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Conference Report

Two Years on from the Forum Summit: The Future of Africa- India Engagement

Africa Programme, Chatham House

9 April 2010

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The Nordic Africa Institute



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SUMMARY POINTS

- This conference took place on the second anniversary of the first India-Africa Forum held in New Delhi in 2008. Although India and the African continent have been closely linked through long-established trade roots, there has been too little debate and analysis on India in Africa and this conference was an effort to provide a platform for a more balanced and focused debate, away from the existing overemphasis on China and its efforts in Africa.
- China and India can both look back upon long political and economic relationships with Africa. New, however, is the notion of building a 'partnership', which is mainly motivated by the importance of energy security for the two Asian countries. Although often summarized in terms of 'Asia's' approach towards Africa, both countries in reality have very different strategies. More specific research on India-Africa relations is essential as people often do not realize how different China's and India's approaches to Africa really are. Despite the current focus on the two Asian countries, the West remains the major player in most African countries.
- The three focus areas of India's foreign policy are to ensure a peaceful periphery, sustain relations with major powers and tackle issues of the future such as food security, water, energy and environment. In recent years, two dynamics on the African continent have caught India's attention. The first is the growing presence of China. The second is the significant diaspora of Indians in Africa, although this does not necessarily provide a significant advantage, for example in the case of Kenya. India's ambitions need to be matched by sustainable new doctrines and diplomatic capabilities as India currently only has a thin net of representation. Business and industry are likely to remain the key drivers of India's renewed diplomatic efforts beyond the rivalry with China.
- India is already largely dependent on oil imports and this dependency is forecast to increase to 90% within the next 10 years. While the country has sourced its oil supply mainly from

Saudi Arabia and Iran in the past, it is now increasingly looking at African countries such as Nigeria and Angola. With respect to energy, issues of importance are the country's competition with China and the political instability in some African countries. Furthermore, India is subject to increasing pressure from the global community to cut down its carbon emissions and is now looking very closely at renewable energy technologies.

- Whilst China and India are clearly important partners for Africa, there is a danger of obscuring the reality with their claim to partnership and solidarity. There already have been incidences which lie outside the normal South-South relationship. Nevertheless, the increased interest from China and India offers new opportunities for Africa to move away from the rigid relationship with the West of always donor–always recipient.
- India's technology has tended to concentrate on products that are adaptable, appropriate and affordable. As a result, Africa has emerged as a potential market for India's producers. Africa has also moved up India's political agenda. India's goal of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council led to the development of its aid programme. India has a particular relationship with likeminded emerging powers such as South Africa. But India already faces a dilemma in that it is unable to please all the parties that it wishes to.
- India needs to do some soul-searching as to why it does not hold more appeal for Africans. India has always been the latecomer. For example, although India has engaged with Nigeria in imports/exports in the past, now Nigeria is importing more from China than it is exporting to it. There are ways in which India might further constructively engage in Africa, using its own particular strengths, for example with Indian skill transfer within the rhetoric of 'South-South' partnership, not least in ICT development.

WELCOME BY ALEX VINES, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL & SECURITY STUDIES AND HEAD OF THE AFRICA PROGRAMME, CHATHAM HOUSE

Chatham House celebrates its 90th anniversary this year and throughout these years India and Africa have featured in what has been debated and discussed in Chatham House's meeting rooms. Speakers have included a number of African leaders, including two recent ones who have won the Chatham House Prize, and Indian officials have been regular visitors. The mission at Chatham House is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all including the Commonwealth and G20 partners represented here today. The world is changing, and India is re-emerging on the global stage, including in Africa.

This conference takes place on the second anniversary of the first India-Africa Forum in New Delhi in 2008. Although India and the African continent have been closely linked through long-established trade roots, there has been too little debate and analysis on India in Africa and this conference is an effort to provide a platform for a more balanced and focused debate, which at least in the West is away from the existing overemphasis on China and its efforts in Africa. Two recent publications feature these relationships between Africa and the two Asian powers: One is a special issue of the *South African Journal of International Affairs* on India in Africa edited by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Alex Vines (Vol 14, No 2, 2007); the second is the book *The Rise of China and India in Africa* edited by Professor Fantu Cheru and Dr Cyril Obi, which will be launched later at today's conference.

Chatham House is grateful for the support of the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala as well as the United Kingdom's Department for International Development office in India, which has provided financial support to the conference.

SESSION 1

India in Africa

Chair: Professor Ajay Dubey, Chairman of the Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal University, New Delhi

Speakers:

Professor Fantu Cheru, Research Director, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala

Dr Cyril Obi, Senior Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala

Discussant: Adam Roberts, News Editor, *The Economist*, London

Professor Fantu Cheru: The Evolving China-India-Africa Relations: Potential benefits and risks

Launch of the book, The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions, edited by Professor Fantu Cheru and Dr Cyril Obi.

Africa currently finds itself in a major exercise of self-assessment, reflecting on what went wrong during past decades. There is a recognizable shift in attitude towards the West, which is now frequently perceived in Africa to be giving aid with one hand and retrieving it with the other. Furthermore, the West's perspective on Africa is often one of 'doom and gloom'.

China and India by contrast have approached Africa with an open mind and a strong business focus, which has been welcomed on the continent. China and India can both look back upon long political and economic relationships with Africa. New, however, is the notion of building a 'partnership', which is mainly motivated by the importance of energy security for the two Asian countries. Although often summarized in terms of 'Asia's' approach towards Africa, both countries in reality have very different strategies. China's engagement in Africa is dominated by state-owned enterprises and an often aggressive market-entry strategy. India's engagement is mainly driven by private businesses and has by comparison been more modest so far. Nevertheless, recent years have featured strong and more coordinated activities from India leading some experts to suggest that the Indian approach will turn out to be more successful in the future than that of its Chinese counterpart. Both China and India face challenges to their investments in Africa, just as the West does, such as low governmental standards, low local labour capacity and security issues.

There is not only active competition between China and India, but also with Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, both Asian players seem certain in their objectives in Africa. It is important that African countries learn to strengthen and negotiate their own positions. Only then will Africa have the chance to integrate itself into the global market in a non-discriminatory way. It is too early to jump to conclusions about how these asymmetric relationships between China, India and Africa will develop in the future.

Dr Cyril Obi: Energy

China's and India's investment strategies in Africa's energy sector date back to the late 1990s, but have now come to a critical point. Oil supply from traditional Arabic suppliers has been threatened by political turmoil in the region. At the same time, China and India have respectively become the second and fifth largest oil importers in the world. While this can create new opportunities for Africa, the critical question remains whether and how Africa can benefit from this new interest and competition, which is not only between China and India but also between these new players and Western countries.

There are a number of questions that need to be addressed: Will India and China learn from Western experiences? Will they cooperate or compete in the oil sector? Will the Asian countries' energy investments be 'clean'? Will the investment go beyond crude oil? What kind of policy space will be created in Africa as a result of this new investment? What will really be the benefits for the African continent?

Even if most African countries officially control their oil industries, progress in technology in the oil sector provides investors with a distinct advantage. Matters of energy security have made oil an issue of global power and put Africa back into the focus of business activities. However, the important question to address is what effect this foreign interest will have on African countries.

Adam Roberts: Discussant

More specific research on India-Africa relations is essential as people often do not realize how different China's and India's approaches to Africa really are.

Despite the current focus on the two Asian countries, the West remains the major player in most African countries. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese state-capitalist model will have positive impacts on Africa. China's

economic success in the last decades is based on its liberalization in the 1990s following a rather ‘Western’ approach.

Climate change is an important topic that has been neglected so far in the discussion when talking about the relationships of China, India and Africa. Last year’s Climate Summit in Copenhagen saw an alliance amongst developing countries and China in the G77 group. There is a strong incentive for the three sides (China, India and African nations) to work together as all of them will be amongst the countries most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change in the future.

Discussion

Human rights in Africa, especially in countries with sizeable foreign investments in the oil industry, were a focus of discussion in the question and answer session. One speaker argued that for investing countries such as China and India, securing stable oil production is crucial. Given that oil supply is vulnerable to interruptions due to conflict or piracy, the human security dimension is also of concern to companies. However, it is very difficult to resolve these challenges, be it from the government side alone or with support of external investors driven by business interests. Well-known examples of risk areas include the Niger Delta and Sudan, but formations of rebel movements have also been reported in other countries. Oil production inevitably impacts the host country and communities and assessing the cost of securing oil production to countries and investors is difficult.

While some speakers argued that Western companies are more aware of and respond better to human rights issues – in part due to greater pressure from media and human right organizations – others claimed that in reality there is not much difference when it comes to the bottom line. Oil production in Africa holds a special place in the global oil market as it is the only continent where new oil resources are still being discovered, with the exception of Brazil. There are a number of NGOs working in various African countries, which focus on minimizing the negative effects of the oil industry. China has been heavily criticized for its activities in Sudan in the past and has started to experience similar pressure by media and human rights organization as Western countries. At the same time, Western companies’ activities are not free of such criticism as recent reports on Equatorial Guinea have revealed.

Despite the attention China’s and India’s relationships with African countries have recently drawn, Western countries are still the main players on the African continent in all industries. As a result, it should not only be the effects

of the rise of India's and China's engagement on Africa that are considered, but also how this will affect Western companies and their relationships with Asian competitors.

Professor Cheru emphasized the difficulties of undertaking empirical research in Africa in general and also with respect to the two Asian countries. It is difficult to access information on bilateral relations and especially with regard to China, one is caught between a lack of transparency on both the African and Chinese sides. This makes gathering reliable data challenging and the situation would benefit from more openness from African countries.

For Africa, the most important question is how to further democracy and what kind of state is needed in African countries. There needs to be more focus on ascertaining the impacts of foreign influence on 'ordinary' Africans.

SESSION 2

India in Africa: Country studies

Chair: Dr Gareth Price, Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House, London

Speakers:

Dr Gerard McCann, Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Transnational History, Oxford University

Dr Parvathi Vasudevan, Consultant Chatham House, Mumbai

Luke Patey, PhD Fellow, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg

Discussant: Dr Cyril Obi, Senior Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala

Dr Gerard McCann: Kenya and India

Much is heard about India's intentions in Africa, but less about the abilities of Indian actors within specific African contexts. Variations of opportunity and power around the continent need to be more carefully debated to challenge fixed notions of the 'Asian Drivers'.

Kenya faces profound societal and governmental problems. Some progress has been made in drafting a new constitution, although the 2005 referendum shows that nothing should be taken for granted – and there is potential for further strife. The country had been relatively politically introverted, but it is now enjoying the attention of a host of suitors. The so-called 'Look East' policies of President Mwai Kibaki have resulted in energized missions from China, and visits from the presidents of Iran and Turkey in 2009. In addition to industrious Chinese construction companies and shady Libyan consortiums, Indian multinationals and a host of SMEs have a place in Kenya's economic landscape.

Many have argued that cultural and economic linkages through the historic presence of South Asian communities in the region present India with a head start. However, a fractious history of local race relations influenced many Kenyan leaders' impressions of India, falsely believing that 'exploitative Kenyan Asians' had economic links to India. This was increasingly inaccurate as Nehru dissociated himself from Africa's Indians, creating a sense of abandonment. Race relations are improving, yet the place of 'Asians' remains uncertain and relations with various 'African' groups are often uneasy.

In the 1970s half of India's meagre African foreign direct investment (FDI) was directed to Kenya, although this tailed off in the next two decades. Despite some private sector activity, India's early post-colonial South Asian foreign policy introversion, domestic economic insularity before 1991 and dissociation from the diaspora only enabled weak linkages to East Africa. Kenya's foreign policy reserve compounded this distance. Such dynamics are now changing to various degrees.

India's contemporary activities in Kenya are primarily characterised by resurgent private sector market-seeking investment activity and Indian companies are seeking opportunities largely without the aid of diaspora and Indian state networks.

Perhaps the most well-known Indian investments relate to telecommunications. Mumbai-based Essar Group injected \$500million to purchase a majority share in Econet Wireless Kenya (EWK), opening Kenya's fourth mobile phone network in November 2008. EWK re-branded to Essar Telecom Kenya in April 2009, providing the confidence for a further \$94million injection from Africa's largest infrastructure equity fund in July 2009. With such backing Essar is seeking to become a major regional telecoms player. Essar has also acquired a 50% share in Kenya Petroleum Refineries, the sole refinery in eastern Africa. Essar's intention is to retail fuel in Kenya and export to Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and even Uganda.

Indian companies that have added to local 'Kenyan Asian' manufacturing enterprises include Tata, Sanghi Group, Ranbaxy and others. Indian companies have also penetrated more controversial Kenyan sectors, for instance Karuturi Networks, India's biggest floriculture company, acquired the holdings of Dutch-Kenyan flower farm giant Sher Agencies on Lake Naivasha.

There have been recent capital influx from China, Libya, Qatar and elsewhere; revenue that is allegedly flowing into the coffers of PNU leaders. Large deal-making in Kenya is often conducted in opaque and elite state-to-state arenas. The monetization of Kenya's post-colonial politics and the intertwining of political and business elites are both therefore important. India's African initiatives are more private sector-led, and therefore companies are responsible to shareholders and there is pressure for transparency from domestic civil society, rendering access to these controversial avenues of economic advantage more problematic.

The Indian High Commission in Nairobi appears to be a poor conduit of state-to-state relations, and has hitherto been driven by personalities concentrated on traditional 'South-South' cooperation, rather than the economic ambitions

that preoccupy a younger generation of New Delhi technocrats. This is slowly changing, although Nairobi lags behind sister missions in Johannesburg, Dakar and Addis.

There are ways in which India might further constructively engage in Africa, using its own particular strengths, for example with Indian skill transfer within the rhetoric of 'South-South' partnership, not least in ICT development. Kenya is often viewed as a 'gateway' for investment in the wider eastern African region, due to its coastal position, infrastructural advantages and multilateral institutional residences in Nairobi. In this sense, Kenya should remain a hub for initial Indian investment in Africa. A new chapter in India's relations with East Africa looks set to emerge, one based perhaps on technological and private sector linkages between Indians and Africans, rather than channelled through the diaspora.

Dr Parvathi Vasudevan: Nigeria and India Relations

India has always had an oil-centred relationship with Nigeria and whilst the focus at the beginning was on palm oil, it has now changed to crude oil. Similarly, Indian companies have gone from being traders to real-time investors, and they have given an indication that money will be ploughed back into Nigeria if the environment is right. None the less, Indian engagement in Nigeria has also occurred in other areas, for example in the textile sector or through teacher-exchange schemes, which were particularly popular in the 1970s.

Political and diplomatic relations between the two countries have developed rather hesitantly. In the first 40 years of Indian-Nigerian engagement, there were only two official visits and one unofficial from an Indian Prime Minister to Nigeria. However, this has changed in 2000 due to the central role of former President Obasanjo – a leader who was much liked and much disliked in Nigeria. He was very popular from 1999 to 2003, and again until 2007 but once he was out of office, he came to be seen as evil personified. In 1999, Obasanjo became Nigeria's first civilian president and although his election was neither free nor fair, he managed to achieve recognition for Nigeria from the international community and re-established the country in international organizations, for example in the Commonwealth, the UN and others.

On a visit to India, Obasanjo stayed for four days and visited trade bodies and talked about doing more on food security. He also visited New Delhi briefly and told Indians that if they do it right in Nigeria they could reach the rest of Africa. He dangled the carrot of oil and said that Nigeria's concern is that its

role in international relations is recognised. The savings rate and local capacity is limited in Nigeria, and the growth question began to assume a big role in internal policy discussions – a point made in the Chatham House paper on Asian oil companies in Nigeria. India promised a lot but nothing materialized. There is little information on this disconnect but closer links have been sought since the 1970s.

The 1990s was a decade of reform in India, the 2000s signalled reform for Nigeria, but why was there still no movement? It could be because India has not done its part, or because Nigeria is not being pushed enough or it is not responsive enough. Indian teachers do not survive in Nigeria because of the low salaries and the poor security. Nigeria is only interested in specialized technical training.

In Delhi, it is said that there is no problem with Nigeria, but does the relationship stop with delegations meeting or does it go forward from there? China's strategy is to send large delegations that do not only visit Lagos but travel around the country, whilst Indian delegations only visit Lagos. In the 1980s, 75 Nigerian students were invited to come to India. Today China has responded to Nigerian calls for training in particular fields by setting up specialized institutions, and has tripled the number of Nigerian students that it hosts.

India needs to do some soul-searching as to why it is not appealing more to Africans. India has always been the latecomer. Although India has engaged with Nigeria in imports/exports in the past, now Nigeria is importing more from China than it is exporting to China. In any small town in Nigeria, markets are flooded with Chinese goods. Indian textiles have been overrun by the Chinese. 70 percent of the textiles sold in Nigeria are Chinese, and the attraction is that there are lax customs regulations. India has promised to build a road from Kano to Lagos and a railway, but China is constructing the road from Abuja to Kano.

Luke Patey: Sudan and India

There have been remarkable changes over the past decade in the relationship between Sudan and India. In 2001, the Indian Minister of Industry wanted to raise the amount of trade from US\$80 million to US\$100 million. This trade was to be in lentils and fruit but it made headlines. By the following year, 12,000 barrels of crude oil arrived in India from Sudan. Officials declared that it was not imported oil, but Indian oil. It was the first ever

shipment from an Indian operation overseas, and it had a transformative effect.

ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) invested in Sudan in March 2003, and went on to buy other operations. The company developed a pipeline from Khartoum to Port Sudan which cost US\$1 billion, but avoided signing any long-term contracts. At that time, there were concerns that an oil shock could happen and a surge in oil prices – similar to the one which followed the Yom Kippur War in 1973 – could have negative effects for India's economy.

70% of India's oil comes from overseas, and of this 75% is from the Middle East. Energy security is a major concern for Indian officials, only food security is more important. As a result, a parliamentary committee on oil was formed in 1997. Energy security is seen to be linked to economic growth, which is in turn linked to poverty reduction, which is linked to stability in oil fields. When Talisman Energy Inc. left Sudan in 2003, it was not easy for OVL to continue to operate in Sudan. There was opposition to India's continued presence in Sudan at home and from the international community. The debate in New Delhi was more focused on the security of India's investment rather than the human rights issues. Sudan had harboured international terrorists, which was also a problem for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. US\$720 million spent on foreign investment meant a loss of domestic jobs in India, and workers had been killed in Assam province. Officials in India also wanted to make sure that OVL would not embarrass New Delhi by staying away from Sudan, and they were encouraged by the Chinese companies already in operation there.

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) – China's largest oil and gas company – swooped in as it wanted to use its contractual rights of first refusal and saw no need to bring in partners with 2000 barrels a day. The Indian government pulled in the Sudanese Vice President Taha for a tête-à-tête, and in the end Khartoum agreed rather than placing all of its eggs in one basket. After 2005's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, OVL's production and oil prices skyrocketed until 2008. What were India's promises at this time? Trade went up from \$80 million to \$450 million. There was some private sector investment, but it was government relations that were particularly strong.

Problems have arisen of late because of commercial and security-based setbacks. When OVL first invested, it wanted US\$1.2 billion for refining at Port Sudan, but it could not get the bank loans needed so its plans fell apart. This incident is rarely mentioned, and if the plan had worked it would have doubled the returns. The pipeline agreement was delayed. Finally, security is

a general problem and there were kidnappings in 2003. Reform will happen because of positive deals made during the war.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: South Africa and India

Government-to-government relations began in 1993, but there are much older people-to-people links. The Indian High Commission in South Africa is currently holding events to celebrate 150 years of the South African Indian community – the largest Indian population born outside of India. The diaspora in South Africa see themselves as black South Africans. There is one anecdote that tells of a prominent figure in the Indian South African community who the government wanted to give a diaspora award, but it was refused as the individual saw themselves as only South African.

There are very strong political anti-apartheid connections, and of course Gandhi's stay in South Africa is well-documented. Ties between the ANC and the Indian National Congress are longstanding, and India was the first country to bring the issue of apartheid before the UN. Since 1994 there has been much goodwill between the countries. In the case of Nigeria, the relationship with India has fallen short of expectations and potential. South Africa is a strategic partner for India in terms of South-South relations, but relations have not prospered.

This is because:

- of capacity, especially from the South African perspective, where there are a lot of good ideas but it has been difficult to move forward;
- of a lack of clarity from the South African side on where the country sits on particular issues, for example, on the seats of the UN Security Council;
- India and South Africa are competitors within Africa. Their relations are different to those between India and other South African countries, and also between China and other countries.

What is the challenge in this context? How can good will be made more substantial whilst the countries remain competitive? There needs to be a balancing out between being big potential competitors, being democracies at the cornerstone of South-South relations, and enabling a fairer global order.

Two tiers could develop in the global south, with the more systemically important developing a global system which needs more marginal countries.

India is looking for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and this will probably coincide with the time that South Africa gets elected to the Security Council. Do India and South Africa see the world in similar ways? Do their actions attest to that? The answer is, not always. South Africa sees India as a partner and, as a key component of its South-South strategy, it has become even more important. Bilateral relations are not just commercial but also concern issues of global governance, as discussed at the 2003 forum of India, Brazil and South Africa. This does not mean that there will be informal alliances at the World Trade Organization, or that they will have the same position there. In some cases South Africa was more assertive on agricultural issues, whilst India was more so on industry. Both countries have an agreement that what was being decided was something that needed to be withstood.

South Africa went with other African countries on decisions to do with the UN Security Council, particularly when they stipulated that any new permanent members would need to have a veto. This meant that South Africa could not align itself with the G4's position. This was a point of some concern, and the issue is always raised in India. It is the biggest challenge to its worldview. The problem for South Africa is that it has to choose between African consensus and solidarity versus a more robust leadership, and has to be prepared to stand apart from the group.

Unlike South Africa, India is not automatically seen to be speaking for the region, and the G20 leaders' summit was a sign of that. South Africa is, in many respects, coy about leading politically, and this has led to frustration for India. In 1995 a Bilateral Commission between India and South Africa was set up. South Africa had a spate of these after apartheid, and all experienced peaks and troughs. The one with India had a broad gamut, with nearly thirty agreements and MOUs. In terms of state visits, Thabo Mbeki went to Delhi in 2003 and September 2004, and Manmohan Singh visited South Africa in 2007. Since 2007 the ANC has highlighted its party-to-party links, and before he became President Jacob Zuma visited the leader of the Indian Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi.

Since 1992, exports from India to South Africa have gone from R190 million to 2009's figures of R18 billion in imports and R15.5 billion in exports. A lot of this trade has been in gold, which accounts for the skewed trade balance. Both countries say that trade barriers are difficult to deal with. Nevertheless,

there has been two-way investment: there are forty South African companies in India, including a number of breweries, and Neotel is the second most popular fixed line in South Africa.

Areas of disagreement are tiered and multi-dimensional. How does India view South Africa? Its status is locked down because of India and Brazil in BRIC. Nuclear non-proliferation is also a point of contention, and there is a history of South Africa selling arms to Pakistan in the past. There is a further issue of South African and Indian pharmaceutical companies. Tenders have been given to local companies in South Africa despite Indian companies offering more favourable business deals.

There was also the attempted deal between the South Africa-based MTN Group Limited and Bharti Airtel, India's leading provider of telecommunications, which fell through in September 2009. Indians questioned why South Africans were happy to allow the South African banks to give money to CNPC but were not prepared to see this deal through. The frustration is recognizing South Africa's sensitivities to its role within Africa.

Dr Cyril Obi: Discussant

The central question is: Why is India in Africa now? What are the platforms of engagement? India has been in Africa for a very long time. Africa dropped off the radar, but it is now back on it. Why? In the next ten to twenty years India will be one of the biggest eight economies in the world. This engagement is economic; it is about a search for markets and about global influence. India needs friends and allies in its global ambitions. Development cooperation is useful, and the question is which developmental model to use – Western or Eastern? India is providing appropriate technology, capacity building, IT, health and education.

It is also necessary to question the nature of this trade – is it transforming the nature of production in Africa, or does it duplicate the relationship between the West and Africa? What does this say of the mutual benefits in the India-Africa relationship? Is there also a technical transfer to Africa? What is the future of India's perception of Africa in a changing world? It is very important that each of these papers portrays an accurate picture.

On the role of the Indian diaspora in Kenya, there is a need to hear more about the others – why are Indian companies not doing well? What is the history of Indian state involvement in Kenya?

Dr Parvathi Vasudevan gave a deep analysis of India and Nigeria and particularly interesting was the analysis of the role of the oil industry. She mentioned Obasanjo's promises to the Indians – he probably said exactly the same thing to the Chinese. Would it be dangerous to say that during the Obasanjo years, India basically depended on him? Western nationals wanted to diversify the players in the oil business, and China has been the most aggressive in trying to get what they want out of Nigeria. What has been the role of the Indian sector, and of the Chambers of Industry? The Indian share of the textiles industry collapsed because of the Chinese, among others. What is the most critical challenge to Chinese textiles now?

What is the link with governance? I agree that there is a disconnection in the link to the critical constituencies in Nigeria and India. Is it in the nature of people-to-people relations? The human potential is one area which India has not exploited. In forward-looking strategies, there needs to be some soul-searching. For the Nigerian population, what is the most critical perspective?

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos alluded to the problem for South Africa in playing a leadership role within Africa. What is the difference between South Africa's actions within Africa and India's?

Discussion

Q: Can India learn from the way that South Africa does business on the continent? Over the last decade there has been this idea of South Africa bringing in African marketing. There are also the links between African and Asian companies – China and Sonangol in Guinea for example. Can India be like them?

A: There is an ambiguity in South Africa's foreign engagement and policy. Politically it is coy, and economically it is on a continent which has been pushing particular interests. South Africa's entry into contracts has happened often despite the government, meaning that the corporate side has done well, and South African companies have learnt a lot. From the perspective of the South African government, there is a big concern about how the corporate sector is seen on the continent. There must be a clear developmental through-flow, and the attempt has been to do this in a collaborative fashion, not with the 'stick' approach.

A: Co-operation between Western and Asian oil companies also has its merits.

Q: The Chairman of the African Union is half-Chinese – which demonstrates how informality can work in Africa. In all of this, common people seem to lose out. What is the role of the local private sector in Africa? Please can you comment on private sector complexity, for example the battle of South Africa versus Nigeria in MTN – where 60 percent of the profit comes from Nigeria, but Nigeria only has a three percent stake.

Q: How does China continue to get oil out of Africa when India cannot?

A: By resilience through insecurity. Chinese companies face more threats because they have a heightened presence. Insecurity slows down operations. Oil production is stagnating because of insecurity.

Q: I have experience of the privatization of tea estates in Rwanda. It was set up as a sale; a post-genocide fire sale and was very unsophisticated considering that there are a lot of ways to restructure the private sector. Instead of ten estates, only two were sold by the government and none of them went to Indians. It was a situation where an outside investor was not exploitative, but was responding to a government call for involvement.

Q: What is the reason behind the Indian diaspora in Kenya's lack of interest in Indian companies trying to invest in Kenya?

A: The Indian diaspora has had a long residence in Kenya, and in the past Kenyan Asians had wanted to play a part in nation-building but Nehru disassociated from them, which left people feeling abandoned. There are also different economic interests between the populations. It is also important to keep in mind that Gujarati and Punjabi identities are very different.

Q: Are there many Indian concerns over the allocation of visas to Nigerians? There is an increasing rise in the involvement of Nigerians in organised crime. Many of the drug traffickers arrested in India are Nigerian. Has there been any dialogue on this?

A: Nigerian and Indian authorities are very cagey about the drug-smuggling issue. The role of the Indian private sector is significant; in fact the government piggybacks on the work of India's private sector, which is unlike China where the state is fully involved. The Indian private sector has had a major impact, particularly on the pharmaceutical front, but there are some bad apples.

SESSION 3

Strategic Themes

Chair: Michael Anderson, Director General, Research, Policy and International Relations, Department for International Development, London

Speakers:

Ruchita Beri, Research Officer, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

Dr Emma Mawdsley, Senior Lecturer and Fellow, Cambridge University, UK

Alex Vines, Director of Regional and Security Studies and Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, London

Manish Chand, Editor, *Africa Quarterly*, New Delhi

Discussant: Dr Renu Modi, Director, Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai

Ruchita Beri: Locating Africa in India's Energy Policy

Energy security has become a key term when talking about India's recent investments in Africa. Although there are various definitions of this term, they are all similar in the way they look at energy from a consumer perspective.

Over the decades, India has experienced high economic growth rates which have drastically increased its energy demands. While the country is rich in coal, it has relatively poor resources in oil and gas. India is already largely dependent on oil imports and this dependency is forecast to increase to 90% within the next 10 years. To keep up its growth in the future, India is therefore facing a daunting challenge of securing its energy supply. While the country has sourced its oil supply mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iran in the past, it is now increasingly looking at African countries such as Nigeria and Angola. Indian companies have become very active in the upstream component of the oil sector and are currently exploring a number of new oil sources in Madagascar, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda.

India is trying to build up a sustainable partnership with Africa in the oil sector. From an Indian perspective, this is focused on five growth areas: to increase oil purchases; to invest more in upstream oil production; to foster new exploration; to make India's skills and technology available for African partners, and to develop a holistic approach to the whole energy sector. The latter also includes India's expertise in downstream.

India's relations with Africa with respect to energy are fairly complex. Issues of importance are the country's competition with China and the political instability in some African countries, which has led to downsizing of India's acquisition strategy. Furthermore, India is subject to increasing pressure from the global community to cut down its carbon emissions and is now looking very closely at renewable energy technologies. The Indian government created the Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (DNES) back in 1982 and has set ambitious targets for the expected share of renewable energy to the total power generation capacity.

Dr Emma Mawdsley: India as a Postcolonial Donor

A current research focus of Dr Mawdsley is Gift Theory in relation to aid and particularly its different application to DAC (Development Assistance Committee) and post-colonial donors. The Gift Theory was developed by sociologist Marcel Mauss and in essence states that giving creates a social bond between giver and receiver and therefore carries a social charge. Together with economic exchange and redistribution it is one of three ways of resource allocation. Giving itself involves three actions: giving, receiving and reciprocating.

A number of academics have drawn upon the Gift Theory to explain the North-South relationship in the context of foreign aid. This involves the notion of 'negative giving', in which the persistent failure or inability to reciprocate 'gifts' creates a relation of superiority and inferiority between donor and recipient countries. Negative giving has mainly been associated with Western countries and their donor relationship, which partly is perceived as a gesture of generosity that conceals double-sided expectations. However, despite the fact that aid from Western donors is often linked to deeper strategic interests, it normally includes a charitable or generous motivation.

DAC and postcolonial donors vary in their history of aid cooperation and their motivations, which is also reflected in their ways of communication in statements, declarations as well as modalities and practices. Western donors' claims are mainly based on charitable thoughts, the moral obligation to help combined with the ability to provide superior expertise in knowledge, technology and science. On the other hand, postcolonial donors' claims generally avoid the terminology of 'donor-recipient' and rather talk of mutual opportunities, South-South solidarity and empathy. Postcolonial donors can offer first-hand advice for developing countries as they have only recently experienced similar development pursuits and growth. In sum, while Western

development cooperation is mainly driven by suspended obligation and a lack of reciprocation, postcolonial donors are driven by mutual benefits and recognition of reciprocity.

A common debate in international development is about loans versus grants. While grants without doubt can relieve pressure from highly indebted countries, loans can give recipient countries new confidence and re-balance the asymmetric relationship. This can be seen with the example of Sri Lanka, which sent donations to the United States after Hurricane Katrina. Although the total amount was negligible, it was an important step for the country's self-confidence and independence after having received large amounts of donations following the tsunami in 2004. Similarly, India refused to accept donations after the tsunami in order to avoid falling back into dependence similar to the old donor-recipient relationship.

Whilst China and India are clearly very interesting partners for Africa, there is a danger of obscuring the reality with their claim to partnership and solidarity. There already have been incidences which lie outside the normal South-South relationship. Nevertheless, the increased interest from China and India offers new opportunities for Africa to move away from the rigid relationship with the West of always donor – always recipient.

Alex Vines: Indian Peace and Security Policy in Africa

The three focus areas of India's foreign policy are to ensure a peaceful periphery, sustain relations with major powers and tackle issues of the future such as food security, water, energy and environment. In recent years, two dynamics on the African continent have caught India's attention. The first is the growing presence of China as discussed in more detail earlier in the conference. China has not only developed into a major investor in Africa's oil industry but has also become a major competitor over maritime power through its expansion of access to ports and airfields in Africa. This has raised India's concerns since the country is heavily reliant on imports by sea and is facing a challenge to secure the country's growing oil demand. The second is the significant diaspora of Indians to Africa. The highest Indian populations in Africa are now in South Africa, Mauritius and La Réunion with 1.2 million, 800,000 and 220,000 people respectively.

India issued its first Maritime Doctrine in 2004 and updated it in 2009 with respect to counter-terrorism and anti-piracy. India's cooperation with Mauritius goes back to 1977 and has included secondments of Air Force and Navy Personnel, the provision of a patrol boat in 2001 and training for Indian

Defence establishments. More recently in 2003, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Seychelles which allows India to patrol territorial waters, and to foster cooperation between the two countries through secondments of coast guards and helicopters, as well as joint exercises and routine visits. Establishing such cooperation is part of India's response to China's 'string of pearls' strategy of establishing sea lines of communication reaching from Hong Kong to Port Sudan, including several strategic points such as the Strait of Malacca. In addition, India has set up a listening post in Madagascar and a radar and air station in the Maldives to track Chinese naval movements. It has also increasingly fostered ties with South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique, but so far much of this cooperation appears to be stronger on paper than in reality.

When talking about India's Peace and Security Policy in Africa, piracy at the Horn of Africa is a major factor. In the past, over 100 Indian citizens have been kidnapped and several Indian naval ships have been deployed. The Indian navy seems to have been more aggressive than the Chinese in its actions against the pirates.

India also tries to establish its influence in Africa through its involvement in regional and economic cooperation. It is part of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), an organization with 18 member states aiming to be a source of information and to overcome the impediments to trade and investment within the region. The country is a member of the IBSA Dialogue Forum between India, Brazil and South Africa, a grouping of three important powers of the developing world promoting South-South cooperation. In addition, India is cooperating with African regional communities such as the AU, SADC and COMESA and is establishing bilateral economic links with individual African countries.

India's ambitions need to be matched by sustainable new doctrines and diplomatic capabilities as India currently only has a thin net of representation. Business and industry are likely to remain the key drivers of India's renewed diplomatic efforts beyond the rivalry with China. Western countries can play their part in encouraging India to take more responsibility in the Indian Ocean.

Manish Chand: Comparing China with India in Africa

Differences between the two countries' approaches have been significant from the beginning. When China held the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, it became the largest diplomatic summit ever held in China, attended by 35 African heads of state. President Hu Jintao presented

it as the beginning of a new strategic partnership between China and Africa and set out Chinese investment goals and other forms of cooperation such as scholarships. At the end of the summit, 14 agreements were made featuring Chinese investment projects and concessionary loans to Africa. In contrast, The Africa-India Forum Summit in 2008 was much more modest. The attendees were a mixture of heads of state and business people. The tone was much more one of creating a wider partnership which not only focused on business.

China's interest in Africa is driven by its hunt for resources. The country relies on energy imports to ensure the continuation of its economic growth. Currently, 41% of its oil imports come from Africa. China also understands Africa as a platform for its global ambitions. Chinese companies use the opportunity to go global with the help of tax breaks and support by the Chinese government. The latter follows an approach of 'aid through trade' and does not link any conditionality to its investment. This 'economic diplomacy' remains purely business focused and often allows for fast progress in business negotiations.

Similarly, India's key driver is also its energy security. By now, 50% of India's oil imports come from Africa with Nigeria alone providing a share of around 10%. However, investment is driven more by the private sector as opposed to Chinese state-owned companies. Additionally, India claims to look for a wider partnership promoting democratization, research, and training and skills transfer between itself and the African continent.

In the future, it is very likely that China will stay ahead of India in terms of investments in Africa for at least another decade. Having two large investors with two distinct approaches in addition to Western investors provides African countries with an opportunity to be more selective in their choice of partner.

Dr Renu Modi: Discussant

Western and Asian countries do not differ that much when it comes to energy investment in Africa. The main difference rather lies in the rhetoric they use: India is only importing crude oil at the moment while at the same time talking about capacity building in Africa.

In contrast to China's approach to Africa, India will build a long-term partnership with Africa rather than focusing on short-term business objectives. The country's interest in Africa is not only focused on economic gains from the extractive sector. The potential for an economic partnership is strong and

includes sectors such as agriculture and agribusiness. Moreover, India is a supporter of civil society movements in Africa in several countries such as Nigeria or Namibia.

Discussion

Several questions focussed on the lack of an African perspective in the current debate. Current focus is mainly on analysing the strategies and approaches of Western or Asian countries in Africa rather than paying attention to what Africa's strategies and responses are. Also, there is a need for research on how African businesses are involved in China and India.

Alternative views were presented of China's business-focused approach, which has made it subject to criticism for ignoring environmental and human rights issues. China, it was argued, has a foreign policy of non-intervention in the sovereignty of other countries and provides aid to Africa in line with its own capacity as a developing country.

SESSION 4

The Future of India-Africa Relations

Chair: Alex Vines, Director, Regional and Security Studies and Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, London

Speakers:

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, National Director, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg

Professor Ajay Dubey, Chairman of the Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal University, New Delhi

Dr Gareth Price, Head, Asia Programme, Chatham House, London

Discussant: Professor Fantu Cheru, Research Director, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Triangulation has been used by European development agencies and South Africa when working together to build capacity in third – mainly African – countries. Such cooperation has the potential to benefit both the European donor and the African receiving nation as they have the advantage of South Africa's 'Africa' expertise. Although there has been much discussion regarding triangulation between India, South Africa and a third party, no specific projects have formally taken shape yet.

There are advantages and disadvantages to this kind of trilateralism. South Africa can benefit from its role as emerging development assistant. It has the chance to allocate specific funds for projects it has previously identified as important and at the same time can contribute its experiences as a developing country. One disadvantage could, however, be the cooption of vulnerable nations into other countries' agendas. One example was a programme involving the Netherlands, which – by some – could have been seen as having encouraged South Africa to act as a tool of the European agenda.

As for the future of India-Africa relations, first of all, South Africa and India are in each others' backyards and further cooperation is very likely to take place. Secondly, for triangulation to be successful, it is important that all parties have the same goals. Political relationships between countries need to be strong enough to navigate possible tensions that may arise. For other African countries, progress in triangulation between Africa and India could lead to concerns and rivalry within the region and may reinforce the perception of a

neo-colonial South Africa. Collaboration between India and South Africa could also be seen as an attempt to dislodge other third parties and could have potential consequences for relations with China and Brazil for example. Finally, it is important that South Africa shares its lessons and experiences of development cooperation. At present, the South African Development Partnership Agency and the IBSA Development Fund feed into new initiatives between India and South Africa. Additionally, there is a great value in focusing on individual bilateral relations between nations and looking at projects with regional focus. In this regard, joint action plans are a very positive step forward.

Professor Ajay Dubey

The relationship between India and Africa is multidimensional and operates at continental, regional and bilateral levels. In a scenario where Africa is going to be increasingly democratic, accountably governed and with a market-based economy, Indian engagement in Africa will move from a passive request-based approach to aggressive involvement of the Indian private sector.

The multinationals of the South are going to increasingly become like the multi nationals of the North in their Africa activities. Rapidly growing India-Africa trade will also become increasingly indistinguishable from North-South trade since it is going to involve export of primary commodities from Africa and sale of value-added products from India, along with an adverse balance of trade for Africa in non-petroleum sectors. From the Indian government side, the engagements are likely to increase in capacity-building and human resource development, based on the knowledge economy where India is very competitive.

Agriculture and energy resources are going to see both private and public sector initiatives. Both are going to challenge the traditional goodwill of India if not handled properly. Agriculture, which has great potential for people-centric cooperation, is witnessing decreasing involvement from Indian government initiatives and increasing involvement of the private sector. Political cooperation in building institutions of governance both at macro and micro levels such as institutions of local governance and civil society organizations is going to intensify. The newer areas of future cooperation will utilise Indian diaspora resources and newer, hitherto unexplored Francophone and Lusophone territories that are rich in energy resources will also see deeper engagement from India. The multi dimensional Indo-African relations will ensure that even when India succeeds in meeting its short-term objectives

such as restructuring some of the institutions of global governance, the Indian ambition to rise as a major economic power will ensure growing African engagement.

Dr Gareth Price

Until the 1970s, it was assumed that the diaspora was the defining link between the two regions. The nature of this relationship has now shifted although, since 2000, there have been attempts to try and resuscitate this relationship.

India and its economy have undergone significant changes. From independence up until the 1980s, India's economy had very little private sector activity and engaged in a negligible amount of outward investment. In 2008, however, outward investment stood at around \$17 billion, which is due to a major shift in the country's foreign and economic policies.

Until recently, India's private sector did not view Africa as market opportunity but this perception has been rapidly changing. India's technology has tended to concentrate on products that are adaptable, appropriate and affordable. As a result, Africa has emerged as a potential market for India's producers. Africa has also moved up India's political agenda. India's goal of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council led to the development of its aid programme.

India has a particular relationship with likeminded emerging powers such as South Africa – a nation that is also working on developing its relationship with the US. But India already faces a dilemma in that it is unable to please all the parties that it wishes to. A few years ago at the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), for example, India had to choose between Iran and the US. Although in this circumstance, it chose the US, India will have to make similar difficult decisions in the future.

India needs to develop its policy framework but is likely to struggle to balance this. There is a question mark over who India will choose as its primary partner: will it be South Africa, other African nations or the United States (which would, for example, affect its relations with Sudan)?

Professor Fantu Cheru

Both the United States and EU will remain very important African partners for the foreseeable future. The ability of Indian to engage with Africa will be

defined by the opportunities and risks that India faces in the global system. The global context of the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and even past events – such as India and Brazil's disagreement over agriculture in the WTO – will determine how countries manage their partnerships. Like China, India is, however, unlikely to sacrifice its relationship with the United States.

Researchers have the task of establishing how to create greater engagement with African research institutes and universities. This will be a challenge given the dire state of much of the African Higher Education system, but it is important to rectify the current absence of African voices on the global stage. Researchers need to make a concerted effort to reach out to African institutions. Together, they need to define an agenda and produce joint knowledge that can then be turned into policy dialogue, in which state, private sector and civil society participate.

Finally, it is important to diversify current engagement with Africa. To become more robust, research must reach out to other disciplinary areas outside of sociology and the political sciences such as economics and law.

SPEAKER AND CHAIR BIOGRAPHIES

Michael Anderson is Director General of Research, Policy and International Relations at the UK's Department for International Development. Mr. Anderson returned from New Delhi in early 2010 where he was Head of DFID's India Office.

Ruchita Beri is a Research Officer at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She specializes on political and security issues of Sub-Saharan Africa and her current focus of research is *Redefining India-Africa relations*. She has an M.Phil in African Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi and a diploma on Conflict Studies from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. She is currently the Vice President of the African Studies Association of India and an alumna of the Women in International Security (WIIS), USA. She has edited the book *Africa and Energy Security* and has over 75 published articles and book chapters.

Manish Chand is Editor of *Africa Quarterly*, a journal specializing in African issues and India-African Relations, published by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. He is also Senior Editor at IANS, a global media company, and writes on issues relating to India's foreign policy and various facets of India-Africa engagement. He has co-edited a book entitled *Engaging with a Resurgent Africa* (published by McMillan in collaboration with the Observer Research Foundation). He participated in the India-Africa Editor's Conference that was held in the run-up to India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi in 2008. He has accompanied the Indian prime minister on state visits to various countries, including the United States, France, Germany, Nigeria and South Africa.

Professor Fantu Cheru is Research Director at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden and Emeritus Professor of International Development at the School of International Service, American University in Washington, DC. Previously, he was a member of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Panel on Mobilizing International Support for the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as well a Convener of the Global Economic Agenda Track of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy. He also

served as the UN's Special Rapporteur on Foreign Debt and Structural Adjustment for the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva from 1998-2001.

Professor Ajay Dubey is Director of the Area Studies Programme on Africa, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and former Chairperson, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, JNU. Currently he is the Secretary General of African Studies Association of India (ASA India). He is associated with two peer reviewed international journals, as Managing Editor of *Insight on Africa* and *Africa Review*. He has published around eight books and several research papers in academic journals on issues relating to African affairs and Indian foreign policy. He has supervised over one and half dozen doctoral thesis on African affairs.

Dr Emma Mawdsley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography, Cambridge University. She has worked for over 15 years on regional and environmental politics in India. She has also researched and published extensively on development ideologies and practices. Her current work on India-Africa relations, and non-DAC donors, brings some of these threads together. She is currently co-editing a book with Gerard McCann on India-Africa, to be published by Fahamu.

Dr Gerard McCann holds the Mellon Fellowship in Transnational History at Oxford University. He is a Fellow of St Cross College and a Research Fellow in the Politics Group at Nuffield College, Oxford. After a short spell in political consultancy in the City of London, he returned to academia and has published on the social and political history of South Asian diaspora in East Africa and Southeast Asia, based on doctoral work at Cambridge University. His more recent research concerns postcolonial relations within the 'global South'. In addition to publication in academic journals on India-Africa relations, he is currently finalizing a collection entitled *India in Africa: changing geographies of power* (Oxford: Fahamu, 2010), co-edited with Dr Emma Mawdsley.

Dr Renu Modi is a senior lecturer and Director of the Department of African Studies, University of Mumbai. She is a political scientist and received her PhD from the Centre for African Studies Jawahar Lal Nehru University in New Delhi. Her current research interests include issues of India-Africa trade

relations and Indian diasporas in Africa. Her forthcoming book is entitled *South-South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage* (Palgrave). In addition, she has published articles on India-Africa trade relations. She has a specialist interest in development and displacement issues; livelihood reconstitution at resettlement sites and gender aspects of involuntary resettlement in the Afro-Asian context.

Dr Cyril Obi is a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. He has been on leave since 2005 from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, where he is an Associate Research Professor. In 2004, Dr Obi became the second Claude Ake Professor at the University of Uppsala. He has received international recognition and awards. In 2001, he was a fellow of the 21st Century Trust, Conference on 'Rethinking Security for the 21st Century' at Oxford and visiting Post-Doc fellow to St Anthony's College Oxford in 2000.

Luke Patey is a PhD Candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies. His research focuses on the influence of oil development on civil war and the peace process in Sudan with a particular focus on the operations of Asian National Oil Companies. He has written several articles on the oil sector in Sudan, including 'Crude Days Ahead? Oil in Sudan at the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement', in *African Affairs*, 2010, and 'Against the Asian Tide: The Sudan Divestment Campaign', in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2009. His dissertation addresses how the rise of energy in India led to its engagement in Sudan.

Dr Gareth Price was appointed head of the Asia Programme in 2004 after initially leading the India project at Chatham House. Prior to this, he worked as a consultant in India for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, for four years, covered political and economic developments in India and Pakistan as the Senior South Asia Analyst for the Economist Intelligence Unit. This followed work for a political risk consultancy and a PhD from Bristol University, which examined ethnic conflict in North East India.

Adam Roberts will move to be a correspondent for *The Economist* in India in the middle of 2010. He joined *The Economist* in 1998 as a writer on international affairs, based in London. In 2001 he moved to Johannesburg,

South Africa, where he served as Africa correspondent. Since the beginning of 2006 he has been News Editor, based in London, overseeing *The Economist's* news content online. He co-hosts a weekly podcast for *The Economist* on international affairs. He is author of *The Wonga Coup*, which tells the true story of Simon Mann's attempted overthrow of the government of Equatorial Guinea in 2004 and he co-edited two books in South Africa.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, is the national director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg. She is the editor of the *South African Journal of International Affairs*. In 2008 she co-edited a special issue of the Journal on 'India in Africa' with Alex Vines from Chatham House. She has headed the Institute since 2005, before which she was director of studies. She was previously research director at the South African Institute of Race Relations and editor of the *Race Relations Survey* (now the *South Africa Survey*) an annual publication documenting political and constitutional developments, and socio-economic disparities in South Africa.

Alex Vines has been head of the Africa Programme at Chatham House since 2002 and in 2008 became Director of Regional and Security Studies. Alex first joined Chatham House as an Associate fellow for the British Angola Forum in 1999. From 2005 to 2007 Alex was a member, and later Chair, of the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire and served in 2001-03 on the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia. Alex has had a long association with Human Rights Watch and served as their senior researcher on Business and Human Rights. He serves on the editorial board of several leading journals and writes regularly for publications around the world.

Dr Parvathi Vasudevan, currently conducting research with Chatham House, lived in Abuja, Nigeria for three years before recently returning to India. She is a retired academic from the University of Mumbai's Centre for African Studies. Her work on "The Political Economy of Africa's Adjustment" published in 2001 sought to deconstruct some of the myths surrounding structural adjustment in Africa. In the last three years, she has written a number of journal articles on Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. She has been a commentator for the BBC World Service in Tamil and Hindi on African issues. She is a Member of the Governing Council of The Centre for International, Strategic and Development Studies in India.