THE EU STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT AND OPPORTUNITIES

AFET

EN 2012
Abstract

Adoption of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa should open new opportunities for successful engagement in the region. More coherent action creates the opportunity for the EU to be recognised in the region as an actor in its own right, and with the influence that the scale of its engagement should bring. The appointment of an EUSR for the Horn of Africa should allow the EU to speak more clearly with one voice in the region. Doing so would allow the EU to exploit more fully its comparative advantage in the region: as a bloc, it is one of the most significant sources of assistance and investment into the region and an important trade partner. The EU is clearly active across the region, especially through high profile engagement in Somalia and the Sudans. However, quiet engagement in Ethiopia and Eritrea presents the greatest new opportunity to influence constructive shifts in regional security and economic dynamics. This was true before the recent death of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and is even more the case now. Strengthening IGAD will also be essential if the region’s potential and the EU’s goals are to be realised.
This study was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is based on desktop research, and on interviews with a range of EU and regional officials in Brussels and Addis Ababa between 23 July and 2 September 2012.

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# The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impacts and Opportunities

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Adoption of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa should open new opportunities for successful engagement in the region. The European Union (EU) and its member states undertake a wide range of activities in the region, from humanitarian operations to capacity building of regional institutions, anti-piracy missions and military training. By providing an overarching set of principles for European engagement, the Strategic Framework offers the potential for the combined impact of member states and EU institutions to be harnessed and used to push for the EU's goals in the region.

The prospect of more coherent action offers the opportunity for the EU to be recognised in the region as an actor in its own right, and with the influence that the scale of EU investment should bring. Through the appointment of a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn of Africa, the EU has the potential to speak more clearly with one voice in the region. Doing so would allow the EU to exploit more fully its comparative advantage in the region: as a bloc, it is one of the most significant sources of assistance and investment into the region, and an important trade partner.

This ad hoc study consciously focuses recommendations on areas where more could be done, while acknowledging significant efforts already underway. The document adopted in November 2011 is notably quiet on issues related to Ethiopia and Eritrea. These two countries, and their unresolved conflict, are at the core of the region's security dynamics. The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi provides perhaps the first unanticipated test case for the Strategic Framework. With a change of leadership in Addis Ababa, there is significant new potential for external engagement to assist in resolving the lingering hostilities, and promote the re-opening of economic linkages that would be beneficial for both nations. The creation of the EUSR role generates an interesting opportunity for quiet diplomacy between the two capitals. If a common EU position can be achieved, and if Alex Rondos can be empowered to pursue it – two important variables – there is an opportunity to be grasped.

During the political transition in Ethiopia, the EU and member states have the opportunity to play an active role in promoting stability and in providing incentives for movement towards the good governance goals that the Strategic Framework outlines. Even without developing an Action Plan, a coordinated EU and member states approach is vital to retain a key ally and could be a productive driver to promote more progress on governance objectives, in Ethiopia and the region.

In other parts of the Horn, EU engagement could help bind states closer together in terms of future regional strategic thinking.

The bloc has a vigorous mosaic of activities in Somalia (on land and in terms of the anti-piracy operations), in the Sudans and elsewhere in the region. The EU’s long-term aims cannot be promoted without a coherent regional framework. This is true both in terms of promoting regional stability, poverty reduction and development, and in terms of limiting the impacts of the region’s insecurity on Europe itself.

As such, the EU should continue to focus on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as a key potential partner in its engagement with the region and help to enhance its institutional capacity and strengthen its mandate. This would enable IGAD to play a more robust role in promoting regional cooperation and stabilisation, while at the same time benefiting European goals of reducing inflows of economic migrants and asylum seekers, the added costs and insecurity for international shipping caused by Somali piracy, or the export of militant/terrorist ideologies. Political dialogue between the EU and its Horn of Africa partners is the key to a successful implementation of the Strategic Framework. Such a dialogue must rely on mutual interests in order to foster ownership of the strategy by those member states.
The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has enabled the EU to better put its collective resources into practice but the EU should continue working towards fine-tuning its internal institutional working relationships, as well as the instruments at its disposal, so that it is able to respond more flexibly and quickly to situations in the region. Ultimately, with the right level of buy-in from all stakeholders, the Strategic Framework will enable the EU to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the Horn of Africa's complexities and develop a medium-to-long-term approach that will be much greater than the current sum of its parts.
MAP: THE HORN OF AFRICA

Sources: www.mapresources.com; British Somaliland protectorate, Republic of Somaliland International Boundaries (Colonial Office map), www.somalilandlaw.com; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, Kenya Map No. 4187 Rev 1, January 2004; UN Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, Sudan Map No. 4458, October 2011; Edward Thomas, The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, Politics and History in the North-South Boundary Zone of Western Sudan, Rift Valley Institute, 2010, www.riftvalley.net/publications, Map 2. Sudan: Western Bahr al-Ghazal and Map 3: Sudan: North-South Border with Area of Detailed Map; Vivien Knips, Review of the Livestock Sector in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Countries), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, p. 8, Map 3: Human Population Density (per sq. km), September 2004. The boundaries and names shown and designations used on this map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by the author or Chatham House.
1. INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE HORN OF AFRICA’S CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL TERMS

Within Africa, the Horn of Africa stands out in terms of its political, developmental and security challenges. Its experiences do not compare well to other parts of the continent, and resist conventional efforts to categorise and understand them. Regional dynamics also bear some similarities to those in the Middle East, with which the Horn of Africa shares some cultural affinities – unsurprising given the proximity of the Horn to the Gulf States, North Africa and Levant. While comparisons with the Middle East also fall short, the events of the Arab Spring have correctly focused minds on dynamics in the Horn that have the potential to fuel similar upheaval. Nevertheless, regimes in the region have proved resistant to change fuelled by socioeconomic pressures, which have fed into serious protests in Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan.

The Horn of Africa is important to the EU in terms of its geo-strategic significance; the scale of its humanitarian and developmental challenges; the negative impact of piracy off the coast of Somalia on international maritime security and regional and international economic activities; the effects of irregular migration out of the region, including into Europe, and the attendant significance of the region’s diaspora communities in the EU; and the threat of terrorism, both in the region and through its linkages to Europe.

1.1. Political and economic realities that persist in the region

To be effective, external engagement must take account of the political and economic realities that persist in the region. Some of these realities are tackled below.

1.1.1 Conflict

The region has experienced active conflict for decades – in Ethiopia this trend stretches back even further. Whereas conflicts in other parts of Africa have begun to cool following the turbulence of the post-Cold War 1990s, the Horn of Africa has resisted this trend. The last decade has seen two Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia; a Kenyan intervention in Somalia; a brief clash between Eritrea and Djibouti; clashes between newly independent South Sudan and Sudan; and continuing insurrections in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopian airstrikes on Eritrean territory in March 2012 served as a reminder that while open hostilities have been largely absent since two countries’ 1998-2000 war, unresolved tensions related to the conflict remain and are a key factor in the regional security picture.

Violence has long been an important element of identity formation across the region, including through indigenous imperialist projects and processes of state formation and consolidation, as well as through the attendant resistance to and attempts to escape from the states in the region. These dynamics predate the colonial presence in the Horn, and have continued afterwards – especially in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. The current ruling parties in South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea

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1 The Horn of Africa is defined, for the purpose of this paper and by the European Union (EU) as the countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.
have their roots in resistance movements which spawned insurgencies and overthrew the pre-existing regime (or in the case of South Sudan secured the right to secession).

Moreover, insecurity in one country is frequently linked to another. States in the region have intervened in their neighbours’ conflicts for decades. Many state borders cut through economic or social zones, providing avenues for the transmission of instability from one to the other. Arid and semi-arid regions in Somalia, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya form one such region – with trade, linguistic and religious ties forming some linkages across borders. Similarly, Ethiopia’s south-western and western frontiers have linkages into Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. Relatively porous borders allow for population movement, in terms of displacement by conflict or food insecurity; or of military deployments or militia movements, who might use poorly policed border regions as a zone of operation. Even localised conflicts in such regions – for example over access to land or water – can spill across borders, making them difficult to contain.

1.1.2 Governance

Insecurity has fed into the generally poor track record of governance in the region, reinforcing and exacerbating its impacts. Changes of government/regime have rarely been achieved by other than violent means: the 2010 elections in Somaliland and the 2002 elections in Kenya both saw the presidency transferred to an opposition political party, but remain rare exceptions. Even the current political transition in Ethiopia following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi does not represent a transfer of power outside the ruling party.

In Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Uganda, South Sudan and Sudan, the current political dispensation was introduced violently, either through civil war or a coup. With the exception of Somaliland (and potentially Ethiopia), all those states are still led by former insurgents or coup leaders. Governments in Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda still define themselves in large part in national security terms. Somalia is struggling to re-introduce state institutions after more than twenty years of civil war. Even Kenya’s relative stability has been punctuated by election related violence since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. Djibouti, while stable if not democratic, hosts French and US military bases, and is a key logistics centre for anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia. In such a context, it is perhaps unsurprising that regional governments are perceived by many citizens in the region less as service providers and more as a threat to be evaded – particularly by those at the margins of society or the frontiers of states.

1.1.3 Growth

In spite of the security conditions, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have managed to significantly boost economic growth rates in the last decade. With the exception of Kenya, states in the region are building on a very low economic base and remain dependent on the export of primary commodities. Growth is also thus highly vulnerable to shocks, external or internal. Sudan’s and Eritrea’s economies only picked up once oil (Sudan) and mining (Eritrea) operations came on stream. But Sudan’s economy, as well as South Sudan’s, has been hugely and detrimentally affected by instability following the July 2011 spilt, especially as a result of the halt in oil exports from South Sudan in recent months. Kenya’s economy is

relatively more diversified, and the country serves as an important financial and investment hub for East Africa. Uganda and Ethiopia managed to weather the 2008-09 global economic downturn, although growth rates are slowing towards around 5 per cent in both countries. Meanwhile, Kenya’s growth trajectory has not yet recovered to its pre-2008 trend, holding steady around 5 per cent. The effects of the global downturn exacerbated the impacts of the early 2008 post-election violence on Kenya’s economy, denting its recovery prospects.

Nevertheless, continued growth in most countries of the region has helped to transform perceptions of the region from being dominated by famine or violence towards increasingly attractive investment destinations. Slow growth and limited financial returns in the more developed markets of Europe and the United States (US) have also helped to drive interest in riskier emerging regions, such as Eastern Africa – and Kenya and Ethiopia in particular. A significant element of risk remains, in part linked to the threat of insecurity. Another factor is inflation; most countries in the region have experienced double-digit inflation along with higher growth rates in the last five years, although for different reasons. All countries are to a greater or lesser extent sensitive to fluctuations in global commodity prices, which have been rising again following a brief pause during the global economic downturn. However, Ethiopia’s inflation is also fuelled by monetary policy, including intentional devaluation of the birr, but also heavy government borrowing. Sudan and South Sudan’s recent inflationary pressures have been influenced strongly by monetary policy in the wake of disruptions to oil exports, which has seen government revenues in both countries plunge. Lacklustre monetary policy in Kenya also fed strong inflation during 2011.

As such, while the growth story is an important element of the Horn of Africa’s regional trajectory, these recent economic gains remain fragile. In the case of Sudan, the economy has actually contracted in the last year, and is projected to do so again. High prices also have the capacity to feed into social unrest, or to exacerbate the vulnerability of certain populations – especially those already affected by food insecurity.

Another important aspect of the economic story has been the improvement of essential infrastructure – especially in terms of transportation and power. These improvements have had regional impacts, reflecting potential and actual linkages and dependencies between neighbours. For example, Ethiopia has remained dependent on Djibouti for the vast majority of its external trade for more than a decade, after its border with Eritrea was closed by the war. Ethiopia, meanwhile, is developing a number of hydroelectric dams – boosting its generation capacity to the point where it will be able to export power to its neighbours. Projects to develop transmission infrastructure are underway, to connect Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan to Ethiopian supplies. Kenya remains the main entrepot for trade into Eastern Africa, via existing port facilities at Mombasa. Ground has been broken on a Kenyan project to develop a new deep-water port at Lamu, with the aim of providing a new logistics hub and transport corridor serving not only Kenya but also Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda.

Although some of these projects are some way off from completion, they point to the economic interconnections between the countries of the region – linkages and dependencies – which feed into and are reinforced or undermined by the region’s security dynamics\(^1\). Eritrea’s economy would naturally be dominated by trade and investment links with Ethiopia, to both countries’ benefit, were it not for the severing of relations. Insecurity in Somalia prevents its ports from challenging Djibouti or Kenya as a regional hub, despite its long coastline. South Sudan’s disputes with Sudan have pushed it towards

expanding trade routes via Kenya, while trade through existing and more logical links from Port Sudan is undermined. Meanwhile, the proposed port at Lamu and the rail/road/pipeline corridor connecting it with South Sudan have received a boost, helping Kenya to continue to bolster its role as a regional gateway – but potentially intensifying concerns in Uganda and Tanzania that Kenya’s businesses and services will undermine their own offerings. Although the EAC is making tangible progress on economic integration, forward momentum faces the prospect of interruptions due to political factors.

1.1.4 Cooperation

Although the region’s interconnectedness and dependencies are manifold, cooperation between states remains fairly tepid. This is reflected in the relative weakness of the regional bloc, the IGAD. Although IGAD has served as an important forum – most notably providing the auspices for the peace negotiations that led to transitional arrangements in Sudan (2005-11) and Somalia (2004-12) – it remains largely subservient to the agendas of its members. Conflicts between members have undermined its coherence. Eritrea’s membership has been suspended since it withdrew in protest over Ethiopia’s December 2006 intervention in Somalia – a fundamental split in the bloc which has continued to dominate its agenda since then. Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia all have troops in Somalia at present. Sudan and Uganda have a long history of mutual interference in the other’s security, which has fuelled insurgencies in both countries. Perceptions of Eritrea as a regional spoiler, undermining the security of its neighbours (especially Somalia), must be tempered with the understanding that foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is driven in large part by the logic of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’; if Asmara interferes, its interference is not so different from that of its neighbours – its main characteristic is that it punches above its weight, in terms of the size of its population and economy.

1.2. Utility of a regional approach

In light of these tangled dynamics, it is essential to view the Horn of Africa through a regional lens – in addition to maintaining bilateral relations – in order for the EU’s engagement to be coherent, and to support the body’s goals.

The EU has focused on IGAD as a key potential partner in its engagement with the region, which looks set to continue. IGAD’s potential is currently under-realised, but the body could play a more robust role in promoting regional cooperation and stabilisation, were its capacity to be enhanced and its mandate strengthened. As a pillar of the African Union’s (AU) regional integration framework, IGAD has the potential to benefit from broader regional institutional improvements. In practice, it has largely failed to keep pace with other regional blocs, and even on less politically sensitive issues such as trade, IGAD has not played a leading role – its members are part of more functional regional trade blocs including the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In terms of the AU regional security agenda, IGAD was unable to provide the framework for a regional stand-by brigade, which instead is being developed in common with the members of the EAC as an East African Stand-by Force (ESF).

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States of the region have demonstrated a track record of resisting external influence. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, in particular, independence and self-reliance form an essential part of the national identity – in Ethiopia grounded in the 1896 defeat of Italian forces at the battle of Adwa, and in Eritrea in the thirty-year liberation struggle from Ethiopia, ultimately achieved without external support (and in the face of significant external assistance to its foe in Addis Ababa). In Sudan, a protracted Western policy of isolation – most visibly embodied by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) issue of an arrest warrant for President Omar Hassan al-Bashir – has left Khartoum reluctant to engage in dialogue. Ethiopia and Uganda have proved adept at maintaining important security relationships with Western powers, which has proved useful in limiting external criticism of governance shortcomings in both countries. Although bilateral engagement will continue to be essential, the EU’s long-term aims cannot be promoted without a coherent regional framework. This is true both in terms of promoting regional stability, poverty reduction and development, and in terms of limiting the impacts of the region’s insecurity on Europe itself, either through inflows of economic migrants and asylum seekers, by the added costs and insecurity for international shipping caused by Somali piracy or by the export of militant/terrorist ideologies.

1.3. A note on the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa

The EU and its member states are the largest providers of development and humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, as well as being key partners of the AU and IGAD. The UK, Italy and France have strong historical ties to the region and Europe hosts the largest concentrations of diasporas from the region all meaning that the EU is in a position to be an important driver for change.5

EU concern for the Horn of Africa came to the fore in 2006 with the European Commission (Commission) communication to the European Council (Council) and the European Parliament (Parliament) – ‘Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa.’6 The communication built on two existing strategies: the European Consensus for Development and the EU Strategy for Africa, both initiated in 2005. With a focus on supporting regional integration and interconnectivity the communication subsequently led to the Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI), launched jointly in 2007 by the Commission and IGAD to promote political partnership for peace, security and development in the region. These strategies provided a good platform for future initiatives and engagements, particularly with regard to promoting regional development and integration.

Under the Swedish Presidency in December 2009 ‘An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive strategy’ was adopted.7 This policy was aimed at getting EU Council commitments actionable on the ground. Member states called on the EU to build on this more security-focused strategy and ensure that its responses to the various threats from the region (particularly piracy) were coherent, cohesive and tackled the root causes of the issues.8

8 Ibid.
The 2006 communication and the 2009 policy were the building blocks for a more comprehensive EU strategy for the region. The EU adopted a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa in November 2011, marking a significant shift in the EU approach to the region – helping not only to coordinate action across member states, but also speak with a more coherent voice in the region through the appointment of an EUSR, which was recommended in the 2009 policy. Italy had lobbied strongly for the creation of an EUSR for the region and for it to be filled by a former Italian politician and other European candidates were also short-listed. The new post was filled in early 2012 and the incumbent, Alex Rondos, has already made a number of important engagements.

The Strategic Framework was drafted by the EEAS under the leadership of the Director for Africa Nick Westcott and the Horn of Africa division. Adopted by the Council, it now guides EU action for greater peace, stability and prosperity in the region, setting out five areas for EU action and proposing ways the EU can pursue its approach in partnership with the region itself and key partners. As well as areas for action, specific actions, in the form of sub-strategies and Action Plans, are subject to agreement by the Commission, Council and member states. The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), EEAS, EUSR, EU delegations in the region, Commission and member states work together to implement this Framework.

1.4. How is the Strategic Framework faring in practice?

One early sign of a cost-benefit is that where before there was a sense that EU had policies without goals, the Strategic Framework has given the EU a set of common objectives and aims in its approach to Horn of Africa. The document represents a guideline that can be used to improve the coherence of tools and instruments on the region. Instruments currently form a mosaic of intervention in the region; less than a year after the Strategic Framework’s inception it is difficult to assess whether there has been a significant improvement in the coherence of approach.

The following sections, 2-6, provide an examination of the different strands of the EU’s approach to the region. It is hoped that doing so will help to build up a picture of whether they are beginning to come together under a common Framework. Section 2 examines some of the financial instruments at the EU’s disposal in the Horn; Section 3 focuses on the relationship between the two main Directorate Generals (DGs) in Brussels responsible for planning external assistance to the Horn of Africa, as well as the EU’s engagement with African regional blocs; Section 4 considers the EUSR’s role and relations with counterparts in the region, as well as looking at EU delegations in the region; Section 5 explores the EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy with particular reference to the Horn of Africa and the proposed European Endowment for Democracy (EED), as well as the potential involvement of the diaspora; finally, Section 6 appraises the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Horn.

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10 Building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic cooperation. Ibid.
2. OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS RELEVANT TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

The EU’s overall budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), spans seven years. Covering internal and external areas of EU action, it reflects political priorities in financial terms through areas of resourcing. The current MFF is from 2007 to 2013 and the new MFF will start in 2014 and end in 2020.

The EU implements its external policies through geographic and thematic financial instruments (see Figure 1). It draws on an array of means to implement action in the Horn of Africa including: development cooperation through the European Development Fund (EDF) and member states’ bilateral programmes, joint programming in the regions’ countries where appropriate, relevant EU budget lines, trade instruments, conflict prevention and crisis response, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), diplomacy, EUSRs, cooperation and dialogue through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (Cotonou) of 2000. The EU also provides humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations in accordance with humanitarian principles.

Negotiations on the priority areas of the EU’s new seven-year budget cycle are progressing and are expected to be concluded by the end of 2012. There is also an on-going review of existing financial instruments ahead of the new MFF. The Commission’s new development approach, called an ‘Agenda for Change’ was approved by the Council in May 2012, building on commitments made in the 2005 European Consensus on Development.\footnote{European Commission (2011) \textit{Increasing the Impact of EU development Policy: an Agenda for Change}, Brussels; 13 October 2011.} It is intended to refocus EU development assistance on fewer sectors supporting democracy, human rights and good governance and creating inclusive and sustainable growth. These issues are to feature more prominently in political dialogue with recipient countries, and will be associated with stricter conditionality. In the best cases, countries will receive budget support, now re-labelled ‘good governance and development contracts.’\footnote{Ibid.} Where budget support cannot be justified, money will be channelled away from governments and in favour of local actors and non governmental organisations (NGOs).

Under the ‘differentiation’ principle, the EU will allocate a greater proportion of funds where aid can have the highest impact: in the regions and countries that are most in need, including in fragile states.\footnote{The implication is that countries that fall outside those regions, or that fail to meet the new criteria, will receive less aid. Ibid.} Priority will be given to sub-Saharan Africa including countries in the Horn of Africa.

Some of the financial instruments relevant to the Horn of Africa are outlined in this section. Long term instruments include the EDF and the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), while humanitarian funds come from the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). A more thorough examination is given to relatively short term financial instruments including the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
2.1 The EDF, DCI and ECHO

2.1.1 The EDF and DCI

The EDF, the geographic instrument for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) is currently funded outside the EU budget as a fixed percentage of Member states Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\textsuperscript{15} The proposed EDF for 2014-2020 constitutes €34 billion, aimed at financing poverty reduction in cooperation with developing countries.\textsuperscript{16} Under the 10th EDF (2008-2013), €17.7 billion out of a total of €22.7 billion was given to support National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPv). Of that

\textsuperscript{14} European Commission (2011) A Budget For Europe 2020 - Part I - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; COM(2011) 500/I final.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. The EDF is extra-budgetary and funded by member states according to a specific contribution key. It is subject to its own financial rules and is managed by a specific committee. Some EU member states and the Commission are pushing for it to be included in the EU budget, to increase public control of this aid, as well as transparency and effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{16} The final amount is still under negotiation, to be decided in 2012.
figure, countries in the Horn of Africa received €2 billion. Sudan and South Sudan were ineligible\(^\text{17}\) and Ethiopia alone received €644 million in development assistance.

In the same period, the EU also allocated €645 million to the four Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (ESAIO) region: IGAD, COMESA, EAC, and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). In 2010, the EU signed project financing agreements totalling €118 million to support diverse regional economic integration and development projects in the region as well as the RECs regional cooperation and global economic integration.\(^\text{18}\)

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**Box 1: African Peace Facility**

The African Peace Facility (APF) is an instrument under the EDF that supports the African Peace and Security Agenda/Architecture (APSA). Over €740 million has been channelled through it since 2004, providing €600 million to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), €100 million to strengthening African institutional capacities in peace and security at continental and regional level, and €15 million to a number of mediation activities. The facility is also a major financing instrument of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), in particular the partnership on peace and security, adopted under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.

The APF’s financial support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive and long-term approach to support security and development efforts of the AU in Somalia, guided by the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.\(^\text{19}\) On top of its country allocation of €212 million to Somalia for the 10th EDF, the EU contributed €325 million to AMISOM through the APF.\(^\text{20}\) The APF also contributed towards resolving the conflict in Darfur by supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with €305 million between 2006 and 2007.\(^\text{21}\) Mediation actions supported by the APF include the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, including support for civil society engagement in the negotiations.

Countries in the Horn of Africa are also eligible for thematic programming under the DCI. Launched in 2007, it provides €5.6 billion (2007–2013) to developing countries for support in the following fields: investing in people; environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy; non state actors (NSAs) and local authorities in development; food security; migration and asylum.

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\(^{17}\) Due to Sudan not having ratified the Cotonou Agreement, which provides the legal framework for relations between the European Community and the ACP.

\(^{18}\) The overall objective of the 10th EDF ESAIO Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) is to contribute to the eradication of poverty in member countries and assist them in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as enshrined in the ACP - EC Partnership Agreement by supporting economic growth and developing trade.

\(^{19}\) EU is the biggest donor to Somalia, having committed €315.4 million since 2008 for governance, security, and economic growth and an additional €200 million for 2011-2013: [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/piracy/stabilisation_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/piracy/stabilisation_en.htm)

\(^{20}\) Covering allowances, operational running costs, transportation, medical expenses, housing, fuel, and communication equipment.

\(^{21}\) Until AMIS handed over to the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
2.1.2 ECHO

The EU is the world’s biggest donor of humanitarian aid working mostly in the areas of food crisis, catastrophes, and risk reduction. ECHO has an annual budget averaging €1 billion which does not rely on emergency contributions from member states to avoid risk of politicising aid. ECHO is also not included in the EU delegations on the ground because of their need to remain independent. From 2011 to 2012 the Commission allocated €313 million of humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa in the form of food assistance, nutrition, water and sanitation. There are ECHO desks in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and a regional desk in Nairobi in charge of Somalia. Despite ECHO’s independence, there is cooperation with the Directorate General for Development Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO), the EEAS and the delegations in the field.

The EU’s humanitarian aid to the region adheres to the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence as laid out in the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Aid is directed ‘first and foremost at the people’ – this has been one of the reasons why ECHO is not a direct part of EU crisis management and has not been integrated into the structures of the EEAS. It can only be an integral part of a comprehensive approach if these principles are respected.

Box 2: SHARE

In 2012 the Commission proposed a new Action Plan for the Horn of Africa - Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE). SHARE is an example of the Strategic Framework’s role in guiding action and promoting good coordination between ECHO and DEVCO. The instrument links short term humanitarian aid with development coordination mechanisms ‘to bridge solid links between relief, recovery and long term development that aims to break the vicious cycle of crises in the region.’ The main idea is to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). The Commission is investing more than €270 million in SHARE to support recovery from the 2011 drought and work to strengthen population’s resistance to future crises.

2.2 Instrument for Stability

Launched in 2007, the IFS has intensified the Commission’s work in the area of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building. The instrument is meant to react ‘swiftly’ to unforeseen crises, working ‘complementary to humanitarian aid’ and in coherence with the EU’s other external assistance: one of the reasons why the duration of actions taken under the IFS is limited to two years.

The EEAS and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) in cooperation with DEVCO and the EU delegations, are responsible for the planning and implementation of this instrument’s activities. The IFS has a budget of €2 billion for 2007-2013. Over a quarter of funds, the largest share, is given to projects in Africa. Under the IFS, activities can be supported in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when timely financial help cannot be provided from other EU sources.

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22 DRR: disaster/drought risk reduction.
26 Crisis response projects under the IFS focus on a wide range of issues, such as support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict.
In the Horn of Africa the IfS has assisted on several issues: early recovery programmes in Ethiopia after the Horn of Africa drought, as part of other humanitarian relief efforts (€13.75 million); support to stability in post-referendum Sudan (€18 million); and continued support to countries engaged with piracy trials linked to the EU’s CSDP Atalanta counter-piracy naval operation. The EU has signed prisoner transfer agreements with the Seychelles (2009) and Mauritius (2011) and is negotiating one with Tanzania. Transfers to Kenya are possible on a case by case basis but it has shown reluctance to try and detain transferred piracy suspects as the judicial system is not fully prepared to cope with the additional complexities and workload.27

**Box 3: Critical Maritime Routes Programme (MARSIC)**

In the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Western Indian Ocean, the issue of piracy and armed robbery has become a serious problem since 2008. With the threat of piracy to security and international trade being a focus of the EU, the IfS has targeted the Horn of Africa for counter-terrorism and organised crime programmes in the 2012-13 strategy.28

MARSIC is a €6 million IfS funded project (2010-14) aimed at increasing the security of critical maritime routes in the area to help to safeguard shipping and trading lines of communication. MARSIC supports the implementation of the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct, whose aim is to establish a framework for information-sharing and cooperation among coastal and user states for the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.29 The programme is being implemented to improve the regional response towards piracy by enhancing information sharing and training capacities. It supports the training of maritime administration staff, officials and coast guards in the Seychelles and Kenya, as well as in Somaliland and Puntland. Interpol, the implementing partner, provides the regional partners with training and equipment to conduct investigations and to identify and dismantle piracy networks and their supporters.

The MARSIC team of experts from EU member states provide technical assistance setting up and supporting the operations of the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre in Sana’a, Yemen, (which produces regular reports on incidents of piracy) and the Djibouti Regional Training Centre for maritime affairs (which provides for the training of law enforcement officers and coast guards).

By assisting with the development of local maritime capacities the EU recognises that the countries in the region should be in a position to secure their territorial waters instead of international forces. Yet, the long term goal of improving maritime governance by enhancing levels of information sharing, coordination with the international community and the response capacity of coastal states is extremely ambitious, especially as countries in the Horn of Africa do not prioritise anti-piracy as highly as EU member states do.

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27 A joint EU/UNODC programme of support for the justice system in Kenya was launched in May 2009 to provide Kenya with practical assistance to cope with the extra demands associated with the prosecution and detention of piracy suspects (€1.75 million). Similar support programmes are available to the Seychelles (€0.78 million) and Mauritius (€1.08 million). See EEAS Factsheet *The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa, June 2012*: [http://eeas.europa.eu/agenda/2012/200212_factsheet_piracy.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/agenda/2012/200212_factsheet_piracy.pdf)


Stakeholders who made use of the IfS in the Horn of Africa reflected on its speed compared to other EU instruments, but noted that deployment, which can take up to six months, is still an issue of capacity that requires improvement. The IfS is seen to have contributed to an improved exchange of information on conflict prevention and peace-building between EU headquarter and delegations as well as among different DGs in Brussels. It has also stimulated reflection on programming priorities with a view to how conflicts can be prevented and led them to analyse why certain activities were not planned under the regular cooperation.

However, there is still a need to build the EU institutions’ capacity, especially the delegations, to administer the IfS effectively. The number of staff with backgrounds in conflict prevention and peace-building should be increased to handle the tasks at hand and to mainstream its objectives to the policy level. Also, where conflicts are interrelated, such as the Horn of Africa, information-sharing must become the norm between delegations implementing IfS programmes. This would allow for more strategic use of the IfS through the identification of actions which support regional priorities in the region.

Most funds are used in response to short-term crises (less than two years), but where valuable IfS programmes should lay the basis for continued EU action under long-term instruments or risk being significantly undermined. There is a need for increased coordination and a more comprehensive approach to utilizing all the EU’s instruments to address the causes of conflict. Efforts currently underway in the EEAS and DEVCO to change this should be actively encouraged and supported as they are an essential complement to its effective functioning.

2.3 **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)**

The EIDHR expresses the EU’s intention to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide. It provides support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries, granting aid where no development assistance exists, and its critical strength intervening without the agreement of the governments of third countries.

The EIDHR budget is €1 billion for 2007-2013 mainly implemented through call for proposals to EU delegations or Brussels DGs. Country-based support schemes for the Horn of Africa are between €300,000 (Eritrea) and €1 million (Sudan). The main feature of EIDHR is working to promote democracy and implement mechanisms for the protection of human rights alongside NSAs and civil society organizations (CSOs).

The EIDHR has faced criticism that it should respond more flexibly and quickly to the situations in countries facing the most serious challenges. Another is that it requires greater synergy with other instruments that are used to implement EU policies for democracy and human rights, such as crisis-related interventions under the IfS. The EIDHR is rigid in terms of programming cycles and budgeting.
For example, grants provided oblige recipients to make a substantial contribution themselves. Funding is not usually given directly to local CSOs but provided in partnership with a contracted party, usually an international organization or NGO. Although there may be programming benefits to this approach, it serves as a restraint on local capacity building, and where local capacities are sufficient, it serves as an administrative drain on funding.

The EIDHR funds EU Election Observation Missions, noting that elections are an essential component of a functioning democracy.36 Recent missions in the Horn of Africa include Southern Sudan’s referendum on 9 January 2011, where the relatively peaceful and credible process reflected Southern Sudanese voters’ desire for secession. In the Ethiopian elections of 2010, observers declared the electoral process fell short of international commitments and noted a narrowing of political space.37

There is a question as to whether the human rights and democracy framework makes sense for engagement with the Horn of Africa.38 Political space remains restricted with de-facto one party states led by African ‘strong men’. Previous to the death of Meles Zenawi, this could be attributed to five of the eight IGAD member states, outside of which Somalia has seen civil war since 1991 and Kenya experienced violent disputed elections in 2008. Additionally, crackdowns on political opposition, the media and civil society activists are commonplace, as are violent attempts to prevent citizens from exercising their legitimate right to vote during elections. Assistance brings real risks for its recipients, but this should not be a valid argument for not prioritising support to such groups.

**Box 4: EIDHR and Transitional Justice**

The EIDHR supports transitional justice mechanisms in the Horn of Africa.39 Bolstering the rule of law is a long term objective of the JAES, a key element of political dialogue with the region. This concern also underpins recognition in the Cotonou Agreement that the ICC is an integral part of the international framework for building peace and justice. The EU believes that the ICC has an integral role in encouraging international norms of behaviour in conflict as well as conflict avoidance.

However, the ICC is engaged in three very different but equally politically contentious investigations in the Horn of Africa – in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. These investigations have strained the human rights discourse between the AU, its member states and the EU. African states have tended to band together, accusing the ICC of unfair targeting. This is evidenced by the AU refusing to implement the ICC warrant on a sitting member of the African Parliament, Sudanese President al-Bashir.

The EIDHR should be deployed more broadly to encourage conflict avoidance and as far as it can support the capacity of local law makers and develop indigenous processes of transitional justice where they emerge. But in order for the EIDHR to remain effective in the region the EU should keep it independent from the ICC’s inflammatory actions.

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37 Ibid.
38 In Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda there exist clear institutional barriers and limits to what can be achieved by promoting locally driven democratisation processes through CSOs.
39 Projects carried out mainly through international organisations and NGOs without the need for host government consent. Project areas include promoting and strengthening the ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the processes of
An examination of the EU’s human rights and good governance agenda as well as the proposed EED, and their applicability to the Horn of Africa is provided in Section 5.
3. COHERENCE BETWEEN EU INSTITUTIONS, MEMBER STATES AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE REGION

This section explores the coherence of EU stakeholders working on the Horn of Africa, which is important in order to achieve greater consensus of common values and strategic objectives in the region. An examination is given for relations between EU institutions, EU institutions and member states as well as EU engagement with external actors in the Horn of Africa.

3.1 EU Institutional relations: EEAS, DEVCO and the delegations

DEVCO, created in 2011 as a merger of the European Commission’s DG DEV and DG EuropeAid, possesses a long institutional memory of EU development assistance programming and implementation. By contrast, the EEAS, the EU’s diplomatic service with a worldwide coverage of geographical desks, is only just over a year into existence and has a focus on EU security interest led initiatives with developing countries rather than development-led plans.40

Given its composition, some of the EEAS staff members that come from the Commission are well aware of the programming, while for other EEAS staff members the process is new.41 In this regard, DEVCO staff have expressed concern that the respective programming responsibilities for development cooperation of the EEAS and DEVCO could bear the risk of orienting development cooperation closer to the EU’s security or economic objectives.42 However, this is not borne out by looking at the working relationship and how the programming cycle is envisioned.

On January 2012 the working arrangements for cooperation between the EEAS and DEVCO were signed.43 The agreement is confidential, but its main aspects are outlined below.44 Under the 11th EDF, the EEAS will be responsible for strategic planning of geographic programming for individual countries and regions. DEVCO will implement these programmes and retain funding control. DEVCO will also be responsible for thematic programming and implementation under the DCI, with the EEAS having oversight. The EEAS will do the planning in agreement with the Commission and DEVCO. Decisions emerging from this process are to be submitted jointly by the Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs and the HR/VP, Catherine Ashton for adoption by the Commission. It is the Commissioner for Development who has the final responsibility in both the thematic and geographic programming. This will ensure that development policy and poverty reduction remain at the core of external activities.

The inter-service agreement helps to set out the rules of the procedural relationship, but implementation challenges remain in Brussels as well as in the EU delegations in the Horn of Africa. A new generation of financial instruments and country and regional strategies will be drawn up and implemented from 2014-2020. The need to start programming for the EU’s new budget presents an

40 As evidenced by the Strategic Frameworks on the Sahel and Horn of Africa.
41 Around 100 officials working at geographic country desks of the DG Development were transferred to the EEAS. The majority of senior Africa staff come from there. See Görtz, S. and Sherriff, A. (2011) The EU’s new diplomats for Africa Who are they and what policy context do they face? ECDPM, Europafrica.net e-Bulletin; 42. Maastricht.
42 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
43 By the Commission’s Secretary General and the EEAS Chief Operating Officer.
opportunity to set aside internal EU struggles over the division of responsibilities and to put cooperation with partner countries centre stage. The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa should provide coherence in the next cycle of programming, making it easier to determine priorities for each of the country as well as areas of regional support.  

For objectives to be met in Brussels and the EU delegations, good cooperation mechanisms need to be embedded and functioning well between DEVCO and the EEAS. With both the EEAS and DEVCO leading on different steps, regular information exchange and good collaboration becomes vital, and more complicated. Effective communication and clear guidelines on workflows between the two are necessary. Interviews with officials in Brussels and in the delegations reinforced that information exchange and more regular formal reporting is an area where improvements should be ongoing.

The EEAS has to prove that it can mainstream development concerns, as set out in the Strategic Framework. On the ground, EU delegations are often understaffed to fulfil the role expected from them, especially on the political side. They are comprised of both EEAS and DEVCO staff, with a larger ratio of development to political staff, usually including the head of delegation. Operational teething-problems have meant that in certain instances, DEVCO staff have carried out the political responsibilities that should be taken on by EEAS staff. The delegations in the region are going through a rotation of personnel from September 2012 which should address these political gaps. As part of the holistic approach the EEAS is also embedding civilian-military staff into its programming and culture. The increased political role of delegations promises to bring more insights from EU presence in the region. This will take time and the EEAS does not have a full set of resources to steer this transition.

The challenge for the new-look EU delegations will be to provide quality sectoral support, operational guidance and ensure policy coherence of the multi-faceted work in the region. The EU is mostly non-operational in the field where programmes are carried out by partners. Although EU delegations control the implementation of programmes in country, they are bound by decision-making and all manner of administrative and accounting regulations from DGs in Brussels. Alex Rondos argues the need for mechanisms that ensure greater flexibility for EU delegations to be able to commit to programming, without the need for clearance from Brussels: ‘The staff of the EU that I see in the field I would be happy to plunge into all sorts of programmes, but it is their necks that are on the line.’ This would ensure better delegation to country coherence and avoid implementation delays.

3.2 Coherence between EU institutions and member states

Coherence between the EEAS, DEVCO and member states is important for putting into action the guidelines that have been agreed upon in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. Speaking with one voice is difficult, yet reaching consensus on important areas of action is important if the EU’s contribution to the region is to be valuable. Divergent approaches between institutions and member states can be an impediment to achievement of important goals in the region.

45 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
46 Ibid.
47 Such as the United Nations (UN), AU, CSOs and NGOs.
48 Interview with Alex Rondos, before House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs (Sub-Committee C) Inquiry on Combating Somali Piracy: The EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, Thursday 21 June 2012.
In the Strategic Framework on the Horn of Africa there is only passing mention of the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. It is commonly understood that little headway can be made on peace and security in the region unless this impasse can be negotiated. Renewed conflict would ‘endanger our other policies in the region.’ The EEAS and certain member states were keen for prominence to be given to the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship in the document, but EU member states held up the drafting as they were unable to agree. Certain states were adamant that the issue should be addressed and the wording strong; others wanted something more subtle. The lack of unified opinion among member states has resulted in the most important regional fault-line being given a watered-down passing mention by the EU.

Thus, it is important that when it comes to breathing life into the Strategic Framework through targeted Action Plans, sufficient freedom is given to the EEAS, DEVCO and the EUSR to guide the EU’s approach to the region. Member states should work towards supporting the collective objectives set out in the document. There are other implementation challenges. The EEAS will present a review of the Strategic Framework to the Council in November 2012. The monitoring procedure is commendable: There should be an annual review of the Strategic Framework that highlights implementation gaps and opportunities to improve coordination. However, it is difficult to assess how the Framework can have made a significant impact in less than a year after its adoption.

**Box 5: A comprehensive EU approach to South Sudan**

The EU’s engagement in South Sudan offers a precedent for EU institutions and member states uniting behind a common approach in the Horn of Africa.

The EU was supportive of the new Republic of South Sudan in the run up to its independence on 9 July 2011. It assisted the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) through the preparation of the referendum for independence. The volatility of the security situation means that Sudan was closely watched in Brussels.

The HR/VP created an inter-service task force for Sudan bringing together the EEAS, Crisis Management and Planning DG, DEVCO and ECHO. The task force introduced a ‘Comprehensive Approach to Sudan’ that was endorsed by the FAC on 20 June 2011. The document represents an integrated approach on political-governance, diplomatic, security, development, humanitarian and trade issues. It also shows how the EEAS can bring together EU institutions and member states to effectively support a country and apply a common set of principles and purpose.

The true test of the Strategic Framework will be to ensure a cohesive approach when preparing programming for the next budgetary cycle (from 2014-2020, the 11th EDF). The Strategic Framework should make it easier to determine priorities for each country in the region, as well as for areas of regional support. Internal procedural challenges such as the specifics of how documents should be presented should be left up to the EEAS and DEVCO; the Council and Parliament should not place significant barriers in front of the implementation of Action Plans.

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49 Interview with senior EU official in Brussels, August 2012.
50 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
3.3 EU engagement with external actors in the region

Recent Europe-Africa relations have been characterised by efforts at continent level dialogue based on declared principles, consensus of common values and strategic objectives. In practice this is achieved through the increasing interaction of the AU and the EU, the two regional organizations that group each other’s respective nations. The political dimension of the EU-AU relationship has peace and security issues at its core. It has been strengthened by seeking African ownership of policies and actions as a guiding principle although in practice finding a common African position can at times be challenging.

The shift in EU-AU relations is reflected in the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa and the 2007 JAES. This Joint Strategy provides an overarching long-term framework for Africa-EU relations. It is implemented through successive short-term Action Plans that should enhance political dialogue at all levels, resulting in measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership. The JAES focuses mostly on four areas: peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and key development issues.51

The JAES is financed through relevant existing financial instruments such as the EDF (including APF), DCI, and the Ifs, as well as the various thematic programmes. Apart from the APF, current EU instruments have not been established with reference to the joint strategy. At current resourcing, European Community assistance to Africa is approximately €5 billion a year from 2008 to 2013.52 Among the deliverables achieved under the JAES are: €1 billion support to APSA; €1 billion Food Facility,53 training for election observers, and €168 million in grants to mobilise financing of about €2 billion for infrastructure projects in Africa.

The EU appointed an EUSR to the AU in 2007 to improve links between the EU and AU. The current EUSR, Gary Quince, is also the head of the EU delegation to the AU. It has been argued, as with the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, that the ability of the EUSR to combine EU instruments and ensure a coherent approach to Africa would considerably improve if they could exercise autonomy in programming and managing funds. However, others maintain that to do so risks increasing the politicisation of EU support.54

In the field of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the EU currently provides over €15 million per month in financial support for AMISOM.55 It supported the deployment of AMIS in Sudan/Darfur (see 2.1) and continues to provide financial assistance to the AUHIP in mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan. The EU has offered technical assistance and expertise in drawing up the tabled oil deal, as well as border demarcation and management and is ready to act as a guarantor in the signing of these agreements. The EUSR, Rosalind Marsden and other international envoys from US, UK and China are present at the mediations and have regular engagement with the panel and both parties.

51 There are four other areas: Energy; Climate change and environment; Migration, mobility and employment; and Science, Information, Society and Space.
53 In the Horn of Africa, the Food Facility provides €13.5 million to Eritrea, €42.9 million to Ethiopia, €31 million to Kenya and €14.1 million to Somalia.
55 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
The EU actively supports the AU in its national and regional engagements on the Horn of Africa, as well providing funding for the RECs in the region, of which IGAD, headquartered in Djibouti, most fully represents the countries of the Horn of Africa.

Funds for the ESAIO RIP allocation under the 10th EDF are provided under the thematic areas of regional economic and political integration. The HoAI was launched jointly in 2007 by the Commission and IGAD to promote political partnership for peace, security and development in the region. It focuses on delivering enhanced interconnectivity in transport, energy and water resource utilization for food security. The EU has provided €165 million in funding to date, while also coordinating other finance sources, including the regional 10th EDF, national programmes, the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank.

The EU also recently appointed Nicola Delcroix to lead the EU Delegation to Djibouti and be Representative to IGAD. Previously, the representative for the region had been based in Nairobi. He will be joined in the delegation by a regional political advisor who will work with the EUSR for the Horn of Africa on the regional political picture and implementation of specific Action Plans. The appointments signal an increasing engagement with IGAD.

Despite these contributions, the EU needs to engage more with both the AU and IGAD in devoting resources to long-term capacity building actions. Of the €645 million allocated to the four RECs in the ESAIO under the 10th EDF, including IGAD, only 5 per cent (€32 million) was earmarked to assist the region in knowledge development and institutional capacity-building. The majority of funding for APF supports PSOs. Under the 9th EDF, ninety per cent of resources were devoted to PSOs (with AMIS getting the majority). Only ten per cent (€34 million) was allocated to capacity building actions.

In the current EDF this has increased to €65 million but it is clear that the lessons learnt have not been fully integrated into current financial planning. There is a need for the EU to have better dialogue with IGAD and there are challenges to making the RIPs more coherent. The EU has already signalled the need to help IGAD with improving its own institutional and operational capacity. IGAD’s institutional development has lagged behind real political processes in the region as well as being reliant on the shifting alliances between leaders in the Horn of Africa. This is evidenced by Eritrea’s self suspension from the organization from 2007.

On balance with other commitments the capacity-building element of the APF and support for IGAD is still weak. It should be reinforced through increased long-term funding, based on requirements in human resources, material resources, expertise and institutional organisation.

56 Under the 10th EDF (2008-13) €645 million has been allocated to the four RECs of the ESAIO region. In 2010, the EU signed project financing agreements totalling €118 million to support regional economic integration and development projects.

57 Regional Economic Integration: supporting regional integration processes, trade related assistance, private sector development in order to deepen regional integration and enhance trade (85 per cent of the allocation - €548 million). Regional Political Integration: supporting activities in the areas of peace and security, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, while also touching upon security issues (piracy) and governance (electoral processes) (10 per cent of the allocation - €64 million).

58 Priority projects have been identified, with costs totalling approximately €5.4 billion including: four ring roads, forming part of the ring corridor; four energy links; four renewable energy projects; six water/food security projects.


60 Mainly used to finance African training centres and develop strategic transport capabilities within the AU.

Publicly, both the AU and IGAD have welcomed EU’s stepped up engagement in the Horn of Africa, as testified by the adoption of the Strategic Framework and the appointment of an EUSR for the Horn of Africa. Officials in Brussels commented on the positive effect the document has had on relations with the AU and the region, ‘Member states see that we take the region seriously, that through our commitments the region is shown to be geo-strategically important to EU.’ For example, the EUSR has already been to Asmara and had positive dialogue with Isaias Afewerki and there has been mention that the EU’s framework for the region could potentially have a knock on effect within the AU, leading them to adopt a similar framework for a common approach for their action in the region.

However, interviews with AU and EU delegation officials made it clear that the AU currently feels left out of the analysis and decision making process that feeds into areas of the JAES, and that those decisions are taken in Brussels. In instances of truly joint-ownership, success would be higher where ‘agreements resulting from honest dialogue trickle down and engender good working relationships among civil servants on both sides.’ The current structure, where before serious consultation with African partners is had, decisions that affect the continent are made in Brussels and ratified by its own member states, is not based on joint decision-making. This should be changed.

Political dialogue between the EU and its Horn of Africa partners is the key to a successful implementation of the Strategic Framework. Such a dialogue must rely on mutual interests in order to foster ownership of the strategy by those member states. The EU works on the assumption that the best structures for regional engagement in Africa are the RECs. As such, despite the challenges IGAD faces it has a potentially important role to play in the region. The EU could facilitate this role by engaging further in the process of building their internal capacity. This point is echoed by Alex Rondos, ‘One of my conclusions reached after my first few months is that actually we need as EU to engage more with IGAD and help give them more capacity. This is the sum of how you build up security. You have ECOWAS in the west and you have the East African Community. IGAD should begin to play that role in that part of the Horn. I think there is ample room to do more and for the countries to pitch in and accept a wider role.’

62 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
63 Ibid.
64 Interviews with AU officials and EU delegation officials, August 2012.
65 Interview with Alex Rondos, before House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs (Sub-Committee C) Inquiry on Combating Somali Piracy: The EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, Thursday 21 June 2012.
4. **RONDOS AND THE EUSRS; BRUSSELS DGS AND THE DELEGATIONS**

With the adoption of a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa the EU has recognized that to render its engagement more effective it must pursue a comprehensive and coordinated approach that addresses the region’s interlocked challenges. A coherent approach is in the interest of all stakeholders interested in the region and helps to minimize the risk of overlapping and confused policies and instruments. In this fashion the EU appointed an EUSR for the Horn of Africa who’s aim is to contribute to developing and implementing a coherent, effective and balanced EU approach to the region ‘encompassing all strands of EU action, with, in the first instance, a focus on Somalia and piracy.’

4.1 **EUSR for the Horn of Africa**

Initially appointed on a six month mandate on January 2012, this was extended in July for one year on a rolling basis subsequent to review. The EUSR for the Horn of Africa’s reports directly to the HR/VP, Catherine Ashton and also maintains close relations with the Political and Security Committee (PSC). He has good interface with the EEAS in Brussels where he has an office in the Africa Department, located next to the Horn of Africa section.

There seems to be consensus among member states, as well as officials interviewed for this study, on the need for an EUSR for the Horn of Africa, to play an important coordinating role and as a political face for the EU’s instruments and action in the region. There is positivity around the appointment of Alexander Rondos, a Greek national, who brings to the role considerable experience of the region in the world of development and emergency relief, as well as politics.

As the EU’s political envoy for the region, Mr Rondos will spend at least half of his time there. He has already been noticed in Somalia having spent time there during the lead up to the September 2012 Presidential elections. Although he is not in charge of the EU’s interventions in the Horn of Africa, nor able to take a position on finances, he can make recommendations and his role helps to federate the different strands of the EU action (including DEVCO and the EEAS). The other half of the EUSR’s time is spent in Europe reporting progress and lobbying to ensure continued member state engagement, support and endorsement for the EU’s activities in the region.

The EUSR has the freedom to travel between EU delegations in the region and has recently had a budget approved for a small representative office in Mogadishu. His insistence on ‘flying the flag’ in Somalia, facilitated by the improved security situation in the capital, indicates the EU understands the need to shift the centre of their policy engagement to the Somali capital. The office will contain two or three people operating ‘with the system in Somalia as well as working with AMISOM’.

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67 Unfortunately, EUSR Alex Rondos was unavailable for direct comment.

68 ‘The support I need is more the access to be able to talk at the right levels in the member states so that everyone understands what it is I think needs to be done and what my recommendations are.’ See Interview with Alex Rondos, before House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs (Sub-Committee C) *Inquiry on Combating Somali Piracy: The EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta*, Thursday 21 June 2012.

69 Ibid.
4.1.1 Other international actors

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran as well as multilateral fora such as the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) all have representatives in Mogadishu. The EUSR’s presence there will improve his ability to establish, or enhance coordination between Somalia’s international partners, particularly non-traditional partners outside the ‘Western’ fold. The issue of access and being able to lobby key international actors at the right level is critical to enhancing the coherence, quality, impact and visibility of the EU’s actions on the Horn of Africa. Alex Rondos has already travelled beyond the immediate region to the Gulf. He has been engaged in discussions with the United Arab Emirates on a broad spectrum of regional interests including counter-piracy, with the possibility of joint action on capacity building related to EUCAP Nestor. It is important that the EUSR is not constrained by the immediate geography of the region and that he interacts with countries such as Egypt and Yemen.

The need for rejuvenated dialogue with other international actors is important. Africa’s geopolitical importance is growing, as indicated by the interest of emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China on the continent.70 The economic crisis in Europe might reduce member states’ capacities for influence in the region, which makes collective representation, ‘speaking with one voice,’ under the EU more important. This is especially true in the Horn of Africa where relations are based on strong bilateral relations with European countries. Despite the EU’s contribution to development and humanitarian assistance in the region, being allied to US anti-terror policies has fostered the perception of a lack of credibility.

One of the EUSR’s main focuses is the underlying challenges of the region and how the EU makes complementary use of its instruments, while re-enforcing their political co-ordination. He is able to flesh out the broad Strategic Framework (a guideline agreed upon by member states) with specific actions, in the form of sub-strategies and annual Action Plans for the region.71 There are three Action Plans in the pipeline for 2012, including the SHARE initiative, launched jointly by ECHO and DEVCO to support drought and food resilience (Section 2.1).72 Alex Rondos is also working on framing a response to regional security ‘thinking of how we build an architecture for security so these countries find ways of avoiding conflict with each other.’73

4.2 Relations with other EUSRs

There are currently ten EUSRs working to promote the EU’s policies and interests in different areas of the world.74 Three of them work on Africa, and of those, all three have a presence in the Horn of Africa. Alex Rondos’ mandate is supposed to see him coordinate closely with the EUSR for Sudan and South

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70 South Africa is also a recent addition to the group of BRIC nations, which also includes Russia.
71 These are subject to subsequent decisions by the Commission, Council and member states.
72 The other Action Plans are on counter-terrorism and piracy. Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
73 Interview with Alex Rondos, before House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs (Sub-Committee C) Inquiry on Combating Somali Piracy: The EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta, Thursday 21 June 2012.
Sudan, Rosalind Marsden, as well as Gary Quince, the EUSR to the AU, based in Addis Ababa. He will also have to work with Stavros Lambrinidis, the recently appointed EUSR for Human Rights, whose mandate will include work affecting the region, and is explored further in Section 5.

Concerns have been raised by member states that the EUSRs for the Horn of Africa and Sudan and South Sudan could have overlapping roles. Where Rosalind Marsden focuses on the mediation efforts between Sudan and South Sudan, including the Lord’s Resistance Army, Alex Rondos is responsible for Somalia, piracy and the larger regional picture. In the short term there is a clear need for the EU to maintain separate intensive engagement on Sudan and South Sudan, given the recent tensions and outstanding issues of conflict, security, border demarcation and oil revenues between the two nations. During interviews, EU officials commented on there being little overlap between the two roles and early indications are that the two EUSRs have developed a good working relationship.75

The EUSR to the AU is able to work closely with both EUSRs on issues related to the Horn of Africa within the AU. Mediations between Sudan and South Sudan by the AUHIP, led by Thabo Mbeki, have been ongoing at the AU in recent months, as have discussions over the political future of Somalia in the lead up to the expiration of the Transitional Federal Governments (TFG) mandate in August 2012. With unfettered access to the AU, Gary Quince is in a unique position to engage with and assist the geographical EUSRs through the EU delegation to the AU.76

There has also been some concern over Alex Rondos duplicating the efforts of the EU Representative for Somalia. Belgian, George-Marc André serves as the head of the EU delegation to Somalia, based in Nairobi. He is engaged as a traditional civil service diplomat in charge of administrating and managing the EU’s development intervention in Somalia. The role played by the Representative allows the EUSR to be more of a free-ranging political actor devoid of the administrative and financial responsibilities of running a delegation.

An important point to make is that there are plans in the pipeline. Where the EU is engaged in mediation and social reconstruction, such as Sudan and Somalia, this will take time and a patient approach is required. Efforts towards diplomatic progress are not always visible. The creation of the EEAS has enabled the EU to better put its collective resources into practice. The Strategic Framework has evolved out of a series of strands, but the goal is that it becomes ‘more than a sum of its parts’ where there is strategic planning and an understanding of what the EU wants to achieve in the region, in the medium to long term.77

75 Interviews with EU officials in Brussels and in the EU delegation officials, August 2012.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
5. THE EU’S PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONDITIONALITY

The promotion of democracy and human rights has become one of the sharpest debates around relations between the EU and African states. The relationship has expanded from a primarily economic relationship to one that addresses political issues.

The Lisbon Treaty provides the principal framework governing the EU’s relations with the rest of the world and reaffirms the EU’s determination to promote and protect EU values such as human rights and democracy through all its external actions.78 In terms of the ACP-EU relationship, Article 9 of the Cotonou defines as ‘essential’ respect for human rights, adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law.79 They are also acknowledged as common value for the vision of development echoed in the JAES, with these issues integrated into Country Strategy Papers (CSP), dialogues and all relevant external assistance instruments.80

The EU has, therefore, fully embraced human rights, democratic principles and good governance as the norm in international development, and a tool to foster the growth of its relationships with African states. As a method of conditionality it will only be effective if employed consistently and effectively by the EU. The variable nature of democracy and good governance is beyond the scope of this study; however, these values compete with other EU and member state goals, making conditionality less effective. As such, the EU’s application of conditionality has been, and will continue to be inconsistent and the potential for conditionality policies will stay limited.

The conditionality of development assistance is an attempt to use aid to incentivise African states to reform their institutions and policies. Breaches of the crucial elements of Article 9 of the Cotonou can lead to the suspension of agreements under Articles 96 and 97. If African states fail to adhere to democratic principles, the EU has the power to suspend aid after an enquiry. The Articles define ‘cases of flagrant violation’ and ‘appropriate measures’ which must be taken proportional to violations.81 The main reasons for sanctions under Article 96 are coups d’état, flawed or non-transparent electoral processes and violations of democratic principles; under Article 97 it is cases related to ‘corruption’ or good governance.82

5.1 Application of conditionality to the Horn of Africa

If the goal of conditionality is to provide incentive for reform and correct the violations of states then it is important to examine the EU’s practice in the Horn of Africa, one of the most turbulent areas in the world.

Authoritarian regimes, of which there are plenty in the region, are likely to resist the conditions of the EU where they are attached to shared values. Sudan, whose leader President Bashir has been indicted

81 Cotonou Agreement: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/agr01_en.pdf
82 Ibid.
by the ICC, has refused to ratify the Cotonou. This is due to a clause in the agreement that requires steps towards implementing the Rome Statute - the treaty that established the ICC. As Cotonou provides the legal framework for relations between the EU and ACP states, non-ratification prevents the EC from implementing bilateral development assistance to Sudan under the 10th EDF. However, EU humanitarian assistance has grown during this period due to the 2011 drought and the fall out of conflict in border areas. Support for AMIS in Darfur and mediation efforts between the Sudans have continued. Funds have been distributed under other instruments, such as the IfS and EIDHR, in order to assist implementation of the CPA and foster development and democratic transformation across Sudan. Clearly then, effective aid suspension has not been implemented meaning there has been no real incentive for Sudan to comply with the EU’s requests. Positive changes in the respect of human rights and good governance and have not been apparent in Sudan.

If the EU is to be credible in its external human rights policy, it must ‘be exemplary in ensuring respect for human rights’ in its domestic affairs. Double standards undermine cooperation with states in the Horn of Africa. Suspending aid to a state, ‘while at the same time supporting it in other ways, such as through trade, will not make aid suspension effective.”83 Making agreements in other areas will only serve to contradict the EU’s moral stance, further undermining the value of conditionality.

Other governments, especially Russia and China, will be swift to point to the EU’s own human rights failings. The emergence of ‘non-traditional’84 donors in the Horn of Africa such as China has led to changes in the structuring of aid. Especially noticeable is the fact that the EU has introduced less conditionality instead of a previous approach towards positive conditionality, or ‘more for more.”85 This is a reaction against China’s respect for sovereignty/no strings attached aid that makes EU conditionality and aid suspension in the region less effective.

As noted, the EU has most consistently applied conditionality in Africa after coups d’etat and not so where deteriorations of democratic governance and human rights violations occur. The EU is more likely to turn a blind eye towards certain countries governance and human rights records where these are trumped by their own strategic interests – such as security and trade. The EU’s overarching external relations goal of poverty reduction might also conflict with democratization.86 Seemingly the EU is confronted with a dilemma in such countries, as the following example of Ethiopia demonstrates.

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84 ‘Non-traditional’ refers to non-Western. China, for example, has a long history on the continent.
85 As pointed out in the EU Guidelines for Accra in 2008, “The EU is convinced that conditionality must be reformed in order to give partner countries the necessary sovereignty on their development strategies….Imposed conditions should be avoided.” Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines for Accra; 2-4 September 2008.
Box 6: Governance – principle versus practicality in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the EU’s largest recipients of EDF funding for ACP countries. Current EDF bilateral support allocates €49 million towards strengthening democratic governance: including €29 for capacity-building in key institutions, and €10 million for developing the dialogue between state and NSAs with a view to creating an open, democratic and participatory society. However, political space has been restricted since a crackdown on the political opposition following heavily contested elections in 2005.

In the 2010 elections, opposition parties had their appeals rejected after results saw their representation reduced to just 3 of 547 parliamentary seats. The restriction of political and civil rights after 2005 explains the miniscule gains of the opposition. The EU Election Observation Mission noted that there was a lack of transparency in the process, a lack of a level playing field and a narrowing of political space. Despite the fact that both national elections were flawed the EU did not invoke Cotonou Article 96. Budget support was suspended for a year in 2005 but has continued since despite deterioration in Ethiopia’s record since, especially through restrictions on the media and NGOs.

The EU sees Ethiopia as an important and growing regional power. The EU strategy in Ethiopia goes beyond development assistance and crisis management. They have built a strong partnership based on commercial links and state support. Ethiopia’s economic growth and its performance towards the MDGs are impressive. This is reflected in the ‘humanitarian dilemma’ that exists where donors continue programmes because they are well run and because suspending them would have worse consequences for the population.

Addis Ababa is also the home of the AU, and the EU’s main delegation in the region. The EU and its international partners rely on Ethiopia as a strategic ally in the securitisation of the region, on issues such as counter-terrorism and peace and security in Somalia. This makes it difficult to see the EU enforcing conditionality, or anything other than quiet diplomacy, in attempts to encourage Ethiopia to further human rights or democratization.

Practically speaking the human rights and democratization agenda will continue to gain very little traction in the Horn of Africa. Emerging out of post-conflict scenarios, Somalia and South Sudan offer the most fertile ground for the EU’s new policies and initiatives. However, human rights violations will continue in the region, as will lip-service towards democracy - and there is no doubt so will the EU’s preference for engagement and influence over conditionality and sanctions.

87 The largest in the Horn of Africa with €644 million under the 10th EDF (2008-2013).
88 €10 is also provided for promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment and rights. See Ethiopia-EC Country strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013: http://ec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/scanned_et_csp10_en.pdf
5.2 Forging ahead with an agenda for change

The EU continues to move ahead with its democratization and human rights agenda, embedding it into development assistance, planning new instruments such as the EED and in June 2012 adopting a Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. The new human rights strategy is strong in aspiration and according to the EU represents ‘a watershed in EU policymaking.’ This is the first time that a unified strategic document has been adopted with Action Plans for its implementation. As such it shows the EU attempting to deliver on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty regional agreements such as Cotonou. The EU has a long catalogue of statements on human rights and democracy, but these have tended to focus on particular issues or countries. It is notable that the Framework does not set priorities for individual countries or regions. Some of the Human Rights Framework’s central elements need further development. The distribution of the various tasks within EU institutions, and between the EU and member states, is not very clear. The objectives and ambitions in the Action Plan need more specific actions to be detailed.

In an identical process to the Strategic Framework on the Horn of Africa, the new human rights strategy also comes with its own EUSR, Stavros Lambrinidis, charged with implementing and enhancing the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy. He will work closely with the EEAS, who prepared the Framework, along with the Commission and EU member states; jointly responsible for its implementation. This is the first thematic mandate given to an EUSR. The dual approach should complement and bring coherence to the work undertaken by Alex Rondos on the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.

Human rights country strategies are being developed which on a positive note, could lead to greater synergies between EU human rights and development action. This has implications for countries in the Horn of Africa as the EU looks to deepen bilateral political dialogue and focus its funding instruments with greater regard for human rights issues. Kenya offers the best test-case for EUSR Lambrinidis to lay down a marker on human rights, and should be a priority country in a region which otherwise offers little traction for the human rights agenda. South Sudan and Somalia also present opportunities for engagement. As previously mentioned, the EU’s policy of ‘more for more’ with regard to democratic and human rights reform is likely to be tested in the Horn of Africa, and successful implementation and enforcement will be the true measure of the new approach.

5.3 EED and its applicability to the Horn of Africa

The EED is envisioned as an autonomous international trust fund for the purpose of giving financial help to support democratisation in partnership with civil society. The statutes for this new body were published in June 2012, although its operational details, including its location (within an EU member state) and budgetary decisions are yet to be announced.

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94 Ibid.
The EU has been discussing the establishment of an EED since 2011, when it was proposed under the Polish Presidency in response to developments in Belarus, and subsequently the Arab Spring. EU member states agreed on a political declaration supporting the EED’s inception in December 2011 and Catherine Ashton offered her support, despite the details of budget, geographical reach and funding regulations having yet to be clarified.

The EED would be a non-partisan grant making instrument to assist local democratic movements, NGOs, and individuals who work towards encouraging ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ consistent with EU policies. The intention is to create a dynamic structure with low operational costs, where decisions are implemented flexibly and rapidly. The fund could be financed partly by the European budget, but would rely on voluntary contributions from EU member states. Its establishment has been delayed and doubts remain over the level of support from member states and EU institutions due in part to concerns over political sensitivities and risks to other areas of engagement. A lack of serious funding from member states would imply that the EU is not serious about democracy.

In principle, the EED would seem to be applicable to the Horn of Africa, with its focus on transition counties and societies struggling to achieve democratization. There is certainly much need for support for burgeoning democratic movements in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. As well as countries in transition, EED support could target ‘closed’ countries such as Eritrea and should operate where there is the greatest leverage on recipient country and opportunity for impact.

Other tools such as the EIDHR (section 5) are close in scope to the EED, but more inflexible in terms of budgeting and programming. The EED could be used to launch projects that could later be taken on by the EIDHR with a more long-term support for reform and democratization. This would create complementary instruments with sustainability of projects in the longer term.

The EED will have little value if it does not fund what might be seen by the regions governments as controversial NSAs, unlike existing EU funding instruments. Political opposition parties require support as democracy’s ‘weakest link.’ Opposition parties in authoritarian countries are very weak – they are stifled, co-opted and have little chance of making inroads during elections.

Post-conflict countries such as South Sudan and Somalia bring additional complexities, but EU leverage in these countries is greater. This offers opportunities for the EED to make a contribution to supporting wider civil society and encourage the spread of political action through charities, the media, universities, think tanks and trade unions, as well as those that are often underrepresented in existing arrangements, such as dissidents, local activists, journalists, and bloggers and diaspora organisations.

Will the resources allocated under the EU budget be sufficient to realise all of these new commitments? Probably not. Also, not many leaderships in the Horn of Africa are likely to respond kindly to the EED. Former rebels who develop political parties in power may be reluctant to give space to political opposition and genuinely democratic systems. There is always a conflict of interest between survival

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 A fund of around €100m per year in envisioned, with the majority coming from member states. Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
and reform because the latter implies a dispersing political power currently held. This will pose a serious problem to the EU in terms of accessing civil society and could lead to further restrictions on freedoms and political space. No matter how separate the EED is from the EU’s budget, it is unlikely to insulate the EU and its member states from criticism over interference in their countries affairs. And direct EU support for such EED is seemingly at odds with the strategic security and trade relationships the EU has with certain countries in the Horn of Africa.

The greatest effects of the EED would come where governments are willing to institute reforms in key legislation and procedures (e.g. electoral code or political party laws). In the Horn of Africa support for opposition parties and civil society is not commonplace; a similar fund proposed in the AU would likely have little traction with the majority of African member states.

**Box 7: Kenya – a Test Case for Democracy**

Kenya might be one country in the Horn of Africa where some progress could be made promoting democratic values because of the vibrancy of civil society, the heavy presence of the international community in Nairobi, and the willingness not to repeat the violence resulting from the 2007 elections in 2013. The EU has worked hard to promote human rights, democracy and good governance in Kenya and seen its efforts undermined. Kenya could be a testing ground for the EED and the EU’s capacity to export democracy and human rights - the outcome of the next elections will be key to seeing whether such an opportunity exists.

**5.4 The role of diasporas in the stability and prosperity of the Horn of Africa**

EU policy makers continue to wrestle with the best way to tap into the potential of the diaspora from countries in the Horn of Africa. The Strategic Framework mentions involving them as a ‘positive resource to achieve its objective.’ Their access in both host and home countries gives them the potential to be interlocutors, especially for promoting peace in fragile states which is an important basis for engagement for the EU.

The fact that many in the diaspora are involved with CSOs promoting development back home, gives them the potential to act as mediators and transmitters of values like pluralism. Moreover, the commitment of certain diaspora, willingness to remain engaged, skills that they offer, and desire to be part of a possible future solution remains a real reason for hope in countries such as Somalia. Diasporas from the Horn of Africa are not homogenous, so an understanding of the actors should form the basis of any EU engagement. Differences exist between diasporas within the region (such as the

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103 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.


105 In areas such as education, healthcare, public infrastructure and private enterprise as well as post-conflict reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance to relatives and communities.


Somali community in Kenya) and those outside it (such as in the EU and the US) as well as within these communities. Many of the most vocal groups in the Eritrean, Ethiopian, Ugandan and Sudanese diasporas are opposed to the government back home. A Somali diaspora consultation at Chatham House in London in February 2012 was an excellent example of how difficult it is for people to agree on a way forward – clan interests, the status of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, and suspicions about certain political actors dominated the discussion, making debates on political solutions or security highly contentious. In order for the EU to engage with the diaspora on a political level it should work with and draw lessons from European member states that have the heaviest concentrations of people from the region and who have built up experience of community outreach.\textsuperscript{108}

What is clear is that region’s diaspora is immensely important to the country’s survival. For example, up to 1.5 million Somalis live abroad, and remittances are estimated at $1.3bn-$2bn a year.\textsuperscript{109} The optimal role for the diaspora in the political future of home countries is less clear. Diaspora groups are not apolitical: efforts towards peace-building require local legitimacy and bringing to the table specific skills or resources. If local sensitivities are not accounted for, the diaspora can add to conflict and they should not be involved at the expense of suitable local actors.\textsuperscript{110} The Somali diaspora is highly engaged in funding and representation in politics at home. President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Prime Minister Mohamed Abdiwelli Ali are both diaspora returnees. Politicians from the diaspora risk being seen as not genuinely dedicated to their home countries. For example, many still have their families living abroad.

The EU is in a unique position build on diaspora groups’ existing areas of work, fostering engagement through instruments such as the EED and IfS, and also by linking them at a regional level through IGAD and the AU. There is an explicit need for diasporas to be involved in decision-making, such as being part of civil society steering-groups on peace-building at the national and regional level. EU delegations have a role to play by strategically engaging diaspora-based groups on the ground into their consultations.

Laura Hammond’s paper \textit{Cash and Compassion} points to several areas where the EU could have success engaging diasporas from the region.\textsuperscript{111} The most salient are: taking the lead in facilitating successful contributions by the diaspora, for example by providing matching funds to complement diaspora supported activities; or by supporting return programs, allowing diaspora members to contribute their expertise to the betterment of their country. A key caveat here is the importance of long-term commitments and resources, otherwise there is a risk of undermining locally built initiatives.\textsuperscript{112} Diaspora members should also have a role in agenda setting, knowledge creation, analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation of development and peace-building engagements.\textsuperscript{113}

It must be noted that there is a limited direct role for the EU in these processes, without the risk of adding to existing resentment towards the international community for being interventionist. Too much international support for the diaspora's peace-building work, before it is considered legitimate by locals, could overturn their efforts.

\textsuperscript{108} The Nordic countries, The Netherlands, Italy and the UK are good examples.
\textsuperscript{111} Hammond, L. et al. (2011) \textit{Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building}, UNDP.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. p. 98-100.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
6. **CFSP IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

The stability of the Horn of Africa is of major strategic importance to the EU, as cross border dynamics in particular (for example, illegal migration and refugee flows, trafficking in arms and drugs, and terrorism) can reach far beyond the immediate neighbourhood and can even pose a threat to European security.

As the EU is not only the major trading partner but also the most important development partner for the countries in the region, the Strategic Framework points towards economic interests that underline its engagement. While recognizing the regional interconnectedness of most conflicts in the Horn, it particularly emphasizes the need to tackle the Somali crisis. Along with its humanitarian, developmental and political engagement, the EU has steadily been placing more and more emphasis on engagement by military means, directly and indirectly.

As part of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, the EU aims to bring coherence to the different CFSP operations in the region. The EUSR is charged with bringing unity and balance to the EU’s security responses, especially on piracy, which has its root causes in the instability of Somalia.

At the operational level, EU institutions are learning comprehensiveness ‘by doing’ and have had to cope with the institutional instability caused by the creation and setting up of the EEAS. Cohesion of CSDP actions on Somalia is even more of a challenge given the complexity of the security issue in Somalia stretches beyond piracy, and especially as counter-piracy policies do not only concern the EU.

### 6.1 CSDP operations

Under the umbrella of its CSDP, the EU is currently conducting three military operations targeting the Somali region: European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) – Operation Atalanta, which fights piracy off the Somali coast; European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), which contributes to the training of Somali security forces; and the European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), launched in July 2012 to strengthen maritime capacity building in the region (RMCB). A brief analysis of each of these missions is provided below.

#### 6.1.1 EUNAVFOR – Operation Atalanta

EUNAVFOR was launched as a response to the increasing challenge of piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2008, particularly because of its negative effects on humanitarian efforts and maritime traffic in the region. In all EU military operations, responsibility lies with the Council while the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction. The mission is funded via the Athena mechanism with a budget of €8.6 million for the year 2012 covering the costs for the operational and force headquarters, as well as medical services and transport. Contributing member states bear the cost of the resources they deploy.

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114 Interview with EU delegation official, August 2012.
115 The EU also recently launched European Union Aviation Mission in South Sudan (EUVASEC), a civilian CSDP mission to strengthen the capacity of Juba International Airport.
116 Mission costs were €8.4 million for 2010 and €8.05 million for 2011.
117 Operation Headquarters are in Northwood (United Kingdom). Operation Commander is Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, UK Royal Navy.
They are not public, but one report puts combined EU member states costs for EUNAVFOR at €1.5 billion per year. The current mandate was renewed in 2012 until December 2014, and the area of operation extended to include Somali coastal areas as well as internal and territorial waters, in order to disrupt pirate logistic dumps on Somali shores.

It must be recognised that piracy is a symptom of political instability in Somalia, not a cause, and only by working to improve stability, security and governance structures in the country will a solution to the problem be found. There is compliance, but very little traction politically among states in the Horn of Africa on piracy. It is not prioritised among their concerns.

At the same time the EU should continue to assist Atalanta through direct measures that dissuade piracy. This could be done by working towards stopping the current catch and release practice, putting more emphasis on supporting the judicial and detention capacities of local administrations, and disabling pirates’ capacities on-shore. More needs to be done to track financial flows and prosecuting investors in Somalia and elsewhere. The EU should actively address concerns of Somali coastal communities with regard to illegal fishing and waste dumping, and react towards their fears that their livelihoods may be endangered.

6.1.2 EUTM

Since 2010 EUTM has contributed to the reform of the Somali security sector through training and support for Somali forces in Uganda. In accordance with its mandate, the EUTM Somalia will end in December 2012. It currently has an operational budget of €4.8 million, for 15 months from August 2011 until 31 October 2012. By the end of the fourth intake it will have trained almost 3,000 recruits. The impact that will have on the Somali National Security Force (SNSF) is unclear, although it is hoped to aid command and control structures through properly trained officers. The mission is part of a wider international effort consisting of the vetting of trainees, training and monitoring of the forces once back in Somalia, as well as the funding and payment of salaries. It is executed in close coordination with the TFG, Uganda, AU, UN and the US. Uganda provides basic training and European instructors teach special skills. The US adds to financial assistance, logistical and technical support and supports the recruitment process of the TFG in Mogadishu. AMISOM soldiers carry the responsibility for reintegrating

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118 In the case of Germany this amounted to €59.1 million in 2009 and €65 million in 2010. See Deutscher Bundestag (2011) Antwort der Bundesregierung vom auf die Kleine Anfrage von Abgeordneten und der Fraktion der SPD, 01.08.2011; Drucksache 17/6715: p. 12.

119 Also noted was the fact that piracy attacks had not been successful on ships that followed the guidelines on how to avoid piracy. See Holzer, G. And Jurgenliemk, H. (2012) The Somali Crisis and the EU: Moving onshore and committing to Somalia, GGI Analysis Paper; 5/2012.

120 Typically, EUNAVFOR consists of four to seven surface combat vessels, one or two auxiliary ships and two or three Military Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. These are deployed in the area of operation that covers about the size of the EU. The area comprises the South of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles.


122 Official troop figures are about ten thousand but in reality there are closer to five thousand Somali troops.

123 Such as infantry techniques (Ireland), urban warfare (Portugal), and communications (Germany). The training also covers international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as the protection of civilians, including specific protection needs of women and children.
soldiers into the SNSF over a period of three months. EUTM eases AMISOM’s training burden, freeing resources for its counter-insurgency efforts.\(^{124}\)

EUTM can be regarded as a success in that it has integrated the efforts of a diverse set of actors to train the forces of the TFG and the training of forces has been efficient. However, there have been problems with EUTM, none more so than its deployment in Uganda and not Somalia. The EU has no means to validate the integration of trained soldiers back into the SNSF. Although significant efforts have gone into the selection of candidates from across clans, defection has been an issue of contention. Linked to this, regular and sufficient payment of soldiers has been a problem for the TFG with some soldiers turning to al Shabaab due to more regular payment and AMISOM troops receiving far larger wages.

The concept of building a SNSF, not a force loyal to the TFG is also important. It is hoped that the end of the current transition and formation government in August 2012, may provide for a nationalisation of trainees that have been selected by and trained for the TFG. EUTM is a step in the right direction and directly supports the capacity of the SNSF but the operation has been largely symbolic. The EU and international community should continue and expand support for the development of SNSF within Somalia, including their command and control structure, beyond the end of its current 2012 mandate.

6.1.3 EUCAP Nestor

EUCAP Nestor could potentially become the instrument which gives cohesion to the security operations in the region. It aims to enhance the maritime capacities of initially five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean\(^{125}\) and strengthen the capacity of states in the region to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their ability to fight piracy. The new mission seeks to strengthen the sea-going maritime capacities of participating countries and build up the rule of law sector, initially in the Somali regions of Puntland, Galmudug and Somaliland, notably by supporting the development of a Coastal Police Force.

EUCAP Nestor is a civilian mission of 175 people augmented with military expertise. Training will take place both in the Djibouti Regional Training Centre as well as in the countries concerned.\(^{126}\) EUCAP Nestor links well with the MARSIC under the IfS (see Box 3, 2.2), which has addressed maritime capacity building needs in the Western Indian Ocean region, focusing on training and information sharing. Ultimately, the EUCAP Nestor mission is supposed to offer an exit strategy for operation Atalanta through the gradual take-over of the responsibilities for maritime security by regional states themselves. This is important as political willingness for EUNAVFOR to remain a ‘playground for unemployed navies’ will not last in the current austere financial climate.\(^{127}\) Capacity building takes time and given the enduring nature of piracy threats, it will take much longer to develop than the initial two year mandate provided. It will also require much more than the €22 million funding currently allocated and will need support from other international actors with an interest in the regions maritime security,


\(^{125}\) Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles and Somalia, with plans to extend into Tanzania.

\(^{126}\) Activities will include expert advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security; coast guard training to develop the ability to enforce law on the sea; and procurement of the necessary equipment.

such as UAE.\textsuperscript{128} Building the capacity of five countries (that require ships) to do the job that the best navies in the world struggle to do seems ambitious.

By reinforcing the capacity of states in the region to effectively govern their territorial waters and acknowledging the need to shift resources away from a military-centric strategy, EUCAP Nestor is a step in the right direction towards more comprehensive engagement. However, again, piracy can only be tackled as part of a wider local engagement that addresses local needs in the development, security and governance sector. The resources spent by the EU patrolling the coast of the Horn of Africa are ‘ten times the amount spent on development and humanitarian aid.’\textsuperscript{129} Long term solutions can only be found by ensuring security for Somalis as well as focusing more on socio-economic development.

6.2 Coherence between CSDP operations

There has been very little complementarity between these CSDP activities until 2012. The launch of EUCAP Nestor marks a shift of resources away from military-centric strategy towards more strategic long-term planning in the region. In addition, to coordinate and increase synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa, an EU Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa was activated in March 2012. The Operations Centre provides direct support to the operations commander for the planning and conduct of the RMCB mission and facilitates coordination between EUTM and EUNAVFOR and their interaction with Brussels-based structures.

In the past, CSDP missions have suffered from being disconnected from other EU political and financial actions. The actions described above, as well as the gradual embedding of the EU’s military component within the EEAS will ensure that CSDP engagement in the region falls closer in line with existing activities. If the purpose of EU engagement is to build peace and improve lives, it is essential that these military activities are firmly linked to other activities supporting the security sector and development. In this regard, the coordination between the EEAS and the Commission regarding CSDP missions and development programmes needs improving due in part to ‘the lack of common direction at the strategic level.’ The increase in coordination of CSDP missions, facilitated partly by the political leadership of the new EUSR for the region, should result in better feedback to the political structures in Brussels and thus enable improved strategic planning for CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa. In future, the Strategic Framework will hopefully influence the planning process and development of operations and operational plans.

\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Alex Rondos, before House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs (Sub-Committee C) Inquiry on Combating Somali Piracy: The EU's Naval Operation Atalanta, 21 June 2012.

7. OPPORTUNITIES AND LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE SAHEL STRATEGY

Adoption of the Strategic Framework should open new opportunities for successful engagement in the Horn of Africa. As outlined in the previous sections, the EU and its member states are already undertaking a wide range of activities in the region, from humanitarian operations to capacity building of regional institutions, anti-piracy missions and military training. By providing an overarching set of principles for European engagement, the Strategic Framework offers the potential for the combined impact of member states and EU institutions to be harnessed and used to push for the EU’s goals in the region.

The prospect of more joined up action also offers the opportunity for the EU to be recognised in the region as an actor in its own right, and with the clout that the scale of EU investment should bring. Through the appointment of an EUSR for the Horn of Africa, the EU has the potential to speak more clearly with one voice in the region. Doing so would allow the EU to exploit more fully its comparative advantage in the region: as a bloc, it is one of the most significant sources of assistance and investment into the region, and an important trade partner.

More immediately, explored below are two examples where the Strategic Framework opens new opportunities to push for a shift, and more importantly an improvement, in regional dynamics. Without the coherence of a regional approach, both of these opportunities would be significantly narrowed.

Both of these cases are linked to Ethiopia and Eritrea. These two countries, and their unresolved conflict, are at the core of the region’s security dynamics. EU engagement with the Horn of Africa is clearly broader than this. The bloc’s activities in Somalia (on land and in terms of the anti-piracy operations) and in the Sudans are quite robust. The Strategic Framework offers less in terms of new opportunities on these fronts. However, the document adopted in November 2011 is notably quiet on issues related to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Hence, this report is focusing on areas where more could be done.

7.1 Ethiopia’s post–Meles transition

The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia on 20 August 2012 has provided perhaps the first unanticipated test case for the Strategic Framework. Although there had been rumours about the Prime Minister’s health for some time, it was not until his prolonged absence from office starting in late June that speculation on his departure from office really took off. Following Meles’s death, a political transition is now underway. Although power still rests with the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), it is far from assured that the succession process has been definitively settled. On September 20, Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Deselegn officially succeeded Meles as premier. This is significant, in two main aspects.

First, Hailemariam is not an ethnic Tigrayan, but rather represents a smaller ethnic group from southern Ethiopia, the Wolayta. His rise through the EPRDF’s ranks during the past five years has been quite dramatic. The EPRDF is in principle a multiethnic coalition, which rules under a system of ethnic federalism. This system represents an effort to address a perceived structural flaw under the imperial and socialist regimes which preceded the current dispensation; namely the perceived domination of ethnic Amhara among the ruling elite, and the attendant marginalisation of other ethnic groups. In practice, Meles’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has dominated the EPRDF, and largely controls the levers of state power. However, Hailemariam may represent an effort by the EPRDF to broaden its base beyond its historical constituencies. Hailemariam is also a Protestant, a group which has been
politically marginalised in Ethiopia, although its membership is growing rapidly. His accession to power can be seen as a blow to the Ethiopian Orthodox church.

Second, Hailemariam has no liberation struggle credentials. Since 2010, the EPRDF has been in the process of handing over key posts in government to a ‘new generation’ of politicians. Hailemariam’s appointment as Meles’s deputy and foreign minister was part of this transition; Hailemariam also holds the deputy leadership of the EPRDF. There was an open question as to whether Meles himself intended to step down as announced ahead of the 2015 elections. However, Hailemariam also represents a trend within the EPRDF to secure its continued domination of politics in Ethiopia by establishing the basis for succession within the party – outside the decisions of Meles himself to retire and appoint individuals; a party that cannot renew its leadership cannot survive in the medium-to-long term.

These two qualities make Hailemariam an interesting, but potentially divisive figure. His lack of liberation credentials is married necessarily with a less developed power base. Although no one within the EPRDF could match the position that Meles had achieved during his nearly three decades of leadership – first within the insurgency, and then in government – other figures will have more established positions of influence and greater resources at their disposal than the new premier. A succession battle is not inconceivable. Moreover, the EPRDF has not yet faced a significant crisis to test the cohesion of the new leadership arrangement. As such, there is the potential for an unstable transition.

Ethiopia’s geo-strategic position in the Horn of Africa makes the possibility of a leadership crisis all the more unsettling. A divided Ethiopian government would become more vulnerable to external destabilisation – for example, should Eritrea attempt to interfere more strongly, or make significant military movements near the border (although these remain low probability risks).

The Strategic Framework should enhance the ability of the EU and member states to work towards a common goal in supporting a stable transition, and in providing incentives for movement towards the good governance goals that the Strategic Framework outlines. Even without developing an Action Plan, there should be sufficient definition within the Strategic Framework on governance objectives for the EU to come to a common position, enabling coordination between member states and the EU to promote improvements in governance in Ethiopia, and to retain a key ally in the region.

In the near term, while the EPRDF continues to hold power, it seems certain that no politician within the party will be able to achieve as dominant a position within the elite as had Meles. This means that decision-making will be less efficient, as the new premier must answer to a number of stakeholders within the elite. Ethiopia’s leaders are likely to remain as reluctant in principle to accept external influence as ever. However, a less cohesive elite may not be able to dismiss the perspectives of key partners as readily as Meles appeared able to do.

The Strategic Framework creates the potential for a more unified EU approach, which would limit the Ethiopian government’s ability to exploit differences in Europe in order to pursue its own agenda. Given the scale of European assistance to Ethiopia, a cohesive approach could start to yield traction with Addis Ababa on a more parallel level.

7.2 Ethiopia–Eritrea

Following the end of open war in 2000, a stand-off over the implementation of the 2002 Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’s ruling has lasted more than a decade. International efforts to remain actively engaged with the issue tapered off around 2005.
During 2006, the border stand-off was overshadowed by events in Somalia, where the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) looked set to push out the internationally backed TFG. Ethiopia grew increasingly uncomfortable with the prospect of an openly Islamist administration in Mogadishu, and with the sidelining of its preferred leaders. Ethiopia’s unilateral invasion to install the TFG in Mogadishu and disrupt the ICU was strongly opposed by Eritrea within the auspices of IGAD, and Asmara suspended its membership in the regional bloc in protest. Eritrea offered refuge to the ousted Islamist leaders, as well as others who had fallen out with the TFG, who set up in Asmara under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia.

During the next five years, Eritrea sought to counter Ethiopian interests in Somalia by assisting alternative movements, including individuals who would later become associated with Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahidin (HSM or al Shabaab), some of whom went on to defect to the TFG. During the period of Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia, from the start of 2007 until early 2009, Ethiopia-Eritrean relations reached a new nadir. However, neither side re-ignited the conflict. Instead, Ethiopia capitalised on Eritrea’s withdrawal from IGAD to pursue a policy of keeping Asmara isolated diplomatically – within the region, the AU and internationally. Addis Ababa successfully lobbied for UN sanctions as a result of Eritrean support for armed movements in Somalia, which since late 2009 have targeted senior government figures.

However, for most of the past three years, Asmara has been attempting to break out of its isolation, and better engage with its neighbours and key international powers. It restored its delegation to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa ahead of the January 2011 summit. An alleged plot by Eritrea to bomb that summit, which was included in a UN monitoring group report later in the year, as well as further allegations of support for al Shabaab in Somalia (Asmara’s support for Somalia actors has actually dropped off significantly) fed into pressure to tighten UN sanctions in late 2011. However, the Security Council’s additional measures were fairly minor and significantly did not target the country’s emerging mining sector, which has begun to generate revenues for the government.

The prospect of Eritrea breaking free of its isolation has been perceived as a threat in Addis Ababa. This probably fed into the decision in March to launch two airstrikes on alleged bases inside Eritrean territory. Notionally, the strikes were linked to a January attack by ethnic Afar gunmen on a tourist convoy in northern Ethiopia, near the Eritrean border. Ethiopia maintains that the gunmen were criminally motivated rebels sponsored by Eritrea, and that the airstrikes destroyed Eritrean training facilities. Importantly, Eritrea did not respond to the airstrikes with any retaliatory strikes of its own. Even its rhetorical response was fairly restrained.

As such, even before the momentous events of August, it had seemed that there was some potential for movement on the frozen conflict. The status quo appears to have been breaking up. Most likely, this trend will continue, and may even be intensified by the succession process in Ethiopia. Unfreezing of a conflict carries risks, certainly. However, both sides have powerful incentives to refrain from a return to open war. The prospective economic costs did not prevent the last war, but those costs would be much higher now. Moreover, elites in Ethiopia have benefited strongly from the rapid growth in the last eight years. In Asmara, a similar argument could be made, given that the economy is only just emerging from a decade of isolation and war-related economic costs.

With a change of leadership in Addis Ababa, the potential is even more significant that external engagement could prove useful in resolving the lingering hostilities, and promoting the re-opening of economic linkages that would be beneficial for both nations.

It appears that EUSR Rondos has already visited both capitals, as part of his opening round of diplomatic outreach in the region. The creation of the EUSR role creates an interesting opportunity for quiet
diplomacy between the two capitals, in a way that a high-profile international figure whose mandate was specifically linked to resolving the conflict has failed to do in the past. Notionally, Rondos’s agenda is dominated by Somalia and the anti-piracy agenda. This provides an opportunity for quiet engagement with both sides.

The fact that the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict – the core political and security fault-line in the region – received so little specific mention in the Strategic Framework document itself disguises the level of division between member states over the issue, and how best to approach it. However, if a common position can be achieved, and if the EUSR can be empowered to pursue it – two important variables – there is an opportunity to be grasped.

7.3 Lessons from the EU Sahel Strategy

The Horn of Africa Strategic Framework benefits from path setting by the EU’s first regional strategy – the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The Sahel strategy was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2011. It was drafted by the EEAS and was several years in the making. The desire to focus on the Sahel region grew during the 2008 French presidency when several member states and key individuals within EU institutions highlighted that the situation was declining. Under the 2009 Swedish presidency and 2010 Spanish presidencies, fact-finding missions were sent to Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Algeria. The findings from these were taken up in a joint paper by the Commission and the Council General Secretariat.

Due to continued kidnappings, the growth of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and wider unrest in the region, eight member states wrote to the HR/VP requesting the intensification of European engagement. The Foreign Affairs Council on 25 October 2010 agreed the need to establish a Sahel Strategy and a Sahel task force was set up led by the Director for West and Central Africa within the newly created EEAS in response. In early 2011 a draft of the Sahel strategy was discussed by ambassadors in the PSC and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, resulting in a shortening of the draft.

The Foreign Affairs Council on 21 March 2011 endorsed the Sahel strategy and invited the HR/VP and Commission to proceed with the implementation stage. A second round of missions visited the region to seek input for action.

The Sahel strategy advocates intensified engagement along four strategic lines of action: (i) development, good governance and internal conflict resolution; (ii) political and diplomatic action; (iii) security and rule of law; and (iv) the fight against violent extremism and radicalisation. The strategy also identifies Mauritania, Mali and Niger as the core Sahel countries and argues that lack of governmental capacity and systemic poverty are mutually reinforcing dynamics.

The strategy accurately identified many of the challenges affecting the region, but did not anticipate the implications of the Libya conflict in 2011 or how fragile Mali was in 2012 and its subsequent fragmentation. One senior EU official admitted, ‘the Sahel strategy has always been playing catch up to events.’

A study for the Parliament in December 2011 concluded that the strategy had assisted coordination towards a common strategy but that ‘effective implementation of this comprehensive vision is found

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130 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2012.
The overall thrust of the strategy is determined by the allocation of development funds and is premised on a synthesis of development objectives and security goals. In reality, this strategy is an amalgam of long-standing development goals of the Cotonou partnership; national and regional targets (CSPs, RSPs and RSPs RIPs); achieving the MDGs and the eight thematic partnerships of the JAES. In its embryonic stages, the same argument can be levelled at the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.

This development assistance needs to be complemented by investment in regional capacity building that, as shown by the Mali crisis, has limited response capacity. This includes a CSDP operation to assist the Malian military and reinforcing the EU partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Sahel. The small civilian CSDP mission in Niger is not an appropriate template for what is needed in Mali.

Following the Mali crisis, the limitations of the Sahel strategy’s geographical scope – focusing on Mauritania, Mali and Niger as core – has become evident. The crisis is clearly regional and North African countries such as Algeria play a pivotal role. The EEAS director for West and Central Africa currently coordinates the strategy, but the North Africa angle suggests that longer term, a wider strategy backed by a Special Representative might be helpful. In this regard, the EUSR for the Horn of Africa has an advantage. He should be encouraged to continue to engage with countries in the wider region including Egypt in the post-Mubarak era (crucially on issues such as water resource management), and those in the Arabian Peninsula such as Yemen and the Gulf states.

The Horn of Africa Strategic Framework and its supporting instruments might provide some useful insights on improving the Sahel strategy, including the need to consider supporting security capacity building efforts in Mali. As is the case with the Horn of Africa Strategic Framework, the Sahel strategy has helped frame a common EU strategic vision and provides a template from which to design future action. Despite its limitations, this would have been more difficult to achieve if an EU Sahel strategy had not existed.

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8. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Strategic Framework lays out five areas around which future engagement is intended to be framed:

I. Assist all countries in the region to build robust and accountable political structures, including civil and civic institutions, allowing the people of the Horn to express their legitimate political aspirations and ensure that their basic human rights and freedoms are respected;

II. Work with the countries of the region and with international organisations (especially the United Nations and African Union) to resolve current conflicts, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, and avoid future potential conflicts between or within countries;

III. Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, terrorism or irregular migration;

IV. Support efforts to promote the economic growth of all countries and people in the region, to enable them to reduce poverty, increase prosperity and enjoy not suffer from the benefits globalisation can bring; and

V. Support political and economic regional cooperation and bolster the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to tap into positive trends and developments across national borders.

The following recommendations represent an attempt to link the opportunities described in previous sections with the targeted areas of engagement laid out above.

8.1 Post–Meles transition in Ethiopia

The EU and member states have the opportunity to play an active role in promoting stability during the political transition underway in Ethiopia following the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on August 20. By engaging within the Strategic Framework, and by taking advantage of the single voice that EUSR Rondos can provide, the EU can also push in the near to medium term for more progress in Ethiopia on EU governance objectives in the region (as set out in point I above). Although the opportunities for real change are modest, there could be tangible gains on political freedoms and human rights in Ethiopia. Coordinated and coherent EU engagement could be a productive driver of such change.

8.2 Building the capacity and independence of IGAD

IGAD remains an under-developed instrument for the enhancement of regional cooperation, integration and security. Given the history of bilateral relations between its members, this is unsurprising. However, without a more effective regional organisation, there is little prospect of meaningful and durable improvements in terms of either security or integration. The future prosperity and development of the Horn of Africa hinge on improvements on both counts. Given a track record of domination by Ethiopian interests, it may be that the opportunity is available to push for IGAD’s independence, and to build its capacity. Ultimately, this cannot be achieved without buy-in from member states, which points to a long, slow process. However, if the EU is able to take advantage of the coherence offered by the Strategic Framework, if the role of the EUSR can be used to push this agenda with each member state, and if the EU can be the catalyst for other international partners providing
more long-term funding for IGAD’s capacity-building, then there is the possibility of improvement. The EU could usefully commission a study to assess IGAD’s current strengths and weaknesses as an initial step. Moreover, revitalising the IGAD Partners Forum -- both by ensuring it remains an active vehicle for enhancing the regional bloc, and by working to include the broad range of external states with active interests in the region (such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, India, Egypt and China) – could provide an opportunity for EU leadership in this process. The EUSR for the Horn should be the lead European voice within this forum. A more functional IGAD would promote all five areas of the EU agenda, as laid out above.

8.3 Quiet engagement on Ethiopia and Eritrea’s unresolved conflict

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is in some real senses the most important fault line in the region. Tensions stretch back decades, and the stand-off which has held for the past ten years has fed directly into instability in Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. Moreover, the closure of the border to economic activity has had and continues to exact significant negative consequences for both countries. The conflict is also holding up any meaningful chance of regional integration with the wider Horn of Africa. Although these factors appear to be well understood, the Strategic Framework is remarkably quiet on this issue. A more clear and unified effort from the EU to push both sides towards engagement could yield some important progress on this stalemate. The appointment of the EUSR for the Horn of Africa offers an interlocutor who can be seen as speaking for the bloc, and can make clear the incentives for cooperation that the EU can offer. Moreover, Meles’s death will change the dynamics of interactions between the two countries. Making progress on resolving this conflict would have important knock-on effects in the region – helping to address the EU’s goals in points II, IV and V above.

8.4 Lessons learned – working towards mutual interests

The flaws in the political dialogue and joint consultation with African partners described above should be addressed. The EEAS is preparing to conduct an annual review of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa that it will present to the Council in November 2012. As part of the EEAS’s review process it should consult diaspora groups in the EU on how they view the Strategic Framework. This in itself would be an educational process, allowing the EEAS to develop improved relations with European diaspora groups from the region and also spreading the reach and visibility of the Strategic Framework to civil society and people in the region who would otherwise never have heard about it.

The EU has a strategic partnership with the AU. Therefore, considering joint-way-forward processes with key REC partners on the continent would demonstrate a willingness to work towards mutual aspirations. In this regard, the European Parliament could also commission a study on the emergence of EU regional strategies and priorities and how they relate to the JAES in the run up to the 2014 EU-Africa summit to be held in Brussels. More specifically to the Horn, review of the Strategic Framework should be annual, along with bi-annual debate in the European Parliament.

We would recommend that the European Parliament ensure its findings from this, and any subsequent studies on the region are sent to the Pan-African Parliament, as well as the IGAD secretariat and national parliaments of the region. This would support the EU’s goals under point II and especially point V.
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