 1970s.¹ Western aid was curtailed, personal access to Myanmar was limited first through 24-hour and then week-long visas, and multinational assistance was terminated. That experience prompted senior officials after 1988 to continue to believe that they did not need Western support and could contain Western influences – an inaccurate assessment owing to the public’s greater access to international media, which limited state control over unflattering coverage of Burma from abroad.

The present government is the most recent incarnation of military influence. A new constitution, affirmed by a 92.4 per cent vote in a heavily manipulated referendum in May 2008, explicitly confirmed the military’s role in political life. With a model similar to that of Indonesia under General Suharto, the constitution ensures *Tatmadaw* control through a 25 per cent military presence in legislatures at all levels. In November 2010 general elections, again manipulated by the regime, consolidated political control by the state-sponsored and military-dominated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).²

The new government under President Thein Sein … began a remarkable effort to move to what the military calls a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’. What has transpired since then has been a commendable series of reforms that have astonished internal and foreign observers.

Although the United States and some European countries regarded the referendum and the elections as fraudulent, the new government under President Thein Sein (formerly a prime minister and a general) that took office on 30 March 2011 began a remarkable effort to move to what the military calls a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’. What has transpired since then has been a commendable series of reforms that have astonished internal and foreign observers. Foreign support from the US and the EU has been forthcoming, and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been active in the country. Clearly a major degree of pluralism has been instituted.

**Inaugurating political pluralism**

But this pluralism keeps within limits prescribed by the military. National unity, the prevention of secession, national sovereignty, the autonomy of the *Tatmadaw* independent from civilian control – these have been guiding principles for all of Myanmar’s military-controlled administrations. In

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¹ It amounted to some $2.2 billion by 1988. See David I. Steinberg, ‘Japanese Aid to Burma: Assistance in the Tarenagashi Manner?’, in Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr (eds), Managing Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 135–162. General Ne Win, trained by the Japanese, was close to them. But with the intense spirit of nationalism in Burma, Japanese assistance was not extensively discussed except in the context of war reparations.

² Elections in May 1990 were overwhelmingly won by the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), whose principal figure is the Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Whether the elections were for a new government or a constitutional convention is disputed, but the military ignored the result. In the 2010 elections, the NLD decided not to participate because Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest and the regulations were too stringent. The NLD did, however, participate in the April 2012 by-elections, and Aung San Suu Kyi won a parliamentary seat.
the wake of recent reforms, civil society may grow, the media may generally be free of censorship, trade unions may be established, political opposition may complain in open debates in the central legislature, and various local legislatures and elements of a market economy may be established. None the less, the Tatmadaw remains for now the ultimate determining force in Burmese society.

Pluralism, in its current guise in Myanmar, is the first stage in an evolving political process. This process may or may not move towards an unmodified democracy – without the ‘guided’, ‘disciplined’ or other qualifiers that undercut the meaning of the term. And elections alone do not make a democracy. The new regional and provincial parliaments and six subordinate ethnic legislatures have truncated powers that prevent them from developing the genuine participatory role that their existence suggests. Moreover, local implementation of powers prescribed by the military and bureaucracy is sometimes in question.

Political reform is not simply about wider distribution of power. It also depends on the diversity of those in institutional roles. This has been lacking in Myanmar in the half-century of military rule. Unlike in any other military-dominated state or administration in Asia – for example in Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea – the Tatmadaw has controlled all avenues of social mobility. Higher education has been limited to those approved by the military, and the best educational institutions have been military academies. The Buddhist sangha (clergy) hierarchy has been state-dominated. Economic advancement was impossible under the socialist regime. Civil society was allowed only after 1988, and even then it was limited to non-confrontational roles. Politics has existed only as a means for military control, with a position in the military seen as an honourable career and, in the later stages of Tatmadaw domination, as an avenue of economic advancement. Military officers have dominated cabinets, taking more than 90 per cent of all posts, and the higher ranks of the civil service – some believe they have taken 30 per cent of those positions. This exceptional control has been a dominant factor, along with the coercive power of the state, in the longevity of military rule. Its legacy will ensure only a gradual diminution of the Tatmadaw’s power, to the chagrin of those who seek rapid political reform.3

Military domination has been accompanied by the subordination of women (who account for only about 2 per cent of the military), even though they have traditionally been powerful and equal elements of society and have excelled in education and some professions. This control has also closed doors for Christians and Muslims. Members of ethnic minorities who attain a position in society are obliged to play by Burman rules. Under the military, what had been a culturally and religiously diverse civilian administration gradually hardened into a core Burman Buddhist leadership. There is probably no Christian, Muslim or member of a minority group ranked colonel or higher in the Tatmadaw.

As in many traditional societies, power is highly personalized; loyalty is to the individual at the top of the hierarchy in any setting. This leads to weak institutions. Even members of the extreme political left (for example, underground communist parties), supposedly glued together by ideology, were plagued by factional disputes that destroyed them. In this sort of political environment, compromise and delegation of authority, both components of democratic governance, become singularly difficult. Progress is further impeded by the fact the Tatmadaw has always feared ‘chaos’, the loss of authoritative control.

3 See David I. Steinberg, ‘Closed Doors and Glass Ceilings: Social Mobility and the Persistence of Tatmadaw Dominance’, in David I. Steinberg (ed.), Myanmar: The Dynamics of an Evolving Polity (Boulder: Lynne Rienner [forthcoming]). A substantial portion of the urban population, families, businesses etc., rely on military rule; and in rural, non-insurgent areas, military control is essentially absolute.
Towards democracy

Dictionary definitions of ‘democracy’ may be clear in academic settings but the international use of the term varies. This extends to its interpretation in the context of the political process in various states. Three points are evident. First, foreign demands on the Burmese reform process have held the country to a higher standard than most other states in Asia. Second, the dualism prevalent in Western thought often fails to consider the varying shades and nuances of societies in transition. Democracy and authoritarian rule are not absolutes; nor is military or civilian governance. Third, and this is perhaps a particularly American issue, there seems in the West to be an emotional and politically driven need for instant change and success.

Why did the reforms in Myanmar take place? They were rare in Asia, in that they reflected top-down mandates rather than bottom-up pressures, as in Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. In Asia, only Taiwan has also instigated such changes via the incumbent leadership. No doubt Myanmar’s leaders felt chagrin that the country, once predicted to become the richest in Southeast Asia, was the poorest in the region. And Western aid, from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and others, was also important. Too great a reliance on China was a violation of traditional Burmese neutralism. It should also be remembered that the Burmese military, contrary to its stereotyping as a bunch of ‘thugs’ by much of the West, is very patriotic. Its members have certainly felt shame at the plight of their state.

Now the Myanmar polity is in a gradual process of transformation. The reforms have been evident, and major retreat from them without a compelling cause could bring a people’s revolution. Only in the past two years have avenues of social mobility begun to open: good-quality higher education is beginning, and civil society has expanded. Although there is a shortage of bank capital for Burmese entrepreneurs, the private sector has grown rapidly. And politics is beginning to provide an avenue for social mobility, both for civilians and retired members of the military.

Complete military control, as exercised in the past, will probably start to be eroded. This is also likely to happen through parliamentary activities as, for the first time, military and civilians deal with one another as relative equals. It is, as a senior official (and former military officer) has said, the ‘end game’ for the military. A gradual reduction of the military presence in parliament is likely, as is the military’s control over the economy, public institutions and social mobility. There must certainly be those in the Tatmadaw who regard the reforms as anathema, but as long as the military’s autonomy as an institution is protected and the country remains unified, the appeal of the military as the sole avenue to power and resources is likely to continue to decline.

Myanmar’s problems are acute. The central issue since independence has not been about democratic governance but about an equitable (in a Burmese sense) sharing of power and resources between the Burmans, who constitute two-thirds of the population, and the myriad minority groups. The unitary nature of the state has exacerbated the problem, resulting in perhaps two dozen ethnic insurrections, some small but others beyond the ability of the state to control. There are some 50,000–100,000 armed insurgents along Myanmar’s periphery. Myanmar is a state but not yet a nation – that is, not yet accepted as a recognized entity with an overarching national ethos among its diverse ethnic groups. The present government has shown far more awareness and flexibility than any previous Burmese regime. But even a national ceasefire is as yet uncertain, although

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The government hopes to conclude one before the 2015 elections, and a national peace process is quite distant. A former Burmese head of state estimates that 1 million people have been killed in insurgencies since independence. It is not by chance that the 2008 constitution stipulates that the minister in charge of minority affairs must be an active-duty officer.

International players

Arrogance has been evident in foreign dealings with Myanmar. Some observers have claimed that outside pressure has forced reforms, as if the Burmese were not capable of seeing and facing their own deficiencies. The US and the EU have called for democracy, and imposed sanctions, but the purpose of US sanctions until the Obama administration was ‘regime change’, which was never likely to happen. Strategically located, Myanmar has become the nexus of concern for China, India, the US, Japan and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This affects what foreign institutions can accomplish. No country wants to see another state play a dominant role in Myanmar. Nor do the Burmese, whose exceptional capacity for neutralism enabled U Thant to become secretary-general of the UN in 1961 despite opposition from both China and the US. A new equilibrium in foreign affairs, distinct from the old Cold War neutralism, is likely to be a foreign policy objective of the present Myanmar administration.

As pluralism spreads and intellectual inquiry is allowed, educated young people may begin to examine and question their own culture. Reactions against perceived foreign cultural invasions, as well as a questioning of local values, are likely to cause problems.

In any foreign relationship, careful attention must be paid to Burmese (in effect, Burman) nationalism. An unstated sense of the vulnerability of their culture is prevalent among many Burmans. This takes the form of extreme nationalism, at times xenophobia, as they feel under cultural siege. Thus anti-imperialism was earlier a prominent theme. Anti-Chinese sentiment became evident in response to Chinese development projects that seemed to benefit China more than Myanmar. It also reflected stresses related to the massive influx of undocumented Chinese businessmen – 2 million, by some accounts. Currently, a vehement anti-Muslim feeling is pervasive, as Burman Buddhists declare that their religion will be lost to Muslims. This sentiment is exacerbated by the cultural vulnerability of the Rakhine Buddhists, who were conquered by the Burmans in 1785. They have remained virtually second-class citizens, and are especially outraged that foreign assistance in that region has gone to the Muslim Rohingyas (whom Buddhists in both Rakhine and central Myanmar regard as illegal Bengali immigrants). The West, especially the United States, is likely to be the next object of suspicion, as greater exposure to tourists, foreign businesspeople, aid workers and Western pop culture inevitably prompts fears about threats to traditional Burmese values and virtues. As pluralism spreads and intellectual inquiry is allowed, educated young people may begin to examine and question their own culture. Reactions against perceived foreign cultural invasions, as well as a questioning of local values, are likely to cause problems.

Foreign assistance has a role, none the less. Myanmar’s deterioration over decades of misrule has resulted in a lack of capacity in numerous fields. Targeted and coordinated assistance is necessary to prevent the multitude of donors – national, private and multinational – from overwhelming the resources of the small and harassed Burmese bureaucracy. Coordination is essential among the
multinational, national and private NGOs that seem ubiquitous. Donors should avoid appearing to side with any political or ethnic element.

Politically, there is a potential minefield here. If the continuing, overarching problem of the state is majority–minority relations, then foreigners must remember, as the Burmese assuredly do, that every country bordering Myanmar (except Laos) has supported ethnic or political insurgents and dissidents. So, too, have the UK and the US. Foreign intervention on ethnic issues is greeted with suspicion, not only by the Burmese. China questions the US’s interest in minority affairs, especially those of the Christian Kachin, Chin and Karen groups, who have an effective Christian lobby in the US. It considers that interest part of a ‘containment’ policy closely linked to US support for Japan and the increase in Japanese aid to Myanmar. And as those seeking regime change have been frustrated, and as reforms in other fields have removed some sources of potential protest, criticism of the Myanmar government now focuses on minority issues.

In spite of the EU’s ‘common position’, European states have taken diverse approaches to Myanmar and its development. The UK has been most vociferously pro-opposition. Japan’s early influence resulted not only from its reparations and assistance, but also from the personal attachment to Japan by Ne Win, who was trained by the Japanese in an anti-British colonial army. Recent increases in Japanese aid have several causes, but a prominent one is the need to balance Chinese influence, which is profound (especially from Yunnan province) and reflects China’s strategic interests.

A few years ago the prospects for a democratic Myanmar evoked pessimism, but that attitude has changed. Progress will be patchy and slow, but there is evidence of a will to improve the lot of the country’s peoples. Diverse populations will demand more pluralism in society, and this demand is likely to grow. Too slow progress or too rapid change could engender unrest. As diplomats are liable to comment, cautious optimism is the appropriate attitude.

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1 For a period in the later 1980s, the Japanese ambassador was the only diplomatic corps leader who had access to Ne Win.
2 For a detailed study, see David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2012). The types of Chinese investment and the strategic importance of the state give the Burmese far more influence in the relationship than is generally believed. Japan has been quite concerned. A retired Japanese general has said that China could import oil through Myanmar and avoid the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea (as it is now doing), which is not in Japan’s national interest. Personal interview.
Meeting Summary

Day One: Thursday 2 October

The discussions on day one began with a sobering assessment of the challenges facing the global community and the overarching question of how best to manage risk. Tim Hitchens, the British ambassador to Japan, talked about the significance of failing states and of stalled transitions in the Middle East. He addressed a broad range of challenges, including the risk of making the planet uninhabitable as a result of climate change and the risk of pandemics. Yohei Sasakawa echoed this line and highlighted how quickly things change, drawing attention particularly to how the challenges of the twenty-first century have eclipsed expectations of it being an era of peace and positive relations.

The Rt Hon Sir John Major reiterated this theme and argued that the world is becoming more perilous. He developed the discussion further by focusing on a core set of issues particular to Asia and emphasizing the importance of recognizing Asia not merely as an economic phenomenon but also as a profoundly political part of the world. He itemized the risks of China's growing military presence in the region and pointed to the risk of conflict that is brought about more by accident than by design. Sir John discussed the challenge of a nuclear North Korea, the risk of conflict in Asia and, more broadly, the risk of nuclear proliferation. He spoke about the risk of popular nationalism and the importance of solidifying democratic values, a matter especially relevant in the current context of Hong Kong. In addition, he pointed to the importance of energy and resource security with reference to Tibet and of access to water supplies.

The good news is that the world, and particularly Britain and Japan, seems well prepared to address those challenges. According to Sir John, the nation-state is up to the challenge and is not derelict. The UK and Japan share a great deal of will and common resolve. In tackling these issues, this greater resolve is a very significant change on the part of Japan over the past few years.

Tim Hitchens talked about Japan's new proactive diplomacy, urging a more integrated approach by Britain and Japan. He emphasized the importance of a joint approach to global challenges that does more than tackle individual problems and those immediate to specific countries. Both Tomohiko Taniguchi and Yuichi Hosoya re-emphasized the idea that Japan is ready for such cooperation. Taniguchi argued for the importance of Japan being a goodwill investor or a 'broken window mender'. Hosoya highlighted the importance of values diplomacy as part of the Abe administration's new agenda.

Considering what can be done in this positive context is the next step. European countries, and specifically Britain, can be involved. They have been successful examples of how to build institutions that can promote security and aid international mediation. Sir John went a step further, providing two proposals for what Britain could do working individually and also together with Japan. The first was for a 'Marshall Plan' for education in East Asia. The second was a proposal for enhancing Japan’s global presence by establishing it as a member of an expanded UN Security Council.

Failing states

The first session, on failing states, dealt with issues that international relations specialists and policymakers have grappled with for many years. The speakers highlighted the importance of providing a
clear definition of the term. Akihiko Tanaka singled out two essential characteristics that mark what are termed ‘failing states’: incompetence and a high propensity for conflict. Sir Adam Roberts drew attention to the need for more caution in using the term too liberally, for fear of generating a backlash from countries that are inappropriately labelled. It was also made clear that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution when contemplating the problem of state fragility.

Discussion led to the following set of policy recommendations and further ideas for future deliberation. First, greater creativity on the part of governments is necessary in addressing the problems of ‘failing states’. As David Malone pointed out, financial resources should be used in a more imaginative way, such as off-budget solutions, in order to promote stability. It is also necessary to prioritize failing states that are most in need of attention from the international community, and specifically from the UK and Japan. The sustainability of international involvement in the effort to create more stability among the most vulnerable states must also be considered. A long-term approach is necessary instead of short-term fixes and simple responses, such as sponsoring elections as an exit strategy for reducing the involvement of the international community. Therefore, time horizons must be considered that contemplate how long rather than how much is enough for active international involvement.

Second, the concrete areas in which there is particular need for help from Britain and Japan must be examined. The range of issues in which Britain and Japan can be legitimately involved should be considered, such as educational and maternity health support in failing states. It is also necessary to consider how to synchronize efforts with other states in order to promote greater stability. This will not be easy. As David Steinberg pointed out, in the case of Myanmar (Burma), domestic politics could complicate the response of Britain and Japan to challenges faced. Rather than simply being a technocratic problem, there is a crucial political dimension that makes the issue more complex.

Disaster management

In the second session, on disaster management, the message of the panel was positive, providing some reassurance in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Lt-Gen. Goro Matsumura of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF or jieitai) highlighted how much the JSDF have achieved since Fukushima at a practical level. Equally important, he pointed to the shift in public attitudes towards the JSDF in Japan. The success of close collaboration with the US military, through the Operation Tomodachi disaster relief operation, has had a profound impact in changing public attitudes in Japan to the jieitai. Previously they had been seen to lack full legitimacy. Moreover, as Lt-Gen. Matsumura pointed out, close collaboration with ASEAN has been crucial in strengthening the role of the JSDF regionally. Taniguchi stated that this shift in attitude has had a positive effect on foreign policy.

Margareta Wahlström presented a set of very specific policy recommendations. Greater integration is necessary among the different bureaucratic actors in disaster relief coordination. Moreover, means of dealing with the excessive ‘stovepiping’ of overseas development assistance must be developed and more emphasis must be given to long-term reconstruction. Individual countries need a greater capacity for engagement with the international community and for international coordination. Closer civil-military relationships and more effective coordination are necessary too.

Taniguchi also indicated the need for a more developed institutional memory. This will be more feasible in Japan with the return of political stability to the office of the prime minister. Important questions remain to be considered in this regard. They cover issues such as where Britain and Japan can cooperate in the field of disaster management, whether or not challenges can be addressed through refining
existing institutional mechanisms, and whether or not Japan’s National Security Council should develop a crisis-management mechanism along the lines of the UK’s COBRA emergency committee.

It may be necessary to examine more critically some of the shortcomings that beset disaster management both in Japan and further afield. Sir David Warren noted the importance of accurate risk assessment and the danger that exaggerated risk can pose with regard to man-made and natural disasters. It may be useful to focus on regulatory mechanisms as part of the disaster-prevention process rather than on disaster management. More attention could also be paid to the role of the private sector, both internationally and domestically, in this area of its cooperation with government.

**Democracy in transition**

The final session of day one, on democracy in transition, was the most abstract of the day’s discussions. Two main points emerged. First, democracy is not guaranteed as a political model. Second, democracies are fragile, and can fluctuate in terms of where they are on the spectrum of political regimes. Fewer than half the members of the UN are unambiguously secure, stable democracies, and all countries can improve their democratic performance. However, it is reassuring that both Britain and Japan wish to engage in promoting democracy.

As Hosoya stated, a new emphasis on values is emerging based on creating an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ in Asia. This emphasis on values is quite unusual in the context of Japanese politics. It is necessary to consider whether such an arc will be feasible in the regional political context or whether it will provoke unintended and unwanted reactions from important actors. For example, the risk of such repercussions was considered when Taro Aso, as foreign minister, introduced the idea of a quadrilateral initiative for promoting democratic values on the part of Japan, Australia, the United States and India. The then Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was very critical, arguing that such an approach would risk increasing China’s fear of containment and thereby contribute to a further deterioration of relations between the leading actors in the region.

Furthermore, David Malone stated that the West is often seen as being too ‘preachy’ in its advocacy of democratization. This is particularly relevant in the context of East Asia, where North Korea all too often criticizes the West for defining democracy in its terms. Although this is a self-serving argument in the case of North Korea, the idea of respect must be recognized as an increasingly important part of relations between nominal friends as well as with enemies in East Asia.

This is a crucial point in relations between Japan and South Korea. One of the most frustrating elements of the current discussion is that the two countries seem unable to cooperate despite their natural convergence of interest in dealing with challenges such as those from China and North Korea. In their own way, all the regional states articulate a common desire for respect and recognition of their own cultural and political traditions. This holds true for both Japan and South Korea.

The current challenge for these nation-states is to take the next step of cooperation. Many states are sensitive to being told from outside how best to manage their political affairs, and Andrew Gamble emphasized the role that international institutions could play in promoting the democratic agenda. In this case, the focus then shifts to determining which international institutions are best equipped to do so and the ways in which Japan and Britain can influence them so as to advance this broad objective. The specific means that should be adopted to promote further democratization must be examined too. Elections are important but they are not enough. Constitutional foundations are critical, and must have relevance and legitimacy to the countries in question.
Social and educational initiatives will be vital in promoting greater awareness of the long-term significance of democracy. As Professor Harukata Takenaka pointed out, context matters. Democratic values are more likely to be embraced by states if they are seen as a passport to a larger club of democratic nations that offer not only political recognition but also economic advantages and institutional support. However, this presents one of the biggest problems of the democratization agenda. The club of democratic nations is no longer as secure as it once was owing to the rise of political populism in Europe and elsewhere, which is creating alternative political models.

**Day Two: Friday 3 October**

Day two of the conference focused on three case studies: the crisis in Syria, the disaster in Fukushima and the democratic transition of Myanmar. The sessions examined the critical issues and challenges they raised and possible ways in which nation-states could effectively deal with them. As the panellists on day one had concluded, the nation-state still has a prominent role in facing these challenges. The main theme seemed to be governance and the roles that various actors at the local, national and international levels could play in establishing more effective governance. Each case showed that without a strong nation-state founded on accountability and transparency, humanitarian and development assistance will not be sustainable and thus will not be able to contribute to a long-term solution. The panellists also discussed the potential roles of Japan and the UK in engaging with countries, and provided specific policy recommendations in each case.

**Syria**

The first session, on Syria, examined the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East and what other nations and international organizations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees could do to address the lack of effective governance structures there. Yoshiji Nogami pointed out the tension between the concept of the nation-state and other unifying and motivating forces, namely pan-Arabism. The panellists agreed that the governance of Syria is fragmented and complicated. It is thus necessary to work with the numerous actors who make up Syria and are involved in the crisis, including the Assad regime, local actors, refugee host states such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, and other countries of the region, including Iraq and Iran.

Kiichi Fujiwara pointed out that, although necessary, neither military involvement nor humanitarian assistance alone will fundamentally transform Syria and the greater Middle East region. Looking at the bigger picture, he argued that the root problem lies in the lack of governance structures and an accountability framework. He proposed the potential solution of establishing an accountability framework that clarifies and limits external states’ involvement and that is acceptable to local communities. Specifically, he suggested Japan’s potential role in working as a neutral middleman between Western states and Turkey.

Lord Michael Williams said it is quite unlikely that Syria will return to the status quo ante; we must think about how Syria and other states in the Middle East should be reconstituted. He reflected on the recent failures of international governance in addressing the crisis and argued for the new UN envoy to engage with the Syrian government. Highlighting the roles that nation-states could play in the refugee crisis, he focused on the need to understand the specificities of each refugee host country, the better to discern how they can help and be helped. He proposed a possible joint project between Jordan and the UK involving unarmed military capabilities.
Nigel Fisher questioned the nature of past external engagement and argued that external actors should work with existing government structures, especially at local levels, rather than working around them. He pointed to the need to make a break with the past model of 'charity-based' international involvement, raising questions of how to go beyond humanitarian efforts and how to link various aspects of the situation in Syria with the refugee host countries. Addressing the issue of how to help governments to take charge of their own society, he proposed that the international community should work more with local councils and NGOs to create sustainable programmes that strengthen municipal services rather than making them implementers of external actors' plans. He also noted the potential in identifying common areas of interest and underlying problems such as drought and lack of education. He drew attention to the potential role of the UN in working with moderate local Islamic groups and of Japan and the UK in bringing these different actors together.

**Fukushima**

The second session, on Fukushima, reiterated the need for better governance in the nation-state and focused on the crucial elements of accountability and transparency. The discussion also brought up the concepts of central and local governance and how to balance the two in planning future energy policy. Sir David Warren pointed to the importance of effective risk management in the wider context of the state's role.

Kiyoshi Kurokawa highlighted the Japanese government's lack of transparency and accountability in handling the Fukushima accident and the public's loss of trust in it. He explained that since the accident and the publishing of recommendations by various investigative panels, there has been little improvement in governance and the development of a safety culture. He recommended greater localization and regionalization of the energy industry in order to deal with 'regulatory capture' and proposed establishing 'smart grids'.

Jeffrey Kingston set out the necessary steps for the government to regain trust, starting with providing precise risk calculation and risk mitigation. Echoing the problems raised about governance, he further pointed to the tension within the nation-state between central government and local governments in risk management and response. He noted that responsibility for evacuation in Japan currently lies with small towns, which have little ability to manage it.

Lutz Mez provided a global context for the discussion on the place of nuclear power in the future energy mix, referring to policy debates in Germany and the surprisingly fast development there of the renewable energy industry. He drew attention to the need to develop a long-term strategy for the future of Japan's energy mix and also to ensure adequate transparency and monitoring of the energy sector. The discussion underlined the potential opportunities that crises and accidents can create in improving a country's mechanisms for emergency responses, developing new solutions and promoting better governance.

**Myanmar**

The final session, on Myanmar, covered issues also raised in the Syria session, particularly the significance of the nation-state's capacity for governance and the need to understand the specific roles that involved actors could play in the transition to democracy. Aiko Doden noted that in past cases, democratic transition has resulted in countries’ own unique form of democracy and that the peace process in Myanmar must be home-grown. David Steinberg echoed the importance of strong political
structures for a successful transition to democracy. Identifying the factors distinguishing Myanmar from other Southeast Asian countries that have experienced democratic transition, he pointed out the significant role that commitment to a strong parliamentary system and a weakened military had in Indonesia’s democratic transition.

Thant Myint-U addressed the issue of the weak nation-state and identified the need for a stronger nation-state with a greater capacity for governance so that foreign aid can make a difference. As a specific policy recommendation, he pointed to the need for a substantive taxation system, as most economic revenue currently goes into private pockets. He argued for federalism as an effective governance structure to manage the conflicting ethnic groups. He also brought up the need to negotiate a single nationwide ceasefire agreement as the first step in establishing a treaty framework for the new government after the forthcoming elections.

The uncertainty of the political situation and the weakness of the nation-state are obstacles to the economic development of Myanmar. As Jonathan Head stated, short-term investment with direct, immediate returns is booming, but political instability means that investors are still wary of making long-term investments. Furthermore, the political economy centred on the minority groups that has emerged over the past 15 years will be difficult to unwind.

Another recurring theme was the importance of local actors and how external bodies can work with them. Yohei Sasakawa highlighted the positive role that Japan, through the Nippon Foundation, has played in fostering local ownership and self-sustainability by working with villages in Myanmar to promote education and medical support. He also argued for the need to invest in the ‘software’ of human resources through education and training. Steinberg pointed to Japan’s potentially large role in assisting Myanmar in view of its non-involvement in ethnic conflicts and its provision of neutral aid to the country in the 1960s and 1970s.

Conclusions

The discussions at all the sessions of the seminar indicated that nation-states must be involved in these critical issues and that failing to engage with them would have unwanted consequences at home. The question is not whether but how to engage. The discussions clarified and fleshed out the various levels of governance within the nation-state at which there can be engagement, the various actors to engage with, and the appropriate timing of involvement. The panellists provided concrete policy recommendations, emphasizing the need for early engagement with local actors, especially in Syria and Myanmar. The sessions also highlighted the need for a framework of strong political structures to be put in place in order for external assistance to be effective. In addition to institutional and technical ‘hardware’, there must be ‘software’ that will allow accountable and transparent governance to function, as discussed in the case of Fukushima. Such foundations are fundamental to the formation of democratic relationships between government and the public.

The UK and Japan must think of themselves as external actors and must also be aware of the models of democracy that they project to the world, especially now that the need for regulatory reform in Japan is pressing and populist and isolationist sentiments are growing in the UK. The discussions at the seminar should lead the two countries to re-examine their own centralized governance structures. As the roles of nation-states and globalization evolve, we must apply these lessons and continue to develop our long-term and innovative thinking.
Agenda

The Role of the Nation-State in Addressing Global Challenges: Japan–UK Perspectives

2–3 October 2014

Day One: Thursday 2 October

08.30–09.00 Registration
09.00–09.30 Opening remarks

Tim Hitchens, British ambassador to Japan
Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman, The Nippon Foundation
Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House

09.30–10.45 Keynote Speech: Security Challenges in Asia: The Relevance of the European Experience
The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1990–97)

Chair: Akiko Yamanaka, Senior Diplomatic Fellow, Cambridge Central Asia Forum, University of Cambridge

10.45–11.15 Coffee break

SESSION 1 | FAILING STATES

11.15–12.45 To what degree do failed or failing states pose a threat to global and/or regional peace and security, broadly defined? How might the international community sensibly and coherently respond to such threats? What has been the track record to date of the UK and Japan, acting individually or in concert with one another/other states, in addressing the challenge posed by failed/failing states, for example, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Libya, North Korea and Somalia? Are there specific examples of failed/failing states that provide salutary and instructive lessons about how the international community should respond to such challenges?

Speakers: Akihiko Tanaka, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency
Sir Adam Roberts, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford
Takashi Inoguchi, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo; President, University of Niigata Prefecture

Chair: Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House

12.45–13.45 Lunch
SESSION 2 | DISASTER MANAGEMENT

13.45–15.15  What policy lessons from recent environmental and technological catastrophes can be applied in formulating good practice for individual nation-states regarding risk reduction and preparation? What comparative advantages do Japan and the UK have in responding to such challenges, and do their policy strengths lie in individual or collaborative responses? Which institutional actors in both Japan and the UK are best placed to respond? Are there specific examples of recent disasters – for example Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013), Cyclone Phailin in India (2013), Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), the Kobe earthquake (1995), the 2011 triple disaster in northeastern Japan – that can be usefully studied in addressing the above questions, particularly with regard to aid provision, population displacement, reconstruction, housing and sanitation? What policy recommendations can Japan and the UK make to help nations strengthen their disaster-risk reduction and preparedness? Can lessons be drawn from the experiences of ad hoc military coalitions that have operated in the wake of some of Asia’s recent disasters?

Speakers:  
Tomohiko Taniguchi, Professor, Keio University Graduate School of System Design and Management; Special Advisor, Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe  
Margareta Wahlström, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction  
Lt-Gen. Goro Matsumura, Commanding General, North-Eastern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

Chair:  
Isabel Hilton, Editor, ChinaDialogue

15.15–15.45  Coffee break

SESSION 3 | DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITION

15.45–17.15  Which factors help to explain the transition from authoritarian to democratic polities, and how important is external intervention in shaping such transitions? What roles have Japan and the UK previously played in influencing such transitions for good or ill? In view of efforts by present and past Japanese premiers, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso for example, to highlight the importance of ‘values-based diplomacy’ (as in the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ concept), can and should Japan play a more active role, either independently or with the UK and other states and international organizations, in facilitating transitions? Do transitions and transformative experiences enhance or detract from global stability? What are the lessons from developments such as the Jasmine Revolution in considering future potential transitions, for example in North Korea?

Speakers:  
David Malone, Rector, United Nations University; Under-Secretary General, United Nations  
Andrew Gamble, Professor of Politics, Queens’ College, University of Cambridge  
Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  
Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University

Chair:  
Takashi Shiraishi, President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Day Two: Friday 3 October

09.30–10.00 Registration

10.00–10.30 Opening remarks: Are existing institutional structures necessary and sufficient for solving the critical issues of failing states, disaster management and democratic transitions?

*John Swenson-Wright*, Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House

SESSION 4 | SYRIA

10.30–12.00 What are the origins of the refugee crisis in Syria and who should take responsibility for addressing this challenge? How effective has the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees been in addressing the needs of Syrian refugees? What happens when the humanitarian needs of refugees clash with state sovereignty interests and border-policing challenges? How have Syria’s neighbours, for example Turkey and Jordan, responded to this challenge? What role might Japan and the UK play in addressing this challenge, particularly through the deployment of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping bodies such as the Japan Self-Defense Forces? Why has the international community failed to cope with the Syrian crisis and why have UN efforts failed to make progress? Is there a future for the nation-state in the Middle East?

Speakers:  
*Kiichi Fujiwara*, Professor of International Politics, University of Tokyo  
*Lord Michael Williams*, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Chatham House; UN Under-Secretary General, Middle East (2006–11)  
*Nigel Fisher, O.C.*, former Assistant Secretary-General and Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Amman

Chair:  
*Yoshiji Nogami*, President, Japan Institute of International Affairs

12.00–13.00 Lunch

SESSION 5 | FUKUSHIMA

13.00–14.30 In April 2014, Japan reversed its ‘zero nuclear’ goals. Why did the Fukushima disaster not have the same effect on Japan that it did on Germany? And although some in Japan advocate nuclear power as a viable route for its energy security, might not renewable energy sources be just as good? Can Japanese public concerns regarding nuclear waste be allayed in view of the government’s plan to continue using nuclear reactors? Moreover, is Japan able to address global security concerns over its plutonium stockpile, a problem exacerbated by the April 2014 decision to continue reprocessing fuel at Rokkasho? After the Fukushima disaster, transparency and honesty have become norms for nuclear governance. What lessons can other nuclear-dependent countries take from the Japanese experience? Similarly, what can Japan learn from the UK, EU and US experiences? Given the reversal of ‘zero nuclear’ goals, will there be a place for renewable energy sources in the rebuilding of Fukushima?
The Role of the Nation-State in Addressing Global Challenges: Japan–UK Perspectives

Speakers:  
Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Academic Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Chair, the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, National Diet of Japan  
Lutz Mez, Professor in Political Science, Freie Universität, Berlin  
Jeffrey Kingston, Director of Asian Studies, Temple University, Japan  
Sir David Warren, Associate Fellow, Chatham House; British ambassador to Japan (2008–12)  

14.30–15.00 Coffee break

SESSION 6 | MYANMAR/BURMA

15.00–16.30 How far has the transition to democratic government in Myanmar/Burma progressed? How has this change been effected and what role have foreign powers played? How important have overseas development assistance and economic engagement been in facilitating the transition? How durable are these democratic reforms and what can be done to ensure that they are sustained? What has been the role of Britain and Japan in contributing to these changes? Are there lessons from other, similar political transitions (either positive or negative, past or present) that might be applied to the case of Burma (for example, Thailand)?

Speakers:  
David Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University  
Thant Myint-U, Chairman, Yangon Heritage Trust  
Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman, The Nippon Foundation; Special Envoy for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, Government of Japan  
Jonathan Head, Southeast Asia Correspondent, BBC News  
Aiko Doden, Senior Commentator, NHK

16.30–17.00 Closing remarks
Robin Niblett, Director, Chatham House

17.00 End
About the Authors

Dr Kiyoshi Kurokawa served as the chair of the National Diet of Japan, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (2011–12), for which he was awarded the 2012 AAAS Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Award and named among the 100 Top Global Thinkers of 2012 by Foreign Policy. Dr Kurokawa has served as the chief scientific adviser to the Japanese prime minister’s cabinet (2006–08), president of the Science Council of Japan (2003–06), commissioner to the World Health Organization, and was dean of the medical school at Tokai University (1996–2002). He is currently a member of the World Dementia Council (April 2014 to date), organized by the UK government.

Sir Adam Roberts is senior research fellow of the Centre for International Studies in Oxford University’s Department of Politics and International Relations. He is also emeritus professor of international relations at Oxford University, and emeritus fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. He has been awarded honorary doctorates by King’s College London (2010), Aberdeen University (2012) and Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo (2012). Previously, he was the president of the British Academy (2009–13).

David Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University, and was the former director of Asia Studies for 10 years. He is a specialist on Burma/Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia and US policy in Asia. Previously, he was a representative of the Asia Foundation in Korea, Hong Kong, Burma and Washington, DC. He was a member of the Senior Foreign Service, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State. He is the author of 14 books and monographs, 100 articles and book chapters, and some 300 op-eds.

John Swenson-Wright is head of the Asia programme at Chatham House, senior university lecturer in Japanese politics and international relations at Cambridge University, and an official fellow of Darwin College, Cambridge. He has a BA in politics, philosophy and economics (PPE) from Christ Church, Oxford; an MA in international relations and East Asian Studies from SAIS, Johns Hopkins; and a DPhil in international relations from St Antony’s, Oxford. He comments regularly for the global media on the international relations of East Asia, with particular reference to Japan and the Korean peninsula. He has testified on East Asian affairs to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. He is a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council (GAC) on Korea as well as of the UK–Japan 21st Century Group. He is a member of the editorial board of Global Asia, and a founding member of the European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN).
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