Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) has established Project Tardis to help pave the way for NATO to think more effectively about how best to build credible and functioning Comprehensive Approach (CA) capabilities via its theatre-level staff. Attention is focused specifically on flexible command and control structures and on civilian-military co-operation in hybrid conflict. Of particular importance is the opportunity such free-thinking operational experimentation affords for genuine multinationality within the Comprehensive Approach, thus underpinning the legitimacy and influence upon which such operations rest and, critically, the unity of purpose and effort that is the *sine qua non* of the Comprehensive Approach.

Objective

Given the drafting of the new Strategic Concept and the critical phase into which operations in Afghanistan have entered, ARRC and other headquarters should be encouraged to further experiment and to share their experiences to enhance the delivery of the Comprehensive Approach.

Definition

The Comprehensive Approach is the cross-governmental generation and application of security, governance and development services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.

Core Message

If the Comprehensive Approach is to work as it should, the concepts and doctrine underpinning such a cross-Alliance effort must be matched by efficient generation and use of required resources, political will and strategic patience. The Alliance is at a tipping point. *If the Strategic Concept does not take account of what is required for operational effectiveness in hybrid conflict*, then while the Alliance might persist as a political organization its operational and deterrent credibility will be seriously eroded.
Command Arrangements

Operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach: The effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach is central to the future utility and credibility of NATO. Equally, an effective Alliance will be vital to the International Community’s ability to conduct effective Comprehensive Approach operations in future hybrid conflicts. However, the experience of the ARRC suggests that a much more systematic approach at NATO command level is needed to generate and sustain all of the required elements and partnerships.

A Comprehensive Approach Command: The centre of gravity of the Comprehensive Approach should be the three star theatre command with standardised High Readiness Forces (Land) (HRF (L)) fighting the tactical battle. Ideally, a bespoke Comprehensive Approach Command under SACEUR would ensure that civil-military integration takes place from top to bottom and from the strategic to tactical with the role of strategic headquarters first to ensure that campaign planning is sound but above all to ensure that organisation and delivery to theatre of forces and resources.

Holistic View of Operations: Comprehensive Approach operations should be based on a holistic view of the mission’s strategic objectives and should include all partners in the assessment and planning processes. Influence is the medium through which the Comprehensive Approach is most clearly manifested and the central organising concept for hybrid operations. All operational elements (campaign planning, targeting policy and strategic communications) should be part of a holistic influence effort.

Command and Control in Hybrid Operations: NATO strategic commands must apply a model of effective and flexible command and control, able to embrace and reach out to key civilian partners (member and partner nations, international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), supported by HRFs that are able to operate at tactical level as a rotational planning and command nexus for sustained operations.

Level of Ambition: The Comprehensive Approach must be seen from the outset as a whole of government/s issue with structures built accordingly at

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1 The seven HRF (L) HQs of NATO’s Force Structure include, in addition to the ARRC, the Eurocorps, the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps-Italy, the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps-Spain, the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps-Turkey, and the Rapid Reaction Corps-France.
Alliance-level with the sustained backing of nations to support the theatre-level effort. Equally, the Alliance must avoid over-bureaucratising the process.

**Harmonize Headquarter Practices and SOPs:** SHAPE should take the lead in determining how HRF (L) headquarters’ practices and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be harmonized on the basis of the experience, experiments and lessons of the HRFs, notably including the ARRC and the experience of ISAF/IJC operations.

**Consequences of Failure:** Failure will mean that the Comprehensive Approach will only ever ‘work’ if one member (the US) leads which, whilst attractive in the short-term, will tend to undermine the legitimacy and multinational ethos that is vital for mission success.

**Non-Military Aspects**

**Building Systematic Relationships:** The establishment of more systematic relations between partner institutions and states engaged on and in hybrid conflict would promote a better understanding of realisable aspirations and thus enhance campaign planning. Regular meetings and exercises would enhance a better understanding of the opportunities for co-operation (and constraints) and lead to a better understanding of achievable goals within likely agreed timeframes. Therefore, **building on the Mid-Term Exercise Programme** a more systematic set of exercises is needed with a detailed audit process with the results shared with all partner institutions and partner states.

**A Broad Understanding of Civilian Capacity and Capability Development:** NATO lacks a capability beyond short term infrastructure development that is itself limited to the direct support of deployable forces. NATO therefore requires a broader understanding of capacity and capability development. Such a commitment must go together with assured access to resources (coupled with a determination to become involved in these sectors) which are, usually, on a direct path to the strategic objectives of a mission.

**Subject Matter Experts:** NATO Subject Matter Experts (SME) are needed both at the centre and within operational headquarters. NATO needs to build civilian capability within its structures with seconded/civilian experts at SHAPE, Joint Force (JF) and High-Readiness Force (HRF) levels. This will require systematic access at short-notice to relevant expertise.
Deployable Civilian Expertise: Civilian expertise will need to be deployed forward to support headquarters such as the ARRC. A more systematic approach to training and education is needed with a particular focus on how to operate in a multinational military organisation; understand the contemporary operating environment; build networks with civilian organisations, and understand different planning methodologies.

Civilian Planning Element: HRF HQs must be able to effectively ‘plug and play’ with a cadre of expert civilians built around a dedicated Civilian Planning Element (CPE) itself embedded in civil-military planning and the civil support elements of a headquarters. The CPE must be able to pass on knowledge and know-how to successors to ensure campaign momentum.

Ensuring Continuity at the Politico-Military (pol-mil) Level: Continuity at the pol-mil level is vital. NATO is best placed to develop mechanisms such as a Policy Steering/Action Group and a Civilian Planning Element. However, a PSG/PAG will by its nature be theatre specific, while CPEs should be developed for all NATO headquarters and fully integrated into the best practice of SHAPE and Brunssum. This will ensure that all partners critical to mission success are brought into the process (physically as well as figuratively) and thus embrace both concept and design early in the operational cycle.

The Role of Strategic Communications: Strategic communications explain why actions are necessary and the benefit they will bring. Broad consultation over policy with key civilian partners, a wider understanding of what comprises a Stratcom target (both friends and foes), and a Stratcom strategy that places all actions within a broad context would promote enhanced synchronisation and de-confliction of efforts by partners.

Civilian Advisory Cluster: An effective Command Group would ideally include a Stratcom Advisor who would be a civilian from outside the formal structure in support of the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). S/he would also work in conjunction with the Political Advisor and Cultural Advisor and with a Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG) as part of a civilian cluster designed to test all planning assumptions, as well as reach out and back to external expertise and influence.
PROJECT TARDIS

This report lays out both the vision and the challenges NATO should address if it is to establish itself as the best practice leader in a vitally important strategic and operational domain. In a protracted phase of operational experimentation, HQ ARRC has over the past eighteen months attempted to improve the utility of the HRF (L) headquarters by experimenting with better working practices so as to operate more effectively in the contemporary environment.

HQ ARRC has developed Project TARDIS over the course of the past twelve months to overcome some of the perceived shortcomings of the land components of NATO High-Readiness Forces (Land) (HRF (L)) in the delivery and the operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach. The goal is to achieve unity of purpose in hybrid operations. The lessons learned thus far from Project TARDIS have been infused with experience from operations in Afghanistan and other theatres driven by the need to establish effective Allied mechanisms to promote better cross-theatre co-operation.

Thus far experience of the international civil-military effort in Afghanistan has emphasised three weaknesses in the Allied effort: a) the creation of national stovepipes that undermine the transnational effort and thus weaken cross-theatre co-operation; b) an inability to measure progress (or otherwise) in the key areas of governance, such as rule of law and development; and c) an inability to speak with one voice to actors in region. However, if the goals established by General McChrystal for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are to be achieved then unity of effort will necessarily amount to far more than the merger of the military counter-terror and counter-insurgency efforts. The challenge will be to reach out effectively to include key civilian partners at an early stage in campaign planning. High-level political fusion is also critical to both unity of purpose and effort and ideally would be achieved through the driving influence of a senior political figure able to act as a consistent interface between the political level and all partners to an operation.
EXERCISE ARRCADE FUSION 09

Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 09 (Ex AF09) took place in November 2009. Ex AF09 produced a number of lessons and observations pertinent to the ongoing work of the NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group with a specific focus on operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach. This report is the responsibility of the main author Professor Julian Lindley-French, Head of the ARRC Commander’s Initiative Group (CIG) with the support of other CIG members, Professor Paul Cornish of Chatham House, Dr Andrew Rathmell of the Libra Advisory Group and Ms Leslie Simm. The intent of this report is to support the work of the Expert Group in the design of the strategic concept.
KEY LESSONS FROM PROJECT TARDIS AND EXERCISE ARRCADE FUSION 2009 (AF09).

- **Effective Delivery:** For the Comprehensive Approach to be effective it is critical that campaign planning and command decisions take place at the right level. To that end, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is vital to ensure integrated civil-military support to subordinate commands fighting the tactical battle. Civil-military integration is essential, from top to bottom and strategic to tactical, with a Policy Steering or Action Group (PSG or PAG) led by an international political figure speaking with the authority of principal international organisations (UN, regional organisations, EU) that could properly reach out to host nations and other key partners in the mission. The role of strategic headquarters once the campaign plan is agreed is thus to support and enable the theatre commands as part of a partnership between the NATO Command Structure and the High Readiness Force structure.

- **Operationalize the Comprehensive Approach:** An integrated Civilian Planning Element (CPE), working within the headquarters provided trusted collaboration and the exploration and implementation of ideas previously beyond the mandate of a purely military HQ and demonstrated the utility of embedded civilians. Equally, the need for those civilians to be fully prepared and trained prior to the exercise was also evident. Ideally, such an exercise (possibly Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 13) would be civilian-led with a strong NATO civilian-led inter-agency approach supported by member nations. Such an exercise format would help to inform the effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach, with headquarters fostering new relationships between NATO in Brussels, SHAPE in Mons and member and partner/participating states.

- **Develop Effective Cross-Function Partnerships:** Partnering and collaboration across functional areas and domains is essential and should, where appropriate be replicated across all levels of the NATO structure, particularly the High-Readiness Forces (HRFs). Such partnership was simulated (and achieved) at the corps level on Ex AF09 through the incorporation of the Civilian
Planning Element which included individuals provided by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the UK’s interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit (SU) and the Department for International Development (DfID), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department. Importantly, collaborative planning began seven months prior to the exercise.

- **Provide Time to Work up Partnerships:** Ex AF09 demonstrated the critical need for the early working up of such partnerships and the extent to which success was dependent on trust. For example, the willingness of British departments of state to deploy a Civilian Planning Element to current operations in Afghanistan is compromised by the inherent difficulties in persuading different departments to work together. There are, furthermore, dangers and risks inherent in a complex contemporary operation even within the framework of a single nation. The challenges posed by the Comprehensive Approach are magnified by the construct of NATO’s institutions, the lack of any bespoke, dedicated architecture, particularly at higher levels of the command chain, by the need for consensus and by the lack of any dedicated shared doctrine (ways of doing business) and understanding of best practice across the Alliance. Such partnerships take time to construct and cement.

- **Unity of Purpose:** The Comprehensive Approach operationalizes unity of purpose through unity of effort. Campaign planning translates medium to long-term stabilisation objectives via a range of critical partnerships between civilian and military actors into a shared road-map. Unfortunately, examples abound of NATO military headquarters attempting to co-ordinate unity of effort in an environment where unity of purpose is not much in evidence. In the first instance, co-ordinating the efforts of NATO, the United Nations (UN), and regional organisations such as the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the preliminary stages of a deployment are vital if unity of purpose is to be meaningful. Particularly important for unity of purpose is early agreement over the political legitimacy upon which any such security, stability and development operation must rest. On Ex AF09 the focus was on the politico-security (of which the politico-
military was a part) where unity of purpose and effort was promoted through the early establishment of an in-country Policy Steering Group (PSG) co-chaired by the UN International Coordinator and the President of the Host Nation with membership of the group extended to key actors and institutions in country.

- **Effective Strategic Communications:** Strategic Communications connects all activities and actors across all theatres with host nations and home nations. If unity of purpose is to be achieved NATO must have a unified message, ideally aligned to that of the international community, communicable to ally and adversary alike and offering a cogent story to publics at home and in-theatre. A coherent strategy to deliver such a narrative and to maintain consistency is also vital. In certain respects a compelling narrative is the foundation upon which the Comprehensive Approach is established and a fundamental element in effective campaign planning. Clear political leadership and buy-in from the civilian stakeholders early in the planning is essential to avoid a gap between political and military activity. This is particularly important for maintaining campaign momentum because inevitably different military and civilian actors, IOs and NGOs require different narratives and have different decision-making cycles. Effective Stratcom thus creates an information domain within which all actors can operate in partnership. To that end, HQ ARRC put influence at the heart of its activity physically and conceptually in Ex AF09. HQ ARRC’s goal was to match narratives with actions with the specific objective of adopting an approach that was the least kinetic possible consistent with problem resolution and the need for the headquarters to assure the fighting power of the force.

- **Capacity vs. Time:** Mechanisms must be in place early to systematically provide resources for collaboration between the major actors engaged in theatre, and to influence and exploit it. That is not the case today. The military are usually possessed of the capacity for spontaneous planning and implementation, whilst the civilian actors that comprise the international community (e.g. member-nations, UN and EU) tend to require time in order to operate effectively and to ensure the systematic application of
funding of all-important political reconciliation, reconstruction and development.

- Civil Support: ARRC has long recognised its own shortcomings in facilitating civil support and fully recognises its limited role as an enabler. Nevertheless, ARRC seems to be well in advance of other NATO HRFs with regard to these aspects of operations. To that end, the Mid-Term Exercise Programme could be developed further both to achieve a standard approach across HRFs and to integrate a wider pool of civilian expertise through NRF command post exercises. Rarely, and normally only if the security situation prevents civil involvement, will ARRC (or military forces in general) involve themselves in reconstruction and development projects and humanitarian assistance. In order to better inform the military activities of the headquarters, ARRC established a Civil Support branch with military (reservist) subject matter experts (SMEs) and contracted civilian SMEs to advise on the appropriate level and nature of military involvement. The branch covered several areas critical to gaining the rapid support of host publics, such as essential Services (water, power, sewage etc); Governance and Rule of Law; and Economic Development. This external expertise also allowed a better understanding of the funding dynamics within theatre and where to best influence donors and project leaders.
THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – GETTING THE BASICS RIGHT

The 2006 failed review of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) resulted in a political compromise that spawned the dysfunctional Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) which undermined the Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, it was decided not to resource the NATO Response Force (NRF), most critically the Land Force elements. HQ ARRC prepared for and stood up as NRF 13 from January to June 2009 (preparation period) and June to December 2009 (stand by period). As such the ARRC gained some relevant insights into the NRF structure and process, as well as operating with the DJSE.

- **Deployable Joint Staff Element:** ARRC exercised on three occasions with the DJSE from Allied Land Command Heidelberg. The first exercise saw the DJSE ‘integrated’ into HQ ARRC to augment the ARRC role as Headquarters Combined Joint Force Land Component Command (HQ CJFLCC). The two other exercises saw the DJSE deployed ‘in country’ along with the Joint Force Commander as a separate entity to the land component command with the DJSE acting as a discrete command node separated from the static Joint Headquarters. It is ARRC’s assessment (and it is a view widely accepted within the HRF (L) Command cadre) that the DJSE concept in its primary role (i.e. as a separate headquarters) is flawed, although this is contested by both Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). DJSE complicates and adds an unnecessary layer to the command structures and confuses responsibilities within theatre. DJSE also relies heavily on a commander supported by a staff that are unfamiliar with each other and who by definition are neither Joint in construct nor well trained whilst physically splitting the commander from his worked-up planning staff, possibly by some thousands of miles. In other words, such an approach is the very antithesis of sound campaign planning upon which the Comprehensive Approach must be built because it creates a core military planning and command hub that is at best ad hoc.

- **Weak Communications and Support:** These failings are exacerbated by bandwidth limitations which prevent the two halves of what is a separated headquarters from adequate and
effective communication. In addition to the lack of bandwidth, NATO does not, in any case, have the basic deployable infrastructure (IT equipment, temporary accommodation, catering support etc) to support the concept. An HRF (L) Land Component Command (LCC HQ) deployed in theatre is far better resourced to undertake tasks currently assigned to the DJSE, especially in the area of Key Leader Engagement (KLE). Indeed, there is no reason why the LCC HQ could not host the Joint Commander when he chooses to visit the theatre.

- **The NATO Response Force:** The NATO Response Force has undergone a review over the past twelve months resulting in the decision to extend the stand by period from six to twelve months. This is a sensible initiative given the time and resources required to train for the commitment. However, for ARRC’s NRF 13 commitment the land component command Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) was only filled to 27%, which would have resulted in a period of integration being required before the force was viable. This additional time would have prevented the Land Component NRF from achieving its mandated 5 days notice to move by some considerable period – perhaps a delay of up to 14 days. In brief there was/is no force at readiness.

- **HRF (L) Employment on ISAF:** DSACEUR’s early aspirations envisaged HRF (L)s providing a trained and cohesive nucleus to the newly formed ISAF Joint Command Headquarters (IJC HQ) in Afghanistan, as well as a number of functional area leaders which would have capitalised on their collective training and understanding, and in turn would have provided for gainful employment of high readiness staffs conducting annual integrated training. The reality is somewhat different with the Flags to Posts (F2P) process ensuring that HRF (L) staff will only ever be used in a piecemeal fashion as individual augmenters. Once again this undermines the possibility of a systematic approach to building NATO headquarters able to act as hubs for the Comprehensive Approach in a sustained and systematic manner. This method of employment is likely to threaten the continued support and resourcing of three-star corps headquarters by their framework nations if SHAPE will not/cannot
employ them in a coherent manner. NATO should in future ensure that employment of HRF (L)s is not only in keeping with their design and levels of training, but that effective command and control is reinforced systematically by the civilian knowledge and expertise communities vital to mission success.
THE WAY FORWARD?

If the operational experimentation undertaken by the ARRC is to be capitalized upon then far more work needs to be done to promote truly credible and effective combined, joint and comprehensive (CJC) (civil-military) command and control. Exercise ARCADE FUSION 13 will take place some three years hence and thus both the opportunity and time exist to use this vehicle for further operational experimentation. Specifically, it should take place within the framework of the NRF (or rather a new NRF concept) to identify what is really needed in command and control terms.

There are several adjustments to modus operandi that would need to be made. The DJSE is not designed to work with a LCC, but rather with a Joint Force Command (JFC), such as Brunssum or Naples. At present, DJSEs are predominantly manned by army staff, although the objective is to render them progressively more joint. Thus what would be needed as a minimum (and ad interim) is a LCC with a credible level of joint expertise to effectively manage maritime and air assets. Even if key actions take place on the ground, maritime and air components are key enablers.

In any case, DJSEs were always to an extent a ‘fix’. Ideally, integrated ‘fly-forward’ packages would be drawn from the staffs of Brunssum and Naples. The implication therefore is that either Heidelberg or Madrid would be surplus to requirement. However, if the nations continue to block structural solutions for political reasons the need for some form of composite solution will persist and with it the very tendency to resort to quick fixes that makes NATO on occasions appear far weaker and more inefficient than is actually the case.

As Omar Bradley once famously said “Amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics”. Logistics are indeed critical for the kind of operations envisaged. The ARRC offers a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) which could act as a model for the reform of other HRF(L)s so that Rear Support Commands are standard, thus enhancing the ability of the Alliance to rotate headquarters without losing either institutional knowledge or operational momentum. However, whilst the ARRC itself can provide a number of services to meet the LCC's requirement for entry and sustainment into theatre, neither the ARRC nor any other HRF (L) offers the joint expertise to effectively manage theatre level maritime and air theatre logistic requirements and resources. Indeed, given the constraints on Brunssum, Naples and LCCs this seems to be structural failing which is becoming steadily more pronounced the more that one nation (the US) fills in the gaps. Hopefully, the IJC will offer the way forward but it must be a) genuinely multinational in
ethos, structure and practice; and b) not seek to command all elements as it will simultaneously need to look up, out and down.

Equally, the ARRC’s experimentation raises another set of questions. For example, is it right that one member nation (other than the US) finances a commitment to provide a theatre level headquarters with all that entails over a period of time? Can a headquarters that rotates every nine-to-twelve months be effective at managing a €1bn fuel management programme for ISAF, or the €200m infrastructure programme that is spent annually in Afghanistan if there is in effect very little chance for a seamless handover of function from headquarters to headquarters? The inference is that to be truly effective in stabilization and reconstruction the Alliance needs to examine where best campaigns, tasks and personnel should be generated, organized and commanded. In other words to achieve maximum effect in a large complex space over time and distance with limited resources would likely take truly radical reform of the NATO command structure, not to mention a new set of relationships with key partners vital to mission success. To that end, SHAPE should take the lead in determining how HRF (L) headquarter practices and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be harmonized on the basis of the experience, experiments and lessons of the ARRC.

Given that context, it is a particular concern that very few of the other HRFs can emulate the ARRC, and surely for this reason alone the work the ARRC is doing should be used to help (not exclusively) further develop and transform the other HRFs. In the contemporary international security environment the Alliance requires a smaller but nevertheless effective cluster of headquarters that can rotate seamlessly without any loss of institutional memory or operational momentum. These headquarters should all conform to a common set of command and control standards, enabling a plug-and-play structure easily augmentable as and when required.

To that end, the NATO Peacetime Establishment (PE) Review must be urgently concluded to make NATO fit for purpose (even given the relatively limited scope of operations undertaken by the Alliance particularly with regard to Crisis Response Operations (CROs)). Specifically, a more agile C2 construct is needed with clearly defined roles for Naples, Brunssum (and Lisbon) so they demonstrably add value and are seen to do so. Ideally Brunssum would be the supporting command for HQ ISAF, with responsibility for pre-deployment training, deployment of forces, long-term resource planning etc with HQ ISAF reporting directly to SHAPE. Without such reform the tendency of nations to retreat back into national stovepipes during
deployments will persist and all the effort invested in both a trans-national Comprehensive Approach (worthy of the name) and multinational formations designed to generate cost-effective, strategic, theatre and tactical effect will wither.
CONCLUSION

The Strategic Concept must make the operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach central to the future development of the Alliance and its modernisation. Whilst the ARRC is to be commended for its attempts to create a multinational, multi-disciplinary hub such transformation will need to go significantly further if a truly cross-NATO multinational culture of operational effectiveness is to be created. The simple fact is that Europeans (and Canadians) need to close the gap between a world that increasingly buffets them, the implicit and explicit security task-list that emerges from such events and the limited forces and resources available to European (and Canadian) leaders. Here, an opportunity could exist through closer NATO-EU relations because the method implicit in the Comprehensive Approach is central to the emerging European strategic culture (for all its many failings). If the basic geometry of the challenge is not addressed sooner or later the armed forces of a NATO member or a NATO intervention will fail and possibly catastrophically. It is imperative, therefore, that these issues move beyond the merely military-technical.

NATO is of course the sum of nations’ ambitions. At present there is a growing gap between aspirations/agreed concepts, and the willingness of nations to meet commitments. There is a pressing need for nations to re-discover the strategic patience that hybrid operations invariably require. Given that the public finances of most NATO nations are under severe pressure investment in quality personnel would offer a cost-effective opportunity to enhance Alliance effect. If the Alliance could embrace such a level of ambition then the transformational would become the credibly operational and the Comprehensive Approach would be realised in full.

In 2010 the Alliance faces a tipping point. If the Strategic Concept is not written with at least an understanding of the fundamentals examined in this report then the Alliance might persist as a political organization but the effective and credible fighting power upon which it is and must be based could well decline to the point where no operational or deterrent role is credible.
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