# Book reviews

## International Relations theory

**A political theory of territory. By Margaret Moore.** New York: Oxford University Press. 2015. 280pp. £48.00. ISBN 978 0 19022 224 6. Available as e-book.

Contemporary liberal political theory has paid a great deal of attention to individual rights, social justice and the authority of the state. But in spite of the attention given to the importance of sovereignty in this context, somehow the deeply political dimension of the state's location in and claim over territory has been subjected to much less theoretical reflection until relatively recently. This is true in spite of what would seem to be the evident normative problems arising from territorial claims and the importance of issues such as secession and state-breaking, ethnic conflict and territorial disputes, and just war debates about national defence against armed violations of territorial integrity.

In fact, as Margaret Moore argues in her enormously valuable contribution to the growing debate on the political theory of territory, philosophers have generally acted as if raising questions specifically about territorial rights is obviated by theories of sovereignty: 'state sovereignty necessarily involves control over territory', they commonly assume, and 'whatever justifies the state also justifies the territory of the state' (p. 4). However, the belief that justifying sovereignty is sufficient to account for the territorial claims that states also make fails when confronted with problems at the margins of sovereignty such as how disputes over uninhabited islands can be evaluated and settled. But even had it accounted for such things satisfactorily, the very success of a body of theory that focused exclusively on individual rights, social justice and state sovereignty would run the risk of obscuring what Moore persuasively argues is a distinct and independently important normative dimension of political life: the particularities of people's relationships with political space and the ethical dimensions of occupying land and claiming it as political territory.

According to Moore's argument, the question of territory has to be understood as an integral part of the experience and value of collective self-determination. This is due to the special relationships that arise not only between the members of a self-determining community but between them and the particular geographic spaces within which they determine their political destinies. Moore's theory offers a well-articulated rival to the dominant approaches to territory. Chief among these are, on the one hand, liberal-nationalist accounts such as those of David Miller and Tamar Meisels (as well as the ethno-geographic arguments put forward by Avery Kolers) and, on the other, those Moore characterizes as statist-functionalist accounts which she identifies in the work of Allen Buchanan, Anna Stitz, Lea Ypi, Jeremy Waldron and Cara Nine. Where the former camp emphasizes culture as the decisive mediator between people—and *nations* in particular—and land, Moore argues that theorists ought to focus on *peoples* defined as politically competent and historic self-determining communities (which may display wide cultural diversity internally and

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which she maintains may or may not map onto the ethno-geographic divisions central to Kolers's analysis). And whereas the second camp identifies territorial rights with the state, based on its performance as guarantor of peace within the territory over which it has jurisdiction and insofar as it realizes justice, Moore offers a highly suggestive account of how peoples claim territorial rights themselves.

Crucial to an adequate account of the territorial dimension of modern political life is an appreciation of the particularity of peoples' attachments to specific geographical spaces. Peoples need guarantees not only for juridical and institutional protections within which to develop bonds of interpersonal civic cooperation but also for a territorial space within which to cultivate a continued sense of place and belonging. Political territory, Moore argues, is not a relationship-independent good. A people's territory—like someone's parents and unlike many forms of property—is not fungible in a simple, direct way and cannot be exchanged for another without some essential loss.

Having laid out its theoretical foundations, Moore's book turns to a series of applications in which it can be used to address normative disputes over, respectively, wrongful seizure of territory and corrective justice, rights claims about natural resources, the question of border controls and immigration and the problem of justifying the defence of territory from international aggression.

Offering both an original theory and a careful demonstration of its applications, Moore's book is an enormously impressive and highly distinctive contribution to the growing literature in this important field.

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**Recognition in International Relations: rethinking a political concept in a global context. Edited by Christopher Daase, Caroline Fehl, Anna Geis and Georgios Kolliarakis.** Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 284pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13746 471 2. Available as e-book.

Editors Christopher Daase, Caroline Fehl, Anna Geis and Georgios Kolliarakis set out to examine the concept of recognition in International Relations (IR) by drawing on, and connecting, the study of recognition within the fields of political theory, international law and IR. In doing so, their edited volume connects to a broader movement within IR: see, for instance, the 2013 symposium on recognition in *International Theory* and recent titles such as *The international politics of recognition* (edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, Paradigm, 2011), and *Global justice and the politics of recognition* (edited by Tony Burns and Simon Thompson, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). The latter volume draws on philosophical and sociological models of recognition to study international conflict, while the former explores the relationship between recognition and globalization within political philosophy. Forthcoming is *Recognition and global politics* (edited by Patrick Hayden and Kate Schick, Manchester University Press, January 2016), which offers a perspective on the possibilities recognition holds to address justice and injustice in world affairs.

But *Recognition in International Relations* is not a superfluous addition to a well-saturated field as it offers a new perspective by combining insights from three different disciplines. It looks at four key issues from political theory, international law and IR, addressing the scepticism of political theorists about whether recognition can be applied to interstate and transnational political processes; the gap between recognition as a social science concept and the debates on recognition in international law and conflict resolution; the tendency in IR to consider recognition a form of identity politics; and scholars' neglect of the ambiguity of

recognition (pp. 4–6). Such a broad approach runs the risk of wanting to contribute to too many debates at once, but the authors have avoided this pitfall by choosing to emphasize two key points. First, they consider recognition (and non-recognition) as a gradual process which occurs 'in complex and entangled forms and constitutes two poles on a long continuum of policies and outcomes'. This provides a theoretically deep analysis, for instance when dealing with the 'grey areas between legality and legitimacy' (p. 16). Second, the authors focus on the 'dark sides' of recognition. These include the unintended consequences of (non-)recognition, such as removing a dictator which opens a void for other actors, and the ambiguous effects of granting or withholding recognition, for instance a government recognizing a terrorist group by negotiating with it. There is an interesting overlap here with the study of friendship in IR, because both friendship and recognition imply a group of insiders that are recognized and a group of outsiders that are not recognized (p. 19).

The editors present a well-thought-out structure, which is reflected in five parts and 15 chapters. Part one, 'Conceptual foundations', offers an extensive introduction, setting out the authors' aims, contributions, and a state-of-the-art literature study, and also introduces and summarizes the contributions to the volume. Parts two and three offer contributions that study recognition among states, recognition of states and governments and recognition among states and non-state actors. Standout chapters include studies of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by Janusz Biene and Christopher Daase, and Carolin Goerzig and Claudio Hofmann; an analysis of the role of the struggle for recognition as a cause of the First World War by Michelle Murray; an evaluation of the positive sides of being non-recognized for Somaliland and Kurdistan by Rebecca Richards and Robert Smith; cooperation despite inequality in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by Caroline Fehl; and a study by Erik Ringmar that introduces four distinct recognition regimes and applies these to China. Three chapters specifically deal with analysing the extent to which recognition has established itself as a separate field of research within IR, specifically in the fields of political theory (Mattias Iser) and international political theory (Nicholas Onuf). Alyson Bailes's contribution deserves a special mention: a former Foreign Office diplomat, she gives a unique account of recognition in diplomacy, based on her practical experiences.

In conclusion, *Recognition in International Relations* makes a very convincing and strong case for accepting recognition as a field of study in IR. Insights from political theory, international law and IR are skilfully combined to demonstrate the relevance of recognition. By emphasizing recognition as a gradual process and drawing attention to its dark sides, the editors not only set out a clear agenda for studying recognition, but also secure the volume's unique place in the growing literature on recognition in IR.

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## International history*

**The First World War in the Middle East. By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen**. London: Hurst. 2014. 263pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 274 1. Available as e-book.

**The fall of the Ottomans: the Great War in the Middle East. By Eugene Rogan.** London: Faber and Faber. 2015. 485pp. £8.85. ISBN 978 0 46502 307 3. Available as e-book.

These two books, with their very different approaches to what might seem to be much the same topic, complement rather than compete with each other. Both authors make

* See also Luis Martínez-Fernández, *Revolutionary Cuba*, pp. 1215–17.



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abundantly clear the sheer awfulness of the conditions under which the First World War in the Middle East was fought, and the inexcusable waste of human life that resulted from the incompetence of the military command on all sides. The inadequacies of the Mesopotamia campaign have been known since the publication of the report of the HM Government's Mesopotamia Commission as early as 1917, but both authors' accounts of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles suggest equal measures of callous indifference and lack of preparedness on this front as well. Much the same can be said of some of the more disastrous Ottoman military operations, particularly the sheer insanity of the Caucasus/Sarıkamış campaign of late 1914 and early 1915. Here, Enver Pasha apparently thought it was worth sending tens of thousands of ill-clad and ill-equipped soldiers across passes over 2,000 metres above sea level in late December, in order to capture a strategic railhead in the Russian Caucasus and inflict a heavy defeat on the Russian Army. A campaign that lasted a mere two weeks caused the death of some 50,000 Ottoman soldiers, about a quarter of them from frostbite and exposure.

Both authors are to be commended for the skilful way in which they advance their narratives across time and space. Eugene Rogan is perhaps a little more rigorous about this, sticking fairly strictly to a chronology which gives readers a panoramic view of events occurring at more or less the same time. Coates Ulrichsen gives a particularly thorough account of the diplomatic relations between the powers, and also of the ways in which policy was formulated within and between Britain, France and Russia, and by the Ottoman government. Both authors emphasize the importance of the Russian Revolution and the events leading up to it, as well as the effects of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk from which the Ottomans profited considerably, in terms of both their no longer having to maintain the Caucasus front and the return of 'the three provinces'—Batum (until 1920), Ardahan and Kars—which had been lost during the Ottoman–Russian War in 1877–8.

Inevitably, both narratives contain some familiar material, although they have greatly enhanced my own understanding of the war in the Middle East. Rogan's use of diaries and memoirs (from combatants on all sides) is often extremely moving, men recording their fears, forebodings and frustrations for posterity, although it is clear that many did not imagine that they could possibly survive the hells to which they were sent. His use of memoir material in Arabic and Turkish gives readers a rare glimpse of the emotions of those taking part on the 'other side', although he also quotes from an impressive number of accounts written by soldiers from Britain and the British Empire. I found Coates Ulrichsen's description of the war as an 'industrialized conflict' fought over largely pre-industrial terrain, an idea that is reiterated and elaborated throughout the book, extremely useful in explaining the many failures of supply, lines of communication, and even the difficulty of keeping units in contact with each other.

Both authors are unsparing in apportioning blame for the Armenian genocide in eastern Anatolia that began in the spring of 1915. It might have been useful to go into more detail about both the history of Ottoman/Kurdish/Armenian relations since the 1880s and the oscillating but tentatively cooperative relations between the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Young Turks. Both the ARF and the Young Turks had opposed the regime of Emperor Abdulhamid II, and at least before the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, the Young Turks had intimated that they would agree to some degree of autonomy for the Armenians of eastern Anatolia. It should also not be forgotten that the Ottomans had been obliged to accommodate several million refugees from their former territories in the Balkans who had been 'ethnically cleansed' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and this formed at least part of the rationale for the expulsion of the

Armenians (and the Greeks) from their homes and lands. It is also the case that some, maybe a majority, of Armenians made common cause with the Russians during their invasion of eastern Anatolia early in 1915. But there can be no equivocation about the facts of the genocide, and no possible justification for it. Both authors put the blame for this precisely where it is due, naming those Ottoman officials most responsible, basing their accounts on the research of Taner Akcam and Donald Bloxham, as well as on eyewitness accounts of this deliberate attempt to annihilate a people, along with their history and their culture.

While the narrative of both books is lively and compelling, one major shortcoming that they share is the poor quality of the maps. It is extremely difficult to follow the course of the major campaigns on the maps in either book; a simple rule of thumb ought to be that if a place is mentioned more than once it should appear on one of the maps. Both authors fall short of that criterion. Coates Ulrichsen's two-page spread—labelled 'Ottomon Empire' on each page—is particularly inadequate, but Rogan's several pages are not much better; it is difficult to follow the Gallipoli campaign, which he describes in considerable detail, since so many names in the text do not appear on the maps. Also, all the maps are purely static and do not show the progress of the various campaigns, something which is relatively easy to portray with modern cartographic methods.

Some random thoughts: it is fairly commonplace to talk about Britain's betrayal of 'the Arabs', but it may be worth pondering just who 'the Arabs' were. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the installation of the Sharifian government in Damascus, it became clear that many 'Syrians' wanted to rule themselves, rather than be subject to the rule of 'foreigners' from the Hijaz. Both authors mention the Allied blockade of the Syrian coast, which evidently caused serious shortages in Syria, but it would be good to know when it started, how long it lasted and how it was enforced. Coates Ulrichsen refers to the Russian ambassador to the Porte as Girs: Giers is the more usual spelling. He also describes 'Dunsterforce' as consisting of '750 armoured cars' (p. 143), while General Dunsterville's own account says that he left Baghdad with 12 officers and 44 men transported in 41 Ford vans. Finally, although they may have both thought it too hackneyed, it is still a pity that neither author mentions Ronald Storrs's characteristically laconic comment on his appointment as military governor of Jerusalem in 1917: 'There are many positions of greater authority and renown within and without the British Empire, but, in a sense I cannot explain, there is no promotion after Jerusalem.'

These are two truly excellent accounts of the First World War in the Middle East. Coates Ulrichsen places more emphasis than Rogan on the background to the Great War, especially the territorial losses that the Ottoman Empire sustained in the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as the British, French Ottoman and Russian 'sides' of the conflict. Rogan emphasizes the various campaigns and battles in greater detail, highlighting the human tragedy of mostly inexperienced soldiers on all sides caught up in a series of terrifying events, recognizing the humanity of those thrown into a morass of confusion and despair. Also, as his title suggests, his principal concern is with the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

Lastly, I am not sure that it is really the case that the reverberations of Sykes–Picot created problems on the ground which are 'still haunting us' a century later, given that the only major boundary changes in the Middle East, between 1925 (the award of Mosul to Iraq) and about 2013—besides those created by an expanding Israel—were the doubtfully legal handover of the sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey by the French mandatory authorities in Syria in 1937 and the uneasy unification of the two Yemens in 1990. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria may have thought it symbolically important to destroy the boundary

posts between Iraq and Syria in 2014, but this desire to 'break down the borders drawn by colonialism' does not seem to have formed a major political objective any time before that. But both authors are undoubtedly correct in asserting that the First World War was the most significant event in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century, not least because of the unravelling of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious institution which, until the excesses of its last two or three decades, had a great deal to commend it.

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**Midnight at the Pera Palace: the birth of modern Istanbul. By Charles King.** New York: W. W. Norton. 2014. 228pp. £19.00. ISBN 978 0 39308 914 1. Available as e-book.

Charles King's latest work explores how major upheavals in domestic and international politics affected the city of Istanbul between the end of the nineteenth and the middle of the twentieth century. The book's title refers to the hotel built by the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits in 1892 to provide suitable accommodation for the Orient Express clientele. It is perhaps best known as the place where Agatha Christie allegedly wrote her novel *Murder on the Orient Express*. The Pera Palace is presented as a microcosm of Istanbul's social and political life during the period.

An engaging work of urban history, *Midnight at the Pera Palace* is based on a broad array of sources—diplomatic correspondence, private papers, memoirs, the Turkish and international press, as well as photos, music, insurance maps and hospital records. King skilfully weaves a wealth of information into his narrative, highlighting Istanbul's connections to major international events and players, such as Leon Trotsky, Ahmet Ertegün (the founder of Atlantic Records), composer Vernon Duke and papal delegate Angelo Roncalli (later Pope John XXIII).

The events forming the backdrop to the book—two world wars, the Allied occupation of Istanbul and Turkey's war of independence—caused many to take advantage of Istanbul's location on an international crossroads and its relative openness. King provides insight into how several waves of migrants, while presenting challenges for Istanbul's local administration, shaped its cultural and intellectual scene. For example, he describes how a large community of White Russians found a temporary home in Istanbul after the October 1917 Revolution, introducing the city to the concept of restaurants and nightclubs. Similarly, Jewish academics escaping Nazi Germany formed the core of Istanbul's higher education cadres in the 1930s, providing world-class education to the republic's younger generations. The book also touches on the darker side of Istanbul's international role—such as drug trafficking and, especially, espionage. As King points out, 'intrigue of some sort seemed to be the city's common currency' during the Second World War (p. 245), leading to grotesque situations and tragic events, such as the explosion at the Pera Palace in 1941 targeting British diplomatic personnel.

King's account puts equal emphasis on the impact of Turkey's domestic politics on the changing nature of Istanbul—particularly relating to minorities. Mass population exchanges in the aftermath of the First World War meant that 'coming to Istanbul or leaving it was the defining journey' (p. 162) for many; the city's minority population decreased sharply, diminishing its cosmopolitan character. In addition, as Turkey's largest urban centre, Istanbul was at the forefront of the government's relentless pursuit of modernity through secularization, alphabet reform and adoption of international laws and regulations—the midnight in the book's title refers to the first New Year's Eve party after Turkey's adoption of the international calendar in 1925. The chapters on writer Halide Edip and Turkey's

first Miss Universe Keriman Halis—two women with very different career trajectories—explore various aspects of the changing role of women in the Turkish republic.

By demonstrating how Istanbul's permanent and temporary residents had to 'live the present as a grand improvisation' (p. 374) to cope with the challenges thrown in their way by domestic and international politics, Charles King convincingly argues that overarching narratives are not a useful way of looking at history, as 'people always manage to lead messier lives than nationalists would like' (p. 167). Showcasing the many ways in which Istanbul was enriched by its openness and cosmopolitanism, the book presents a strong argument in favour of diversity and tolerance and reminds readers that, like the changing owners of the Pera Palace, 'all of us ... are in the end only custodians' (p. 375).

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## Governance, law and ethics

**Rule of law in war: international law and United States counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. By Travers McLeod.** Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 286pp. £55.00. ISBN 978 0 19871 639 6. Available as e-book.

Travers McLeod is the CEO of an Australian think-tank, the Centre for Policy Development. To judge by this admirable study, originating in a doctoral thesis, policy development should be in safe hands out there. It is a book about another book, the 2006 *U.S. Army/Marine Corps field manual for counterinsurgency operations (FM 3–24)*.

It is, I hope, allowable to start with a few terminological observations. 'War' must today include counter-insurgency (COIN). 'Rule of law' is a slogan in COIN, its content and implementation vitally important in what is a battle fought through ideas as well as 'kinetic actions' (defined in a US Air Force document as actions 'taken through physical, material means like bombs, bullets, rockets and other munitions'). 'Legitimacy', frequently invoked, addresses the endorsement (or rejection) of COIN operations by those experiencing them in their towns and villages. McLeod never slips into the usage that seeks to blur the distinction between what is and is not lawful. Law, he shows, indeed international law, is crucial to *FM 3–24*.

At the heart of the book are three chapters dealing respectively with the background to *FM 3–24*, its construction and its 'prosecution' (i.e. implementation). In his contribution to David Fisher and Brian Wicker's *Just war on terror* (Ashgate, 2010, p. 133, reviewed in *International Affairs* 87: 1) General Sir Hugh Beach wrote: 'The new *Manual* has great value as a way of doing counter-insurgency which is more ethically centred and more likely to be effective than the Americans have had before. The rest of the world, including Britain, has much to learn from it' (a second edition of the manual appeared in 2014, a 'more reflective than prescriptive' document, but the message remains broadly the same).

Once again, scarred by the experience of Vietnam, but this time in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States was not engaged in conventional warfare where 'you shot the tanks that didn't look like you'. The mission of Generals Petraeus and McChrystal and their teams, to overcome the American military's conservatism and 'doctrinal void' (basically 'no more Vietnams') is vividly told. Some useful material did exist, drawn from the experience of colonial conflicts—particularly Colonel Galula's reflections on France's counter-insurgency campaign in Algeria and British writings. But Iraq and Afghanistan were not colonies and there were gaps in military and legal doctrine. McLeod's narrative benefits from a mass of interviews with those responsible for *FM 3–24* and those having to apply it on the ground.

He was granted full access to the drafting history, the *travaux préparatoires*, and pages of draft text are reproduced with deletions and insertions. The voices come through. Petraeus: 'You know, we ought to write something', or emphasizing legitimacy when an operation goes tragically wrong: 'Don't put lipstick on pigs'. There was resistance and concern, at all levels: an ordinary soldier remarked that, when faced with a split-second decision whether to shoot, 'better to be judged by twelve than carried by six'. Senior ranks grumbled. There is an instructive account of the way criticism was invited and responded to in the drafting process (pp. 103–107).

But this narrative serves a more general purpose. McLeod's goal is to 'show empirically that in the law versus power debate questions of causality are complex but analysis remains possible'. In other words, is it possible to tell whether the law actually affects behaviour? He has brought this enquiry to bear on international law, understandably the subject of scepticism about its role in warfare, using three 'pathways' through his material (pp. 20–28). The first pathway tests the 'ideational' (the word does exist) pull of international law in the context of *FM 3–24*. It becomes apparent that the idea of international law was firmly in the minds of those constructing and applying the manual. The rule of law meant going back to the law of armed conflict (LOAC), itself derived from various sources in international law. Although the US has not always signed up to the relevant international instruments, customary international law and common sense fleshed out a workable legal doctrine. That, in turn, triggered the second pathway: 'legitimacy'. Again doctrine and practice could be shown to work together. Things could and did go wrong, sometimes badly, but there was to be no lipstick. The third pathway, international law's 'mandatory influence', is linked to the efficacy of domestic sanctions and remedies. It is especially relevant to the treatment of detainees, where the limits in practice of the influence of international law have become well known. Yet the US courts and *FM 3–24* still made a difference to the position as it might have been, had the politicians always been given a free hand (Chicago School theorists note). Doctrine, nevertheless, remains at the mercy of 'the variable the US cannot control—the host nation', i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan (p. 242).

McLeod should be congratulated for showing how questions in the philosophy of law can be illuminated by empirical studies. Scholars and practitioners of modern war should be familiar with his book. It is sometimes hard going, but the argument is firmly based on three simple questions. What does *FM 3–24* prescribe? How did that come about? Has the manual changed things?

*David Bentley*

**The politics of leverage in international relations: name, shame, and sanction. Edited by H. Richard Friman.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 240p. ISBN 978 1 13743 933 8. Available as e-book.

The last decade has seen an increasing interest in naming and shaming strategies among International Relations (IR) scholars. One of the main reasons for this is the general redirection from state-centric to more norm-centric approaches in the study of international politics. Yet the issue at hand has not been studied as a distinct phenomenon until very recently. Rather, it has been mentioned as one among a multitude of mechanisms of influence, without serious devotion to carefully defining and explaining it. This leads to several question: What is naming and shaming? How can we identify, conceptualize and understand naming and shaming practices in the context of international relations? Perhaps an even more pressing question is how effective naming and shaming is and under what

conditions, if any, it leads to compliance with international rules and norms. This book is the first of its kind that aims to address all these questions.

*The politics of leverage in international relations* is divided into two parts. Part one reflects the existing empirical literature on naming and shaming, which is profoundly focused on human rights and non-governmental organizations' shaming strategies, reflecting the reality that shaming as a strategy to influence state behaviour is most frequently used by human rights organizations. In the second part of the book, scholars contribute to the shaming literature beyond the human rights field, turning to economic issues and naming and shaming in corporate practice.

The book's introductory chapter, by H. Richard Friman, contains a much needed definition of the term naming and shaming and explores the different conceptualizations of it found in the literature; it links these to the main theoretical schools in IR. In chapter two, William F. Schulz emphasizes the power and usefulness of public exposure as a means to change the illegitimate behaviour of the target state. However, he also points out that it is insufficient for improving human rights in itself. While James C. Franklin goes on to explore and highlight the importance of the domestic shaming processes and their interplay with international shaming campaigns, Dongwook Kim, in chapter four, enriches our understanding of the effects of shaming by investigating different types of third-party actors, such as states and intergovernmental organizations, that may or may not have an interest in improving the conditions for human rights. The fifth chapter, by Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, explores the potential shaming effects of truth and vetting commissions in domestic as well as international settings, and discusses the ethical appropriateness of shaming acts.

One of the main contributions of this book is the finding that naming and shaming is a sequential process conditioned on different factors that play distinct roles in the different sequences. For those who believe in the psychological effects of shaming, such as feelings of shame and embarrassment, the findings of the book are sobering, or even disappointing, as the book is quite loyal to traditional IR theories. Although these effects are not rejected entirely, there are methodological difficulties associated with establishing them empirically. The book's conceptual distinction between public exposure (naming) and public condemnation (shaming) is an important contribution to the literature. Yet, for establishing the real-world relevance of this analytical distinction, more empirical research is needed. Readers are also left with questions about actors' strategies to avoid naming and shaming in order to prevent negative publicity. Regarding the role of material sanctions in the context of shaming strategies, the book reflects the varying conceptualizations of naming and shaming among contributors as well as among scholars in the discipline. Most importantly, the book demonstrates the difficulties in isolating the effect of the threat of economic sanctions as this might be determined by the actor's subjective perceptions and expectations.

The book is well written and remarkable in its conceptual and theoretical contribution, offering broader and more far-reaching perspectives on naming and shaming as a leverage strategy in international relations than previous literature on the topic.

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**Global gangs: street violence across the world. Edited by Jennifer Hazen and Dennis Rodgers.** Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2014. 300pp. Index. £61.50. ISBN 978 0 81669 147 0. Available as e-book.

Of course, global gangs themselves are not global. Despite some suggestion that at least the Central American *maras* are part of transnational networks, not least thanks to the

circular process of illegal migration into the United States and forced repatriation home, there seems little real evidence that even these are more than street gangs sharing common traditions, values and iconography. On the other hand, the street gang is found across the world—and for that matter across time, although this is an interesting perspective the book does not really address. It is not only a global phenomenon, it is one often shaped through globalization, from the adoption of foreign symbols and practices to the extent to which processes from migration to deindustrialization create congenial environments for the gang and help define its identity and opportunities.

There are impressive bodies of scholarship within US sociology and criminology, likewise within the UK and to an extent Europe. However, what has been lacking is a serious attempt to create a wider, global body of scholarship on street gangs, one which is interdisciplinary, international and inclusive. This collection, edited by Jennifer Hazen and Dennis Rodgers, makes an admirable bid to fill this gap, bringing together a round dozen studies of street gangs from Brazil to South Africa.

In common with most such collections, there is a danger of the whole being less than the sum of its parts. Beyond a—rightly—loose definition of a gang, as a group with a certain institutional continuity, which engages in illegal violent acts and is largely comprised of under-25s, there is no real attempt to follow a single model, approach or line of enquiry. What could have been a flaw means, instead, that we are treated to a number of fascinating case-studies, from which certain commonalities emerge. Most notably, as sociologist and gang studies pioneer Sudhir Venkatesh puts it in the epilogue, 'youth gangs must be considered very much at the centre of transformations taking place in society' (p. 283).

Thus, Lening Zhang's fascinating study of Chinese youth gangs places them within the context of the phenomenon of the 'little emperors', pampered offspring generated by the state's one-child policy. Conversely, the driver behind the child vigilante squads of India's slums studied by Atreyee Sen are the products of not just poverty but also sectarianism and the failure—sometimes wilful—of the state to provide law and order.

In other words, there is no single template for the street gang. Like so many other expressions of organized illegality, from the Mafia gang to the warlord, it fills, in however partial, predatory and primeval a way, a void in structures of governance and legitimacy. Many street gangs, after all, do not rely simply on macho violence and mercenary self-interest to bind their members together, but also on narratives of historical or cultural continuity. The Mungiki gang movement in Kenya, discussed by Jacob Rasmussen, for example, began as an expression of Kikuyu tribal identity and draws explicit connections with the Mau Mau of the anti-colonial era.

In most cases, though, street gangs reflect the travails of marginalized and often impoverished youth in countries or neighbourhoods with limited state penetration and economic, political and social opportunity. The impact of globalization—especially on such criminal economies as drug trafficking and dealing in counterfeit goods—has encouraged a closer blending of the traditional gang with its focus on local status and control of a 'turf', with a more businesslike organized crime model.

Either way, the proliferation and resilience of the gang represent not only a good indicator of weaknesses in practical governance but also a challenge to it and to efforts to uplift local economies and strengthen government structures. To that end, eclectic collections such as this fine book, especially when they draw on primary field research, ought to be welcomed and read widely. Of course, the impact of an edited volume of papers is often limited by its very nature: the variability in the quality of contributions (some are much more impressive than others) and the lack of a clear and compelling central argument

beyond the fact that gangs matter and need to be studied more broadly and internationally. In many ways, it sets the stage for what we need next: a serious and wide-ranging monograph on the street gang that explicitly looks at it in a global rather than local context.

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## Conflict, security and defence*

**Gender and private security in global politics. Edited by Maya Eichler**. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 304pp. £19.99. ISBN 978 0 19936 438 1.

*Gender and private security in global politics* explores the growing private security industry and its impact on gender and gender relations within the state. The title completely undersells this book, as Maya Eichler achieves the difficult task of bringing a new dimension to an area that is already rather saturated. This feminist approach to a male-dominated profession was missing from the literature on private military and security companies (PMSCs) and the present volume makes an important contribution to the field of security studies. Few private military and security companies presently hire women to conduct physical security in war zones. At the same time, the men who are in their employ are often driven by a hyper-masculine culture that can negatively impact their performance on the ground. There is an urgent need to break open the apparent taboos of the industry and examine the impact of this gendered environment on the security missions undertaken by PMSCs.

Of particular interest in the first part of this book is Bianca Baggiarini's chapter, which examines the effect of PMSCs on society's valuation of sacrifice. Baggiarini shows that the use of private contractors in conflict zones has depoliticized the notion of sacrifice, an act that was previously celebrated by the state. The reliance on private actors has estranged the state from its populace by breaking the social contract that was previously reliant on the security interdependence between the government and its citizens. The male-dominated private military industry also reaffirms a gendered narrative of sacrifice, seen as an act that must be carried out by the male population, thereby going against the recent acceptance of women in combat roles.

The second part of Eichler's edited volume includes chapters on the role of foreigners in PMSCs. Jutta Joachim and Andrea Schneiker demonstrate that the constructed hyper-masculine image of the western contractor contrasts with the recruitment of third-country nationals who are perceived by the former as an inferior type of combatant. PMSCs deliberately project an image that promotes the white, British or American ideal of a warrior, while hiding their increased dependence on foreign contractors. This perpetuates a culture of subordination within the companies that is reminiscent of the colonialist narrative of 'westerner' vs 'the other'. In addition, PMSCs tend to 'feminize' their non-western recruits by delegating non-combat roles to them such as cleaning and clerical duties.

Chris Hendershot's chapter on the hazing scandal of ArmorGroup in part three of the book continues the exploration of gender relations in PMSCs. Hendershot argues that the public in fact expects hetero-normal attitudes from private contractors and participates in perpetuating the gendered environment of the industry. This manifests via a virtually voyeuristic attitude towards the male body of the contractor, expressed through intense media scrutiny, for example in the coverage of scatological misbehaviour in the Kabul incident.

Finally, part four outlines the legal framework that holds, or in this case fails to hold, private contractors accountable for their actions. Both peacekeepers and private contractors

* See also Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, *The red web*, pp. 1185–7.

have been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in postwar environments. In the majority of these cases, women have been the primary victims of sex trafficking and survival sex, crimes perpetrated by the soldiers and contractors meant to protect them. Instead of holding these actors accountable, PMSC DynCorp fired the whistleblowers who reported abuses to their manager and was subsequently awarded further contracts in Iraq. The law, Ana Vrdoljak shows, has yet to catch up to the practice of outsourcing security to a male-dominated private industry, despite existing legislation on their public counterparts: soldiers.

In *Gender and private security in global politics*, Eichler seeks to draw attention to the complex dynamics of the relatively unaccountable gendered industry of PMSCs. The impact of hyper-masculinized contractors on the societal perceptions of gender, both in battle and in peace, has been neglected by scholars until this publication. This book goes beyond the traditional debate on gender issues. It also includes a relevant and interesting analysis on the relations between 'western' contractors and foreign nationals and on the complicity of the public in both tolerating and perpetuating hetero-normal hyper-masculine expectations from the men to whom they are delegating the security of the nation. Perhaps it is time for the industry to employ more women in security positions?

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**The modern mercenary: private armies and what they mean for world order. By Sean McFate.** New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. 248pp. Index. £18.00. ISBN 978 0 19936 010 9. Available as e-book.

Sean McFate's new book is a highly provocative and enriching addition to the literature on the private military industry and stands apart from much contemporary scholarship on the subject in a number of interesting ways. As a former private security contractor turned academic—no doubt a rarity among Oxford University Press authors—McFate speaks credibly of having an insider's perspective on this industry, and he effectively leverages his experience training the Liberian military with the firm DynCorp into one of the book's two chapter-length case-studies (the latter looking at the market for force in current-day Somalia). As a former US paratrooper and assistant professor at National Defence University, McFate is also decidedly a student of war. Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that he positions his study of the private military industry in the context of 'private military organizations—from ancient mercenaries to modern private military companies (PMCs) such as Blackwater USA' (p. 1), rather than viewing PMCs as the sharp end of the globalized *private security* industry. This decision to interpret PMCs through the lens of mercenaries, private armies and privatized warfighting rather than through the more common (if anodyne) lens of commodified security services performed by private military/security companies (PMSCs)—a term he rejects as too broad to be analytically meaningful (p. 11)—has serious and stimulating taxonomical, empirical, historical and theoretical ramifications for the study writ large.

Taxonomically, McFate makes two important moves that let his work stand out from the crowd. First, PMCs—the focus of his book—are seen as analogous to the US Army's combat arms, both of which are essentially (and literally) defined by the function of using lethal force or training others to do so (p. 13). As a result, the type of lethal force most commonly used by PMCs (i.e. shootings performed during static armed guarding or mobile security details) is not analytically differentiated in quantitative or qualitative terms from the type of force deployed by a state's armed forces. Second, McFate jettisons the common

definitional variable of *legality* in his list of five key characteristics distinguishing PMCs from other armed non-state actors (p. 13). These are interesting and provocative decisions, and they reintroduce some theoretical ambiguity and conceptual overlap between state armies, warlords, private armies and the commercial private military industry, that remain unresolved in the text.

Yet this blurring is not an oversight; it is instead precisely part of McFate's larger argument about the changing character of warfare—itself a centuries-long evolutionary process—that winds itself like a red thread through the book. He constructs his argument creatively, using evidence to demonstrate empirically how academic dividing lines between PMCs, warlords and even state armies can become unclear in real life. Examples of PMCs that have engaged in active combat operations in the 1990s, of Afghan warlords who market and sell their private armies as PMCs to the US government, and PMCs operating in the regulation-free environment of Somalia are lined up to make his case. Yet there are deeper theoretical reasons why McFate is keen to dismantle these conceptual boundaries and reintroduce terms like 'private armies' and 'mercenary' (which he uses not only in his title but as a PMC subtype) into an analysis of the modern private military industry.

Specifically, he takes aim at the modern Westphalian state system, and argues that the return of the modern mercenary is a sign of the fact that we are on the cusp of a broader, wholesale replacement of our state-centric world order by a poly-centric international system best characterized by the English School scholar Hedley Bull's notion of neo-medievalism. PMCs—for good or ill depending on the circumstances—are both a cause and an effect of a new de facto division of legitimacy, power and authority between non-state and state actors. In many neo-medieval places and contexts around the globe, such as in failed states like Somalia, trying to draw distinctions between PMCs and warlords in this 'free market for force' can become a quixotic exercise due to the lack of an effective government capable of drawing and enforcing any difference in the first place. This problem is not going away soon, and tomorrow wealthy private actors may hire private armies to wage war on their own behalf as they once did in the past. This, in a nutshell, provides a snapshot of where we are today and a glimpse of our future—one characterized by a return to 'contract warfare' and a market for force that will be either 'mediated' (e.g. controlled by public authorities) or truly 'free' and thus open to all the vicissitudes therein. For McFate, 'the implications of this are enormous, since it suggests that international relations in the twenty-first century will have more in common with the twelfth century than the twentieth' (p. 168). For these kinds of creative and thought-provoking challenges alone, this book is well worth the read for scholars and laypersons alike. Overall, McFate does a good job interweaving a rich and easy-to-read historical analysis with his overall thesis, drawing fascinating parallels between our medieval past—complete with mercenaries, military entrepreneurs and privatized warfare—and their post-modern contemporaries in an emerging neo-medieval present.

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**National intelligence and science: beyond the great divide in analysis and policy. By Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory F. Treverton.** New York: Oxford University Press. 2015. 240pp. £21.00. ISBN 978 0 19936 086 4. Available as e-book.

It is a truism of the contemporary era (and indeed probably all eras) that the world is an increasingly dangerous and complicated place. The role of intelligence within that complex and dangerous arena has hitherto mostly centred on the collection, analysis and dissemination of secret information to assist in the mitigation of threats. This book rightly

acknowledges that there is a chasm between the reality and what western publics expect of intelligence forecasting and threat mitigation: the gap exists and so successful attacks degrade public confidence and create political pressure. Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton seek to break ground within intelligence studies in asserting that the more productive aim of intelligence practitioners and the governments they serve should be the management of risk and uncertainty in areas that are critical for national and international security. They convincingly argue that the established practices of intelligence are inadequate for dealing with the sorts of rapidly transforming threats that we now see. Furthermore, they argue that intelligence practice is trapped between the unpredictability of the emergent threats (cyber, hybrid and asymmetric threats) and the need for accurate assessments, delivered to compressed timelines, about imminent dangers or those appearing on the horizon. The essence of intelligence, which is to blend incomplete information into an accurate account of the unknown is similar to areas of contested natural and physical science.

The core premise of the book is that there has been strong resistance to thinking about intelligence challenges from scientific perspectives for mostly political and cultural reasons. Agrell and Treverton include a sustained commentary around the (artificial) epistemological barriers that exist between these supposedly divergent disciplines. They also argue that the existing approaches in both intelligence and science are stretched by their contemporary challenges and consequently they will need to reform to remain relevant and effective. They further argue that the concept of risk society is helping to bring science and intelligence more closely together, and the most prominent contemporary example we have is the use of data analytics in intelligence to provide increasingly accurate risk assessments and to help begin to guide risk mitigation.

*National intelligence and science* extensively explores the fragmented intelligence picture that sits behind any assessment. The authors are particularly persuasive with their case-studies of the 2011 attack by Anders Breivik and the 9/11 atrocities. These examples show that modern intelligence is not so much the search for a smoking gun, more the search for the individual nuts and bolts of a gun dispersed through a city of haystacks. At their core, Agrell and Treverton convincingly suggest that if the political and cultural barriers between disciplines can be overcome (and it seems likely that this will be substantially easier in practitioner than in academic communities) then there are improvements that can be made to modelling to provide more accurate assessments. For example, 'activity-based' intelligence is highlighted in the book as an area that—and cue references to the totemic film *Minority report*—is capable of 'locating unknown unknowns', that is to find answers to questions that have yet to be posed—finding a gun in the city of haystacks without knowing that one is searching for a gun. Such mining of communications, finance and geolocation data has been highlighted by the fallout from the Snowden affair, but not discussed in as sober terms as Agrell and Treverton achieve. For students and scholars of intelligence, this should be of considerable interest, as it represents a future focus for intelligence activity and is a scientifically driven response to the sorts of data gaps that are created in complex and contested battlespaces (such as those present currently in the Middle East), where human intelligence is exceptionally difficult and adversaries understand communications technologies.

Agrell and Treverton spread their focus from social media and big data as a means by which to understand threats, to how the most modern forms of communication are being used to improve business practice within agencies. The use of internal wikis and delivery modes akin to Amazon's whispernet, where documents just appear on a decision-maker's computer or tablet, has the capacity to break down the classical intelligence assessment that

would appear in hard copy in a registry to something more fluid and usable. The breaking down of institutional silos was a big issue in the fallout from 9/11, and has been subject to challenge again in light of the Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden leaks.

*National security and science* is an essential read for all those who study or are interested in intelligence practice or the intellectual underpinnings of intelligence for two key reasons: first, the discussion about the bunkered disciplines of broadly science-science and broadly natural and physical science is worthy of being read by all those engaged in political science and International Relations; this element requires a much broader audience. Second, Agrell and Treverton understand very well the direction of travel that intelligence practice is taking, and articulate it well: Treverton's positioning in the US intelligence community makes it particularly compelling.

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## Political economy, economics and development*

**Political order and inequality: their foundations and their consequences for human welfare. By Carles Boix.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 334pp. £50.00. ISBN 978 1 10708 943 3. Available as e-book.

This is one of those rare books which elicit a 'Wow!' at the sight of the table of contents, a 'Wow!' when one reaches the end several days later, and many more in between. I imagine that Adam Smith's *Wealth of nations* provoked a similar response from its early readers, if in different language.

Boix presents nothing less than a theory explaining why we humans have constructed the state (an organization with the capacity and incentives to monopolize violence and enforce order); why virtually no one in human history experienced economic growth and sustained welfare improvements until two centuries ago; and why the 'modern breakthrough' occurred as the small fraction of the world's population first in north-west Europe and extending to the zone we call the West experienced economic growth and (for the most part) welfare improvements over the past one to two centuries.

The time scale is the very *longue durée*. It starts with 'forager' or hunter-gather societies before the dissemination of intensive agriculture around 4000 BC (and still today on the capitalist fringes). The initiating questions are: what explains the emergence of spontaneous (non-institutionalized) cooperation among forager societies and what explains the lack of economic growth? The time scale ends with the emergence of western capitalism and liberal democracy after the Industrial Revolution and their spread in mutating forms around much of the world by the late twentieth century.

The overarching theory includes explanations for: (1) the emergence of differential technological change between human societies, and hence differences in agricultural productivity, population growth, urbanization and warfare capability (horizontal inequality), (2) the emergence of wealth and income inequality within human societies (vertical inequality), and (3) the emergence of the state (institutionalized political authority) in two main forms, monarchies/dictatorships and republics.

Out of this combination comes a theory of millennia-long economic stagnation, and a linked theory of what caused the emergence of built-in ('endogenous') economic growth in most of the West. The explanation of stagnation gives central causal place to specific political institutions which, coming out of the agricultural revolution (together with successively

* See also Rose J. Spalding, *Contesting trade in Central America*, pp. 1214–15.



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stronger metals and fortifications), froze the distribution of political power between two strata (see below) and froze wider economic development.

The main narrative runs as follows. Forager or simple agricultural societies experienced differential technological change (e.g. irrigation, improved fish traps in riverine environments). At this point, two basically different strategies emerged. Those who benefited from the new technologies and became more productive (achieved a comparative advantage in production) preferred to continue with the existing cooperative equilibrium ('the producers'). Those who saw themselves disadvantaged had an incentive to loot or plunder the output of the more productive individuals or societies ('the looters'). The result could be a Hobbesian world of systematic conflict.

At some times and places a state emerged which restored peace. Boix distinguishes two basic types of states. The more common was created by the looters (also known in the literature as 'roving bandits') when they restrained themselves from plunder and invested in providing permanent protection to producers, in return for some continuous flow of resources (food, labour, money) from the latter; they became 'stationary bandits'. They tended to create states of monarchical or dictatorial type. Less commonly, the producers succeeded in creating a state and kept control of the levers of power, setting up defensive structures to deter potential looters. The resulting political order took a 'republican' form, with an elected leader, a governing committee, an oligarchy of traders, a general assembly, in varying combinations (as in some classical Greek polis and medieval and modern European city-states).

The monarchical/dictatorial states kept order through a system of privileges, favours and side payments which distorted competition and inhibited innovation. The advantaged governing classes opposed technological changes they could not control, which might strengthen the power of challenger social groups. This is the basic theory of economic stagnation.

The 'modern breakthrough' rested on ecological and political conditions. The necessary (but not sufficient) ecological condition was the combination of rich soils and salubrious climate for crops and livestock, able to allow for a growing non-agricultural population. By 1800, western Europe (not including Mediterranean Europe) had a substantially higher share of total population living in urban centres than any other region, including east China and Korea. Economies of agglomeration and scale in urban concentrations fostered faster technological change and the creation of skilled artisans in the two main industrial activities, textiles and metals, able later to take the scientific breakthroughs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and run with them.

The necessary ecological condition in western Europe combined with three broadly political sufficient (but not necessary) conditions. One was the initial political fragmentation of the continent, which allowed for more producer-governed towns with more autonomy from land-based state power than in the European Mediterranean or Asia. A second was the arrival of a more effective and more capital-intensive means of violence than the horse and the pike: guns. Commercial towns could raise the large-scale resources needed to buy and deploy guns on a 'level playing field' with oppositional, landed groups. The growth of commercial and urban strata then accelerated learning-by-doing (endogenous technological innovation), which matured into the Industrial Revolution. After that came the third political condition: the 'embourgeoisement' of old landed elites. The landed classes, instead of protecting the growth-inhibiting institutions which underpinned their earlier rule, invested in the emerging industrial sectors, sharing in the gains and acquiring a vested interest in the political and legal consolidation of the new order—of a relatively liberal, market-friendly kind compared with what went before.

This bare-bones account has about as much connection to Boix's discussion as a cemetery has to the living society above. As it proceeds, the book lays out, with crystal clarity, similarities and differences between its arguments and those of prominent approaches to similar questions, including functionalism, Marxism and especially differences from the popular neo-institutionalism represented by Douglass North, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson (see, for example, *Why nations fail*, Profile Books, 2012) and many others. It also provides abundant empirical evidence relevant to its core arguments. That is why the 'wows' come all the way through, not just at beginning and end.

At the same time, we can note that the grand scope of the argument leads to analytical categories—notably, producers and looters, and monarchies/dictatorships and republics—which are inadequate for closer-in examination of western capitalism over the past several decades. It might, however, give a startling insight into dominant tendencies: namely, that latter-day looters—owners and managers of finance—have achieved dominance over producers (we call this 'financialization of the economy'), yielding not a monarchy or dictatorship but a looters' republic, in the form of Wall Street capture of the legislative and executive commanding heights of the state in the United States, for one. To elaborate the insight one needs to draw on, for example, Michael Moore's film *Capitalism: a love story* (Paramount, 2010), Robert Kenner's film *Merchants of doubt* (Sony, 2014) and the book of the same name by Noami Oreskes and Erik Conway (Bloomsbury Press, 2010), Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the twenty first century* (Harvard University Press, 2014, reviewed in *International Affairs* 90: 5), Timothy Besley and Thorsten Persson's *Pillars of prosperity* (Princeton University Press, 2011), George DeMartino's edited *Oxford handbook of professional economic ethics* (OUP, forthcoming) and George Akerlof and Robert Shiller's *Phishing for phools* (Princeton University Press, 2015).

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**Currency politics: the political economy of exchange rate policy. By Jeffry A. Frieden.** Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2015. 320pp. £22.00. ISBN 978 0 69116 415 1. Available as e-book.

In *Currency politics*, Jeffry Frieden makes the critical and yet often overlooked point that economic policies reflect the preferences of different groups in society and so the right choice—providing that the available sets of policies are sound—depends on whose preferences prevail. Within the theoretical framework that opens the book and supports the subsequent discussion, Frieden explores the relationship between currency policy and the distributional features—rather than the political-institutional ones—of national political economy. He sets currencies and exchange rates within the context of government policies and explores how exchange rates affect economic agents and how economic agents' preferences affect a country's exchange-rate policies. In other words, a government's exchange-rate policy 'both reflects and is determined by the country's social as well as political structures and relations' (p. 263). The author's main claim is that economic actors that are more exposed to currency volatility tend to prefer stable and predictable exchange rates; exporters, *ceteris paribus*, tend to prefer a depreciated real exchange rate.

The book highlights two sets of policy dilemmas that policy-makers in financially open economies typically face when they choose whether to embrace a fixed exchange rate or a flexible one. These dilemmas are described in the book as stability vs flexibility (first set) and purchasing power vs competitiveness (second set). Frieden maintains that there is 'no obvious "right" decision for both sets of choices' (p. 9) and ultimately the decision reflects,

and is informed by, the preferences that prevail within a society—or the preferences of the prevailing group. These preferences, in turn, reflect the interests of various economic agents. In the introductory chapter, Frieden anticipates that 'monetary politics in an open economy will more closely resemble interest group politics than in a closed economy' (p. 15).

The book is organized around a theoretical framework and some historical case-studies. The choices here are interesting albeit somewhat limited: the United States from 1862 to 1896, Europe in the years that led to the establishment of the monetary union, and Latin America with its monetary policy experimentation between 1970 and 2010. These cases make interesting reading, but they are hardly new. To be fair, Frieden does not deliver more than what he promises in the introductory chapter: this is not a book that aims to present new cases or new evidence, but to use the existing evidence to address the author's research question. Nonetheless, to some extent it is a disappointing book, and this is because it reads too much like an academic paper and does not seem to be in tune with the current policy debate. For example, the dilemma between stability and economic growth is central to the debate on macroeconomic policy coordination, but the trade-off between domestic policy objectives and the impact of these policies on other countries is mentioned in passing and not sufficiently explored. Frieden notes that 'macro is the new trade' without, however, discussing the implications of this observation. And what about China? It is quite remarkable that a book on currency politics does not include a case-study on China's exchange-rate policy which is one of the pillars of the country's recent economic transformation, and a lightning rod around which many interest groups tend to converge—or diverge. The book's last chapter describes some issues—from the relationship between trade and the exchange rate to China's exchange-rate policy—that are central to the current policy debate. Perhaps they will be discussed in Frieden's next work, but their superficial treatment in *Currency politics* leaves the reader with the sense that the book does not quite address questions that are very relevant to today's world.

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## Energy, environment and global health

**Disease diplomacy: international norms and global health security. By Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton.** Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2015. 192pp. Pb.: £23.00. ISBN 978 1 42141 648 9. Available as e-book.

**The rise of global health: the evolution of effective collective action. By Joshua K. Leon.** Albany: State University of New York Press. 2015. 240pp. £26.00. ISBN 978 1 43845 517 4. Available as e-book.

Two recent publications—*Disease diplomacy* and *The rise of global health*—both illustrate the increasingly inexorable advance of global health onto the 'high politics' of the world stage in the twenty-first century. Rather than, as in the past, viewing global health as a backdrop or counterpoint to the pressing political, social and economic issues of the day, these books remind us that health, environmentalism, infectious disease and global inequality stand to become the fundamental human, political, diplomatic and economic challenges and conflicts that the world will face in the future.

Global health concerns do not, of course, necessarily trump considerations of security, defence, diplomacy and economic growth which dominate current political and foreign

policy agendas. Rather, as both of these publications remind us, such considerations are increasingly entangled—what Douglas Adams called 'the fundamental interconnectedness of all things'. The causes of global problems such as terrorism, for example, often lie in ill health and disease, and the world's trouble spots are also, increasingly, those areas most affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other international health concerns. Health security considerations, of particular importance in the wake of the Ebola outbreak, illustrate related overlaps between foreign policy, global health and foreign policy concepts such as 'enlightened self-interest' (Jordan Kassalow, *Why health is important to U.S. foreign policy*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).

Enter the 'disease diplomacy' paradigm. Framed through a discussion of the International Health Regulations and the World Health Organization, the book reminds readers throughout that political will, essential to both the funding and implementation of global health programmes, is lacking among both donors and recipient countries. This lack is the greatest challenge to world health. In turn, this political will can only be engendered by embedding, deep in global health negotiations, considerations of trade, security, citizenship and national (as well as health) security.

Related considerations of global health governance remind us that the increased importance of global health has led to a rise in power and support for its governing bodies on the world stage, with organizations such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria consciously or inadvertently influencing critical political decisions in donor and recipient countries that extend far beyond health. This untrammelled rise, free of the principles that govern national governments and supranational bodies such as the United Nations, is, perhaps, an echo of the problems currently besetting the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)—an organization whose unofficial remit far exceeds its original scope, riding on the back of football's rapid ascendancy on the world stage.

In *The rise of global health,* Joshua Leon refers, presciently, to the enduring importance of soft power and interests under the aegis of the 'foreign policy model' among global health actors. From Sweden to Japan, Canada and the United States, a series of key associations between altruism, security, humanitarianism and coarse commercial interests are described. Although such considerations appear to strike at the integrity and objectivity of targeted disease control programmes, it is important to bear in mind that, without such enlightened self-interest, most forms of development aid would be difficult to justify to citizens and taxpayers—particularly in times of economic austerity and contraction.

Similarly, global health is now increasingly conscious of the importance of diplomatic programme delivery and design, at both the governance and programmatic levels. Unless global health negotiations and the interventions themselves are conducted in a 'smart' fashion, there lies the risk that diplomatic obstacles, challenges and even threats will outweigh health benefits, creating 'tense and confusing dualities' (*Final report of the CSIS Commission on smart global health policy*, CSIS, 2010) between diplomatic and humanitarian ideals. Conversely, governance negotiations that are sensitive to their significant diplomatic impact, and which involve all elements of the political spectrum, will be more likely to meet with success on both the medical and political levels.

If these books contain a flaw, it is the limited attention the authors give to this diplomatic impact, both positive and negative, of different global health interventions and approaches across populations, regions and diseases. Making a stronger argument that global health programmes can successfully achieve objectives related to foreign policy or national security, for example, builds a compelling case for a transfer of funding and responsibilities

away from the military industrial complex towards development—surely a welcome change, after the devastating conflicts of the twentieth century.

Nonetheless, both books make important advances towards the promulgation of a 'smart global health' paradigm, under which policy-makers, programme managers and field staff become increasingly conscious of, and responsible for, a far wider range of health and non-health roles than has been the case to date. The associated decline of rigid departmental or academic specializations, 'siloing' or 'stovepiping', will help to ensure that diplomatic, foreign policy and humanitarian considerations are consistently aligned and integrated rather than operating in isolation of each other.

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**The price of thirst: water inequality and the coming chaos. By Karen Piper.** Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2014. 299pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 0 81669 542 3. Available as e-book.

Karen Piper takes readers on a *tour de force* of the failed piped dreams of the world. In vivid detail, she describes the plight of people for whom clean water is out of reach. The main thrust of her argument is on the privatization of water services, in particular the expansion of big multinational corporations, tracing the machinations and power struggles of corporate interests in water supply services in a variety of settings around the globe.

The book has three main sections, one dealing with water privatization in the Americas, one with post-colonial privatization and one with water wars in the Middle East. Piper covers the experiences of water privatization in drought-prone California and Chile, relating how the latter became the first country in the world to fully privatize its water resources during Pinochet's dictatorship, which in turn led to speculation, hoarding and soaring inequalities in water access. She goes on to make an explicit connection between the legacy of colonialism and patterns of water service infrastructure today, drawing on the experiences of South Africa and India to illustrate how the past still colours the present in struggles over water. She describes the optimism of the South African post-apartheid years that over time turned to disillusionment and anger over poor basic service delivery, particularly water. In her chapter on India, Piper further elaborates on the theme of colonial legacies, describing the continuing campaigns of an old couple, Sunderlal and Vimla Bahuguna, against dam building and ends with a note on the hubris of the Indian River Interlinking project, one of the greatest inter-basin transfer projects in the world.

The author's forte is her ability to bring to life the people she encounters, such as the Bahugunas, but the book could have benefited from more analytical rigour. In the section on the Middle East, Egypt and Iraq, Piper claims that the Egyptian revolution was as much about water and the failure of basic service delivery as it was about increasing disillusionment with the political regime. She describes well how burgeoning luxury gated communities and private cities with velvety lawns and golf courses stand in stark contrast to the living conditions of poor people in Cairo's sprawling informal settlements. The chapter on Iraq provides a harrowing account of the sufferings of a war-torn country and of the grisly consequences of the sarin gas attack that contaminated the city of Halabja's drinking water supply, the effects of which are still being felt by the local population today. She hints at the intricate webs of corporate interests in war zones, and how American firms stood to gain from the occupation—and how they have left behind broken promises of clean water.

The book reads like the well-researched travelogue of a compassionate explorer. While most chapters come alive with the voices of real people, some, while informative, are a

bit long-winded and convoluted at times—such as the first chapter on the intricacies of corporate water hoarding in California. As the book flags a number of very important issues concerning water services provision in an era of increased urban migration and insecurity, the concluding chapter is a somewhat disappointing read, as it only includes a 'wish list' of general points one should pay greater attention to. This reviewer would have hoped for a conclusion that got to grips with the intricacies of corporate practices and its implications for water security in societies around the world. The chapter doesn't really attempt to delve into detail about the issues raised throughout the book, but confines itself to making general recommendations on the necessity of combating climate change, preserving land rights, recognizing indigenous knowledge, regulating virtual water trade, etc. Overall, the book is very readable and packed with deeply moving stories. Piper deftly provides us with the details of corporate wheeling and dealing, while telling the tales of real people confronting real problems along the way. *The price of thirst* should be recommended reading for anyone with an interest in global inequalities in water access and the shift of control over our most basic resource—from being a public-sector responsibility to becoming increasingly dominated by corporate interests with the often dire consequences which follow.

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## Europe*

**Aparaty centralne służb wywiadu cywilnego Układu Warszawskiego jako wyspecjalizowane struktury państwa 1944–1991** [The central organs of the Warsaw Pact civilian intelligence services as specialized state structures 1944–1991]. **By Jan Larecki, Leszek Pawlikowicz and Paweł Piotrowski.** Rzeszow: KORAW. 2015. 165pp. £11.00. ISBN 978 8 39383 808 0.

In the early 1990s, two of the most embarrassing questions facing democratically elected politicians responsible for national security in the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) member states—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania and to some degree the ex-GDR—were 'how closely did their civilian intelligence services cooperate with the Soviet KGB?' and 'what were their activities around the world?'

The Warsaw Pact was a military organization and, at the beginning of its existence, Moscow's agenda was the only one the other members and their intelligence services were allowed to have. This began to change in the 1960s, when Albania became China's outpost in Europe, and Romania gradually adopted the status of a reluctant observer in the organization. In post-communist Europe, only the GDR ceased to exist as a state, and it was in the united Germany that the first informative publications about the intelligence efforts of the NSWP regimes began to appear. Gradually, scholars, critics and former intelligence practitioners began to publish their works in other former Warsaw Pact member states.

This new Polish book about NSWP civilian intelligence organs is the first attempt in any language to describe, in one volume, all of them, including a short chapter on Albania, which left the organization officially in 1968 after several years of disagreements with Moscow. Written by two experienced scholars (Pawlikowicz and Piotrowski) and a former intelligence officer (Col. [Rt.] Larecki), the book includes short but good descriptions of structural changes of each intelligence service, from their inception to their demise, and

* See also Anders Persson, *The EU and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 1971–2013*, pp. 1193–5.

the structures of their central organs, as well as their operational priorities and geographical target areas. Each chapter includes a brief description of the relationship the individual intelligence organ had with the KGB or its predecessors. The authors were able to collect some interesting statistics from each country. The tables in every chapter covering individual countries are informative, including the final summary which compares all of the covered organizations. The descriptions of organizational structures and their reforms are frequently supplemented by terminology in original languages. The book provides statistical information about the numerical strength of some of the described organizations, the names of all the heads of the intelligence organizations, their biographies (except Albania) and the specific periods when they were in charge.

The geographical target area for each of the intelligence services described by the authors is on the whole not surprising. With Bucharest and Tirana following their own agenda, the rest of the Warsaw Pact was clearly subcontracting for Moscow almost to the very end of communism. Some of the intelligence services spent considerable sums and wasted manpower on spying on and neutralizing—sometimes even eliminating physically—members of their own ethnic communities abroad. But their primary targets were always the United States and other NATO countries. For most countries, the Federal Republic of Germany was also the main enemy. The exception was Bulgaria which focused its intelligence operations on Turkey, Greece and Italy. Italy (including the Vatican) was also high on the list of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. All civilian intelligence services were very active in London and Paris, with Romania treating France as one of its priority targets. Romania became a focus of attention of the Bulgarian Committee of State Security and in the late 1980s of Hungary. The USSR monitored, as much as it was possible, all its Warsaw Pact allies, sometimes with the assistance of other member states when the pact began to crack.

The author's comparison of the staffing levels of various NSWP intelligence services is also revealing. With 4,778 employees of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HVA), the GDR had by far the largest spy community among Moscow's reluctant allies. It was 75 per cent bigger than the second largest service, that of Romania; the latter employed almost twice as many people as its Czechoslovak counterpart and three times as many as Poland. The chapter on the East German HVA includes two tables showing the information received—measured probably in files—from its communist partners from 1969 to 1989 and the information sent to its partners from 1980/81 to 1989. The most rigid of the Warsaw Pact countries, the East German system produced the most stable intelligence organ. From the early 1950s to the end of 1989, it had only two heads. The least stable of Moscow allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively had eleven and twelve heads of their civilian spying organizations. The book includes a multilingual list of acronyms, a fragmented but easily readable bibliography and a personal index.

'The central organs of the Warsaw Pact civilian intelligence services' is a unique book which would be very popular with scholars and students of the Cold War and intelligence services around the world … if only it were in English.

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**Zones of rebellion: Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish state. By Aysegul Aydin and Cem Emrence**. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2015. 192pp. Index. £25.60. ISBN 978 0 80145 354 0. Available as e-book.

As the 30-year-long conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) reaches a new peak, *Zones of rebellion* offers an ideal read for those wanting to under-

stand the origins, escalation and transformation of the conflict. What makes this book distinct among studies of the Kurdish question is its focus on the process of the conflict and the effective role of violence, instead of pre-conflict explanations of the issue. The strength of the work lies both in its innovative theoretical framework and in the extensive data it presents as a result of years of research. The authors carefully map the insurgent and counter-insurgent attacks, as well as the incidents of civilian unrest over a 24-year-long period (1984–2008) and build on a novel analytical framework that bridges ecology-based theories and historical institutionalism. The book has a twofold argument: first, the combatants' violent and non-violent tactics vary across time and space, which reveal their ties with territory and community. Second, the combatants' early political choices shape these tactics and, ultimately, the consequences of the civil war.

In the first part of their work, the authors examine the transformation of the PKK in terms of its organization, ideology and strategy. One of their key arguments is that the recruitment of too many members and the leadership cult around Abdullah Öcalan enabled the PKK's early military accomplishments yet prevented the establishment of an efficient bureaucracy later. The PKK thus remained a guerrilla organization despite the transformation in its ideology, which turned towards demands for democratic decentralization and promotion of constitutional rights within Turkey, when it initially desired the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The authors, indeed, show how this ideological transformation followed the PKK's military record, shaped by its interaction with territory and community.

The second part of the book investigates the organizational and ideological response of the Turkish state to the PKK insurgency and sheds light on its counter-insurgency strategy. It argues that the tactics to reorganize the territory and quarantine the threat (both of which were the legacy of Ottoman policies) produced mixed consequences: while they kept most of the Kurds away from PKK influence, they also reinforced the antagonistic atmosphere in the region and divided the Kurds. Besides, the fluctuation of state ideology was evident over time; it adopted a developmentalist agenda in peaceful times and focused on co-opting local elites in the region during phases of insecurity.

Although the authors' theoretical arguments find strong empirical support in the book, the link between theory and empirical data gets lost from time to time for readers. One possible improvement would have been to divide the book according to the theories of historical institutionalism and zone-making and build the analysis under these two theoretical labels. Indeed, the sections on organization and ideology reflect more the path-dependency arguments of the authors, whereas the sections that explore the strategies of the combatants show the significance of zones in reflecting the strength of ties between the resources and combatants. For example, the authors argue that in order to mobilize civilian support, both the PKK and the Turkish state are ready to diversify their approach to contested zones, whereas in areas under their control they tend to be consistent in their choice of tactics and targets.

In their conclusion, the authors provide a concise evaluation of this long-lasting battle between the two sides: even though the Turkish state won the military struggle and the PKK failed to expand its resources in the long term, the path-dependent choices of both sides divided the Kurdish community to such an extent that it has become difficult to solve the political question today. Aydin and Emrence convincingly argue that neither side, at the peak of its military success, used the opportunity to transform its armed gains into an inclusive political agenda. However, some readers may be left with questions as to the authors' approach towards the Kurdish nationalist parties that took up the political

challenge of establishing a negotiation process between the two sides. Nonetheless, this well-explored case-study will be of great interest to scholars of conflict studies in general.

*Pelin Ayan Musil, Anglo-American University and Jan Evangelista Purkyne University, Czech Republic*

**State-building in Kosovo: democracy, corruption and the EU in the Balkans. By Andrea Lorenzo Capussela.** I. B. Tauris. 2015. 320pp. £26.90. ISBN: 978 1 78076 915 8. Available as e-book.

This book provides a very timely message for western, especially European, policy-makers, facing the prospect of involvement in supporting state rebuilding in countries such as Libya and Syria, and above all in Ukraine, where the similarities with the challenges the United Nations and the European Union faced in Kosovo after 1999 and that state's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 are considerable.

The author was, until 2010, head of the economics unit of the International Civilian Office in Kosovo, the ICO head doubling as the EU's Special Representative. He admits he was fired just several hours before the expiry of his contract and has since then been openly critical of the ICO and the parallel EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) established in 2008. These events clearly influence his writing, as the book's critics, within and outside EULEX, have pointed out. Some of these counter criticisms are valid, especially the views of US judge James Hargreaves, formerly of EULEX, and UK academic commentators, to the effect that the author is setting mission success criteria too high. However, subsequent events such as the widespread EULEX management and mandate changes in 2013 and 2014, and particularly the allegations of bribery of EULEX prosecutors made by the British lawyer Maria Bamieh and reported in the *Guardian* in November 2014, do suggest that Capussela raises legitimate questions of integrity and project management effectiveness which have major implications for future international community intervention in fragile states.

The author, first, describes Kosovo's role within the Yugoslav Federation, the circumstances of the 1999 conflict, the establishment of the UN Mission in Kosovo and its military arm Kosovo Force (KFOR). Capussela takes a legalistic view of the sanctity of state sovereignty, and shows some sympathy for the Serbs. He then provides a Weberian analysis of Kosovo's circumstances as a limited access social order state, where the elite was reinforced by largely undismantled successors of the Kosovo Liberation Army. A narrative of the implementation of international and EU governance structures follows: this, crucially, involved the creation of extensive executive powers, including in the judiciary. The author also highlights the sheer size of the EULEX operation, in contrast to the much smaller deployment in Bosnia at the time, and analyses manpower allocations, suggesting that excessive resources were given to routine police and public order operations at the expense of supporting judicial investigations and anti-corruption and organized crime efforts. Short-term technical assistance programmes were insufficiently integrated into long-term capacity building efforts. Accordingly, too few criminal cases were initiated against high-level and politically connected suspects, with a low success rate. Detailed statistics support Capussela's case. His conclusion is that organized crime remained essentially untouched; critics would argue that this takes decades.

The final section provides a similar analysis of the economic and governance role of the ICO, namely that the maintenance of public order (with memories of the 2004 riots) took priority over fair elections and the passage and enforcement of laws which would curb the elite's controls of the economy and parliament and thereby reduce corruption and energize

the economy. Differences between the EU and the US are cited as reasons for the limited progress made, even though the fundamental conceptions of both were similar.

In a stimulating conclusion, Capussela argues that the original aims of statebuilding were soundly based but quite quickly failed in execution. He finishes on a timely and sober note by stressing the lessons for states such as Ukraine, 'whose political and strategic importance is now far greater than Kosovo's'.

Therein lies the rub, and it is for that reasons that Capussela's critiques require careful consideration, whether rebutted or not. The alleged lack of cooperation between the EU and the US needs to be evaluated, as does the feasibility of objectives—especially on corruption and public finances—where executive powers are not held internationally. Fewer and better may have to become the maxim if the problem of serious undermanagement of complex and multiply connected challenges is not to be repeated in future. Kosovo may have been a flawed flagship, but the lessons learned could well provide its successors with sound keels.

*Euan Grant*

## Russia and Eurasia*

**The red web: the struggle between Russia's digital dictators and the new online revolutionaries. By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan.** New York: PublicAffairs. 2015. 350pp. Index. £15.80. ISBN 978 1 61039 573 1. Available as e-book.

On 23 June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, arrived at Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow. He was *en route* to Ecuador via Cuba, hoping to secure political asylum. Reportedly, he was simply transiting through Russia, but his passport was cancelled by the State Department in mid-air and so he then had little choice but to seek asylum in Russia. Since 2013, we have learned an astonishing amount from Snowden about the NSA, one of the world's most powerful intelligence services, together with its British partner, GCHQ. Overnight, code-word-protected programmes that once enjoyed eye-watering levels of secrecy like 'Tempora' and 'Prism' became the stuff of everyday conversation. Yet we still know almost nothing about similar agencies in other parts of the world, even the ones in Russia, where Snowden is currently being hosted.

For the inhabitants of 'The Doughnut', GCHQ's curvilinear home in the Cotswolds, the last few years have been rather vexing. Its closest ally has carelessly spilled some of its most important secrets. Alan Rusbridger, editor of the *Guardian*, then paraded them to persuade Britain's chattering classes that Cheltenham was run by Voldemort. Meanwhile, many of their overseas competitors escaped such extended public comment. The Israelis busied themselves weaponizing cyberspace with computer viruses of amazing destructiveness. The cyber spy division of Chinese military intelligence was happily stealing half the world's commercial secrets. Singapore and Malaysia used the internet to track the thoughts of each of its citizens almost in real time. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan geared up to fight a digital World War Three. None of this has attracted as much attention.

Perhaps the situation is now changing. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two of Russia's top investigative journalists specializing in espionage, have given us a thrilling account of the online war between Russian surveillance and digital protesters. They trace the remarkable history of Russian electronic spy systems and secure communications. They begin with the engaging story of the research laboratories constructed inside Soviet-era

* See also Takeshi Inoguchi, *Japanese and Russian politics*, pp. 1206–08.

labour camps during the 1950s, where politically suspect scientists continued to work on projects. These peculiar laboratory-jails were called 'sharaska' and even contained Tupolev, one of Stalin's top aviation scientists, who designed many of his best military aircraft from behind bars. Another distinguished resident was Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a mathematician and sound expert, who worked on speech encryption at a scientific research facility and prison run by the Ministry of State Security.

In their investigation of more recent developments, Soldatov and Borogan have operated rather like Britain's veteran investigator Duncan Campbell, a celebrated science journalist who probed GCHQ's secrets to great effect in the 1980s. Often using public data, they have gathered dozens of open source technical manuals and documents from the Zakupki government procurement body, as well as mundane records from administrative bodies. Piecing the story together from fragments, they discovered overlooked amendments that have been made to telephone and Wi-Fi networks that allow extensive monitoring and filtering of all traffic, using 'SORM', Russia's system for intercepting phone and internet communications.

SORM is a box the size of a VHS player and constitutes the main weapon in this electronic battle. Used widely by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), this is one of the world's most intrusive listening devices and now has been adapted to collect not only emails, but also data on internet usage, Skype and all social networks. Today SORM-1 is used to tap telephone lines, including mobile networks, SORM-2 intercepts internet traffic and SORM-3 deals with all other communications, as well as storing these records. The authors show that new technical specifications outlined by the Russian state telecoms agency also reveal an intense interest in a technology known as 'deep packet inspection'. This allows more attention to content and permits the FSB to filter users more effectively by particular keywords. This is now being widely installed across communications networks in Russia and most new telecom infrastructure is required to be compliant with the SORM system. While the authorities claim the FSB technically requires a warrant to intercept communications, it is not obliged to show it to anyone.

The surveillance system is highly convenient. FSB boasts SORM Control Centres that have a secure line to the servers of the service provider. If they wish to tap someone's phone, officials simply type the request into the SORM Control Centre based in the headquarters of the local FSB. Across all of Russia, the FSB has local offices that are wired directly into the regional communications network. Remarkably, the old KGB handed on this system in the liberal 1990s with little attention to oversight in relation to surveillance. Even if court orders and warrants were ever made meaningful in this area, the technology would now make accountability rather difficult to implement. In short, the FSB achieved through the front door what the NSA sought to achieve by the back door. Unsurprisingly, Russia's cautious culture of personal secrecy has hardly changed and the idea of universal telephone tapping is deeply rooted in the national psyche. 'This is not a conversation for the telephone' is still part of everyday parlance.

Yet the authors are cautiously optimistic and, at times, echo famous internet philosophers like John Perry Barlow. In common with the original creators of the web, the authors believe that the internet is ultimately a tool of liberation and, on balance, tends to promote anarchy, not order or discipline. They have conducted many interviews with Russia's electronic rebels and cipher punks who are now challenging the state. They insist that Russian radicals are effectively using the web to chip away at the power of Putin's state, accelerated by ever more dispersed communications and enabled by social media. In Putin's 'Matrix', a community of 'Neo'-like editors, programmers and protesters are on the run from the 'agents' and find new ways to challenge abusive state powers online.

*Red web* is a superb book by two brave journalists. It deserves to be widely read because it asks profound questions about freedom and the future of the internet. These have a global significance. In the wake of the Arab Spring we must ask, does the internet favour the protester or the policeman? In Russia, is the internet really an ideal instrument of surveillance which gives every awkward citizen number and a geolocation? Or will it ultimately prove to be a way in which Putin's authoritarianism might be overthrown? Sadly, this book also points to another possible future in which a global internet, designed to allow the free exchange of ideas, could be splintered into geographical sections. In the bleakest version of this landscape, the internet will no longer be a medium for global exchange, but instead a fragmented and heavily policed series of domains that are shaped by the world's more powerful governments. In Russia, some fear this is already happening.

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**The strong state in Russia: development and crisis. By Andrei P. Tsygankov.** Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. 272pp. £64.00. ISBN 978 0 19933 620 3. Available as e-book.

How and why has Russia's historical development differed from the West's? Will these differences endure? Andrei Tsygankov tackles these fundamental issues, which are urgent again today, in this clear and readable work. His focus is on Russia's tradition of state strength.

Tsygankov takes to task 'Westernists' who impose concepts and categories drawn from the West in understanding and judging his country. Russia's experience should be understood in its own term, in particular the tradition of a strong state. He argues for its centrality in Russian thought: reactionaries and reformers alike have historically ascribed great importance to it. He explains its prominence through a functional approach: the strong state is rooted not in culture but in the practical demands of survival on a highly insecure steppe. Feuding princes and boyars were unable to unite Russia, and a weak state always led to a *smuta*, a time of troubles. Only a highly centralized power could mobilize and direct the resources necessary for ensuring state survival, an imperative further sharpened—he argues following Alexander Gershenkron—by Russia's economic backwardness. Conversely, when survival pressures eased, the state could grant rights and initiate reforms.

The strength of this explanation is its clarity and causal power: state strength is directly and logically linked to the imperative of survival. Its weakness lies in its contingent nature: if these causal circumstances change, can the justification for state strength itself survive? This weakness continues to gnaw away at the argument as the historical account approaches the modern era. State power had supported extraordinary Russian expansion during the nineteenth century, with imperial troops reaching Paris in 1815. But within 40 years Russia was falling behind as a Great Power. In an age of rapid industrialization, power now depended less on size than on technological and economic development. The leadership and governance of Russia's strong state increasingly ill served the country, above all in disastrous wars: against Britain and France in 1853, Japan in 1904 and Germany in 1914, the latter hastening the collapse of the entire system. Tsygankov recognizes these 'self-inflicted' developments, but does not consider whether Russia's strong state was itself becoming an underlying cause of these growing problems.

Tsygankov charts the rebuilding, rather than 'withering away', of a far stronger and more ruthless state under Soviet rule. He denies the inevitability of the USSR's eventual collapse, for which he criticizes Gorbachev's reform leadership. Change, he argues, should have 'modified, not dismantled' the state, and he attributes economic collapse to the 'removal of

state orders'. The Yeltsin era was another *smuta* which 'squandered the comparative advantage' of Soviet industry and failed to build effective new institutions.

The Putin era is covered in a series of straight narrative chapters on political, economic and foreign policy issues. These do not address the key theme of state strength explicitly, though some notable and debatable judgements touch on it. In particular, Tsygankov maintains that a strong Russian state is compatible with democracy, albeit differently conceived and problematically implemented. He also criticizes a liberal economic system for its 'demonstrated inability to support the country's great power status'.

Tsygankov is too learned and candid not to recognize the dreadful price Russia has historically paid for its strong state. He sees its corruption, brutality and chronic inefficiencies. No other people, he suggests, has suffered so much at the hands of its own state. He even points to the weaknesses of Russia's 'managed democracy' today. Yet despite this indictment he insists on the essential and enduring role of a strong state for Russia. Giving it up is not possible because 'Russian people are mentally accustomed to a strong state, and it would be presumptuous to think that they would settle for less than that'. The only support for this view is a quotation from Vladimir Putin: the Russian President is the most-cited source in the book. Tsygankov also argues that, while few states today are insecure, Russia 'remains preoccupied with the security of its borders and natural resources'. But is this fear objectively justified or is it constructed by the regime? He also maintains that a strong state is essential for diversifying the economy away from natural resource dependence and a 'semi-peripheral' future. Some might wonder whether Russia's bloated, rent-seeking state is itself hindering modernization. A book which begins with a defence of Russia's strong state tradition ends in a search for reasons why it remains indispensable today.

Tsygankov argues that the present crisis of the Russian state must be resolved by creating a new, more workable version of a strong state. But what this might look like remains elusive, for the major weakness of this book is that it never clearly defines its central concept of 'strong state'. Does this merely mean a highly centralized one? Is it a matter of brute size and the domination of the economy and society? Or is a strong state one that is resilient and adaptable, responds to challenges, implements decisions effectively and manages succession smoothly? In other words, is the modern meaning of state strength at odds with Russian traditions?

Such a view does not require surrendering to 'Westernism', a conclusion Tsygankov is committed to resisting. He might instead consider whether non-western states offer an alternative. Since Crimea, Russia has begun to build closer relations with Asia. Perhaps Japan, South Korea, Singapore and others—highly effective systems which work differently from their western counterparts—could serve as attractive examples for Russia.

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**Russia's foreign policy: ideas, domestic politics and external relations. Edited by David Cadier and Margot Light.** Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 245pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13746 887 1. Available as e-book.

The Ukraine crisis has undoubtedly put the spotlight on the study of Russia's foreign policy both in the media and in scholarly analysis. In this context, David Cadier and Margot Light's edited volume insightfully charts the influence of domestic and external factors on Russia's foreign policy and its actions in Ukraine. The book brings together established scholars with contrasting points of view and theoretical standpoints, while also covering a series of geographical areas ranging from the West to the post-Soviet space and Asia–Pacific.

What sets the volume apart from other attempts is that it clearly underlines that internal factors have been the most salient determinants of Russia's foreign policy since Putin started his third term as president. In this sense, the chapters focus on a series of internal factors: regime and personal insecurity, the nature of the political system, Russia's constitutional order, the role of conservative ideas in the political sphere or public opinion. The only major external factor identified in the book is the need to proof Putin's regime against external influences and the potential spill-over from wide-scale democratic protests or social movements in the post-Soviet space.

In the broader literature, due to the lack of access to key actors in Russian foreign policy, most studies tend to rely heavily on speeches, strategy documents and, more rarely, interviews with opposition leaders or 'defectors' from the current regime. This particularly leads most scholars to analyse official discourse and try to identify various patterns. Cadier and Light's volume also exhibits a slight tendency for contributions to engage in constructing detailed narratives rather than applying precise analytical frameworks. Nevertheless, the book explores a wide range of very useful analytical concepts such as soft power, constitutionalism, biopolitical conservatism, authoritarianism and nationalism.

The intensity of the conflict in Ukraine has made analyses in media and scholarship increasingly ideological, in a way reminiscent of the Cold War era. The volume also includes a series of normative positions on Putin's regime and its actions in Ukraine. These range from what seem as 'crusades' against Putin's regime to more apologetic accounts of his rule which put most of the blame for the conflict in Ukraine on the West. Russian conservatism is particularly criticized by several of the contributors for the way it is instrumentally used by the government, with a slight hint that embracing liberalism would be a better choice for Russia. Even though personal and ideological views seem to influence a series of chapters, all contributors construct well-informed and argued analyses. However, as it stands, the book presents a rather western view of Russia's foreign policy. The volume could have been strengthened through the inclusion of a few more contributors based in Russia who have access to policy-makers and possess insider's knowledge about decision-making in Russian foreign policy.

Regardless of their theoretical or ideological standpoint, contributors to the volume highlight that the most important domestic factor is Putin's need to assure his survival in the face of increasing regime insecurity. Putin is portrayed as the most salient, if not the only, genuine decision-maker in Russian foreign policy. This raises the question of whether too much agency is afforded to Putin in discussing domestic factors. Moreover, there is an underlying assumption in some of the chapters that other leaders in Putin's position would have chosen a different path in directing Russia's foreign policy. With this in mind, the editors conclude that 'based on the findings of this volume, one can forecast that in situations where regime insecurity is high and the economy lags, Russian foreign policy is likely to remain the continuation of domestic politics by other means' (p. 216). All in all, *Russia's foreign policy* is invaluable reading for all those interested in Russian foreign policy and its recent evolution.

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**Negotiating Armenian–Azerbaijani peace: opportunities, obstacles, prospects. By Ohannes Geukjian**. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. 2014. 300pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 47243 514 9. Available as e-book.

A negotiated resolution to the long-running dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the majority Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) continues to prove

elusive. Violence erupted at the end of the Soviet era over demands for autonomy, which soon developed into a full-blown civil war between Azerbaijan and the enclave supported by Armenia. Although it is over two decades since a ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the ensuing stalemate has brought no real peace or stability, and the conflict dominates the domestic and foreign policies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite years of negotiations, fundamental issues remain unresolved and the threat of renewed hostilities remains very real.

In this book, Ohannes Geukjian examines the array of peace proposals that have been put forward since 1992 in an attempt to resolve the protracted conflict over the disputed territory. Utilizing theories of conflict management, transformation and resolution, he investigates why each proposal has been unsuccessful to date. In his opinion, the struggle continues and discussions fail because negotiators have failed to address the psychological elements of the conflict, such as longstanding animosities rooted in a perceived threat to identity and survival. He argues that there is a 'historical pattern for failed Armenian–Azerbaijani negotiations', which mediators need to break for any genuine progress to be made (p. 2). This is the second book Geukjian has written on Nagorno-Karabakh. While his previous work explored the deep roots of the conflict, focusing on its historical, territorial and ethnic dimensions, this work concentrates on the obstacles to peace.

The book analyses the motives and interests of the principal internal actors (Armenia, Azerbaijan and the NK leadership) and external actors, including Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States. It also investigates the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the mediation process, focusing particularly on the role of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG). The Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France and the US, is a coalition of OSCE member states dedicated to seeking a negotiated settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, since 1999, the Armenian and Azeri presidents have been meeting regularly within the MG framework to discuss the conflict. Geukjian explores the progress that has been made within this forum, contending that the OSCE's entry as a third-party mediator has changed the conflict's structure and facilitated a 'different pattern of communications'.

The first two chapters of the book set out the conceptual framework and principal themes of the work, namely conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation. Geukjian identifies asymmetry as the most striking feature of the NK conflict, stating that 'the Karabakh leadership is totally fixed on the conflict, which involves its existence, whereas Azerbaijan, in addition to its commitment to the territorial integrity of the state, has many interests' (p. 3). Using the work on conflict resolution and management by scholars such as William Zartman, Edward Azar and John Paul Lederach, he argues that internal asymmetric conflicts are very difficult to resolve because core issues, such as identity and territory, are 'highly impervious to negotiation' (p. 36). He concludes that the Karabakh conflict cannot be resolved without tackling the needs of identity, security and recognition and stresses that the relationship between the identity group (Karabakh Armenians) and the state (Azerbaijan) lies at the heart of the conflict.

The bulk of the book provides a detailed chronological analysis of the negotiation process since the early 1990s, and analyses the reasons why different initiatives have been unsuccessful. One of the most interesting sections of the book outlines the summit meetings that took place, providing background to each meeting, as well as the domestic reaction in Armenia and Azerbaijan to proposals put forward. The optimism surrounding the Key West summit of 2001 was shattered by public opinion in both countries, which was 'not prepared for a compromise'. The longer the conflict remains unresolved, the harder it has become for national leaders to make the necessary concessions. Geukjian's work makes

it clear that official, 'top-down' diplomacy may not be able to resolve the conflict without tackling core issues of territory, security and recognition: 'what is needed to resolve the Karabakh conflict is a broad, open-ended and dynamic process embracing efforts to transform injustices as well as to bridge opposing positions' (p. 211).

This volume provides a thorough, scholarly analysis of the apparently deadlocked negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh and highlights the numerous obstacles to any breakthrough. It would have benefited from more thorough copy-editing by the publisher, as the work is littered with typos and spelling errors, which obscure meaning at times. Nevertheless, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the long-running dispute, providing an insight into the evolution of the negotiating process and the reasons why a resolution has proved to be so elusive.

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## Middle East and North Africa*

**ISIS: inside the army of terror. By Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan.** New York: Regan Arts. 2015. 288pp. Pb.: £7.70. ISBN 978 1 94139 357 4. Available as e-book.

**ISIS: the state of terror. By Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger.** New York: HarperCollins. 2015. 416pp. £13.00. ISBN 978 0 06239 554 2. Available as e-book.

The takeover of large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) came as a surprise, but it should not have done. The growth of Al-Qaeda's replacement was slow, steady and well documented. The group's rise is still a recent phenomenon, making it difficult to assess without falling into the speculation trap. But both *ISIS: inside the army of terror* and *ISIS: the state of terror* avoid this by offering readers a detailed but accessible account of the origins, development and methods of this surprisingly brutal group that seems here to stay.

ISIS should not have caught anyone off guard. It is a familiar enemy—one that the United States in particular fought for a number of years under different names, according to Hassan Hassan, an analyst at the Delma Institute, and Michael Weiss, a columnist for *Foreign Policy*. Authors Jessica Stern, a Harvard terrorism lecturer, and J. M. Berger, a non-resident fellow with the Brookings Institution, focus instead on what sets ISIS apart from previous terror groups, including its predecessor Al-Qaeda. Stern and Berger emphasize the group's successful use of the internet and social media to attract a critical mass of followers.

Taken together, both books provide a comprehensive overview of the group's history and its sophisticated strategy. Hassan and Weiss base their descriptions on first-hand accounts and interviews with different types of jihadists in both Iraq and Syria, thus tracing the group's growth and evolution in both countries. ISIS's success in Iraq is attributed to the US intervention and its subsequent early retreat. The policy of 'de-Baathification', in particular, left a generation of educated, disaffected, former Iraqi officials with little to do. When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ISIS's founder, masterminded the terrorist attacks in Iraq following the US invasion, he did so with the help of these former Iraqi officials. The unlikely alliance between secularists and an extremist religious group was not expected to last. But a decade of discrimination and sectarianism first under Saddam Hussein, then under Nouri al-Maliki helped bring them together in their hatred of Shi'is.

* See also Nicolas Blarel, *The evolution of India's Israel policy*, pp. 1200–02; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *The First World War in the Middle East* and Eugene Rogan, *The fall of the Ottomans*, pp. 1163–6.

After Maliki's sectarian policies, Bashar al-Assad's brutal repression of what began as a peaceful uprising provided the space ISIS needed to expand into neighbouring Syria. Initially, ISIS fought Assad alongside other Islamist groups under the banner of the Al-Nusra Front. It then switched its attention to consolidating territory. Fighting broke out among the insurgents and ISIS used the opportunity to convert many to its ranks in Syria. Hassan and Weiss give credence to the idea that Assad deliberately allowed ISIS to gain ground in order to weaken his foes. They cite the amnesty accorded to imprisoned insurgents and the Syrian air force's reluctance to hit ISIS targets as proof of this.

Both books also cover the break between ISIS and Al-Qaeda. It is well known that the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called ISIS out on its reliance on extreme brutality. But Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rejected him and established ISIS as a separate organization. Stern and Berger conduct a particularly thorough comparison of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. They outline Al-Qaeda's weaknesses and describe the group's disintegration, and conduct a thorough analysis of ISIS's messaging and PR machine, agreeing with Hassan and Weiss that ISIS is 'a slick propaganda machine effective at disseminating its message'. Both books emphasize ISIS's superiority and sophistication. The group's greatest achievement is in grabbing and administering territory. In doing so, it goes beyond being a brutal terrorist organization: it invites followers to join in their vision of an ideal Islamic state. In a region rife with poor governance and provision of services, ISIS's effective administration and 'combination of divide-and-rule, indoctrination and fear' rallied people with different backgrounds to their cause. Hassan and Weiss also offer a particularly compelling read of the different types of people who joined the ISIS cause based on interviews they conducted.

ISIS is an international problem. A significant number of its recruits flock to the self-described caliphate from all over the world. Stern and Berger outline how the group's brutality and messaging is disproportionately targeted to help drive foreign recruitment. But ISIS is also of international concern because of the growing problem of lone-wolf actors who carry out attacks in Europe and the United States. According to Stern and Berger, a 'combustible mix of social marginalization and extremist ideology drives these freelance killers'.

All four authors agree that the rise of ISIS is in part due to western intervention and premature disengagement from Iraq. But both books fail to offer concrete policy recommendations on how to tackle the ISIS phenomenon—likely because there is no attractive or easy option. Stern and Berger dismiss the current US-led campaign, rather, they outline an effort to counter and discredit ISIS messaging. Containment seems to be the name of the game. Indeed, containment and patience are perhaps the international community's best bet: administering territory effectively is not easy in the long run. But Hassan and Weiss strike a more pessimistic tone: 'the army of terror will be with us indefinitely', they state.

*Dina Esfandiary, King's College London, UK*

**From deep state to Islamic State: the Arab counter-revolution and its jihadi legacy. By Jean-Pierre Filiu.** London: Hurst. 2015. 240pp. Pb.: £16.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 546 9. Available as e-book.

The French historian Jean-Pierre Filiu has attempted to connect the past to the present in this highly topical and ambitious work that looks to chart how the Arab revolutions, which he wrote about optimistically in 2011, have been crushed by a combination of authoritarian regimes and jihadis. It is a 'study of the repressive dynamics designed to crush any hope of democratic change' (p. x) that looks to draw a parallel with the Mamluks, who ruled Egypt from 1250 to 1517, to understand how a military elite in particular was able to 'hijack the

post-colonial independent states and establish their military dictatorships' (p. 125). Filiu combines the Mamluk history with a broad look across the Middle East and North Africa with a focus on Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, in just 240 pages.

The hijacking of independence movements is a rip-roaring tale of purges, coups, exiles, states of emergency and the ubiquitous 'Communiqué Number Ones'. Once in power, the new Mamluk rulers 'demonstrated an exceptional capacity to survive at any cost, especially when this cost is paid by their own population' (p. 135). This 'deep state', as Filiu describes it, does not rely on oil, which allows it an adaptability in the face of challenges such as the Arab revolutions, and the author takes pains to point out the 'fundamental difference' between Mamluk authoritarian regimes and aspiring totalitarian systems of Libya and Iraq (p. 80).

Filiu places a significant emphasis on the history of Egypt, quoting the economist Samer Suleiman who wrote that 'Egypt's story in the last quarter century had been the story of regime success and state failure' (p. 152). Filiu charts how the 'Mamluks' survived the transition of Tantawi to Sisi via a 'tripartite alliance between militarized intelligence, politicized judiciary and criminal gangs' (p. 167) and warns that Sisi 'could prove more devastating than all the previous Mamluk adventures' (p. 247).

Filiu speculates that it was the 'passivity' (p. 179) of the West post the violence in Egypt that gave Assad the confidence to use chemical weapons in 2013; he also makes the point that the brutal repression in Syria is because 'it was far easier for the military clique to handle civil strife than peaceful demonstrations' (p. 192). By contrast, in Tunisia the more successful revolution was helped by the emasculation of the army which 'nipped in the bud other potential Mamluks' (p. 84).

Where things become somewhat blurred is in Filiu's analysis of the 'jihadi legacy' of the book's title. Throughout, he describes the jihadi threat as a 'strawman' that was used by Arab Mamluks' to blackmail western powers in order 'to extract a "protection" bounty against a threat that they largely generated themselves' (p. 127). Filiu quotes Bernard Rougier on the Assad regime needing the jihadi threat, as 'a key component of its [the regime's] survival stems from the comparison he nurtures abroad with a worse threat than itself' (p. 147). In Yemen, the 'jihadi bogeyman is a trump card that can prove lethal to any political process' (p. 200). The author is not clear on assessing the scale of the jihadi threat despite arguing that 'abandoning the Syrian revolution had only consolidated the jihadi threat and extended its capacities' (p. 205) and Filiu has tragically been overtaken by events in writing that 'the jihadi threat seemed more or less contained in Tunisia' (p. 230).

The book would have benefited from longer endnotes and is prone to occasional dubious throwaway comments on more recent history; for example, it is by no means clear that former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was a 'staunch ally' of Assad (p. 206) simply because both had links to Iran. Furthermore, just adding 'Mamluks' to everything does not a theory prove and Filiu's 'Mamluk template', while a powerful mechanism for understanding the operations of the 'deep state' across the Middle East, needs a fuller explanation.

*James Denselow*

**The EU and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 1971–2013: in pursuit of a just peace. By Anders Persson.** Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2015. 191pp. Index. £51.95. ISBN 978 0 73919 244 3. Available as e-book.

Anders Persson examines the fraught and complex relationship between the European Union and Israel, a relationship often viewed by Jerusalem with suspicion, and, by Europe, with exasperation. The author defines and deconstructs the concept of just peace within the

context of general peacebuilding, then within the EU, and, finally, within the Middle East. Persson then details the potential securing of such a peace, security reform in the Palestinian Territories and the building of a Palestinian state.

Certainly one of the most interesting parts of the book deals with relatively recent developments in just war theory, where Persson elaborates on the theory of *jus post bellum*, or justice after war. To be taken as an addendum to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello, jus post bellum* has five principles: just cause for termination of war; right intention, meaning the process of terminating war must be done without seeking revenge; public declaration, and legitimate authority; discrimination, meaning the victorious shall be circumspect when carrying out punitive measures; and proportionality, meaning severe punishment must be avoided when peace terms are pursued. However, as the author points out, *jus post bellum* is yet to achieve the same standing and exposure as *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, but it does, nevertheless, reveal attempts by just war theorists to create new conceptual frameworks for modern military challenges.

In the chapter 'Securing a just peace', Persson notes that Salam Fayyad, Palestinian prime minister from 2007 until 2013, saw the essential nature of security in the process of Palestinian statebuilding. He believed that in order for a state to be established, security must be in place before the state can be a viable entity. This matter highlights one of the essential differences between Fayyad and his predecessors, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. Both sought the solution of all final status issues before the creation of a Palestinian state. One of the flaws of this approach was that since issues such as Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees were unlikely to be solved at any point, let alone before the creation of a Palestinian state, *ipso facto* a Palestinian state would not be created. This flaw was compounded by the aversion on the Israeli side to divide Jerusalem, or offer more than a symbolic gesture in relation to the Palestinian right of return (a concept which successive Israeli governments refuse to accept). Indeed, when Ehud Barak went to Camp David in 2000, in order to offer the most far-reaching concessions the Israelis had ever made, his government deserted him and he was subsequently trounced at the polls by the hitherto unelectable Ariel Sharon. Barak was prepared to divide Jerusalem and offered the vast majority of the occupied territories to the Palestinians, as well as a land swap in the Jordan Valley for those areas Israel felt unable to surrender.

The chapter entitled 'The EU and just peace' serves to emphasize both the realist and neo-realist approaches to the EU and its peacemaking in the Middle East. Indeed, Persson correctly notes that the EU has had little success in building peace outside the union, and especially in the Middle East, but it is emerging as a security actor, and is already a major economic actor. One of the reasons behind this out-of-area lack of success is the apparent failure of western-orientated organizations and institutions to understand those factors that transcend the 'last word' in human political organization, the nation-state: communications, nuclear power and transport, along with ethnicity, civilization, religion and class, with the balance of power possibly being the sole constraint. Whatever the case may be, Persson is correct in his statement that the EU today, as Europe always has done, needs the protection and security of the United States, thereby preventing the EU as a whole, or as individual countries, from pursuing Middle Eastern policies that significantly diverge from those of the US. However, with the rise of Islamic State, the EU, and the rest of the world, may have to adjust the way it sees the Middle East and the Arab–Israeli conflict, and seek a unification of values and interests transcending the parochial, and possibly supporting hitherto shunned regional figures such as Assad, in order to combat a global threat. In so doing, a regional framework for peace may just be created, but as a side effect of something significantly larger.

This book is enlightening, challenging and well researched, and will serve to educate both layperson and specialist in an area that is in danger of becoming, in its current form, a political dead horse. The terminology used might have been a little tighter, but that is a minor point, and the concluding segment to each chapter, along with the final chapter and conclusion, serve to make this a worthy addition to the area of EU statecraft in the Middle East.

*Howard A. Patten*

## Sub-Saharan Africa*

**China and Mozambique: from comrades to capitalists. Edited by Chris Alden and Sérgio Chichava**. Johannesburg: Fanele. 2014. 220pp. Index. Pb.: £13.00. ISBN 978 1 92019 694 3. Available as e-book.

After a decade of mostly broad-brush books on China in Africa, this edited volume forms part of a new phase in China–Africa studies, of drilling deeper into country specifics. Mozambique is an interesting country to focus on as its relations with China are not like Angola's, Kenya's or Ethiopia's, and can be best characterized as 'a relationship of caution, compromise and collaboration' (p. 1).

The ten chapters in this book attempt to chart the evolution of Chinese engagement in Mozambique, particularly over the last 40 years since independence. Some of the chapters are also revisionist of some of the literature of the last decade on Mozambique, for example Deborah Bräutigam's work on land grabs and on Chinese grand strategy (chapter four by Mikkel Bunkenborg and chapter six by Sigrid-Marianella Stensrud Ekman in particular).

Chapter one by Chris Alden, Sergio Chicava and Paula Cristina Roque is a good summary of the state of play up to 2013. By 2008, China had become the second largest investor in Mozambique after South Africa, up from 26th place less than a decade ago. This is a significant jump, and the Mozambican government has actively encouraged deepening China–Mozambique relations. Chinese investment has focused on infrastructure, agriculture, aquaculture and forestry. Since 2008, Chinese companies have shown more interest in oil, gas and coal and in 2013, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired a piece of ENI East Africa, giving it a stake in Mozambique's future gas development. This book was written at the peak of commodity prices and it was notable then that Chinese engagement with the mineral sector remained small.

Although China's overall investments in Mozambique compared to neighbouring Tanzania or South Africa are small, Mozambique is China's lead supplier of wood in East Africa. Unfortunately, 'most of the timber is illegally exported as unprocessed logs, a strategy pursued with the assistance of locals' (p. 12). Indeed, China's logging activities are one of the most controversial aspects of its engagement in Mozambique. Corruption, collusion by local authorities and weak institutional oversight all contribute to a problem that the authors conclude 'continues through poorly controlled ports in the central and northern provinces leading some to speculate that senior political interests may be involved and there is no clear evidence that fines made against the country are being paid' (p. 14).

So what do the authors tell us about how China–Mozambique relations will develop over coming years? The China Development Bank is considering basing its regional office in Maputo, to help regional integration and market access. Chinese companies will continue to be awarded large infrastructure tenders as they win on price, although Morten Nielsen

* See also Christina Stolte, *Brazil's Africa strategy*, pp. 1212–14.

in chapter five highlights the need for better oversight. João Feijó argues in chapter nine that labour relations with Mozambicans working for Chinese companies urgently need improvement too.

Not mentioned in the book, the prestige bridge from Maputo to Catembe will be Chinese-built, but the quality appraisal will be conducted by an American firm, Bechtel. This shows that the Mozambican government has realized that given its own weak institutional oversight capacity, it needed international support—in this case American engineering review of Chinese construction.

One can argue over whether the Catembe bridge should have been a development priority, but how the deal was structured shows that the party of government, Frelimo, has the ability to manage an array of external actors. This has 'meant that China's approach in Mozambique, while emphasizing the now familiar focus on resources and infrastructure, nonetheless has been far less significant than perhaps Beijing's aspirations would have it' (p. 2). Mozambican government policy of diversification is unlikely to change, so Chinese investment will grow in coming years, but Indian, Japanese, European, American and many others will do too.

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**Death in the Congo: murdering Patrice Lumumba. By Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick.** Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2015. 276pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 067472 527 0. Available as e-book.

*Death in the Congo* captures a striking portrait of an international crisis in the early Cold War caused by one post-colonial nationalist's rise to power. It meticulously details the way Patrice Lumumba was subsequently ousted and how his murder was encouraged by western powers. In many ways, it is a character study of the political leaders who instigated and backed Lumumba's murder and the men in the lower ranks who carried it out. The surprising ignorance of the key decision-makers and the amateurishness of much of their plotting is well documented. In a moving end to the book, the former Prime Minister and two comrades are handed over Pontius Pilate-style to his separatist enemies and clumsily killed by a mixed firing squad of Belgian and Congolese security men.

Much of the book's narrative relies on documentary sources and witness testimony recorded during a Belgian investigation into the murder in 2001 and by the Church Committee's investigation of American intelligence activities in 1975–6. Thanks to these, there is a strong beginning and ending to the book, with detailed coverage of Lumumba's rise to power, the chaotic decolonization of the Congo and of the cover-up in the aftermath of the assassination. The authors have also drawn some detailed character portraits of famous contemporary international leaders. Figures captured in the book include a callow young King Baudouin, an ageing and grumpy President Eisenhower and a humanitarian but cunning UN Secretary General in Dag Hammarskjöld, who was to meet his own suspicious end in the Congo shortly after Lumumba's death. The personage of a young Joseph Mobutu lurks in the background, but in the end he is not central to the Prime Minister's cruel fate.

The coverage of the back and forth within the different governing circles of the UN, the United States, the various Congolese regimes and the Belgians in the run-up to the assassination highlights the limited information available to decision-makers and the way internal political pressures often drove events, rather than the situation in the Congo itself. In the middle of the book this focus comes at the expense of Lumumba's character, motives and

actions. As other leaders mentioned by the authors as targeted for assassination survived, for example Fidel Castro, more details of Lumumba's own actions, at least in summary, would have been useful. In particular, a deeper analysis of the various secessions and resulting military conflicts could have provided a greater idea of the strengths and weaknesses of his position.

But *Death in the Congo* ably covers a turning-point in international history between the shrinking colonial world of the Europeans and the international system of nation-states that replaced it. The book pays tribute to Lumumba's qualities as a nationalist leader and the Congo's ablest politician, while admitting that his posthumous reputation has perhaps been preserved by his brutal and untimely end. Many other African leaders who were lionized at independence went on to disappoint their people mightily. Yet while the book offers no evidence that Lumumba was any more visionary or tolerant of dissent than his contemporaries, the evidence it gathers suggests that the Congolese Prime Minister was no more populist or left-wing than many nationalist politicians in the 1950s and 1960s. Nonetheless, he would fall victim in an astonishingly arbitrary way to Belgian dislike, American fear of communism and western politics over NATO.

In conclusion, the book's narrative is strong when tying the western governments of America and Belgium to complicity in Lumumba's eventual murder and for pushing for it behind the scenes, but takes less time to explore his African enemies. This is possibly because the foreign machinations are better documented. The UN's careful stipulations of where it will and will not protect Lumumba are particularly masterfully detailed, as Hammarskjöld is shown trying to balance the competing pressures on his fledgling organization. In our age of explicit claims of responsibilities for assassination, the amateurishness and reluctance of both westerners and the Congolese to take responsibility for the eventual murders is also vividly drawn. Readers are certainly left with a desire to learn more about the deeper history of the Congo beyond this stimulating picture of its recent past.

*Neil Thompson*

## South Asia

**The China–Pakistan axis. By Andrew Small**. London: Hurst. 2015. 319pp. £30.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 341 0. Available as e-book.

Few strategic partnerships anywhere in the world are characterized by the opacity and obfuscation that mark the ties between China and Pakistan. Although both sides routinely deploy cringing rhetoric to describe their relationship—billboards in Islamabad ahead of President Xi Jinping's state visit to Pakistan in April 2015 exclaimed that the 'Pakistan–China friendship is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel'—bilateral ties between Beijing and Islamabad are driven much more by cynical necessity than both sides are wont to admit. These ties are also fundamentally asymmetrical, with Pakistan usually the supplicant and China the benefactor. But Beijing's subtle conduct towards its weaker South Asian partner—where both patronage and reprimands are conveyed quietly and usually outside the public eye (in contrast to the often heavy-handed behaviour of the United States)—mark China out in Pakistani psychology as a distinctively 'all weather friend'.

Yet this friendship almost never was, as China and Pakistan hailed from distinctly different backgrounds. Pakistan, born weak from the carnage of a partitioned Raj in 1947, yearned for security through solidarity with the West—first Great Britain, and quickly thereafter,

the United States—which despite its reservations embraced Pakistan in its containment strategy directed against Soviet and Chinese communism. As a revolutionary entity from its birth as a modern state in 1949, China, not surprisingly, viewed Pakistan at first with suspicion. Chinese reservations, however, gave way by 1955 to a tentative *rapprochement* that rapidly strengthened when both nations found themselves confronted by a common adversary in India, with which they would each fight hot wars during the 1960s.

The early solidification of Sino-Pakistani ties during that decade highlighted a leitmotif that survives to this day: the threat posed by some third force—persistently India, for a while the Soviet Union, and now, Islamist militancy and the United States—provides the glue that cements Sino-Pakistani geopolitical interdependence, however asymmetrically, while driving the ensuing collaboration deep underground as each side seeks to preserve its freedom of manoeuvre *vis-à-vis* other actors in the international system.

There is no better exposition of this dynamic than Andrew Small's *The China–Pakistan axis*. Small has illuminated the complementary calculations in Beijing and Islamabad which nurture this fascinating relationship, through a painstaking survey of numerous, diverse sources, coupled with extensive interviews throughout southern Asia (to include, most importantly, China). But nothing that Small uncovers in this volume alters four broad understandings about the Sino-Pakistani relationship that are already well known.

First, the Sino-Pakistani compact was forged amidst, and continues to draw sustenance from, the enduring Chinese and Pakistani rivalries with India. Second, the earlier Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and now deepening US ties with India, have created new reasons for both Beijing and Islamabad to enhance their counterbalancing against common dangers. Third, the rise of Islamist extremism in south Asia has set China and Pakistan at odds because of Islamabad's nurturing of these armed proxies, but it has also compelled cooperation between the two nations in order to defeat internal threats while parrying external accusers such as India and the United States. And, finally, China will continue to double down on its 'iron friend' Pakistan, despite the lure of more productive commercial relations with economically successful entities such as India, because, its pathologies notwithstanding, Islamabad serves to imprison New Delhi within the Indian subcontinent and offers Beijing the critical geographic avenues necessary for the success of new Chinese strategic initiatives such as 'One Belt, One Road', to the common geopolitical advantage of both nations.

Even if Small's analysis does not alter any of these four fundamental conclusions, the felicity of his writing and the wealth of detail summoned in the book vivifies them in ways that make this work indispensable even for scholars who otherwise follow south Asian security issues closely. *The China–Pakistan axis* traverses a vast gamut of issues: the Pakistani nuclear programme and China's indispensable contributions to its success; China's efforts to underwrite Pakistan's security but not its revisionism against India; the Chinese suppression of Uighur nationalism both in collusion with and in opposition to the Pakistani military and intelligence services; China's efforts to invest in major infrastructure projects in Pakistan for both economic and strategic reasons; Beijing's initially tentative but now concerted involvement in Afghanistan; and the geopolitical importance of Pakistan in the context of China 'marching West' as it confronts the American rebalancing to its east. In doing so, Small brings to bear not only copious research but analytic subtlety that makes this book both a joy to read and a veritable 'keeper'.

Whatever the occasional quibbles over facts or matters of interpretation may be, *The China–Pakistan axis* enlarges our understanding of this all too murky strategic relationship. Given the foreseeable trajectory of Sino-US, Sino-Indian, US–Indian, US–Pakistani

and Indo-Pakistani ties—the five principal constraining variables that matter—affinities between China and Pakistan are likely to grow further in importance, especially if the continuing rise of China makes the US–China relationship more fraught and the US–India relationship more intense. After all, if the Sino-Pakistani compact thus far has singularly attested to the truth of Kautilya's dictum, 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', then it should not be surprising if this partnership deepens even more in time. As one Chinese expert, cited by Small, declared: 'If China decides to develop formal alliances, Pakistan would be the first place we would turn. It may be the only place we could turn' (p. 181). Perhaps, but even that instantiation is unlikely to take the Sino-Pakistani concord, *pace* Small, entirely 'out of the shadows'.

*Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, USA*

**An intimate war: an oral history of the Helmand conflict 1978–2012. By Mike Martin.** London: Hurst. 2014. 400pp. £18.40. ISBN 978 1 84904 336 6.

Mike Martin's book, *An intimate war*, is part of an emerging literature on the war in Afghanistan: local history based on direct participation and serious academic research. As such, the book is a must-read for anyone interested in a detailed history of the British war in Helmand province or the counter-insurgency debate. Having worked for the British Army in Helmand as a cultural expert in a Human Terrain Team and speaking Pashto, the author is uniquely qualified to write about the British war in Helmand. The interviews were conducted after the author left the British Army and the book is the result of academic research.

*An intimate war* is chronologically organized and provides useful insights in the social dynamics of the province before the start of the civil war. In particular, Martin carefully distinguishes between northern Helmand and southern Helmand, which have different tribes and different economic settings. The book's main thesis is that violence in Helmand is not the result of the involvement of national actors (Taliban, the government, foreign troops, etc.), but essentially 'driven by dynamics between groups and individuals on the ground' (p. 4) and best described as a 'continuing civil war' (p. 5). To prove this assertion, the author gives numerous examples of the Helmandis manipulating outsiders, even before 2001, during the jihad against the Soviets. In chapter five, the authors shows how Helmandis were able to persuade the British forces to support one side or another in local conflicts, even before the massive increase of resources post-2010. This hypothesis is supported by an impressive number of interviews (150, in Pashto), which allow Martin to reconstruct a detailed history of the province. The anecdotes are carefully selected, generally first-hand, but avoid any kind of heroic self-representation. This way of conceptualizing a civil war, as the addition of local conflicts, is obviously inspired by Stathis Kalyvas's classic work (quoted in the bibliography), *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

However, a complete picture of the Afghan war cannot be constructed just by adding up local insurgencies. What is missing from the book is the explanation of the interaction between different levels: local, regional, national, transnational. The author does not question whether the province of Helmand makes sense as a scale of observation; one could argue that the Afghan south would have been more appropriate. At least, it would have been interesting to interrogate the meaning of 'local', a concept that is not self-evident considering the complex nature of interests, ideological discourses and resource flux. It is no coincidence that an author who focuses on the local level ends up finding local explanations and narratives. A different scope of research would have produced different questions

and different explanations: the role of the Pakistan-based networks, the ability of the Taliban or the Afghan officials to manipulate in return the local players. From a broader perspective, the general dynamics in Helmand appear over-determined by national and international trends, which explains why other provinces with different social structures had rather similar trajectories to Helmand's.

In the last chapter, Martin reflects on the origins of the failure of the British policy in Helmand. He correctly notes that the 'cultural experts' were largely confined to an advisory role and that, in any case, not enough of them were trained. He also points to the lack of everyday contacts between foreigners and Afghans (the separation was less absolute during the Soviet occupation). Yet although the Taliban's sanctuary is in Pakistan, nothing is said of the Pakistani–British relationship and the lack of pressure from London on Islamabad. Maybe, for the British government, the cooperation of the Pakistani intelligence services on radical Islam, including within the United Kingdom, was essentially more important than securing their support against the Taliban.

Finally, the book does not answer a vexing question: why a third of the coalition forces were sent to a province that is strategically marginal. Martin's hypothesis is that the British went to Helmand because of NATO internal politics, and the US chose Helmand over Kandahar because the British were ready to cooperate with the Marines (and the Canadians were not). This explanation is probably correct but partial, because the very idea that the 'centre of gravity' of the Taliban movement was in the south, hence the counter-insurgency should focus on this area, was flawed.

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**The evolution of India's Israel policy: continuity, change, and compromise since 1922. By Nicolas Blarel.** New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2015. 472pp. Index. £22.00. ISBN 978 0 19945 062 6.

Narendra Modi will soon become the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. Long estranged, the two countries have built a remarkably strong relationship since establishing full diplomatic relations just over two decades ago, in January 1992. They have forged significant economic ties—bilateral trade now stands at about $4.5 billion per year—but it is in the area of defence and security cooperation that the relationship is burgeoning.

To explain the evolution of this relationship, Nicolas Blarel takes a long historical look back to 1922, when the British assumed a League of Nations mandate over the former Ottoman territories of Palestine and Iraq, albeit in the face of opposition from British imperial authorities in India and deep concern on the part of Indian Muslims and secular nationalists. As Blarel shows, these events helped stimulate efforts by the Indian National Congress (INC), led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, to lay out an alternative foreign policy for an independent India. Seeking to garner support among Indian Muslims as the Khalifat movement peaked in support, the INC first adopted a strong stance against the Balfour Declaration. Then, as that movement waned and relations with the Muslim League became more complicated, the INC expressed a preference for a federal Arab–Jewish state in Palestine, seeing Zionism as a potential inspiration for similar religious nationalist movements within India, among its Muslim population. Nehru and the INC did maintain channels of communication with the Zionists—they invited a delegation to the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, for example, despite opposition from within the INC and some Arab states—but a federal Palestinian state remained their preferred option right up until the creation of Israel in 1948.

Two years of agonized debate followed in New Delhi before India finally recognized the new state. In the meantime, Nehru and the INC worried about India's relations with the Arabs, who were being wooed by Pakistan, and the opinions of Indian Muslims. India voted against Israel being admitted to the United Nations in 1949, but afterwards pragmatism prevailed: a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly had been reached and Israel admitted. Once Iran recognized the new state in March 1950, the game was effectively up, and India did the same six months later.

There was, however, a catch. India gave recognition, but did not establish full diplomatic relations. This odd—some think unique—situation in the history of modern diplomacy persisted until 1992. Publicly, India cited budget constraints to explain its failure to send an ambassador to Tel Aviv, but Blarel shows that Nehru's desire to maintain close ties with Egypt, with which he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1955, and to dissuade Arab states from backing Pakistan at the UN in the Kashmir dispute, were the key reasons in the early years. Then came the Suez Crisis in 1956, which alienated the two still further, and entrenched 'non-relations' as the norm.

Blarel argues that while this norm prevailed in the two and a half decades that followed, it did not go uncontested. It was criticized by intellectuals outside parliament and by Hindu nationalist, socialist and liberal voices inside it, particularly during the Six-Day War. It was bypassed, in effect, by covert linkages built between India's external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing, and Israel's Mossad. It was also undermined by the lop-sidedness of India's West Asia policy, which was painstakingly sensitive to Arab concerns, but which gained few quid pro quos from them when India most needed support, in 1965 and 1971 in particular. But the policy of non-relations retained the support of key foreign policy-makers and powerful politicians, especially Indira Gandhi, who allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open its first embassy in New Delhi and who was vociferous in her condemnations of successive Israeli actions, like the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osiraq in 1981.

Things began to change after Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, initiated a dialogue with Israel and Jewish groups in the United States, but the weakness of his government helped prevent the emergence of a new approach. It was not until the successive shocks suffered by India in 1990–91, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the oil price rise and balance of payments crisis, that a window of opportunity opened and full diplomatic relations were established. The pragmatic Prime Minister Narasimha Rao did the deed, assisted by Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, after talks with a weakened Yasser Arafat, who had earlier made a disastrous call in backing Saddam Hussein's attempted annexation of Kuwait. The military and intelligence establishment, growing in influence in foreign policy-making, backed the move as a means of gaining access to much-needed technology and training.

Blarel argues that this decision was not as momentous or pivotal as some have claimed. He observes that it has taken India and Israel some time to build the robust economic and defence ties they now have, and that the partnership is narrow and focused. Throughout the past 20 years, India has remained rhetorically committed to the Palestinian cause, and it continues to take a very different line on the challenge posed by Iran, but these and other areas of disagreement have been effectively quarantined to facilitate intelligence sharing, counterterrorism initiatives and trade in military technology.

Meticulous and judicious, this book will be regarded as the authoritative account of the evolution of this fascinating—and at times downright strange—bilateral relationship for some time to come. Scaffolded in a robust analytical framework that utilizes theories



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of policy change and policy monopolies, *The evolution of India's Israel policy* also makes a significant contribution to the wider literature on foreign policy analysis and is a welcome addition to the fast-improving corpus of work on India's international relations.

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## East Asia and Pacific

**China's coming war with Asia. By Jonathan Holslag**. Cambridge: Polity. 2015. 198pp. £40.50. ISBN 978 0 74568 825 1. Available as e-book.

Over the past decade, China's phenomenal rise as a major economic and, to an extent, military power has drawn growing attention from policy-makers and analysts alike. While most acknowledge—and indeed there is significant consensus on—the speed and extent of China's growing economic and military power and diplomatic influence, there is no agreement on the international implications of a rising China, especially its impact on global and regional affairs. Specifically, how Beijing will use its power to protect and promote its interests, and the extent to which doing so will upset the current international order remain subjects of heated debate.

Structural realism predicts that the rise of China will be highly destabilizing, as history is replete with instances where rising powers challenge the existing international order in what is often characterized as the 'Thucydides trap', resulting in great wars between the challenger and the reigning power. Liberalism, on the other hand, remains confident that the postwar liberal order can and will survive China's rise, due to the resilience of norms, rules and institutions.

*China's coming war with Asia* provides a refreshing perspective on the current debates. Jonathan Holslag makes a strong case for why China's rise will inevitably lead to conflicts with its Asian neighbours, not so much because Beijing deliberately seeks confrontation, but rather because, as Beijing pursues its four great aspirations, its policy and behaviour will appear to others as revisionist and threatening. The first half of the book tells a compelling story about how Chinese foreign policy has undergone, over the past six and half decades, significant changes, from that of a revolutionary power seeking to topple the existing international order to one of a normal, even status quo power in the current international system. Throughout this period, regardless of the changing international environment and domestic political upheaval, four great aspirations—border security, the legitimacy of the Communist Party, respect for China's sovereignty and the recovery of lost territories—have remained constant. What has changed is China's ability to secure and realize these aspirations.

Holslag demonstrates rather convincingly that, until recently, Beijing has scored major accomplishments by adopting a decidedly conciliatory and friendly approach to its neighbours. Chinese leaders often emphasize that China can and will rise peacefully and that it seeks to promote a harmonious world where all can coexist in peace, especially the major powers. Here Holslag's thesis comes into its own. He argues that, in effect, China has patiently bided its time, built up its capabilities, made conciliatory gesture to its neighbours, and yes, sought and expanded cooperation with many of them on a broad range of issues. But it has in no way given up on its great aspirations. If anything, it becomes ever more urgent that China fulfil them now it is a no longer a weak power. It is not that Beijing harbours any ill intentions, or is deliberately aggressive towards others; on the contrary, it wants peace and seeks harmony just as much as others, and it considers the recovery of

lost territories as confirmation of its ascendancy to Great Power status. But this can only be realized through either concessions by others or the threat or use of power by China. The frustration, and hence Beijing's more assertive behaviour in adopting a mercantilist industrial and trade policy, is as much a reflection of its failure to achieve its aspirations as its growing confidence and ability to apply the power it has accumulated to have its way. As a result Asia, laments Holslag, 'is in for another tragedy of Great Power politics, but it is not China's tragedy alone' (p. 173).

*China's coming war with Asia* draws readers' attention to the tragic nature of Great Power politics. China's growing power has significant implications for Asia's future. But surprisingly, the United States, the predominant power and presumably the one that will be affected the most in the regional geostrategic transformation, receives only some discussion, in chapter eight. The sense of inevitable course towards conflicts between China and its Asian neighbours is projected discounting the US factor. Clearly, what Washington can and will likely do would feature quite prominently in Beijing's calculations. China's ability to divide and rule in the region will remain a function of US policy and commitment towards Asia. Indeed, Sino-US rivalry for regional primacy, from economic dominance to military competition, is already on full display. And even if China succeeded in reducing the US role in Asia, it would still face formidable obstacles in establishing its dominance in the region.

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**Powerful patriots: nationalist protest in China's foreign relations. By Jessica Chen Weiss.** New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. 360pp. £64.00. ISBN 978 0 19938 755 7. Available as e-book.

Traditional Chinese statecraft famously compared the relationship between the ruler and the ruled to that between boat and water, stressing the capability of water (the ruled) either to carry or to capsize the boat (the ruler). In modern times, this dialectical dichotomy in China's political life, because of the arrival of western powers, became an intricate trichotomy in which the ruler and the ruled determined their reciprocal stances while casting a careful eye at the outside force. Hence, during the nineteenth century, when challenged simultaneously by external adversaries and internal rebels, the Manchu rulers of the Qing Dynasty opted for 'rather compromising with friendly powers than giving in to home servants'. At the turn of the century, in changing their battle cry from 'opposing the Qing and eliminating the foreign' to 'supporting the Qing and eliminating the foreign', the Boxers made a strategic decision for legitimizing their anti-foreign onslaught. The twentieth century had such examples as well. One was Chiang Kai-shek's policy of 'internal pacification before external resistance', a choice made between the dual danger posed by the Chinese communists and the Japanese invaders. Another was Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution which was supposedly an effective way to fight both 'Soviet revisionism' and 'American imperialism', but actually threw Chinese society into chaos. These recent examples indicate that, since the mid-nineteenth century, China has become one of the self-governed nations of the world, but as a 'nation', if understood as a collectivity of free-willed individuals, the 'China nation' or oftentimes the 'Chinese people' in China's political discourse, is yet to govern itself. The 'boat–water' analogy has thus remained valid, except that a third protagonist, 'wind', or foreign factors, has to be added to the equation, which can either affect the speed and direction of the 'boat' or turn the 'water' from a calm surface into an angry tidal wave.

Jessica Chen Weiss's carefully researched and highly illuminating monograph investigates how this trichotomy continues into our time. Focusing on Beijing's management of popular protests stirred up by issues and incidents in China's foreign affairs in the past two decades or so, the study unfolds under a title that gives misleading centrality to the protesters. As Weiss's meticulous reconstruction of events shows, the extent to which these protests could be characterized as 'powerful' depended on Beijing's calculation about risks and benefits in deciding whether and on what scale the protests were permitted to continue. Beijing could also at its discretion label the protesters as 'patriots' or something else.

The study consists of seven chapters plus 'introduction' and 'conclusion'. In using countries like Jordan and Syria as China's sister autocracies, which can be questioned, chapter two theorizes that such regimes face an inescapable predicament in taking a stance on street protests concerning foreign affairs. While wary of the danger that, if permitted, protesters may potentially get out of hand and take up domestic grievances, autocrats have to take into account the cost of diminished legitimacy if they repress protests against foreign targets. When there is no clear choice between the two evils, foreign policy considerations often decide a regime's attitude. Weiss applies this analytical insight to her 'plausible universe of cases' (p. 9), which includes two Sino-American crises at the turn of century (chapter three), but mainly a string of troubles in Sino-Japanese relations from 1985 to 2012 (chapters four to eight). Whereas claiming empirical novelty in studying Chinese protests permitted *and* repressed, the study pursues interpretative originality in establishing a third opinion between two previous opposing views that respectively allege Beijing's arbitrary disregard of protests and its anaemic deference to them. Weiss's finding, that in exercising social control in this age of digitized information, the Chinese authorities are as adaptable as China's netizens are resourceful, may not surprise her readers.

Weiss's scholarship is judicious in general and yet leaves more to be desired. China has been in constant transition in the past few decades and a popular practice in China is to use terms like 'post-80ers' and 'post-90ers' to define today's young Chinese. Generational differences between China's leaderships and street activists, however, seem irrelevant to Weiss's behaviour analyses. She uses 'nationalist', 'patriotic' and 'antiforeign' interchangeably, seemingly unaware that these terms carry rather different connotations in Chinese political discourse. China's actions in international affairs are, of course, understood as the Chinese Communist Party's, but when discussing discords between the party leadership and the protesters, Weiss could have done more to delineate divergent views on 'national interests' in today's China. This is not to diminish Weiss's main contribution; understanding, not to say predicting, Beijing's behaviour at home and in the international scene has been a baffling undertaking for China watchers and policy analysts. Weiss's thorough investigation of recent cases and carefully reasoned interpretations yield a welcome contribution to evaluations of Beijing's responses to foreign and domestic pressures. Weiss is fair in admitting that because inside information about Beijing's actual policy deliberations is lacking, she has to speculate about several of her cases. Based on a wide range of contemporary observations, published documents and interviews garnered during 14 months of fieldwork, Weiss's scenarios of Beijing's policy-making are probable and may even be plausible in certain cases. Weiss's goal is to 'move beyond the "black box"' (p. 40) of Beijing's secretive process of policy-making. Only time can tell whether or not she has been successful. As for the 'black box', it is up to historians to crack it.

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**North Korea: markets and military rule. By Hazel Smith.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 394pp. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 52189 778 5. Available as e-book.

Hazel Smith complains at the very start of this superb study of all aspects of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that hers is a subject that has generated much heat but little light. In her first chapter, she draws attention to the dominant media and popular image of the country as a 'hermit kingdom' presided over by figures like Kim Jong-il and his successor Kim Jong-un, who are represented in the western imagination as comical buffoons. North Koreans are portrayed as brainwashed automata, either falling about screaming in grief at Kim Jong-il's funeral or rapturously cheering his successor's every footstep on inspection tours.

Smith's granular, meticulously researched and balanced study reduces this popular image to rubble. A visitor to the country for many years and resident there in the early 2000s, she can draw on first-hand experience. But she also locates the modern DPRK in its historic context, as a country divided, born from a ruinous war with a mindset still dominated by grief and resentment over its suffering in the era of Japanese colonization and then at the hands of UN-led forces from 1950 to 1953. All this is underlined by a strong exceptionalist mentality (shared by some in South Korea) which sees Koreans as being unique and different to any other race. The result is the system of Stalinist-style governance that prevails today. But as Smith goes at some lengths to argue, the DPRK people are agents who need to be understood rather than caricatured, and there is nothing *sui generis* about their system. It has plenty of parallels, for instance, with the USSR or Maoist China, and with other militarized, failing states.

The book divides post-Korean War history in the DPRK into the Kim Il-sungist era, where state control over ideology, the economy and political life was most complete, and where there were plenty of developmental successes to claim legitimacy from, and the era from 1994, when aid from the USSR in particular was withdrawn, Kim Il-sung died and the great famines started. In this period, the doctrine of 'military first' appeared, with an all-out effort by the regime to survive by simply concentrating on its military ability, acquiring nuclear weapons, and tolerating the creation of a scrappy, unofficial marketized system. In this era, Smith describes how the Party and government were unable to fulfil their basic obligations and the majority of people simply had to find informal ways of feeding themselves and getting by. For them, the manifold failures of the government were clear enough. But they were in a battle to survive: 'The population', she states, 'learned to circumvent the regular attempts to prevent growth in market activity such that all the population almost all of the time were effectively acting outside the law and in defiance of government dictates, even though these continued to carry risk' (p. 224). Since 1994, therefore, there have been two parallel forces: military first doctrine for the regime, to ensure that it survives, while for society markets have existed in almost every area despite their being formally illegal.

This is a very complete account, and one that remains extraordinarily even-handed, despite Smith's evident deep sympathy for the real suffering of so many North Koreans under a system that has proved as bankrupt ideologically as it has economically. She presents a view of the new leadership under Kim Jong-un as almost akin to a 'ghost in the machine' one, where military cliques manipulating the young, inexperienced leader are protecting themselves largely through the clear knowledge that they have no effective plan B. A similar conclusion is also reached by another excellent commentator on North Korean affairs, Andrei Lankov. Needless to say, there is nothing remotely comical about this tragic situation.

North Korean leaders have done an excellent job of presenting their country in the worst possible light. This means that the appetite for tales of the regime's atrocities and inhumanity have the sort of large audience Smith refers to critically in many parts of the book. This makes her much more nuanced and complex view of the country and its people so important, because it manages at least to evince some sympathy for the predicament that the country is now in. North Korean people, she shows clearly, are perfectly aware of their position, and are exposed as never before to ideas from the outside world through Chinese and other visitors.

This book has excellent chapters on North Korea's diplomatic situation (including a crisp summary of the torturous relationship over the last two decades with the US), and on some of the achievements of the regime—universal educational provision, some amelioration in the prevention of infectious diseases in the 2000s and at the least mitigation of the very worst malnutrition problems. But her conclusion is sobering. This is a society where poverty remains endemic, where the political elite is committed to the most narrow strategic objective (military control) and where the country suffers from diplomatic isolation that antagonizes, rather than helps. For anyone wanting a concise, well-informed and balanced discussion of all aspects of North Korea, this book is the definitive place to start. It is hard to see how it could have been bettered, and it fully achieves the objective promised at the very start—offering light and reducing heat.

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**Japanese and Korean politics: alone and apart from each other. Edited by Takashi Inoguchi.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 295pp. Index. £68.00. ISBN 978 1 13748 830 5.

**Japanese and Russian politics: polar opposites or something in common? Edited by Takashi Inoguchi.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 224pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 137 48844 2.

I would be making the understatement of the century if I said that Japan's relations with its neighbours are a bit troubled. A nation that prides itself on being removed from the military conflicts of East Asia, Japan harbours major territorial disputes with three nearby countries. A state with ambitions to lead Asia to a new era of peace and prosperity, it is mired in constant, petty bickering with South Korea and China over events of 70 to 120 years ago. A people with among the most sophisticated senses of aesthetics and fashion, Japanese often see other Asians as inferior. Two recent volumes edited by the prolific Takashi Inoguchi attempt to explain why Japan has difficulty getting along with South Korea and Russia. While chockfull of useful information and description of recent events, both volumes unevenly utilize political or economic theory and could stand much more thorough English editing.

The Japan–Korea book divides into sections on Japanese and Korean politics, and Japanese–Korean relations. Most of the contributions make uncomplicated points. Developing the theme of the two countries as 'alone and apart from each other' (p. 1), Inoguchi suggests that the current national leaders, scions of famous political families, have moved in opposite directions: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe boosting defence ties with America, Korean President Park Geun-hye moving closer to China. Yutaka Harada notes that Abe's economic success so far has been due to recognition of the key role of monetary policy but, if Japanese leaders want growth strong enough to save the economy, they need even more aggressive monetary easing. Cheol Hee Park shows that, although the 2012

electoral victory of Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) looked impressive, it actually had more to do with low voter turnout and the collapse of the previous ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Won-Taek Kang believes that Korean politics has evolved from a regionally based four-party system to a more stable national two-party system, in which weakening partisan commitment and declining ideology have favoured the ruling conservatives over the opposition progressives. The concept of *ressentiment*, i.e. 'resentment or hostility against a stronger party in a relationship', is Satoru Miyamoto's vehicle for explaining recent difficulties in inter-Korean relations: whenever South Korea tries to benevolently assist its northern brethren, Pyongyang reacts belligerently (p. 147): a jarring, off-message addition to what was supposed to be a book about Japanese–Korean relations.

One of the best overall attempts to use theory and provide a comprehensive explanation of recent Korean development is Jongryn Mo's analysis of Korea's vaunted developmental state. He asserts that there has been a 'paradigm shift' in Korean economic policy, exemplified by the advent of the Park Geun-hye administration (p. 122). The 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent recession moved Korean conservative rhetoric to the centre, with more focus on welfare spending to assuage public anger about perceived inequality. Park was able to win the presidency because she added Chungcheong province to the conservatives' regional base in the south-east, and performed fairly well in Seoul. Mo feels that, while Park will pursue limited welfare reforms, she will not be able to fundamentally alter the export-driven dynamic at the heart of the modern Korean economy. This chapter could have been strengthened with a section comparing the evolution of Korea's developmental state with that of Japan.

Readers are also treated to fairly effective overviews of Japanese and Korean foreign policy. Kazuhiko Togo links Abe's foreign policy to his 'three arrows' economic policy, and feels that Abe has not yet revealed whether he is an 'idealist-nationalist' or 'realist-pragmatist' (pp. 197, 199). Actually, he is probably a bit of both. Relations with the US have improved markedly, and with Russia a bit, but historical and nationalist issues are holding back the creation of stronger ties with Korea. Chung-in Moon and Seung-Chan Boo insist that Park's foreign policy has a clearer rationale than that of her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, but her North Korea policy is nearly identical to Lee's efforts: the 'trust-building process' has become quite reactive and dependent on Pyongyang's actions, is mostly decided by the President herself, seems driven more by emotion than pragmatism and appears never to move beyond 'easy' issues (p. 227). Once again, by dissecting North–South Korean relations, not Tokyo–Seoul ties, the book goes a little off track.

In *Japanese and Russian politics*, Inoguchi implies that the Japanese–Russian relationship is even more perplexing than Japan–Korea ties. Both countries are presented by analysts as *sui generis*, and so there seems to be little basis for a better relationship. History has consistently driven the two countries apart, from the Russo-Japanese War and the world wars to the Cold War and beyond. Although published this year, Inoguchi's piece still talks about Democrat Yoshihiko Noda as prime minister; that ought to have been updated. The Russian authors are a bit more analytical than the contributors to the other volume. Dmitry Streltsov suggests that Japanese political parties did not form as they did in the West, i.e. in opposition to ruling parties, and never developed the full-blown liberal and conservative ideologies that characterize many two-party systems. Like Cheol Hee Park, he states that the LDP victory in 2012 was less awe-inspiring than it appeared: voters felt great 'disenchantment' with the DPJ, and turned to the LDP in 'desperation' (pp. 41, 44). Sergey V. Chugrov presents Japanese foreign policy shifts over the past decade as seen through the eyes of Russian observers, who are mildly alarmed by the strengthening of the Japanese–

American alliance, blame the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute on that entente, and caution Tokyo against belligerence towards North Korea. While the Russian public evinces little interest in Japan and academics remain divided, the political elite seem uncertain about how to handle their Pacific neighbour.

Among the more intriguing chapters are the Russians' accounts of their own politics. William Smirnov outlines the gradual transformation of Russia's politics under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Russian voters were initially willing to trade a degree of political freedom for order and stability, but since 2012, have drifted to the left and have become more vocal. Medvedev and Putin tried to head off these moves with mild political reforms that have marginalized and atomized the opposition. Liubov Karelova sketches government plans for Russian modernization, focusing on creation of a post-industrial service economy, social policies to support economic innovation and more democratic governance, especially in terms of lessened regulation and local control. Russian foreign policy, Sergey Oznobishchev claims, is characterized by 'pragmatic realism' (p. 185). As possibilities for cooperation with the West have deteriorated, Russia has turned to East Asia and to 'formation of rather unusual amalgamations' with the other BRICS countries, and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (p. 193). Both the Russian and Japanese governments have expressed willingness to work towards solving the bilateral territorial issue and signing a peace treaty, but have taken only preliminary steps.

The other chapters are somewhat less effective. While Harada provides a serviceable overview of the economic dilemmas facing recent governments in Tokyo, and Shigeki Hakamada offers a fairly clear brief on Abe's programme to strengthen the Japanese–American alliance and stand up to China (once more, the authors go somewhat off track), Nobuo Shimotomai resorts to a forced analysis of Russian politics in Aristotelian terms. Akio Kawata limits himself to describing Moscow's shift from a global power to a 'multi-bordered' state adept at foreign policy improvisation (p. 165).

As one might guess by now, a principal weakness of both books is the underwhelming nature of many of its conclusions. Several chapters are almost entirely descriptive, with little reference to theory or analysis that one could apply to other cases. A number of those in the Japan–Korea collection cry out for better English editing. Editing problems extend to the organization of the two volumes: for instance, Harada's pieces on Japanese and Russian economic policy consist of distractingly short and chopped-up sections that need to be combined into a more succinct, flowing narrative. Also, at the risk of sounding picky, the volumes' subtitles are a bit clunky. However, these books are useful introductions to Japan's bilateral relations, as long as readers recognize their limitations.

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**Hun Sen's Cambodia. By Sebastian Strangio.** New Haven: Yale University Press. 2014. 320pp. £16.60. ISBN 978 0 30019 072 4. Available as e-book.

In the 1960s, Cambodian head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk unsuccessfully sought to distance his kingdom from the bloodletting of neighbouring states. Hard-pressed to enforce strict neutrality and inclined to believe that the United States would eventually quit the region anyhow, he edged strategically leftward, casting an ever more complicit eye on the growing number of Vietnamese combatants who sheltered and resupplied on Cambodian soil. American military planners responded in kind, targeting communist bases for cross-border raids and, in due course, backing a putsch that ousted Sihanouk, all but ending the authority of the Cambodian state.

A very uncivil war followed. With stunning speed, troops of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic lost the countryside to an expanding communist force, despite (or quite possibly because of) a relentless American air assault on rebel positions that constituted one of the heaviest aerial bombardments in the history of warfare. A victorious Khmer Rouge then declared the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea and began emptying its cities and forests of myriad enemies, hundreds of thousands of whom were put to death over the next three and a half years. The purge was still under way when Vietnamese troops intervened, occupying (or arguably liberating) the country and establishing a puppet administration led by a group of Khmer Rouge defectors. The struggle did not end there: deposed Khmer factions of all stripes regrouped on the border and, with liberal doses of economic and military aid from China and the United States, fought each other and the Vietnamese for the better part of the next decade. Indeed, by the time peace talks bore fruit in the late 1980s, Cambodians had been killing each other for some 20 years and roughly a quarter of the population, some 2 million people, had died for no particular end.

This is the *mise-en-scène* for Sebastion Strangio's study of Hun Sen and his role in contemporary Cambodian politics. His is the second act of the tragedy: a tale of the muddled authoritarian state that is cobbled together, first under Heng Samrin and then under Hun Sen, as war and peacemaking wind down and the rapacity-building forces of the market are granted free rein. Nothing goes as it should. Perpetrators of wartime atrocities are left at large, unpunished and unrepentant. International agendas for electoral politics and democratic pluralism are renegotiated and shunted aside. Foreign aid, forest cover, civic freedoms and due process all quickly go missing. Para-politics and state-sanctioned thuggery prevail. Reconstruction eventually gets under way and the economy begins to show signs of life but the emergence of a tiny class of well-dressed coffee drinkers in the cities is more than offset by the deteriorating conditions of the poor majority and the increasingly concentrated wealth and power of an interconnected elite.

Strangio does a fine job of describing a rather complex political terrain here but he still tends to oversimplify, tracing many of the country's problems back to a single cause—Hun Sen. Heading the state for some 30 years, Prime Minister Hun Sen and his organizational backers are arguably more responsible than anyone else for events and Strangio affords them near-proprietary control over developments, for better or—far more frequently—worse. One of the problems with this particular narrative, and the genre of political-national biography it reflects, is that it stops at the border, creating the impression that Cambodia's political circumstances are somehow unique.

This is simply not so. Viewed in broader context, Hun Sen's Cambodia is actually rather typical, just the sort of political system one would expect to find given the country's recent history. It bears ready comparison to a number of other polities in south-east Asia, having obvious precedents in Suharto's Indonesia and Ferdinand Marcos's Philippines. It also shares commonalities with subnational administrations such as Abdul Taib Mahmud's Sarawak and the Ampatuan Clan's Maquindanao. If one sets aside the need for a long-tenured avaricious autocrat, most (if not all) of the political organizations in south-east Asia appear to turn on elite-driven personalized power networks, widespread extrajudicial practices, predatory economic policies and—at times—brute force directed at recalcitrant citizen-subjects. Strangio seems to recognize that developments in Cambodia are a lot bigger than Hun Sen, and during the course of his study he regularly deploys 'political culture' to explain the man and his government. What he fails to point out is that Cambodia's 'traditional' political arrangements—hierarchic social orders dominated by inter-linked elites—were essentially regional in nature.

Hun Sen is clearly a force in contemporary Cambodian politics but Strangio has overstated his role. Irrespective of the country's political leadership, the results would have been the same—a dysfunctional constitutional monarchy held together by a coalition of entrenched political factions. The authority of any postwar Cambodian state, in turn, would have invariably been compromised and undercut by emerging economic interests.

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## North America*

**Global rules: America, Britain and a disordered world. By James E. Cronin.** New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2014. 416pp. £22.50. ISBN 978 0 300151 148 0. Available as e-book.

For a book on Anglo-American efforts to shape international affairs, *Global rules* has relatively little to say about the intricacies of this ostensibly most 'special' of relationships. Yet James E. Cronin is not offering another exploration of when and why the transatlantic alliance was intimate (or strained, as was often the case). Rather, this fine study explores American and British visions to shape global politics and world finance since the 1970s. Domestic and international political and economic crises towards the end of the decade triggered a shift, Cronin argues, which crystallized in both countries during the 1980s. The renewed Anglo-American relationship informed foreign policies that promoted free markets, market-based democracies and human rights; this contributed to the end of the Cold War and, furthermore, created the framework for global politics and economics. Championed most vigorously by US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the 'markets, rights and democracy' formula helped establish 'global rules' for the post-Cold War world. These guidelines—in reality, Atlantic rather than global—appeared to outline a path for stability and prosperity. Notwithstanding stern tests and turbulence during the final decade of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty-first century, especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 2008 financial crisis, the basic concept of encouraging market-based democracies remains alive today in Washington and London. Battered and bruised no doubt but, Cronin argues, it has not been dislodged by an alternative paradigm. The rules proved remarkably resilient.

*Global rules* is well researched and lucidly argued, and should therefore appeal to a broad audience. Based on wide reading in the secondary literature—including the latest works in a number of fields—and archival research in several American and British repositories, it also incorporates interviews with former (largely British) policy-makers and officials. Illustrating the critical domestic economic and political factors that informed US and UK foreign affairs, Cronin expertly guides readers through the international and economic crises that elites in both countries were responding to. The heart of the book—and its real strength—is an examination of the late 1970s to early 1990s. In many respects, *Global rules* is an assessment of the world that Reagan and Thatcher made. The two leaders were committed to 'a joint venture in remaking the political and economic landscape' of not only their countries (p. 108) but the world. The transatlantic conservative ascendancy was by no means a seamless, coordinated effort but the commonalities were more significant than the disagreements.

Cronin makes a strong case for Anglo-American prominence in the international sphere, although it was far from hegemonic. Other actors were active participants, especially

* See also Luis Martínez-Fernández, *Revolutionary Cuba*, pp. 1215–17, and Travers McLeod, *Rule of law in war*, pp. 1167–8.

Europeans during the collapse of communism and restructuring of the continent and China in the new century. While he acknowledges the role of Europe, China features rarely. An exploration of how others responded to the US–UK vision would require a quite different study, of course, although some consideration of how *global* the rules actually were could have been a useful addition to the argument. Indeed, while the importance of free markets in the Anglo-American formula is convincingly argued, rights and democracy occupy something of a backseat. For all the attention to human rights rhetoric and action, political crises and economics appear more important (especially in chapter three). The large, and ever expanding, literature on the 'human rights revolution' has highlighted the complex lineage of the concept in international affairs and the problems it posed for nation-states. Jimmy Carter may have emphasized the importance of human rights in US foreign policy but his successors had quite different conceptions of what this entailed and how to act accordingly, with the Reagan administration in particular keen to highlight Soviet abuses at the same time as waging extraordinary violence in the global South. Furthermore, eastern Europeans had myriad reasons for breaking the shackles of communism—'markets, rights and democracy' was not teleological. These are nonetheless minor quibbles with a superb account of how Anglo-American designs, whether realized or not, have tried to shape world order.

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**Superpower: three choices for America's role in the world. By Ian Bremmer.** London: Portfolio Penguin. 2015. 207pp. £13.10. ISBN 978 0 24121 677 4. Available as e-book.

Ian Bremmer urges Americans to choose what sort of role their country will play in the world in *Superpower*. He makes this plea in part due to what he describes as President Obama's rudderless foreign policy, which is exemplified, for him, by the National Security Advisor Susan Rice's long delay in releasing a National Security Strategy document because 'it would have been overtaken by events two weeks later, in any one of those [previous] months' (p. 169). To Bremmer, Obama has drifted from crisis to crisis abroad, bereft of any real strategy, simply reacting to events. He warns that above all else, Americans most choose a foreign policy strategy.

To his credit, the author aptly diagnoses what may well be one of the most important variables in the next two decades of international affairs: the foreign policy direction the United States chooses to take. The debate, Bremmer explains, is largely between three different approaches: an independent—some may say isolationist—America, 'Moneyball'—utilizing limited resources for maximum effect (derived from a baseball management system made famous by the film of the same name)—and indispensable America. To guide this debate, Bremmer provides three polemical arguments from each perspective which constitute the bulk of the book's analysis.

Independent America asserts that the United States has for too long been too engaged and exposed in the world. American allies have become too used to a free security umbrella, and the resentment of American enemies at its perceived imperialism has grown further. At the same time, the US public has grown weary of committing blood and treasure abroad because a 'superhero' foreign policy where America tries to be a global policeman. The chapter denies that this approach is 'isolationist' and instead argues that America can lead by example through investing more at home. Indispensable America offers a starkly contrasting vision that many proponents of American exceptionalism would find appealing. It argues that it is vital that the US maintains its global leadership position and pushes forward American values. If it fails to police the global commons then no one else will and this

would lead to a much more dangerous world for all. 'Moneyball' America provides a more 'goldilocks' approach by suggesting a strategy that utilizes American power only where vital interests are at stake. A 'Moneyball' approach recognizes that the US is a powerful nation, but not exceptional and by no means is it always right. It would look to avoid messy military entanglements in wars of choice, but not shy away from acting when American interests are clearly at stake. The book provides a useful and succinct guide to some of the overarching arguments surrounding US foreign policy strategy for laymen and advanced readers alike. It succeeds in creating a stimulating discussion that will hopefully provoke many to think more deeply about its core question.

Perhaps what is most surprising about *Superpower* is the book's conclusion, which is deliberately not foreshadowed in the introduction or the majority of the book. In fact, readers have to wait until page 198 (out of 204) to discover what the author actually thinks. Bremmer picks independent America, but he fails to make a particularly strong case for why or how—particularly as he concedes that America will find it difficult to resist calls from all corners to get involved in global affairs as the world gets worse. To be fair to Bremmer, he does not set out to explain the 'how' part, but he also falls down on the 'why'. His argument that there has been a fundamental generational shift in American public opinion away from international engagement may have already, rather ironically given his frustration with Susan Rice, been overtaken by events. For example, in recent months there have been opinion polls showing that while Americans are split over whether to send combat troops back to Iraq, a majority of young Americans are in favour. The book also doesn't really tackle the underlying problem of an independent America approach—who or what replaces the United States abroad. Bremmer makes a clear case for the US avoiding wars of choice, but he does not explain why it is not in America's interests to protect open sea lanes and international trade. Yes, America may pay a higher premium than others in protecting the global commons, but it also benefits far more from it. Of course this will change over time, but it seems rash to abandon the role before an alternative model is ready.

The argument that the US needs to invest more at home to provide a better example abroad is strong and has been well explored in other works—for example, in Richard Haass's *Foreign policy begins at home* (Basic Books, 2013). Nevertheless, Bremmer does not explain why America cannot have strong domestic infrastructure investment *and* play a global role—it is something it managed to do in many parts of the last century. Resources may be more constrained today, but it is simplistic to suggest that the US has a binary choice between guns and butter. Surely it can do at least a bit of both?

Overall, the author may be trying to fit too much into one short book to the detriment of his conclusion and he may have provided good answers to all of the above points in a longer study. Nevertheless, *Superpower* is a good summary of the current debate and well worth a read.

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## Latin America and Caribbean

**Brazil's Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international status. By Christina Stolte.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 220pp. Index. ISBN 978 1 13749 956 1.

One of the persistent questions running through the cut and thrust of Brazil's foreign policy debate during the last decade has been: why the turn towards Africa? As critics of the Workers' Party government consistently argue, trade with the entirety of Africa is lucky to

comprise 5 per cent of Brazil's international commerce. Government acolytes counter that trade is only part of the picture and that cultural affinity and political support in international institutions also justify the expanded engagement under the Lula and Dilma presidencies. Christina Stolte's book wades into the midst of this debate with a potentially much more interesting answer, arguing that Brazil's Africa strategy is grounded in a drive for international prestige and a longstanding ambition to raise the country's global status.

In an approach that will be familiar to seasoned Brazilianists, but likely a bit of a shock to those embedded in the western academy, Stolte builds her argument around an analysis of the actual and desired national identity of the country's foreign policy elite. As she rightly points out, there is a century-long tradition of aspiration to Great Power status in Brazilian foreign policy that has consistently seen its diplomats thrust themselves forward for a seat at key global governance tables. The innovation Stolte brings to the argument is a departure from the standard preoccupation with material power in foreign policy analysis in favour of a turn to social identity theory.

Stolte argues that there was an understanding among the country's foreign policy elite that if Brazil wished to be accepted as a Great Power it would have to act like one. The resultant challenge was twofold. The first was one of material capabilities, particularly its inability to marshal and project military or economic power much beyond its immediate neighbourhood. More significant is the second, namely a national identity and foreign policy tradition that explicitly eschew the sort of coercive practices habitual to a typical Great Power. It is only in the last 15 years that a new way forward has appeared through an apparent shift to a sort of rules-based multilateral order where ideas and the power of dialogue often matter more than brute force. Married to this is the rising importance of the ability to provide real solutions to the concrete problems of developing countries, something Brazil has amply demonstrated through its highly successful anti-poverty policies and which has proved to be extremely attractive to African partners.

The case Stolte sets out is that Brazil's lack of an assertive foreign policy tradition, new-found ability to provide proven social development policies and capacity to offer foreign direct investment and trade in volumes that do not overwhelm recipients have combined to create a magic foreign policy moment that has allowed the country to act like a Great Power. Moreover, the author sets forth some preliminary evidence to suggest that Brazil has, to a certain extent, been accepted in the Great Powers club, although perhaps seated on a temporary stool at the table, not yet ensconced on a permanent throne. While all of this is grounded in the context of offering an explanation for the strong turn towards Africa in the early 2000s, some of the most interesting parts of the book relate to Brazil's relationship with the United States and how the expansion of South–South ties has supported relations with Washington, instead of constituting a challenge to American pre-eminence in the region.

Although growing, the English-language literature on Brazilian foreign policy remains relatively small. Stolte's book stands as a useful contribution to this scholarship. Her development of social identity theory as an analytical tool for explaining Brazilian foreign policy is a refreshing break from power politics approaches often found wanting in the South American case. Her excellent survey of Brazilian diplomatic history, which is one of the best chapter-length primers on the subject currently available, also deserves a mention. The churlish might argue that Stolte could have provided more detail on what exactly Brazil is up to in Africa—a subject she does ably address—but this would miss the wider point of the book, which is to explain why Brazil turned to Africa, not the details of what it is doing there. Indeed, this is precisely the task much of the literature on Brazil in Africa fails

to undertake. As such, Stolte's book provides an important contribution to academic debate on the strategy behind one of the key shifts in post-Cold War Brazilian foreign policy.

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**Contesting trade in Central America: market reform and resistance. By Rose J. Spalding.** Austin: University of Texas Press. 2014. 350pp. Index. £39.00. ISBN 978 0 29275 459 1.

The onset of neo-liberalism in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s has attracted considerable scholarly attention, as has the subsequent reaction against it in the first decade of the new century, epitomized by the election of a range of left-wing governments and their ostensible rejection or modification of the once sacrosanct economic prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. Few studies consider the period as a whole and fewer still have brought the countries of Central America within their purview. Political scientist Rose Spalding's new book is thus doubly welcome for charting, in one volume, the rise and decline of fundamentalist market reform in a region that has always been more heavily influenced by the asymmetric power of the United States than the larger countries of South America. This is also the first work to examine in any detail the negotiation in 2003–2004 of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States (to which the Dominican Republic has also acceded), the embodiment of the region's move towards a more open economy, and the counter-movement that it engendered due to its profound socio-economic ramifications.

Spalding draws on an impressive number of interviews conducted over several years with more than 200 key informants at a governmental and business level, as well as representatives of a plethora of civil society movements. She presents insightful case-studies of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, as these countries illustrate variations in the process of market reform and reaction in all its phases. Costa Rica, for example, due to its strong social democratic traditions, exhibited a 'hybrid reform model' during the heyday of neo-liberalism, retaining state-run social services and resisting privatization of key sectors such as telecommunications; thereafter, it only narrowly approved CAFTA (in 2007, long after the other parties to the agreement) in a popular referendum that deviated from the regional norm of purely legislative endorsement and provided a contemporary instance of pragmatic right-wing modifications to the market model under President Oscar Arias (2006–2010). The author's primary interest clearly lies in the emergence of resistance movements: almost half her interviews are with civil society leaders and she grants as much space in her text to the attempt to sell the merits of CAFTA to the general public as to the progress and terms of the actual negotiations themselves. She devotes an entire chapter to the emergence of a diverse grassroots opposition to CAFTA, distinguishing between 'critic negotiators', who act within the rules of the prevailing system, and 'transgressive resisters', who challenge the very legitimacy of these rules; she is impressed by these movements' capacity for 'political embeddedness' (p. 237) and by their cultivation of regional transnational networks. The process of ratification of the agreement in the three countries receives extended treatment, since it provided a forum for contrary views to be expressed, even though legislative passage in two out of three cases examined was easily assured. A separate chapter details the specifics of opposition on largely environmental grounds to gold mining projects in El Salvador by US-registered mining companies, one of the few concrete consequences of a more open economy that are analysed in the book in any depth. Spalding closes with a lengthy consideration of how the 'populist left' govern-

ment of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2007–present), the 'incrementalist left' government of Mauricio Funes in El Salvador (2009–2014), and the aforementioned Arias government (the 'heterodox right') in Costa Rica—a reflection of the spectrum of response across Latin America as a whole during these years—have variously adapted to the post-CAFTA universe in terms of political change, their ability to adjust the market model notwithstanding endogenous and exogenous constraints, and the pressing need to alleviate high levels of poverty. Even Ortega's government, often lumped together by detractors with the 'contestatory left' in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, she finds, was limited in what it could achieve.

There are a few areas where the book might have said more. Spalding barely mentions Honduras and Guatemala (let alone, of course, the Dominican Republic) in her text. To what extent did these two countries conform to the variegated patterns discerned in her taxonomy of reaction? Nor does she dwell sufficiently on the crucial pressures that the United States brought to bear at key moments in the CAFTA negotiation process, beyond the exemplary general discussion of Washington's 'rule maker' role. There is an intriguing reference (p. 76) to CAFTA opposition coalitions in the US, but nothing further is said about them; were there any links with opposition movements in Central America? The author has a generally accessible writing style, and resorts only occasionally to political science terminology when discussing theoretical issues. Some readers may flinch, though, at the inevitably large number of acronyms that populate almost every page; less indulgence may be shown for the employment of unnecessary abbreviations, such as CCT for 'conditional cash transfer' and TRIM for 'trade related investment measure', as the terms appear too infrequently to warrant their usage. These are all decidedly minor criticisms when set against the author's stunning overall achievement.

All in all, the book provides a measured and non-partisan assessment of the process of neo-liberal reform and reaction in a region that has been rather neglected by scholars and commentators in the aftermath of the tumultuous upheavals of the 1980s.

*Philip Chrimes*

**Revolutionary Cuba: a history. By Luis Martínez-Fernández.** Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2014. 386pp. £39.00. ISBN 978 0 81304 995 3.

In July 2015, after 55 years without diplomatic relations, embassies were reopened by Cuba in Washington and by the United States in Havana. Speculation about the impact of *rapprochement* on Cuban society is rife and Cuba experts are in demand for comment. As author Luis Martínez-Fernández states: 'the historian's perspective allows us to turn towards the future the same telescopes that we normally point to the past' (p. 280); it is a good time to publish a history of revolutionary Cuba.

Writing that history is not so easy. Cuba studies 'is both politicized and polarized' (p. 11), as Martínez-Fernández recognizes. As a life-long Cuban exile, whose family 'endured the indignities of state-organized harassment', the author does not claim to be free from bias (p. 12). As a scholar, however, he has striven to write 'a balanced and honest scholarly book on the contentious and polarizing subject of the Cuban Revolution' (p. xiv). Doing so implies extricating himself from the restricted paradigm of 'Cubanology', the politically motivated school of interpretation which dominates English-language scholarship on Cuba (see e.g. Andrew Zimbalist's *Cuban political economy*, Westview Press, 1988, and Helen Yaffe, *Che Guevara*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 3–5). Cubanology began in the early 1960s with academic investigations and study centres effectively set up by the

Pentagon and the CIA. The key tenets of Cubanology are: the revolution of 1959 presents a rupture in Cuban history; Fidel (and now Raul) Castro is synonymous with the revolution, personally dominating domestic developments and foreign policy; there is no democracy and civil society is repressed; Cuban economic growth since 1959 has been negligible; and pre-1959 dependency on the US was replaced by dependency on the USSR (and subsequently Venezuela).

Martínez-Fernández endeavours to negate some of these precepts, for example by focusing on continuity in pre- and-post 1959 Cuba. In addition, while not referring to a 'civil society' as such, he recognizes political participation in Cuban society by grassroots organizations representing women, neighbourhoods, small farmers and children for example (p. 62), and concedes that revolutionary Cuba 'offered its own definition of democracy, in which discrimination on the basis of race and gender had been outlawed and sharply reduced' (p. 122). He acknowledges 'considerable progress' (p. 85) made by the revolution's social agenda and government investment in social welfare and education. Unfortunately, Martínez-Fernández fails to escape the Cubanology paradigm of Fidel Castro as a Machiavellian dictator obsessed with power. While Fidel Castro's protagonism is indisputable, the loss of all objectivity leads to a parody which fails scrutiny. Castro is portrayed as devoid of politics, principles, ideology and ethics. In typically Cubanologist mode, Martínez-Fernández describes post-1959 internal and foreign policy developments in Cuba as the result of Castro's 'triangulation strategies' (the choice of term varies, Samuel Farber, for example, refers to 'salami tactics' in *The origins of the Cuban Revolution reconsidered*, University of North Carolina Press, 2006), so those around him, friend or foe, are practically puppets unaccountable for their own actions. Consequently, Martínez-Fernández struggles to explain developments rather than merely observe outcomes. References to 'triangulation' do not help us understand the challenges and choices faced, the forces involved or the objectives guiding praxis.

This leads to contradictions, so even in part one, 'Idealism, 1952–1970', Fidel Castro was not, in fact, motivated by ideology or convictions of any type: he was 'the master triangulator [who] cunningly applied divisive strategies to purge the military, the cabinet, labour unions, the media, the Church, political parties, and other institutions' (p. 56); never mind that a revolution which does not replace old institutions, power structures and social relations with new ones is hardly 'revolutionary'. There is no suggestion that Fidel Castro was motivated by the material benefits of power. Indeed, Martínez-Fernández points out that he was from a wealthy landowning family and claims that he had enjoyed 'political protection' from members of the Cuban elite (p. 23). But without principles or convictions, why risk everything to launch an armed struggle around a progressive programme of agrarian reform, industrialization and the provision of health care, housing, employment and education? Fidel Castro appears irrational. How does the author explain the revolution's endurance since 2006 when Fidel Castro de facto resigned? We are only told: 'Raul Castro's regime has carried out triangulation strategies of its own but on a much smaller scale' (p. 281).

The book is compiled through secondary sources: there is no new research and arguably no new analysis. The misspelling of *this* reviewer's name in every reference to her own work is one of several mistakes: wrong dates (for example the tugboat incident and Maleconazo on p. 217) and mismatched references. Despite this, *Revolutionary Cuba* provides a useful overview of the 1952 to 2013 period, emphasizing the dynamic interrelation between events in Cuba and the United States. Is this, then, the book that holds the clues to future developments in revolutionary Cuba? While recognizing that 'making predictions about Cuba's

future has proven to be a treacherous endeavour' (p. 280), Martínez-Fernández goes on to do so. Writing in 2013, the author laments the United States' 'failure to achieve rapprochement' (p. 282) with Cuba. By that time, however, secret negotiations between the two countries were already under way.

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**Mexico's evolving democracy: a comparative study of the 2012 elections. Edited by Jorge I. Dominguez, Kenneth F. Greene, Chappell H. Lawson and Alejandro Moreno.** Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2014. 304pp. £35.50. ISBN 978 1 42141 554 3. Available as e-book.

Mexico's 2012 election was historic in that it saw the return to power of the previously hegemonic party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), by a clear majority in both presidential and congressional polls. Despite numerous irregularities involving campaign spending and accusations of vote buying, the victory by PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto was largely (and surprisingly) undisputed, with all three major parties accepting the outcome, in contrast to the contested aftermath of the 2006 presidential poll that saw Felipe Calderon beat Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador by a razor-thin margin. While the election results were not a surprise, they nonetheless raised a series of important questions about Mexican democracy. Why had voters re-elected the PRI after only 12 years of experimentation with another party in power, when the PRI itself seemed to be a spent force at the federal level in both 2000 and 2006 (when it came in third in the presidential election)? How did new electoral rules, established in 2007 after the controversy of the 2006 vote, impact on both spending and asset allocation in the campaigns? What was the effect of violence on voter preferences, given the Calderon administration's heavily criticized struggle against organized crime and drug cartels? To what extent is clientelism still a major force in Mexican politics and how does it play out during the election cycle? Lastly, how did parties embrace, and how were they affected by, the then-recent explosion of social media onto the political scene?

*Mexico's evolving democracy* offers answers to these questions and more, based on the result of the Mexico 2012 Panel Study. The first strength of the book is that the 2012 data provide the basis for detailed analysis of voter opinion, preference, perception and identity, providing statistical support for existing hypotheses about voter and party behaviour, and testing out new theories about Mexican elections. The second major strength is that the 2012 study builds on the results of the 2000 and 2006 Panel Studies, providing the basis for a historical comparative approach that offers important insights into change and continuity in Mexican electoral politics.

Chapters by Chappell Lawson and Kathleen Bruhn which provide an overview of the 2012 poll and place it firmly in the context of the two previous elections, are not only important for those new to Mexican politics, they also ring true to the keen observer of elections in Mexico, calling to mind some of the more remarkable events and controversies of the campaigns, and, of course, set the stage for more in-depth analyses later in the volume. The decisive role played by the candidates themselves, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their campaigns, receive particular attention. Bruhn's description is particularly relevant when placed alongside Kenneth Greene's later chapter on campaigns. He demonstrates that they do indeed matter, and that there were significant shifts in support due to events on the campaign trail in 2012.

Eric Magar's chapter on the impact of electoral campaign laws not only analyses the significance of the shorter campaign season (reduced from one year to only three months)

that was introduced after 2007, controls on negative campaigning and the differential impact of new rules on the various candidates, but he also focuses most tellingly on the deceptive factor of campaign spending limits. Although these limits meant that there was only minimal growth in spending by the parties in 2012, the provision of free airtime to the candidates by television stations implied a massive non-cash media subsidy that took effective spending per vote far beyond the levels seen in 2006.

The role of violence on voter turnout and preferences receives in-depth attention in the chapter by Vivanco, Olarte, Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, who estimate that three per cent of Mexican voters stayed away from the ballot box on election day due to concerns over security, that it probably negatively impacted Peña Nieto's support more than the other candidates', but that violence was far from being the defining issue of the campaign.

Clientelism has long been identified as a defining feature of Mexican politics and its role as a factor in elections is the focus of two chapters. Ana De La O's conclusion is that clientelistic relationships in Mexico have generated a greater tolerance for corruption; this ties in nicely with Simon Nichter and Brian Palmer-Rubin's analysis of the prevalence of clientelistic behaviour during the 2012 campaign. The PRI was seen by voters as being the most likely to offer handouts in exchange for votes, but this does not seem to have hurt their electoral chances, suggesting that the 'machine' may be experiencing a rebirth. An important element of this latter chapter, and one that ties in well with Magar's analysis, is that the authors identify the confusion over the role of electoral authorities in investigating these claims.

The final substantive chapter in the volume takes on the new issue of the role of social media in the election, and devotes particular attention to the phenomenon of the #YoSoy132 movement that helped to crystallize the divide between Peña Nieto and Lopez Obrador, with the latter gaining most support from the movement, and PRI voters rallying in response to slightly strengthen support for Peña Nieto.

Taken together, these chapters offer a definitive study of the 2012 election and provide insights that are entirely consistent with observations and assumptions made by non-academic analysts and think-tank scholars. Jorge Dominguez's concluding chapter pulls the book's diverse analyses together and presents readers with a convincing explanation of Peña Nieto's and the PRI's victory. One minor quibble with the work is common to many academic books. The time taken by publishers to turn the book around means that many of the very important questions raised by the contributors about the meaning of the election for the incoming administration's priorities and *modus operandi* were already outdated by the time of publication. This is not the fault of the authors, of course, but simply another argument in favour of moving towards a more streamlined and speedy publication process.

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