Book reviews

International Relations theory

Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy. By Francis Fukuyama. London: Profile Books. 2014. 658pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84668 436 4. Available as e-book.

For one who, in 1989, famously announced the end of history, Francis Fukuyama has shown a remarkable interest in it, and not just for its own sake, but also for history's relevance to the contemporary world. In 2011, his book *The origins of political order* (Profile Books) an Olympian survey stretching from pre-human times to the French Revolution, showed convincingly that human beings did not start out as isolated individuals who gradually came to form societies: they were socially organized from the start, just like their primate forebears. He then argued that as human societies developed, three basic categories of institutions emerged: the state, rule of law and mechanisms of accountability. Although states began as largely patrimonial enterprises, many of them came to uphold, at least in principle, the interests of all citizens—largely through achieving a balance between the three types of institution. Meanwhile, some other states had run into trouble because they had failed to build a workable balance between the three.

In this second volume, *Political order and political decay*, Fukuyama brings the story forward from the industrial revolution to today. He continues to be concerned with the evolution of institutions within individual societies, not with international institutions. He declares that his focus is firmly on how we got to the present, not on writing prescriptions for future improvement; and he insists that there are no easy answers to the question of how to improve government.

The 'political order' of his title is seen as a vital precondition of both peace and effective development. It can take many forms. Fukuyama describes in detail how Japan, China and other societies of East Asia are heirs to a long tradition of belief in a strong centralized state, and notes wryly that these countries have succeeded in developing economically whether or not the state concerned has effective democratic institutions. He indicates that in China, change in a democratic direction may occur not because of top-down mandates from the current leadership, which he sees as brimming with self-confidence, but from the astonishingly rapid emergence of a new middle class. As for various other parts of the post-colonial world, he suggests that it is an illusion to suppose that multiparty democracy can flourish in the absence of effective state institutions capable of delivering the administrative underpinning that all societies need.

The 'decay' of his title is no less fundamental to his vision. As he puts it: 'Political institutions develop over time, but they are also universally subject to political decay. The problem is not solved once a society becomes rich and democratic. Indeed, democracy itself can be the source of decay' (pp. 461–2). He is critical of the US system of government,

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which developed an administrative bureaucracy later than the other arms of government, and in which courts and political parties play outsized roles that are performed by professional bureaucracies in other countries. As for Europe, he refers several times to the failure of Greece and Italy to develop high-quality public administrations—a failure which is seen as a key part of the European Union's travails.

He repeatedly returns to the theme that weak government and weak state institutions are a cause of conflict and poverty. He acknowledges a deep debt to Professor Samuel Huntington's *Political order in changing societies* (Yale University Press, 1968), which had challenged simple propositions that economic development would be a smooth road ahead for many post-colonial societies. But he recognizes the strength of certain criticisms of the Huntington thesis. He accepts the argument that conflict is the result, not so much of development, but of poverty. As he puts it, many failing or fragile states are 'caught in a low-level trap whereby poor institutions fail to control violence, which produces poverty, which further weakens the ability of the government to govern' (pp. 48–9).

Despite his protestations to the contrary, many policy conclusions could be derived from his thorough, wide-ranging and trenchant analysis. The most obvious is that western states' emphasis on assisting the spread of democracy around the world is bound to run into difficulties in those countries where there is no tradition of the state providing meaningful benefits for its citizens or depending on taxes from them. He gives appropriately sober evaluations of outsiders' statebuilding assistance in countries as varied as Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia. All those concerned with the key foreign policy issue of stabilization of fragile societies could benefit from reading this book.

Yet it is on the very question of whether its propositions have universal validity that this deeply impressive study shows most signs of inconsistency. A reader of its historical parts could be forgiven for concluding that, so far as political systems are concerned, we need to beware of universalist approaches. Each society has its own ways of thinking, acting and living with institutions. Some make a mess of it. History really is still with us. Yet at the same time the Fukuyama of 2014, like the Fukuyama of a quarter of a century ago, shares at least some strands of a universalist belief. Perhaps it springs from the incurable exceptionalism of his native United States. In the first chapter he writes: 'I believe that a political system resting on a balance among state, law, and accountability is both a practical and a moral necessity for all societies' (p. 37). And in the concluding paragraph of the book he returns to this theme: 'there is a clear directionality to the process of political development … accountable governments recognizing the equal dignity of their citizens have a universal appeal' (p. 548). These statements are hard to square with his forswearing of prescriptive approaches. Such inconsistency may be logically problematical, but it is certainly interesting, and is especially so in this remarkable work.

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World order: reflections on the character of nations and the course of history. By Henry Kissinger. London: Allen Lane. 2014. 432pp. £11.00. ISBN 978 0 24100 426 5. Available as e-book.

It is difficult to separate aspects of this new book by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from the biography of the author himself. *World order* has two sweeping purposes: to provide a historical account of the development of the current international system and to suggest how the United States might reconcile different conceptions of order held by Russia, China, India and others with its own. With both a historical and an analytic

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dimension, this book is enlightening, well written and perceptive, with some chapters that are truly remarkable in their ability to pinpoint and distil how different societies see the world often in terms unfamiliar to American and European diplomats. But it is also subject to lapses and odd silences which break the flow of the narrative and raise questions about whether the author's personal experience and position in the Washington power structure have undermined the otherwise high quality of the book.

The central thesis of the book is that there has never been a single international order which encompasses the entire world; rather, most regions have produced their own distinctive orders driven by the leading states in the system. Europe developed the Westphalian system, marked by sovereign states and the balance of power; the Asian system developed differently, with China asserting itself as the linchpin of 'All Under Heaven', while Japan, India and others struggled to stake out an independent role in what Kissinger calls the 'multiplicity of Asia'. With a broad historical view, Kissinger argues that many of the convulsions in the Middle East today are due to the absence of a unifying regional order, as the Arab Spring revolutions led by middle-class moderates gave way to organized power grabs by Islamists and the military. In his view, the violence in Iraq and Syria today is also attributable to a lack of a stable and legitimate regional order. The task facing the United States, as Kissinger sees it, is to weave together a coherent global order which is reflective of the different views of legitimacy found in Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. While details of this order are not provided, Kissinger implies that this will be a modified worldwide version of the Westphalian order underwritten by American power. He argues that such a new world order must keep two elements—power and legitimacy—in balance and be sustained by the deft diplomacy of statesmen who recognize that order can only be built upon the already existing political and cultural foundations of the societies themselves. Ultimately, all of the major players must have a stake in the new world order or war will inevitably result.

Unsurprisingly, the strongest section of the book is the account of European power politics and the incorporation of states like Russia and the United States into that regional order. For Kissinger, the European approach, marked by pluralism and a cool calculation of the balance of power, is the only order which can travel to the global level, as it does not demand that all major players in the system recognize the imperial prerogatives of a leading state. He also provides a persuasive account of American diplomacy which is fair-minded to the idealist and realist dimensions of that tradition. Yet the silences and strained language in parts of the chapters on America are instructive. Kissinger is rightly proud of his role in opening diplomatic relations with China, yet leaves himself out of the account of how the bloody end of the Vietnam War unspooled the thread of America's concept of world order. He states blandly that the US has chosen to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq and implies that both decisions were costly for world order, but seems wary of directly criticizing Presidents Bush or Obama for these decisions. He even goes as far as to temper his account of the Iraq War debacle with a statement of personal affection for George W. Bush, thus reminding the reader of his own role in advising presidents in some of the fateful decisions he now criticizes.

Outside Europe, the book shows much more variation in quality. Drawing in part from his last book, *On China* (Penguin, 2012), his chapter on China is insightful and thoughtful, full of interesting personal asides and deep historical knowledge. His chapter on the Middle East, however, has a number of important flaws. He portrays Israel as a defender of the Westphalian order amidst a sea of chaos, while failing to acknowledge how some of Israel's own actions—such as its attacks on Lebanon and Gaza and its ongoing settlement project in

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the West Bank—have added to the disorder in the region. His account of the failure of the Arab Spring tends to be reductionist in attributing its cause to the rise of jihadi forces and to the belief that Islamic societies—often described in the book as a single whole—cannot countenance long-term, equal coexistence with non-Muslim states. Similarly, he portrays Iran almost stereotypically as a wily state given to dissimulation and tactical manoeuvres and implies that the Iranians are insincere about negotiations over nuclear weapons, without providing an account of the domestic and economic reasons why they find themselves at the bargaining table. Curiously, some regions of the world—notably Africa and South America—are entirely ignored in Kissinger's account, thus raising questions as to whether they are integral parts of this new global order or merely subjects of it.

In the end, Kissinger has provided a compelling statement of the problem facing the United States in building a world order with rising powers such as China, India and others, but he does not provide a comprehensive solution. This is probably due to the fact that Kissinger does not believe that there is one. He recognizes, in an elegant set of closing chapters, that the diplomatic game has changed dramatically in a wired, technology-obsessed world, but he concludes that it will always be the task of fallible leaders to craft modalities of coexistence between states with different perspectives on the legitimacy of the existing order.

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International organization, law and ethics

The status of law in world society: meditations on the role and rule of law. By Friedrich Kratochwil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 302pp. Index. Pb.: £18.00. ISBN 978 1 10768 107 1.

Kratochwil's *The status of law* consists of eight contemplative exercises on the subject of law in international society. Fundamentally, it is a critique of the usual suspects in International Relations: positivism, disciplinarity, progress; and it bases that critique on practice—how the law is actually used. The method is that of a 'conversation', in the heuristic sense. It's like Hermann Hesse's *The glass bead game*, where ideas tumble about and the player follows them, constructing links between them, in changing kaleidoscopes. The result is a lot of insight, but not much direction. The reader is invited to play the game and to understand that the law is a tool, not a programme.

If international law is part of a conversation, it weaves its way through several distinct discourses. One of these is the contemporary German enthusiasm for 'constitutionalizing'. Kratochwil points out that the original meaning of 'constituting' was the bringing together of different families and clans under a new law, Aristotle's *synoikismos*—and hence its possible application to international relations. This new 'constitutional' law then becomes the reference point for further changes in the normal 'regulative' law, providing us with 'an authoritative map' by which to orient ourselves in the context of change. The British constitution aside, however, he points out that the hoariest problems might—and often do—lie outside the constitution, and require war or domination to determine. Furthermore, practical solutions to problems frequently proceed without reference to 'codification' or to disputed constitutional principles, the European Union being an example. The point, first, is that you cannot neatly separate constitutional questions from day to day normal law testing and, second and following on, that much 'normal' law-making may have constitutional implications. The relation to international law and international order

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becomes at once obvious. It is no longer possible to view international law solely in contractual terms. It is constantly laying down some basic rules or constituting positions, but it is doing so in a fragmentary, disorganized and multiprocedural manner. Trying, then, to locate the basic constitutional principles in such an order—locating the 'constitution' in the United Nations Charter or the World Trade Organization agreements—the two major contenders—will seem arbitrary, to say the least. Too many requisites of a constitution remain outside both orders, for example human rights.

The second discourse is of progress and the emergence of a global community. Here it is not so much a pre-existent constitution, but a *telos*, or a direction, that might orient us, with judges creating the new order at the stroke of a pen. The candidates have been non-use of force, *ordre public* and a thick conception of human rights. Apart from the bumpiness of the ride, it is not at all clear that 'we are all on the same metaphorical bus' (p. 136). Not only is history too open-ended to allow for a determination of its direction, but the consequent, varied visions entail quite different political projects, from evolution to requiring revolution.

But the most extensive treatment is given to the discourse of rights, not least because rights are held in the modern liberal age to 'trump' all other values, and are conceived as 'an evolving cosmopolitan order embracing all mankind' (p. 202). Here there is a careful dissection of three major problematics: the conceptual minefield of third generation rights; the absence of absolute foundations; and the constitutive role of law, not as a chisel on pre-existent material, but as itself structuring social facts. Here, what stands out is the unintended consequence of a thorough-going rights discourse: an 'indicator of a pathology' (p. 231) in which claimants become clients and their power is transferred to professional rights claimers who act on their behalf. It is in this last section that Kratochwil gets down to his understanding of pragmatism, essentially as *aufgaben*, of 'taking care' (p. 291), and the making and remaking, through genealogical reconstruction, of the path that has led us here. The effect of this method is immensely clarifying and Kratochwil's 'meditations' are basic to any understanding of the diverse and sometimes very problematic role(s) of law in international society.

Cornelia Navari, University of Buckingham, UK

Time to react: the efficiency of international organizations in crisis response. By Heidi Hardt. New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. 272pp. £47.90. ISBN 978 0 19933 711 8.

Heidi Hardt focuses on an overlooked aspect of international relations: the influence of informal institutions on peacekeeping response. She argues that organizations with a more informal institutional atmosphere are better during crisis decision-making and therefore react more quickly to issues of conflict than organizations with a more formal atmosphere. This fills a gap left by much of the realist and rationalist literature, which portrayed these types of multilateral negotiations as a sum of national interests. Hardt's examples clearly demonstrate that there is much more at work than national interests in the negotiations of ambassadors.

Hardt examines four regional organizations: the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Each organization is studied based on how efficiently it responds to peacekeeping operations. Efficiency is measured by how quickly an organization gets from the initial demand for an operation to putting supplies on the ground.

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Hardt first provides the reader with basic information on the number of countries in each organization, and their average response times in some of their most recent peacekeeping missions. The author addresses an additional issue in the literature of the EU, noting the counterintuitive fact that although the EU has one of the largest budgets of the organizations studied, it takes nearly twice as long as the others to respond to a peacekeeping request.

Using interviews from 50 ambassadors, Hardt demonstrates that these differences in response times can be attributed to the formal or informal nature of each organization. The AU, OAS and OSCE foster a more informal culture, allowing ambassadors to deliberate and reach a consensus outside the meeting room. Ambassadors from the OAS, for example, state that all of their crisis decision-making occurs outside formal meetings. This allows for a quicker response because less time is spent deliberating in meetings. The EU, on the other hand, holds a large number of long, formal meetings which prevent the ambassadors from using informal means to reach a consensus.

Hardt provides interesting insight into the inner workings of regional organizations, and why these organizations respond to peacekeeping operations the way they do. She provides very important information on how they reach decisions and gives policy recommendations on how organizations can attempt to improve their crisis decision-making response. Hardt's use of a narrow scope allows the organizations to be compared across similar operations and similar types of decision-making, which renders the results much more impactful.

It would be interesting to see this method expanded over a larger number organizations, using more diverse decision-making scenarios. Hardt briefly explains why NATO was not used in the analysis, but, with fewer states than the OSCE, it would seem a reasonable and fascinating addition to the analysis. It would likely strengthen the argument of the book if more diverse types of decision-making were looked at. Furthermore, analysing economic and policy negotiations would bolster Hardt's argument by demonstrating that informal institutions have an effect on many different types of decision-making, not just in times of crisis or peacekeeping.

Despite the narrow scope of the argument, *Time to react* takes the first step in filling a significant gap in the literature. Hardt offers an inside look at how diplomats make decisions and how organizations can foster faster decision-making. The response time of the EU compared to the other organizations studied is an important distinction, given the previous praise of its capabilities. This book would be of interest for those who want to know why and how international organizations get things done.

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NATO beyond 9/11: the transformation of the Atlantic alliance. Edited by Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Benjamin Zyla. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2013. 347pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 0 23039 121 5. Available as e-book.

NATO's response to the attacks of 9/11 and its travails in out-of-area missions in Afghanistan and Libya have prompted a wide-ranging discussion of the alliance's condition and prospects. Given the multitude of opinions on its vitality and the wisdom of its twenty-first-century enterprises, a comprehensive account of the state and evolution of NATO in the aftermath of 9/11—such as the one *NATO beyond 9/11* sets out to offer—is a valuable contribution. Apart from tracing the evolution of the alliance in a number of areas, including military, geographical and political, editors and contributors attempt to gauge the influence of the

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events of 9/11, pondering whether the Al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington DC should be seen as bringing about a Kuhnian 'paradigm shift' for NATO.

The interrogation of the significance of 9/11 is a welcome enterprise, as is the overall conclusion of the book. The authors avoid the temptation of a simple explanation, which would approach 9/11 as a watershed ushering in an entirely new era of international politics. Instead, *NATO beyond 9/11* offers a more holistic analysis, which, while acknowledging the importance of the attacks, still places them firmly within the context of earlier trends (pp. 7–8, 326–9). Carl Hodge treats NATO's missions in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and in Libya as elements of the same, continuous arc of evolution (pp. 67–88); Ellen Hallams argues that 9/11 did not change the fundamental transatlantic dynamics at the heart of the alliance (pp. 221–3, 233); and Trine Flockhart proposes that while 9/11 and the ISAF mission accelerated the development of NATO's network of partners, they were not the sources of it (pp. 278–96). Equally useful is Tim Bird's chapter, in which the challenges NATO faced in Afghanistan are viewed not as evidence of a 'paradigm shift', but rather as 'perennial challenges' of burden sharing and the ability to marshal resources (pp. 118–39).

However, despite some excellent insights, one of the editors' main promises—to address the shortcomings of NATO-related academic theorizing (pp. 9–15)—remains unfulfilled. With the main theoretical contribution limited to applying well-established approaches to the post-9/11 evolution of NATO, the book does not offer a breakthrough in concept building. Applying the concept of a paradigm shift to NATO's evolution is also only partially realized: some chapters do not even address the issue directly, focusing instead on structured description of NATO's post-9/11 initiatives, and the editors do not offer an analysis of what exactly a paradigm shift might look like.

The book also perpetuates some of the staples in NATO-related debates, which do not necessarily help to sharpen the analysis. Chief among them is the tendency to divide European allies into old—western Europe—and new—central and eastern Europe—and to assume that the two groups have very different priorities and uses for NATO. The new members are presented as focused on territorial defence against Russia and reluctant to tackle threats prioritized by other allies. While it is true that central and eastern Europeans usually have at least one eye looking east, the cliché of a region exclusively preoccupied with the threat from the Russian Bear glosses over its interpretations of allied solidarity and its participation in operations in Afghanistan and the US-led mission in Iraq. Within ISAF, for example, Polish and Estonian troops deployed to two of the most dangerous Afghan provinces and did not apply the panoply of caveats that dogged other troops. Uncritically accepting the East–West division can lead analysts to ignore the more zig-zag shape of most NATO fault lines, with strategic and tactical divergence between, say, France and Germany or Italy and Norway, arguably comparable to those between the old and the new members. It can also prompt conclusions based on very shaky ground. Trine Flockhart, for example, blames the supposedly Russia-obsessed allies for blocking the development of NATO's partnerships networks, when a better question to ask might be whether these potential partners wish to see their relationships with NATO becoming more structured and formalized (p. 294).

Even with some theoretical and analytical shortcomings, however, *NATO beyond 9/11* is a useful contribution to the post-9/11 debate on NATO. The overview of NATO's activities and evolution in the twenty-first century is comprehensive and the book's nuanced approach to the significance of 9/11 for the evolution of the alliance makes it useful to analysts and practitioners wishing to ponder the impact any one event can have.

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Conflict, security and defence

Drone warfare. By John Kaag and Sarah Kreps. Cambridge: Polity. 2014. 195pp. Index. Pb.: £15.00. ISBN 978 0 74568 099 6. Available as e-book.

The leader of the free world, the world's most powerful democracy, a nation built upon a bedrock mistrust of an over-mighty executive, has a 'kill list'. Some of the names on that list are American citizens. Some targets are not named at all—rather they end up in the cross-hairs on account of the 'signature' of their behaviour as observed from afar. Increasingly, drones engage these targets remotely, not while they take part in active combat, nor even while in countries with which the United States is actively at war. Self-evidently, there are profound moral and legal questions which these efforts provoke, particularly as they seem now to be permanent features of a new global strategic reality poised ambiguously somewhere on the spectrum between war and not war. This book is an excellent primer on these particular aspects of the broader question of the implications of drone warfare. It would be highly useful as a set text in courses on military ethics and the law and war. It would also suit as an additional text in more general courses on contemporary security affairs.

The authors clearly have a view, which is that legally and ethically the current policy is wrong. The discussion of the relevant legal regime is lucid reading for the non-specialist, yet clearly grounded in a sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of the literature, the controversies and personalities within the debate, and sensible in terms of its prescriptions for a better way forward. The gist of the argument presented is that drones limit the blood and, to an extent, material costs of war strategies, which in turn diminishes—by design—the public visibility of policies that are potentially morally and legally questionable. The authors are refreshingly undogmatic about their conclusions, however, and are clearly sensitive to the pragmatic realist case, which is also compelling and for which others have constructed an ethical case (pp. 127–32). Not all readers will agree, but they would do well to consider the objections that are raised in this text.

To my mind, though, the case could be strengthened. This is not so much a criticism of this book, which works very well within its brief—and is admirably succinct and readable, moreover. It is, rather, that some of the issues that the authors touch upon could usefully have been expanded further. Two related issues are germane. First, the authors mention Luttwak's 'post-heroic warfare' thesis and inarguably locate the current debate over drones within that school of thought. But there has been much more written on this, including Martin Shaw's concept of 'risk-transfer war' (*The new western way of war*, Polity, 2005; reviewed in *International Affairs* 82: 1, 2006) and Colin McInnes's 'spectator-sport war' which is highly relevant (*Spectator-sport war*, Lynne Rienner, 2002). The West's quest for a more bloodless, cheaper form of war via technology is not solely connected to the development of drones. Second, though avowedly interdisciplinary, the book does not really do history terribly well. Consider this cogent critique of American policy: 'Through its isolation of the military actor from his target, automated warfare diminishes the inhibitions that could formerly be expected on the individual level in the exercise of warfare … Remote-controlled warfare reduces the need for the public to confront the consequences of military action abroad' ('The American way of bombing', *Harper's Magazine*, June 1972). That is not from 2002, or 2012, but from a 1972 study of a bombing system combining drones, remote sensors and a near real-time global command and control network stretching from the White House to the trigger buttons of B-52 bombardiers high over South-East Asia.

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It could be said that compared to the carpet-bombing of miles of jungle on the evidence of lorrynoises picked up by microphones monitored from half a world away, today's more precise targeted weapons, guided by high-resolution visual observation, do represent something of an ethical leap forward. As the authors acknowledge, the key question, strategically, ought to be: does it work? The evidence suggests that it does not; indeed, that the West has been chasing a form of warfare that is not just elusive but illusory—and not just in the last decade but for decades.

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The morality of private war: the challenge of private military and security companies. By James Pattison. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. 258pp. Index. £55.00. ISBN 978 0 19963 970 0. Available as e-book.

What is the difference between a mercenary and a state soldier? The answer is not nearly as intuitive as it might appear at first glance. Drill deeper, to the normative questions, and the picture becomes even less clear. What is the moral difference between privately enacted war and publicly enacted war? *The morality of private war* presents one of the most sustained recent treatments of this question.

James Pattison's contribution is part of a broader research programme on the ethical dimensions of non-state actors in conflict, including mercenaries, private military firms and pirates. He approaches the issue by addressing what, for some, is an uncomfortable analytical feature of private force: it is rather difficult to ascertain anything intrinsically wrong about warfare carried out by private contractors. As some scholars have noted in recent years, moral arguments against private military actors apply, to a significant degree, to state militaries as well. Pattison is concerned with two principal issues: the permissibility of private military force and whether private military force is preferable to public force. In this sense, his inquiry taps into the very old tradition of just war theory, in the context of a new phenomenon. Of course, commercial force for hire has been a part of warfare for most of history, but its emergence as a legal, transnational, corporate enterprise over the past two decades has brought its ethical implications into very sharp relief.

The morality of private war weaves its way through assessments of the morality of both public and private warfare, vindicating the moral rightness of neither. Instead, Pattison's sophisticated treatment establishes the relative desirability of public over private authority in the execution of warfare. The most compelling arguments arise from his cumulative legitimacy approach, which takes the moral legitimacy of a military as a matter of degree. In reality, war entails a violation of fundamental morality and the best philosophical compromise is to seek out the least bad option for deeply held principles. Ultimately, he rejects arguments in favour of using private military contractors. He does, however, leave some theoretical space for the possible justifiable use of private military contractors, specifically when they have very beneficial consequences for the enjoyment of human rights. But, in reality, these circumstances are few and far between. Convincingly, Pattison arrives at the nuanced conclusion that although private military force may, at times, be permissible, the cumulative legitimacy of a well-ordered, all-volunteer force should be preferred in general.

Pattison addresses the deep and contingent problems of using private force at three levels of analysis: the individual contractor's, the employer's and for the international system. At the individual level he finds that it may, indeed, be justifiable to participate in contract war under certain circumstances. Theoretically, the private contractor has greater decision-making autonomy than state soldiers in determining when to go to war. Thus, assuming a

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stricter adherence to the precepts of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, a contractor may, in fact, be preferable to state soldiers. In practice, however, this is unlikely. For the employer, their use of private military contractors does not necessarily undermine the moral legitimacy of the state, the democratic control of force or the military itself. But when considering the cumulative legitimacy of different forms of raising a military—conscription, volunteerism, private contracting—the private approach is less desirable. It is at the level of the international system that Pattison makes his most strident arguments against private force, suggesting that its provision has the potential to be far too destabilizing to international order. Together, the accumulated arguments against military contractors are enough to dismiss them as legitimate participants in modern just warfare.

Perhaps the book's most lasting theoretical contribution to the field is its expansion of the ontological scope of just war theory itself. Pattison is interested not only in a deontological and consequentialist account of the morality of killing in war, but also in *who* is deciding and, ultimately, pulling the trigger. Just war theory, he says, has a significant limitation—the parameters of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are too narrow to provide satisfying answers to the morality problem of private warfare. These traditional concerns are predominantly focused on the conduct of going to war and fighting in combat. The challenge posed by the military privatization is that the moral agent of just war theory and not simply its actions must be taken into account. Therefore, just war theory must be expanded to consider the legitimacy of the type of military actor who is participating in combat. This matters because the existing just war framework has been unable to properly account for the private military firm. Pattison's approach successfully bridges the gap between the centuries-old philosophical tradition of just war theory and the decades-old field of civil–military relations, while incorporating contemporary scholarship on private military contracting into his account. Thus, *The morality of private war* is a vital contribution to at least three bodies of literature and will be actively engaged with by scholars working in multiple traditions.

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Mixed emotions: beyond fear and hatred in international conflict. By Andrew A. G. Ross. London: The University of Chicago Press. 2013. 240pp. £59.25. ISBN 978 0 22607 739 0. Available as e-book.

Emotional politics is 'woven into the fabric of everyday life in a globalized and interconnected world' (p. 150). In this thought-provoking book, Andrew Ross examines the role of affect—the experience of emotion—in global politics. Drawing from the Rwandan genocide, the conflict in the Balkans and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, he outlines an original and convincing argument for why it is an area that deserves further attention.

Beyond being merely psychological reactions and impulses, Ross contends that emotions are products and forces that shape, and are shaped by, social interactions. He examines how they are conceptualized, moving beyond traditional approaches that isolate emotions such as fear, empathy, hatred and anger, to highlight the complex and overlapping qualities of emotions and the importance of what he terms 'circulations of affect'. This is a core concept of his work, defined as 'conscious and unconscious exchanges of emotion occurring in and through the process of social interaction' (p. 16)—and it is a compelling idea.

According to Ross, emotions are situated in the history, time, practices, norms and memories of the moment. Shaped by their context, they are key components of human agency, endowing it with creativity and helping in the development of collective agency:

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'Emotions exist inside individuals and fill the space between them' (p. 153). In contemporary politics this space is expanded as social media and mass communications extend the geography of affect and bring people together irrespective of their location—as witnessed during the Arab Spring. The contagious nature of affect, and its ability to unite people, means that a focus on emotion in international politics requires an appreciation of the connections between the global and the micro levels of social interactions in generating emotions. However, it remains unclear how one can quantify these different emotions and judge their strength.

Ross's argument builds on a rich and growing body of work on the role of emotions in international relations and draws widely from disciplines including neuroscience, psychology and sociology, as well as critically engaging with concepts within IR literature including constructivism, realism and cultural theory.

It is an ambitious book that aims to inform our understanding of contemporary phenomena and develop a framework by which to incorporate emotions and dynamics of affect into the study of current affairs. His methodology explores different social interactions to demonstrate how emotions are transmitted across three case-studies—terrorism, ethnic conflict and transitional justice. Through these, he assesses protests, speeches and participative rituals, and examines how narratives and accounts of events interact with lived experience. Admittedly, the case-studies chosen are quite prominent and obvious examples of emotion in international relations, and it would be useful to see how the approach applies to lesser known cases. This however means that the reader, already familiar with the emotions elicited by, and attributed to, the events, has a point of reference by which to engage with this relatively new topic. These case-studies reveal interesting dynamics. Through the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the attacks in Spain on 11 March 2004, Ross contrasts the different reactions to the events. In Spain, he argues, the Madrid train bombings led to popular criticism of the conservative government, whereas in the United States there was a wider outpouring of emotion, including grief and fear, owing to both the nature of the event and the historical connections made to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, which formed a frame of reference and underpinned and legitimized much of the narrative and tone of the response.

Ross then moves on to focus on ethnic conflicts, exploring Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Although he recognizes that emotions are central to nationalism and give force to symbols, rituals and identities, he challenges reductive ideas that these conflicts were essentially about identities or hatred. Instead, he looks at media of affect such as speeches, radio broadcasts and rallies, to assess how a diverse range of emotions contributed to the environment within which conflict took place and raised the level of tolerance and permissibility for violence. In his final case-studies on transitional justice, he turns to the International Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Within efforts at reconciliation and repair after conflict, he points to the limited awareness of tribunals of the production and potency of emotions in international legal processes, and the importance of recognizing emotions such as pain in the course of reconciliation to help communities heal.

This interesting and original book draws attention to the potential power and complexity of emotions within global politics. Through this contribution, Ross challenges existing concepts in international relations, while raising questions worthy of further study.

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Energy, environment and global health

European Union foreign policy and the global climate regime. By Simon Schunz. Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Lang SA. 2014. 364pp. Index. £35.00. ISBN 978 2 87574 134 9. Available as e-book.

The European Union has proclaimed itself a leader in global climate change negotiations. Since it is one of the most progressive players, academic literature has examined the EU's leadership role in numerous studies. However, the concept of leadership is ambiguous on whether being a leader means achieving one's aims. Some connect leadership to outcomes, whereas others focus more on the attributes of the leader, such as having ambition, taking initiatives and 'leading by example'. As a result, assessments of EU leadership on climate change differ greatly. Simon Schunz offers a refreshing new perspective, by using the concept of influence instead of leadership. Influence is directly connected to outcomes, as it is defined as 'the modification of behaviour, preferences or beliefs of the target actors in response to the influence attempts of the influence wielder' (p. 30). Schunz provides a clear, concise and sophisticated study to trace the EU's influence on other actors and on negotiation outcomes throughout the life of the climate regime in 1992–2012.

The book starts by outlining the conceptual and methodological parameters of the study, which are both rigorous and accessible. There are five chapters covering different phases of the climate regime's development, where Schunz traces the EU's influence on negotiating outcomes. He focuses on the formal UN negotiations, but refers to other forums and to bilateral relations when relevant. He finds that the EU's influence was mostly based on arguing: the EU was proactive in making proposals and often had a strong agenda-setting role; also, when backed up by strong science, the EU managed to convince others to accept the two degree target at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009. Its successes were much more limited when it came to bargaining situations, where parties exchange concessions. Its offer of 15 per cent reductions during the Kyoto negotiations did push others to raise their ambition, although its 30 per cent offer in 2009 was ignored. It has also managed to obtain Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by linking it to its support of Russia's World Trade Organization membership bid. A final analytical chapter brings all the insights together and paints a wider picture of the EU's influence across time. The conclusion includes some interesting policy recommendations based on the author's findings.

Schunz's analysis has many strengths: it is rigorous, thorough, deep and comprehensive. Each chapter paints a holistic picture and includes a great amount of detail. The negotiations are described in detail and these sections can get a bit tedious for readers who are familiar with them, but are a great resource for newcomers to the topic. Another very important strength is the use of the concept of influence instead of leadership. It allows for a much more focused analysis while continuing to speak to the leadership literature. As described in the findings, *attempted* leadership is a more apt description for the EU's actions in the climate regime: 'the EU tried hard, but seldom succeeded in mobilizing any followers' (p. 304). The long time frame of the analysis, covering 20 years of regime development, lends credence to the results, as it allows for a long-term view of the European Union's role, which reflects both internal developments—internal EU climate policy and expansion of membership—and changes in the negotiating environment—proliferation of negotiating forums, the increased importance of emerging countries.

There are some weaker points, though these are few and do not detract from the overall high quality of the analysis. For example, Schunz finds that the EU is more successful in

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its influence attempts when these are well tailored to the external context. Although this is intuitively appealing, it is not very helpful analytically or in terms of policy applications. With hindsight, it is easy to say what does and does not fit the external context, but it is extremely difficult to anticipate other actors' reactions to EU proposals, especially when they do not reveal their preferences. I also take issue with one of the policy recommendations, although I find the others excellent: Schunz suggests that the EU should consider employing more coercive policy instruments, such as threats to impose border tax adjustments on countries which do not take any significant mitigation measures. Coercive tactics are high risk and literature on negotiations notes that they can make other actors more intransigent. One needs to be in a considerable position of power to employ such tactics credibly, and besides ethical issues, the EU's power in the climate regime has waned, as acknowledged by Schunz. Despite such minor criticism, this book is highly recommended, both to those interested in EU foreign policy and to those interested in environmental politics. Academics and practitioners alike will find this book valuable.

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Globalizing oil: firms and oil market governance in France, Japan, and the United States. By Llewelyn Hughes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 272pp. £54.00. ISBN 978 1 10704 199 8. Available as e-book.

Llewelyn Hughes has earned a place for *Globalizing oil* on the eye-level shelves of any library of political economy or the oil industry. The book aims to explain the shift in the 'compacts' between the oil industry in the United States, Japan and France and their governments, where 'compact' refers to a stable balance of expectations and responsibilities, rather than to formal arrangements. Although the book goes back, in some detail, to the period before the Second World War, the focus is on the changes which have taken place since the late 1970s, after the governments of oil-exporting countries took control of production in their territories from western-based international oil companies which had previously enjoyed concessions there. As a result, a large part of global oil trade no longer took place between the exporting and importing branches of the integrated international companies, but between exporting companies owned by the national governments and the mainly privately owned refining and marketing companies in importing countries; this created the open and competitive commodity oil market which persists today. *Globalizing oil* describes how the governance of oil in the US, France and Japan adapted to these changes. Major findings of the analysis are that, although provoked by changes external to the group of industrialized countries, the 'compacts' in these countries have been heavily influenced by the legacy of the previous period and by the interests of the enterprises in these countries in adapting to the new situation.

By framing the analysis in this way, Hughes aims to test the concept of institutional change in terms of political economy and to remedy the scarcity of studies which place the evolution of oil governance in the context of broader trends. Though free market ideology was not the major driving force, the changes which took place in the governance of international trade in oil were compatible with it. The OECD countries were moving away from government control and management of enterprises in general—including oil enterprises in some countries—towards liberalized markets, free movement of investment and the general subordination of sectoral interest to broader economic growth targets.

There are three areas chosen to demonstrate different characteristics which, Hughes shows, can be attributed largely to the legacy of previous practices and to industry responses to new environments. In the US, with domestic oil resources, the industry had developed a

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dual structure of large companies with important international investments, and domestic producers mainly concerned with their position within the American market. US governance of the oil sector reflected shifting balances between these interests and those of consumers, and national security. Despite some consolidation, this has persisted and domestic production has been stimulated by recent developments. In many European countries, including France, there was a legacy of state-sponsored—and partly state-owned—oil companies. These enterprises were keen to develop their international activities as a source of growth and profit more attractive than the protected French market—and short-lived Algerian concessions. EU governments concentrated on securing oil supplies by EU and International Energy Agency cooperation in stockpiling—and in the UK by promoting North Sea development—rather than by promoting overseas investment. European domestic oil markets were de facto liberalized, while the European Commission concentrated on Europeanizing the gas and electricity markets. In Japan, by contrast, a legacy of government support for a number of competing local refining and distribution companies was replicated after the change. These companies have not been vertically integrated like those in France, and government attempts to promote overseas upstream investments by Japanese companies, without any upstream management or assets, were largely unsuccessful.

Globalizing oil is a diligently researched book which describes, in terms of political economy, the evolution of oil governance in three important countries against a background of changing global oil markets. The author makes good use of the analytic tool of a 'compact' and describes in detail the circumstances which lead to the compact being changed and the factors which shape the new compacts in these countries. But one needs to look elsewhere for a discussion—in terms of 'compacts'—between oil-exporting countries and foreign international oil companies on the one hand, and governments of oil-importing countries on the other. In many cases, before 1970, these compacts rested on a colonial or quasi-colonial relationship between particular pairs or groups of countries. The withdrawal of European influence, especially from the Middle East and Indonesia, was a backdrop to the nationalization of foreign oil assets, the breakup of vertically integrated companies and new relations between foreign investors and 'host' oil-exporting countries. There may be an effective new compact—the commodity markets—for international trade in oil, but this is not the case for the governance of foreign investment, as is shown by the failure of the Energy Charter Treaty to establish new compacts between the international companies and most of the oil exporters, particularly Russia.

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International partnership in Russia. By James Henderson and Alastair Ferguson. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 2014. 336pp. £68.55. ISBN 978 1 13735 226 2. Available as e-book.

Putin's energy agenda. By Stefan Hedlund. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2014. 265pp. £48.95. ISBN 978 1 62637 069 2.

The Ukraine crisis has put economic ties between Russia and the West under unprecedented scrutiny and strain. The crucial energy dimension is no exception. These two books offer a timely opportunity to consider the experience of western companies and their role in Russian energy development.

James Henderson and Alastair Ferguson's study of international oil companies (IOCs) offers an ideal blend of academic rigour, empirical research and deep practical experience. It should be read by anyone wishing to understand not only Russian energy, but Russia.

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At its heart is a theory of bargaining more nuanced than the standard models of IOC–state interaction. In an opaque, unpredictable and weakly institutionalized environment, where the state is captured by vested interests, a well-connected local partner is a prerequisite to doing business in Russia. The partner's core competence is 'local knowledge', a perhaps euphemistic term that encompasses not only a deep understanding of politics and bureaucracy, but the relationships, informal practices and methods needed to protect business and make deals. But relative bargaining strength shifts over time. On the one hand, the foreign investor's sharing of technical and managerial skills diminishes the value of its contribution; on the other hand, the local partner has powerful incentives both to prevent the foreign investor from acquiring valuable local knowledge and to preserve the larger system that makes this indispensable. This dynamic drives a new version of the classic obsolescing bargain, weakening the position of the foreign partner and often forcing its exit.

This model is well supported by survey evidence and case-studies, and most vividly illuminated by Ferguson's experience as head of gas for TNK–BP—so far one of the biggest Russian–western partnerships. He richly illustrates the local culture and practices—short-term, aggressive, exploiting weakness, a 'win-lose' mentality—which a foreign partner faces, the pressures and threats applied to those who resist local interests, and the elaborate deceptions woven to mislead and disorientate. His conclusion has relevance beyond the energy sector: 'senior Russians did constantly try to keep the foreigners confused and off guard, using deception and misinformation as key tools. They also understood that in any difficult situation, the more chaotic things became the more likely they were to win'.

What prompts the use of these methods? The authors find that the main cause of tension in energy partnerships is more subtle and obscure than mere distributional conflict. Rather, the Russian side often seeks to push through investment decisions which lack commercial rationale but serve as side deals for senior Russian managers to navigate the complex web of relationships and obligations that define their position within the wider Russian system. For Ferguson, this reflects the deeper truth that maintaining power, rather than creating wealth, is the ultimate driver of behaviour in Russia.

Yet this study maintains that, while difficult and risky, partnerships in Russia can be lucrative and successful. They are most likely to work when the foreign partner takes steps to break the monopoly on local knowledge by acquiring its own capacity for managing relationships and checking on its partner. The authors set out a sound framework of recommendations to achieve this, though it remains unclear how effective it can be in the face of the fierce local resistance they document so well. They see promise, too, in the evolution of partnership models from joint ventures covering single asset-to-asset swaps, such as those concluded by Rosneft with ExxonMobil and Statoil. These, they argue, can incentivize broader, more stable and durable alignments. Nonetheless, the 'game of perpetual motion' between partners must always be played with rigour and care.

The authors' insight into the ultimate primacy of power over commerciality invites further reflection. They stress the continuities of the Yeltsin and Putin eras, in particular the colonization of institutions by vested interests perpetuating a system defined by relationships rather than rules. Some would argue this understates the significance of the changes wrought by Putin, in particular the return of major energy assets to a resurgent state and the ambition to fashion usable instruments of influence for an 'energy superpower'. Has this added a new and rougher grain to Russian thinking and practice, a foreign policy corollary to the primacy of power in partner relations?

In his study of Russian energy policy Stefan Hedlund raises this issue, but hastens to dismiss it. While acknowledging Russia's manipulation of energy dependence on small

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neighbours, there has been, he states, no 'early master plan' or 'detailed agenda from the outset' to use energy as a foreign policy tool against, for example, the European Union. Few, though, would propose the straw man of a 'master plan', but many might argue that the Putin presidency brought a set of concerted reflexes and methods about how, and to what ends, power should be used, including in energy policy. Despite its title, President Putin is largely absent from Hedlund's book, which invokes such abstractions as 'endogenous institutional adaptation' and 'the burden of history' to explain a system driven by 'hosts of vested interests, all with their own short-term agendas'. If this may feel unsatisfactory, the story of Russian energy development charted here makes clear the growing vulnerabilities which Russia faces, three of which stand out. First, Russia's heavy reliance on energy exports to fund a bloated state has only grown with the country's failure to modernize and diversify significantly. Ironically, this failure might itself be a consequence of an energy 'resource curse' distorting institutions and the rule of law. Second, Russia's assertiveness has provoked adverse international reactions, notably the loss of influence to China over Central Asian gas exports and the EU's determination to diversify its energy supply and apply competition law to Gazprom. Third, the rapid rise of shale gas production in the United States has begun to disrupt Russian policy—for example, in the suspension of the Shtokman project—and will continue to do so when the US begins exporting gas.

Henderson and Ferguson explore the challenges facing IOCs in Russia, while Hedlund examines those facing Russia itself. This leaves us with a complex and contradictory picture. On the one hand, future Russian energy supplies will come from challenging offshore and unconventional sources, in which western companies have great experience and their Russian counterparts little. Western expertise will therefore be more important than ever if Russia is to maintain production as current fields decline. On the other hand, the Ukraine crisis has drained the Russian–western relationship of trust; sanctions have added new political risks to doing business in Russia, as well as constraining the transfer of oil technologies. Meanwhile, Russia has responded by deepening its energy ties with China, whose acquisition of stakes in Russian energy projects will open a new chapter in the handling of local partners and local knowledge. It remains to be seen whether Russia will find rising China a more amenable partner than the West.

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International history*

MI5 in the Great War. Edited by Nigel West. London: Biteback Publishing. 2014. 425pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84954 670 6. Available as e-book.

Nigel West is one of the most prolific writers on intelligence in the United Kingdom. Indeed, since the early 1980s, he has averaged a book a year. His most recent offerings have been edited collections of historical dictionaries, encyclopaedias and, such as the book here, reproductions of hitherto unavailable texts. Much like his earlier two volumes on the Guy Liddell diaries, *MI5 in the Great War* is the work of someone else. Originally conceived by the Director General of MI5, Sir Vernon Kell, in the aftermath of the First World War, the main content of *MI5 in the Great War* is a historical account written by Lucy Farrer, an

* See also Stephen Long, *The CIA and the Soviet bloc: political warfare, the origins of the CIA, and countering communism in Europe*, pp. 214–15, and Ian Rutledge, *Enemy on the Euphrates: the British occupation of Iraq and the great Arab revolt*, pp. 199–200.

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academic who had served in MI5 during the war. As West reveals in the introduction to the book, the work was commissioned to protect Kell's organization: by detailing its wartime successes, Kell hoped to secure its postwar future. This certainly happened, but whether or not Farrer's book helped is another question. Farrer herself produced an enormous tome. As West tells us, she sifted through hundreds of different investigations in the MI5 registry to produce a monumental record of over 2,000 pages, split across ten volumes. Her book focused on how well MI5 had done in discovering, monitoring and countering the German espionage networks affecting the United Kingdom since 1905. Her conclusion, perhaps unsurprising given her commission, was that it had been an unquestionable success.

In this edition, West has abridged her enormous history into a book of 425 pages—plus two appendices. The book, as it appears here, is split into chronological chapters: one for the prewar period, then one chapter for each year of the war—though 1915 and 1916 are combined. West's introduction is useful, albeit short. He makes it clear that some aspects of Farrer's work remain classified owing to the need, even after all this time, to protect the identities of those concerned. Herein lie several problems for the reader: Farrer's book, as it is reproduced, contains no annotations. At times, some explanatory detail would have helped, particularly given that the book is—presumably—intended for a wide readership. More troublesome for the academic reader is that it is never clear where abridgements have been made. The chapter on 1918, for instance, is a tiny fraction of the length of other chapters. We are never told why. Similarly, the vast majority of the book concerns the lives of myriad German agents. What is missing is any detail about how these operations were received in London or how MI5 reacted and adapted to the threat. Perhaps these are also missing in the original, but we simply don't know. A conclusion, written by West, would have been a tremendous help.

Despite these reservations, Farrer's book is fascinating and fun. The colour and personality of some of the agents shine through; this is no drab account but a fast-paced and readable history. Although she probably would never have anticipated that her hard graft would ever see the light of day, some 90 years after it was written, Farrer's own introduction, reproduced in the book, is first rate. Many of the lessons she identifies in investigatory work, and the characteristics of those who undertake the work for MI5, are as useful today as they were when the book was written. On reflection, it is quite a shame that Farrer's name does not appear on the cover or spine of the book. Apart from a short introduction by West this is, after all, her book.

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American grand strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II. By Andrew Buchanan. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 311pp. Index. £60.00. ISBN 978 1 10704 414 2.

The theme of Andrew Buchanan's book is clearly stated in his introduction, where he writes: 'Viewed in the light of America's modest and often inconsistent prewar aspirations in the region, its emergence barely five years later as *the* predominant power in the Mediterranean stands out in sharp relief. By the end of World War II, the United States had replaced Britain as the major power in the region with its influence resting on its wartime operational experience, on the continuing presence of American arms, and on its residual network of airbases, ports and military depots. Behind this lay the largely invisible but always critical networks of contacts forged by American diplomats, businessmen, aid workers, technical advisers, intelligence operatives, and military officers … which make

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international relations—and great power hegemony—work … This book is a study of this dramatic transformation' (p. 5).

This is a worthy theme and, on the basis of American and British archives plus secondary literature, the author has written a workmanlike volume. The chapters on Spain and French North Africa, the account of the activities of and rivalries between the various American agencies, such as the State Department, the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration, and the emphasis upon the personal role of President Roosevelt, are particularly illuminating.

However, the book has its shortcomings. The most important of these, perhaps, is that the author fails to make any direct use of the considerable source material and scholarly literature emanating from the Mediterranean countries themselves. One does not expect command of all the languages spoken in the Mediterranean, but does Buchanan have no knowledge of French, Spanish or Italian, the languages of the three countries upon which he concentrates? It would have added much valuable grist to his mill if he had shown evidence of knowledge of the relevant literature in any one of them.

Second, the author tends to overemphasize the novelty of his central thesis. After all, both Matthew Jones, in his *Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44* (St Martin's Press, 1996), and Simon Ball in his *The bitter sea: the struggle for mastery in the Mediterranean, 1935–1949* (HarperPress, 2009)—to mention but two English scholars—bring out the decline of British power in the Mediterranean and the rise of that of the United States during the period concerned. (Both authors, incidentally, are cited by Professor Buchanan.)

Finally, there are occasions when the author claims too much prescience on the part of the United States. In the case of the Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944, for example, the diversion of troops and equipment from Italy to southern France prevented the Allies from advancing more rapidly into northern Italy—as the British wished—and so gave more time for the Bonomi government to negotiate an agreement with the predominantly left-wing Italian Resistance, thus preventing a possible clash between the latter and Allied troops. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that this consequence was intended. It cannot, therefore, be proof of superior American 'politico-strategic understanding', as Professor Buchanan would have us believe (p. 207). If the United States ended up as the new hegemon in the Mediterranean, it was more the result of its sheer power—both military and economic—than any other factor as, indeed, the book demonstrates.

In conclusion, however, it must be emphasized that despite these shortcomings, *American grand strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II* is well worth reading and is a valuable addition to the existing literature.

Geoffrey Warner

Winding up the British empire in the Pacific islands. By W. David McIntyre. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. 304pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 0 19870 243 6.

This opus is the latest addition to *The Oxford history of the British empire companion series*. It differs from its predecessors in a number of significant ways. It is the first volume to have a single author, thus ensuring a greater degree of topical uniformity. The author, a professor emeritus at the University of Canterbury, in New Zealand, and an authority on the constitutional evolution of the Commonwealth, has also, uniquely, undertaken for it a copious amount of research in the UK National Archives, including material on the late 1970s that has only recently been made available to researchers. In addition, this is the first volume in the series devoted exclusively to the process of decolonization in a given area; it is the kind

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of holistic approach that might profitably be emulated in a future offering on the path to independence in another insular imperial domain: the Caribbean.

The decision taken by the Labour government of Harold Wilson in 1968 to withdraw from east of Suez, although it took longer than projected to implement, is often taken to mark the symbolic end of the British empire—a suitable termination point for general histories of its rise and decline. The real 'death warrant' of empire in Oceania—unknown to the British public at the time—according to McIntyre, was in fact the circular dispatch to the officials concerned, signed on 13 June 1975, announcing Whitehall's decision to proceed with the 'accelerated decolonization', wherever practicable, of the remaining dependent territories, which by 1981 was to leave only Pitcairn in the Pacific under British administration. *Winding up the British empire* is, contrary to the book's title, far more than a narrow study of this late phase of decolonization. The overall process of decolonization in the Pacific, 'as ad hoc and diverse' (p. 20) as the original acquisition of territories at the end of the nineteenth century, is framed, for example, within the ongoing debate about the implications for the old Commonwealth of the gradual accession of a multitude of small states, an issue that was also, at a later date, to colour thinking at the United Nations. Decolonization is analysed almost entirely from the point of view of the policy-makers, the 'official mind' of decolonization as it were, rather than, say, from a Fijian or Gilbert Islands vantage point, except in its final stages. McIntyre lays out in some detail the proposals of the various bodies set up at different junctures after 1945 to consider the final constitutional destination of Britain's smaller possessions, the Pacific Future Policy Committee of 1961 being the first to look exclusively at the region; all dismissed any prospect of viable independence for the disparate islands, placing them in a category he dubs '"never" land'. Despite pressure from the United Nations after 1960 to expedite decolonization, three developments in the 1960s in particular—financial crises leading to a reduction in Britain's overseas commitments, the crises over Southern Rhodesia and Aden that put it on the defensive at the UN, and administrative reorganization signalled by the closing of the Colonial Office in 1966 and the consequent diminution of a genuine ethos of stewardship—'completely altered the whole context of decision-making' (p. 129), all of which were to affect Oceania.

The focus of the book is not entirely on official British policy. Australia and New Zealand, which spearheaded the original acquisition of the island territories, are accorded their due as 'pioneers' in decolonization. New Zealand was the only colonial power in the area to vote in favour of UN Resolution 1514 in 1960 and quickly led the way by granting independence to Western Samoa (1962) and free association status to the Cook Islands (1965), while Australia abruptly decided to grant independence to Papua and New Guinea in the mid-1970s, with implications for the future of the Solomon Islands. There is some discussion of US territorial claims, especially to certain islands in the Gilberts, and of French policy as it pertained to the Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides, giving some feel for the stance of other colonial powers in the region; this points to the need for a more integrated approach to the subject.

McIntyre provides eminently lucid accounts of each territory's distinct road to independence. Most of the cases deal with rather dry constitutional issues—changes in forms of representation, the growth of ministerial responsibility and the diminishing role of the colonial governor—that evoked little clamour: the least contentious move was Tonga's release from protectorate status in 1970, which required just a simple exchange of letters. The fairly lengthy chapters on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Kiribati and Tuvalu) and the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), however, provide some real drama, entailing secession, the plight of the Banabans (the only issue to have any public salience in Britain thanks to a vocal lobby

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group), and Anglo-French military intervention in July 1980 to suppress a separatist rebellion *à la Mayotte* on the island of Santo.

In sum, the book excels at providing a broader context for the factors that served to propel the unforeseen decolonization of Britain's Pacific island dependencies. It is an exemplary contribution to the Oxford series and to the overall literature on decolonization that has, understandably, mainly focused on Africa.

Philip Chrimes

Europe*

Urgences françaises. By Jacques Attali. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard (Collection Pluriel). 2014. 236pp. Pb.: £7.20. ISBN 978 2 81850 393 5.

La France au défi. By Hubert Védrine. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard. 2014. 174pp. Pb.: £11.00. ISBN 978 2 21368 108 5.

In this brace of books, two lions of the French left cry out for radical reform in their country. But their roars have yet to resonate. Everything about both of these men qualifies them more than virtually any others to analyse and recommend the policies that should place France on a firm footing for the future. Jacques Attali is a pure product of the French educational meritocracy. He was first in his class at the École Polytechnique and third at the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), as well as graduating from the elite École des Mines engineering school and from the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He taught economics at Paris Dauphine university and at the École des Ponts et Chaussées, another top French engineering academy. Attali was a special adviser to François Mitterrand, the French president, at the Élysée Palace in 1981–91. He left to become the first president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London. He is a founder of the not-for-profit PlaNet Finance, the largest provider of microfinance funding and services in the world. Hubert Védrine has even greater direct policy experience than Attali, having been more at the business end of power than an intellectual observer. Védrine also attended Sciences Po and ENA before joining the French Foreign Ministry. He then moved to the Élysée Palace, also during the presidency of François Mitterrand, first as a diplomatic adviser, then as presidential spokesman, before being appointed, in 1991–95, the president's chief of staff. Védrine was then French foreign minister in 1997–2002.

Attali presided over a commission, appointed by the right-wing president Nicolas Sarkozy, then newly elected, on how to 'liberate' French economic growth, resulting in a *Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française: 300 décisions pour changer la France* (La Documentation française, 2007). Similarly, Védrine answered Sarkozy's call to present a report on France and its struggles with globalization, *La France et la mondialisation: rapport au Président de la République* (La Documentation française, 2007). Among Attali's more than 50 books, one prominent title is *Une brève histoire de l'avenir* (Fayard, 2006), published in English as *A brief history of the future* (Arcade Publishing, 2009). Similarly, Védrine wrote *Continuer l'histoire* (Fayard, 2007), published in English as *History strikes back: how nations, states, and conflicts are shaping the 21st century* (Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

Both published their most recent prescriptions for France following the election of François Hollande as French president in the spring of 2012. Attali begins his examination of 'French emergencies' on two positive notes, explaining that the world at large

* See also Simon Schunz, *European Union foreign policy and the global climate regime*, pp. 182–3.

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and France within it hold great promise for the future. Among French strengths he cites a unique geostrategic position as well as strong institutions, a credible army, balanced demography, an improvement in the position of women, increasing security at home, high-quality infrastructure, a relatively well-protected ecology and innumerable sources of talent, as well as high-quality agriculture, world-leading companies in industry and services, an outstanding quality of life and a globally recognized language (pp. 37–54). He then turns to the negative side, with a catalogue of woes encompassing everything from the fact that the French dislike each other, that they shun capitalism and that France never became a proper maritime power—to which he attributes a lack of a trading mentality; instead France has a 'rentier' or entitlement mentality—going on to decry poor performance by the state, the educational system, national debt, lack of social mobility, a housing shortage and the exodus of the best and the brightest. Following a chapter on how France refuses to reform itself, trapped in its entitlement mentality, Attali explains that France only progresses by revolutions. He forecasts either decline over decades or a new revolution in the next two years. Then, reviewing how other countries such as Germany, Sweden, Canada, Italy and Poland effected reforms, he calls for a French 'national mobilization' around ten initiatives, ranging from reform of government to debt control, reinforcing the military, promoting a vision for La Francophonie and for Europe and enhancing the knowledge and networked economies. In his brief conclusion, he expresses doubt that France will choose the path of reform, but has faith that it can.

Védrine's *La France au défi* is more narrative, but covers many of the same issues. Picking up on his globalization report, Védrine begins with a series of 'denials and mirages' that the French are operating under, before demolishing French exceptionalism and the country's inability to learn from others. At this point, he reviews France's 'unrecognized strengths'. It takes him longer to turn negative than Attali, but, in subsequent chapters, he explains that the French no longer believe in France and that the French system creates its own obstacles. Védrine is exigent, saying no set of international obligations will save France (read, European Union budget restrictions) and there is no excuse for the French not to make the necessary efforts themselves. He concludes with a shorter list than Attali of necessary reform areas—education, innovation, immigration, justice—that could be the objectives of a grand coalition.

The greatest value of both these books lies in their articulating the problems of France in a clear and comprehensive manner. The voices arguing for recognition of those problems, moreover, come from the socialist camp, indeed from some of the most experienced and respected thinkers on the left. Both books call for attitudes and actions based on cooperation and consensus, rather than conflict and confrontation—a serious change of manner from the old ever-in-opposition left.

But the books, and their authors, leave us hanging when it comes to how to implement their policy prescriptions. Attali and Védrine are among the most intelligent and audacious minds anywhere along the spectrum of French politics, and both are now firmly in the centre. The dire circumstances they describe, and the radical reforms they propose, may require more of them, as senior statesmen, than analysis and recommendations. Charles de Gaulle, who returned to run France when himself a senior statesman, wrote at the beginning of the first chapter of his book on leadership, *Le Fil de l'épée* (Plon, 1932): 'Au commencement était le verbe? Non! Au commencement était l'action!'—'In the beginning was the word? No! In the beginning was action!'

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Parochial global Europe: 21st century trade politics. By Alasdair Young and John Peterson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. 304pp. £55.00. ISBN 978 0 19957 990 7.

Surprisingly, while trade policy has been one of the first and most important supranational competences of the European Union, a comprehensive book on this policy domain was not on the market before this project by Alasdair Young and John Peterson. It is, therefore, an understatement that this is a timely contribution—all the more because trade policy has come to the centre of political and public attention in the EU lately, with the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US since 2013.

Young and Peterson have been working on this project since 2003. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this is like having started a book on social media in the same year as Facebook or Twitter were founded. Many things have changed in global and EU trade politics over the past ten years, all of which Young and Peterson skilfully incorporate into this book; its subtitle is indeed apposite. But this book provides much more than a simple historical overview of EU trade policy, a description of how EU trade policy is made or an analysis of EU policy positions *vis-à-vis* diverse trading partners. What distinguishes this book from articles or book chapters on the subject is its analytical depth. The authors argue that it is inappropriate to speak of one homogenous EU trade policy field, rather the domain is composed of very different trade *policies*, or 'trade policy sub-systems'. These trade policy sub-systems are clusters of decisions that impact on EU trade flows with different interest group constellations and on decision-making rules and dominant policy objectives. How these variables produce trade policy positions is also influenced by the relative power of the EU, which varies over time and relative to that of trading partners. Consequently, decisions on the EU's unilateral trade programme with developing countries—the Generalized System of Preferences—have a completely different dynamic than bilateral trade negotiations with the United States or anti-dumping measures against China. Overall, the authors convincingly show that EU trade policy can be understood as a composite domain. Their approach demonstrates that the inconsistencies and puzzles within EU trade policy, often the object of scholarly analyses, are not surprising and obscure, but understandable and even predictable.

It remains to be seen whether the analytical framework put forward in the book, which works very well to explain past EU trade policies, will work as effectively in the future. It could, in my view, turn out to be increasingly difficult for EU trade policy-makers to protect their policy subdomain from other corners of EU policy-making. Trade negotiations with the United States are also about energy; geopolitical and geo-economic relations with China; the position of Turkey; developing countries in the EU's 'pyramid of preferences' and the EU's regulatory regime. Perhaps twenty-first-century politics makes for less compartmentalized EU trade politics, without distinctive policy subsystems.

This is an indispensable book for students and scholars of EU trade policy. The book and its approach can easily and interestingly be confronted with more detailed accounts of EU trade policy issues that use different theoretical perspectives. Moreover, the book leaves fascinating questions unanswered such as: how can this subsystem approach explain that TTIP negotiations have been successfully launched in 2013 after two decades of frustrating attempts? The authors hint at the, in my view, very plausible hypothesis that the EU's trade power is beginning to depreciate, and that one of the drivers for the TTIP negotiations is exactly the realization that rules can no longer be set in Brussels alone, but that the EU and the US will have to cooperate in the future.

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The politics of the Black Sea region: EU neighbourhood, conflict zone or future security community? By Carol Weaver. Farnham: Ashgate. 2013. 178pp. £57.10. ISBN 978 1 40946 366 5. Available as e-book.

The international significance of the Black Sea region has increased since the end of the Cold War, due in part to its geopolitical importance and the wide range of security challenges it faces. A key transit route for oil and gas from Russia and the Caspian region, it is home to a large number of unresolved conflicts. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO to the shores of the Black Sea means that the wider region has become an arena where the interests of Russia and the West meet and sometimes collide. Thus, developments in the Black Sea region now have broader and more direct implications for European security, highlighted most recently by events in Ukraine and the ongoing tensions between Russia and the West.

This book investigates the political, economic and security challenges facing the wider region. It provides a broad overview of the history, political systems and policies, conflicts and future trends of the region, as well as the role of key external stakeholders such as the EU, NATO and the United States. It sets out to explore three core themes, reflected in the title: the idea of the region as an EU neighbourhood, a conflict zone and potential future security community. The opening chapter, designed primarily for 'background information' (p. 13), provides an introduction to the countries that constitute the wider Black Sea region, outlining key political features, as well as domestic and foreign policy influences. Carol Weaver notes that all 'are either members of the European Union or its geographical neighbours' (p. 39), a point that underlines the significance of the region: as the borders of European organizations such as the EU and NATO have edged eastwards, greater attention has been paid to stability on the periphery.

Subsequent chapters focus on the presence and role of external stakeholders, particularly the EU and US, and their strategies in the region. Examining the Black Sea region as a part of the EU's 'neighbourhood', Weaver explores the impact of concepts such as Europeanization, democratization and regionalization on EU policies, as well as the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Lisbon Treaty. Democratization is covered again in the chapter on tensions between Russia and the US in the region, and Weaver notes Russian suspicions of western attempts to promote democracy within its 'domain' (p. 69). Further chapters cover the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, which have implications not only for stability in the Black Sea region, but also for Europe and the wider international community, and for the region's important role as a transit route for oil and gas from Russia and the Caspian region.

This broadbrush approach represents one of the weaknesses of the book: it is simply trying to cover too much ground, meaning there is insufficient detail or analysis and the central themes are not developed enough to be fully conclusive, undermining the utility of the book. From the recent political histories of the nine countries comprising the wider Black Sea region, to democratic peace theory, the establishment of the EU and NATO, energy politics, conflict, realism and spheres of interest, there is simply far too much ground to cover; at times, different chapters read like stand-alone analyses. This book has also fallen victim to the dynamic nature of contemporary international relations and contains sections that are already out of date, including references to the Nabucco pipeline project, Russian concerns about access to the Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol in Crimea and Mikheil Saakashvili potentially holding on to power in Georgia.

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Nevertheless, this book does provide a good overview of the political influences shaping the post-Soviet development of individual countries in the wider Black Sea region and is a useful reference tool for those seeking an introduction to the complexities of the region and the challenges it faces in the twenty-first century.

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The last Stalinist: the life of Santiago Carrillo. **By Paul Preston**. London: Harper Collins. 2014. 432pp. Index. £30.00. ISBN 978 0 00755 840 7. Available as e-book.

Santiago Carrillo became a figure of importance in 1970s Europe, as he insisted that democratizing western communist parties offered models for the Soviet bloc, perhaps even ushering in new Prague Springs. In Spain, during the twilight of the Franco era, the then best-known Spanish leftist undoubtedly contributed to a relatively peaceful democratic transition 'by helping to convince the right of the moderation of the left' (p. 336). Until his death in 2012, he cultivated an avuncular image, which Paul Preston now categorically demonstrates, in a scintillating and unsparing biography, to have been a total sham.

Carrillo emerges as a strangely contemporary figure, immersed in political work from an early age, a natural bureaucrat with little personal hinterland, who got a vital start through being born into a leading socialist family. As head of the socialist youth movement in the tense years before 1936, he denounced gradualism and championed social revolution. Carrillo contributed to the 'intensification of hatreds in Spain' and wielded much influence in the Civil War (p. 64). Having taken the sizeable socialist youth movement into the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), he became public order chief in the besieged capital. Thorough research by Preston leads to the conclusion that Carrillo played a leading part in the greatest single atrocity on the Republican side when, in late 1936, thousands of imprisoned opponents were summarily executed as Madrid seemed poised to fall. Preston reveals an inveterate survivor who, out of Spain for over three decades, was ever ready to be in tune with the required Soviet outlook of the time.

In exile in France and wartime Russia, he graduated from being an apparatchik to Stalinist leader. Preston links him with the elimination, or betrayal, of leading militants who showed any trace of autonomy and charges him with the likely murder of his first wife. Those who had advocated guerrilla warfare in Spain after 1945 were denounced as traitors, even though he had also backed this ill-fated move. As he climbed up the party, he mimicked the exiled communist party chiefs of Eastern Europe who purged local militants for allegedly losing touch with Soviet orthodoxy.

Preston mistakenly places the Hungarian dictator Rákosi in Bulgaria (p. 167). But his account of the ideological shifts which Carrillo adapted himself to is an assured one. Prior to becoming party leader in 1959, he dismantled the legendary status of his predecessor, Dolores Ibárruri. Talented subordinates, who contended that the modernization of Spanish capitalism and the decline of polarization ruled out the politics of revolution, were expelled. But he soon plundered the reconciliation strategy advanced by Jorge Semprun and Fernando Claudin, major intellectuals in their own right.

Carrillo's break with the Soviet Union, managed in stages during the 1960s, was performed with the same opportunism and ruthlessness which had enabled him to be a master in inner party warfare. His daring improvisations were facilitated by his quick intellect and enduring capacity for party work. But he had little understanding of conditions at home and he faced the rise of talented activists—including numerous lawyers—who would simply not be bossed around by a wily autocrat. Tensions escalated when he endorsed the

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restoration of the monarchy without consulting any level of the PCE. As the party splintered in the early 1980s, his last role was to be the perennial one of crushing internal dissent.

His political acumen at least enabled him to contribute to a peaceful retreat of the dictatorship. He was assisted by the fashionable radical intellectual, Régis Debray, whose 1974 interview with him, conducted in a luxurious Cannes villa, sanitized his image before the world. He gained further lustre from preaching Eurocommunism in a dangerous, bipolar world and his new-found image even disarmed ultras at home with long memories of his Civil War role.

Preston offers a very perceptive and well-documented appraisal of an ambitious, resourceful and utterly ruthless—though outwardly congenial—European communist who survived many vicissitudes to die at the age of 97. He reveals the life of someone who graduated from being a despotic Stalinist to an elder statesman and it is not entirely without lessons for our own times. The stamina and ruthlessness which Carrillo exhibited as his political world collapsed around him in the 1930s are qualities which may need to be emulated by the current generation of young left-wing leaders in different parts of Europe, as they find increasing obstacles in the way of fulfilling their ambitions. So this is a book not merely of relevance to connoisseurs of modern Spain.

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Russia and Eurasia*

Ukraine crisis: what it means for the West. By Andrew Wilson. London: Yale University Press. 2014. 224pp. Pb.: £12.00. ISBN 978 0 30021 159 7. Available as e-book.

The term 'information war' has never been so aptly used as when it is applied to Russia's continued military campaign against Ukraine and its post-Yanukovych political leadership. Russia's propaganda campaign has been as vital in its efforts to subjugate Ukraine as its military efforts. First, it has mobilized the Russian population behind a policy of naked aggression, while convincing them that it is fundamentally defensive. Second, it has created a counter-narrative of the events in Ukraine that has obliged those pushing to confront Putin's aggression to constantly disprove his falsehoods. The need to continually re-establish the truth and explain the reality of the situation has eaten up vital time, which Russia has used to press the offensive. War is a political act, and as the old saw goes: 'in politics, when you are explaining, you are losing'.

Andrew Wilson's account of Viktor Yanukovych's overthrow, and the Kremlin's violent response to it, should be read not so much as a work of scholarship or journalism, but as an act of counterpropaganda. This is not a criticism: *Ukraine crisis* is a welcome and necessary attempt to provide a coherent narrative of the events in Ukraine following the start of the Euromaidan protest movement in November 2013. Wilson places the political aspirations of the Ukrainian people themselves, and the extraordinary sacrifices they have been willing to endure to achieve them, at the heart of this narrative—and rightly so. That said, *Ukraine crisis* benefits enormously from Wilson's considerable academic expertise in Ukrainian and post-Soviet politics, and his application of a scholarly approach to the subject at hand. Care is taken to establish a detailed chronology of the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, aided by extensive interviews with local activists and officials. This helps provide a structure and coherence to a conflict that has often appeared chaotic to those watching it develop daily.

* See also James Henderson and Alastair Ferguson, *International partnership in Russia*, pp. 184–6, and Stefan Hedlund, *Putin's energy agenda*, pp. 184–6.

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This approach has its drawbacks. Many of the activists and other sources used by Wilson are, by necessity, anonymous. Others, such as the Ukrainian military analyst Dmitry Tymchuk, are of questionable reliability. Wilson does not always make sufficient allowance for the fog of war, particularly in his accounts of the political manoeuvrings of oligarchs supporting the Donbas insurgents. Hindsight may be 20:20, but it can also make opportunism and luck look like strategy. The book is also, necessarily, something of a first draft of history, and the situation in Ukraine has developed considerably since the 5 September ceasefire which serves as its endpoint. Nevertheless, it is likely to be a key text for future researchers, and provides a strong foundation for future editions, once certain facts are more solidly established.

Wilson also takes care to analyse the Ukraine crisis in context. The Borgiaesque excesses of the Yanukovych era are presented as the predictable outcome of decades of corruption, fecklessness and incompetence on the part of Ukraine's political elite—including Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Wilson is also frank in his assessment of the challenges facing Petro Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk. While Ukraine's new governing tandem unquestionably offers better prospects for Ukraine than Yanukovych's kleptocracy, it is still reliant on the support of regional oligarchs of uncertain loyalty and intent. *Ukraine crisis* also highlights how the political and ideological exhaustion—or less charitably, bankruptcy—of Ukraine's neighbours has fuelled the crisis and kept it from an effective resolution. The fundamentally cynical 'virtual politics' that has underpinned Putinism cannot survive in a world where Ukrainians are able to engage in the kind of meaningful democratic politics that their Russian brethren have been denied. This is why the Kremlin has expended so much energy trying to smother Ukrainian democracy in its crib. The European Union is castigated for its descent into technocratic post-modern politics, which has failed to address Europe's economic problems while simultaneously draining the EU of its sense of purpose and mission. Wilson is rightly scornful of EU attempts to convince Ukraine to sacrifice its future to 'resolve' the crisis, instead of concentrating on mounting an effective response to Russian aggression. This is all the more ironic given the role of the EU in inspiring Ukraine's democratic activists to flock to the Maidan in the first place.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the most serious challenge to European and western security since 1989, and arguably since the end of the Second World War. It has been pushed to the back burner by other crises such as the rise of Islamic State. But this does not change the fact that a nuclear power has begun literally rewriting the map of Europe using military force. Wilson treats the issue with the seriousness it deserves, and recognizes Russia's aggression in Ukraine as a sign of things to come, not an isolated event. Policy-makers would do well to read his book and take notes.

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The limits of partnership: US–Russian relations in the twenty-first century. By Angela Stent. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2014. 355pp. Index. £16.95. ISBN 978 0 69115 297 4. Available as e-book.

The US–Russia relationship has been struggling under the combined weight of numerous disagreements, including how to respond to the war in Syria, Russian asylum for Edward Snowden and Russian accusations of US interference in its domestic politics. The war that erupted in Ukraine in 2014 has ruptured the US–Russia relationship further, with each side blaming the other for starting and then inflaming the crisis. Each side has imposed economic sanctions on the other, resulting, as Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has stated, in the ruination of the positives of the 'reset', and a situation that is tantamount

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to economic warfare. Indeed, both sides have become embroiled in a proxy war providing financial, material and political support to the warring parties in Ukraine. As a result, there is much talk among officials and experts on both sides of a 'new Cold War'—the start of a prolonged period of tension in relations between the US and Russia.

Although it was published this year, the drafting of this book was completed before this rupture and so misses these latest, possibly era-defining developments. Nevertheless, *The limits of partnership* is an important contribution to the literature, and is a book that deserves a wide readership. While much of the narrative will be familiar to Russia watchers, in offering a sober and accessible overview of the relationship, the book provides important historical ballast and context that is too often overlooked or forgotten by commentators and policy-makers alike.

Angela Stent has considerable experience and expertise drawn from her time both in academia and in the US government. As the list of interviewees for the book makes clear, she is particularly well placed to assess the US side of the question. The text is punctuated with useful explorations of the 'recurring' and 'unresolved' (p. 257) debates between those who sought a more pragmatic foreign policy approach to Russia and those who argue that the US should link foreign policy cooperation to questions of Russian domestic politics; as well as discussions of the roles of Congress and the White House and the various structural reorganizations in practicalities of the making of US policy towards Russia. But the book is intended as an exploration of the relationship from both sides, and Stent also provides an overview of Russian positions by making good use of speeches by Russian officials, particularly those given by Vladimir Putin, and supplements this with interviews with a number of former Russian officials and prominent commentators, and her regular attendance at the Valdai discussion club, a forum that facilitates access to prominent Russian policy-makers and observers.

The book opens with a brief prologue that sets the scene with the dialogue between George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev at the collapse of the Soviet Union. It builds on this in eleven substantive chapters, set out broadly in a chronological framework, following the evolving relationship through the Clinton–Yeltsin, George W. Bush–Putin, Obama–Medvedev and finally Obama–Putin eras, and laying out the questions central to the relationship, such as Iran, arms control, missile defence, counterterrorism cooperation, European security, the George W. Bush/Dick Cheney administration's 'Freedom Agenda' and the 'colour revolutions'. This structure allows Stent to emphasize the point that the overall framework of the US–Russia relationship has not changed much over the last 20 years: the relationship has been driven disproportionately by the personal ties of the leaders of both sides; this personalization becomes problematic when the incumbents change and the main questions and problems remain broadly constant—and unresolved.

An important thrust of Stent's argument is that there are underlying divergences in world-views of the US and Russia that narrow the range of ways partnerships can be established, while simultaneously broadening the possibilities for disagreement. Indeed, over the last 25 years, there have been four resets in the relationship, she reminds us, but—as a result of these divergences—these have in effect been sailing against the wind, as each partner sought something the other was unwilling or unable to give. Stent's conclusion that hopes for new partnership had again evaporated once the fourth reset—initiated by President Obama in 2009—reached its limits in 2012, sets the scene well, therefore, for the current state of relations and reminds us that this is the culmination of years of disagreements rather than a new departure.

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Conflict, crime, and the state in postcommunist Eurasia. Edited by Svante Cornell and Michael Jonsson. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2014. 296pp. ISBN 978 0 81224 565 3.

The selection of the areas covered in this book is unusual since they represent a very widespread set of pieces in the post-communist puzzle. Most of the areas covered—Tajikistan, the Caucasus, Georgia, Moldova and Transnistria—were once part of the Soviet Union, while Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR and the two other countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, were part of Yugoslavia. What these regions do have in common is the experience of brutal internal conflicts and a very painful transition to what is, in various degrees, the troubled unknown. All of the countries are still facing difficult years ahead, though they represent a spectrum, with Georgia at one end being the closest to what could be a functioning democracy, despite its recent political tensions, and Afghanistan facing a very bleak future at the other. Watching countries in which democracy is yet to be discovered is a difficult task. This is maybe one of the reasons why all of the authors use mainly English language sources.

One of the editors and author of two chapters, Svante Cornell, focuses on the opium industry in Afghanistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, concentrating on the movement's activities outside Uzbekistan. Johan Engvall covers the Tajik civil war (1992–97) and the subsequent slide of the country into what appears to be a narco-state. The chapter on Chechnya, by Murad Batal al-Shishani, describes Chechen organized crime well, but suffers from the lack of Russian language sources, treating the region almost as if it was not a part of the Russian Federation.

Georgia's turbulent recent history has been explained in many publications, especially after the brief Russo-Georgian war, but Niklas Nilsson, though using only English language sources, presents an excellent picture of Georgia's internal conflicts, with a brief but very good description of the security sector reforms and state decriminalization. The Transnistrian conflict, temporarily frozen, but likely to simmer again if the fight between the Ukrainian state and its large and powerful Russian minority is not peacefully concluded, is covered by Alexandru Molcean and Natalie Verständig, and includes interesting Moldovan and Russian sources. Jana Arsovska presents the mixture of wars, transnational crime and politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a well-researched and well-written chapter. Her conclusion could suggest that this relatively new member of the European community is one of the least stable countries in the region and should be carefully watched. The other weak link in the increasingly democratized Europe is Kosovo, the subject of the last chapter written by Michael Jonsson. Liberated by NATO intervention and recognized by only slightly more than half of the UN members and 23 out of 28 member states of the EU, Kosovo merits more attention from the organizations monitoring human rights abuses and transnational crime. The author's depiction of the problems and failures of the post-conflict reconstruction of the country is very good.

If the individual chapters covering eight areas—the editors recognized North Caucasus as a country (p. 211), while Transnistria is not recognized by the UN or any international organization—will be of interest to students and scholars of these regions, the introduction and the concluding chapter, both authored by the editors, will be of little practical use beyond the world of academia. Readers may be confused not only by the unusual choice of countries and regions covered but also by the editors' examples and arguments bringing in Nagorno-Karabakh and Zapatista's 1990 rebellion in Mexico to reinforce their arguments (p. 206), or may wonder what they mean by 'this problematique' (p. 218). The argument

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that western countries prioritize stability over the rule of law is debatable in view of our interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan—the book's editorial deadline was before the West destabilized Libya without trying to establish the rule of law there.

As with many books authored by several experts, the delivery deadline appears to be about two years before publication. This does not diminish the content or the quality of individual chapters. The strongest point of the book is that all the contributors are experts in their subject areas and have made their chapters informative and interesting.

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Middle East and North Africa

Enemy on the Euphrates: the British occupation of Iraq and the great Arab revolt. By Ian Rutledge. London: Saqi Books. 2014. 471pp. £24.50. ISBN 978 0 86356 762 9.

The centenary of the start of the First World War has been marked by an outpouring of publications analysing nearly every dimension of what was a truly global conflict. This has filled many of the lacunae in the literature, such as the paucity of works addressing the tangled legacy of the first western military intervention into Mesopotamia in 1914 and the subsequent creation of the modern state of Iraq in 1921. Ian Rutledge steps into this void with a fast-moving account of the uprising that galvanized local opposition to British attempts to formalize their occupation of Mesopotamia, and which continues to reverberate across Iraqi politics a century later.

British and Indian troops occupied Basra in November 1914 in order to safeguard the oil interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British Petroleum) at nearby Abadan and to protect the strategic flank of the vital land and sea routes to India. Expecting neither a prolonged engagement nor significant local opposition, Indian Expeditionary Force D advanced rapidly towards Baghdad in 1915, only to suffer a humiliating defeat and surrender of its garrison at Kut al-Amara in April 1916. This came just months after the Ottomans had inflicted a similarly cathartic blow to British objectives at Gallipoli and necessitated a redoubling of British–Indian forces to regain the initiative and minimize the damage to British prestige occasioned by the setbacks. Baghdad was captured on 11 March 1917 and British control was extended throughout the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul by the end of the war in November 1918.

Rutledge guides the reader through the twists and turns of British policies towards Iraq with clarity and aplomb. He describes how oil became a 'first-class British war aim' (p. 117) only very late in the war, in July 1918, setting in motion a last-minute scramble to take control of Mosul before hostilities ended. Pen portraits of key 'personalities' such as Arnold Wilson, Gerard Leachman and Gertrude Bell add considerable colour to the story of how a small cadre of British officials in Mesopotamia succeeded in operating without oversight from London in the chaotic yet hugely important months that followed the end of the war, when big decisions taken elsewhere about the future of the Middle East failed to translate into on-the-ground realities in Mesopotamia. During this period, 'those officials responsible for determining the political status of the territories … became increasingly bogged down in trying to untangle the complex web of promises made and obligations undertaken which had been so casually adopted in the general struggle to defeat the Turks' (p. 135).

In the growing gap between lofty pronouncements of support for 'self-determination' emanating from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the deepening of the instruments of British control in postwar Mesopotamia, a powerful backlash among local tribal sheikhs

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and religious notables took root. Rutledge is particularly strong on the socio-political and economic currents that coursed through the series of tribal uprisings that began in Najaf with the murder of the British assistant political officer in March 1918 and culminated in the great Iraqi revolt between June and September 1920. This included close cooperation between Sunni and Shi'i leaders in 1920 in a strategy designed to conceal 'the demand for independence' behind 'a veil of religion' because of British reluctance 'to intervene in what were, ostensibly, religious gatherings' (pp. 182–3). In addition, Rutledge publishes remarkable documents that chronicle the outreach of both sects to Baghdad's Christian and Jewish populations, whose coffee shops were 'inundated' with circulars stating that: 'We in the country are partners in happiness and misery. We are brothers and our ancestors lived in friendship and mutual hope. Do not consider in any way that the demonstrations carried out by the citizens affect, in any way, your rights' (p. 187).

Such manifestations of cooperation and collaboration were almost entirely missed by British political leaders and military officers in Baghdad. In some of the more compelling passages, Rutledge describes how the general in charge of British forces, Aylmer Haldane, was itching to escape the heat of Mesopotamia for the Persian hills just as local tempers reached boiling point in June 1920. For her part, Gertrude Bell 'informed' Haldane that 'the bottom seems to have dropped out of the agitation and most of the leaders seem only too anxious to let bygones be bygones' the day after the uprising formally began with a major attack on a British outpost at Rumaytha. Meanwhile, Haldane's second in command was preoccupied in his 'dual capacity as Chief Steward of the Races and president of the Sporting Club Committee' with 'persuading the Sporting Club to relinquish control over horse racing and agree to the formation of a separate Baghdad Racing Club' (p. 276).

Under these circumstances, insurgents inflicted a series of heavy defeats on British detachments across Mesopotamia in July and August 1920, shocking British officials both in Baghdad and in London, and requiring the emergency dispatch of large-scale reinforcements from India to quell the uprising. Aside from manipulating differences between tribes that participated in the uprising and others that stood aside, Rutledge emphasizes how British officials also conducted a series of raids so punitive—and collective—that 'even [Winston] Churchill's randomly oscillating moral compass could not accommodate such behaviour' (p. 391). *Enemy on the Euphrates* should thus become required reading for officials in London—and Washington DC—as they contemplate yet another military foray into Iraq.

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Counting Islam: religion, class, and elections in Egypt. By Tarek Masoud. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 252pp. Index. Pb.: £20.00. ISBN 978 0 52127 911 6. Available as e-book.

Islamist movements owe their popularity and electoral success to their appeal to religious morality and their capacity to address the needs of the poorest groups in society. This is a common argument, often found in scholarly literature and the media. *Counting Islam* by Tarek Masoud severely tests this assertion and argues instead that the key to the electoral success of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is not its ideological Islamist appeal nor its supposedly extensive welfare network serving the poor.

Based on his analysis of a remarkable amount of socio-economic data, Masoud claims that the Muslim Brotherhood's performance in elections during the Mubarak regime was outstanding, considering the constraints to which the organization was subject. The welfare

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resources of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as hospitals and clinics, are not as significant as it is commonly believed; furthermore, rather than targeting the poorer classes of the Egyptian society with its campaigns, the Brotherhood has a tradition of building consensus within the middle classes. Masoud shows that the poorer sectors of the Egyptian people are more prone to the influence of the regime's clientelist structures, which is also why the leftist movement has never had a significant appeal. The main explanation for the Brotherhood's success is the lack of real competition from leftist opposition parties. Thanks to this, the Brotherhood gained experience of electoral processes, maximized its capacity to connect with the electorate, and identified sectors of society where it could maximize its constituency and catalyse electoral support. Thus, by mastering the cabalistic electoral mechanics of the Mubarak regime and capitalizing on the support of a disgruntled middle class, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has developed political capital leading to its electoral success even in times of repression and has created a solid basis for itself in post-Mubarak Egypt.

The second part of Masoud's book delves into how the Brotherhood was able to build a consensus around its political mission after the uprising for which the Islamists were only minimally responsible—if at all. According to several surveys carried out by the author, the economy was at the forefront of voters' minds, not Islam or the application of shari'a, and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the other Islamist movements capitalized on their consolidated networks, better-organized party structures and previous electoral experiences to appear as the political force that could best deliver economic reforms. If one focuses on the leftist ideational factors of the uprising, the odds for victory in the post-Mubarak elections were all against the Muslim Brotherhood; but the leftist groups, although the natural beneficiaries of the widespread demands for social justice and redistribution, were crowded out by the Islamists. The timing of the election was also crucial to the success of the Brotherhood, coming only a few months after the ouster of Mubarak it gave a strong comparative advantage to groups that already possessed consolidated electoral infrastructures; newly established groups failed to coalesce into a competitive political force.

Overall, Masoud's argument is persuasive, but a few observations can be suggested for the sake of provoking discussion. The first is that Masoud's study seems to reify 'the left' to an almost stereotypical extent, thus not always reflecting a more complex reality. For Masoud, anything that has to do with welfare and redistribution is 'the left'. Conflating the call for a more equitable society with a general acceptance of leftist political ideals reflects only part of a more diverse reality, as it has been observed for example by Perry Anderson and George Lawson. Therefore, the fact that Islamists were capable of capitalizing on calls for social justice is perhaps not as unexpected as Masoud claims; after all, one of the key thinkers of Islamism, Sayyid Qutb, published *Social justice in Islam* in 1949. Second, the author's methodology leaves some things to be desired. A short review cannot do justice to the impressive amount of data Masoud collected to corroborate his thesis, but certain details should caution the reader. In some cases data are drawn from governmental sources and there is a widespread reliance on Google as a source, for example for counting mosques and *zawiyas* in Egypt; is it safe to assume that these are accurate? Furthermore, the use of proxy indicators when data are insufficient or not available may raise questions for the attentive reader. To be fair, the author carefully warns the reader about the quality of sources on several occasions, and presents his arguments more as a set of plausible hypotheses, rather than an uncontested 'truth' underpinned by a hyperpositivist methodology. Third, it remains to be seen whether the author's conclusions are generally applicable. Masoud claims that his findings are relevant outside the Egyptian context, for example in Tunisia. Whereas the claim that structural conditions generally have an influence

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on political processes is convincing, what seems to be arguable—or needs to be further assessed—is that the same structural conditions the author identifies in Egypt are present in the rest of the region. Masoud's thesis may be difficult to apply to other Islamist parties, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, as their activities have been embedded in the context of self-determination struggles, or to countries where social realities differ sharply from the North African context—think of Lebanon's confessionalism or the relationship of the Islamic Action Front with the Jordanian monarchy.

But readers of *Counting Islam* will find that the very fact the book stimulates such discussions is more a sign of Masoud's scholarly contribution than a reason for criticism. Masoud's work is thoroughly researched and effectively debunks otherwise uncontested myths about Islamism; scholars and policy-makers interested in the subject can hardly afford to neglect the importance of his research.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

The new pirates: modern global piracy from Somalia to the South China Sea. By Andrew Palmer. London: I. B. Tauris. 2014. 377pp. £20.65. ISBN 978 1 84885 633 2.

After half a decade of Afro-optimism in the form of the 'Africa rising' discourse and its boisterous fêting of the highest economic growth rates since the 1960s, the pendulum is swinging back to Africa as a major security headache for the international system. The Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea; ethno-regional and religious strife in Nigeria, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, and endless flows of migrants travelling across the Sahel, trying to reach European shores—for many these are not just a present menace, but a harbinger of the chaos to come.

Andrew Palmer, CEO of the maritime consultancy Idarat Ltd, argues in *The new pirates* that the spectacular wave of hijackings of yachts, tankers and container ships off the Somali coast is indeed the opening shot of the return of piracy as a threat to global economic stability. Despite warning against a neo-conservative reading of the connections between state failure, seaborne crime and terrorism, Palmer foresees a bleak future of growing anarchy, as African states become criminalized further and navigate ever stormier international financial seas: 'Piracy is not about Somalia itself, it is really about human beings trying to exist in a world where they have nothing, where greed is the only guide, and there are no restraints' (p. 316).

The new pirates all too often echoes the simplistic and under-theorized dystopianism of Robert Kaplan's *The coming anarchy* (Random House, 1994), by uncritically buying into Hobbesian and Malthusian tropes about increasing violence being produced by resource scarcity, supposed overpopulation, intensifying geopolitics and 'predatory government'—an analytically vacuous catch-all term deployed continuously by the author to explain just about everything. Nevertheless, Palmer does make two important contributions to discussions about security, international relations and economic stability. He rightly notes that 'piracy is not only a symptom of our changing world, but it also serves to illuminate emergent economic and political realities' (p. 7).

The first important insight is that piracy is by no means a Somali problem alone, but needs to be understood against the background of a complex regional political economy and an equally intricate geopolitical whirlpool of interests. The connections highlighted by *The new pirates* are not those between Somali pirates and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab,

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but rather those between the young men in skiffs hunting for bounty in the Indian Ocean and senior government officials in Yemen, elite finance circles in the Gulf, the Indian underworld, local Somali politicians, Ugandan private security companies and Libyan intelligence operatives. Piracy off the Somali coast, then, is not a function of state failure but has thrived in a context of the *reconstruction* of governance structures in Puntland, a burgeoning arms trade and an expansion of communications networks and financial flows between the Indian subcontinent, the Arabian peninsula and East Africa. It has been crucial in stimulating economic activity and social and physical infrastructure in mainland Somalia, as well as in offshore sites in Kenya and Yemen. The latter two have largely escaped scrutiny and the exposure of their ties to 'Somali' piracy because of their global 'war on terror' alliance with Washington, but they matter greatly, as Palmer emphasizes.

A second, related contribution lies in the warning *The new pirates* rings about organized crime in Africa and the growing inequalities generated by the global economic system. While alarmism about drugs, terrorism and state failure is overblown and risks triggering a counterproductive 'war on crime', similar to the disastrous 'war on drugs' model from the Americas, piracy must not be understood as a quirky crime. Rather, it is merely another activity in which transnationally organized mafias are engaged—to top up balance sheets, to return favours to associates, to facilitate money laundering, to force governments to shift time and resources from one region and issue area to another front. Palmer documents the adaptive business model of pirate gangs and their international backers, and the access the pirates enjoy to advanced weaponry, intelligence-gathering capabilities and opaque financial networks. Piracy is not a remote, anachronistic phenomenon, but an integral part of twenty-first-century globalization, and thrives on the many contradictions of its exclusionary neo-liberal form.

Finally, this valuable book could have been more poignant and effective with better editing. Numerous sweeping generalizations about 'the' African reality (p. 71) and irrelevant paragraphs should have been weeded out. Was it really necessary for the author to break the news to us that: 'At the time of writing, the history of Somalia is still being written' (p. 56)? Elsewhere, we are treated to the Cheshire Cat (p. 91), the industrial poetry (p. 302) of one John Mansfield (*sic*—John Masefield) and pop music: 'in the words of D:Ream's song, "Things Can Only Get Better". Let's hope it is true for Somalia; even if it did not work out for the British Labour Party, which used the song in its 1997 election campaign' (p. 56). These needless distractions undermine the author's attempts at producing an unromanticized, overdue portrait of contemporary piracy and its complexities.

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Africa in the new world order: peace and security challenges in the twenty-first century. Edited by Olayiwola Abegunrin. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 2014. 253pp. Index. £59.95. ISBN 978 0 73919 351 8.

With the exception of one chapter by the editor, the book is most definitely *not* about 'Africa in the new world order' or the international system. It is rather a collection of different essays surveying the various security challenges that bedevil individual African countries. Reflecting the dominance of Nigerians in the collection, three of the eleven chapters are specifically about Nigeria, while a couple of others use the country as a reference point. Other chapters are on Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Somalia. Nothing on East or Southern Africa. While some of the chapters are rich with empirical detail and no doubt reflect the expertise of the individual authors, there is no

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underlying theme or thread to the book other than 'insecurity', which remains undefined. The chapters are not united by any theoretical framework or position and are very much stand-alone pieces. Perhaps this is the fault of the editor who, in a (barely) one-and-a-half-page 'introduction', provides no guidance or overarching agenda for the book. I am sorry, but this is just not good enough.

Olayiwola Abegunrin's chapter on the 'leadership problem' in Africa exemplifies the voluntarism of most of the proposals contained in the book—many chapters end with a 'what needs to be done' sort of conclusion: essentially, if Africa were to get decent leaders all would be well. But besides the neglect of the deep historical structures that help account for the, admittedly, hopeless elites in many countries, a blatant Nigerian nationalism permeates the whole chapter. In short, if Nigeria were to get its act together, then Africa would rise. Abegunrin, in fact, states that: 'What I have in mind is a proposal that would set in place one country that would have the authority and resources needed to help bring about and orchestrate … a restructuring of African state–society relations and able to lead the continent as a power to reckon with' (p. 19). This country is, of course, Nigeria, and Abegunrin's elites are to spearhead a restructuring of African state–society relations. This is going to be something to watch!

In the chapter on Boko Haram, Olusoji Akomolafe's starting premise is 2002, as if the profound historical structures which have shaped northern Nigeria and which have clearly helped foster the Islamism that permeates parts of the north are irrelevant. The dual mandate? Sub-contracting a venal northern elite to preside over economic backwardness and the subsequent entrenchment of abject poverty in the region? These are missing in Akomolafe's reading. Even basic material causes are dismissed: 'Boko Haram does not exist nor is it strengthened because Nigeria is riddled with poverty and inequality. Rather, the evidence shows that corruption has a lot to do with the emergence of the sect' (p. 49). Is it really possible to separate Nigeria's endemic poverty and inequality from the deeply rooted culture of corruption in the country? Surely they are inseparable? And what are the causes of this? Akomolafe's thesis is that state 'weakness' is the sole cause of Boko Haram, but this is not satisfactorily discussed, while the dismissal of the inequalities between north and south is just plain strange. It is common knowledge that the south is much richer and boasts a far better socio-economic milieu than the north, that the south has Lagos, the commercial and media capital of the country, and that southerners make up the majority of the diaspora, providing millions in remittances from abroad. Equally, though the north's population is larger, it is much poorer than the rest of the country, with some of the world's worst health and economic indicators. But no, it is all down to state 'weakness'.

To be fair, Sabella Abidde's chapter on the Niger Delta, Christopher Daniels's on Somalia and Benjamin Machar's chapter on post-secession relations between Khartoum and Juba are well worth reading and certainly provide useful insights into the situations under discussion. But these are exceptions. Overall, the book is a somewhat random collection of essays—of wildly varying quality—which does not at all address the key peace and security challenges facing the continent, or even tangentially discuss their root causes. It is a sadly disappointing volume.

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South Asia

Cold peace: China–India rivalry in the twenty-first century. By Jeff M. Smith. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2014. 277pp. £57.50. ISBN 978 0 73918 278 9.

In 1962, India and the People's Republic of China (PRC) fought a short, bitter and brutal war along their Himalayan frontier. The war was a clear case of Indian compellence failure: India had demonstrated much resolve to hold on to disputed territories along the border, but had not developed the requisite capabilities to back that firmness. When the battle-hardened People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces attacked in October of that year, the Indian Army demonstrated much valour, but simply lacked the firepower and the logistics to cope with the onslaught. The PLA forces soon declared a unilateral ceasefire, withdrew in most places to more defensible areas, but not before seizing some 14,000 square miles of territory that India deemed to be its own. Decades later, the Indian military and policy-makers remain fixated on India's humiliating defeat in that border conflict.

Today, of course, India is far, far better prepared to deal with a possible Chinese incursion along its borders. In the wake of the 1962 debacle, it created ten new mountain divisions equipped and trained for high altitude warfare. More recently, faced with a series of probing actions on the part of the PLA along some disputed areas in India's north-east, it has started to raise two new mountain divisions.

Despite these defence preparations, India remains well behind the PRC on a host of economic and military indicators. Its economy today is about a third of the size of its behemoth northern neighbour's and its military expenditures are less than half. Consequently, the best that Indian defence planners can hope for is forging a strategy of conventional deterrence by denial. Meanwhile, they are pursuing a set of long-range missiles which, when deployed, may provide India with a capacity for deterrence by punishment. That capability, however, remains a long way from being realized.

In the meantime, and despite a spate of border talks, tangible progress towards the resolution of the dispute has been glacial. Although, periodically, hopes of a settlement do emerge, they are almost invariably dashed. As Jeff M. Smith argues in *Cold peace*, the PRC did offer India a pragmatic solution in 1960, and possibly again in 1980. The then Chinese premier, Chou En-lai, had made the initial offer and a successor, Deng Xiaoping, had repeated it in 1980. What Smith does not discuss, however, are the circumstances of these two offers. When Chou had suggested a resolution based upon territorial swaps, Prime Minister Nehru was in no position whatsoever to accept his offer. He had deliberately kept parliament uninformed about a set of earlier border clashes and not even members of his cabinet were in any mood to make territorial concessions. The second episode that Smith cites is equally fraught. As he correctly states, Deng made the offer in the course of an interview with an Indian journalist; however, given the long history of distrust between the two states, such a gesture could not serve as the basis for bilateral negotiations.

Smith's book, which covers a range of significant issues in Sino-Indian relations, is both timely and pertinent. It is topical because despite a burgeoning trade relationship—mostly in the PRC's favour—occasional Sino-Indian cooperation in multilateral forums and public professions of goodwill, their relationship remains an enduring rivalry. It is also relevant because Smith highlights the significance of the two states in the emergent global order given their size, demographic features and economic clout.

The book, among other matters, discusses the role of the United States in this bilateral relationship, focuses on the growth of Sino-Indian naval competition in the Indian Ocean

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and on the longstanding Sino-Pakistani entente and its security implications for India. Though Smith covers much useful ground in this book, it has some shortcomings. It lacks, for example, the magisterial sweep of John Garver's *Protracted contest: Sino-Indian relations in the twentieth century* (University of Washington Press, 2010), a work which provided granular accounts of key areas of discord in Sino-Indian relations. Furthermore, even though Smith devotes his attention to a range of nettlesome issues in the relationship, much of his evidence is derivative. Portions of the book have the quality of a research report rather than an analytic account of this extremely fraught and critical rivalry.

That said, the book has the virtue of highlighting a series of ongoing issues in Sino-Indian relations. Consequently, journalists, policy analysts and even policy-makers keen on grasping the key features and dimensions of this rivalry will find the book to be a source of useful information.

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The US–India nuclear agreement: diplomacy and domestic politics. By Dinshaw Mistry. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 2014. 280pp. £61.40. ISBN 978 1 10707 341 8.

When the US President George W. Bush signed the US–Indian Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act—the legislation enabling civilian nuclear trade with India—in October 2008, it was not merely the culmination of more than three years of diplomatic negotiations between the US and India, it also symbolized a turning point in US–India relations, with the two nations deciding to leave their suspicion-ridden past behind and to enter into what has been described as a 'strategic partnership'. The United States' disagreement with India on its nuclear weapons programme had clouded the relationship between the world's oldest and largest democracies, with India remaining the target of US efforts to 'curb, rollback and eliminate' its programme. Though previous US administrations tried to improve ties with India, they were reluctant to move ahead on the nuclear issue, thereby preventing US–India bilateral ties from achieving their full potential. The Bush administration's decision to engage India as a rising global power meant that it became essential to break the deadlock over the nuclear question. To this end, the political leaderships in Washington and New Delhi had to expend voluminous political capital in the face of strong opposition from various quarters, and had to bridge the gap between America's entrenched non-proliferation policy and India's insistence on insurance against any future negative turn. The approval of the nuclear deal by the US Congress highlighted the broad-based support that the idea of a US–India partnership enjoys in the contemporary US polity and society. While the signing of the nuclear pact by the Bush administration was important, its approval by the US Congress was all the more significant as it implied that the US polity was now ready and willing to trust India as a global partner.

The Indo-US nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. It is a remarkable achievement, not the least because it reveals the desire on both sides to challenge long-held assumptions about each other in order to build a partnership that serves the interests of both India and the United States.

The passage of the nuclear deal, however, was in doubt from the outset, as both sides had to reckon with long and largely negative institutional memories, as well as entrenched interests that resisted nuclear *rapprochement* on both sides. Foreign policy-making by democracies

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is often a long, messy process and the US–India nuclear deal was no exception. *The US-India nuclear agreement* by Dinshaw Mistry offers one of the most detailed examinations of the negotiations. The author argues that they are best examined through a framework that links diplomacy with domestic politics. The main domestic factors influencing US–India nuclear negotiations that the author underlines are bureaucratic politics, legislative opposition and mobilization by supporters and opponents. These factors on the one hand 'prevented New Delhi from accepting arrangements with relatively higher non-proliferation provisions' while on the other 'affected Washington's position on arrangements with relatively lower non-proliferation provisions that New Delhi desired' (p. 4).

Based on publicly available material and interviews with key participants, this book provides a comprehensive account of the linkages between diplomacy and domestic politics in crafting nuclear agreements. It would have been useful had the author looked a bit more to the future as the debate on the nuclear deal has not yet ceased. While the agreement opened the door for US nuclear suppliers to do business in India, there has been virtually no progress over the past six years due to India's liability laws, which leave suppliers, rather than operators, accountable for damages resulting from accidents at nuclear facilities. The laws were passed in 2010, before US companies could make any real investments in India, effectively shutting them out of the Indian market. It has been a major stumbling block and there is a lot of frustration in the US because of this. And so the debate continues both in New Delhi and in Washington. We have not seen the end of this discussion and this book provides an important way of examining this debate, even if it does not fully answer all the questions that are still reverberating.

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East Asia and Pacific

North Korea–US relations under Kim Jong Il: the quest for normalization? By Ramon Pacheco Pardo. London and New York: Routledge. 2014. 160pp. Index. £85.00. ISBN 978 0 41575 039 4. Available as e-book.

Books about North Korea and the United States tend to be full of righteous indignation that such a small and insignificant country should defy the world's only superpower and that it should apparently follow what its leaders see as its own interests rather than those of the wider—and generally undefined—'international community'. Recent examples of this genre include *Surrender is not an option* (Threshold Publications, 2007), the memoirs of John Bolton, former ambassador to the United Nations, and *The impossible state* by Victor Cha (Bodley Head, 2012), the former National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs. Others are more measured, yet see North Korea as irrational and an irritant. Ramon Pacheco Pardo's new book is therefore to be welcomed. It wins on many counts. It is clear, informed, succinct and, above all, dispassionate. In his estimation, North Korea's behaviour in its approach to the United States is neither outrageous nor a crime crying to heaven for action. It is how small states behave when faced with larger ones. There is no doubt that North Korea is a weak power. It may have a small nuclear arsenal and a large army. Both are ineffective compared to the might that surrounds it. China, Russia and the United States are all nuclear powers. Japan and South Korea are economic powerhouses, with state of the art military forces. There is no doubt that North Korea could wound, but only at great risk to its own survival. For North Korea, links with neighbours are problematic. It is the distant yet close United States that might provide the balance that would enable North Korea to survive.

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Pardo argues that from the mid-1970s, when North Korea was forced to accept that neither of its allies, the USSR or China, would support it in a new attempt to reunify the peninsula, until 2009, when it conducted its second nuclear test, North Korea's foreign policy was dominated by the wish to normalize its relations with the United States. In 1974, the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, or parliament, sent a letter to the US Congress proposing the normalization of relations. It fell on stony ground and the ground has remained stony ever since. The United States' formal attitude was that issues relating to the Korean peninsula were for the two Koreas to discuss and settle. But even in 1974, North Korea knew that it could get around this by 'brinkmanship'. The capture of the USS *Pueblo* in 1968 and the shooting down of a spy plane the following year showed that the US could be made to respond. Later, fears for the 1988 Seoul Olympics led then President George H. W. Bush to direct talks with North Korea, as did concern over North Korea's nuclear programme in the early 1990s. Once US attention was caught on those and subsequent occasions, North Korea would abandon brinkmanship in favour of further engagement and the ultimate goal of diplomatic recognition. The trouble has always been that the United States' interest in North Korea has tended to fade rather rapidly once it has obtained its immediate objective, whether this was the release of the *Pueblo* crew in 1968 or a cap on the North's nuclear programme in 1994. Big powers with many interests and concerns are like that. Small powers, such as North Korea, remain concentrated on their own areas of concern and before long will do something that again attracts attention. Some do it quietly. North Korea, suspicious of the outside world and fearful of the mighty states around it, tends to go for the dramatic move, often accompanied by hyperbolic rhetoric. I have lost count of the number of times North Korea has announced that it is in a state of war or that the 1953 Armistice Agreement is a dead letter. The reality is that it has not gone to war—a few skirmishes aside—and that the Armistice Agreement is still in place. Pardo ponders whether the steady development of the North Korean nuclear programme means that it will no longer seek better relations with the United States. There are signs that it will. Indeed, as I write this, the release of the two remaining US citizens held by the North has been announced. For North Korea, the United States may be a threat, but it is also its hope for long-term security. As they would say: 'The US is our enemy for a hundred years but Japan is our enemy for a thousand years.' Comments about China would be greeted by references to 'betrayals' stretching back before the start of the Common Era.

Pardo has written a good book, with which I broadly agree. There are a few areas where I would differ a little in interpretation. I think he exaggerates the degree to which the prospect of a North Korean collapse governed US thinking in the mid-1990s. Some in Washington may have thought this would happen, but most quickly realized that it would not. The negotiations leading to the Agreed Framework proceeded with scarcely a pause. Rather than just abandoning the idea of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea in the face of its imminent disappearance, a series of senior Korean-speaking US foreign service officers were prepared to take up the planned liaison post in Pyongyang. In the end nothing happened, but not because the North was withering away. Furthermore, Pardo dates the sense of a Chinese betrayal to the vote for South Korea's UN entry in 1991, but it long predates that. The 'failure', as the North Koreans see it, to support their unification proposals at Geneva in 1954 and the refusal to countenance a further attempt at reunification in the 1970s are also seen as Chinese perfidy.

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The emperor far away: travels at the edge of China. By David Eimer. London: Bloomsbury. 2014. 322pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 40881 322 5. Available as e-book.

This book takes its title from a traditional Chinese proverb referring to China's outer reaches: 'Shan gao huangdi yuan'—'The mountains are high and the emperor far away.' These 'far away' regions consist of China beyond the Great Wall and other remote areas which less than a century ago were beyond both the understanding and control of central government—approximately half of present-day China.

David Eimer, formerly the *Sunday Telegraph*'s China correspondent, sets out to explore the country's borderlands to the west, south-west, south-east and north-east. In doing so, he neatly demolishes two western preconceptions about China: that its people are all of the same ethnicity and speak, or at least read, the same language—a homogenized subcontinent. Also, that the country is universally over-populated. Eimer meets representatives of many of the 55 officially recognized minorities, some of which enjoy autonomous prefectures, and visits the vast open spaces of Xinjiang and Tibet. The Uighurs of Xinjiang and Tibetans are among the largest minorities. Both are problem communities for central authorities, especially of late in major cities of Xinjiang. Observations on the opening up of Xinjiang, from whose capital city of Urumqi a new high-speed train will soon cut the journey time to Beijing to 12 hours, and of the secularization of Tibet, are interesting sideshows in this book's rich tapestry. Also intriguing was Eimer's difficult—for both transport and political reasons—'off the tourist track' journey near the border with Nepal to Mount Kailash, a destination for Hindu pilgrims from India.

The Uighurs live in a land that used to be part of the great Central Asian tract known as Turkestan, albeit Chinese Turkestan, suggesting at least some link with imperial China. Now it is known as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, or just Xinjiang which translates as 'new frontier'. Much of the region consists of desert. In its cities, Uighurs are more numerous than Han Chinese. They are part of a Central Asian mix which also includes Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Tartar, Mongol and Hui peoples, the last being Chinese Muslims, different from the Han by their religion rather than their facial characteristics. Religion is one of the differentiating factors, with as many as 25 million Chinese Muslims, perhaps 400 million Buddhists and probably 'more Christians … than there are members of the CCP' or Chinese Communist Party, whose membership Eimer puts at 82 million (p. 110). Both Islam and Buddhism entered China through Xinjiang, part of the flow of men, materials and ideas on the Silk Road.

This book is more about ethnic than religious minorities. Emphasizing the difference between Chinese citizenry and ethnicity, Eimer tells us that more than 110 million citizens, or eight per cent of the country's population, belong to minority ethnic groups. In parts of Yunnan, where many of the 55 minorities are represented, ethnicity crosses borders such that 'individual minorities feel a far greater sense of kinship with their cousins across the border than they do with the Han [Chinese] … the fact that they are technically Chinese citizens is almost an irrelevance' (p. 163). Eimer's foray down the Mekong River from the Chinese autonomous prefecture of Xishuangbanna into Laos, Thailand and Myanmar to meet non-Chinese Dai, Wa, Bulang, Akha, Lahu and Miao people, brings this point home. Trade across Yunnan's border with South-East Asian nations ranges from timber and jade to opium, amphetamines and the animal parts prized in Chinese medicine. Even brides are trafficked across the border into a nation suffering a shortage of marriageable women.

Another section of the book follows the boundaries of what used to be called Manchuria and is now Dongbei, the north-east, into areas of China populated by Koreans to the south

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and Russians to the north. Indeed, China has expanded into terrain formerly ruled by Korea and Russia, and it becomes evident at this point in the book how much China and the Chinese have been influenced by the intermingling of peoples and religions. Whereas both North Korea and Russia's far east were once sources of wealth, now the traffic of refugees, work seekers or shoppers is mainly inward. With reference to the higher salaries available in China, we are told that: 'Whether they are tarts, traders or translators, the latest generation of Russian immigrants are the most obvious sign of how China is now far more powerful and influential than Russia' (p. 281). On the other side of the Amur River, around the Russian town of Blagoveshchensk, Eimer writes: 'as North Korea already is, the region [of Russia] is set to become an economic colony of Dongbei' (p. 307).

The strength of this book lies in its interviews with local people; this is the work of a journalist who asks a lot of questions and records the answers. Some of his background facts are open to question, notably his suggestion that Uighurs migrated to Xinjiang from Turkey, which is contrary to accepted anthropology that all the Turkic peoples, including both Turks and Uighurs, originated from Central Asia. Overall, this book literally stretches one's understanding of China in a fascinating way, and demonstrates that even the present-day emperor's reach to the distant parts of his empire is somewhat tenuous.

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China's regional relations: evolving foreign policy dynamics. By Mark Beeson and Fujian Li. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner. 2014. 253pp. Index. £44.65. ISBN 978 1 62637 040 1.

The Sino-Russian challenge to the world order: national identities, bilateral relations, and East versus West in the 2010s. By Gilbert Rozman. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2014. 304pp. Index. £34.00. ISBN 978 0 80479 101 4.

Mark Beeson and Fujian Li's account of *China's regional relations* looks at the country's place in its vast and complex neighbourhood: China has land borders with 14 countries and maritime proximity to another half dozen. Chapters cover the historical background and China's economic rise; the development of regional institutions and contestation around East Asia and the Asia–Pacific; China's relations with South-East and North-East Asia; relations with Russia, Central Asia and India and the Sino-Australian relationship. Particular value lies not just in its coverage of China's regional relations, but also in balanced references to the different ways existing scholarship has approached and understood these, including debates among Chinese scholars.

The book's stated argument is that: 'China's rise and growing importance are manifesting themselves primarily in China's relationships with its closest neighbours' (p. 2), though in many ways this is as much an assumption justifying the book's focus as a conclusion. As the authors show, however, it does reflect some current trends in foreign policy thinking in China, where some are pushing for regional diplomacy to be given greater emphasis over relations with other big countries, especially the United States.

The chapter on 'East Asia or Asia Pacific?' raises important questions about regional formation, showing that multiple ways of understanding 'the region' are part of a process of negotiation, and that membership in and engagement with regional institutions can lead to contestation between regional actors. This reflects the constructivist approach to regional formation set out early in the book—though it should be noted that in this way

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of thinking regional formation is not 'arbitrary' (p. 15 or p. 22), but *contingent* on political, social, economic and historical forces. Li and Beeson also highlight the importance of norms in developing regional institutions and argue that there is congruence here between Chinese policy-makers and the Association of South East Asian Nations (p. 19).

Coverage of US–China relations is spread throughout the book, reflecting its omnipresence in discussions of China's regional relations. In one place, the authors argue that a US–China clash is 'almost inevitable' (p. 60) and later cite a prominent Chinese scholar to this effect (p. 191); elsewhere, they are more critical of the realist assumptions which underpin this judgement. Either way, a key theme of the book is that much of China's 'good work' in regional diplomacy has been undone over the last few years, and that neighbours have chosen to balance with the US against China rather than bandwagon with it (pp. 105, 108, 126). Beeson and Li note that some still consider China only to be a regional, not global, power; their conclusion also highlights the novelty of China's global integration and its growing global impact.

Gilbert Rozman's *The Sino-Russian challenge to the world order* is the third of a series he has written or edited, looking at international relations from the perspective of national identity. This is an important theme, and this book is timely, given the apparent drawing closer of Russia and China since 2013. The common theme for both countries is the post-Cold War reshaping of national identity, decades after Stalinism and Maoism 'arguably, the most far-reaching attempts ever made to alter national identity' (p. 2).

Rozman's account is a substantial one, and it is of considerable historical depth on the pre-communist eras through to the 2010s. But, in places, the account tends to present more decisive interpretations than either history or existing literature—at least on China—allows for, often with only light referencing. For example, to say that 'Mao resisted the Sinification of Marxism' (p. 55) would be rejected by Chinese Communist Party theorists. There is a general tendency to essentialize communism in ways which are contestable and to play down the historical role of revolution in both Chinese and Russian understandings: for example, communism is 'in essence … a rejection of full-scale reform' (p. 22), and it 'puts history at the center of identity' (p. 116).

The overall thrust of Rozman's comparative analysis of national identity is an adaptation of the notion of East Asia National Identity Syndrome, set out in the earlier books in the series. He identifies a 'Communist Great Power (Transition 1) National Identity Syndrome', where the 'Transition 1' element allows for the likelihood that further changes in identity will occur. Some may think this sort of formulation over-precise, but it allows Rozman to show clearly that communism had—and continues to have—an important impact on both societies, one which cannot be reversed simply—if at all. It is a useful conclusion to a series which highlights the complex and changing nature of national identity and its impact on international relations.

Tim Summers, Chatham House, UK

Japan and the war on terror: military force and political pressure in the US–Japanese alliance. By Michael Penn. London: I. B. Tauris. 2014. Index. 376pp. £56.50. ISBN 978 1 78076 369 9. Available as e-book.

Japan's international behaviour since the Second World War has always been a bit odd. Though an economic behemoth, Japan pursues a surprisingly timid and diffident foreign policy. It has not put the historical legacy of the war fully to bed, fits uneasily into the geopolitics of East Asia, relies ever more on its defence alliance with America, and so finds

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it difficult to assert its independence or speak with a clear voice on international issues. Even so, Japan has become a major global player. Michael Penn, a journalist based in Japan, goes beyond this commonly accepted account and provides an excellent overview of Japan's participation in the United States' global 'war on terror' and the Iraq War, describing the ways that Japan's leaders used these American campaigns for their own ends. The book is particularly useful in tracing the evolution of elite and public opinion from the 1990s onward, especially from the Koizumi to the Hatoyama governments. The book thus provides one of the best recent glimpses into Japanese foreign policy-making in the past two decades.

The book is at its strongest when it lays out the step-by-step development of opinions on Japan's steadily developing anti-terrorism role. Penn shows that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his associates decided early on to participate in the global 'war on terror', gradually creating a narrative that Japan was a potential target of terror and, owing to the exigencies of the alliance with America, had 'no choice' but to participate (p. 114). Penn rightly asks whether Japan really had no choice. Indeed, if it had no choice, then is it truly an independent country with its own foreign policy? Actually, the argument was a mere convenience, as participation in the Afghanistan War and anti-terrorism campaign served Koizumi's larger agenda of enhancing Japan's defence posture through military deployments abroad.

Penn notes that from the beginning, much of the debate over the expansion of Japan's military role abroad became a set piece of elite conservative assertiveness versus the 'underlying sentiment of many ordinary Japanese' (p. 2). Thus, conservative experts presented what they felt Japan ought to do, i.e. make a robust commitment to fight international terrorism, while others discussed what Japan should avoid, i.e. trouble abroad or trampling on the sovereignty or rights of other peoples. While most Japanese were initially shocked by the events of 9/11, they expressed a mixture of sympathy for the victims and a desire for peace. Koizumi's people, on the other hand, saw the incident as a 'rare opportunity' to assert Japan's own national interests, and the government acted quickly to craft a discourse to fit its policy goals (p. 3). *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan's centre-left newspaper of record for intellectuals, assisted this effort by branding Al-Qaeda a criminal organization and calling the attack an assault on civilization; later they backpedalled by calling for a criminal justice response to 9/11. Several intellectuals called for Japan to take the lead in forging peace between America and the Muslim world, but government policy-makers were openly contemptuous of outside advice. National leadership, stung by negative international reaction to Japan's refusal to join the Gulf War a decade earlier, suggested that the alliance necessitated Tokyo's participation in the Afghanistan War, and that this was a chance to strengthen ties with US leaders. Participation in the Afghanistan War was strongly promoted by the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), which had the strongest relationship of any of the military services with US counterparts. The government won the politics of participation in America's wars but, Penn feels, failed to convince the Japanese people of the necessity for the 'war on terror'.

Changes in Japanese foreign policy reignited old concerns about whether Japan's 'Peace Constitution' of 1947 should be revised. Koizumi was aware from early on that President Bush planned to go to war with Iraq. While various Japanese politicians felt that Bush was not adequately making his case for war and Koizumi urged the Americans to get a UN resolution backing intervention, there was little strong popular opposition to the war. As in Afghanistan, Koizumi came out strongly in favour of action when the Americans made their intentions clear and, as with Afghanistan, he got a special law passed authorizing Japanese deployment abroad. The Ground Self-Defence Force deployment to Samawa, Iraq,

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for reconstruction work, was inherently more dangerous than the Indian Ocean MSDF mission; it actually came under mortar attack, but no military personnel were killed. The Iraq mission took several months to put together; this time was principally spent lining up nominal political support. A special factor driving the deployment was the need to appear strong towards Japan's ever-threatening neighbour, North Korea. Penn concludes that the effects of the two conflicts on Japanese society are difficult to calculate although, before they left office in 2009, the conservatives boosted the power of government to deal with terrorist emergencies.

There is little to criticize in this book. Largely a journalistic overview of the debates among Japanese politicians, academics and journalists that informed defence policy-making up to 2011, the book might have benefited from a more rigorous empirical or theoretical examination of Japanese political dynamics, along with more focus on the pulling and hauling within government decision-making. Penn's study, nonetheless, will stand as one of the most thorough examinations of Japanese foreign policy decision-making, and is highly recommended to anyone as an inside-out examination of the Tokyo policy process. It illustrates the continued weaknesses of opposition politics, and the ways that hegemonic (in the Gramscian sense) conservatives most often carry the day in policy debates. Now, having built up its military and extended its power beyond its shores, Japan has to decide whether it can make its way in the world by itself or whether it will continue to rely on the American alliance.

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North America*

America's search for security: the triumph of idealism and the return of realism. By Sean Kay. London: Rowman and Littlefield. 2014. 330pp. £51.25. ISBN 978 1 44222 562 6. Available as e-book.

The realist tradition in US foreign policy has come under increasing attack. While this has long been recognized as the leading theoretical paradigm within the analytic field, more scholars are coming out of the—particularly constructivist—woodwork to challenge this focus. As such, Sean Kay's new book is set to cause some controversy within the discipline.

This book is a heavily pro-realist reading of US foreign policy. As part of an impressively detailed history dating back to the Founding Fathers, Kay contends that the maintenance of American security has depended on a careful balance between the concepts of idealism and realism: 'Idealism generally sees the national interest as linked with the spread of values, while realists tend to see it in terms of power and capabilities relative to the evolving international system' (p. xii). Within this context, Kay identifies a problematic shift away from realist thinking in US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, when this was replaced by greater adherence to both liberal and neo-conservative conceptualizations of idealism. In effect, US foreign policy has suffered because there is not enough realism. While Kay acknowledges that some sort of balance between these two conceptual foundations provides the most desired means of foreign policy-making, the disproportionate swing towards idealism that he identifies had led to overstretch and domestic decline—evidenced by President Bill Clinton, and then ramped up under the administration of President George W. Bush. Consequently, the most apposite solution for America is to return to a more realist

* See also Angela Stent, *The limits of partnership: US–Russian relations in the twenty-first century*, pp. 196–7.

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foreign policy. Indeed, Kay sees evidence of this in terms of the foreign policy of President Barack Obama, which he considers inherently realist. The 'pivot to Asia', Obama's aversion to intervention in Syria, the commitment to military withdrawal from Afghanistan and pullback during the Russia–Ukraine crisis—these are all held up as examples of the virtues of realism. While others could argue that Obama's actions have been those of a pragmatic multilateralist, or even simply those of a weak foreign policy actor, Kay presents these as acts of realism: Obama's caution is a return to realist thinking.

The idea that Obama is a great realist of the post-Cold War era is a provocative claim. Moreover, it is easy to feel that idealism (and other explanations or drivers of US foreign policy) does not get a fair hearing; even non-idealists may be left feeling slightly regretful over the way idealism is treated in this book. Indeed, it is notable that while Kay seeks to analyse a move away from realism—where this is conceptualized as an inefficient and detrimental imbalance in the system—he does not consider the potential issues that could emerge if that balance were instead significantly skewed towards realism. What about the possibility of 'too much' realism?

Furthermore, this book would have benefited from greater engagement with a number of alternative explanations of foreign policy. For example, Kay largely dismisses the idealism of Bush, without fully considering the extensive literature arguing that this was at least partially constructed. Although he accepts that idealism can be a mask for realism, and that this makes analysis complex, this is not a complexity he factors sufficiently into his own discussion of post-9/11 policy. In addition, there are several other literatures Kay could have addressed given the nature of his argument, for example a more extensive analysis of American exceptionalism, US decline and the current debate on continuity between Presidents Bush and Obama would have been welcome. Yet this is still clearly an excellent book and given the prominence of realism within the field, a necessary read. It provides a superb realist account of US foreign policy history and, as such, is a must for US foreign policy reading lists, as well as the bookshelf of any foreign policy academic.

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The CIA and the Soviet bloc: political warfare, the origins of the CIA, and countering communism in Europe. By Stephen Long. London: I. B. Tauris. 2014. 348pp. Index. £61.00. ISBN 978 1 78076 393 4.

This is the administrative history of a tragedy. With painstaking detail, Stephen Long, a senior lecturer at Canterbury Christ Church University, tracks the almost complete failure of the CIA's covert anti-communist operations in Eastern Europe between 1945 and the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Document by document, he lays bare the lethal consequences of politicians who denied reality, CIA officials who enabled them and a state which failed to impose accountability. More successful covert operations in Western Europe receive some attention, but action against the Soviet bloc is the book's primary focus.

A fundamental contradiction ensured disaster in the east, Long argues. Soviet control was too strong to be removed by anything short of a third world war. America, however, wasn't willing to fight that fight in 1945, and wasn't able to wage it after 1949, when the USSR acquired atomic weapons—and especially not after 1953, when it gained thermonuclear munitions. 'Strategic infeasibility', Long writes, 'was a fundamental flaw.'

'Political warfare' thus consigned thousands of recruits to death, long imprisonments and torture in some cases, at a cost of many millions of dollars, with little or no substantive result. (Long adopts the National Security Council's 1948 definition of 'political warfare'

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as a broad synonym for covert action against hostile states.) 'Covert operations would have to remain small-scale to retain their cover. But limited actions of this type would be totally ineffective', he writes.

Operational incompetence made a bad situation worse. In Yugoslavia, the US infiltrated right-wing monarchist exiles to overthrow Tito in 1948–9, despite the State Department's simultaneous promotion of his regime as an alternative communist model. 'Inconceivably, these exiles were dressed conspicuously in US Air Force uniforms and were quickly arrested', Long reports. In Poland, the CIA parachuted agents, arms and equipment until 1952 to the Polish Freedom and Independence Movement—a group run by an agent of the communist secret police. It stopped only when official Polish media, of all sources, revealed the deception. There were many comparable blunders. Indeed, Long concluded, by drawing attention to dissidents 'Washington actually contributed to the downfall of the resistance movements that it hoped to support inside Eastern Europe'.

No one protested. Cold War fears supercharged by McCarthyism and the Korean War combined with secrecy that hid ineptitude and forestalled external challenges. Inside the government, where access to 'unvouchered funds' was one of the primary reasons why the CIA secured responsibility for covert action, there was even less accountability. Of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a group established in 1948 to wage political warfare and merged into the CIA in 1951, Long writes: 'no parameters or guidelines were established to fence in, organize or control the venture'. As the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 stated: 'The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds … such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director.' Accordingly, despite repeated failures OPC spending grew from $4.7 million in 1949 to $82 million in 1952, the number of overseas stations increased from seven to 47 and its total personnel rose from 302 to 2,812 plus 3,142 overseas contractors.

All of which begs the question: why? Political leaders, department heads and intelligence officers might have objected as President John F. Kennedy did after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, Utah Senator Frank Church's Senate committee did in 1975, and more recently and with less regard to law, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden did with their releases of classified information. Long, as noted, nods to the Cold War, Senator Joe McCarthy, secrecy and other factors, as explanations for this sorry record of hope over experience. Deeper historical contextualization, however, might have offered more complex insights into why the actors in this story behaved as they did.

Long does offer some general conclusions in his final pages. '[A] coherent approach that supports Washington's global aspirations', he writes, is 'the most important challenge for US foreign policy to this day, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in North Africa and the Middle East more recently during the Arab Spring'. Here is to hoping we can apply the lessons of the past, as described in this useful book, to such contemporary matters in the service of improved outcomes.

Robert Neer

Forever Vietnam: how a divisive war changed American public memory. By David Kieran. Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press. 2014. Index. 305pp. Pb.: £22.20. ISBN 978 1 62534 100 6.

The title *Forever Vietnam* does not simply refer to the frequency with which the Vietnam War is invoked in US culture and politics each time the country ponders the need for

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foreign intervention. By the time George W. Bush had left office, there were over 30 books that either compared the Iraq War to the Vietnam War or traced the influence of the first on the second. The history and historiography of US intervention since the mid-1970s all too frequently operates within frames of, or allusions to, the Vietnam War. It has been well established that the memories of the Vietnam War have divided US responses to the deployment of troops in ground warfare around the world. On the one hand, the so-called 'Vietnam syndrome' has acted as an inhibiting force, perhaps most apparent in the popular concern around and negative public opinion polls on questions of intervention and epitomized at the political level by the Powell Doctrine. On the other hand, there has also been a recurrent narrative of US credibility and capability, that the United States could not indefinitely be inhibited by the fear of war. As George H. W. Bush urged in his inaugural address in 1989, no great nation could be sundered by a memory. Simply put, every subsequent war has been compared to or considered within the framework and lessons of Vietnam.

Kieran's view is wider. In *Forever Vietnam*, he inverts the chronology in the first sections of the book by asking how the memory of Vietnam and commemorative practices associated with it have affected other US practices of remembrance. He takes three cases from before the war and three from more recent times, exploring the Andersonville National Historical Site, where Union troops were incarcerated during the Civil War, the effects that the Vietnam literature have had on perceptions of older veterans' post-traumatic stress disorder, narratives of combat in the Second World War and commemorative practices at the Alamo. The cases from more recent times include the US intervention in Somalia in 1993, the commemoration practices of Flight 93 after 9/11 and the competing Vietnam narratives between Bush's surge in Iraq in 2007 and Obama's surge in Afghanistan in 2009. Though seemingly disparate, Kieran cleverly demonstrates the extent to which memories of Vietnam have altered the commemoration of other events and have also shaped US identity, the understanding of US interests around the world and, therefore, its culture's relationship to the military and militarism. This argument is quite original and exceptionally well constructed. Kieran moves out of the traditional frame of Vietnam as an inhibiting force, in part because commemoration practices have depoliticized not only the Vietnam War but also these other sites of remembrance. The uncritical engagement with the issues had become, in part, necessary to compensate for the treatment of Vietnam veterans. Commemorative acts have thus privileged the practice of honouring the troops, focusing on healing over any political evaluation of the wars. For Kieran, this has affirmed 'the continued embrace of American militarism, truncate[d] debates about the wisdom of American military interventions' and obscured the violence of war and its impact both on Americans and the locals forced to endure it.

Contradicting much of the literature until the recent decade and the Iraq War—in which Vietnam was posited as an aberration in US history and therefore relatively unique—Kieran contends that, in limited cases, other wars have been remembered in ways similar to Vietnam to diminish its difference. To some extent, Americans have recovered from Vietnam by reconstituting earlier events in order to legitimate the revisionist accounts of the war and thus assert the value of intervention and of the use of the military—Americans have redefined Vietnam to reassert the possibility of intervention. Taken together, the remembrance of Vietnam and other wars has worked to ensure that the United States adheres to Bush's injunction to get over the war; they have done this by remaking it in various and particular ways.

Throughout the six cases, Kieran's research is meticulous and his arguments are delineated with care. Moreover, the examination of the six sites centres on specific characters and

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incidents, treating each in a very individual way, thereby adhering to the process of recognizing the importance of social agency and examining what specific people do to re-enact a commemorative practice and reshape memory.

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Latin America and Caribbean

Back channel to Cuba: the hidden history of negotiations between Washington and Havana. By William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 2014. 544pp. Index. £21.75. ISBN 978 1 46961 763 3. Available as e-book.

Described in the subtitle as a 'hidden history', the subject matter of William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh's book has been, in fact, only partially hidden from view. The existence of intermittent attempts since 1959 to come to an overall accommodation, especially under Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter in the 1970s, and the periodic negotiation of agreements on specific issues of mutual interest—in particular on the question of migration—between Cuba and the United States has long been in the public domain and has been dealt with at length in the abundant historiography on the bilateral relationship. Indeed, French journalist Jean Daniel revealed in the pages of the *New York Times* in December 1963, shortly after John F. Kennedy's assassination, that he had just been the bearer of a secret presidential communication to Fidel Castro. These initiatives and negotiations, however, have mostly been treated as transient moments by writers preoccupied by the persistence and outward manifestation of an unremitting and irresoluble conflict, whose bases were laid long before the Cuban revolution added a complicating Cold War dimension. It is a story that has been told thus far principally from the standpoint of US policy formulation.

Based on a wealth of US documents acquired over many years through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), interviews with key official and unofficial players, and the extant secondary literature, the authors consider, in greater detail than hitherto, each successive US administration's varying attitude towards negotiations and the often important part played by intermediaries, including foreign governments and individuals such as ABC News correspondent Lisa Howard in the 1960s and the novelist Gabriel García Márquez in the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, they devote the most attention to the periods of direct dialogue, to the strategies employed by the US to achieve the normalization of relations and to the underlying reasons for their failure: Kissinger's incremental strategy, Carter's 'reciprocal sequential steps' approach, Bill Clinton's policy of 'calibrated response' prior to 1996 and 'parallel positive steps' thereafter. Accommodation, they argue, paradoxically stood the best chance of success during the Cold War because the US, after failing to reverse the revolution in the early 1960s, realistically hoped, at best, to modify Cuba's foreign policy—ending the Soviet alliance, Havana's support for revolution in Latin America and its troop presence in Africa. Overcome by hubris at the US victory in the Cold War, all administrations since then have shared the goal of bringing about political and economic change in Cuba; there is even a great degree of underlying continuity, they contend, between the policies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, despite a radical departure in tone. Presidential authority to make policy towards Cuba, moreover, has been curtailed by Clinton's signature—with an eye to electoral politics—of the Helms-Burton bill in 1996, as was recognized at the time, thus holding the Executive branch henceforth hostage to the obstructionism of Cuban American representatives in Congress.

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The book's most distinctive contribution is to grant parity to the Cuban attitude towards prospective reconciliation, as well as its impartial assessment of Cuba's policy aims. 'If US officials', LeoGrande and Kornbluh write, 'could point to evidence that Havana did not really want reconciliation, Cuban officials could just as easily point to evidence that Washington was disingenuous in offering it' (p. 407). They cite a number of occasions on which the Cubans had offered concessions on the verbal promise that they would lead to expanded dialogue on a broader range of issues, only to find these promises subsequently disavowed. The need for respect and equal treatment by the United States, not the standard differential treatment between great and small powers, are the two themes that emerge from Cuban responses; even on disaster relief: 'Cuba wanted to be treated as an equal partner, not a supplicant for assistance' (p. 364). Cuban nationalism suffered from its own measure of hubris.

I have just a few minor criticisms of this stupendous book. First, the authors might have provided more detail on the provenance of the many FOIA-acquired documents cited in the end-notes, than the fact that they are housed in the National Security Archives' Cuba Collection. Second, they seem to have made just one excursion to a foreign archive (in Spain), when further details might well have been gleaned about the role of foreign intermediaries in their respective national holdings. Third, they unaccountably fail to mention—significant, even though it was declined—Cuba's immediate offer of humanitarian assistance to New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, days before the Bush administration was able to respond. Finally, they give the unwary reader the impression (p. 145) that Soviet logistical support was provided for Cuba's initial military airlift of troops to Angola; one of Piero Gleijeses's major conclusions in his 'definitive book' on Cuba's role in Africa is that Havana acted at first on its own initiative without Soviet assistance.

This is an important and instructive work of diplomatic history. It redresses the lopsided quality of the existing literature on the Cuban–US relationship that focuses too much on the element of outright hostility, and provides at the same time a much better understanding of why reconciliation has proved so elusive between these 'closest of enemies', despite windows of opportunity. The lessons that the authors draw from their well-written study ought to be required reading for policy-makers in Washington and certainly will be of interest to scholars of International Relations.

Philip Chrimes

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