Meeting Summary

Population Growth and Demographic Trends: Implications for African States and Regions

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Given that I am speaking to migration specialists here, I would like to give a more general overview of key population trends. I will focus on the dynamics of population change and specifically focus on fertility and deaths which are the two fundamental components when speaking of population size. We already mentioned the growing African population and how we expect it to grow by 2050 and double from 1.1bn to 2.3bn, which will be the largest regional increase from a global perspective. Although migration plays an important part in this forecast, especially South-South migration, it is the balance between births and deaths and changing mortality rates that play a key role in influencing that figure. In particular, the average amount of children that a woman is expected to have over the time of her reproductive life, is projected to fall from 5.1 to 3.0.

First point is that this is completely uncertain – even today we observe in some African countries that the fertility is no longer declining. The other message is that although populations are growing, age structures are changing quite considerably. Something that we would associate with Africa – a very fertile population structure – for various reasons is now changing as we are now seeing progressive aging of African populations – more in some countries than in other. Between 2000 and 2050 the population aged over 60 increased by 50%. In terms of development and practice we are speaking of a completely different age structure in the future. In this context I would like to focus on fertility and then think about mortality, especially in the next 10 years.

When we think about Africa and its population change, we all think about the fertility transition – the transition from high to low levels of fertility that are associated with modernization, social development, etc. Africa lagged behind other regions of the world, but from the 1990s most countries in Africa were experiencing declining birth rates. This was linked to universal primary education, better health care resulting in falling infant and child mortality and real per capita income growth. A set of factors has contributed to this and certainly for those people interested in international development, this marked a turning point as low population growth and small family size is in some way connected to economic and social development. Than at the turn of the millennium there were several demographic and health surveys conveyed in 2005 and what happened was that this decline in fertility has actually stalled. Unlike in Asia, Europe and the USA we were seeing a decline in fall of fertility rates in some countries and complete stalling in others which was quite
significant observation. It showed that the trends from other countries are not necessarily being replicated in others. Especially in East Africa, Kenya and later in Ghana, research indicated a stalling in fertility rate. While trying to explain these developments a number of factors used previously to explain fall of fertility rate was used to explain the more current stalling of the fertility rate decline. For example in Kenya it could have been linked to faltering socio-economic growth in and around 2005, but a number of factors and variables has been explored. Suffice it to say that we are not seeing fertility decline as would be expected – what we are seeing are some of the highest fertility rates in the world. African countries take up most of the top 10 countries with highest fertility rates. So still very high levels of fertility and birth rates. And often these high birth rates are linked to the poorest households, in some countries both rural and urban.

As fertility rates remain high, we need to look at mortality levels. It is very difficult to generalize across the continent, so I refer to sub-Saharan Africa when speaking of Africa. Regarding African mortality we all know that we will miss the targets set up by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The best way to start is to look at life expectancy at birth. In the UK we are expected to live for 80 years, while the average for Africa is 58 years with such countries like Lesotho with 48 years. Some of you may be aware there is a contradiction between me telling you that the populations are getting older, while the life expectancy is so short. So another key issue that we need to focus on is that for the first time people in their older years are living longer than those being born. These are life expectancy at birth figures and mortality in certain countries is highest at birth and in early childhood, is higher during pregnancy – maternal mortality, and in some countries it is also high in reproductive age groups because of the HIV/AIDS. If you go beyond these figures, your life expectancy suddenly shoots up. So there are key hurdles that shape mortality rates and if you get to 50 your life expectancy could be somewhere in the 70s. Life expectancy at birth is calculated on the basis of your chances of living through the life course. Life expectancy of a 50 year old is greater because you have already overcome these barriers that depress the average among the infants and children. Infant mortality rates are higher in Africa than anywhere else – in DRC this is somewhere near 10%. Infant mortality in many cases is not related to the overall level of development. E.g. in Kenya public health initiatives have been significant in reducing infant mortality and particularly distributing mosquito nets has been significant in reducing these rates. If we get to child mortality, picture does not look rosier. Again, MDGs are most likely not to be met. So in the context of mortality the
first year of life and the first 5 years of life are crucial in determining people’s life chances.

Sub-Saharan Africa, globally, accounts for 56% of maternal deaths. Maternal mortality rate is considered high if three hundred women die per 100,000 births. Especially Southern Africa is linked to high levels of HIV/AIDS. Of all the maternal deaths associated with HIV/AIDS 91% are in sub-Saharan Africa. But beyond that many maternal deaths are avoidable – the third of all are caused by haemorrhaging, infections, and by obstructions during pregnancy and many of these deaths could actually be avoided. But what is surprising, also is that more developed African countries see no progress on maternal mortality and that is partly due to HIV/AIDS. We still have a long way to go.

68% of those living with HIV/AIDS live in sub-Saharan Africa. And while HIV prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa overall is not excessive, there are some countries like Swaziland where nearly 1/3 of all women aged 15-49 are HIV positive. In Botswana the figure was above 1/3 until fairly recently. So we see a decline but these are still very high rates.

Key issues relating to this and, I would argue that this is another key life hurdle or challenge, is that it is hyper endemic across Africa, which means that 10% of the population in reproductive age is HIV positive. And that profoundly changes the population structure. If AIDS hadn’t been present, there would another generation currently present on the continent. As it is we have an increasing number of elderly headed households, and a growing amount of child headed households – children were brought up by elderly grandparents which have died. And we have what you call skipped generation households – children living with elderly.

The final point is that we have seen the roll-out of antiretroviral drugs and increasing distribution of generic drugs. In countries like Botswana it is 80-90% of the population who has access to the drugs. What this means is that people affected by HIV are living longer. There is some very interesting work by Tony Barnett based in London about how the whole nature of the disease has changed from one where death is expected to HIV as a degenerative disease, so people can live a long time but there will be period of disability – ups and downs. So we will have to deal with a growing, elderly population of HIV positive people, who will require caring.

Last points, fertility transition across Africa is not uniform. In fact it stopped declining in some countries and that has implications for population growth rate and policy in practice. Life expectancy at birth is shaped by certain
important life course events – key hurdles at early infancy, childhood and early adulthood, and those who clear these hurdles are likely to live longer until older age.

Deborah Potts

What I want to talk about is urbanization and there are a few things that need to be framed, that are key to the points that I want to make. First, what does urban demography and what does urban growth tell us about three different things in Sub-Saharan Africa? Second, the nature of economic activities, bearing in mind that the data are not great on this sorts of things in Africa. It is not easy to go online, and download and find out precisely what everybody is doing in the country, because the data are often quite poor and shaky. What do they tell us about Africa’s position in the world economically? And what do they tell us about the nature of urban economies?

My view is that they tell us an awful lot and I want to strike a cautionary note about some of the things that are very often stated as almost being a fact in terms of what is going on in Africa in terms of urbanization. One of them is that it has the world’s fastest growing urban population. It is true that urban populations are growing very fast but as was pointed out before this is largely because African populations overall are growing very fast. The growth of urban population comes almost completely from natural increase; it mainly comes from the fact that birth rates in the cities are as high as in the rural areas. There are differences between them, but we do not have time here to go into details. Nonetheless, it is absolutely clear, as has been the case for decades, that most urban population growth comes from natural increase in the cities and not from migration. This comes as a surprise to some people. The next thing is that people often say that Africa is the fastest urbanizing part of the world. And that is wrong, that is not true. If one deconstructs the data carefully you can look at what is going on in Asia and you can download this stuff from UN HABITAT sites. Despite the fact that their own states and African cities reports tend to argue against this, if you download data from their sites you will find that Asian countries are urbanizing faster than African. And there is logic in it because Asian urban economies are doing a great deal better than African urban economies. So this is something that although it has been constantly reiterated and said, is not true. So these are some of the key things that I would like to get over in the beginning.

There is this huge difference, and this is where the confusion often lies, between that first thing – the rate at which populations are growing in
absolute terms and the issue of urbanization which is something different and which has very particular ramifications and implications. Because if your population is urbanizing, what you are saying is that there is a shift from rural, natural resource space of economic activity to urban based, urban located economic activities and this for decades has been seen in peoples minds as being associated with modernization, industrialization and development. And this is not happening in Sub-Saharan Africa nearly as fast as most people think it is. People think it is, because people keep saying it is, and in fact UN HABITAT keeps saying that it is, but again if you look very briefly at the data, you will find that there is a different situation.

The other thing is that we need to be careful about generalizing, because Africa is huge, there is a variety of different countries and the different countries are experiencing different things because of the differences in their economies. So there are some cities and there are some parts of some countries where it is clear that urbanization is happening rapidly and there are shifts in economic activities. But if you are looking at Africa in general, right across sub-Saharan Africa, you will find that this picture does not hold as true as most people think, and what we need to do is to begin to differentiate between the winners and the losers in terms of the globalized economy, a liberalized trade world economy – because Africa does not do very well out of this in terms of urban activities. And what the data show is that some parts of Africa and some African cities have been losing population share - they have been counter urbanizing. Quite rare, but in many parts of Africa, cities are stagnating in terms of their relative share of the population and there is a whole slew of countries in which the rate at which the population is urbanizing is 1-2% a decade, so this is slow urbanization and this is actually quite common and is not generally understood.

Just very briefly about what do we know, and I have to say that one of the problems is that our data are not very good and this is from where some of the confusion arises. UN HABITAT on one hand is saying 'we do not know' and then it goes on making very categorical statements about particular cities. So one thing I would like to emphasize is that the figures need to be looked at carefully and not considered definite, because often they are not, particularly if they come from compilations of data, like those produced by the World Bank. It is much better to use African censuses as an indication of where things are going. If you look at UN HABITAT for the state of African cities report in 2008 it shows that the rates at which the growth is occurring has been declining steadily – it is all there, but this is not what they are actually saying. If you look at the census data there is a huge body of data from
something called E-Geopolis which is doing settlements all over the world. You find that when you look at West Africa it came out quite categorically – this part of the world is not urbanizing nearly as fast as everybody thinks it is. It looked very specifically at Nigeria and argued that according to their data Nigerian levels of urbanization in 2006 were approximately 30% while UN HABITAT was saying that it was nearly 50%. That is an awful lot of a difference since we are talking of millions of people and considering them being urban while in fact they were still rural. These are major issues.

The tendency to project and to be definitive nonetheless still continues, so if you look on these big reports you will find some extraordinary things being said. Some argue that the world’s shortest urban population doubling time, less than 9 years, was found in East Africa region – this is completely absurd. But an awful lot of people seize upon these data and keeps using it to create a particular sort of picture that they want to show. There are towns which are growing at this sort of rate in East Africa but they tend to be related to conflicts, nothing to do with economics. Two examples are Gulu and Lira in Northern Uganda with massive amount of refugees flows and they were really growing at about 8% a year, but this is very rare.

Over the past years I have been working on the data from censuses, and whenever a new one appears I try to get the data, which is not easy in itself, and I try to interpret the data, which is even more difficult because sometimes African censuses are extremely difficult to work with, particularly the Nigerian one, and it was clear from the 1980s for example in Zambia, that there are countries that have been actually counter urbanizing. They have been ruralizing, because their urban economies have been so weak that they have been not sufficiently strong to attract migrants and hold them there. Lots of people go in, lots of people move out. What you have got is a tremendous movement out of the cities back to rural areas, sometimes out of the country altogether, particularly in West Africa. Because people are finding it very difficult to sustain themselves in the cities. And this is a very big issue.

I have chosen 10 countries that have experienced extremely slow urbanization in their last inter-census period of about 1.2% over that entire decade and again that does not fit in with the general perception. So we have Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Togo and Benin. It is a lot of countries, and not in any particular region, but across the continent, many different countries in which that sort of pattern has occurred according to the censuses. There are however countries which much more reflect the general wisdom that I try to challenge here, where there has been rapid industrialization in the last inter-census period.
Cameroon for example where both Douala and Yaoundé have been growing at nearly 6% a year and that is really phenomenal and cannot be accounted for merely by natural increase – there have been serious net migrations. In case of Kenya it is not exactly clear – there are some issues regarding how they define what is urban – there are farmers who live around cities but who are not in fact part of the city’s economic reality, so there is this issue there on defining them, although it's clear that Nairobi has been growing quite fast.

By looking at the data of DHS (Demographic Health Services) and urban birth rates, you can see that the gap between rural and urban birth rates now is beginning to widen after decades of only quite small differences. The impact of that will be to actually depress urban growth rates relative to rural even more which ceteris paribus will mean that urban growth rates will slow even more compared to rural birth rates. The implications are that first of all many large mainland Sub-Saharan countries, which house most of Africa’s population, are going to remain primarily rural for decades. Secondly these reduced rates of net immigration which are due to rising rates of outmigration from cities, indicate how severe are the strains on African livelihoods – most people in African cities are very poor. Africa cities have informalyzed and the proportion of population working in formal sector jobs has fallen dramatically over the last 30 years. In Asia it is up dramatically. Real incomes have fallen sharply during the period of structural adjustment and that fall has been devastating. And the final point is that we have globalized economies now in which comparative advantage is more and more dictating what certain countries can do and also within these countries what certain cities can do, what sort of economic functions they can have. This has hugely disadvantaged Sub-Saharan urban economies. As we all know there has been GDP growth but that has been largely coming from natural resource based activities – from mining and from agriculture, from forestry and so on. And that does not directly create urban jobs, even if it can do so indirectly. So cities are finding it very difficult to compete for FDI in productive enterprises and I emphasize productive. There has been lots of deindustrialization across Africa, there have been hundreds of thousands of jobs lost in the stream from South Africa to Nigeria and as I say the FDI is mainly in the natural resources sector.

And just very finally, there are few towns which are kicking against these trends. Anything related to oil, you can see the impact – if you mention for example Niger delta, you can see it there. But there are also towns which are very rarely mentioned, which have got a central functions from an old fashion economic geography perspective, which relate to their hinterlands and offer
natural resource. Like Arusha and Kumasi, they are the fastest growing towns in their respective countries. No one talks about them, but you can see it from their economic geography and it makes perfect sense and it is there in the data. And just one final thing, but I wanted to knock on the head the idea that 1/3 of Africa population is middle class. It is not. Everybody keeps citing this figure, it is not. Clear information is in the data of the African Development Bank, which is the same data that is used to support this untrue statement.

Clarissa Azkoul

In preparing this talk, I would like to acknowledge the work of Hein de Haas and the IOM Migration Research Series, the recently-founded ACP Observatory on Migration, and Anne Sophie Westh Olsen of the Danish Institute for International Studies.

I would like to focus on three main areas:

1. The evolving trends and patterns of migration, with a particular emphasis on West Africa
2. The immediate impact of the Arab Spring and the Libyan Civil War
3. The importance of South-South migration in forging Migration Policy moving forward

I will argue that in order for policy makers to be more effective in confronting changing population and migration trends in the 21st Century, a number of steps need to be taken:

- there is a great need for increased study and awareness of South-South Migration,
- a better understanding of the impact of the Libya crisis is required and,
- consultative processes and dialogue with state and non-state actors need to strengthened and encouraged.

When speaking of evolving trends and patterns in Africa, there are more international migrants in the world today than ever previously recorded: Worldwide international migration is a growing phenomenon, with more than 200 million people now living outside of their home countries for extended
periods; in addition 750 million are moving within their country but outside their region of birth, which means that there are currently an estimated one billion migrants worldwide (or 14% of the global population).

Roughly half of all migrants originating from countries in the Southern Hemisphere reside in another developing country. The UN estimates the number of South-South migrants at 73 million people.

Some of the long-term trends include urbanization (or rural-to-urban migration) which has been a key factor in patterns of intra-regional mobility in West Africa since decolonization. While the total number of West Africans has more than tripled, the urban population has increased by a factor of 10. More than 80 million West Africans have migrated from the countryside to the city during the last 50 years, and urbanization now stands at almost 50%.

Increasingly, we have witnessed a shift in migration patterns with traditional receiving countries (eg Cote d’Ivoire) becoming ‘sending’ countries, while ‘transit’ countries have sometimes become ‘destination’ countries (such as Morocco). Almost all African countries are today also immigration destinations.

West Africans are among the most mobile people, with increasing numbers leaving for Europe and the US, but also for new destinations in South America and Asia, especially China, Malaysia and Dubai.

African migration to China is a relatively new phenomenon and increasing: it is believed that more than 20,000 Africans are currently living in Southern China, but little research is available. Among Africans in China, there are four main types of migrants: Business persons, students, English teachers and informal workers.

New transatlantic migration corridors from Africa to Latin America are on the rise since the mid 2000s, linked in part to the tightening of US and European borders after September 11th, and the relatively open migratory policy of Latin American countries. Brazil and Argentina are the principal destinations, sometimes as a transit stop for those migrants hoping to reach the USA or Canada.

Research on West African migration has tended to focus on specific ‘crisis migration’ issues, such as trafficking, international refugee flows or irregular migration to Europe. This reflects rather Eurocentric policy priorities, since these forms of West African migration are actually relatively small in comparison with intra-regional migration. And in fact, Europe receives fewer migrants from Africa than from other regions.
Indeed, only 1% of migrants in Europe are of sub-Saharan origin. Furthermore, a mere 0.2% of all West African migrants reach Europe and the US. And a majority of those who settle in OECD countries enter legally and overstay their visas.

In the future, migration may be further affected by conflicts arising from access to water, land, ecological degradation, natural resources, culture/identity or ethnicity, socio-economic factors, border disputes or political and military crises.

When it comes to irregular migration or forced migration patterns, the main traditional outward Migration routes continue to be the East Africa Route, the Mediterranean Sea Routes, the Gulf of Aden Route and the Red Sea Route.

Migrants use numerous land, sea, and air routes to reach their desired destinations in North Africa and Europe. Europe's increasingly restrictive immigration policies and intensified migration controls have led to a growing reliance on overland routes, although migrants who can afford it make at least part of the journey to North Africa by airplane. The trans-Saharan journey is generally made in several stages, and might take anywhere between one month and several years. On their way, migrants often settle temporarily in towns that have become migration hubs to work and save enough money for their onward journeys, usually in large trucks or pick-ups.

It is a misconception that most migrants crossing the Sahara are "in transit" to Europe; there are possibly more sub-Saharan Africans living in the Maghreb than in Europe. While Libya is an important destination country in its own right, many migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe opt to stay in North Africa as a second-best option.

Since the 1990s, European states intensified border controls and attempted to "externalize" these policies by pressuring North African countries to clamp down on irregular migration and to sign readmission agreements in exchange for aid, financial support, and work permits. While these policies have not always succeeded in curbing immigration, they have had unintended side effects. These include: increasing violations of migrants’ rights and a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes with evermore dangerous attempts to enter destination countries.

Barring exceptional events (such as the Libya humanitarian emergency or a huge economic crisis in Europe) it is likely that these migration trends will continue. So long as Europe requires migrant labour, and unless more channels for legal migration are created, a substantial proportion of this migration will remain irregular.
The hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan migrant workers returning from Libya during the civil war was a clear illustration of the scale of South-South African migration.

Sub-Saharan migrants who fled Libya at the height of the crisis may have contributed to recent political violence (for instance in Mali). Furthermore, the migrants’ families found themselves deprived of vital remittance income.

It is unlikely that the Arab Spring will change long-term migration patterns and emigration from Africa. Egypt for example, with a large deprived population, has significant emigration potential. However, whether migration will be to Europe or elsewhere depends on discrepancies in future economic growth.

At the same time, it is likely that the Libyan oil economy will continue to rely on migrant labour. In fact, we have observed that Egyptian and sub-Saharan migrants are already returning.

Despite the positive political direction of the region since 2011, these rapid changes have brought about economic turmoil and uncertainty, at least in the short- to medium-term, causing millions of people to cross borders seeking safety, security and asylum, family reunification, or economic opportunity, as national economies falter and others continue to attract migrant workers.

Measures to strengthen migration management, assist migrants in transit and provide safe- and legal-migration channels are needed now more than ever.

At the same time, the Arab Spring has created new migration-related opportunities; research by IOM has found that, in response to recent political changes in the region, many migrants are demonstrating renewed interest in investing in, and sometimes returning to these countries.

IOM helps to foster dialogue and cooperation between governments on both regular and irregular migration, as well as to provide services for people on the move. This is especially important given that some migrants still endure unsafe working and living conditions, and can face exploitation, discrimination and arbitrary detention.

Intra- and inter-country movement will continue to be a central feature of African life.

Volatility in some countries and complex emergencies in the Horn of Africa will continue to cause people to move internally and externally. The issue of protecting migrants caught in crises has been raised by participating
governments at the International Dialogue on Migration meeting held last week (on 13 and 14 September 2012) in Geneva.

Ironically, migration policies aiming at “combating” irregular migration or limiting the entry to Western countries, appear to be a fundamental cause of the increasingly irregular character of migration.

At the same time, South-south migration is particularly important in Africa, but hardly looked at. It constitutes 70% of migration in sub-Saharan Africa and needs to be taken up. It is important that European policy makers should care about the composition and development of sub-regional flows. Migration should be highlighted as a regional development issue in Africa.

A priority for European development policy should be to strengthen the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, moving the focus from European immigration to the development issues raised by the large intra-regional migration flows, such as the Libya humanitarian emergency.

Continued support to the bilateral and multilateral initiatives should be provided to the ongoing continental, regional and national levels, through the African Union, Regional Economic Commissions, ECOWAS and the EAC, the EU-Africa strategic partnerships (Mobility, Migration and Employment, etc), the Mixed Migration Task force of Yemen and of Kenya made up of IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, DRC, etc, national policies and programme and the IOM programmes.

IOM implements many migration project activities and has recently received funding for a project on Migrant Protection along the East African route (including Sinai); and another on the protection and assistance of exploited and abused migrant (domestic) workers. Other key IOM programmes in Africa are the MIDA, Migration for Development, organizing temporary or permanent transfer of qualified human resources from Europe and USA back to the countries of origin.

IOM also promotes and sustains the Regional Consultative Processes, especially MIDWA, MIDSA and IGAD-RCP with the aim to foster inter-state and intra-regional dialogue on migration Management.

Another example of IOM’s efforts is the ACP Observatory on Migration which was founded in 2010. It’s an initiative by the ACP Group of States and the EU, implemented by IOM in a consortium with 15 other partners. The focus is research on South-South migration and its links with development for integrating migration into development strategies. The Observatory has 8 pilot
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Senegal; DRC, Cameroun; Angola, Lesotho; Kenya and Tanzania).

In sum, I have spoken about the importance of South-South migration, the importance of the Libyan humanitarian crisis and the way ahead, stressing the importance of consultative processes and south-south dialogue. Thank you.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question:
To what extent are the problems with the data a consequence of manipulation for political reasons?

Deborah Potts:
I tried to triangulate between all sorts of different data including the Nigerian census, also Africa-Polis data and from other sources. My own view is that the figures for Nigeria show exactly what I am speaking about. Lagos came out with a population of about 9mln and that was way below what many UN-HABITAT data was saying and that was also below what state authorities were saying. Part of that difference was because people did not understand the difference between state population and city population and they confused the data. If you look at the data carefully, city by city, it is much less urbanized than many people think, or have been saying and therefore, because Nigeria is so important for the statistical estimates of the whole Sub-Saharan Africa, it brings them down for the whole region. In fact UN-HABITAT has been constantly downgrading the figures for Lagos every 5 years.

Question:
What is in your opinion the impact of environmental degradation on migration in Africa?

Clarissa Azkoul:
Climate change is a huge issue and it will influence the patterns of migration, but the point I was trying to make was that studying South-South migrations moves might be a way of dealing with climate change, but this needs to be studied more. Especially since sometimes movements initiated by climate change which result in rural population moving to cities could be seen as urbanization, whereas in fact it is not, because there is no economic activity that they could dedicate themselves to, therefore it is not sustainable.
**Question:**
There has been assumption that more Africans will be living in the cities and thus the cities require certain investments and preparations. How do these data you speak of affect policy planning?

**Deborah Sporton:**
The Climate Change Convention and the Secretariat have separate reports instructions for climate change. It is something that separates urban from the rural and although when we talked about urban populations, maybe they are not as significant as they were in many ways, they are still connected to the rural and I think these connections, especially between urban families and rural families, are related therefore impact on family in rural area impacts on the urban one and vice versa. So maybe we need a more comprehensive approach to reporting on these issues. This might happen as a consequence of ‘climate compatibility’ of different programs, especially those sponsored by Western donors, as everything needs to become ‘climate compatible’.

**Question:**
What is your view on the impact of resources on population movement, e.g. increasing food prices or water accessibility?

**Deborah Sporton:**
I think earlier we were talking of ECOWAS corridor and the movement of people along that in West Africa and that is now being linked to oil and natural resources along there.

**Deborah Potts:**
It is difficult to speak of food prices influence, because there is little data on this despite several reports indicating existence of such tendency. However, this is less a problem of food production, and rather food accessibility. In Africa first of all there is a trend of land buy-outs by global companies who grow products that are quickly exported (e.g. crops for fuel). This grows into a political problem on the continent. Secondly, prices on global markets are shaped by events rather in the USA than in Africa.
**Question:**
How does the flow of FDI from China into Africa shape migration on the continent?

**Deborah Potts:**
China is huge in many African countries, but it is frequently happening that this investment goes into natural resources, which takes us back to the argument about such investment not creating jobs in urban areas. When it does go to towns it is very much going into mega infrastructure, which is great because these cities need that infrastructure, but the jobs created by this investment are temporary - once investment is completed, the job is gone. But there is little investments going into productive infrastructure, which I understand as creating urban based jobs for the long term, producing things in cities. Compare it to Cambodia, where investment creates hundreds of thousands of urban based jobs per year, from 1997 to 2007, and Cambodia has a population of 9.5 million which is equal to Rwanda. In Rwanda that would create unimaginable changes. And this is the fundamental difference between African and other countries.

**Question:**
What are your views on extending the value added production across these resource rich African countries?

**Deborah Potts:**
This is to some point a question of comparative advantage. It is difficult to deny and you are absolutely right that African states should focus on where the minerals are to increase the benefits coming from this resources. But it is difficult to implement such structural change policies in practice. You need skilled labour force which is often lacked. They have plenty of cheap labour but that is different. It also requires reliable infrastructure, electricity, etc. which also is a problem. But this is something that holds out African potential. And it requires more research.

**Question:**
Do you believe that in terms of migration people have a strong sense of national identity so that they are likely to come back at some point?
Clarissa Azkoul:
Migration in general depends on push- and pull- factors, but most generally the youth in Africa has different migratory patterns than their parents. They have also different relationship with their national identity due to internet, etc. From our programs we have found that most of the time migrants want to leave, make some money abroad and then come back. Most people don't want to leave their places of origin.

Question:
Some research indicated that countries consider their population growth as exacerbating their vulnerability to climate change. These are also countries with strong need for family planning. Should we integrate this aspect more into overall development policies?

Deborah Sporton:
Different donors and actors have their own development strategy papers which they use and there is little cooperation between them. This creates space for improvement, especially that governments need to comply with all of them and they find it difficult to combine them.

Question:
What are the demographic consequences of conflict beyond direct mortality?

Deborah Potts:
Results are very varied and it cannot go one way. There are very different experiences in Africa. For example in Zimbabwe during the liberation war many people moved to cities and remained there after the long conflict finished. During shorter conflicts the effects also vary, but in the case of Kenya after post-election violence people remained in camps for years. We cannot foresee much because migration theory is based on economics, and when a conflict starts all of that knowledge goes out through the window. Issues such as ethnicity, etc. come into play.
Question:
Is there a proof of Zambian copper belt area hollowing out? Big centres like Lusaka seem to be still growing. And on Nigeria, could have the requests to go back to their hometowns to register in the census make a difference in the general picture?

Deborah Potts:
Zambia is the best case of publishing sensible censuses and reports. If you look at differentials it becomes clear that Lusaka has been growing faster than Zambian population overall. But just because one city is growing fast does not mean that the country is urbanizing overall. And the copper belt region lost population in absolute terms. They are not alone in this, this happens everywhere around the world where a city or a region does not deliver economically.

Question:
Could you tell more about smaller scale migration within Regional Economic Areas (RECs) - was it recorded and if yes to what extent has it been fuelled by employment opportunities and economic factors. And is it less permanent?

Clarissa Azkoul:
In the case of West Africa and the works of ECOWAS there is a lot being done on harmonizing visa regulations and having visa free movement or even having a common passport. This goes in line with the need for strengthening the regional processes but I have not looked into East Africa in specific detail.