The election of Barack Obama as president of the United States in November 2008 raised expectations around the world about the emergence of a more consistently and strategically engaged US policy approach to diplomacy and international relations. Given his own mixed African and American ancestry, these expectations were especially strong among pro-African communities within the United States, just as they were in cities and villages across sub-Saharan Africa.

Importantly, American awareness of the strategic importance of Africa had taken root during the administration of George W. Bush, providing a platform upon which he could build. As with other dimensions of his foreign policy, however, President Obama inherited a set of existing US policies towards Africa and a set of perceptions among African leaders and societies that would constrain his scope for action. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Obama administration also confronted a number of festering conflicts that threatened to break out and swamp its intentions to push forward a determined policy mix of diplomacy and development across the sub-continent. At the same time, the return to a more strategic US approach to Africa raised suspicions among African leaders that, despite downplaying the democracy promotion agenda of his predecessor, Barack Obama would begin to interfere in African politics in ways that carried the sorts of post-colonial echoes few would have expected from an African-American US president.

As a result, the Obama administration ended its first year with a mixed record in sub-Saharan Africa. The announcements of positive humanitarian initiatives and of support for improved levels of local governance have won him support on the African street and among reform-minded politicians. But this positive change agenda has also clashed with the entrenched political priorities

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of a number of key African governments, as well as with some of America’s own long-term strategic interests in the sub-continent.

MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM?

Historically, the United States has rarely considered sub-Saharan Africa as being of great significance to its national interests, and most US presidents have had very little direct engagement on policy in Africa. Even during the Cold War, the proxy conflicts that played out with Soviet- and Chinese-backed enemies across the continent from Angola to Ethiopia were generally never more than side-shows to the larger Cold War stand-off. Sub-Saharan African countries were seen as uniformly poor and of limited commercial interest, had little impact, positive or negative, on the world stage, and did not offer any significant threats or opportunities to the United States. It was assumed that former European colonial powers that in any case happened to be NATO members, such as Britain, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Belgium and France, could be expected to carry the main responsibility for their former colonies.

On the other hand, in common with European countries, the United States has a long history of humanitarian interest in sub-Saharan Africa, based initially on missionary activity and later on an ideological commitment to the international promotion of democracy and human rights. These interests traditionally have been non-governmental in nature, grounded in the churches, civil rights movement and campaigning communities across the United States. Elected American officials have consistently been motivated to pay attention to their concerns, both out of genuine commitment and through the lobbying skills of these groups. However, from the 1990s onwards, the humanitarian lobby for Africa began to grow. Private philanthropy and remittances from the United States to the developing world in 2006 amounted to around $105 billion a year, dwarfing the $23 billion worth of official US assistance – and the growing amount of attention paid by successive US administrations to countries in the region has reflected this growth.

In parallel, awareness of the strategic importance of sub-Saharan Africa for the United States has also grown since the 1990s, particularly because of concerns over terrorism and the radicalization of young Muslims, especially in the Sahel and eastern Africa. One of the earliest, most serious attacks by al-Qaeda on US interests was against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998. The fear that Somalia is at risk of falling into the hands of anti-American extremists has driven US interest in that region for some years, as has the fact that some al-Qaeda operatives have originated from the Comoros and Tanzania. The establishment of an Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 for the US military (discussed further below) is partly tied to this interest, though this is more of a rationalization of current organization than many of its more conspiracy-minded African critics will admit.

Energy security has been another driver of a more focused US policy on sub-Saharan Africa. The United States imports around 22 per cent of its oil
from Africa (15 per cent from sub-Saharan Africa), more than it does from the Middle East, which provides around 17 per cent. The presence of a US embassy in Equatorial Guinea, and the size of the Angola and Nigeria lobbies in the United States, are partly attributable to this fact. However, in comparison to the amount of national resources, both political and physical, invested in the Middle East, Africa has received only minimal attention in Washington to date – but this is likely to change.

A third driver of increased awareness of strategic interest has been the need to win the votes of African countries at the United Nations and to counter attempts by others to do so. Africa has more countries, and therefore UN General Assembly votes, than any other continent. In key decisions, such as over sanctions on Iran, or on climate change, winning the votes of African countries is crucial. In the past, either General Assembly votes were peripheral to US interests or it was considered pragmatic to secure the necessary African votes by inducement. In recent years, however, UN votes have become more important just as African states have become more effective at caucusing, both among themselves and within the broader G77 bloc of developing countries. Moreover, other countries such as Iran and China have increased their own coalition-building efforts, forcing the United States to do likewise. This driver for US interest in Africa is still less developed than the others mentioned above, and until recently both the United Kingdom and France had been more proactive in working to gain support for their positions in the General Assembly than has the United States.

African politicians have a history of skilful diplomacy and playing great-power suitors off against each other in order to secure special concessions for themselves. A key reason for support by African leaders for US policies in the recent past has been a pragmatic calculation of self-interest based on the acceptance, however reluctant, of a unipolar world order in which the United States stood as the world’s only superpower. The dramatic increase in China’s economic and diplomatic activities across Africa during the last five to ten years may yet change this, particularly as commercial and cultural links between African states and China grow. For Europe and the United States, the growing presence in Africa of ‘emerging powers’ such as China has helped push African issues higher up the policy agenda. This is something that most African governments are aware of and are keen to exploit. It is possible that the global economic downturn will slow down this contest for influence and access to natural resources in Africa, but it is also possible that a perception that the Chinese are taking advantage of American and European economic weakness to penetrate even more deeply into African markets and politics could further exacerbate tensions between them.

Unlike those from China and a number of European countries, American firms have lagged behind others in seeking new markets in Africa. But although US investment in Africa outside the energy sector has remained almost static over the past decade, the cumulative level of investments in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has not yet been superseded by Asian investments, and the United States remains Africa’s largest trading partner. In fact, some American investors
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are already doing well in Africa. Washington-based Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) has raised more than $1.6 billion and has made more than 50 investments in 40 countries on the continent in the last nine years. The case of ECP is a rare one as American business does not have a historical presence in Africa beyond iconic brands such as Coca-Cola, and the largest US commercial presence is still in South Africa, where some 700 US companies operate subsidiaries.

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than one per cent of overall US foreign direct investment although Commerce Department figures show US direct investment increased by 5 per cent between 2006 and 2007, to $13.3 billion, including in non-oil producing countries, such as South Africa, Mauritius and Liberia. This relative lack of private-sector investment undermines US policy effectiveness on the continent. It means that American relations with African countries lack the complex business links that are so essential for cementing political ties and that could contribute to a more nuanced and sympathetic African view of American intentions and values.

THE GEORGE W. BUSH LEGACY ON AFRICA

George W. Bush faced withering domestic criticism for doing too little to end conflicts in Africa, especially in Sudan. But, unlike other areas where his administration’s shortcomings overshadowed his positive policies, President Bush is acknowledged to have made progress on HIV-AIDS relief and democratization in Africa by rewarding well-functioning democracies with additional aid. In contrast to the relatively low levels of US commercial investment in Africa, there has been a very strong record of official US humanitarian support and aid over recent years. As a result, the Bush administration was praised by activists and development analysts for its humanitarian commitment to Africa, and, in the end, President Bush met with more African heads of state than any previous American president.

American policy towards Africa in the last five years has fallen under two broad categories. The first sought to build the local governance and development capacities of African states. Policies under this category included the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the African Education Initiative, along with other programmes designed to improve standards of living across Africa. PEPFAR became the Bush administration’s flagship policy in Africa. Signed into law in 2003, it committed the US government to spend $15 billion over five years to combat the global AIDS epidemic. The MCC was also established as an independent agency providing development investment to countries whose governments ‘govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom’. By the end of President Bush’s term, the MCC had signed $4.5 billion of aid agreements with African countries.

The second category of US policies sought to improve the security capacity of African states. Policy under this category included Africa Contingency Operations and Training and Assistance (ACOTA), the Trans-Sahara Counter-
terrorism Initiative, the founding of AFRICOM and the semi-permanent basing of US Marines and special forces in Djibouti.

Two factors underpinned Bush administration security policy in Africa. The first was a belief that the United States had become over-dependent on oil supplies from the Middle East and Venezuela, and that Africa represented an opportunity for diversification. This view was further driven by increased numbers of significant oil discoveries in Africa and by the volatility in the price of oil. Cutting across and influencing this was the increasing demand for oil and natural resources by emerging economies, particularly China.

The second driver was the fear that al-Qaeda-type organizations could become established in African states that have a significant Muslim population, or, even worse, that al-Qaeda could establish bases in a failed African state such as Somalia. It was this fear that led to the most controversial aspects of US policy in Africa under President Bush, generating a level of suspicion and opposition that President Obama must now counter. Aspects of US security policy towards sub-Saharan Africa were controversial because they led the United States into new alliances with African governments that have poor human rights records. Moreover, accusations were made that many of these governments subverted and co-opted the US anti-terrorism agenda to suppress democracy and silence legitimate dissent. This, in turn, allowed extremist voices to gain greater legitimacy by pointing to the futility of democratic opposition.

The best defence of US policies in such cases is that they often took place in the context of fast-moving events and grave threats, with limited specific expertise or intelligence available. The most tragic case of such a blunder occurred in Somalia. Ill-thought-through US policy during the Ethiopian overthrow of a popular Islamic revolutionary movement that had brought stability to Somalia for the first time in over a decade facilitated renewed violence in the country. This strengthened extremists there, delegitimized moderates and led directly to the chaos and piracy that are now increasingly disrupting trade and threatening wider terrorist activity in the region.

Partly as a response to concerns over the effectiveness of American security policy, the creation of AFRICOM constituted a recognition that US national interests in the region had reached critical mass. AFRICOM became operational in October 2008; the command incorporates the base in Djibouti as well as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative; and the initial annual budget is $266 million. While AFRICOM is an indication that the United States perceives African security within a more strategic framework, its implementation and the public relations surrounding it have been extremely poor.

Announced in 2007 during a period when international criticism of US military methods and motives was high, AFRICOM’s role and function in Africa were expounded in mixed messages to African leaders by different sections of the American government. The impression quickly emerged of internal confusion and uncertainty regarding the mandate and organization of AFRICOM. Different branches of the US government, principally the Department of Defense and the State Department, briefed different lines to African officials and others...
according to their perceived interests and perspectives. On the one hand, it was asserted that AFRICOM was a straightforward organizational military reshuffle with no real implications for non-US actors. On the other hand, it was asserted that AFRICOM would revolutionize the way in which the United States engaged with African states. There were also separate and contradictory briefings around where AFRICOM would be based – Tampa in Florida, Stuttgart in Germany or some African country. Combined with growing African concerns about the perceived militarization of US foreign policy in Africa, these contradictions in the public diplomacy surrounding AFRICOM meant that America’s intentions quickly became lost in a sea of conspiracy theories.

The unnecessary confusion over AFRICOM’s purpose is illustrative of the major problem the US government faced during the Bush years in trying to win a sympathetic hearing for its foreign policy abroad, one that is not unique to Africa. There were simply too many American agencies with too many different roles and agendas that had a hand in defining and implementing foreign policy, and a lack of coordination between them. There was also fuzzy thinking and a lack of consistent cost-benefit analysis over the trade-offs between core American values and interests.

AFRICA POLICY UNDER OBAMA

In engaging with sub-Saharan Africa, the Obama administration has inherited a complex legacy from its predecessor. Increased levels of US financial assistance, especially to fight HIV/AIDS, have been welcome, as has the growing awareness of the strategic importance of building closer political relations with governments across the region. On the other hand, the Bush security agenda had awakened latent suspicions of a return to US post-colonial or Cold War-style interference that cut directly across African leaders’ growing sense of their own independence and freedom of action – which has been fed by rising commodity prices and new players, such as China and India, starting to compete with the United States and with each other for access to African resources.

In this context, the Obama administration has attempted to mix continuity on the security front (reflecting its assessment of the continuity of US strategic interests in the region) with some important adjustments to the development agenda and to the coordination between the two. Thus, aggressive counter-terrorism operations have continued in Somalia through President Obama’s first year and, although a review of policy is under way, no change is yet visible. At the same time, in the speech that he gave during his visit to Ghana in July 2009, Barack Obama sought to reassure his audience by stating that ‘our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world’.

The Obama administration has also stepped up efforts to rebalance and better delineate the different roles of the State and Defense Departments. For much of the Bush administration, the State Department, which should have
been responsible for coordinating between and imposing sense upon the myriad initiatives and agencies involved in a more proactive Africa policy, was understaffed, under-funded and under-valued. The Department of Defense ended up being elevated to a position where too much non-military activity was expected of it, including the reluctant exercise of public diplomacy. While these problems are not unique to Africa policy (or indeed to the United States), they have had a disproportionately negative impact on a continent where so much remains to be done.

Central to this rebalancing has been the rapid appointment early in 2009 of an experienced Africa team at the State Department with strong links to the National Security Council (NSC) in the White House and to the UN, another body with which the need for better US coordination on Africa policy is especially acute. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made her Africa priorities clear during her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee early in 2009, insisting that Darfur, natural-resource conservation, the war in Congo, ‘autocracy in Zimbabwe’, African democracy and working to reach the Millennium Development Goals would receive her attention. She can now draw on a team with more Africa experience than many previous administrations. Appointed as US ambassador to the UN at the outset of Obama’s administration, Susan Rice served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the administration of Bill Clinton and can now serve as a valuable ally to Hillary Clinton in this important forum. Gayle Smith, the NSC Director for Africa under Clinton, has been appointed as President Obama’s NSC Senior Director for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Development. The Africa team has Michele Gavin leading efforts at the NSC and Johnnie Carson as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at the State Department. The State Department has also appointed Howard Wolpe, a former Michigan congressman who directed the Africa Programme and the project on leadership and building state capacity at Washington’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, as President Obama’s Special Advisor to the Great Lakes Region. His brief is to tackle a web of conflicts that have affected eastern Congo for 15 years.

As part of its overall approach to the exercise of US foreign policy, the Obama administration has committed itself to strengthening the State Department and also centralizing aid policy under USAID. A review of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs by the Office of the Inspector General made a blistering assessment and worryingly advised that some of its responsibilities be assigned to AFRICOM. One of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson’s initial priorities, therefore, has been to improve the morale and effectiveness of his Africa Bureau. However, as Princeton Lyman highlighted in his testimony on Africa to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April 2009, ‘no amount of staffing nor resources can make up for competing or confused policies’ on Africa. He highlighted how thinly spread the State Department had become in Africa, especially in non-conflict countries. During the same hearing, Howard Wolpe also drew attention to overstretch and to the lack of training in African languages for foreign service and intelligence staff.
appoints special envoys and rolls out new bilateral commissions to deal with key African countries, the Obama administration needs to give careful consideration to the objectives of these initiatives and to their sustainability in terms of human and financial resources.

President Obama also sent members of his campaign team to Europe prior to the US presidential elections to assess best practices from European development agencies, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Drawing lessons from these should assist reform of US aid efforts.

All in all, a number of positive initiatives towards sub-Saharan Africa have emerged over Obama’s first year:

• A commitment to review policy on Somalia is important given US mistakes there in recent years. There are no easy or short-term correctives, but a more inclusive, pragmatic approach to engagement would be helpful.
• In eastern Congo, the aspiration to reinvigorate the ‘tripartite plus’ process will also help, if done with sensitivity.
• The commitment on the Niger Delta is to become ‘more engaged’; and the United Kingdom, Netherlands and other EU members are looking to coordinate their efforts with the United States.
• The assertion that AFRICOM ‘should realize its potential’ is a positive recognition of the problems the command has faced in defining its mission and structure in the face of fierce hostility across Africa.
• The Obama administration’s $3.5 billion commitment to an African food security initiative could be a stimulus to greater investment in the agriculture sector. American food giants Dole and Chiquita are already exploring opportunities in Angola and Mozambique to supply European markets. Clearly, US firms will need more incentives to mitigate the perceived risks of investing in Africa and this is something that the Obama administration could focus on.
• A Global Energy and Environment Initiative that is a radical change from Bush policy will go some way towards promoting a changed public face for the United States in Africa, particularly in South Africa, which is so central to US objectives on the continent and yet has had a difficult relationship with the United States in recent years. By accepting both the need for carbon limits and that Africa has the most to lose if present environmental trends continue, the Obama administration has gained some additional political capital.
• The Obama administration is also paying more attention to multilateral institutions in US interactions with Africa. The September 2009 special meeting with African presidents at the UN General Assembly reflected this multilateral engagement. African perspectives were also being sought in the run-up to the Doha trade negotiations and the Copenhagen climate change summit. There is also more emphasis on the UN
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Millennium Development Goals, which the Bush administration did not take seriously.

- The Obama administration is looking to merge PEPFAR into USAID to ensure that AIDS policy and development policy are better coordinated. Under the Bush administration, development assistance became heavily focused on spending to combat AIDS, at the expense of programmes in other areas essential to economic growth. Recently renewed by President Obama for another five-year term, PEPFAR now has an expanded budget of $19 billion, of which $11.5 billion will be spent in Africa. Its second-generation health policies place a greater emphasis on combating a wider range of disease, including malaria, as well as building health systems.

Plenty more remains to be done. According to Obama aides, the MCC could also benefit from coming under the control of USAID for the sake of better policy coordination and the more effective use of scarce resources. Of the 40 countries that have qualified at some level for the programme, 20 are in Africa. Certainly AGOA and the MCC provide a strong base from which the Obama administration will build further US engagement in Africa.18

Most importantly, the goal of improving US trade links and those of other countries with Africa should not be neglected; in the long term, greater US private-sector engagement in Africa will clearly assist a more rounded, regular Africa policy, drawing it away from its primary current focus on energy security, humanitarianism and counterterrorism. In this context, it is notable that Hillary Clinton led a 300-strong delegation in July 2009 for talks on AGOA in Nairobi with officials from 38 African countries: this is part of the US plan to reform trade policy, cut agricultural subsidies and expand markets at the same time.19 The US Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, attended the AGOA meeting and then visited Ethiopia and Senegal. While in Dakar he signed an agreement with Senegal to provide $540 million to help that country rebuild its transportation and irrigation infrastructure.

Given that only one year has passed since President Obama’s election, the nature and number of initiatives that have been launched towards sub-Saharan Africa are very promising. The challenge, as ever, will be to put these policies into practice, not just within the US inter-agency and congressional process, but also in terms of building support from and engaging with governments and civil society across this diverse region. It is to this aspect of the administration’s policy that we now turn.

PUTTING POLICY INTO PRACTICE: STRATEGY AND FIRE-FIGHTING

In early July 2009, some six months into his administration, President Obama made his first trip to sub-Saharan Africa (he had already visited Egypt). The trip was brief: over the course of just 22 hours on the ground in Ghana, the President visited a maternal health centre, gave a keynote address on Africa to
the Ghanaian parliament and visited a slave-trade castle. White House officials portrayed this stopover at the tail-end of summits in Russia and Italy as an indication that Africa was being mainstreamed, and becoming a routine foreign policy discussion item for the Obama administration.

A short Africa stopover by Obama early in his administration was probably appropriate, given that the detail of his Africa policy was still being defined. As a result, his speech had few specific pledges other than a promise to cut down on funding American consultants and administrators. Instead, President Obama’s Ghana trip was mostly about symbolism, offering an effective backdrop for a sharp critique of corruption and repression on the continent, and advocating home-grown good governance and stronger institutions as remedies. Ghana was chosen to illustrate an African country that enjoys political pluralism and a growing economy.20

Likewise, the first African head of state to be received by President Obama in the Oval Office was President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania in late May 2009. He had been carefully chosen for his technocratic and democratic credentials and, according to the White House, the two presidents ‘exchanged views on approaches to enhancing the US–Tanzanian partnership, improving development policy in the fields of health, education, and agriculture, and working with other partners in the region to solve some of the most pressing conflicts on the African continent’.21 These conflicts include Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya.

Until his Ghana trip in July 2009, President Obama made few statements on Africa, limiting comments to addressing individual African conflicts, for example Sudan (which is a high priority for a number of domestic US advocacy groups close to the Democratic party), Somalian piracy (which has captured US media attention) and Zimbabwe (which stands out as an example of the bad local governance Obama has sought to criticize). Indeed, in late November 2009, President Obama presented at the White House the Robert F. Kennedy human rights award to leaders of a Zimbabwean women’s rights group, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (Woza). The Obama administration has decided to play hardball with President Robert Mugabe and his supporters, hoping that this will weaken his grip on power.

The broad thrust of Obama’s Africa policy was outlined in his Ghana speech: the buttressing of democracy and good governance, smart development assistance, strengthening public health, and support for conflict reduction and resolution.22 He stated: ‘Development depends upon good governance … and that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans’. The wider world must ‘support those who act responsibly and isolate those who don’t … Africa’s future is up to Africans.’ Interestingly, he never mentioned the word ‘terrorism’.23

Hillary Clinton’s first trip to Africa as Secretary of State in August 2009 reinforced the message from Obama’s Ghana visit. As she emphasized, ‘we start from a premise that the future of Africa matters to our own progress and prosperity’.24 She spelled this point out further in her October 2009 address to the US Corporate Council on Africa by highlighting trade, development,
energy security, public–private partnerships and good governance, transparency and accountability as priorities for US policy in Africa.

But this long-term US agenda of promoting good governance and local responsibility for national development in the region must sit alongside important near-term challenges of conflict management. In this context, the situation in Sudan is near the top of the list of US priorities. The appointment in March 2009 of retired Air Force General J. Scott Gration as US Special Envoy on Sudan, even before the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa was in place, emphasized the importance of Sudan for the new administration. He has shifted American emphasis away from an exclusive focus on Darfur to an attempt also to stave off the disintegration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Northern and Southern Sudan by ‘rekindling the same passion’ that infused the original signing of the CPA. He hosted a meeting in Washington in June 2009 intended to boost political will to address some of the unresolved issues and to help prepare a ‘soft landing’ if the South votes in its scheduled secession referendum in January 2011.

The announcement in mid-October 2009 of a new Sudan strategy came after months of internal debate inside the administration, and mounting impatience among US activist groups. It was a welcome recognition on the part of President Obama that the administration needed to focus on diplomatic engagement and ‘mixing incentives and penalties’ to secure cooperation on the part of the Sudanese, rather than oscillating between appeasement and aggression. The strategy also placed the United States in greater alignment with international partners concerned with Sudan such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada and France, and opened the way for greater consensus-building with China and other key powers. Importantly, State Department documents acknowledge previous incoherence in US Sudan policy, and warn that US intelligence cooperation with Khartoum should not trump progress on Darfur and the implementation of the CPA which it is hoped will result in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, so that Sudan does not ‘provide a safe haven for international terrorists’. By ‘mixing incentives and penalties’, US policy towards Sudan introduced for the first time benchmarks for progress and slippage, as well as a matrix of potential pressures, although these remain classified. It is not insignificant that the Obama administration for the first time also favourably mentioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant for President Omar Hassan al Bashir.

This policy shift towards ‘engagement’ fits Obama’s efforts to reach out to the Muslim world, but it also reflects the ambiguity of the different constituencies that Obama has to accommodate at home. The administration’s strategy does not guarantee success, and US groups will be impatient to see concrete results. President Obama himself may have to manage these expectations to allow time for this newly defined engagement strategy towards Sudan to be tested.

Elsewhere too ‘fire-fighting’ responses to other crises have preoccupied the Obama administration’s Africa policy during its first year. Political developments
in Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea have drawn the attention of key officials away from their longer-term policy objectives, although fear of a repeat of Kenya’s disputed election results in early 2008 meant that the US focus on Malawi’s June election contributed to a non-violent outcome there. The administration seems to be concentrating on an effort to end or prevent the escalation of key conflicts through more forceful diplomatic initiatives after years of perceived drift by the Bush administration on these powder-keg situations.

For this reason Kenya also remains central to US regional policy, but it has added significance because of President Obama’s personal commitment to the country, deriving from his family ties. He is able to speak out on Kenyan political issues much as former US presidents with Irish ancestry did on Irish politics. An indication of his harder policy towards Kenya came when, on 23 September 2009, Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson sent a letter to 15 prominent Kenyans raising concerns about their role in blocking political reform. A number of them had already been banned from visiting the United States, prompting President Mwai Kibaki to write to President Obama to complain about this breach of diplomatic protocol.

During her 11-day visit to Africa in August 2009 (the longest ever to Africa by a US Secretary of State), Hillary Clinton visited six other African countries – South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cape Verde. The choice of countries reflected the two themes – good governance, as in the case of Cape Verde, and the need for the United States to be involved in regional peace and security, as in the case of the DRC and Liberia. The choice of South Africa, Angola and Nigeria, however, pointed to a further priority of the administration in its Africa policy – the need to establish good relations with what are likely to be the three ‘anchor states’ of sub-Saharan Africa because of their size, economic potential and military capability, and in the case of Angola and Nigeria their vital roles as energy exporters. Each of these countries is undergoing significant internal political change, and the United States needs to upgrade its bilateral relations with them as quickly and effectively as possible. In so doing, however, the risk is that it may need to be ambiguous, at best, or to compromise, at worst, on its agenda of promoting good governance across the sub-continent.

THE UNITED STATES AND NIGERIA

Nigeria supplies 11 per cent of US oil imports, representing around 46 per cent of the country’s daily production. This makes it the United States’ largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, there are an estimated one million Nigerians living the United States and over 25,000 American citizens living in Nigeria. Recognizing this level of interaction, a US Act of Congress in May 2009 called for the establishment of a bilateral commission with Nigeria. The last such commission (the US–Nigeria Economic Cooperation Commission) existed during Nigeria’s transition back to civilian rule in 1998–99. And, soon after being elected, President Obama phoned his Nigerian counterpart
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President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, in a signal of the importance the United States attaches to the country.

However, signs confirming that engaging with Nigeria is never straightforward became visible after President Obama chose Ghana instead of Nigeria for his first visit to Africa. With the largest population in sub-Saharan Africa (one-fifth of the continent’s people), and as a significant player in the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria sees itself as a key player and has in the past vied with South Africa for the role of leader of Africa in the international community.

Although officially the US President’s bypassing of Nigeria was described as a non-issue by the Nigerian authorities it was widely described as a ‘snub’ in the Nigerian media. And when President Obama stated in his speech that ‘No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves. … No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 per cent off the top or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt,’ many in Nigeria believed he was speaking directly to their government. Obama’s visit to Nigeria’s friend but competitor, Ghana, was painted as a form of punishment for Nigeria’s apparent backsliding on corruption and governance in recent years.

But it was Hillary Clinton’s visit to Nigeria in August 2009 that really upset the Nigerian government. The visit was troubled from the start over issues of protocol and security. Even before she arrived, the Secretary of State was critical, commenting on Nigeria during her stop in Angola. When she arrived in Abuja, she was received by a junior protocol officer from the Foreign Ministry and no senior government officials were present. Despite the smiling photographs of the visit, Clinton’s comment about ‘failure of governance at all levels, mismanagement and corruption and concentration of wealth in few hands’ ruffled the feathers of government ministers. The Nigerian media picked up on these comments with headlines like ‘Clinton Knocks Federal Govt on Corruption’, ‘Clinton – Leadership has failed Nigeria’ and ‘Corruption Erodes Yar’Adua Legitimacy’. The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was swift to condemn the comments on corruption and leadership, stating that they were based on ‘misinformation’.

Those in Nigeria who do not belong to or are not linked to the government took quite a different perspective. Though most Nigerians would agree with Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson that theirs is the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa – and so in their view they should be respected accordingly – any opportunity to show up their distant, disconnected and apparently faltering ruling elite is welcome. Indeed, a Nigerian commentator stated that ‘Mrs Clinton’s comments about the sorry state of affairs in the country, which the PDP found detestable, if truth must be told, are not really original’. The Nigerian Bar Association welcomed her remarks, stating that ‘The NBA wishes to align itself with the statement credited to the US Secretary of State, the summation of which was that corruption, amongst other factors, [has] caused failure of governance in Nigeria.’ Clinton’s remarks garnered support on forums
such as 234next.com, with comments such as ‘They keep reminding us the truth we should tell ourselves’, and ‘It is heart-breaking because we have, through our own actions and inactions and abiding selfish and narrow thinking, nurtured and elevated thieves to the levels of leadership.’

Intentionally or not, President Obama’s visit to Ghana acted as a catalyst for increased conversation and debate within Nigeria on the state of its democracy, which was only heightened by Secretary of State Clinton’s visit. Though the Nigerian leadership may brush off such incidents and the chatter that follows, inevitably they do touch a nerve when they garner such domestic civil society support and also when their country, a dominant regional force for so many years, is negatively compared with its peers Ghana and Angola.

In the near term, therefore, it appears that bilateral relations will remain frosty. Nigeria became front-page news in the United States on 25 December 2009 when Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab tried to blow up a transatlantic flight preparing to land in Detroit. In January 2010 the US added Nigeria to its list of countries that sponsor terrorists, meaning ‘enhanced screening of all holders of the Nigerian passport’. This has further soured relations.

While Washington appears to be ready for ribbon-cutting on the proposed new US–Nigeria Commission, the Nigerians had made little progress by late 2009, although the Nigerian Foreign Minister has agreed to it in principle. Indeed, in addition to President Yar’Adua’s health issues, official displeasure at Hillary Clinton’s conduct in Nigeria may have also contributed to the Nigerian President’s decision not to attend a lunch for 25 African heads of state and African Union Commissioner Jean Ping, hosted by President Obama on the first day of the opening session of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2009.

As of late 2009, therefore, the emphasis of the US policy on Nigeria remained firmly diplomatic, trying to focus the Yar’Adua administration on the issues of poverty, endemic corruption and environmental devastation that underpin the Niger Delta crisis. US officials believe their hard message has contributed to the recent focus by the government in Abuja on trying more actively to engage on the Niger Delta issue. US officials are also concerned about northern Nigeria and are looking to improve their understanding of this region by reopening a consulate in the state of Kaduna that was closed in 1994. But it seems at this stage that the Obama administration has little if any more leverage in promoting structural change in Nigeria than its predecessor, though this is a problem not uncommon among Nigeria’s international partners. The Nigerian government will continue to court China, Russia and others as it seeks to diversify its international relations, as so many African states are doing. If Washington wishes to exert influence over developments in Nigeria, policy-makers will have to develop ever more nuanced and creative modes of engagement with it, without emotional reactions to claims of growing influence from other powers in the country.
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

The bilateral relationship with South Africa had been awkward during the Bush administration, following a fairly constructive period during the transition from apartheid until the late 1990s. In November 1993, a US–South Africa Business Development Committee was established, and Vice-President Al Gore, when attending the inauguration of Nelson Mandela in May 1994, proposed that the United States establish a high-level bi-national commission (BNC) to deepen the relationship between the two countries – similar to commissions that had been inaugurated with Russia and Egypt. This BNC was launched in 1995 under the chairmanship of Gore and South African Vice-President Thabo Mbeki, and comprised subcommittees at cabinet level on a range of issues. It was hoped that the commission would increase the coherence of US assistance to South Africa, but it depended almost exclusively on USAID funding, not departmental budget commitments. As the USAID programme declined, so did funding for the BNC.39

At the outset of the Bush administration, the future of the BNC was in doubt, although the administration initially signalled that South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya were the ‘natural partners’ of the United States in Africa.40 Ultimately, the Bush administration replaced the BNC with a US–South Africa Cooperation Forum, but it met irregularly and not at the vice-presidential or even cabinet level.

During the Mbeki presidency, the bilateral relationship became unexceptional, not helped by the unpopularity in South Africa of the US intervention in Iraq and by Mbeki’s equivocal stances on HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe. The fumbled public relations around the establishment of AFRICOM offered easy ammunition to those in South Africa who had steadily formulated a rather two-dimensional (if, in the context, understandable) view of a rapacious United States seeking only to secure mineral and security interests across Africa, and using humanitarian and developmental concerns as a front.

These underlying tensions might have been expected to ease with Mbeki’s departure from office in late 2008 and Barack Obama’s election. Yet, so entrenched had the suspicion become that, in some quarters, Obama’s African heritage was seen somehow as a threat to South Africa’s self-perception as the leader of Africa bringing the authentic African voice into world discussions (which is deeply disputed and resented in many parts of Africa). Reflecting this ambivalence, President Obama’s first conversation with then President Kgalema Motlanthe at the end of January 2009 did not go particularly well, according to insiders; there were concerns in South Africa that the new administration might signal a return to the Bill Clinton style of outspoken engagement that had so irritated many in South African governing circles in the past.41

Hillary Clinton’s first visit to South Africa in August 2009 was thus a test of whether both countries understood the nature of the tensions between them and could overcome them. This was particularly important because the combined impacts of the global financial crisis and a complex global political agenda
(including the rise of the G20 in which South Africa is an important player) meant that the need to re-engage and build on the extensive common interests between the two countries was long overdue.

As an indicator for future engagement the visit was hopeful. Clinton largely avoided the critical and outspoken language deployed in either Kenya or Nigeria, and repeatedly went out of her way to emphasize South Africa’s regional and global importance and to praise its government. On Zimbabwe, she took pains to urge greater South African leadership while praising the approach taken to date. Only on HIV/AIDS was she slightly more outspoken, obliquely criticizing the former Mbeki policy by referring to ‘lost time’ that had to be made up. This was easier for the South African side to digest as the new government of President Jacob Zuma had disavowed the former Mbeki AIDS policy. Clinton also offered to resuscitate the US–South Africa BNC, thus upgrading the relationship from the ineffective Bush-era US–South Africa Cooperation Forum. Clinton described a meeting in Durban with President Zuma at the end of her South Africa visit as ‘extremely helpful’, and the South African President reciprocated: ‘The two countries have always had good relations and we are taking that relationship higher.’

Despite these positive diplomatic statements, the visit was not easy. There was a sense of detachment on the South African side, and media criticism despite the careful diplomacy. There is some sense that US interest is simply a reflection of its great-power rivalry with China’s increasing interests in Africa, itself an impression that reflects a peculiar defensive insecurity in South African self-perceptions. Treading a path through these prickly sensibilities will be a difficult task for US diplomats, but vital if this important bilateral relationship is to be rebuilt.

THE UNITED STATES AND ANGOLA

Hillary Clinton’s mission in Angola sought to build a strategic partnership between the two countries and followed a visit by the Angolan Foreign Minister to Washington in May 2009. In Angola, Clinton spoke of the two countries as ‘partners, friends and allies’. When the United States established diplomatic relations with Angola in 1993, during the Bill Clinton administration, the relationship was initially warm. Following the collapse of the Lusaka peace process and the resumption of war in the second half of 1998, the United States backed away from an active involvement in the search for peace in Angola. Instead, a concerted effort was made to strengthen the bilateral relationship through the establishment of the US–Angola Bilateral Consultative Commission, which met formally three times during 1999–2000 to discuss a wide range of issues.

The election of George W. Bush was initially viewed with some trepidation in Angola because of the Republicans’ previous association with Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). But, despite the fact that the US–Angola Bilateral Consultative Commission was
inactive during the following years, the Bush administration pursued a policy of active engagement with the Angolan government, driven principally by the recognition of US long-term energy needs. Angolan oil is plentiful and accessible, and is also the type of high-quality crude the United States needs. In 2008, the United States imported just under 4 per cent of its oil from Angola.

Hillary Clinton’s decision to visit Angola on her first Africa trip was seen in Luanda as proof that the United States wanted to work constructively with the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos. Confirming this impression, the United States and Angola plan to resuscitate their bilateral consultative commission and the Angolan Foreign Minister reported that he had found Washington open to solving African problems and to strengthening bilateral relations.

Clinton’s references during her Angola visit to the need for good governance and to hold presidential elections soon were perceived by the Angolan government as appropriate in the context of the country being in transition. This was in contrast to her reception in Nigeria. It was also noted, however, that she was not directly critical of the government, rather stating that the United States was ‘satisfied’ with and would encourage further efforts to promote transparency, and that she was convinced that presidential elections would occur ‘in due course’ after ratification of the new constitution. This was perceived as a pragmatic line to take towards the Angolan government.

Times have changed. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), a former Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist resistance movement, is now the Angolan interlocutor for the US government, while the opposition UNITA – a former Cold War US client – expressed ‘frustration’ that it was not granted an audience with Clinton. Other opposition members and civil society groups felt equally sidelined. Academic Mario Pinto de Andrade claimed that Clinton’s speech undermined opposition parties and civil society organizations that were critical of the government. A letter by civil society activists to the US Secretary of State, highlighting concerns about corruption, bad governance and human rights violations, apparently went without public comment or mention. Recognizing that public criticism eroded engagement opportunities, Hillary Clinton’s trip to Angola was designed to pave the way for increased dialogue.

The approach that Hillary Clinton took towards each of these three ‘anchor’ countries in Africa differs significantly. A critical approach to corruption and low standards of governance in Nigeria annoyed the host government while vindicating civil society. In Angola, the situation was reversed, with opposition groups being critical of the Secretary of State’s generally supportive approach to the MPLA government. In South Africa, American signals appear carefully designed to engage all key partners and upgrade the bilateral relationship at all levels, from government to civil society. Yet South African suspicion has remained and will take some years of cautious diplomacy to overcome.

The diversity of US approaches towards each of these so-called ‘strategic partners’ in Africa might be understandable given the differing US national and security interests that relations with each country evoke. But this emerging
pragmatism can also open up US policy in the African sub-continent to charges of inconsistency, even while it can improve diplomatic freedom of manoeuvre and therefore leverage in specific instances. Such pragmatism needs to be placed within a broad, consistent, positive vision of the kind of democratic values and prosperity agenda the United States must support if it is to remain a leading voice for reform-minded engagement in sub-Saharan Africa in the face of ever-growing competition for influence and access from the world’s other economic powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China. As the Obama administration crafts a more coherent process and infrastructure for developing and implementing its Africa strategy – in contrast to the Bush administration, despite its specific successes – the risk is that a plethora of diverse US approaches to specific countries will undermine the central message of the need for better governance across the region and overwhelm the policy-making process in Washington.

CONCLUSION: BREAK WITH THE PAST?

A higher visibility and better coordinated policy towards Africa, relative to that of its predecessors, was inevitable at the start of the Obama administration. Ahead of his Ghana visit, Obama suggested in an interview to AllAfrica.com that the US government had lacked a well-coordinated aid-to-Africa effort in the past. ‘Our aid policies have been splintered among a variety of agencies, different theories embraced by different people depending on which administration, which party is in power at any given time.’ Since then, in terms of avenues opened and proposals made, President Obama has not disappointed. At the L’Aquila G8 summit in Italy in July 2009, for example, he announced $20 billion in pledges for the developing countries, including $3 billion from the United States to improve food security for the poorest around the world. In his Ghana speech, he said his administration was also committing $63 billion to address global health crises.

However, the level of US commitment to the region, and the quality of that commitment, remain uncertain, not just objectively but, just as importantly, in the eyes of African leaders and their peoples. The state of the US economy given the current crisis could hold the administration back from financing many of its most ambitious plans, and it is worth remembering that Vice-President Joe Biden commented during the 2008 election campaign that a Democratic administration would probably have to moderate its commitment to double foreign assistance. There has been much lobbying against such a pull-back since the comment was made, but levels of funding will be as important an indicator of the administration’s long-term commitment to Africa as have been the good ideas on policy coordination and the appointment of a strong team to carry out these policies. As discussed above, the Bush administration invested seriously in Africa, but many of its programmes were too narrowly focused and inflexible to be of much use in addressing the root causes of bad governance and institutional deficits in a sustainable way, and in offering real incentives for reform. With limited new funds to create major new programmes, and the option of
redefining the existing ones being complex and time-consuming, it will be hard for the Obama administration to chart a new path, especially as one year has already passed.

There is little doubt that the process of US policy-making towards Africa should continue to improve in this administration, but the content will be the test. In this context, despite President Obama’s African heritage, Africa policy is not a priority for his administration. Pressing domestic issues, such as reviving the economy and reforming health care, in addition to major foreign policy challenges such as the Middle East, especially Iran, and Afghanistan and Pakistan, will continue to be the focus of much of the administration’s efforts over the next three years.

NOTES

1 Jimmy Carter was the first US president to make a state visit to sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to that only Franklin D. Roosevelt had visited Africa, during the Second World War, although Richard Nixon had attended Ghana’s independence ceremony in 1957, as vice president. George H.W. Bush made two trips to Africa, both in 1982 as vice president, before Bill Clinton became the first US president to visit Africa twice while in office. George W. Bush also visited twice, and met more African heads of state than any of his predecessors.

2 An exception to this was the Angola civil war when, for some time, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was the second largest recipient of covert US support in the world. It is also worth noting that within five years of the 1959 opening of a US embassy in Guinea, 30 more had been opened across the continent.


8 PEPFAR did come in for criticism, however, for its religiously inspired restrictions on the way funds could be distributed; they favoured programmes that sought to promote abstinence as opposed to condom use.


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12 Samantha Power, also an Africa specialist, has been appointed as the NSC’s Director for Multinational Affairs and David Goldwyn as Coordinator for International Energy Affairs at the State Department. For an assessment of Clinton on Africa, see J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer C. Cooke (eds), *Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001).

13 Wolpe previously served as an envoy to the region from 1996 to 2001 for President Clinton and more recently advised the Obama presidential campaign on African issues.


19 ‘United States/Africa: Obama Launches his Agenda’, *Africa Confidential* 50(14) (10 July 2009).

20 President John Atta Mills and Barack Obama are also newly elected heads of state and were legal professionals.


26 During her Kenya visit, Hillary Clinton also met Somali President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed.

I hope it is a big lesson to the Nigerian leaders that democracy can truly work in Africa with total commitment and will of the leaders and the citizens alike. Whether Obama comes or not, Nigeria is still the giant of Africa. It is okay for Obama to encourage Ghana’s democracy. In spite of our current woes we still have a profound influence across Africa,’ commented a reader of BBC reporting on the visit. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8138641.stm.


34 Ibid.


When he spoke at the Brookings Institution in Washington on 30 September on ‘The Nigeria–US Partnership’, the foreign minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, provided no substance on how this commission would be rolled out.

38 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia spoke on youth and jobs, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda spoke on investment, and Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete spoke on agriculture at this lunch.


40 Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as quoted in e-mails from the US–South Africa Business Council, 14 June 2001.


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47 ‘Chefe de Estado fala de cooperação com Hillary Clinton’, Angop, 11 August 2009.
48 See José Partrício, Angola-EUA: Os Caminhos do bom-senso (Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1997).
50 ‘Sociedade civil angolana apresenta carta aberta a Hillary Clinton’, Club-k.net, 7 August 2009.
52 ‘Africa: Barack Obama’s Address to Ghanaian Parliament – As Delivered’ (see note 22 above).