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OPTIONS FOR THE EU TO SUPPORT THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

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Glossary of Acronyms:

ACCORD – African Centre for the Constructive resolution of disputes
ACOTA – African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (USA)
ACP – African Caribbean Pacific states
ACCP – African Conflict Prevention Pool (FCO, MOD & DFID collaboration)
AEC – African Economic Community
AMIB – AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS – AU Mission in Sudan
AMISOM – AU Mission in Somalia
APF – African Peace Facility (EU fund established 2003/4 of €250million)
APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA – African Peace and Security Architecture
Artemis – ESDP operation in eastern Congo launched 2003
ASF – African Standby Forces
AU – African Union
CAAU – Constitutive Act of the African Union
CEMAC – Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale
CEWARN – Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS – Continental Early warning System
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy (Second pillar of EU under Maastricht)
CIDO – African Citizens Directorate
COMESA – Common market for East and Southern Africa
CSSDCA – Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID – Department for International Development (UK)
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC – East African Community
EASBRIG – East African Standby Brigade
EC – European Commission
ECOBFRIG – West African ASF Brigade
ECOMOG – ECOWAS monitoring group
ECOSOCC – Economic Social and Cultural Committee
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
EDF – European Development Fund
EP – European Parliament
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
EU – European Union
EUFOR TCHAD / RCA – EU force in Chad and Central African Republic
EUFOR DRC – EU force in DRC
EUPEL – EU Police mission in Kinshasa DRC
EUSEC – EU SSR programme in DRC
EUSR – EU Special Representative
EWS – Early Warning System
FOMUC – Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (CAR)
GTZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IGAD – Inter Governmental Authority on development
ISS – Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
JRC – Joint Research Centre (EU)
KAIPTC – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
MONUC – UN mission in DRC
MSC – Military Staff Committee (AU)
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD – New Partnership for African Development
NGO – Non Governmental Organisation
OAU – Organisation of African Unity
PAP – Pan African Parliament
PCRD – Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
POW – Panel of the Wise (AU)
PSC – AU Peace and Security Council
PSO – Peace Support Operations
PSOD – Peace Support Operations Division (AU)
PSTC – Peace Support Training Centre
REC – Regional Economic Community
RECAMP – Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities ‘Renforcement des Capacites Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) (French initiative to reinforce African capabilities since 1997)
Relex – EU DG External Relations
RRM – Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SADC – Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG – Southern African ASF Brigade
SALW – Small arms and light weapons
SSR – Security Sector Reform
TFG – Transitional Federal Government Somalia
UN – United Nations
UNAMID – UN/AU mission to Darfur
UNDP – UN development programme
USAID – US Agency for international development
WANEP – West African Network for Peace building
WESBRIG – West African ASF Brigade
Executive Summary

This study gives an overview of the development of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to date and examines EU involvement in that development. It profiles direct EU military engagement and financial support within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Development Fund (EDF).

Section One of the study highlights the change in European involvement, away from being major UN troop contributors and towards the funding of African-led peace operations, as well as the emergence of time-limited, high impact, missions such as operation Artemis and the new mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. The African Union (AU) has adopted a strong interventionist ethos and this is seen as the foundation for the development of APSA. But it is hampered by capacity constraints, particularly in backroom services such as finance and human resources. The regional basis of APSA is examined and the conclusion is that, of the five regions contributing to the principal deployable component of APSA - known as the African Standby Force (ASF), West Africa has the most developed structures and Central Africa faces a steep challenge to operationalise all elements of APSA.

The EU is the major financial partner of the AU in both military - through the African Peace Facility (APF) - and non-military terms. The importance for the EU of its relationship with Africa is underlined by the recent appointment of a new EU Ambassador to the AU, and by the Lisbon summit of 2007. It is hoped that the new ambassador will be given the leeway and political support to make a significant impact. As a key donor the EU can take the lead in improving coordination amongst partners and in developing common reporting mechanisms.

EU member states, particularly Britain and France, are involved bilaterally in several areas of APSA, most notably training, and bilateral cooperation is increasing. This assistance is undoubtedly useful, not least because EU aid mechanisms are not authorised at present to fund lethal force applications, but there remains scope for greater coordination on a bilateral basis. The APF, which is wholly funded out of the EDF, has been essential for supporting the AU mission in Sudan, but the bar on the use of APF money for potentially lethal ends means certain key logistical restraints remain. The Africa-EU strategic partnership adopted at Lisbon commits both sides to fully operationalising APSA.

Section Two of the study examines the role that African parliaments and civil society have played in the development of APSA. Both the EU and the AU have made explicit statements to the effect that they see civil society and parliaments playing an important role in this respect. The study highlights the need for more critical examination of the role they play.

Civil society is supposed to be brought into the AU structure through the African Citizens Directorate. However, this department suffers serious capacity constraints. The post-Cotonou commitment to encourage civil society means EDF money could certainly be used to strengthen the directorate. Civil society has engaged APSA through think tanks and academia. The latter have helped determine the ethos of APSA and are now examining critically its success and failures.
These organisations are supported by several EU states. NGOs play an important role in post-conflict situations and also have a part to play in preventing conflicts in the first place.

The report focuses on the limited role of the Pan African Parliament (PAP) in APSA. To date, the PAP has no legislative or oversight role. The European Parliament and PAP are developing institutional relations and they addressed the Lisbon conference together. These relations offer an opportunity to raise the profile of the PAP and to build relationships with the members, and, through them, with the national parliaments to which they belong. However, the European Parliament should remain realistic regarding opportunities for collaboration with PAP given the limitations on its mandate.

Section Three draws conclusions from the study’s analysis and makes recommendations. The Lisbon summit in December 2007 marked a new stage in the partnership between the EU and Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture is at the heart of this partnership. Africa has made remarkable progress to be in such a position, just five years after the inception of the African Union. The ability to move so quickly is due to political will within the continent, but also the willingness of outside partners, particularly the EU and its member states, to finance the setting up of APSA.

Successfully operationalising APSA offers the prospect of more African solutions to African challenges. APSA is a holistic approach to peace and security that recognises the importance of prevention and mediation as much as peacekeeping, hence the prominent place for Continental Early Warning. The adoption of the AU constitutive act and its commitment to intervention in extreme circumstances shows an acknowledgement that events such as the Rwandan genocide should not be allowed to happen again on African soil. It would be naïve to think that even a fully operationalised APSA will solve all African conflicts but it does offer a very good chance of improving security on the continent.

The study makes a number of recommendations, including the following:

- **Military Logistics.** EU member states could provide either funds or equipment directly to forces engaged in AU-sanctioned peace and security operations.
- **Direct assistance to most developed regional brigades.**
- **New source of funding.** Need for the EU to develop a special fund to finance African military needs in pursuit of APSA objectives.
- **More attention on non-military aspects.** Establishing the rule of law, support for police ASF units and the inclusion of human rights advisers with ASF missions.
- **EU Ambassador.** The new Commission/CFSP representative to the AU should be given a strong mandate with discretionary powers over funds.
- **AU backroom capacity.** Need for effective finance and human resource capabilities.
- **A standardised reporting system back to donors is needed.**
- **Support for the Pan African Parliament (PAP).** The PAP requires long-term financial and political support from the European Parliament.
- **Firm commitment to inter-parliamentary dialogue.** The European Parliament should remain committed to the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary forum.
- **Support civil society and national Parliaments’ interaction with APSA.** The PAP should be well placed to promote and facilitate such interaction, given its members are also members of national parliaments, and the European Parliament might use its relationship with the PAP to encourage this.
Options for the EU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture

This study begins with a brief introduction and is then divided into two sections. The first section examines the history and future of European Union (EU) – African Union (AU) cooperation in peace and security. It gives an overview of past operations in Africa including Operation Artemis and charts AU deployments in Sudan and Somalia up to the present. Looking first at AU-wide capacity to effectively develop the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), then identifying the disparities in capacity from region to region, the study evaluates African efforts at promoting peace and security. Finally, this section profiles the EU’s role, giving an assessment of its ability to support the AU in developing APSA and identifying some good examples of EU or member state involvement. Section two examines the role that parliaments and civil society have played, and can play, in the development of APSA. This also looks at their role in non-military aspects of peace and security, from framing the discussion to involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. It concludes that, although it is presently poorly understood, this is an important aspect of the development of APSA.

Introduction to the African Peace and Security Architecture

Although in this decade the number of weakened or failed states has declined, Africa remains one of the most politically unpredictable continents. Europe and Africa have a long history of interaction and much has been positive in this relationship, alongside the well known periods of inequality. In recent times humanitarianism has emerged as the driving force behind European efforts towards Africa. This phenomenon, most notably expressed in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report ‘Responsibility to Protect’¹, was inspired by the experience of genocide in Rwanda and strengthened by the crisis in Sudan. In parallel, over the last decade African states have become more active in seeking their own solutions to the challenges they face. Indeed, it could be said that the peace and security architecture in Africa has evolved over the last forty years. The most significant steps, however, have been taken since the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002. The AU has moved away from the approach taken by its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - of absolute respect for national sovereignty, to one where the duty to protect and the right to intervene are enshrined in the constitutive act².

AU organisation

It will be useful briefly to set out the current institutional framework of the AU before continuing. The AU’s highest body is the Assembly, which comprises the heads of state of all member countries. The Executive Council comprises the foreign ministers of the member states and advises the Assembly. The administration and executive branch of the AU is the AU Commission. As in Europe there are commissioners covering different areas of AU activity: Said Djinnit being the current Commissioner for Peace and Security. The Pan-African Parliament is an indirectly elected parliamentary assembly with no legislative powers (although these are envisioned for the future). There are also financial organisations, the Economic and Social and Cultural Council and the

² http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm The constitutive act is the constitutional treaty of the AU.
Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC, in conjunction with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, is responsible for all areas of peace and security policy and action.

Figure I: What is the African Peace and Security Architecture?

The APSA comprises the various elements developed, or in development, by the AU (and some regional organisations) to bring about peace and security on the continent. The structure, as set out above, provides for a political decision making body – the PSC, an intelligence gathering and analysis centre (the Continental Early Warning System - CEWS) a military element (the African Standby Force – ASF - and Military Staff Committee – MSC), an external mediation and advisory body (the Panel of the Wise - POW) and a special fund to cover costs (the Peace Fund). The different elements are intended to provide a comprehensive set of tools for addressing the security concerns of the continent by African actors. The PSC receives advice and information from the POW, CEWS and Military Staff Committee and then instructs the ASF on the actions it deems necessary.
Peace and Security Council (PSC)
The PSC\(^3\) is composed of 15 members, 10 of whom are elected for a two-year term and five for a three-year term. The PSC is mandated to\(^4\):

- Promote peace, security and stability.
- Anticipate and prevent conflicts.
- Combat terrorism on the continent.
- Develop a common defence policy for Africa.
- Promote democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights.

As the central organ of the APSA, the PSC legitimises and coordinates the actions of all the other elements of the architecture. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is intended to provide advice to the PSC on military and security issues and is made up of representatives from the same countries as the PSC.

African Standby Force
The African Standby Force (ASF)\(^5\) is still in the early stages of being established, but is being designed to take the role of an African Rapid Reaction Force capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. The force is based on, and divided into, five regions - North, South, East, West and Central\(^6\), and will draw on military and civilian resources from a combination of some or all of these regions. Each region, when able, will provide a brigade available to be deployed under one of the six scenarios envisaged for deployment of the ASF, namely:

- Military advice to a political mission – deployed within thirty days of an AU resolution.
- Observer mission to be deployed alongside a UN mission – deployed within thirty days of an AU mission.
- A ‘stand alone’ observer mission - deployed within thirty days of an AU mission.
- Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment and peace building - deployed within thirty days of an AU mission.
- Complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Complete deployment within ninety days and military elements within thirty.
- Intervention by AU when international community fails to act, for example over genocide – deployment within fourteen days\(^7\).

Each region will have regional headquarters and planning elements to support the work of their brigades. As will be discussed later in the study, exact regional structures will vary depending on regional circumstances.

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)\(^8\), which is based in the situation room at AU headquarters, will help to anticipate and prevent conflicts. Using open source information the CEWS compiles reports using software adapted from the European early warning system. The reports identify potentially dangerous activity and are then passed to Early Warning analysts who


\(^4\) Ibid, Article 3.

\(^5\) Ibid, Article 13.

\(^6\) For more on the regional organisation of APSA see section on Regional Capacity – REC Incoherence.

\(^7\) Cilliers and Malan (2005), ‘Progress with the African Standby Force’, *ISS Paper*, 98 May, p.3.

\(^8\) PSC protocol, Article 12.
decide on the level of gravity and potential consequences from events identified. The CEWS will also receive information and analysis from the regional early warning systems that are currently being established. The information and analysis from CEWS will help inform decisions reached by the PSC and guide the deployment of the ASF.

**Panel of the Wise (POW)**
The Panel of the Wise (POW)\(^9\) will work primarily in the area of conflict prevention. It is made up of five ‘highly respected’ individuals. Currently they are: Salim Ahmed Salim (former Secretary General of the OAU) representing east Africa, Brigalia Bam (president of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa) representing southern Africa, Ahmed Ben Bella (former president of Algeria) representing north Africa, Elisabeth Pognon (president of the constitutional court of Benin) representing west Africa and Miguel Trovoada (former president of Sao Tome and Principe) representing central Africa. Acting on the instruction of the PSC, the Chairperson of the AU Commission or at their own initiative, the POW will undertake action in support of PSC objectives and give opinions on issues surrounding peace and security. In practice this is likely to mean mediating between warring groups or in situations where a conflict looks likely. It may also involve a behind the scenes role of raising issues with the PSC that are too politically sensitive for serving politicians to handle.\(^10\)

**Peace Fund**
A special Peace Fund\(^11\) has been created to finance peace support operations. The fund will be financed from the AU’s regular budget but also with voluntary contributions from member states and other fundraising activities. These may include innovative fundraising techniques – for example, schemes such as the proposed airline levy have been mentioned in this respect.

**EU Policy in Africa**
In December 2005, the EU adopted its Africa Strategy the aim of which is to “support Africa’s efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and make Europe's partnership with Africa more efficient”\(^12\). Much of the EU’s involvement is in terms of financial support channeled through the European Development Fund (EDF) which, as a formal EU mechanism under the EU’s first pillar, comes primarily under the direct control of the European Commission.

The EU Africa Strategy also recognizes the central role that peace and security play in achieving development goals and commits the EU to support the development of APSA. Indeed, the Africa-EU strategic partnership adopted at Lisbon in 2007 makes peace and security one of the central issues for cooperation.\(^13\) The EU is involved directly in promoting security in Africa, with CFSP-mandated EU missions to African countries, such as the mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to Chad and the Central African Republic. These EU military missions are financed through the Athena Mechanism, a special fund that is used to finance EU military or defence operations. The mechanism meets common costs such as communications or headquarters, but operational costs are the responsibility of the participating member states.

In terms of APSA, EDF money may be used for conflict prevention, but not for anything with ‘lethal implications’. This means that, if the African Peace Facility (APF) [see section 4.2 of the

\(^9\) Ibid, Article 11.
\(^10\) The post election fall out in Kenya is the type of situation that the POW could operate in. Although at this stage it appears the POW has not been involved.
\(^11\) PSC Protocol, Article 21.
\(^12\) [http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/africa/eu_strategy_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/africa/eu_strategy_en.html)
study for an explanation of the APF] - is financed out of the EDF, these funds may not be used to provide military hardware to African missions.\(^{14}\)

The Africa Strategy also commits the EU to engage with Africa at a civil society and parliamentary level. To this end the EP and Pan-African Parliament have engaged in joint meetings, the most recent of which took place at the Lisbon summit. As will be explained, however, the Pan-African Parliament lacks the oversight power of the EP and so is restricted in the role it can play at present.

\(^{14}\) Africa: What will it finance
Section I: Initiatives and operations between the EU and AU

1. Past Operations

The new APSA has grown out of previous attempts to create a stable and peaceful continent. A major influence on its development has been the principle of African solutions for African problems, epitomised by the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. African states have a variety of motivations for participating in peacekeeping operations. South Africa intervened in Lesotho for the sake of regional stability, and in the DRC to bolster its position as a leading African nation. Uganda sees advantages in deploying to Somalia in support of US anti-terrorism objectives, while Rwanda’s interest in Darfur is motivated by its experience of genocide. Some states will join a mission primarily to generate funds for their armed forces, and some for more idealistic ends. Europe’s role in peacekeeping has moved towards support for African missions and short-term interventions, like Operation Artemis, rather than contributing troops to long-term operations. Individual member states, the UK and France in particular, continue to be involved in certain countries, but interventions are increasingly being ‘Europeanised’. This section examines the development of European and African peace support operations in Africa by looking at Operation Artemis, the development of ECOMOG and the current missions in Sudan and Somalia.

Table 1: Significant Peacekeeping operations in Africa (fuller list can be found in Annex 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mission/Country(s) of Operation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Principle Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
1.1 Artemis

It seems likely that future direct involvement by European troops in African peace and security will follow the model set by Operation Artemis. This mission to the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was launched in June 2003, with the aim of stabilising the region in order that a reinforced UN presence could take over. (The short-term bridging role of EU troops is again in evidence with the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission\(^{15}\).) UN Security Council Resolution 1484\(^{16}\), adopted in May 2003, mandated an Interim Emergency Multinational Force to stabilise Bunia. Following a feasibility study by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU Council adopted a joint action plan for a mission to the DRC and France was appointed ‘Framework’ nation\(^{17}\). The mission was driven by the UK and France with Germany supporting. This mission was significant for a number of reasons; it was the EU’s first autonomous mission outside Europe, it adopted the “lead nation” principle, and worked to a very short timescale.

The mission received troop contributions from six European nations - as well as South Africa, Brazil and Canada - although the bulk of forces were French, which also provided the planning and operational leadership for the mission. This French leadership, which built on planning work already carried out in preparation for a possible independent French mission, allowed the force to deploy speedily after receiving its mandate. French command capacity also enabled the mission to be wholly autonomous at an EU level i.e. without needing to resort to NATO capabilities. The operation highlighted a French move away from its past neo-colonial record towards engagement in Africa through the international community\(^{18}\). Artemis also suited the EU’s ambition to be more active internationally\(^{19}\), and particularly in Africa, which is widely seen as an area where Europe can make a positive contribution through the emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

When Artemis came to an end and EU forces handed over to MONUC (UN mission in Congo) it was generally considered to have achieved its objectives. Although there was some criticism that the limited focus on Bunia town had allowed militias to simply spread into the surrounding countryside, this is more a criticism of operational parameters than of the mission’s achievements on the ground. In 2007 the EU was again active in the DRC launching a short-term mission to help ensure that national elections passed off peacefully. EUFOR RD Congo (EU force in Democratic Republic of Congo) drew troops form 21 countries and made a significant contribution to the relatively peaceful elections.

1.2 Sudan and Somalia

Missions are ongoing in both Sudan and Somalia. AMIS - The AU Mission in Sudan (Darfur), originally established as a monitoring mission in 2004, was subsequently expanded to become a

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\(^{15}\) EU Council Secretariat, Background: EU military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic, January 2008.
\(^{16}\) Security Council Resolution 1484 available at:
peacekeeping mission with a wider focus. As a wholly African-run mission, AMIS can offer lessons for the future vis-à-vis identifying areas of strength and weakness in security operations as we move towards exclusively African operations.

With only around 7,000 troops in Darfur the mission has been seriously stretched. It has also been constrained by a weak mandate that prevents it from taking a more assertive role in imposing peace. AMIS has been financially supported through the APF, although some at the AU blamed slowness in releasing EU funds as a reason why troops in Darfur have sometimes received their wages late. As mentioned previously, as the APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) such funds may not be used for actions with potentially lethal consequences. Although most requirements of AMIS are met through the APF, those at the AU responsible for organising AMIS bemoan the restrictions that the EU places on the funds.

These constraints led to the decision to ‘re-hat’ the mission as UNAMID (United Nations / African Union mission in Darfur) under UN Security Council Resolution 1769. The new UN-led mission will, at the insistence of Sudan, remain primarily an African force. Troop levels should rise to 26,000 but the relatively weak mandate may mean that the mission will continue to have trouble pacifying Darfur.

The difficulty in getting the Sudanese government to accept a multinational force with a strong mandate might point to future problems when AU missions seek to intervene in complicated internal disputes. Although the AU has an interventionist mandate it does represent collaboration between 53 nations; and, if one or more of them feel that an intervention could potentially threaten their own position, they can dilute the action agreed upon [see the next section on AU capacity for more on this]. After some of these AU troops were attacked, some contributing nations appeared reluctant to continue; something that does not bode well for future missions.

The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has a different set of challenges. Growing out of regional efforts led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to help the transitional federal government (TFG) in Somalia, the force is supposed to provide 8,000 troops. So far, although Nigeria, Ghana and Malawi have offered troops in principle, only Uganda has actually committed any on the ground. In addition, although 1,750 Burundian troops were promised, to date, only around 300 have arrived in Somalia. As a consequence, until the eventual arrival of the Burundian contingent there were only just over 1,000 Ugandan troops in Mogadishu, far fewer than the number required to keep the peace, and even the arrival of the full 1,750 Burundian troops promised will leave the AU force at less than half strength.

Somalia is a very dangerous and politically complex theatre at present and it is likely that this is a key reason behind the reluctance of the other nations to commit troops. This reluctance indicates a real concern that in similar future situations the AU may continue to find it hard to raise troops for intervention forces. The Somali situation is further complicated by the unilateral involvement of Ethiopia in support of the TFG.

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20 See Annex 1
21 Security council resolution 1769 establishing UNAMID can be found at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement
1.3 ECOMOG

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping. It first took action in 1990 when, following the collapse of Liberia, other West African states took the initiative to intervene and re-establish order. Further missions in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and again in Liberia have established ECOMOG as a serious regional player.

Past ECOMOG missions have relied upon large contributions of troops by Nigeria, the pre-eminent regional power, but have also been supported by other West African states; for instance the commander of the first Liberia mission was a Ghanaian general. Nigerian troops certainly formed the backbone of ECOMOG missions and successes, and the ability to call on a ready and able contributor has been an important element in its success. This reliance on Nigeria has not been without problems, however, with accusations that Nigerian commanders pay little attention to non-Nigerian subordinates and a general resentment that Nigeria dominates. The split between the Francophone and Anglophone countries in the region is also pronounced. This meant that the first ECOMOG missions were almost exclusively Anglophonic, and although this has improved somewhat, the danger that regional action is in fact only sub-regional, remains. If the West African ASF Brigade is to work, then ensuring all states are involved, whatever language they speak, is vital to maintain its legitimacy.

ECOMOG took on a peace enforcing role in Liberia in the early 1990s and this pro-active approach certainly helped bring about the end of the conflict. Nonetheless, certain problems did arise; such as when ECOMOG forces found themselves fighting alongside government troops, thereby calling their neutrality into question.

The development of ECOMOG is held up as a model for the regional brigades being formed under APSA, and it gives West Africa a head start in the African Standby Force (ASF) process. ECOMOG shows that a committed and robust regional force can bring an end to complicated conflicts. Indeed, the experience of ECOWAS in the field of peace and security offers much that the rest of Africa can learn from.

1.4 Conclusion

As more African conflicts are addressed by African actors, the EU’s involvement is likely to become more focused on financing and technical support rather than direct intervention. EU troops will continue to play a role in short-term missions, preparing the ground and providing technical assistance for UN or AU missions to follow. ECOMOG has been adopted as a continental model for the ASF brigades but, as seen in Sudan, African capacity remains limited. It is possible that AU missions will re-hat under the UN if they develop into long-term operations but it remains difficult to find a ready supply of African troops of sufficient readiness in the most dangerous situations. When African states see that a peace process is failing to produce results, as in Somalia, they can calculate that the risk to their personnel is too great and be reluctant to get involved.

External actors, including the EU, can try and de-escalate such conflicts by encouraging mediation for peace talks. The support that Nigerian troops received from the United States in preparation for their mission to Liberia in 2003 ensured they were properly equipped, and so able to deploy in Monrovia. EU member states could perhaps take a similar approach and bilaterally provide the helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and other hardware that Ghana, Nigeria and Malawi might need to work effectively in Somalia.

2. AU Capacity

2.1 Introduction

The AU was inaugurated in Durban in 2002. It grew out of the erstwhile OAU, but is a far more pro-active organisation. Representing every African country, except Morocco, the AU occupies a position of continental leadership. Like the EU on which it is modelled, the AU operates across a broad range of fields, from agriculture, through development, to peace and security. However in many respects the two organisations bear little comparison. Some things are similar; as it has grown to 53 members the AU has experienced similar problems to that of the EU vis-à-vis coordination and internal rivalry. The AU is structured similarly to the EU: it has a commission, council and parliament. The AU, however, has a more straightforward control structure than the EU, without the confusion of different pillar competencies, and the Pan-African Parliament has very limited powers and is not directly elected.

The AU came into existence fully formed, which meant that member states did not have to satisfy any democratic or economic entry criteria before being accepted as members. Hence, unlike in the EU, there is a wide divergence in the coherence of democratic ideals and economies in the AU. It should also be remembered that the development of the AU has been driven more by a political rather than an economic agenda. In the peace and security field the AU has adopted an official policy that permits intervention in member states in ‘grave circumstances’ (Constitutive Act, Article 4h). As such, the role of the AU in the new APSA is twofold; it acts as a legitimising institution and as a coordinating body. So far, as the willingness to intervene in the politically sensitive theatres of Sudan and Somalia has shown, the AU is able to act effectively as a legitimising body. The coordinating role is more problematic.

2.2 Staffing

The AU has met most of the costs of the AMIS mission in Sudan by drawing from the €250 million APF, funded from the EDF, but although very often the money is available centrally, the problem lies in absorbing it. According to our research, the AU does not always have enough staff to spend the money at its disposal and in some departments does not have staff of sufficient quality to spend it effectively. Staffing problems identified during private interviews include: high turnover, lack of training, painfully slow recruitment, and a ‘top down’ management structure.

There is a management structure within the AU that shies away from delegation and seeks to micro manage, which slows down the decision-making process and acts as a disincentive to

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28 As was seen at the Accra Summit in 2007 the issue of continental unity is much stronger in Africa than Europe and for some countries remains a live issue.
29 http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm
31 During interviews examples were given of the most minor travel receipts having to be approved by senior management.
initiative. A few people at the top of the pyramid are extremely busy while those further down are forced to wait for direction. This makes responding to rapidly changing events difficult.

In any organisation, retaining experienced staff is crucial to building institutional memory. AU staff members often point out that they could earn several times more at the UN or in the private sector, and for some the AU serves only as a place to improve their *curricula vitae* before moving on to more lucrative fields. There are also accusations that some staff use generous travel allowances to boost their salaries, and that unnecessary travel further reduced their ability to carry out work in a timely manner. Although pay is a problem this should not be overstated as, by African standards, the rates are attractive. However, the difficulty in negotiating the bureaucracy and dealing with the management structure makes more efficient organisations appear very attractive, especially to those at middle management level, and the failure to empower mid-level staff contributes to the high turnover of qualified people. As in other organisations, less effective staff members are hard to remove, thereby compounding the problem.

There is also a tendency to rely on contract staff in key areas. In the Situation Room, the hub of the CEWS, seven of the thirteen staff members employed by UNDP are on eleven-month rolling contracts. The consequent lack of certainty is a problem for planning and the inability of the AU to fund even these seven key workers itself illustrates a serious constraint. Yet without these extra staff members the Situation Room would not be able to provide the services it does. Consultants can provide useful expertise, but when they take on the roles of permanent staff (who are essential to the long-term effectiveness of the organisation), then long-term goals can be compromised. AU capacity to recruit and retain skilled workers is weak; its human resources department is one that many believe is in need of urgent attention. Long-term support from the EU would be helpful to recruit, train and retain staff in these key areas.

2.3 Backroom services

At the centre of the AU’s problems in delivering effective peace and security programmes is capacity constraint. Something as crucial as paying serving troops on time has proved to be difficult during the current mission in Sudan. Many people complained in interviews that support services such as the finance and human resources departments are simply not able to cope with their workloads. While EU capacity-building support has mainly been targeting elements of the Peace and Security Department, if the frontline is to be effective the backroom departments need to be supported as well.

China has offered to build new offices for the AU to improve the cramped and rundown condition of some of the present buildings. The EU capacity-building fund is being used to rent external offices for the Peace Support Operations Department, but little assistance is being offered to the unglamorous but essential background areas.

2.4 AU Military Staff Committee

Although African troops have some experience in peacekeeping operations, the AU lacks the command structures necessary for effective decision making. The PSC is the key decision making

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32 Interviewees expressed grave concern at the high turnover rate amongst staff.
33 During interviews some staff indicated that the AU pay structure, which encourages travel, leads to misuse of funds.
34 Response by UK International Development Secretary Hilary Benn to question on AU capacity in Darfur 19 December 2006.
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061219/text/61219w0013.htm
body and meets regularly. It is supported by an overworked but functioning secretariat. A key element of the decision-making process should involve the advice that the PSC receives from the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Yet, since the death of the Nigerian chair almost a year ago the MSC has lacked leadership and has met only infrequently. In addition, the already stretched national militaries are understandably reluctant to second their top staff to Addis Ababa, as they see this as detracting from national priorities. Without regular contact with military professionals the politicians on the PSC are in danger of making decisions that are operationally suspect. This is an area where APF funds could be targeted, helping to ensure staff of suitable rank are available in Addis Ababa to provide advice to the PSC, in much the same way the EU plans to provide the means for liaison officers from the regional economic communities (RECs) to be based in Addis Ababa. It may also be an area where seconding EU experts to support the MSC would be helpful.

2.5 African Standby Force/Continental Early Warning System/Panel of the Wise

There are three key operational elements of the APSA, which are on the way to being fully operationalised. The African Standby Force (ASF) brigades - rapid reaction forces to be supplied by each region at the request of the AU - will be at the forefront of the APSA. The CEWS is an open source intelligence network designed to provide warning of potential conflict areas, while the Panel of the Wise (POW) is a group of five elder statesmen and women who can provide advice to the PSC and serve as mediators in conflict situations. The ability of the brigades to perform their mandates will depend primarily on regional capacity and the appropriateness of AU decisions. The latter will be influenced by the effectiveness of the MSC, backroom services and the success of the CEWS and POW. Indeed, intelligence from CEWS and advice from the POW are likely to be central to decisions reached concerning the use of the ASF brigades.

The CEWS is making good progress and is exploring ways to use and adapt Europe’s early warning system based at the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Milan. At present they have only two analysts to deal with all 54 African countries and clearly that number needs to rise. The CEWS receives considerable support from GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), the EU capacity-building project and UNDP as well as support being given directly to the regional components by EU member states and USAID which meets 60 per cent of the budget for the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism run by IGAD in the Horn of Africa. This is a central part of APSA and support, especially in terms of software and analysis, will be crucial.

Important elements of the CEWS and the ASF are located in Addis Ababa, but their eventual impact will be determined primarily by what happens in the regions. Establishing clear regional lines of communication is important in ensuring the effective functioning of the APSA. The EU project to fund REC liaison officers to come to Addis Ababa could offer much in ensuring that these relationships are made to work, providing a regular link between the regions and AU HQ would hopefully improve communication and reduce confusion.

Those who will serve on the POW have been named and should be sworn in during the next few months. In order to support its work the POW will require a secretariat that allows it to carry out its work independently of political concerns. Potentially independent advice from respected elder

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35 PSC Protocol, Article 13, paragraph 8-12.
36 The CEWS is concerned with all 54 African countries including Morocco not just the 53 members of the AU.
statesmen could help address difficult issues. Where it may be too politically sensitive for serving politicians to comment, they may also be able to play an important role as mediators, and as respected elders they could be reassuring for both governments and non-governmental actors when disputes arise. The panel’s impact will be dependent on the calibre of the people selected. With the right people, the POW can serve as an innovative and highly effective means of raising difficult issues and act as a trusted mediator. The Panel has received external support from the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID).

2.6 AU Capacity Conclusion

The EU supports many aspects of the APSA, and the development of an African capacity in the peace and security field is regarded as a priority for the future. APSA complements objectives of the CFSP regarding the promotion of stability and security. While money for operations is crucial, its long-term success also depends on solving the problems with staffing and backroom capacity. Europe can help the CEWS with software and expertise, but again, without well trained and experienced analysts, its impact will be limited. Likewise, the POW is an innovative opportunity to pre-empt problems, but if its secretariat is overwhelmed or under-funded its ability to provide useful advice will be compromised.

The AU is trying to deal with almost every aspect of life on the continent, yet its staff is small, of variable aptitude and its most effective members are swamped under an ever growing workload. Superficially, the AU looks like an African version of the EU, but it is built on different foundations and operates in a radically different, and more difficult, environment. Understanding the realities of the AU should enable EU money to be better targeted at those areas where it can be deployed most usefully. Key to the success of any project is not just the finance for frontline operations but the quality of the structures underpinning them. Providing a reliable and consistent source of funds, over the long-term, for the employment by the AU of key people in these backroom service areas could be highly beneficial.

3. Regional Capacity

3.1 Introduction

While the AU is tasked with higher level organisation and the provision of troops for large missions, it is envisioned that the regions will be the mainstay of the new APSA. In terms of peace and security the AU has divided the continent into five regions (North, East, West, Central and Southern). Each region will provide an ASF Brigade for quick deployment to trouble spots and contribute one member to the POW, and the regional early warning systems (EWSs) will feed into the Continental EWS. The relationship between the regions and the AU, therefore, is crucial. Interviews suggest that at AU level there is a feeling that the regions are not always fully committed to AU leadership. This feeling is reversed in the regions where the AU is sometimes felt to be overstepping itself. If good lines of communications can be opened between the RECs and the AU this problem should be surmountable.

Likewise, the internal dynamics of each region impact on their effectiveness. The problems identified at the AU level will influence the regions, but regional organisations that are well run can circumvent some of the continent-wide problems. Obviously, when both levels work well -

39 According to the draft ‘Africa-EU strategic partnership’ document.
40 The membership of each region is somewhat fluid, this will become clearer as more regions have fully operationalised ASF brigades.
internally and together - the prospect of success is highest. The EU plan to meet the expenses of liaison officers from the RECs to the AU is potentially an excellent way to reduce these tensions and increase inter-institutional dialogue.

3.2 REC incoherence

There are five regions designated by the AU for the purposes of APSA, but these do not correspond directly with the existing eight RECs. For example, East Africa has the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC); neither organisation has a security element, or a comprehensive regional membership. Responsibility for coordinating the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG), drawn from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea, Seychelles, Madagascar and Rwanda was given to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but the latter three countries are not members of IGAD so a new EASBRIG mechanism has had to be established. The following map (see next page) illustrates the overlap between the different RECs.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) both have a security arm within their structure. Tanzania, which is a member of the EAC and SADC is listed as a member of EASBRIG, yet Tanzania is also a signatory of the memorandum establishing the SADC Brigade. Angola, another member of SADC and signatory of the SADC Brigade memorandum, is seen as a key state in the Central African Brigade. It may take some time before the exact make-up of the brigades becomes clear. These regional incoherencies need not mean that the peace and security architecture cannot be established, but it will make it harder. Moves to rationalise the regional organisations have been discussed. For the new Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the EU wants to deal with African regional groupings, rather than individual states, and has expressed its hope that the REC structure will be rationalised.

41 See Annex 2 for members of the main RECs.
42 Memorandum of understanding on the establishment of an East African Standby Brigade: http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/easbrig/inouapr05.pdf
44 For a list of members of regional brigades see Annex 3
Map 1. Illustrating the multiplicity of African Regional Organisations (A full list of members of various Organisations is included in Annex 2.

3.3 Regional Powers

The internal dynamics of the regions are worth examining, especially the role played by key states. In ECOWAS Nigeria has taken a lead role on security issues and, as the largest country in the region by far, this seems a natural position. However, while Nigeria claims to be interested in a stable neighbourhood, other West African states see Nigeria as trying to position itself as a regional hegemon. The difficult relations between Nigeria and the Côte d’Ivoire, dating back to the Nigerian civil war, make military cooperation between the two unlikely. Whatever the hopes of other countries in the region Nigeria is, and will remain, the pre-eminent power in West Africa and programmes that include Nigeria may be more likely to succeed.

South Africa’s role in Southern Africa is central: its military is well equipped and trained, and it has the economic resources necessary to conduct sizeable missions. Although South Africa takes a less prominent role in pushing forward the Southern African peace and security structures than that taken by Nigeria in West Africa, it has been noted that some nations are reluctant to rely on it. This is largely due to fears of South African dominance in the region and intra-regional competition for influence.

In East Africa both Kenya and Ethiopia aspire to regional leadership and this internal rivalry means that the East African Brigade (EASBRIG) HQ has been situated in Addis Ababa while the Planning Element is in Nairobi. This is less efficient than having all elements of EASBRIG

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46 While South Africa is popularly regarded as the major military power in Southern Africa it should be noted that Angola has a larger military and higher defence spending and that Angolan troops have been battle hardened in the civil war and through fighting in the DRC. South Africa and Angola have cooperated over SSR in the DRC.
command in one place. EASBRIG must also deal with the ongoing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and it is inconceivable that their troops could serve together in the near future\textsuperscript{47}.

In North Africa the rivalry between Egypt and Libya for regional leadership is one of the reasons behind the delay in establishing the North African Standby Brigade. Despite the challenges, EASBRIG is taking shape and SADC has begun the process of establishing a Southern Brigade\textsuperscript{48}. Bearing in mind the political restraints experienced, these achievements are considerable.

It is important that the EU recognises the special role of regional leaders, South Africa and Nigeria in particular, and works closely with them to achieve common goals, while sensitively negotiating regional politics. Despite the ambivalence to those countries taking a lead role they will continue to be the most important regional players and will normally be the countries in Africa most able to provide the equipment, manpower and finance for APSA.

3.4 Development of the standby Brigades\textsuperscript{49}

**ECOBRIG – (sometimes called WESBRIG) – West African Brigade**

ECOWAS has extensive experience in the area of peace and security in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, and ECOBRIG is generally seen as the archetype for the other regions in terms of ASF brigades. West African troops and commanders also have experience serving in UN missions: the most recent DPKO rankings place Ghana sixth, Nigeria eighth and Senegal eleventh in terms of numbers of troops contributed\textsuperscript{50}. Taken with its experience of working together at a regional level, this means the ECOWAS brigade is likely to be more effective than other regional brigades.

**North African Brigade**

In terms of military hardware and heavy-lift capability (an essential element in Africa where access by sea is often impossible), North Africa could be the region that contributes most to the ASF. Although an initial agreement in principle on the ASF\textsuperscript{51} has been reached, the slow pace of movement in developing the structures necessary for the regional brigade means that it is unlikely North Africa will be ready by the 2010 ASF deadline.

**SADCBRIG – Southern African Brigade**

Southern Africa can draw on South Africa’s equipment in support of ASF operations, but as movement towards operationalising the brigade only got under way late this year it is hard to say if it will be ready by the 2010 ASF deadline. SADC does have experience of peacekeeping operations in Lesotho (South Africa) and Burundi (South Africa and Mozambique) however\textsuperscript{52}, and has a strong secretariat that should help effectiveness when the brigade is fully established.

**EASBRIG – East African Brigade**

As already indicated East Africa has surmounted considerable internal political problems to create EASBRIG. Yet, it will work in practice remains to be seen.

\textsuperscript{47} New Eritrea-Ethiopia war fears BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7078869.stm

\textsuperscript{48} ‘SADC creates new peacekeeping force’, AFP, 17 August 2007

\textsuperscript{49} See Annex 3 for details of the member countries of each brigade.

\textsuperscript{50} See Department of Peacekeeping operations rankings at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/

\textsuperscript{51} See paragraph 5:

\textsuperscript{52} See Annex 1
Central African Brigade

In Central Africa the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has taken responsibility for developing the brigade and other components of APSA. However, the situation in the DRC and the fragility of other regional states makes this a very difficult region. Despite this the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), drawn from members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), shows that although capacity is limited there is a desire in the region to carry out the objectives of the ASF.

3.5 Training

Effective training gives troops the skills to work as peacekeepers and within multinational brigades. West Africa has the most developed training regime, centred around three institutions: in Koulikouro, Mali - carrying out basic training; in Ghana at the Kofi Annan international peacekeeping training centre (KAIPTC) - focusing on the operational level; and at the Nigerian staff college - focusing on the strategic level.

KAIPTC provides operational training and serves as a regional centre of excellence. It has received considerable support from the German government. In East Africa the British government has supported the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kenya for many years and is now helping to turn this from a national to a regional peace training centre. Some have expressed concern that the PSTC will find it difficult to become a truly regional centre. They argue that in East Africa national centres of excellence that concentrate on developing national capability independently, rather than joint training, may be the best model. While this can also provide excellent training it does compromise the multinational element of peacekeeper training if troops are trained separately and only come together during operations.

SADC has a regional training centre in Harare, Zimbabwe, but does not receive the level of support seen in West and East Africa due to the reluctance of foreign donors to finance a project based in Zimbabwe. South Africa has extensive training facilities that could be used for regional purposes but the reluctance of other countries in the region to become over reliant on South Africa has so far prevented this.

The RECAMP (Reinforcing of African Peacekeeping capacities) initiative, run by France since 1997, offers training support for African forces, and is generally regarded as a success. It provides training at an individual and operational level but also provides equipment support. There are moves to ‘Europeanise’ the financing of RECAMP while maintaining the structure put in place by France. This will provide a direct way for the ESDP to become involved in training African troops. Traditionally, training is one area in which European member states have been very active and where their expertise and money can be used very effectively. Hence, the development of an EU role in training is to be welcomed if it can foster greater coordination and perhaps the involvement of European nations not traditionally involved in Africa.

3.6 Continental Early Warning System

The CEWS will be based in Addis Ababa and will rely on publicly available resources to produce warnings of potential conflict on the continent. Eventually it should also receive information from

the various regional Early Warning Systems and pass information back to them, thus creating a web of information and analysis covering the whole continent.

The regions are at different stages of development on Early Warning. IGAD has established CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and response mechanism) to monitor cross-border disputes between pastoralist groups. Information is gathered by research officers on the ground and then analysed using early warning software. The CEWARN model works well for what it has been designed to do, but it cannot, because of its nature, provide warnings on types of conflict other than at pastoralist level. ECOWAS has officially incorporated the work of the West African Peacebuilding Network - an NGO based in Ghana - as its early warning system. Both of these systems rely on information from open sources. SADC has indicated that it will develop an EWS based on ‘closed source’ intelligence that will not be available publicly. This will create problems for integration at the continental level.

Other regions have yet to begin introducing EWS. The CEWS has the potential to be a central tool for making Africa a more peaceful continent. Good work has been carried out in West Africa and the Horn, but as the CEWARN example shows, the choice of input criteria is crucial in determining the results. Moreover, there are concerns as to what will happen if a regional EWS or the CEWS produces a report on a politically sensitive country.

3.7 Conclusion

The development of APSA is heavily dependant on the ‘buy in’ of the RECs, because without regional cooperation there will be no ASF and the CEWS and POW will be severely weakened.

- West Africa stands out as the region that has done most to meet the APSA timetable and looks likely to be the most effective region in terms of peace and security for some time.
- Southern Africa has potential to support APSA although in practical terms it has some way to go.
- East Africa has overcome some obstacles to put architecture in place, albeit in a limited manner.
- Central Africa has made limited progress: the political fragility of the region and lack of a strong regional body mean this area would benefit from external help.
- North Africa could make a significant contribution as it has the best equipment and resources at its disposal. Despite tension within North Africa and competing demands for its attention from Middle East issues, the region has made some progress towards meeting the APSA goals.

Continued support of the RECs by the EU is important, particularly those that are doing well in developing APSA. And while the desire to rationalise the regions for the EPAs is understandable, letting Africa develop its own regional arrangements is an important part of the new partnership.

55 Niels von Keyserlingk and Simone Kopfmuller, op. cit.
4. EU Role

4.1 Introduction

A distinction can be drawn between what the EU as a union can usefully do, and what is better left to member states. As an institution, the EU is relatively new to the role of force organiser. Before the EU’s EUFOR mission took over responsibility for peace-keeping in Bosnia in December 2005, that role was carried out by NATO or the UN. EU member states, however, do have extensive experience in peacekeeping operations.

Coordinating assistance between the EU and its member states and ensuring that the right institutions and nations are helping in particular areas is important. It is also worth noting that, both for budgetary reasons and because of their commitment to a few, high-demand missions in Afghanistan and Lebanon, European nations are moving away from being a major contributor of troops to multiple UN missions and are now concentrating more on funding. Within the AU there is sensitivity to being perceived as following an EU rather than an African agenda. European assistance given in the spirit of partnership, therefore, will be more likely to prove acceptable and, if the EU understands the realities on the ground in Africa, the partnership will work better. This means that while Africans have to accept that the EU has legitimate concerns about how its money is spent, the EU should not try to micro-manage projects.

4.2 African Peace Facility

As stated earlier, the EU has taken an active interest in supporting APSA with the allocation of €250 million to the APF, much of which has gone towards the AMIS mission. This seemingly large allocation of funds should be seen in proportion, however: the 9th EDF had a total budget of €13.5 billion and the 10th €22.7 billion. Questions of what exactly can be funded will need to be resolved if money from Europe is to be used in the most effective way. At the moment money from the APF can only be used in support of Peace Support Operations.

While it seems unlikely that the EU will be able to use EDF funds for direct military support, finding new ways to enable the direct funding of military development would be fruitful. The need for the EU to find ways of supporting APSA that allows for a greater military element has been made by many who are involved with the AU. As the Athena mechanism for ESDP operations has shown, a special fund into which member states can donate directly, coordinated by the EU, could be one solution. It is also important to find a way to involve North African countries and South Africa in the APF as they are ‘too developed’ to qualify for funding from the APF. Even with this constraint, the APF has not been unsuccessful, for instance, it has allowed AMIS to operate in very testing circumstances.

4.3 New Ambassador

Until recently, the EU was represented in Addis Ababa solely by a European Commission delegation to Ethiopia. This office was involved in many aspects of both AU and Ethiopian interaction with the EU. This dual role meant that AU issues may not always have been given the

necessary priority. The appointment of an EU Special Representative to the AU at the end of 2007 is to be welcomed\(^{60}\), and, if afforded the right responsibilities, has the potential to play a very positive role. There are two key areas here: at the level of political relations between the EU and Africa; and then in the area of distributing funds. The Special Representative, by combining a representation of the Council and the Commission, will streamline Africa’s interface with Europe. His appointment signals to the AU that the partnership with Africa is being taken seriously in Brussels, and a person of this seniority, whose duty is to deal exclusively with the AU, should also serve to increase the level of understanding of the AU in Brussels.

Secondly, if the new representative is given discretionary power over funds it should enable money to be assigned, and paid, quickly and to the most pressing projects. At present, monies are assigned to specific projects. It is a somewhat rigid system, however, which allows little room for adaptation to changing circumstances.

4.4 Coordination of funding and reporting

With the €250 million available to the APF for peace support operations and over €100 million available from the European Commission towards core costs and capacity building, the EU is, by some distance, the largest funding partner of the AU (although Canada and the United States are also important central donors: the US has given substantial support to the Ugandan mission in Somalia, for example). Assistance is also provided by individual European states, and other international partners. While this proliferation of partners means that funds are readily available, there is scope for confusion and overlap. Although there is a degree of donor coordination through organisations like the Africa Clearing House and informal networks, AU staff have expressed a desire for this to be made more formal.

The proliferation of different training programmes is one area that could be rationalised. While, in itself, each programme is useful, they do not necessarily complement each other vis-à-vis training for regional cooperation. The EU through the CFSP can ensure a more effective coordination amongst member states.

As previously stated, the Finance department of the AU (Capacity Section) has serious capacity constraints. A simple and useful way to alleviate this would be to standardise the reporting procedures. As the largest donor, the EU is well placed to take the lead on this issue, and although capacity building here has been discussed informally it will need to be taken forward by a major partner if it is to have a good chance of success. Anything that reduces the bureaucracy surrounding the AU will be welcome. The EU’s role as a lead donor is an opportunity to organise international efforts to support APSA.

4.5 Capacity building

At present, the EU is funding a €27 million capacity-building programme for the Peace and Security department. This money is being used to develop four specific areas; liaison officers between the RECs and the AU; developing the CEWS; an investigation of telecommunication links on the continent; and some direct support of the RECs. The EU also funds workshops concerning the ASF and contributes money towards strengthening the leadership role of the AU Council.

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\(^{60}\) Koen Vervaeke was appointed on the 5 December 2007.
Justifiably, the relationship between the RECs and the AU has been recognised as being crucial, since strengthening understanding here will improve the prospects for success of APSA. In much the same way that an EU representative in Addis Ababa will strengthen EU–AU communications, liaison officers from the regions will help avoid tension and misunderstandings and improve coordination efforts.

The assistance to the CEWS is also crucial: this is an area where Europe has experience that can be adapted for the African situation. Support for more CEWS staff at the AU and in the regional EWSs will help build the capacity for collecting and analysing data. The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) will soon benefit from new offices being rented out for them by the EU and from additional staff, whose salaries will also be covered by the EU. In addition, the capacity-building programme will provide money for training exercises to be run by the Kofi Annan Centre.

The capacity-building project is ambitious and, potentially, very useful. Nevertheless, some EU staff have complained that the lack of clear benchmarks and timetabling means implementation is slow and erratic. It is unlikely, though, that this situation will change in the future given the political sensitivities around EU conditionality. With a stronger presence in Addis Ababa through the Special Representative, the EU will be in a better position to exert some pressure to keep the programmes moving forward.

4.6 Non-military aspects

There has recently been a recognition that security is vital for development, indeed the European Security Strategy accepts that “security is a precondition of development”\(^\text{61}\). However, it is important not to neglect the causes of instability - hunger, poverty, lack of education and development. Consequently, taking a holistic approach to security that includes policing, Security Sector Reform (SSR), reintegration of ex-combatants and economic development is crucial.

Cameroon recently announced plans to build a police peacekeeper training school\(^\text{62}\); and France has pledged $1 million towards the project. It is planned that the facility will be able to train 1,000 officers a year from across the region. This is an important step towards building African capacity in the non-military sphere of APSA.

At present, the EU is involved in three civilian ESDP operations in Africa. It provides 31 civilian staff to the AMIS mission, and runs the SSR programme in the DRC (EUSEC), and a police training mission in Kinshasa DRC (EUPOL). EUPOL is planned to expand to cover the whole of the DRC in the near future. These non-military interventions can be extremely effective and require far fewer staff and less money than military operations. They are generally targeted at a strategic level and can help with drawing up national policing strategies and management issues.

Currently, the EU sends military advisers to the AU to support African missions. However, there is as yet no requirement to also send advisers on Human Rights or Gender Rights. As the scandals befalling the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) have shown, these are important areas to consider if a mission is to be successful\(^\text{63}\). The European Parliament might consider this an issue it could encourage the Council to take up.

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\(^{62}\) ‘Cameroon plans UN peacekeeper training school’, Reuters, 23 October 2007.

\(^{63}\) For information on Sexual abuse see Human Rights Watch testimony to U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations March 2004;
It is tempting for the EU and member states to focus on the military aspects of peace and security, but, without a functioning police or reform of the security sector, the positive gains from successful military operations can swiftly be curtailed. Moreover, such activities are more easily financed under the civilian element of the ESDP budget or through instruments such as the APF, as they do not involve the use of lethal force.

4.7 Member state involvement

Unlike the EU, which is constrained by the EDF criteria from directly supporting military capacity, member states have the advantage of much greater discretion over their spending. France’s RECAMP initiative has been helping to enhance African military capacity since 1997, while Germany has been a key player in improving training facilities in West Africa; and the UK in East Africa and elsewhere. Other European states have also taken an active interest in supporting aspects of the AU peace and security architecture.

Nevertheless, there remain a number of areas where EU member states could further involve themselves in developing African capacity. For instance, African states lack the heavy-lift capacity and helicopters necessary to act independently as regional units. Work is also needed to harmonise equipment and communications. Standby brigades are an excellent concept, but if the troops who join them lack this basic military equipment then their effectiveness will be severely limited. While the APF is unable to fund the coordination and updating of equipment, this area could be ameliorated by member states, working closely together, on bilateral bases.

4.8 Conclusion

The EU has been central to the success of the AU to date; its support for the operation in Sudan is particularly prominent, but the capacity-building programme will, in the long run, help give APSA the human capacity to become fully operationalised. Member states can also play an important role in improving peace and security capacity on the continent. CFSP and ESDP can be deployed to great effect in Africa where support for African initiatives and even direct EU intervention could be crucial. The appointment of an EU Special Representative to the AU is an important development in this relationship. It signals a level of mutual respect and hopefully will increase understanding of the AU in Brussels and improve the effectiveness of EU projects in Africa. The inability to use EDF funds for ‘lethal ends’ restricts the effectiveness of EU support to APSA, however, and finding a mechanism to provide militarily relevant finance will be central to the long term success of APSA.

Section II: Role of African parliaments and civil society in developing APSA

This section examines how parliaments and civil society interact with and influence APSA. National, regional and continental parliaments can shape APSA, and guide its implementation, as well as provide a crucial oversight role. Civil society also plays its part in influencing the development of APSA and the AU, and the latter is officially committed to civil society’s participation in the development of AU policies. Furthermore, the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) indicates a desire of the AU to promote parliamentary involvement in decision-making processes.

The draft of the AU-EU joint strategy recognises the central role that parliaments and civil society can play in peace and security. Nevertheless, there appear to be considerable structural and capacity constraints to realising the full potential of civil society and parliamentary engagement. To date, the role that civil society and parliaments can play in developing APSA has received little scrutiny. Given this, it is not possible within the scope of this study to conduct a comprehensive examination of how national and regional parliaments and civil society have interacted with APSA. However, given the lack of empirical evidence, this paper can highlight the difficulty of assessing how influential these institutions have been. What is certain is that this is an area that deserves further investigation.

Within the bounds of the information currently available, this section examines how different types of civil society have been interacting with APSA. In relation to parliaments, and drawing a comparison with the role of the European Parliament, it then examines the constraints on the PAP in making significant contributions to the development of APSA.

5. Civil Society

There is still little understanding in the African population at large about what the AU actually does. Civil society organisations can serve to communicate the AU’s agenda and development projects to the wider African population which, in turn, can help to inform the AU. In the draft Africa-EU strategy there is an explicit commitment to a ‘people centred’ approach that will empower non-state actors.

Different elements of civil society interact at different levels with APSA. At the higher levels it can help to shape policy formation and to assess the effectiveness of policies once they have been implemented. Through publications and workshops, civil society can help to broaden the perspectives of decision makers. Sometimes, civil society can complement the work of the APSA. For example, the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is providing extra information to a regional organ, the West African EWS. Civil society also has the potential to provide innovative ideas to take APSA forward and act as a guard against bad practice. Without further study it is only possible to highlight a few places where civil society has been able to interact with APSA, yet it is evident that it does have the potential to play a positive role.

5.1 African Citizens Directorate

The African Citizens Directorate (CIDO) is located in the office of the Chair of the AU and is tasked with involving African civil society in the AU’s decision-making processes. There are doubts, however, as to whether it performs this liaison function with civil society effectively, and the widely held impression seems to be that it lacks the capacity to effectively engage with civil
society on all the issues within the commission’s remit. A conference held in Ghana to feed into the Europe-Africa joint strategy in March 2007 brought together civil society and CIDO64. The meeting identified a number of concerns, including a lack of time for consultation. This is especially problematic in the early stages of APSA’s development; a stage at which developments are occurring rapidly.

The existence of CIDO is welcome, but if its engagement with civil society is to be serious it will require African and international support65. European assistance towards the development of the CIDO Secretariat’s human capacity needs to be a priority. Currently, it is evident that the CEWS benefits from such civil society engagement and it can only be increasingly beneficial for the early warning system if the AU endeavours to engage more effectively with civil society across a range of issues.

5.2 Think Tanks and Academia

Think tanks and academia play an important role in helping form ideas about how APSA should progress. They have the ability to look at problems and successes without the blinkers of institutional loyalties. This is one arena of civil society that has been able to interact well with AU structures. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS)66, a South African based think tank, has recently opened an office in Addis Ababa, which gives it great access to the AU and an ability to see programmes develop from close range. Along with other Africa-based centres of academic excellence, this provides a greater capacity for African ideas to shape APSA. Networks between researchers in Europe and Africa should reinforce intercontinental cooperation. However, as much of the funding for these works is made available by foreign partners, one area of concern is the degree to which research is driven by donor interests rather than by concerns on the ground.

5.3 Non Governmental Organisations

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been energetic in trying to shape APSA: especially in South Africa. Safer Africa, ACCORD, and the Institute for Global Dialogue were all involved in the transition from the OAU to the AU. Their influence can best be seen in the ethos of the AU; which pledges a commitment to peace and security and an atmosphere of transparency. The NGO that has impacted most directly on APSA is WANEP67, which developed an EWS for the ECOWAS region. Since 2002, when a memorandum of understanding was signed, WANEP has been officially linked into the West African EWS being developed by ECOWAS68. WANEP is an important part of the emerging EWS in the ECOWAS region. The involvement of a civil society organisation in the official structure of the REC shows a real willingness to engage in a meaningful way with civil society.

NGOs have been central in a number of areas related to APSA. The campaign to stop the flow of ‘blood’ diamonds that resulted in the Kimberley process was spearheaded by NGOs; likewise the efforts to prevent cocoa and timber from fuelling conflict. NGOs such as ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign against the corrupt practices that help to fuel conflicts. The work being done to prevent

66 www.iss.org.za
67 http://www.wanep.org/
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa is being driven by NGO activism. These activities may not be directly linked to APSA but are certainly complementary. Considering ways to learn from their efforts and support the work they have been doing could be a positive way to engage civil society with APSA. The European Parliament could, for instance, invite them to make a presentation, or funds could be made available from the EDF to support their work.

NGOs and aspects of the official APSA structure were brought together by the African Security Sector Network - a network of NGOs in the SSR area - in Addis Ababa recently to share lessons from national and sub-regional experiences and to initiate a dialogue on SSR. This and other such initiatives are a useful way for civil society to interface with the AU and RECs. But such initiatives have tended to emanate from civil society rather than from the AU.

5.4 Conclusion

Civil society is involved at all stages and in all areas of APSA. Civil society works on the ground in post-conflict situations to try and reintegrate combatants or to campaign against small arms. These activities, while independent from the official APSA structure, are invaluable ways of making Africa a more peaceful place. In the past, private security actors have played an important role and will continue to play a part in African peace and security. The private sector (particularly in the area of extractive industries) has at times been a contributing factor to the destabilisation of the continent, but the prosperity that can result from investment can serve to diminish the causes of conflict. How the APSA will interact with these elements will be interesting. While there is interaction between the official AU and REC structures and civil society this is an area that could be further developed. Once again, it is capacity constraints that prevent a fuller engagement with civil society.

Following the Cotonou agreement the EDF has expanded to incorporate civil society involvement both in forming policy and as recipients of funding. The EU commitment to supporting civil society through the EDF could help ensure viable long-term solutions. Member states have been important partners for elements of civil society; the ISS in South Africa has received support from Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands, for example. This bilateral support for civil society is important and allows member states to support projects that fall within their areas of expertise.

6. Parliaments

6.1 Introduction

Incorporated within the AU structure, the PAP has existed since 2004. The 265 representatives who serve in it are elected from within the national legislatures of 53 African countries. The ability of the PAP to exercise democratic oversight is a key way in which AU institutions can be made more relevant to the needs of African people. In Africa, the gap between the representative and the represented is wide and the limited scope of the PAP’s powers means it is, as yet, unable to carry out the level of oversight and legislative function in the European Parliament, for example. Indeed, the European Parliament is a good model for the PAP as it also began life as an indirectly elected body with few powers until, over time, it has developed a much greater say in EU policy-making.

69 The EDF in a Few Words: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/fed_en.pdf
In the area of peace and security, however, this level of power and cohesion remains very limited: something the PAP might bear in mind.

The EU has committed itself to greater exchange with Africa at the Parliamentary level and to this end the European Parliament and PAP addressed the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon last year. In preparation they also met in Midrand (South Africa) in October 2007 before the Lisbon summit to draw up common positions.

### 6.2 Mandate of the Pan-Africa Parliament

The following sets out the objectives of the PAP, according to its mandate. (What is noticeable, is the use of words such as facilitate, promote, encourage, strengthen, and contribute and the absence of any reference to legislate or oversight.)

- Facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the OAU/AEC and, ultimately, of the African Union;
- Promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa;
- Encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in Member States;
- Familiarize the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African continent within the framework of the establishment of the African Union;
- Promote peace, security and stability;
- Contribute to a more prosperous future for the people of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery;
- Facilitate cooperation and development in Africa;
- Strengthen Continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa;
- Facilitate cooperation among Regional Economic Communities and their Parliamentary fora.

The PAP is mandated to involve itself in all areas of African life but not in a legislative capacity. The stated aim is, eventually, to give legislative powers to the parliament and for members to be directly elected from all African countries. If the PAP achieves these powers, the permanent Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution could exercise an important role in overseeing the activities of APSA. As it presently stands, this Committee may make comments and suggestions, but does not have any official influence in the development of APSA. Moreover, it is hard to assess the Committee’s contribution to date; for instance, it is interesting that its section on the PAP website contains no records of agendas, decisions or discussions. Empowering the PAP would allow it to perform a more vigorous role in relation to APSA. A stronger parliament, on the other hand, may be seen as a threat to the freedom of the Commission and this perceived threat might contribute to slowing down the transfer of any new powers to the PAP.

### 6.3 Other PAP constraints

The PAP began life based in Addis Ababa but has since been moved to offices in Midrand, South Africa. While the desire to spread the institutions of the AU around the continent is understandable, it is often noted that placing the PAP so far from the centre of power reduces its

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73 Taken from PAP website [http://www.pan-african-parliament.org/default.aspx](http://www.pan-african-parliament.org/default.aspx)
influence over the decision-making bodies in Addis Ababa. This problem could be overcome with the establishment of a liaison office between the PAP and AU headquarters.

As an indirectly elected body the PAP lacks the mandate that a more democratic chamber would be able to call upon to further its case for a more substantive role. At present, where several African states may be said to be functioning quasi-democracies, it is unrealistic to expect a continental body to move to a more democratic position than some of its members. It is clearly a stated objective of the PAP to be a truly democratically representative body and while this may take some time, assistance in reaching this goal would be helpful.

6.4 Regional and national parliaments

This paper has focused on the role of the Pan African Parliament in APSA as this is the body most closely linked with the continental structures of APSA. Other regional parliamentary assemblies also exist, including the SADC parliamentary assembly, the ECOWAS parliament and the East African Legislative Assembly. These organisations could, in the future, play an important oversight role in the regional aspects of APSA although, at present, their role is minimal. National parliaments tend to have little influence over peace and security policy in most African countries as these areas are traditionally the domain of the executive.

Some countries, including Uganda and South Africa, have stronger defence committees but the general trend is towards executive control with limited parliamentary oversight. However, given the growing relationship between the European Parliament and PAP, and the fact that PAP members are elected from African parliaments, the continental-level exchanges may be a way to encourage greater engagement by national parliaments in the area of peace and security. A full study of the part national parliaments currently play, and might come to play, in shaping APSA would be valuable but is beyond the scope of this study.

6.5 Conclusion

Peace and security is a headline-grabbing issue. As such, with respect to the AU, it has tended to be monopolised by the executive and not been held up to full parliamentary scrutiny. To date, the PAP has not been invested with the powers to do more than offer advice on APSA. That advice lacks power as it comes from an indirectly-elected body. Giving the PAP powers to hold the executive to account, control budgets and exercise a vigorous oversight role would be beneficial. An assembly of ruling parties would not be conducive to effective oversight. The European Parliament with its experience of transitioning to a fully-elected parliament with legislative powers could provide useful lessons for the PAP.

Other problems, such as the location of the parliament will also need to be solved, either by relocation (very unlikely) or by the establishment of a fully functioning liaison office between the PAP and AU headquarters. The potential benefits to be gained from giving the PAP the power and resources to operate proper oversight of APSA are significant and the EU could assist this outcome both through advice and encouragement. The European Parliament may be considered to have a natural relationship with the PAP and could do much to foster its development. Regular meetings between the two parliaments are a good starting point but other activities such as bringing PAP delegations to Strasbourg or Brussels to speak on African issues and return visits to Midrand would further strengthen the relationship and perhaps give greater weight to issues raised by the PAP. The EP might want to look for ways it can help develop the capacity of the PAP secretariat to be effective in the peace and security spheres.
Section III: Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

The Lisbon summit in December 2007 marked a new stage in the partnership between the EU and Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture is at the heart of this partnership. Africa has made remarkable progress to be in such a position, just five years after the inception of the African Union. The ability to move so quickly is due to political will within the continent, but also the willingness of outside partners, particularly the EU and its member states, to finance the setting up of APSA.

Successfully operationalising APSA offers the prospect of more African solutions to African challenges. APSA is a holistic approach to peace and security that recognises the importance of prevention and mediation as much as peacekeeping, hence the prominent place for Continental Early Warning and the Panel of the Wise. The adoption of the AU constitutive act and its commitment to intervention in extreme circumstances shows an acknowledgement that events such as the Rwandan genocide should not be allowed to happen again on African soil. It would be naïve to think that even a fully operationalised APSA will solve all African conflicts but it does offer a very good chance of improving security on the continent.

The emergence of CFSP for concerted EU action and as a forum for internal consultation and diplomatic communication demonstrates the development of the EU into an important global player on the political, as well as economic, front. Combined with ESDP, the EU is now willing and able to carry out operations in diverse parts of the globe. CFSP is about more than just military missions, and the EU is committed to building a comprehensive approach that combines traditional dimensions of security with support for economic development, good governance and institutional strengthening in countries at risk. The connection between development and security in Africa is recognised in the use of European Development Fund monies for the African Peace Facility and in the EU’s commitment to APSA. Although EU member states are less willing than in the past to commit troops to UN missions, the development of EU military operations acting as precursors to longer-term missions means EU soldiers will continue to play a direct role in creating peace and stability.

Although progress in the five years since the AU was inaugurated has been impressive there is still much to do before APSA is fully operationalised. The readiness of the ASF brigades is primarily a regional political issue and there is little external actors can do to quicken their formation. Nevertheless, continued and expanded assistance in the areas of training and logistics to those that are more developed would be welcome. The AU is well funded by external partners but it could be improved through investment in backroom services. The EU could offer important long-term support if a new mechanism could be found to finance activities that may carry ‘lethal consequences’. The importance attached to the relationship by the EU is welcome; the appointment of an EU Special Representative to the AU in Addis Ababa will strengthen this relationship further.

The commitment to civil society and parliamentary involvement is clear, at least on paper, from both sides. The Pan African Parliament may eventually play an important role in APSA but in the meantime the European Parliament can use it as an entry point for supporting the involvement of

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75 See The Africa-EU Strategic partnership
national parliaments in APSA. Civil society plays an important part in assessing and supporting APSA, and both the AU and EU should try to find ways to make real the aspiration to involve civil society in peace and security. Focusing solely on the military aspects of peace and security risks neglecting the equally important part that non-military developments play in securing peace. It is to be hoped that parliamentary and civil society involvement will ensure this does not happen.

B. Recommendations

Operational issues

- **Military Logistics.** African militaries lack much of the hardware necessary for operations in support of APSA. EU member states could, on a case-by-case basis, provide either funds or equipment directly to forces engaged in AU-sanctioned peace and security operations. This problem is particularly acute with regards to helicopters and heavy-lift capacity.

- **Direct assistance to most developed regional brigades.** Given that it seems unlikely that all regions will be ready with ASF brigades by 2010, assistance should be concentrated on those that are most likely to achieve this target - West, East and Southern Africa.

- **More attention on non-military aspects.** While military peacekeeping is the most high profile aspect of APSA, establishing the rule of law is central to the long-term success of any mission. Support for police ASF units and the inclusion of human rights advisers with ASF missions would be a useful development.

Political relations

- **EU Ambassador.** The new Commission/CFSP representative to the AU, Koen Vervaeke, should be given a strong mandate with discretionary powers over funds. This will provide the EU with a well informed decision maker and help support those initiatives that are most pressing and to respond quickly to changing events.

Organisational structure

- **AU backroom capacity.** Without effective finance and human resource capabilities the efficacy of investment in operations, planning or early warning, is reduced.

- **A standardised reporting system.** The EU as the major donor to the AU is well positioned to seek a standardised method of reporting back to donors. This will save time and increase the quality of reporting by AU staff.

Financial issues

- **New source of funding.** At present the APF is prevented from contributing towards potentially lethal ends. However the Athena mechanism could be a model for the EU to develop a special fund to finance African military needs in pursuit of APSA objectives.
Parliamentary

- **Support for the Pan African Parliament (PAP).** The PAP can play a central role in developing a democratic approach to APSA. However, it will need long-term financial and political support from the European Parliament if it is to achieve this objective.

- **Firm commitment to inter-parliamentary dialogue.** The European Parliament can foster strong national parliaments in Africa through a continued commitment to the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary forum.

- **Support civil society and national Parliaments’ interaction with APSA.** Civil society and parliaments should play an important role in ensuring APSA remains on target and within mandate. However, there is as yet little critical analysis of how national governments, civil society and APSA may best interact. The PAP may be well placed to promote and facilitate such consultation given its members are also members of national parliaments, and the EP might use its relationship with the PAP to encourage this.
### Annex 1: Peace keeping operations in Africa 1991-present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mission/Country(s) of Operation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Principle Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAOM DRC</td>
<td>South African Observer Mission to Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>Following an invitation by the Electoral Commission (CEI) of the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>January 2006 - present</td>
<td>SC Res. 1620 (31 August 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Community of Central African States in CAR</td>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel and Saharan States in CAR</td>
<td>December 2001- December 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>OAU Observer Mission in the DRC</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>SADC Peace Keeping Force in Lesotho</td>
<td>September 1998</td>
<td>April 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sovereign Legitimacy</td>
<td>SADC Allied Forces in DRC</td>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group - Sierra Leone</td>
<td>October 1997</td>
<td>May 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIC</td>
<td>OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros</td>
<td>August 1997</td>
<td>April 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Resolutions</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turquoise</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>October 1993 - March 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Regional organisations in Africa and their members

Southern African Development Community (SADC):
1. Angola
2. Botswana
3. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
4. Lesotho
5. Madagascar
6. Malawi
7. Mauritius
8. Mozambique
9. Namibia
10. South Africa
11. Swaziland
12. Tanzania
13. Zambia
14. Zimbabwe
15. Seychelles

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):
1. Benin
2. Burkina Faso
3. Côte d’Ivoire
4. Cape Verde
5. Gambia
6. Guinea Bissau
7. Ghana
8. Guinea
9. Liberia
10. Mali
11. Niger
12. Nigeria
13. Senegal
14. Sierra Leone
15. Togo

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD):
1. Djibouti
2. Eritrea
3. Ethiopia
4. Kenya
5. Somalia
6. Sudan
7. Uganda

East African Community (EAC):
1. Burundi
2. Kenya
3. Rwanda
4. Tanzania
5. Uganda

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA):
1. Burundi
2. Comoros
3. Djibouti
4. DRC
5. Egypt
6. Eritrea
7. Ethiopia
8. Kenya
9. Libya
10. Madagascar
11. Malawi
12. Mauritius
13. Rwanda
14. Seychelles
15. Sudan
16. Swaziland
17. Uganda
18. Zambia
19. Zimbabwe

**Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS):**
1. Angola
2. Burundi
3. Cameroon
4. Central African Republic (CAR)
5. Chad
6. Congo (Republic)
7. DRC
8. Equatorial Guinea
9. Gabon
10. Rwanda
11. São Tomé

**Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)**
1. Cameroon
2. CAR
3. Chad
4. Congo (Republic)
5. Equatorial Guinea
6. Gabon

**Community of Sahel – Saharan States (CEN-SAD)**
1. Benin
2. Burkina Faso
3. CAR
4. Chad
5. Côte d’Ivoire
6. Djibouti
7. Egypt
8. Eritrea
9. Gambia
10. Ghana
11. Guinea Bissau
12. Liberia
13. Libya
14. Mali
15. Morocco
16. Niger
17. Nigeria
18. Senegal
19. Sierra Leone
20. Somalia
21. Sudan
22. Togo
23. Tunisia
Annex 3: Members of Regional Brigades

It should be stressed that at the present moment the exact membership of each brigade is unclear. Some countries appear to have committed to more than one brigade. It is likely that as the brigades near full operational capacity these inconsistencies will be ironed out.

**EASBRIG – East Africa**
- Burundi
- Comoros
- Djibouti
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Kenya
- Madagascar – Also SADCBRIG
- Mauritius – Also SADCBRIG
- Rwanda
- Seychelles
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Tanzania – Also SADCBRIG
- Uganda

**SADCBRIG – Southern Africa**
- Angola
- Botswana
- DRC
- Lesotho
- Madagascar - Also EASBRIG
- Malawi
- Mauritius – Also EASBRIG
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- South Africa
- Swaziland
- Tanzania – Also EASBRIG
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

**ECOBRIG / WESBRIG – West Africa**
- Benin
- Burkina Faso
- Cape Verde
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Gambia
- Guinea
- Guinea Bissau
- Liberia
- Mali
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Togo

**Central African Brigade**
- Angola – Also SADCBRIG
- Cameroon
- CAR
- Chad
Congo (Republic)  
Equatorial Guinea  
Gabon  

North African Brigade  
Algeria  
Egypt  
Libya  
Mauritania  
Morocco  
Tunisia