International Security Programme Workshop Summary

European Security and Defence: A New European Security Architecture?

European Security and Defence Forum: Workshop 4

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INTRODUCTION

The European Security and Defence Forum was created to analyse the shifts and developments in national and European security and defence policies, to promote a better understanding of Europe’s global role and strategic partnerships and contribute new ideas to the policy debate. Building on the first three workshops, which focused on doctrine and concepts, challenges and threats and capabilities and cooperation, the fourth roundtable held on 11 November 2010 examined the current state of the European security architecture and future trends.

The current economic downturn requires European leaders to adjust their security and defence policies. It was argued throughout the workshop that we must think differently about increased cooperation, which can be achieved via two distinct paths. The first path is through bilateral cooperation. The UK and France have already shown willingness to reform their defence and increase their cooperation in this realm. While it remains to be seen what bilateral agreement signed in early November means for European defence, it was argued during the workshop that this sort of strengthened partnership amidst budget cuts could also serve as an inspiration for a more pragmatic European security.

Secondly, the European security architecture at an organization-level has been subject to a number of changes. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called last year for a new legally binding treaty. Moscow is generally dissatisfied with the post Cold War security architecture and aims to influence the shape and activities of the current structure. It was nonetheless argued early in the discussion that we do not need a grand design with new institutions. The existing framework has a lot of potential. We thus need to figure out how to use it best, which requires greater political will and a more open and constructive approach. Discussions also addressed the recent developments within the EU, NATO and OSCE - the main pillars of European security.

It was argued that the European Union aims to act globally but lacks the appropriate means to do so. Hungary will hold the next EU Presidency and announced that it will focus on the implementation of the Lisbon treaty, but in a different way than the Belgian presidency - a self-proclaimed ‘non-presidency’, primarily acting on behalf of the new EU representatives. The Hungarian Presidency aims to retain a large initiative role, in order to support the development of CSDP and the implementation of its institutions and other
instruments. Participants suggested that the EU must demonstrate a higher level of internal solidarity to the outside world.

Europe and North America need a strong NATO, based on both a credible Article V and a capacity to adapt itself to twenty-first century challenges. The upcoming Lisbon summit will be an important turning point for the Alliance, more than ten years after the last Strategic Concept was issued and perhaps more importantly in a post 9/11 world. The Alliance must strike the correct balance between maintaining credible territorial defence via the Article V and projecting influence, while tackling other threats related to energy, cyber and space security for instance.

Given the centrality of both organisations to the security architecture in Europe, cooperation between the EU and NATO will remain crucial. It was argued during the discussion that this partnership has been hindered by underlying political problems. Some suggested that while it would be unrealistic to think that these issues can be overcome in the near future, a few technical steps can be made, such as inviting Turkey at EDA meetings as a non-EU member and yet a big contributor to CSDP missions. On this particular point, more sceptical opinions were expressed over the return of an old argument that has failed on multiple occasions. What is needed is a stronger partnership both at the political/strategy level and the military/operational level. Although NATO has integrated the EU in the redefinition of its Strategic Concept, the EU still has to match these efforts within its own processes. There is a clear need for strategic views to be harmonised. From an operational perspective, the EU-NATO relationship is at times dysfunctional, although commentators usually decide to focus on the high-level political problems.

Since 2008 the European security architecture has been subject to OSCE renaissance. Discussants insisted on its broader approach to security and its inclusion of Russia as the main factors for its return to the forefront of the debate. It was argued that this organisation provides a much needed forum for confidence building.

Russia is a central cause for concern within Europe. The relationship in recent years has been marked by misunderstandings and misinterpretations inherited from the Cold War. To date, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) arguably constitutes the most appropriate format to deal with the Alliance’s relations with the Russian federation. Much progress has been done to improve these relations. However, the NRC has repeatedly proved to be ineffective in tackling crises as they occur. The mere presence of Russia at
the next NATO summit in Lisbon is a salutary step towards stronger cooperation, the extent of which will nonetheless largely depend on how negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and missile defence evolve.

The European security architecture seems to be relatively unstable, based on institutional pillars that aren’t sufficiently linked to each other. In the meantime, the world has changed and the security environment is much more complex. In this regard, it was suggested that the three main European security organisations and especially NATO and the EU must find specific policies on which they would collaborate closely together. The issues would need to be global enough to include the US and Canada, but not too deep in strategic thinking, with consideration of national interests and with short-term benefits in order to be politically desirable. Cyber security falls into this category.
SESSION 1 – STRATEGY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The first session of the day dealt with strategy. Europe is a strong economic power, with a combined GDP superior to the US (€12.5 trillion against €10). European contributions to defence nevertheless amounts to only 30% of that of the US defence budget. Almost half of the continent’s spending in defence matters in fact comes from Britain and France alone.

Europe faces a crucial dilemma: we, Europeans are still profoundly uncomfortable with power but our security largely depends on it. Paradoxically, our efforts to secure peace within Europe have prevented us from developing a strong ability to project power. It was argued that Europe lacks strategy. The academic community has been very active in contributing to the debate on Europe’s foreign policy, yet these efforts have not been translated at the policy level. We are not as weak as we like to portray ourselves, but we need to find the right balance of power within the continent, within the EU and between the EU and NATO in particular. Additionally, amidst budget cuts, are we really broke or are we choosing to be broke? Are we strategically broke?

In the European Union, the recent agreements between France and Britain demonstrate grand strategy in austerity. It ends the Iraq imbroglio and re-establishes St Malo in a different way, by offering leadership and inviting others to rethink the organisation of their own defence. This deal was reached in a genuinely global context rather than a merely national or European one. As repeatedly suggested throughout the workshop, everything we do is in a global context whether we like it or not. If our environment is getting bigger, and we are getting relatively smaller, strategy becomes even more important.

It was argued that strategy should be regional, as France, Britain, and Europe itself, are regional actors, within a broader global context. The US shift of focus towards East and South Asia is putting pressure on Europeans to be effective in its own neighbourhood. With regards the EU, European security and defence is no longer young. CSDP needs to be credible with a highly effective military component, which must be good though it will be small. European security culture should be built on civilian and military partnerships, and a genuinely comprehensive approach. One participant considered that it is incomprehensible that Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, three regional members, are preventing European security reform as a whole. Unless this issue is sorted out quickly, an effective NATO-EU partnership with improved
relations with Russia, an effective strategy to address new threats and the modernisation of forces will not be achieved.


Following an introductory discussion, István Balogh presented his paper on the concept of European Grand Strategy. He argued that terrorism, threats to security of energy supply and threats to the continent’s borders should be considered as Europe’s three main security threats. The additional threats listed in the EU’s main security strategy documents in 2003 and 2008 are either included within these three groups (regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime), or are not directly threatening the EU (ex: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction –WMD).

The EU cannot have too many ‘strategic partners’ or it will lose the practicalities of its relations with the US, Russia and China. The organisation lacks sufficient levels of defence spending. In order to catch up with the US figures, the EU27 would need to spend an additional $800bn in addition to creating the joint military structures it is today lacking. Without a European army, the EU is not able to behave like a great power. Nevertheless, the EU has other strong assets: it is for instance the largest trader and exporter of goods in the world, the largest provider of development aid and pursues a number of economic initiatives with the Caribbean and the Pacific areas for example. The EU should focus on soft power and more modest aims to become more politically credible. In order to do so, the EU must concentrate on transformation, via economic and democratic tools, and build on the success of its enlargement and neighbourhood policies.

In the discussion, participants addressed a number of points raised in the presentation. A participant argued that strategy should not be based on what one can do but rather on what one should do. The problem with Europe is not that it is overambitious but rather that it lacks imagination. István Balogh responded that Europe should adjust its means to reality or it would simply follow an illusory path. Europe should get more of the existing policies and architecture, and be willing to engage in more ad hoc approaches when needed.

The discussion went on to address the issue of Europe’s geopolitical environment. It was argued that the world is becoming a smaller place. Europe’s neighbourhood now includes Iran and the Middle East. Turkey
would in fact be much needed in European security discussions. It has become an important player in the region but it is a free agent whose aspirations do not necessarily match Europe’s. The problem with Europe’s soft power approach in its neighbourhood is that the so-called *magic magnet* only works with a realistic promise of enlargement, which no longer seems to be the case for Turkey and cannot realistically be extended to the Middle East. Another discussant argued that geopolitical strategy resembles chess: it is not enough to have a strategy of your own; you need to anticipate the strategies of your opponent. The soft power strategy therefore has its limits. Moreover, military power and soft power were said to not be mutually exclusive. Even though the US is spectacularly militarized, it is still able to use soft power tools to project influence. Europe’s soft power was argued to be a way to avoid its responsibilities and the reality of crises. The European strategic culture should be based on a comprehensive, civilian-military power. Diplomacy and development are taken seriously because of military power.
Dr Burcu Gültekin Punsmann - ‘Search for Regional Accountability and Ownership in the Shared Neighbourhood - Can a Turkish-Russian Cooperation Coordinated with EU Actions Open New Perspectives for Peacebuilding in South Caucasus?’

The second session, on European neighbourhood policies, began with Dr Burcu Gültekin Punsmann’s presentation. She argued that Turkey is changing very fast and has recently demonstrated a level of confidence in its foreign policy that was never witnessed before. Turkey has for instance greatly contributed to the redefinition of NATO’s Strategic Concept. Until now, because of this lack of self-confidence, Turkey has been unable to think strategically. This country needs more multilateralism and more consultation with the EU. This will largely depend on the development of the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 served as a powerful illustration of the failure or even lack of strategy within Turkey, inherited from the Cold War, when Turkey avoided choosing sides between the USSR and the US. A rapprochement process between Turkey and Russia has nonetheless been underway since the beginning of the 2000’s. The visit of the then Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2004 marked the first visit of a Russian head of state for 32 years. In parallel, the relations between the two countries in the energy sector have been developing starkly in the past few years. The Turkish energy market is the fastest growing market in the region after Russia’s. 68% of the gas used in Turkey comes from Russia. Turkey is the second market for Russian energy after the EU. More importantly perhaps, these energy relations have been steady. Contrary to Ukraine and Belarus for instance, the gas relations between Turkey and Russia have yet to suffer any disruption of distribution.

Turkey increasingly sees Russia as a partner in the region, but acknowledges their differences and difficulties. Possible areas of cooperation between the two countries arguably include Abkhazia’s status, an issue on which Turkey should engage discussion with Russia.
Dr Bernardo Venturi - ‘EU neighbourhood policies for security, defence and conflict prevention: any added value in working with diversified local actors?’

Dr Bernardo Venturi went on to present his paper on the European Union neighbourhood policies. The most important threats to the EU (illegal immigration, lack of democracy, frozen and regional conflicts, environmental threats…) are all unrelated to immediate territorial threats but linked to a wider concept of security. The EU is growing as a global actor with civilian means, as illustrated by the CSDP missions since 2003. However, it should develop better relations with diversified actors at a local level who have better understanding of, and better access to, key players on the ground. EU civilian missions are barely cooperating with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine) and EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia EU) for instance demonstrated the EU’s unwillingness to cooperate with local civilian actors. This could be partly attributed to the fact that CSDP missions are generally run by former military leaders who lack a civilian approach.

The EU needs to implement a more comprehensive approach on the ground, which would involve the use of different tracks (businesses, civilian actors) and a wider range of tools for conflict prevention and peace building.

The discussion went to address the definition of the concept of security. While the classic concept designated the protection of state borders, security today is more holistic, to allow people to go about with their lives. Alternatively, security may also imply the need to intervene abroad. Overall, the threats have changed so new tools are needed.

The question of Turkey’s EU accession was then discussed. Participants wondered whether Turkey’s new foreign policy aspirations and its good image are due to the EU accession path. Dr Burcu Gültekin Punsman argued that Turkey’s proximity with Europe is a very important aspect of its identity. Would it be different if Turkey’s accession was eventually blocked? One participant suggested that the EU stalemate over Turkish membership and the disagreements between the EU and the US over Iraq paradoxically allowed Turkey to become a more helpful and constructive partner, and an honest broker vis-à-vis Russia.

Discussants exposed the limits of the comprehensive approach, pointing at the difficulties encountered with hostile governments and hostile local actors on the ground, or the lack of knowledge about the country, its culture and its way of functioning. The CSDP missions have shown significant limits but
some have demonstrated interesting potential. For instance, the EU missions in Kosovo have helped foster big changes in this country since the early 1990’s. In Georgia, the EU mission was deployed in a couple of weeks only. Even though it has not been particularly successful there, the EU has an important role to play in the region, as a more neutral partner than NATO.

In conclusion of the session, three main lessons emerged: firstly, the European security architecture must integrate Turkey, in one way or another. Secondly, dealing with non-military actors is for the EU a crucial challenge. It is clearly easier said than done. Sending military troops abroad is easier than sending other types of civilian personnel like police, who are already engaged in important tasks within their home country. Finally, the world has become a smaller place where the US still matters and ought to be involved in order to achieve more stability in this world.
SESSION 3: ENERGY POLICY

Shakti Prasad Srichandan - ‘Arctic Meltdown and EU Security - Challenges and Opportunities

The first afternoon session opened with a presentation on the implications of the ice melt for the Arctic and the potential role that the EU could play in the region. In the most recent years, the Arctic icecap has been receding at an alarming rate. This has resulted in a number of changes for the region.

Vast reserves or energy (oil, gas, silver and diamond) are becoming more easily accessible. New sea routes might be open in the Northwest and the Northeast passages. The resulting itinerary from Tokyo to the US could be reduced by 4000kms. Trade is not the only economic opportunity that could result from the Arctic meltdown, as new fishing areas may be created. The Arctic is nonetheless a very fragile environment, which needs to be secured. The native populations in Canada, Alaska, Greenland and Norway for instance have legitimate concerns about the prospect of deterioration of their habitat.

In order to address these emerging challenges and to benefit from the new opportunities without endangering the environmental sustainability and peace of the region, governance will be a key issue. The current framework is mostly composed of the Arctic Council, the Northern Dimension and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). The Arctic Council is the most preferable instrument for governance in the region, as a legitimate and credible forum encompassing a wide variety of actors.

The European Union has recently claimed to play a bigger role in the Arctic but faces internal problems. There is a clear lack of coordination between its institutions. While the European Commission and the Council of the European Union have publicly said that the governance framework in place should not be altered, the European Parliament’s strategic document on the Arctic indicated that a new institution should be created. Shakti argued that some EU policies related to the Arctic in fact contradict each other; most notably the EU climate change policies focusing on renewable energies on the one hand and the interest in fossil resources made possible by the melting of the Arctic ice cap on the other. Moreover, Arctic states such as the US, Russia and Canada are less than enthusiastic about an EU intervention in the region, and Finland, Sweden and Denmark, all EU members, have their own priorities which are different from the EU’s.
The EU has a role to play in the region, yet it needs to make sure that its policies of energy extraction for instance are implemented with the greatest care for local actors and environmental concerns. The EU needs to ensure that sustainable resource management takes place in the Arctic, in partnership with the Arctic Council primarily, the US, Canada, NATO, indigenous populations and NGOs. The recent treaty between Russia and Norway has solved a decades-long territorial dispute over the Svalbard archipelago and is a clear indication that progress is possible in the region.

During the discussion, Shakti insisted that the EU needs to be involved in the Arctic, for economic, energy and environmental reasons for instance. New sea routes will be available for all, and other countries like China have shown great interest in these developments. Given this new strategic context, the EU should have a seat in the Arctic Council.

**Nicolò Sartori - ‘The militarization of energy security: a sustainable challenge for the EU?’**

Following Shakti’s presentation, Nicolò Sartori presented his paper on the military of energy security in a European context. His introductory remark was a historical reference; A century ago, the issue of energy was a salient one here in London and was already closely linked to security. In 1910, Winston Churchill decided that the Royal Navy would move away from coal and shift to oil. At that time, global powers used oil for power. Today they use power for oil.

Energy security has become a central issue for European security and defence in the recent years. Europe’s two main security organisations, NATO and the EU, have integrated energy security in their strategic documents, or are in the process of doing so.

The EU faces emerging threats related to energy, namely competition over unexplored areas, internal warfare in oil producing countries and international terrorism which could represent a future threat to the functioning of the market. Are military means the most appropriate ones to answer these problems? Competition over energy resources cannot be managed by military means. However, countries could intervene militarily to secure sea lanes and stabilize regions subject to conflicts. With regard to terrorism on European soil in particular, it is very hard to imagine that the military would be involved in the protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI) and oil and gas facilities.
Logistics and surveillance support can be useful but generally implies the reliance on civilian and private security forces.

In order to provide some useful help for energy security, the EU must nonetheless need a broader approach, based on strong political will. In terms of specific policy suggestions, the EU should mainly focus its activities on internal and market-based security and technology, by ensuring more independence in energy supply. Additionally, cooperation with NATO seems necessary in this sector. The EU should avoid duplicating any military efforts and must increase its coordination efforts with the Alliance.

Discussions examined energy policies at a national level. Italy was said to have a very good energy policy. The country has been quite active in securing deals with various suppliers including Libya, North Africa and Russia. The UK has not been as effective. It no longer exports large amounts of energy. One participant argued that the prospect of being supplied with gas from Iran, Russia and Central Asia in the near future is less enjoyable. Nuclear energy could be an interesting alternative but it is politically risky and would require significant investments, as the old reactors will go out of service soon. Within the EU, there are three or four groups of countries with different contexts and approaches to energy, which makes cooperation at a regional level very challenging.

With regard to energy markets in Europe, Nicolò argued that the gas market is more related to infrastructures, while oil is more global. Yet the gas market is becoming more similar to the oil market because of new technologies, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The interdependence of these markets should not be overlooked. European countries depend at 40% of their energy imports from Russia but on the other hand, Russia needs these consumers. Some scepticism was expressed about this interdependence issue with Russia. It was said that harder non-economic questions still remain.

Discussants insisted on the need to consolidate the European gas infrastructure. More should be spent on LNG terminals rather than pipeline projects such as Nabucco for example. Countries like Lithuania clearly need better transportation systems for their energy resources. With regards transport of energy, one participant warned that the current state of the Royal Navy in the UK after the SDSR would make naval requirements to protect sea lanes much more difficult.

In order to increase autonomy and sustainability of energy in Europe, some suggested that nuclear energy and shale gas could be a viable option. More
environmentally-friendly types of energy sources (solar, hydro, wind) are still unable to provide energy in a consistent way. In the next three decades, our dependence on non-renewable energies will grow as a result. This context makes R&D investments on renewable energies indispensable today.
SESSION 4 – THE NEW FRONTIERS – CYBER AND OUTER SPACE

The Global Commons include land, air, sea, space and now the artificial one, the cyber domain. Cyber security has been drawing an enormous attention in the last months. In the 1950-1960’s, there were endless discussions over nuclear policy and related concepts such as the prisoner’s dilemma. Will cyber deterrence be the equivalent for the next generation?

Marco Davì - ‘Cyber security: European strategies and prospects for global cooperation’

During his presentation, Marco Davì insisted that the cyber domain requires a cooperative approach. This domain is essentially a very democratic one: several actors can intervene and capability requirements to enter the field are very low. The cyber domain is of utmost strategic significance. Our societies have become highly dependent on networks, which have created diffuse vulnerability, both at the infrastructure and information levels. Cyber security blurs boundaries between the civilian and military spheres. A few relatively significant kinetic incidents have occurred in the past couple of years in Estonia, Georgia and more recently in Iran.

In order to complement and fill the gap in the protection against cyber threats and in the response to cyber attacks, we should pursue strategic dialogue within the existing institutional arrangements. We should not aim to create a new legal treaty but rather provide a platform for strategic dialogue, develop common knowledge that would allow much needed debate in the international community, and beyond the Alliance. The EU has a unique opportunity to take the lead in this matter, thanks to its institutional scope and its potential for comprehensive approach including civilian and military assets. One of the main objectives of the EU would be to increase the infrastructure’s resilience at all levels.

During the discussion, participants noted the difficulties associated with the regulation of cyber space because of the intense activity in the sector, the differences in the perception and appreciation of threats and the necessity to have a very broad approach in the response. Cyber security requires cooperation across a number of departments and policies beyond state boundaries.

The debate went on to address the links between the cyber domain and other sectors. As noted by one participant, two French military aircraft were recently
unable to take off because of a cyber attack on their command and control system. Additionally, it was argued that 90% of the Internet cables are underwater, hence the potential need for increased protection at sea.

Valerio Briani - ‘The EU as a force for stability in space – the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’

Valerio Briani shifted the debate from virtual to real space with his presentation of his paper on the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space. This document is relevant because it provides a first good step for governance. It is the first time that the EU proposes itself as a leader in outer space. Outer space is a crucial domain for geopolitics. In 1991, satellites were considered essential in the US winning effort during the Cold War. Since the 1950’s, satellites have been performing important tasks of surveillance. The space environment is challenged by different threats today. The recent proliferation of space activities has created a heightened risk of collisions. The first one occurred in February 2009.

The arms race or weaponisation in space has forced the EU to create an official document, which is not a legally binding and regulating treaty but rather a code of conduct for good rules. According to the document, a comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer space should be guided by the following principles: freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes, preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit, and due consideration for the legitimate defence interests of States. The document is pragmatic and aims to respond to the few aggressive activities encountered in outer space in the recent years (Chinese attack on NASA tests and the US response; prospects of involvement from India, Pakistan and Russia). The final step of creating a global intergovernmental conference on the topic to improve transparency and communication is within reach.

Valerio insisted during the Q&A session that international consensus is in everyone’s interest in the outer space. Similar to nuclear, once the game starts, it is over and everyone knows it, and even more so than the technology gap between the US and the rest of the world is not as wide as the general public could expect. Several countries have the capability to shutdown satellites. Given this strategic context, a strategic international dialogue is a realistic prospect.
In conclusion of the session, it was noted that we need to do a lot more work on these relatively new issues, especially on the definition of attacks, legal frameworks, and classical ideas of deterrence. To what degree are we up to something new? The US is more advanced than other global powers in these sectors, with more expertise and resources than anyone else. The priority in the next years will be to persuade the US to go on the same multilateral path it has opted for on global nuclear disarmament.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion of the fourth workshop of the European Security and Defence Forum, a keynote speech was given by the Secretary General of the OSCE Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut on the European security architecture and the new defining moment for its main pillars, NATO, the EU and a revived OSCE. The Ambassador’s speech rounded-up this whole-day workshop and provided a useful insight and challenging remarks on the themes discussed.

Throughout the day, participants addressed a number of key issues and challenges on the European security and defence architecture. According to participants, EU-NATO cooperation will remain essential in the future and much remains to be achieved at a political/strategic and a military/operational level to accelerate the progress that has been achieved since the beginnings of EU defence and security policy back in 1998. The Franco-British treaties signed on 2 November 2010 offered an example of how practical cooperation can be achieved on a smaller scale thanks to leadership and new thinking.

For further improvements to be made in this field at a broader level within and between NATO and the EU, disagreements between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus will need to be solved at a high political level. Clear strategic paths will need to be taken, as much in NATO as in the EU, on Turkey (the road to EU accession will need to be clarified) and other issues such as the organisations’ relations with the Russian Federation. Relations with Russia are and will remain one of the key aspects of the energy, governance and military challenges related to the Arctic region, as well as broader energy security. Additionally, participants suggested that there is a clear need for a more coherent and consistent approach to energy security and cyber security in Europe, while notable progress has been made on space security from the EU perspective. Overall, in relative terms, Europe is getting smaller as the world is getting bigger –there is therefore an increased need for a clear strategic vision on the key issues discussed at this workshop.