Book reviews

International Relations theory

Queer International Relations: sovereignty, sexuality and the will to knowledge. By Cynthia Weber. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016. 266pp. £64.00. ISBN 978 0 19979 585 7. Available as e-book.

Questions of borders, boundaries and orders animate this ground-breaking book from Cynthia Weber; throughout, Weber draws attention to the ways in which knowledge is produced in, and about, both 'international relations' and 'International Relations' (IR), and the fidelity that is demanded (mostly implicitly) to conventional configurations of power, legitimacy and subjectivity. These rely on the shared fiction of meaningful boundaries and borders (conceptual, figurative and actual) that cannot—and should not—be transgressed.

Weber proceeds from the recognition that '"queer" and "IR" have for too long been treated as separate (disciplinary) domains of enquiry, especially around issues of sovereignty and sexuality' (p. 13). The book offers a compelling series of insights into the co-constitution of sexuality and sovereignty, woven together artfully to demonstrate 'how "sovereign man" as "sexualised sovereign man" functions in existing and emerging sexualised understandings of intimate, national, regional, and international relations that *both sustain and threaten to suspend* traditional understandings of sovereignty' (p. 198, emphasis in original).

The title of chapter two, 'Queer intellectual curiosity as International Relations method', pays homage to feminist IR scholarship (through its reconfiguration of Cynthia Enloe's 'feminist curiosity'). The particular contribution of this chapter is Weber's explanation of how she deploys Donna Haraway's concept of 'figuration' (pp. 28–33). Weber's account is worth quoting at length: 'figurations are distillations of shared meanings in forms or images. They do not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a signified preexists them. Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that bring specific worlds into being' (p. 28). The immediate theoretical utility of such a construct is significant: 'figuration' deftly sidesteps the connotation of 'the real' inherent in the concept of 'representation', the concept with which much analysis in this vein has worked in International Relations (see, for example, the works of Roxanne Lynn Doty or David Campbell).

The four substantive analytical chapters address, in turn: the figuration of the 'perverse homosexual' in historical and contemporary contexts (chapter three); the figuration of the 'perverse homosexual' in specific global political contexts (chapter four); the figuration of the 'normal homosexual' through discourse about 'the LGBT' or 'gay rights holder' (chapter five); and the 'normal *and/or* perverse homosexual' who 'provokes questions about borders and bordering practices by living on/as rather than just moving through those borders that attempt to define him/her/them and confine him/her/them to *either* the normal *or* the perverse' (p. 159).

International Affairs **93**: 1 (2017) 199–250
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The analysis in chapter four is particularly engaging. Here, Weber explains the figuration of the 'unwanted im/migrant' as the embodiment of 'civilising development on the move' (p. 76). Weber shows how the im/migrant is the uncontained and uncontainable excess of the development enterprise which is founded on sexualized logics of civilization and modernization. By traversing the boundary between developing and developed worlds, the im/migrant confounds the logic of the boundary; he 'corrupts … [and] directly threatens modernization and development projects and the Western (neo)imperial "sovereign, civilised, developed man" who licenses them to contain "developing man" in the global South' (p. 84). Weber produces a similarly persuasive analysis of the 'al Qaeda terrorist', who puts 'sexual barbarism on the move' (p. 101), arguing that the construction of 'dangerous mobility' reinforces the depoliticization of 'heteronormatively understood homes, homelands, and sexualities' (p. 102).

Chapter five explores the politics of sexuality in the context of neo-liberal capitalism. Drawing on the works of Lisa Duggin and Jasbir Puar, Weber shows how the figuration of the 'normal homosexual'—using the vehicle of Hillary Clinton's 2011 speech on gay rights being human rights—relies on 'desires around neoliberal domesticity' (p. 110). This chapter presents probably the clearest and most accessible argument about the sexual logics of global politics; Weber shows how Clinton 'divides the world into good gay-friendly states and bad homophobic states' (p. 135), which then has clear implications for geopolitics and diplomacy.

In her introduction to the volume, Weber notes that 'most IR scholars regularly undertheorise how the will to knowledge about sexualities is part of what makes games of power possible' (p. 2). This book not only demonstrates the validity of this claim through careful explication of a number of figurations of sexuality in global politics, but also provides scholars with the theoretical and conceptual tools with which to proceed in their own analysis of 'games of power'. It is an important contribution that deserves to be read most widely.

Laura Shepherd, UNSW Australia (the University of New South Wales)

Six authors in search of justice: engaging with political transitions. By Michael Newman. London: Hurst. 2016. 256pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 632 9.

In 2012 Michael Newman sat down to write an academic study of transitional justice. That involved an assessment of judicial and non-judicial measures that may be taken to address legacies of human rights abuses in countries moving from repressive regimes to more democratic societies. These measures may involve different mixes of retribution, criminal procedures, projects of memory and recognition and reconciliation. The mix depends on the history of the country, the nature of the overthrow and who is in power.

The words did not flow, he says, until he began to study the works of Albert Camus written after the Second World War, as France came to terms with the aftermath of the German occupation. There Camus struggles with finding the right response to German atrocities and French collaboration. Newman went on to read the work of Nadine Gordimer from South Africa, whose subtle novels illustrate the effect on individuals, first of living in the socially unjust world of apartheid and then in the unsettling transition from apartheid to African majority rule. How should past wrongs be recognized and how far should retribution go?

These writings opened up the justice issues at a deeper and more personal level and this persuaded Newman to carry the project further. In addition to Camus and Gordimer, the book examines the writings of Victor Serge in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Ngugi wa Thiong'o on independent Kenya's treatment of the Mau Mau, Jorge Semprun on Spain's response to Franco and Ariel Dorfman on post-Pinochet Chile.

As one might expect, common themes emerge, although each situation is individual and the texture of the particular historical experience, the smells and the colours, appear naturally from the writing. The outcome in most cases depends on the balance between those who want retribution, or at least recognition of their suffering, and those who do not need or want to penalize the perpetrators too heavily, especially if this risks the transition. Amnesty for the perpetrators was a condition of transition in both Spain and Chile. And this, though they might agree with the necessity to make the compromise, left the victims, at a deeper level, unsatisfied.

Ariel Dorfman's play, *Death and the maiden*, vividly represents the dilemmas. Paulina, the main protagonist, has been tortured in the past by a man who played Schubert's *Death and the maiden* while raping and assaulting her. She recognizes this man, Roberto, who is brought to the house by her partner, Geraldo, who has been put in charge of a commission to investigate past abuses, but only in the case of those who died. While Geraldo is out, she manages to tie up Roberto and threaten him with a knife. She forces him to confess, although he maintains he has no memory of her. Geraldo says she must accept the commission's limitations for the sake of the nation. She asks why the victims are always the ones who have to give way.

The newly independent African government in Kenya chose not to recognize the suffering of Mau Mau suspects at British hands or to promote recognition and reconciliation between 'loyalists' and Mau Mau. It was considered more important to keep on good terms with the remaining white settlers and the British government. Ngugi was a tireless recorder of these situations, showing in his novels the distortions to community life induced by colonialism and then perpetuated by the new African elite. He tried to write in the vernacular to carry his message deeper—and was detained as a result.

When the needs of the victims are not met, they tend to resurface later. Spain is now beginning to allow some discussion of the atrocities of both sides during the civil war and of the repression under Franco which followed. Michelle Bachelet, when she became president of Chile, allowed gardens of memory to be planted and opened a Museum of Memory in Santiago in 2009. And some Mau Mau claimants have now gained compensation from the British government for sufferings during the emergency.

All the writers cited lived through periods of transition and used their work to project situations and beliefs to a wider audience, often through autobiography and memoir. Newman's approach remains political and he makes clear that he is using his authors to illuminate political dilemmas and is not embarking on literary criticism. This seems entirely justified given his project. But one welcome consequence of the book is that it gives an introduction to and context for the work of some exceptional writers, not all of them well known. Readers may be drawn to study them further.

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International history

Eisenhower and Cambodia: diplomacy, covert action, and the origins of the Second Indochina War. By William J. Rust. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2016. 374pp. £36.95. ISBN 978 0 81316 742 8. Available as e-book.

At the height of the US intervention in Vietnam, during the mid-1960s to early-1970s, Cambodia was considered a 'sideshow'. More than a decade earlier, Cambodia was a 'sideshow of a sideshow'. This is the period examined in *Eisenhower and Cambodia*; but as William J. Rust

convincingly demonstrates, there was no shortage of diplomatic intrigue, policy frustration and international plotting over this relatively unknown Cold War battleground. Although the book is principally focused on US–Cambodian relations during the mid to late 1950s, and on Washington's rather difficult dealings with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, it also offers a fascinating look at the clandestine role of South Vietnam and Thailand in seeking to undermine the Cambodian monarch, the limited ability of the CIA to promote 'regime change' and the even more limited influence the US had on its regional anti-communist allies. The book further explores the extent to which US foreign policy was undermined by numerous objectives and organizations working at cross-purposes, and provides a useful case-study of the Eisenhower administration's response to the emergence of neutralism in the 'Third World'.

While Rust's extensive investigation into the US archives offers readers a more sophisticated and detailed narrative of the US's role in Cambodia during this period than any previous work on the subject, the author acknowledges that the lack of access to still-classified CIA material has meant that a more conclusive treatment remains to be written. That being said, Rust does a commendable job collating and evaluating the available material, especially with respect to the US's role in an unsuccessful coup attempt against Sihanouk in 1959 and the numerous plotting that preceded it. Sadly, the key sources that are not included in this study, assuming they exist at all, are the records of the South Vietnamese and Thai governments, particularly those of their intelligence services. Whereas a mainstream image exists of South Vietnam and Thailand as countries with no shortage of coups occurring internally, there is much less awareness of these two countries as launching pads for coups elsewhere in the region. As Rust highlights, leaders in Saigon and Bangkok often had their own foreign policy agendas that conflicted with Washington's. With respect to Cambodia, their approach to promoting anti-communism was viewed by the Americans as unhelpful, if not outright counterproductive. Indeed, it was precisely because these countries were generally seen as US pawns, rather than actors that often ignored American efforts to constrain their activities, that Washington still received the blame for their actions. Admittedly though, the US was often unwilling to sanction its allies, fearing it would undermine or alienate them.

Rust's account is notable for illustrating how US officials were repeatedly swept up in intrigues not of their own making and over which they had little control, regardless of popular images to the contrary about US omnipotence. Such was the complex nature of relationships, interests, policies and priorities within the US government and among its regional allies that it would prove highly challenging even for a first-class game theoretician to come up with a winning formula. On the one hand, the US wanted to promote its anti-communist agenda in an ostensibly neutral country led by a monarch who seemed to lean towards communism—an awkward situation in itself. On the other hand, the more hard-line but clumsy anti-communist efforts of America's regional clients were likely to undermine that agenda. Living with Sihanouk was far from ideal, but engaging in plots to overthrow him that had little chance of success was also problematic. The result, as Rust shows, was to seek to please everyone, but failing to please anyone: an enduring policy dilemma that remains highly relevant today. Though there may have been missed opportunities to improve US–Cambodia relations, or more precisely US relations with Sihanouk, *Eisenhower and Cambodia* showcases the wider regional complications and internal bureaucratic interests that ensured that consistent and coherent policy formulation, even in a relative backwater, was nearly impossible.

If there is one weakness of this book, it is the title. Eisenhower rarely makes an appearance—hardly surprising given Cambodia's relatively low priority—nor is there much

discussion about the 'origins' of the Second Indochina War—a hugely contentious issue in its own right. That said, *Eisenhower and Cambodia* should not only be considered the standard work on US–Cambodia relations during this period, but it is also a highly useful text for understanding US foreign policy formulation during the Eisenhower years, Washington's often fraught relationship with its anti-communist allies, and the limits of covert action.

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The tears of the Rajas: mutiny, money and marriage in India 1805–1905. By Ferdinand Mount. London: Simon & Schuster. 2015. 784pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 47112 945 2. Available as e-book.

India conquered: Britain's Raj and the chaos of empire. By Jon Wilson. London: Simon & Schuster. 2016. 576pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 47110 125 0. Available as e-book.

Among the stained glass windows of Westminster Abbey is a memorial to Donald Smith, Lord Strathcona, who was born in 1820 and died in 1914, commended as a 'great Canadian imperialist and philanthropist'. The word 'imperialist' leaps out as an anachronism to the viewer of 2016, but was a high commendation in 1919 when the window was dedicated. In subsequent years the British empire collapsed, was transformed to form the geographical basis of the modern Commonwealth, and has received differing treatments at the hands of historians and biographers, above all since Indian independence and the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947. Niall Ferguson's 2003 television series and book on *Empire* (Allen Lane, 2003) was dismissed in a *Guardian* article at the time by the author of one of the two books reviewed here, Jon Wilson, as presenting 'the acceptable face of imperial brutality … based on a version of the history of empire that is simply wrong'. As the 70th anniversary of the end of British rule over India approaches in 2017, the polemic over whether the whole venture was, on balance, good or bad, still rages on, with more (from William Dalrymple, *inter alia*) in the pipeline.

The two books under review (published in 2015 and 2016 respectively) both challenge any remaining vestige of a glorious interpretation of empire, but from different ends of the spectrum. Ferdinand Mount's *The tears of the Rajas* charts the history of his family of Scots-men and women who played a variety of roles in India in the period 1805–1905, described against a background of all but forgotten massacres and partial military victories—during which Mount's great grandfather, General Sir John Low, rose through British military ranks to fulfil his imperial mission in particularly gory circumstances and detail. Jon Wilson's *India conquered* charts the fragility of the conquest and administration of (or 'dominion over' in the language of the time) India from the perspective of a wider social scope of actors from the seventeenth century onwards. The work concludes, as does the book's subtitle ('Britain's Raj and the chaos of empire'), that imperial rule was more smoke, mirrors and improvisation than a reality of control.

That this 'dominion' expanded and lasted so long, however, did reflect the success of the official propaganda and social hierarchies established by this chimera of control, which prevailed for much longer in the eyes of the British who were part of it. My own mother, who was brought up in southern India in the 1930s and 1940s as the daughter of a nonconformist missionary, still maintains that 'it wasn't all bad'—and if visits back to her old school in the Nilgiri Hills that still functions as a Christian academy for girls are anything to go by, the current and entirely Indian incumbents would in large part agree. It was the conception and execution (often literally) of the imperial mission, situated much further north (and

run originally out of Calcutta, then Delhi and New Delhi), that was at fault, not so much the daily human detail of what might unkindly be called the 'hangers on' of empire. My mother characterizes them as the aid workers of their day, Oxfam and Christian Aid both being inventions of the aftermath of the Second World War. Seen as misguided or forgotten back in Blighty as the missionaries now are, it was these British pioneers who set up and ran hospitals and schools for the lowest in the Hindu caste system or the tribal peoples of southern India whom no one otherwise sought to help.

Wilson charts the accidents and chaotic improvisation that led Britain to seek to conquer a whole subcontinent, but focuses far more directly on the engineers, military officers and civil servants who served British trading and administrative interests than on the well-being or interests of the Indians on the receiving end. The latter were at best an inconvenience, or if in direct rebellion (more often mutiny) were to be dealt with as harshly as possible to dissuade others. The railways were never built for the convenience of the local population—even if the railways have subsequently served independent India well. The large number of Scots who volunteered to be good imperialists—like Lord Strathcona in Canada—suffered in the task, but clearly far less than those they subjugated and subdued to the point of slaughter in many cases. However, conquest is also a story of local complicity and greed from which the Rajas in both Wilson's and Mount's accounts do not emerge honourably. 'If British policies were bad, it does not necessarily mean that those of the Mughals were good', writes Rishi Raj, reviewing Wilson's book in India's *Financial Express* (9 October 2016).

Both books are replete with detail, but even at more than 700 pages in the case of Mount's tale of his ancestors, do not somehow capture the whole story. Judging a previous era in the light of modern values makes the past seem far more brutal than anything that might be conceivable now. Yet we live in times where the slaughter of civilians continues in the Middle East at the hands of governments as well as rebels, in conflicts that might equally reflect a struggle over spoils and territorial control. In other words, the good, the bad and the indifferent co-habit, often uncomfortably, at any time in history.

Claire Spencer, Chatham House, UK

The poisoned well: empire and its legacy in the Middle East. By Roger Hardy. London: Hurst. 2016. 272pp. £17.50. ISBN 978 1 84904 639 8. Available as e-book.

Roger Hardy offers readers a historical narrative to explain the sources of violence and breakdown in the Middle East. In ten concise chapters, he provides a background reading of the period in between the defeat and dismantling of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of postwar independent states—such as Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and their neighbours—many of which are in their turn disintegrating in front of our eyes, unleashing endless violence and bloodshed. Between the end of the First World War, when imperial powers drew up a new regional map, and the end of the Second World War, when the British and French empires collapsed and the independent Middle Eastern states emerged, is the period during which European imperialists laid the foundations of the current troubles, according to Hardy, who starts the introduction as follows: 'The crises and conflicts of today's Middle East are rooted in the colonial past. The Israel–Palestinian dispute, radical Islamism, Iran's hostility towards the West, the fraught relationship between Turkey and Europe, and between France and Algeria—all these, and a host of other issues, have their origin in the era of European colonial rule' (p. 1).

This historical drama is narrated through the memoirs of political leaders, diplomats and journalists who witnessed those times, making this book highly readable and rich in

the details that make complex developments accessible. One such amazing story is that of Amal al-Atrash, a Druze princess from Syria, better known to the Arab public as Esmahan (or Asmahan), who once competed with Umm Kalthum as singer and actress and whose role in politics and espionage, and unconventional personal life, make her a larger than life character.

The story begins in 1919, with the Turkish feminist writer Halidé Edib, who once served as the translator of Mustafa Kemal. This choice—to start modern Middle Eastern history in 1919, when the Ottoman empire had disappeared—itself predetermines the analysis: the modern history of the Middle East starts after the First World War and current problems should be traced back to those formative years. In this, Hardy follows the consensus among historians, which is also the point of view of Turkish nationalist and Arab Ba'athist historic narratives. Middle East historiography still poses the problem of how to bridge the great chasm that was the First World War, making sense of the evolution of the region's history before and after. In other words, Middle Eastern historiography is still struggling to work out continuities and changes between the centuries of Ottoman rule, the colonial period and the emergence of independent states in the post-Second World War period.

Hardy mentions the fact that it was the Committee of Union and Progress leaders—the party in power in Istanbul—that decided to enter the First World War and not the imperialists who attacked the Ottoman empire for territorial ambitions, but he does not integrate this fact in his analysis. He also mentions the Armenian Genocide, while avoiding to use the term, but again the mass killing and expulsion of over 4 million Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians—twice the size of the total population of Syria at the time—does not have consequences on the rest of the narrative. Halidé Edib, who during the war was enthusiastically engaged in the genocidal project by converting Armenian orphans to make them Turkish and Muslim, is seen as a progressive woman struggling for national independence from western colonialism.

The collapse of the Ottoman empire—and the genocides and mass deportations that followed—was such a traumatic event for the entire region that we are still unable to grasp its depth and suggest narratives integrating those experiences in making the modern Middle East. Yet there has been some progress made in better understanding Ottoman history, its successes and failures. We need to integrate in our broader understanding the continuities and discontinuities of post-Ottoman order. Hardy suggests a history of the short-lived British and French colonial domination over the Middle East, but an account of the root causes of the current collapse of the political order of that region is yet to be written.

Vicken Cheterian, Webster University Geneva, Switzerland

Governance, law and ethics

Debating the future of the 'Responsibility to Protect': the evolution of a moral norm. By Pinar Gozen Ercan. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 202pp. £52.66. ISBN 578 1 13752 426 3. Available as e-book.

R2P is neither a dying norm nor a functioning roadmap towards more effective interventions. As argued by Pinar Gozen Ercan, R2P is a moral norm that is a useful tool, but its lack of effectiveness mirrors the currently dysfunctional international intervention regime which is in need of dramatic reform.

Although the first few chapters of Ercan's book may be familiar to those immersed in R2P debates, they offer a solid backdrop for the reasoning behind the argument for the need

for larger UN reform. Against this, the second part of the book painstakingly traces the institutionalization of R2P and discusses some of the relevant reports and cases. However, it is the final section of the book, an examination of current proposals for change and a way forward, that is the most original and offers insightful contributions for scholars and practitioners.

The United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, is notably ill-equipped to address the most difficult conflicts of our time. As the book observes, the current emphasis on prevention attempts to bypass the need for change. Ercan argues that 'R2P lite', or narrowing the scope of R2P and the emphasis on prevention, is unrealistic and faint-hearted (p. 148). The fundamental problem is the divided Security Council. Ercan depicts the Security Council as a 'toddler going through its "terrible twos" and into its "horrible threes" … when the interests of the members of the Council are not affected or when there is something not to like, no one (or no grave humanitarian concern) can make it do what ought to be done' (p. 147).

The author makes a good case for reconsidering R2P's dependence on the Security Council and for placing R2P under the mandate of the General Assembly (p. 125). She notes that divisions within the Security Council and the veto powers of its five permanent members have prevented a just application of R2P. Ercan also makes an excellent case for enhancing the relationship between R2P and the International Criminal Court (ICC), equipping R2P with new powers. R2P's implementation can be assisted through the ICC for determination whether an authority has manifestly failed to protect its population; and second through enforcement, by beginning proceedings on alleged crimes (p. 137).

There remain, however, fundamental questions on how to make these changes possible, given the resistance to reform, and also on making General Assembly resolutions relevant in situations when states are already failing in their responsibility to protect their populations from atrocities. Conflicts in the Middle East, most notably in Syria and the Israel–Palestine conflict, are primary cases where the UN has been unable to build a consensus or take effective measures that would reduce the vulnerability of civilians. Lack of Security Council action may just be replaced with disregarded resolutions coming from the General Assembly. A stronger link between R2P and the ICC, as proposed by Ercan, could prove a more powerful tool. However, once again the ICC relies on the cooperation of states and is commonly perceived to be a tool of punishment rather than protection.

Perhaps one way to move forward is to unpack the toolbox of coercive intervention and reach a consensus on the most effective tools for ending atrocities. Bombing campaigns seldom improve protection and the use of the military commonly has unintended effects, for example on women, making traditional security tools not appropriate for prioritizing the protection of the entire population. Ercan's book works on the presumption that a better functioning UN regime, flowing from decisions taken by the General Assembly, would take measures that prioritize the protection of the most vulnerable populations. Perhaps, but that still leaves the question of enforcement.

Responsibility to protect vulnerable populations is a fundamental issue of our time and consequently Ercan's analysis on the future of R2P is a critical contribution, of interest to scholars and practitioners both. Although the book does not address key questions like appropriate coercive tools or how to tackle the current divisions particularly in the Middle East, Ercan makes a valuable case on the evolution of the moral norm and reforms that could make R2P more relevant and effective. A norm-centric analysis of intervention moves us closer to understanding the necessary steps towards a consensus on compliance with R2P. Reaching a consensus on the third pillar of R2P and the application of the norms

in divided contexts remains the largest hurdle, but is also vital for creating a more effective intervention regime.

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Conflict, security and defence

Outsourcing war: the just war tradition in the age of military privatization. By Amy E. Eckert. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2016. 200pp. Index. £24.30. ISBN 978 0 80145 420 2. Available as e-book.

The private military and security industry has shifted and changed in the decades since the end of the Cold War. In view of the developments in the provision of private force, Amy E. Eckert unpicks some of the challenges posed by the industry to understandings of armed conflict. In *Outsourcing war*, Eckert specifically explores the relevance, or otherwise, of just war principles to the ongoing use of the private military and security industry. Although Eckert's work centres on an empirical study of private military companies (PMCs), her theoretical claims provide the book's most crucial insights. Eckert concludes that just war theory can evolve to engage and address shifting political dynamics, including the roles of PMCs in conflict.

Early in the book, Eckert establishes that although statist assumptions shape many approaches to just war theory, the principles that underpin moral debates around war are not inherently tied to the modern state. While the state remains undeniably significant, severing the just war tradition from its state-based constraints allows for a focus on a range of actors, including PMCs. The just war tradition has been shaped by the connection between political authority and prevailing forms of force; Eckert examines the history of the tradition and its relationship to the state's consolidation of the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The recent 'reprivatization of force' (p. 13), Eckert suggests, marks an erosion of the state's monopoly over the use of force. This erosion prompts Eckert's exploration of the place of PMCs within the just war tradition, and, she argues, necessitates a reconsideration of just war principles as currently understood. In an international political system where private actors play various roles, the strength of Eckert's work lies in her claims around the potential of just war theory to evolve to address such actors.

In her application of just war principles to PMCs, Eckert demonstrates the usefulness of the private military and security industry as a case through which to explore debates around the ongoing worth of the just war tradition. In chapter three, she examines what the use of PMCs may mean for the application of *jus ad bellum* considerations that shape decisions to go to war. Eckert particularly focuses on the implications of PMCs for deliberations around proportionality and reasonable chance of success, noting that such calculations are made more complex with the addition of PMCs. Nonetheless, Eckert concludes that the state engaging PMCs is ultimately responsible for upholding *jus ad bellum* principles. In the case of *jus in bello* concerns, however, this determination of responsibility is less straightforward.

In chapter four, Eckert outlines challenges posed by PMCs to *jus in bello* constraints around appropriate conduct in war. She notes that transnational PMCs are independent of state military institutions and practices of control over the use of force, and that they problematize the clear divide between military and civilian actors. Thus, the use of PMCs in conflict situations challenges the normative understandings that inform *jus in bello* rules and the law of armed conflict. Eckert explores the impact of PMCs for considerations of non-combatant immunity and perceptions of proportionality. She concludes that although

states retain some responsibility for ensuring compliance with *jus in bello* rules in the face of this normative challenge, the firms themselves and their employees must also hold themselves to account.

Although Eckert's engagement with the private military and security industry is thoughtful, it suffers, like similar accounts, from the inability of published work to update with the industry. Thus, Eckert's empirical study does not reach beyond the industry's peak in Iraq and Afghanistan. I would have appreciated Eckert's insights on more recent shifts within the industry and its practices, especially with regard to regulation and accountability, and her perspective on what these mean in light of her conclusions. Nonetheless, the important contributions of Eckert's work, sparking debates about the ongoing usefulness of just war theory, are significant beyond discussions of PMCs. A broader audience should thus be encouraged to engage with the ideas raised and conclusions put forth within this book with regard to the relevance of just war theory to the changing public–private divide in warfare, evident in the use of PMCs and other actors. As Eckert notes, the future of just war theory will be characterized by shifts in the theory to account for changes in the international system and in the use of force.

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Maritime strategy and global order: markets, resources, security. Edited by Daniel Moran and James A. Russell. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 2016. 336pp. Index. £46.50. ISBN 978 1 62616 072 9. Available as e-book.

In *Maritime strategy and global order* the editors propose a multidisciplinary approach in order to give some form to the idea of strategy as related to the seas. Methods from history, political science, political economy, case-studies and country-studies are all deployed in the various chapters, with different degrees of success. The volume is a mixed bag methodologically as well as conceptually.

One of the first problems is the contributors' lack of rigour in defining strategy, and maritime strategy in particular. The context and introduction to the collection are underresearched and undervalued in their appreciation of what the maritime system is, how it works or has worked at various points in time, and how it is or is not therefore comparable to other strategic concepts—land, air, economic or diplomatic. As such, there is a sense of shallowness or superficiality about exactly what the point and purpose of the volume are, why the individual chapters have the focus that they do and how they create a coherent whole. The study favours an emphasis on the naval element of the maritime domain to an overwhelming extent, while endeavouring to engage with the ideas of markets, economics and global finance to achieve a maritime strategic security nexus. The chapters fall under such headings as 'Long war—long peace', 'Regional security' and 'Architecture', but there is little to indicate what those mean, how they link or consolidate the chapters included under them, or make a connection between the three areas mentioned in the title. One could reasonably expect that if the title claims to see markets, resources and security being connected to achieve a maritime strategy, then those should form the organizational basis of the work. As such, the melding of the claimed constituent parts does not produce a convincing holistic picture of the way in which maritime strategy is the key enabler of a global economic system. It addresses the place of naval power, at times, in varying conditions, with varying degrees of success, in that system, but little more.

The individual chapters vary in terms of their levels of academic rigour and clarity of argument. Those on Britain's role in driving forward the globalization of the seas in the first

half of the twentieth century and the subsequent impact of the Cold War on that process, are among the more interesting. A useful exploration of conditions in the South China Sea today, with a focus on the three declared areas of exploration, is also worthy of note, as is the contribution on the relationship between maritime law and maritime strategy. The others are either too generalist or too underresearched to add much to readers' understanding of the combination of various maritime elements into a greater maritime strategy creation process. The seemingly random nature of the regional and architectural topics, as well as varying chronological focus within the individual chapters, adds to the confusion regarding the principles or tenets of maritime strategy. Disregard for the economic, political, social and technological attributes of specific ages or eras (for example the banking, transport or communication revolutions), leaves the reader unconvinced at times of the legitimacy of the claims made. A good example is the chapter on maritime strategy in the period from 1914 to 1945, that fleshes out various national naval perspectives but predominantly focuses on the Anglo-American experience. However, the emphasis on American dominance or influence in the era ignores decades of historical analysis and evidence that sees this as a period of British control and dominance, not just because of the country's naval power, but because of its empire's maritime resilience, predicated on credit creation, financial control, currency influence and trade bloc management, all facets of the period ignored in the author's haste to get to U-boats, convoys and naval battles.

Overall then, there are some nuggets to be lifted from the volume and it gives readers a hint of how to address the question of defining, and refining, the concept of maritime strategy and the linkages between naval power, markets, resources, financial power, technology and the creation of a national security strategy that is predominantly maritime. However, the book should be seen as the starting-point from which other scholarship can proceed to enhance or refute some of the initial explorations undertaken here.

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Collateral damage: a candid history of a peculiar form of death. By Frederik Rosen. London: Hurst. 2016. 205pp. £16.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 407 3.

The aim of this book is to explore where collateral damage fits among the established notions of authority, state and governance, considering along the way the morality of the proportionality rule as such. From an 'original sin' starting-point, the concept of collateral damage is seen to have grown from the ambiguity created by human imperfection. The proportionality rule accommodates legal space for imperfect judgements, skills and weapons (p. 7).

Rosen describes in stark terms the distinction between terror bombing and collateral damage: victims of the latter are anonymous and unseen. Out of sometimes sweeping language, relevant trends emerge quickly and clearly, such as the increasing centrality of law in targeting. The author puts collateral damage and the associated proportionality rule in a sociological context and sets against these the practical and ambiguous realities of urban warfare. Risk emerges as the critically important feature.

Network-centric warfare's decentralized decision-making drives responsibility downwards and, as Rosen argues, by understanding the perspectives of those involved, rich veins of thought can be uncovered. So will human rights law come to the rescue by influencing collateral damage assessment? Analysing the implications of the right to life, the duty to investigate under human rights law is properly presented as a matter that states must consider increasingly pre-deployment. The author must be right that no customary

obligation to compensate for collateral damage currently exists and considers whether it might emerge in the future. This reviewer rather doubts it.

Drones are seen to have a role to play. Increased time on and proximity to target may enhance the ability of attackers to take precautions and thus to limit collateral damage; the hitherto unforeseen may become foreseen. This reviewer wonders, however, whether cyber interference might disturb that otherwise encouraging prospect.

The book then explores the philosophical context, with the author commenting that 'who may claim collateral damage equals the question of who may rule the world' (p. 80). Just war theory, theodicy, the doctrine of double effect and utilitarianism collectively suggest collateral damage as merely a reflection of more general authority and governance imperfections (p. 107). So how, Rosen asks in chapter six, is it seen? Apparently not in the same way as the sacrifice associated with a soldier's death in battle but rather as a matter for polite regret for an essentially invisible event inflicted as of right.

Rosen then examines the notion of accident, contrasting it on philosophical grounds with collateral damage's features of 'notoriousness, general decisions, foreseenness, calculatedness, and authorization from sovereign authority' (p. 130) and accordingly concludes that accident speaks to the local level while collateral damage has qualities of the global or national about it, such that the former is descriptive while the latter is, as noted earlier, imbued with a claim of right. Complications with such a phenomenon arise of course if, as current trends might suggest, authority is fragmenting, becoming increasingly devolved and even privatized. What value collateral damage if the actor is no longer the centralized authority—God or the state—that the inception of the notion presupposed? And so it emerges that this concept, which epitomizes controversies around authority, governance, human agency and morality, also is the threshold between centralized and decentralized authority. One is left with the impression that future attitudes to collateral damage will have a lot to do with the degree to which authority and governance remain as centralized, identifiable features of societies in general. When respect for the deity wanes and state authority dissipates, the assumptions on which its acceptability is based, it is argued, evaporate. Readers of this book may never quite see collateral damage in the same light again.

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Political economy, economics and development

The urban imperative: towards competitive cities. Edited by Edward Glaeser and Abha Joshi-Ghani. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2015. 463pp. £32.99. ISBN 978 0 19945 777 9.

Urbanization has not been central to the agenda of scholars of international politics, who have largely viewed their object of analysis as the system of states and tended to dismiss cities as they are subnational entities. However, so profound has been the urban growth of the last four decades that this situation is beginning to change. Global urbanization is arguably the key trend of the early twenty-first century, and this is a critical moment: the forms that it takes now will lay down patterns that will shape international affairs for decades to come. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, we have become a predominantly urban species—a profound change from the rural world of just 100 years ago. Over 3 billion more people are expected to move to cities by 2030 and urban space is expected to triple over the next 30 years. Much of this will take place in the developing world—and it is here that massive growth often coincides with weak governance capacity. But, more than this, urban-

ization is on a vast scale, and the urban forms that are emerging—megacities, transcontinental urban corridors—are often transnational in reach. Whether it be their centrality to the global economy, their global environmental impact or their increasing influence on global governance structures, cities are becoming impossible to ignore in discussions about the shape and governance of the international system.

This new edited volume seeks to intervene in the policy discussions about how we can shape urbanization to create more productive, liveable, equitable and sustainable cities. It is a result of a World Bank initiative, part of the bank's strategy to strengthen its ties with policy-makers, the private sector, research institutions and NGOs. Its editors are the Harvard economist Edward Glaeser, who has written prolifically and engagingly about the unique generative economic power of cities, and Abha Joshi-Ghani, who is Director for Knowledge Exchange at the World Bank and has been involved with its urban development programmes for many years. Their backgrounds set the tone of the book, which sees the market as the most powerful mechanism for the problems that mass urbanization throws up, and works from the premise that urbanization is absolutely key to the continued transition from poverty to prosperity. The chosen contributors largely reflect this: they are predominantly economists or from major consultancy firms, McKinsey & Company's work figures prominently in the book; the sociologist Saskia Sassen is a rare exception.

The book covers a variety of topics: cities and productivity; national urban systems and optimal city size; urban entrepreneurship; informal urbanization and slums; inequality; segregation; migration; infrastructure; the relationship between public and private authority; financing models; sustainability; technology; and housing. The individual chapters contain fascinating discussions and the authors are deeply knowledgeable about their topics. Although a great many useful policy-relevant insights are generated, the starting-point of the majority of the contributors gives the book a certain technocratic slant, and works to exclude some of the more broad political questions that attend the character of contemporary urbanization. This book has clear policy relevance and is targeted at those seeking to shape urbanization. It does indeed offer a number of useful tools, benchmarks and insights, drawing on the experience of the authors to assess what works for cities, and what doesn't. What it doesn't try to do is reflect on the broad political and historical questions of global governance and international transformation that global urbanization has brought to the fore.

Working, then, within its own parameters, the book draws out the immense potential of cities for positive change, as well as the many intractable and serious problems that urbanization on this scale brings. Urban agglomeration and density increase productivity and innovation. Cities are hubs of knowledge, entrepreneurship and innovation—crucibles of creativity and growth and sources of transformative ideas. Marrying density to information technology, for example, can help to produce smart cities that reduce urban environmental footprints. But, at the same time, such density has always brought in its wake a number of pathologies: crime, pollution, slums, social division and economic polarization. Much of the book is devoted to offering ways in which city leaders can be empowered to produce sustainable, inclusive and equitable forms of urban life.

The authors here argue that urbanization cannot and should not be reversed. But, at the same time, there is a recognition of the pressing need to 'defeat the demons that come with density' (p. xvi). There is, in this statement, a recognition that something needs to change in the current development trajectory—that business as usual will overload a planet set to add 3 billion more urbanites in the next two decades. Leaving inequalities and uneven

access untouched may well become a serious source of social and political instability. Many of these social problems are generated by market externalities and market failures. This suggests that solving the paradox of the relationship between the market and the city is likely to be a key issue for the future of global politics. It is worth pondering the extent to which that question can be solved from within the framework offered here.

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The International Monetary Fund: distinguishing reality from rhetoric. By Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2016. 234pp. £75.00. ISBN 978 0 85793 969 2.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has attracted much scholarship since its creation in 1944; however, a common understanding of its activities is still missing. To clarify empirical evidence and distinguish it from rhetoric, this book offers an extensive discussion of the state of the art on the fund. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands are primarily concerned with offering an objective analysis that avoids generalizations 'unsupported by the empirical evidence' (p. vii). The very complexity of the IMF's work, they argue, complicates the task of reaching sound scientific conclusions as to its performance.

Bird and Rowlands bring together a carefully compiled study which includes papers they published previously in academic journals, as well as new research. The authors set out to perform an unbiased analysis isolated from any political views, to provide a sound foundation for policy discussion. Through the book, large sample regression techniques are complemented by qualitative analysis, which allows the authors to identify different patterns and outliers. Empirical evidence helps them answer long-debated questions about the IMF, albeit the limitations of this approach must also be kept in mind.

The IMF, established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, to end the detrimental 'beggar thy neighbour' policies of fixed exchange rates, was intended to promote monetary cooperation and to encourage trade. Today, it is the world's premier international financial institution. Initially established with 44 member countries, today it counts 189 members all over the world. Nevertheless, its work has sometimes sparked controversy. This book contributes to the contemporary debate with an unbiased analysis of the fund's operations.

The book begins with an overview of the criticisms faced by the IMF. These come broadly from two directions. Critics on the political 'right' argue that some countries end up postponing economic reforms because of the 'cheap' financial assistance provided by the fund. On the political 'left', the complaint is that IMF interests clash with those of poorer countries, so the IMF should be reformed, if not closed down. To shed some light on the debate, the first question addressed by the authors is whether quotas, the 'basic building blocks of the IMF' (p. 36), on which subscriptions, drawing rights and votes depend, constitute an appropriate foundation. Given their implications for the balance of power, the deficiencies detected are one of the biggest challenges the IMF has to face if it wants to maintain its role on the international scene. The next question relates to 'the range of lending facilities' (p. 40) and the differences among them. It seems the economic justification to maintain all existent facilities no longer holds, so a redesign of their organizational structure is needed. Next, building on earlier research, the authors analyse the patterns and determinants of IMF lending. The financial crisis of 2008 brought about an increase in lending just when it seemed that the institution was losing its *raison d'être*. This raises doubts about the potential to predict lending, which is seen as episodic and volatile. In fact, the economic and political factors that may influence IMF lending depend on the sample

under consideration, evidencing 'the need for a disaggregated approach' (p. 9) that embraces different circumstances. This emphasizes the complexity of the fund's operations and the urge of scholars to draw conclusions with due care.

In the last few chapters of the book, Bird and Rowlands turn their attention to the implementation of IMF programmes and their impact, also considering the allegedly catalytic role the fund is supposed to have on private capital. While the difficulties in capturing the effect of the IMF on economic growth are obvious, evidence provided by the authors shatters claims suggesting a negative impact emanating from it. They argue that any potential negative impact from restrictive policies encouraged by the IMF in the short term is overcome by the longer-term positive effect of programme implementation and increased resources. In contrast, empirical evidence does not support the assumed positive catalytic effect of IMF programmes. Instead, the research indicates 'that catalysis is generally negative rather than positive' (p. 210), which has, in turn, important policy implications.

The book ends with a discussion of the main conclusions inferred from the analysis. Two, in particular, are worth noting. On the one hand, it seems a reform of both the quota system and the IMF lending facilities is needed. On the other, the analysis of IMF lending determinants, which evidences countries' repeated need for assistance, or the failure to attract private capital, among other things, suggests a poor performance. This calls for further analysis to reconsider its role. Despite difficulties of finding unambiguous answers, Bird and Rowlands argue the importance of a debate supported by empirical evidence. The richness of their study will certainly provide a benchmark for debate and future research in this area. Through the book, the authors have managed to maintain an unbiased approach to the IMF, which offers priceless material for reviewing the IMF mission.

Ana Lara Gómez Peña, University of Cantabria, Spain

Energy, environment and global health

Deadly river: cholera and cover-up in post-earthquake Haiti. By Ralph R. Frerichs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2016. 301pp. £18.50. ISBN 978 1 50170 230 3. Available as e-book.

In August 2016 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, delivered a damning report on the responsibility and culpability of the UN in relation to the ongoing presence of cholera in Haiti. The first ever cholera outbreak on the island began in mid-October 2010, ten months after a devastating earthquake led to deaths of (at least) 220,000 people. The cholera outbreak, six years on, has infected thousands and claimed over 9,000 lives. To this day, there is controversy around its causes, who knew what in the early weeks of the outbreak and who bears responsibility for eradicating the disease as well as compensating those who have lost so much because of it.

The reason why we know the cause of the cholera outbreak in Haiti is due to months of careful epidemiological (and politically sensitive) fieldwork by Dr Renaud Piarroux, from the Université de la Méditerranée in Marseilles, France. Piarroux, an academic and experienced humanitarian medic, decided to investigate due to his personal doubts about the environment theory being put forward as the cause of the epidemic at the time. His scepticism would come to be supported by the UN Secretary General-appointed Panel of Independent Experts, who presented their findings in May 2011. They found that the cholera strain had come from South Asia and most likely originated in the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) camp Annapurna in Mirebalais, Haiti, not long after the Nepalese

peacekeeping contingent arrived in early October 2010. Importantly, the panel rejected earlier scientific conjecture—including from within the UN—that the cause was environmental. This theory stated that the outbreak could be traced to a natural release of cholera bacteria, found in river beds, during the earthquake which then multiplied due to stronger than usual warm weather patterns. However, while putting forward the UN peacekeeping camp as the cause of the outbreak, the panel also suggested that it was a lack of clean water and safe sanitation facilities within Haiti's communities that was the 'real' cause. In *Deadly river*, Ralph Frerichs tells the story of how Piarroux came to study and document the UN camp's release of the sewage into the river system coupled with a failure to treat the pipes that delivered this contaminated water as the real culprit of the cholera epidemic.

The book details Piarroux's journey through a day-by-day account of his experiences and presents three main arguments over 24 chapters. First, Piarroux discovered the cause of the cholera outbreak *in spite of* the efforts by international actors on the ground—particularly UN agencies and organizations located in Haiti as well as the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in Haiti. The book provides a detailed history of the conversations, maps, media statements and articles that were being produced in the early months of the cholera outbreak to illustrate that there was—at best—a lack of interest in locating the cause of the outbreak or—at worst—a deliberate attempt to cover up the link to an increasingly unpopular UN peacekeeping camp, as local sentiment had already turned against the mission's continued presence. I was not always convinced by the argument that the UN, in particular, was working as one to hide the cause of the cholera outbreak. It is a pathological entity that rarely thinks or acts as one; but this book provides convincing evidence that demonstrates curious positions and statements adopted by the World Health Organization (in particular) and Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which sought to categorically deny any link between the cholera outbreak and Nepalese troops. What is also particularly troubling is the failure of a troop-contributing country to implement the medical screening that they are expected to complete on deployment of their soldiers, and then the failure of the UN medical team within the peacekeeping mission to ensure that checks had been carried out across the battalions deployed.

The second argument of the book is on who prioritizes what type of response during a crisis such as this one. As Alston has argued in his recent report, the people most affected by this outbreak are the poorest and most politically disenfranchised. The environment-as-cause theory had fuelled the misperception that cholera may be an 'inevitable' and 'natural' reality for the poor Haitian population. Piarroux's findings challenged this and revealed that specific organizations were responsible and had a duty to eliminate a disease that was not naturally occurring in the country. This meant that more effort would be required from the Haitian government and the international humanitarian community (including NGOs and international organizations) to devote time and focus to detecting the cause of the outbreak and to eliminating it. This book details the initial resistance and scepticism experienced by Piarroux, and the hard fought gains he made with the support of select UN agencies such as UNICEF (the UN children's agency) and NGOs like MSF (Doctors Without Borders) to win the fight to treat the outbreak as introduced and therefore possible to eliminate—and this fight continues today because of the years it has taken to gain acceptance of the scientific evidence. This book convincingly argues that poor communities require short-term interventions such as vaccination and treatment triage to stop the spread, but *everyone* will be back again without also implementing the necessary preventative measures that poor people also have a right to—clean water, clean sanitation and health facilities. *Deadly river* provides an important lesson for outbreak control that goes beyond the cholera emergency

in Haiti. As I read this book, I found myself relating Frerichs's argument to Ebola in West Africa, Zika in South America, and the Yellow Fever outbreak in central Africa. Tracing the cause of outbreaks is vital for implementing measures that not only treat, but prevent further infection and reinfection. This book is a political study of both the scientific community and the aid industry in health emergency response.

This book is a compelling 'how-to' study of why it remains vital to investigate the 'common sense' explanations of events. But it offers readers no happy ending—infection, deaths and poverty continue in Haiti today. No government, UN agency, local business, scientists or troop-contributing country has yet had to face the consequence of their personal failure to investigate the cause of cholera in the first four years.

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European climate leadership in question: policies toward China and India. By Diarmuid Torney. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2015. 304pp. £48.00. ISBN 978 0 26202 936 0. Available as e-book.

When the United Nations' efforts against climate change began in 1992, primary responsibility for mitigation was allocated to developed states. Throughout the 2000s, the European Union established a reputation as a climate pioneer, and to a significant extent, based its global identity on the issue. In the quarter-century since 1992, the role played by emerging economies—those states with low per capita emissions and economic development, but significant absolute greenhouse gas emissions and economic clout, such as China and India—is now paramount to effective climate action. As such, the relationship between these environmentally precarious yet powerful actors and the EU is complex, sensitive and urgent. Diarmuid Torney's contribution to the subject represents a standout piece on this most important of topics. As Robert Falkner rightly states on the back cover of the text, this book is a stunning achievement.

To analyse the approach taken by the EU towards China and India, Torney develops a comprehensive yet nuanced analytical framework. He proceeds sequentially, adopting a tripartite approach, commencing with the factors that drive engagement, which then influence the form of engagement taken by the EU, which finally shapes the response from China and India. Each of these stages is further divided into discrete categories which are applied identically and robustly to the two relationships. As such, not only does the book offer significant insights, but the methodological framework represents a useful contribution to analyses of international relations. Following the methodological second chapter, chapter three examines the drivers of engagement, before turning to the normative gap between the states in chapter four. Finally, chapters five and six focus on the EU's relationship with China and India respectively. This neat structure ensures that the book feels both eminently readable and coherent.

Torney argues that the fluctuating leadership of the EU on climate change between 1990 and the 2010s, and expanding broader engagement with China and India, heavily influenced the relationship between the actors. As a result, the normative gap between the EU and the two states has grown regarding climate mitigation details and debates over responsibility for climate change during the period. However, this gap has decreased over the importance of climate adaptation, and the actors have moved in step over policy instruments, such as market mechanisms. The two chapters examining the respective relationships are detailed empirical analyses; every relevant nuance, such as the fractious issue of lifting the EU arms embargo on China (p. 103), is meticulously acknowledged and researched. Regarding the

EU–China relationship, Torney argues that a limited amount of normative emulation—admittedly as well as resistance—from China following the EU's attempted leadership could be identified. In contrast, India has strongly resisted the EU's attempts at leadership, resulting in very limited normative emulation by the Indian government. Instead, individual EU member states, especially the UK and Germany, facilitated more effective cooperation with India. Thus, despite the often overly simplified homogenization of China and India as similar emerging economies, Torney shows that the relationship between the EU and these individual states has varied significantly.

This text is of the utmost value to scholars of climate politics, as well as regional specialists of EU, Chinese and Indian politics. Indeed, the text touches on other emerging economies, such as Brazil and South Africa, intermittently too. Moreover, because of its robust and innovative analytical framework, the book is sure to be of interest to researchers of wider international engagement as well. Last, Torney concludes with three recommendations (pp. 212–13) to European policy-makers, emphasizing the need for the EU to reaffirm its domestic ambition, reframe its objectives to suit the needs of third-country preferences and embed climate change in broader external relations strategies. In sum, this accessible yet fine-grained analysis is a landmark piece, on a topic that is sure to dominate political agendas for decades to come.

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Europe*

France and the politics of European Economic and Monetary Union. By Valerie Caton. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 211pp. £63.00. ISBN 978 1 34948 853 7. Available as e-book.

'What a frightfully dry subject for a woman' (p. viii) was the observation made in 1997 by the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Paris, of the issue that had driven French politics for almost three decades and was to lead to the adoption of the euro two years later. In fact Valerie Caton is very well placed to write about European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from a French perspective, having started her career at the UK Representation to the European Communities in Brussels in 1982, before becoming First Secretary for Internal Political Affairs at the British Embassy in Paris from 1988 to 1992 and then Financial and Economic Counsellor in Paris from 1997 to 2001. She has combined the knowledge gained from her professional experience with some primary research in the archives of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the French National Archives and François Mitterrand's private papers, as well as from consulting a limited range of secondary sources to write a stimulating book. While not an academic monograph, her book nonetheless makes an important contribution to our knowledge of French policy-making, not only in the years leading up to the Treaty of Maastricht but, perhaps uniquely, also in the period between 1992 and the present day. Yet in doing so it raises almost as many questions as it answers.

Reflecting the postwar liberal consensus, Caton argues that support for EMU in France was driven by necessity rather than ideology. François Mitterrand had no choice, she insists, but to abandon building socialism in France, less than two years after his election, if he wanted to continue the European policy pursued by previous governments since the end of

* See also Diarmuid Torney, *European climate leadership in question*, pp. 215–16.

the Second World War. There is no discussion of whether the EMU marked a continuation or a shift in that policy. The story then becomes one of French governments conceding to German demands over the independence of the European Central Bank, the removal of controls over the movement of capital and the rejection of an economic union to balance the monetary union in all but name. The reward for France was that a unified Germany became locked into a monetary union within a specified period of time. However, for many, it spelled the end of a Europe built on social democratic principles.

Beneath the liberal consensus, Caton provides glimpses of a French government divided over its European economic policy. If Mitterrand had staked his political career on harnessing the economic and financial power of Germany to promote the growth of the French economy, many of his ministers were sceptical that it would lead to a social Europe able to protect its citizens against the risks of unbridled global capitalism. While Mitterrand preferred to finance investment in the French economy from international capital markets rather than domestically, others, particularly Pierre Bérégovoy, his minister of finance in the years leading up to the Treaty of Maastricht, argued that the removal of capital controls without a prior harmonization of taxes in the European Community would undermine French public finances. In a footnote, Caton explains that in the Bretton Woods system of fixed but flexible exchange rates, the United States had insisted on strict controls being placed on the movement of capital for investment purposes. Other contentious issues were the lack of democratic accountability of a monetary union managed by an independent central bank without an economic union representing the interests of voters.

Although Caton goes on in part two of her book to examine the political compromises which led to the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact and acknowledges the many mistakes made in not making provision in the event of a financial crisis occurring in the eurozone, she remains optimistic that a history of making improvised solutions will continue to work in the future. If there is a criticism to be made of her approach, it is that she has analysed the politics of French policy-making on EMU without engaging fully with the economic debates.

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Bosnia's paralysed peace. By Christopher Bennett. London: Hurst. 2016. 388pp. £35.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 054 9.

From the choice of book cover (borrowed from one of the band Dubioza Kolektiv's bizarrely intelligent records, 'Apsurdistan'), to the solution proposed to the Bosnian question, this book makes a bold effort to stand out from the by now lengthy list of books on the international community's peacebuilding experiment in Bosnia. Aiming to utilize his insights as a long-term observer of Bosnia not (only) to lament the ills of the country, but actually to propose a strategy to eclipse its current status as *reductio ad absurdum*, Christopher Bennett has penned a historically solid, analytically robust and comprehensive account of the road from the Dayton Peace Agreement to the present Europeanization strategies aimed at creating a viable state. The former International Crisis Group (ICG) reporter and communications director of the Office of the High Representative and of the EU Special Representative knows the country and its many international actors extremely well, and takes readers on a fascinating journey through the thick and thin of Bosnian postwar politics. At times almost tediously detailed, there is no doubt that this book presents a comprehensive view of the intricacy characterizing international–local dynamics over the past 20 years. And here lies its strength; if one were to read only one book to get introduced to Bosnia's recent polit-

ical history, this could very well be it. Inside perspectives on the many failed international attempts to build a multi-ethnic polity dot the book, and contribute to a deeper understanding of how poorly managed, naive and ill designed the liberal peacebuilding project has been in Bosnia—or, as Bennet writes, how 'international policy had been akin to pushing a square peg into a round hole' (p. xxii). It also illustrates the path dependency of the international trajectory: from insisting on preserving the Dayton Agreement, to holding premature elections in September 1996 (excellently recounted in chapter five, 'Elections at any price'), many current problems can be explained by previous mistakes and failure to shift direction at critical junctures. The resultant situation is one that we know all too well: entrenched positions by the former warring parties whose existence is locked in a fragile—but individually profitable—status quo, propped up by international troops and money.

The book does at times take on a quasi-scientific veneer, which is not entirely convincing given the already rich literature that more systematically tackles democracy and divided countries. However, where the book stands out is in its final chapter, 'Changing the logic of Bosnian politics', where Bennett proposes a fresh solution to Bosnia's current deadlock. It was needed, after 240 pages of details as to how this 'Paralysed peace' came about. What Bennett proposes is perhaps more innovative than he admits: that Bosnia adopts a form of shared sovereignty, whereby Croatia and Serbia would enter into more transparent and formal relations with Bosnia, and construct a 'double confederation', designed in such a way that no community (Bosniak, Croat, Serb, other) would be able to dominate any other. This would ensure the 'societal security' of each community, while eclipsing the straitjacket which is the 'Bosnian question': Bosnia would become a 'bridge rather than a battleground between Croatia and Serbia' (p. 260). In order to ensure the good intentions of this arrangement, the European Union would serve as the external guarantor, Bennett suggests, modelled on the Allies' long-term executive powers retained over Germany and Austria from 1945 to 1991. Moreover, the system would be served by a rather complicated electoral system based on centripetal principles of bringing people together, while taking seriously their group loyalty. It is a radical, bold and nothing less than revolutionary proposal. While this arrangement would not be acceptable to Bosniaks under the current conditions, and would imply the dissolution of Republika Srpska, while meeting resistance also in many capitals outside the western Balkans, fearful of economic costs and political precedents, it is a refreshingly innovative thought in the current European climate characterized by a reversion to nationalistic solutions to global problems. Moreover, it is welcome from the point of view of the western Balkans, whose future rests with finding a constructive solution to the bitter and factional regional political landscape. I can only hope that Bennett's book finds an audience among young Bosniaks with ambitions for their country and among international actors with sufficient clout and patience to abandon the current strategy and adopt new approaches in Bosnia. For as Bennett reminds us, changing the current pessimism on Bosnian politics will require nothing short of a paradigm shift, and a rethink of the many contentious issues that formed the backdrop to the war itself: self-determination, statehood, sovereignty, definitions of nation and the institutions of representative democracy.

Simone Tholens, Cardiff University, UK

The global chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the reshaping of the international order. By Kristina Spohr. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 211pp. £29.40. ISBN 978 0 19874 779 6. Available as e-book.

In this book Kristina Spohr offers a major and long overdue reassessment of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. She sets out to challenge dismissals of him as essentially a crisis manager whose achievements do not measure up to Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl. Quite rightly, she assesses Schmidt in the bleak and difficult context of the 1970s: struggling with the aftermath of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the oil crises and the tortuous politics of strategic imbalance. This book makes the case that Schmidt was Germany's first truly global chancellor, an architect of a new world economic order and a 'double interpreter' between the superpowers. He also emerges as an 'intellectual statesman', on a par with Henry Kissinger but possessing the resources of an elected political leader.

The book's real value arises from Spohr's copious use of archives in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and above all Schmidt's private archive in Hamburg. Its strengths are most evident in the four chapters dealing with Schmidt's major contributions in the field of defence and security: 'The strategist of balance', 'Defusing the neutron bomb', 'Constructing the dual track' and 'The double interpreter'. Here Spohr is at her best, and the book's claims to be original, significant and rigorous and to stand as an essential reference are well founded. Each chapter can be read with great profit. In particular, Spohr's claim that Schmidt was a 'defence intellectual' is well substantiated. He had read and thought hard about strategic issues in a way no one else had in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and published a major book which was internationally well received. It is here that the comparison with Kissinger stands.

The book's weakness is evident in its unbalanced treatment of the economic and defence aspects of Schmidt's global role. Here there are some gaps, all the more curious because in later years Schmidt wrote at length about economic matters and above all about economic and monetary union in Europe. Spohr does not make the case that Schmidt was an 'economic intellectual' in the same way as he was a 'defence intellectual'. This is consistent with the lack of any reference in the book to Karl Schiller, Willy Brandt's 'superminister' and Schmidt's early mentor in Hamburg (though their relationship was difficult even then), and a key architect of the SPD embrace of the social market economy in the Bad Godesberg programme. Arguably, Schiller cast a shadow over Schmidt: he stood out as the 'economic intellectual' of the SPD. In short, there was not the same gap to fill in SPD economic policies as in its defence policies. There were also intriguing similarities of style: both Schiller and Schmidt presented themselves as educators of the German people. Schmidt, like Schiller, could be abrasive, but he recognized that personal relationships were of the essence in politics and that there was a danger in letting economics play too big a role in politics. Schmidt's behaviour at the 1978 G7 summit in Bonn contrasted sharply with that of Schiller at the infamous Bonn meeting of finance ministers in 1968.

No less puzzling is the very slight treatment Spohr accords to the foundation of the European Monetary System in 1978–9 (just one paragraph). This hardly does justice to the importance that Schmidt gave to this aspect of his legacy, above all in giving substance and momentum to the process of economic and monetary union. There is no real attempt to connect the EMS to Schmidt's role as 'global chancellor' and no sign that the author has read deeply into the relevant literature here. This goes along with the absence of reference to the German Bundesbank and to the figure of Karl-Otto Pöhl as Schmidt's sherpa. Above all, Spohr does not refer to the famous, powerful speech by Schmidt to the Bundesbank council

in which he situated the impending EMS in its larger geostrategic and historical context. This speech was an intellectual *tour de force*.

The book might also have benefited from an attempt to analyse critically Schmidt's own later attempts to explain and interpret his role. For him, a key aspect was the centrality of the Franco-German relationship in establishing and giving momentum to the process of economic and monetary union, as well as his critique of Anglo-American financial capitalism. Schmidt's role as 'intellectual statesman' did not end in 1982—if anything, it took wings.

Despite this imbalance the book remains a major contribution by a first-rate scholar and should be widely read. It is testament to the importance and value of detailed archival research.

Kenneth Dyson, Cardiff University, UK

Russia and Eurasia

All the Kremlin's men: inside the court of Vladimir Putin. By Mikhail Zygar. New York: Public-Affairs. 2016. 340pp. Index. £15.90. ISBN 978 1 61039 739 1. Available as e-book.

This fascinating book describes the establishment and consolidation of Russian President Vladimir Putin's leadership, through the prism of the members of his entourage. It covers the period from late 1999, when Putin was first appointed acting president of the Russian Federation, to the present day, by which time Putin has served two terms as president and one as prime minister and is approaching the end of his third presidential term.

The author, Mikhail Zygar, was until 2015 editor-in-chief of Russia's only independent television station, TV Rain (*Dozhd*). His book is based on face-to-face interviews that he conducted over seven years with dozens of Kremlin insiders. While some interviewees are not identified for reasons of confidentiality, 60 per cent of them are named, and these include individuals with direct experience of the events being studied, such as Putin's first chief-of-staff Aleksandr Voloshin; long-time Putin friend and now exiled businessman Sergei Pugachev; and Kremlin spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky.

What makes the book exceptional is that it focuses not on Putin (though he is never far from the scene) but on those around him—the entourage that Zygar calls 'the collective Putin'. The story is told chronologically, with each chapter focusing on a specific individual and their role in Putin's exercise of power. The book is packed with gossipy nuggets about the various men involved. Whereas Putin has commonly been thought of as the person who makes all the key decisions, here he is portrayed as cautious, often unwilling to act and needing to be persuaded. Zygar describes Putin as 'a man who accidentally became king' and who is as much a creature of the system as its creator (p. xx). All decisions are indeed made by Putin, but Putin is not 'one person', Zygar writes. Rather, he should be seen as 'a collective mind' whose decisions are strongly influenced by his colleagues (p. xx).

Another way in which the book stands out is its revelation of the complexity of the various Kremlin factions. The elite cannot be simply divided into clearly defined interest groups, such as hard-line *siloviki* (military and security officers) versus 'liberals' (p. 52). Rather, Zygar argues, the factions themselves are fluid, opportunistic and often divided within themselves.

The book offers particularly valuable insights on Russia's relations with Ukraine (chapter five) and on the decision-making process that led to Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea (chapter 17). Zygar persuasively identifies fear of an 'Orange Revolution' at home as 'Putin's main phobia' (p. 66) and explains in detail the key role played by the events in Ukraine in shaping Russia's domestic and foreign policy (p. 123).

Two conclusions stand out from Zygar's analysis. One is, as mentioned above, that decisions are taken not by Putin in an individual capacity but by the 'collective Putin', that is, Putin acting in response to the opinions of the trusted members of his entourage. Zygar goes on to argue that Putin himself has no grand strategy; rather, decisions are made on an improvised basis. 'Everything that happens is a tactical step, a real-time response to external stimuli devoid of an ultimate objective' (p. xx). This assertion appears to contradict the conclusions of other well-informed experts, such as Karen Dawisha, who persuasively argued in *Putin's kleptocracy* (Simon and Schuster), published in 2015, that Putin and his team sought from the beginning of his presidency to establish an authoritarian regime governed from the top down. Perhaps the apparent dichotomy may be explained at least partially by imagining that, while Putin came to power determined to establish centralized order and stability following the chaotic 1990s, he found himself obliged by his own cautious nature to do so in a tactical manner and—as all politicians find themselves forced to do—to respond to unforeseen external events in unplanned ways. Zygar's insistence on Putin's lack of a grand strategy leads to a second conclusion, which is that it is a mistake to view Putin's policies in terms of conspiracy theories. Rather, Zygar argues, Putin's decisions have been reactive and improvised.

An important issue remains, however: how do we know we can trust what the author tells us—or rather, what he was told by those whom he interviewed? Zygar himself recognizes the importance of credibility. He notes on page one that many 'participants in the events did not fully remember what had actually happened'. 'People erase their memories and try to say what they want to say', Zygar told an audience in London in October 2016. Over the course of the seven years he spent writing the book, therefore, Zygar sought to meet his interviewees on multiple occasions and to ask them the same question repeatedly. If an interviewee gave him exactly the same reply at the second meeting as at the first, Zygar concluded that the interviewee was deliberately fabricating his response and that his answer should not be trusted.

This book makes for compulsive reading because of its lively, detailed and anecdotal reporting. It is, however, unlikely to prove an easy read for those without some background knowledge of Russia's convoluted and constantly evolving political system.

President Putin is currently engaged in a renewal of his entourage, moving such previously influential associates as Sergei Ivanov and Vyacheslav Volodin into less influential positions and replacing them with fresh faces. This appears to be in preparation for the spring 2018 election that many expect will see Putin stand for a fourth presidential term. With these changes under way, it is much to be hoped that Mikhail Zygar is even now preparing a follow-up to this valuable volume.

Elizabeth Teague

Black wind, white snow: the rise of Russia's new nationalism. By Charles Clover. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2016. 384pp. £20.00. ISBN 978 0 30012 070 7. Available as e-book.

What influences Russian foreign policy and grand strategy is a pressing question for western policy-makers. There are broadly three different lines of argument: Russian foreign policy is shaped by either geostrategic interests, economics or ideas—or a combination of these factors. Among these various explanations, one is recently back in vogue: the geopolitical theory of Eurasianism. Eurasianism is a complicated, pseudo-scientific and esoteric theory, which traces its history to Russian émigrés immediately after the Bolshevik revolution.

In light of that, *Black wind, white snow* is an exceptional new contribution to the historical literature by the former Moscow bureau chief of the *Financial Times*, Charles Clover.

In his book, Clover traces the history of this ideological force which is arguably shaping Putin and his *siloviki* (military and security officers). Eurasianism is a mishmash of ideas which combine, somewhat unorthodoxly, Luddite illiberal romanticized traditionalism with pseudoscientific geo-ethnic hypotheses. Clover is correct in his assessment that Eurasianism is very different from what we recognize as scientific theories in the West. This peculiar ethnogenetic theory is completely unsubstantiated and speculative, and even in some ways mystical, as it marks Russia's unique origin story from the central Asian steppe tribes and states and concludes that it is destined for exceptionalism. Clover tells us how this theory is now forming the backbone of a newly resurgent nationalist movement, previously a subculture during both the Soviet and early post-Soviet times.

The book is fascinating and rich in history, and offers readers some interesting titbits, especially focusing on Russian political scientist Aleksandr Dugin and his current ideas of geopolitics. In Clover's own words, Dugin's post-modernist dross is to be recognized by its 'flimsiness and fakery', but is now the intellectual foundation of the Kremlin-sponsored, managed nationalism of Russia.

Clover intends this book as the intellectual history of Eurasianism and therefore there are certain questions which are left unanswered. If Eurasianism explains or shapes Putin's foreign policy or the rise of Russian neo-nationalism, it doesn't explain the deviations of Russian grand strategy. Russian *rapprochements* and phases of detente with the West, as well as cooperation on various fronts, including anti-terror intelligence, regional and space cooperation, would not have taken place if Russian actions were solely motivated by a specific ideology, rather than pragmatic and flexible interests. Second, how much Dugin and his neo-nationalism are influencing Russian policy-makers, or how much these ideas are used as rhetorical tools to advance Russian interest is a matter of considerable debate. For any political scientists studying Great Power behaviour, especially, but not strictly limited to authoritarian regimes, it will not come as a surprise that nationalism and exceptionalism are kept at a slow burn and are used as causal justifications for actions. Clover is absolutely right to point out that Russian nationalists and their Eurasianist ideologues are bound by a common chain of pseudoscientific conspiracy theorizing, but fails to provide evidence that these people in turn influence or shape Kremlin policies, or alternatively are used by the Kremlin as pawns. Barring either causality, the thesis of Eurasianism as a social force in Russia stands on grounds which need to be researched more.

In Clover's defence, he never set out to answer that question, and frankly it would be difficult to do so without access to Kremlin archives. What Clover successfully manages is two things. First, somewhat unintendedly, he answers or at least raises a valuable question, which urgently needs further study. It is conventional wisdom that the social backlash against Marxism, during the late 1980s, was spearheaded by liberals. One might argue, considering the direction eastern Europe is moving in, that it was in fact spearheaded not by classic liberals, but by social conservatives who were influenced by their own version of nationalism, and that this is true for Russia as well. Second, and more importantly, Clover provides the first complete intellectual, social and political history of Eurasianism, a theoretical terminology which has baffled western policy-makers since Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov used it to justify altering President Boris Yeltsin's international leanings. That, in itself, is an invaluable scholarly contribution.

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Middle East and North Africa*

The battle for Syria: international rivalry in the new Middle East. By Christopher Phillips. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2016. 239pp. Index. £18.95. ISBN 978 0 30021 717 9. Available as e-book.

Syria's conflict lends credence to the post-modernist view that there is no truth, only competing narratives—indeed it is as much a battle of narratives as of arms. This book goes a long way towards penetrating the fog of war, and will be seen as the definitive account of the international dimension of the 'battle for Syria'. Based on meticulous research and masterful analysis, and with a felicitous writing style, it uncovers the multiple agents behind Syria's tragedy.

Christopher Phillips acknowledges that Syria's non-violent protests descended into an intractable civil war because the regime's violence and sectarian discourses helped militarize and sectarianize what had been non-violent opposition. His main thesis, however, is that external interference is of equal importance in explaining the Syrian tragedy. Without it the fragmented opposition had little chance of prevailing; but 'balanced interventions' by anti- and pro-Assad powers tipped Syria into protracted civil war. Importantly, this intervention was driven by delusions and miscalculations, most importantly the delusion of anti-Assad forces that his regime was fragile and would soon fall, and, if not, that US intervention would tip the balance against him.

At the global level, under Obama the United States was withdrawing from its failed attempt to assert hegemony over the region, into a more realist strategy of offshore balancing, thereby putting the regional order in flux. This, however, was not understood by those opposed to Assad, who hoped to use American power against him because Obama talked the language of hegemony in demanding that Assad go, even though he had no intention of intervening to force it. Obama did not want to become involved in another Iraq-like quagmire that would saddle the US with responsibility for reconstruction of another failed state. His anti-Assad discourse partly issued from his misperception that Assad was on his way out, another authoritarian domino ready to fall.

The Libya intervention also sent the wrong message to Syria's opposition and its regional allies who failed to see it as an exceptional case or that Russia was determined to block a replication in Syria. It emboldened the opposition to arm themselves and led the regime to use tanks and helicopters to prevent rebels from creating a liberated zone, from which, as in Libya, intervention might be invited. Another 'conflict escalator', Phillips asserts, was the 18 August 2011 joint demand by western countries that Assad step down—preceded by the visit of the US and French ambassadors to Hama, which encouraged the opposition to continue big protests on the expectation that intervention was coming. Phillips observes that the protesters overtly invited such intervention with their 'Friday of the No Fly Zone' march. The disbelief of protest leaders that the US could stand by while atrocities were committed against civilians, expressed trust in a post-sovereignty world, assimilated from western discourses on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and on the efficacy on non-violent resistance in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Assad, still in the age of prickly sovereignty, saw those inviting external intervention as traitors and, fortunately for him, his allies, Iran and Russia's Putin, were equally determined to roll back the West-centric post-sovereignty world to one where sovereignty and a global power balance prevailed.

* See also Roger Hardy, *The poisoned well*, pp. 204–205.

Miscalculations by the regional opposition to Assad led them to follow inflexible policies in Syria. Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were convinced that US intervention was coming and they conveyed their confidence to the exiled opposition in the Syrian National Council (SNC), thereby discouraging any compromise with the regime; when the SNC's head, Maoz al-Khatib, proposed talks with the regime, the Saudis engineered his replacement. The regional anti-Assad powers went through the motions of supporting the Arab League mission to Syria and jumped at its failure as a necessary stepping stone to sending the issue to the United Nations Security Council and precipitating intervention. The Saudis shunned Kofi Annan's mission for not insisting on Assad's immediate ouster. With Qatari and Saudi support, the Muslim Brotherhood, often seen as 'moderate', pushed for a militarization of the opposition. Qatar, the first to call for military intervention against Assad, also engineered the first big arms transfers from its Libyan clients to Syria at the end of 2011, via Turkey, which facilitated their delivery. They thought the US was more likely to intervene if there was an armed opposition ready to take over. Phillips argues that Qatar was inflated with over-confidence owing to its self-perceived victory over Gaddafi in Libya. Turkey, expecting to be deferred to by Assad, lectured him for not sharing power with the Muslim Brotherhood, while at the same time organizing the opposition in exile against him, a combination certain to antagonize. Saudi Arabia, while wary of the Arab uprising, calculated that the fall of Assad would reverse the expansion of Iranian influence in the Arab world.

The US–Russian diplomatic settlement of the crisis over the regime's alleged use of poison gas in 2014 proved to be a turning point. Once it became clear that US intervention was not coming, the anti-Assad powers began fostering the jihadists among the opposition. The funding of jihadists by Gulf donors and the sectarianism of the Gulf media, together with Assad's brutality, created an environment for radicalization. Turkey opened its borders to a flow of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) recruits into Syria, while allowing oil to be imported from ISIS-controlled oilfields. Generally, Phillips concludes, the competition of anti-Assad groups for external support initially fragmented the opposition; later, it drove its jihadization. In some ways this helped the regime by polarizing the struggle between it and jihadists of the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra ilk.

In his conclusion, Phillips observes that this was a war everybody lost. Turkey forfeited its claim to regional leadership and precipitated a transborder struggle with the Kurds. Qatar's excessive ambitions were cut down to size. Riyadh fell into the Yemen quagmire. Iran was also bogged down in supporting the Assad regime and dissipated its former soft power in the region. Russia seemed the winner in the short term, since its 2015 intervention pushed regime collapse—and Assad's departure under any diplomatic settlement—off the agenda, for the time being.

Phillips reviews statistical studies that show that external intervention, especially if 'balanced' and by multiple rival states, escalates domestic conflicts and prolongs civil wars; his analysis not only validates these findings in the Syrian case but the book's meticulous process tracing also exposes the concrete mechanisms behind the numbers. Phillips's account also shows that, as realists expect, when global and regional power balances are in flux, miscalculation, and hence war, are more likely.

This book deserves to take its place alongside other classics of International Relations scholarship of the modern Middle East, most notably Patrick Seale's masterful *The struggle for Syria* (Oxford University Press, 1965).

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Oil and the Kurdish question: how democracies go to war in the era of late capitalism. By Stephen C. Pelletiere. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2016. 195pp. £65.20. ISBN 978 1 49851 666 2. Available as e-book.

The Kurdish spring: a new map of the Middle East. By David L. Phillips. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 2015. 244pp. £73.50. ISBN 978 1 41285 576 1. Available as e-book.

These two volumes share more than a focus on Kurdish issues, which neither approaches in a narrowly academic manner. Each has been given an alarmingly misleading title. Stephen Pelletiere writes as if the 'Kurdish question' applies exclusively to Iraq, where considerably less than 20 per cent of all Kurds live. He has relatively little to say about the impact of oil on Iraq's Kurdish question, although it is considerable, and says practically nothing at all either on how democracies go to war or about the late capitalist context. David Phillips, on the other hand, does address the plight of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria, as well as Iraq, and at least until the last 50 pages or so, he pays equal attention to them. However, although he would clearly like to see a new map of the Middle East, and one that takes account of Kurdish aspirations, his volume offers few reasons why we should expect such a map to emerge any time soon, and many reasons why we should not. In so far as there is such a prospect, his comments apply exclusively to the Iraqi case. Although Phillips touches on the recent march of events in the regions of the Middle East where Kurds mostly reside, he does little to explain quite why he thinks there is, or has been, a 'Kurdish spring'.

Pelletiere's varied career incorporates a period as foreign correspondent in the Middle East, and his writing has more than a whiff of journalism about it. Indeed, it strays towards the polemical; its somewhat rambling, discursive style is hard going at times, but on balance this book is an informative, entertaining and provocative read. The author's focus is chiefly on the past, and in particular the machinations that lay behind both US-led wars against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Few escape his wrath, and he makes a decent case that few deserve to. He is assisted in his arguments by a sometimes highly forensic approach, possibly acquired during his spell as the CIA's chief political analyst during the Iran–Iraq War, and as a senior research professor at the US Army War College. Thus, he describes British indifference to the societal make-up and aspirations of the peoples of what eventually emerged as the state of Iraq. He presents the Barzani tribe as feudal, unpopular and led by chieftains more interested in themselves than any wider Kurdish cause—which in any case, he claims, many Kurds do not greatly concern themselves with. He argues that fewer Kurds died in the 1988 Halabja gas attack, and the wider 'genocide' of Kurds by the Ba'athist regime, than has been claimed. Furthermore, he analyses how Iran may share with Iraq any responsibility for it. Neither Human Rights Watch, the non-governmental organization that first publicized these atrocities against the Kurds, nor Peter Galbraith, who was later appointed as US ambassador to Croatia and who was an early champion of the Iraqi Kurdish cause, ever possessed the evidence to back up their claims of atrocity. A clever Israel, not least through its relationship with Washington's neo-conservatives, was very much behind the machinations that led up to the Second Gulf War—and so on. This is a myth-puncturing, hard-hitting and deeply questioning piece of work.

Phillips is well known for his pro-Kurdish sentiments and his human rights activism. His career has been mostly spent as a Washington insider, variously serving at the US Congress, State Department, a number of think-tanks, as well as academia. In stark contrast to Pelletiere, he fully embraces both the 'fact' of the Halabja gassing and Baghdad's responsibility for it. His accounts of the struggles by the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, from the end

of the Ottoman empire right up to and including the emergence of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, Turkey's Kurdish peace process, the Kurdish role in the Syrian crisis and the recent Kurd-related turmoil in Iran, are detailed and workmanlike, although it cannot be claimed that they break any new ground or offer any startling insights. Phillips itemizes the persisting and complex factionalism and rivalry that have bedevilled Kurdish history to this day, the repeated betrayals that the Kurds have suffered at the hands of external and regional powers, and the fierce opposition to Kurdish self-determination that continues to characterize the policies of the host powers. The Kurdish story is an unhappy one, and events since Phillips produced his manuscript—the re-emergence of tense relationships between the various Iraqi Kurdish factions, and the security and economic challenges that the Kurdish region of Iraq confronts; the breakdown of Turkey's peace process and the brutal violence that has come in its wake; and the deepening of Syria's Kurdish complexities in light of Turkey's recent military intervention in that troubled country—all reinforce the depressing narratives that Phillips so painstakingly develops.

Yet the final section of Phillips's book, on the perils and opportunities that the Kurds are now presented with, introduces a somewhat schizophrenic element. Phillips is clearly excited by the central role the Kurds are now playing in the region, as Washington's foot soldiers of choice in Syria and, to some extent, in Iraq; as a result of the complexities that spring from the ambiguous relationships that Kurds have with Damascus and Baghdad; and in light of the renewed violence between the state and the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, in NATO-member Turkey. But the deep divisions among the Kurds, the renewed suspicions that their current high profile has aroused on the part of the host states, and the scope for betrayal by both regional and external actors alike all remain very much in place. Phillips is acutely aware of this, yet resorts to an appeal for the righting of a historical injustice at least for Iraq's Kurds, who he thinks should be granted the right to independence. For Turkey's Kurds, who constitute around half of all Kurds, he doesn't offer much more than tea and sympathy. He calls for Washington to be nicer to the Syrian Kurds of the PKK-aligned Democratic Union Party, but has little else to suggest for a group that currently finds itself very much in the eye of a storm. Such sympathy is all very well, and easily aroused, but it sits uncomfortably with the brutal realities of the Kurdish story that the bulk of this book unblinkingly portrays. If Pelletiere's book is depressing for the harshness and deviousness that it places at the heart of international diplomacy, Phillips's volume is arguably even more so for the frustration and impotence that it inadvertently exhibits in the face of such realities.

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Tribes and states in a changing Middle East. Edited by Uzi Rabi. London: Hurst. 2016. 286pp. Index. £45.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 345 8.

This book is a tribute to the late Joseph Kostiner, long associated with the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University, whose passion was the role of tribes and tribalism in state formation in the Middle East. Compiled in mid-2012, a little more than a year into the Arab Spring, this memorial volume suggests that tribes and states in the contemporary Middle East are best approached on a state by state basis, even though comparative analysis can provide insight into unique cases. Uzi Rabi, Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and one of the foremost scholars working on tribal identity, has assembled an impressive group of scholars to explore the past context and current conditions shaping tribal–state

relations in the region. Contributors include historian Joshua Teitelbaum, anthropologist Dawn Chatty and political scientist Jill Crystal.

The contributors argue that in Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia, tribes and states generally have reached understandings mutually beneficial for both parties. Consequently, the tribes in these states are less likely to challenge the state as long as the rulers maintain a balance of power between the tribes and include tribal values in the national ethos. Tribe–state interdependence is most notable in Jordan, where the regime's tribal base of support has proved vital to the preservation of the political order. In Qatar, tribal identities have endured despite the country's transformation into an independent petrostate, but in the United Arab Emirates, tribalism as an organizing force in governance and social life has declined, superseded by a growing sense of national identity. In Oman, the sultan has preserved the cultural values of the tribes, but reduced their political power to neutralize their ability to harm the regime. In Saudi Arabia, cultural elements of tribal traits and traditions have been safeguarded and tribal mechanisms continue to be utilized to govern a society where kin and tribal modes of living endure.

In contrast, the chapters on Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain 'highlight the potentially destabilizing power of the tribes when the state suffers from eroding legitimacy or a weakening central authority' (p. 7). The regimes in Syria and Yemen are not tribal in nature; nevertheless, the tribes in both countries have proved to be among the social and political forces of opposition most effective in challenging the state. Tribal groups have capitalized on the power vacuums created by the civil war in Syria and the uprising in Yemen, to consolidate their autonomy in territorial enclaves impervious to state penetration. In contrast, tribalism in Iraq in the aftermath of the American invasion in 2003 did not present an alternative to the predominant ideologies of sectarianism, political Islam, Iraqi nationalism and liberalism. In twentieth-century Iraq, tribes were a negligible factor in state formation, and in contemporary Iraq, the Sunni Arabs are the only group to grant tribal affiliation any significance. Due to the non-tribal character of the population, the story of tribe and state in Bahrain centres on the evolution of the economic and political hegemony of the Al Khalifa ruling family.

In the penultimate chapter, Philip Carl Salzman proposes an alternative approach to the study of tribes and states. Defining tribes 'as the largest group in which there is a commitment to collective responsibility' (p. 208), he argues that thinking of tribes and states in terms of strategies for security, defence and offence 'goes to the heart of tribal life and state formation, highlighting their differences' (p. 207).

Given the relatively limited number of recent studies on tribes and tribalism in the Middle East, *Tribes and states in a changing Middle East* is a welcome contribution to the literature. In arguing that tribes and states are best approached on a state by state basis, the individual chapters on the nine states examined are historically informed and contemporary in focus. This book will be of foremost interest to specialists in the field; however, its scope and accessibility also make it attractive to undergraduate students and the informed general public.

Ronald Bruce St John

Sub-Saharan Africa

The French war on Al Qa'ida in Africa. By Christopher S. Chivvis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 227pp. Index. £61.75. ISBN 978 1 10712 103 4. Available as e-book.

This is a useful and timely book that speaks directly to a large and diverse audience. It provides a detailed account of France's successful military campaign to prevent Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other armed Islamist factions from seizing power in Mali in 2013. Its first six chapters chart the buildup to this intervention, tracing alternately the evolution of the threat and the formulation of the international response. It maps AQIM's origins, its links to Osama bin Laden and its organization, and identifies the internal pressures and external opportunities that drove and encouraged the group to seize control of increasing amounts of Malian territory. It also chronicles France's efforts to draw the world's attention to this growing danger and the complex interplay of domestic and international factors that eventually convinced President François Hollande and the French public of the need to act.

The remaining three chapters then catalogue the successive phases of the different operations that together comprised this intervention, as well as the French government's attempts to stabilize and rebuild the Malian state and armed forces. They also add to the ongoing chronology of Paris's non-stop diplomatic efforts to generate a collective response to the unfolding crisis and, in particular, actively involve regional governments and organizations. What emerges from these chapters is a vivid picture of an intricate and ambitious campaign which was seldom more than inches away from serious setback or even catastrophic failure.

In doing so, the book arguably makes one of its most important contributions. Certainly, its account of the campaign is instructive. As one of a small number of longer, English-language studies, it is automatically established as essential reading for anyone interested in what France did and why. Yet its dispassionate tone and unflinching narration offer fascinating and valuable insights into both the practice of international politics and the process by which a Great Power—other than the United States—generates and executes an overseas military expedition. And what it shows clearly is the lack of clarity: the risks and uncertainties, the fluidity of attitudes and aims, and the challenges—both planned and unforeseen—that had to be overcome. Indeed, perhaps the most surprising and intriguing revelation was the extent to which France's armed forces had to improvise. That they did so to such great effect speaks less of their lack of preparation—while inevitably raising questions about the willingness of European governments to invest in their militaries—than of their ingenuity and determination to forge a passage through the fog of war.

The book also identifies and challenges some common yet erroneous assumptions. One is that France is more reluctant to use military force than other Great Powers. As the volume demonstrates, President Chirac's refusal to commit French forces to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is the exception, not the norm. Another is that Paris acted alone. While France certainly took the lead and provided the largest contingent of troops, it was not only ably supported by ground units from other countries—most notably Chad—but depended on the US, UK, Belgium, Denmark, other NATO allies and Russia for operational intelligence and air transport. And another still was that France's victory was straightforward. Although AQIM was undoubtedly outgunned and outmatched numerically and technically, French forces still encountered pockets of stiff resistance and, more crucially, had to cope with the extreme climate and vast distances. In light of what France achieved in just

a few weeks and at relatively low cost, the book labels the campaign both a success and a model for the future.

The French war on Al Qa'ida in Africa is a thoroughly researched and informative book, engagingly written and well paced. It should appeal to a wide audience of established scholars, students and practitioners with interests in north and west Africa, Islamist insurgent and terror groups, statebuilding and French foreign and defence policies. It deserves to be widely read.

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South Asia*

The age of aspiration: power, wealth, and conflict in globalizing India. By Dilip Hiro. New York: The New Press. 2015. 369pp. Index. £11.60. ISBN 978 1 62097 130 7. Available as e-book.

Why India is not a Great Power (yet). By Bharat Karnad. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2015. 529pp. Index. £34.99. ISBN 978 0 19945 922 3.

The two books under review take very different approaches to explaining important aspects of contemporary India, but come to similar conclusions about its politics. *The age of aspiration*, by the veteran journalist and prolific author Dilip Hiro, is a collection of vignettes rather than a monograph in the classic sense; *Why India is not a Great Power (yet)*, by the strategist Bharat Karnad, is a much more academic work, albeit a lively and often entertaining one, designed to try to change the minds of policy-makers in New Delhi.

The cover of *The age of aspiration* features a photograph of Mukesh Ambani's extraordinary multistorey residence in Mumbai, Antilla. Built at a cost of 1 billion dollars, its 27 levels include a lap pool and large public entertainment areas, guest accommodation, luxurious family quarters and rooftop helipads. This monument to money and ambition, Hiro thinks, is emblematic of the 'New India' of growing but unevenly distributed wealth and inexorably spreading consumerism. This is an India quite distinct from the country he described in *Inside India today* 40 years ago, in 1976.

Age of aspiration is a study of change, but one of its great virtues is that it carefully relates emerging trends in India to patterns of behaviour set in the immediate post-colonial period. Hiro weaves material gleaned from several years' worth of interviews with individuals across 'New India' with broader historical narratives, to try to set those trends in context and explain their origins. He ranges widely, from the shining new city of Gurgaon, on Delhi's outskirts, to the slums of Mumbai; from the big business of conglomerates to the woes of tenant farmers; from monumental graft to Maoists; and of course beyond India's territorial borders to 'global India', in London and Silicon Valley, and beyond.

The result is a readable book, with memorable pen portraits of people and places, some of which will be more familiar to India watchers than others. The broad theme is simple and established: that economic liberalization and globalization have brought great wealth to some and great misery to many others, and in the process corrupted the political system and damaged Indian society.

Hiro acknowledges that prior to the 1990s, governments—most of them dominated by the Congress Party—collaborated with big business on economic policy, but did so with

* See also Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki, eds, *Poised for partnership*, pp. 237–8; Ferdinand Mount, *The tears of the Rajas*, pp. 203–204; and Jon Wilson, *India conquered*, pp. 203–204.

'discretion' (pp. 298–9). But he argues that the liberalization that has occurred since 1991 has led to the rapid growth of the private sector and capital accumulation on an unprecedented scale, and that this has generated many of the ills discussed in the book. As big business has grown more wealthy, it has become more bold, and politicians and bureaucrats more willing to facilitate access to land and natural resources, conscious that they can use the payoffs that result not just to enrich themselves, but also to buy the votes necessary to keep them and their allies in power.

Karnad's portrait of India's political class in *Why India is not a Great Power (yet)* is no more flattering. As a writer, Karnad specializes in the jeremiad, and his new book is a classic of that genre. It is a visceral attack on India's policy-making elite, a group he thinks is 'habituated to aiming low and hitting lower' (p. 2), and whom he blames for preventing India's emergence as a true Great Power. As with Hiro's book, the cover of Karnad's says it all: an Indian lion in the foreground casts the shadow of a sheep.

Karnad's thesis is that great power only comes from great ambition. Many countries are sufficiently large, rich and well located to shape international politics, but only the ones with vision, he thinks, do so. His complaint is that India's elite lacks the necessary 'outward-thrusting nature backed by strong conviction and sense of national destiny and matching purpose' (p. 1). To make that point, Karnad unfolds his argument over seven long chapters amounting in total to more than 500 pages, starting with a synopsis of the world-views that have dominated Indian thinking since independence. Karnad praises Jawaharlal Nehru for his expansive vision of India's role in the world, though he faults his 'moral posturing' (p. 34) and blindness to China's ambition, but he is scathing about the world-views he thinks now prevail. He identifies three—one that sees a path to greatness via 'soft power' and another via moralism, while the third wants India to eschew such aspirations and concentrate on economic development and social welfare—and finds all wanting.

Karnad's alternative world-view, which he develops in the rest of the book, is uncompromising. Classical geopolitical thinking should inform India's elite, he argues, and an Indian Monroe Doctrine should be proclaimed and enforced in south Asia and the Indian Ocean region. India should build its capabilities and use what it already has more astutely, advancing its interests and building a coalition to restrain China's ambitions in Asia.

To do this, Karnad suggests, India must 'co-opt' Pakistan (p. 164) through economic means and by strategic reassurance, reorientating its armed forces towards the East, while taking advantage of the 'common socio-cultural milieu' (p. 166) between the two. At the same time, it must resist American entreaties, recognizing Washington's 'record of bad faith and scheming' (p. 200), especially with regard to China and Pakistan. Karnad is particularly exercised about the prospect of a Sino-US G2 dictating terms to the rest, raised in the early days of Barack Obama's first administration.

Both of these books are engaging and diverting; both are also replete with detail and data. In essence, they make the same argument, namely that the Indian state is the greatest obstacle to India's rise. But their explanations for the failure of the political class and the bureaucracy differ. Hiro argues that the state has been corrupted—perhaps irretrievably—by 'neo-liberalism' and 'globalization', while Karnad attributes its failure not to venality but to a supposed lack of vision on the part of the New Delhi elite. Neither argument, however, is convincing. Hiro himself shows that the wealth generated by liberalization has compounded problems stemming from a pre-existing lack of state capacity, rather than causing them in the first place. Karnad, on the other hand, argues that there is more capacity available than the elite realizes, especially in the defence establishment, but he downplays many challenges that should arguably loom larger in his analysis, not least the problem of

India's chronic internal security environment, which ties down a significant proportion of the armed forces and resources that could be used for other purposes.

That said, these books are well worth pondering, as India struggles to sustain its economic growth and develop the capabilities and vision necessary to become the 'leading power' Narendra Modi's government has declared it to be.

Ian Hall, Griffith University, Australia

Indian foreign policy: an overview. By Harsh V. Pant. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2016. 258pp. £50.40. ISBN 978 1 78499 335 1.

Competing visions of India in world politics: India's rise beyond the West. Edited by Kate Sullivan. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 266pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13739 865 9. Available as e-book.

Globalizing India: how global rules and markets are shaping India's rise to power. By Aseema Sinha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 354pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10713 723 3. Available as e-book.

The election in 2014 of Narendra Modi as prime minister of India ushered in a single-party government with a unique opportunity to define the country's global role. Debate on India's foreign policy has been dominated by two broad positions. The first relates to the 'Nehruvian' vision of its founding fathers which is suspicious of global capitalism, alliances and Great Power politics, advocating reform of institutions and solidarity with the global South. The other reflects the more orthodox 'realist' ambition towards 'Great Power status', pursued in line with traditional International Relations (IR) interests and priorities. This debate is ongoing precisely because the tension remains.

Three new publications make different, but nonetheless complementary, contributions to this field. In turn they provide overview, external assessment and global economic context for discussions of India's emerging role in the increasingly multipolar international order.

In *Indian foreign policy*, Harsh Pant assesses the country's approach to foreign policy by looking first at its decision-making mechanisms, then at a series of key bilateral and regional relationships, before examining thematic areas. The book is ideal as a reference text for researchers, especially those dealing with policy. Pant's view is that developmental limitations and moralistic ambitions have institutionalized in India an aversion to power, especially hard power and the role of the military. This inhibits the adoption of strategy, planning and institutional structure for a foreign policy commensurate with the reality of India's increased influence. Civilian control of foreign and defence policy has concentrated decision-making around the Prime Minister's Office. This leaves the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence as 'implementers' with limited advisory roles. This arrangement supports India's democracy, but foreign policy is therefore highly personalized, centred on the 'interest and political will' of incumbent prime ministers. This remains the case despite the establishment of the National Security Council, and for Pant demonstrates an approach lacking in long-term grand strategic ambition and capacity. He sums up his assessment succinctly: 'The assertions, therefore, that India does not have a China policy or an Iran policy or a Pakistan policy are plain irrelevant. India does not have a foreign policy, period' (p. 13).

For Pant, Narendra Modi might be able to overcome the institutional posture which has hamstrung foreign policy. This is the context for his book—that India is finally in a position to renovate its approach to the world. Modi's 'economic diplomacy' has engaged

with all partners, regardless of alignment, in the service of a national objective of attracting investment. The priority of interest over values—a more pragmatic realism—is welcome for Pant, but it is still to be determined whether, due to the institutional constraints the author lays out, a shift in foreign policy thinking and strategy could outlast Modi's time in power, if achieved in the first place.

In contrast, *Competing visions of India in world politics*, edited by Kate Sullivan, explicitly attempts to move away from a realist reading of India's role. At issue is the concern that conformity with traditional major power behaviour—essentially that India needs to reject its legacy of a values-based role, and move into a more assertive and interest-driven space—reflects a preponderance of positivist and US-centric thinking, excluding other perspectives. Addressing this requires an acknowledgement that different countries see India differently, and engage with it differently as a result.

The book is therefore an attempt to create space and broaden the debate. Bypassing 'western' and 'Anglosphere' states, it looks for issue-specific responses to, and perceptions of, India from the other BRICS countries, regional powers, as well as wider examples—from Africa or Iran and Syria. Though this could lead into an overly academic space, too speculative with regard to state identity, the volume explicitly grounds its arguments in official and government perspectives, ensuring that its findings are policy-relevant.

The assessments that emerge are mixed. Chapters on east Asia and Russia highlight the centrality of China, and India's relation to it. This comes at the expense of an alternative normative vision India might represent beyond the principle of non-intervention or strategic autonomy, reflecting the country's variable utility as a counterbalance to Chinese influence. Sullivan lays out a problem in her opening chapter, which she returns to in the conclusion: has India's rise up the Great Power value-chain put its legitimacy to global South or 'secondary states' status in doubt? A case in point is India's nuclear programme and the nuclear tests it carried out in the 1990s. Despite it contesting the international regime on nuclear issues, the independent pursuit of nuclear status was interpreted by some as a self-interested act undermining the country's wider moral stance. As a comparison, Harsh Pant cites the consistency of India's nuclear policy across administrations as the one example of genuine strategic thinking in India's foreign policy.

Competing visions achieves its aim, shedding light on sometimes overlooked views of India, even if those views highlight similar tensions to those present domestically, between the pursuit of power and commitment to values. The principle of non-interference may become less of a fig leaf as India becomes a pole in itself, rather than simply an advocate of multipolar diversity.

The economic dimension to India's rise is fundamental to assessing its role. India has become more important as its economy has grown, which has had an impact on a range of domestic factors. Aseema Sinha, whose previous work has focused on assessing India's multilevel framework of governance and the role of federalism, has produced a book, *Globalizing India*, which examines this in great depth.

Reflecting several years of fieldwork and drawing on case-studies in the pharmaceutical and textile sectors, Sinha's book is a fascinating and admirably objective interrogation of India's shifting political economy, engagement with globalization's institutional frameworks and resultant policy orientation. This is an academic text, deeply embedded in the literature, which presents a crucial study of the two-way street of India's ongoing economic transformation and global integration. Sinha assesses the manner in which India's economic model developed through periods of dirigisme and reform, to its present iteration as a 'trading state' in which interests that feed engagement with the world economy have been actively created.

What Sinha is tracking is the process by which liberalization, and increased engagement with market forces and their global frameworks, have moulded internal interest identification dynamics. She puts meat on the weighty bones of Atul Kohli's work on the emergence of a state–business alliance in post-1991 India. Taken in combination with the two other texts reviewed, this amounts to a picture in which India stands at a crossroads. Modi's mandate, as noted by Pant, highlights an opportunity to break with previous thinking and positioning. But as Sullivan and her co-authors make clear, India will have to define its role while taking into account not just traditional aspects of major power strategy, but also aspects unique to India—its position as an interlocutor between those inside and outside the status quo and what it chooses to do with that capacity. The internal forces driving this process are brought into focus by Sinha's study.

It will be fascinating to watch what happens next, but all three books will be useful tools to track and interpret India's trajectory.

James Hannah, Chatham House, UK

Deadly impasse: Indo-Pakistani relations at the dawn of a new century. **By Sumit Ganguly.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 176pp. £64.99 ISBN 978 0 52176 361 5. Available as e-book.

This slim volume reviews relations between India and Pakistan from 1999 to 2009. The narrative of events is well and clearly described, as is the profusion of violent incidents from the Kargil War of 1999 through to the assault on the Indian parliament in 2001, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and the two bombings of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. In fact it is surprising that, in spite of such circumstances, so much dialogue took place, including the 'Composite Dialogue' which so nearly ended in success in 2008.

Sumit Ganguly is at his best when examining how India chose to react to all these atrocities. Both Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh were conscious of the dangers of provoking a nuclear-armed nation which had a declared 'first use' policy. They also found it hard to be sure what was the work of terrorist groups acting alone and which attacks might have been sponsored by Pakistan. The attempted military mobilization in 2002 showed India how poorly prepared it was to make a quick retaliatory strike. Some Indian defence experts argued the case for a conventional war under a nuclear umbrella (p. 47), but were unable to demonstrate that it would be possible. Little wonder, therefore, that both prime ministers returned to engagement with Pakistan. In 2016, Prime Minister Modi has been wrestling with the same issues after the attacks on Pathankot and Uri, but with some new ideas intended to show Pakistan that there could be penalties (perhaps in Balochistan or relating to Indus waters) from asymmetric tactics.

It is a pity that the author views events almost entirely from the Indian angle. He makes very little effort to understand the Pakistani viewpoint. This is perhaps best demonstrated by his contention that India is a 'status quo' state whereas Pakistan is 'greedy' (p. 20), 'expansionist' (p. 107), 'predatory' (p. 107) and 'revisionist' (p. 122). His own description of events belies these titles. India, for reasons of territorial integrity, invaded Hyderabad in 1948, Goa in 1960 and Sikkim in 1975 (p. 25). Pakistan's takeover of Balochistan in 1948 and its attempt to hold on to East Pakistan in 1971 had identical aims. Given its relative size compared to India, its focus on preserving its territory seems reasonable. Kashmir is different; it is a genuine dispute with strong arguments on both sides. The Pakistan movement always envisaged Kashmir (or at least the Muslim areas of Kashmir) being part of Pakistan—indeed the K in Pakistan's name stands for Kashmir. The author's parting comment that 'Pakistan

seems incapable of envisaging a security order in South Asia where borders drawn at the end of British colonial rule are now considered to be final' is wholly unrealistic (p. 133).

The author struggles to shoehorn the India–Pakistan relationship into accepted academic models. Neither the 'security dilemma (spiral model)' nor the 'deterrent model' quite fits the bill (pp. 1, 2, 13 and 121). Understandably, given both the complexity of the issues and the emotions involved, he also finds it hard to make any recommendations. His final sentence is little more than a plea for sanity: 'the only viable policy alternative ... is to eschew the adoption of provocative military doctrines and strategies that are destabilizing, to rein in technologies that can help foster arms racing and adhere to whatever confidence building regimes that do exist' (p. 133). He is also surely wrong to judge that 'the gap between the capabilities both economic and military will become so great that Pakistan's periodic depredations will cease to be of any significance' (p. 127). This is to misunderstand the very nature of asymmetric threats.

I think there are more positives to be extracted from the text. India's exercise of restraint and its willingness to talk have been notable, although Ganguly is perhaps a little naive in thinking that Indian engagement with Afghanistan and Balochistan has been entirely disinterested. By contrast, Pakistan's apparent willingness to sponsor terrorist groups against India is unjustifiable; it is also destabilizing to Pakistan itself. The key is for the dispute between the two nuclear-armed powers to be kept within the confines of Kashmir and not to be allowed to spill over into Afghanistan, Balochistan or into a wider dispute about water. There is also a role for China to balance its relationships more evenly between India and Pakistan.

As for Kashmir, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came close to a resolution. Bad luck intervened in the form of Musharraf's battle with his chief justice and the constitutional crisis that ensued. Ganguly rightly wonders whether Musharraf could have delivered the deal to his Corps Commanders, who were kept in ignorance of much of the detail. Nonetheless there remain the outlines of agreements over the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and even turning the Line of Control into an international border. Two powerful leaders and propitious circumstances will be required to enact a deal. Prime Minister Modi could be one component. The other would have to be Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff.

This is a useful book: a valuable summary of a tough decade and a thorough airing of some of the options for the future.

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The handbook of Indian defence policy: themes, structures, and doctrines. Edited by Harsh V. Pant. Abingdon: Routledge. 2016. 444pp. £95.00. ISBN 978 1 13893 960 8.

The handbook of Indian defence policy is a broad and creditable survey of an increasingly important field. At £95.00, it is also outlandishly expensive, reflecting a lamentable publishing model that relies wholly on the free, or underpriced, work of academics and the procurement budget of university libraries. For readers without access to the latter, the handbook cannot be recommended at this price, not least because it is most useful to dip into individual chapters rather than to read cover to cover. In fairness, this warning applies to virtually all such hardbacks.

Putting this issue aside, there is much of value in the book's two dozen chapters. These cover the Indian military, its three services and its relationship to state and society (pp. 15–232); defence spending and procurement (pp. 233–68); internal security (pp. 269–320); the broader security apparatus (pp. 231–384); and nuclear weapons, missile defence and space security (pp. 385–414). The contributions come from a mix of academics, practitioners and journalists.

A chapter on the Indian Navy is written by one of its former chiefs, one on the Indian Air Force by a former Air Marshal and another on the air force's doctrine by a serving Air Vice Marshal. Vikram Sood, the former head of India's foreign intelligence service, the Research & Analysis Wing, has provided a short but insightful chapter on Indian intelligence, making caustic remarks on a former prime minister ('an impractical moralist', p. 339), a former national security adviser ('micromanaging', p. 341) and India's western intelligence liaison partners ('never anywhere adequate', p. 343). R. N. Ravi, chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee, writes remarkably candidly on the Indian police, arguing that it is 'inadequate', 'yet to shed its feudalistic orientation', 'coarse', burdened with a 'yawning empathy deficit', and marked by a 'proclivity to use disproportionate force' (p. 349). Similarly, two respected defence journalists, Sushant Singh of the *Indian Express* and Nitin Gokhale of NDTV, write on the Indian military's role in diplomacy. These perspectives are valuable, affording officials the opportunity to reflect on their areas of professional expertise at greater length than in the more common format of a newspaper editorial, and reporters the space to consider broader trends beyond day-to-day news.

As is common with all such edited volumes, the contributions are of uneven depth, rigour and quality. Laxman Behera offers an excellent, data-rich account of trends and patterns in Indian defence spending since 1947, collating figures that have languished in dispersed sources and presenting them in a series of revealing charts (pp. 235–51). Other chapters provide less detail, and their subjects are better covered in recent peer-reviewed journal articles.

A further problem is topicality. National security issues evolve at a rapid pace, but the production of such handbooks occurs on a long and sluggish timeline. This leaves entire sections incomplete and obsolete even before a book has hit the press. Kaushik Roy's chapter, 'Indian society and the soldier: will the twain ever meet?' (pp. 64–75), is a fine historical survey of class and ethnicity in recruitment, but neither this, nor Ayesha Ray's chapter on civil–military relations (pp. 48–63), so much as mentions the longstanding issue known as 'one rank one pension', despite a major policy shift that occurred in September 2015. The two chapters on the Indian Army barely touch on the development of a new China-orientated mountain strike corps (p. 136), despite this being the most important shift in the army for decades. Chapters on the air force pay no attention at all to the procurement of the Dassault Rafale and the induction of the indigenous Tejas fighter aircraft, though these, along with a new single-engine fighter, will determine the shape of the fleet for the next 30 years. In September 2016, just as the handbook was being released, there occurred perhaps the most important Indian military operation since the Kargil war: the so-called 'surgical strike' by Indian special forces across the Line of Control dividing Indian from Pakistan-held Kashmir, in retaliation for a major terrorist attack on Indian troops earlier that month. The risk is that such handbooks, intended as broad surveys, achieve neither the focus of in-depth journal articles nor the immediacy of online commentary, and fall into the gap in between.

Nevertheless, the handbook stands up well to its rivals. A 50-chapter *Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy*, published in July 2015, was an impressive work, but light on defence issues. Oxford University Press has its own *Handbook of India's national security* scheduled for late 2017, which is likely to have broader, but overlapping, coverage. These are useful reference volumes, providing readable and succinct primers of what can be technical and esoteric fields of study.

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East Asia and Pacific

Security relations between China and the European Union: from convergence to cooperation? Edited by Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen and Han Dorussen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 250pp. Index. £52.50. ISBN 978 1 10714 903 8. Available as e-book.

China's offensive in Europe. By Philippe Le Corre and Alain Sepulchre. Translated by Susan Emanuel. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2016. 185pp. Index. Pb.: £18.50. ISBN 978 0 81572 798 9. Available as e-book.

Relations between the European Union and China have not produced a depth and breadth of research which would reflect the importance of these two actors in international affairs. Two new books, which examine different aspects of the bilateral relationship, are therefore welcome, particularly at a time when the relationship is facing a number of structural and political challenges.

Security relations between China and the European Union, an in-depth volume edited by Emil Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen and Han Dorussen, examines different aspects of security relations between the EU and China. This has grown in importance as Brussels and Beijing have increasingly looked beyond the traditional economic and commercial core of their interactions to cultural, political and security concerns. This editors' approach is a broad one and contributors pay attention to 'non-traditional' security issues from terrorism to migration, human security and climate change. These areas have become more prominent not just in the International Relations literature, but also in the policy analysis and priorities of both the EU and China.

The chapters are universally thorough and well written and the authors consistently respond to the questions set by the editors, namely to evaluate the extent of convergence or divergence of views in each field of security, and the record of cooperation to date. The research is strengthened by bringing together Chinese and European scholars, ensuring good insights into views from both sides.

The book's conclusions vary across areas, with greater levels of shared priority found in nuclear non-proliferation than cyber security, for example. In none of the areas, however, do the EU and China really have a shared high level of convergence in assessing threats or in cooperation, though overall the editors comment that there is more overlap than would be inferred from previous assessments. As the chapters make clear, these conclusions are complicated by differing conceptions of security (the chapters on human security and cyber security are particularly interesting in this regard).

On the European side, the focus is deliberately on the EU level, though there are enough references to member state bilateral interactions with China to remind readers that this is a multi-level picture. In the context of Brexit, it is also worth noting that the UK features particularly prominently in many of these bilateral case-studies, suggesting that a post-Brexit EU will find itself weakened in at least the scale of its security relations with China.

There are also passing references to third actors, especially the United States, and the volume highlights areas where the EU has played a positive role, possibly bringing the US and China closer on climate change (p. 241), mediating on the Iran nuclear issue (p. 73) and maintaining a more neutral stance on the South China Sea (p. 57)—something which may turn out to be wise and helpful in the context of a deepening US–China security dilemma in the region.

The chapter on economic security highlights its growing importance to both sides (one implication is that the interplay between economic and security relations is growing), and crucially notes that there is a growing negative perception in Europe of China as a 'fierce and unfair competitor' (p. 191).

It is this impression which not only lies behind, but will be further reinforced by Philippe Le Corre and Alain Sepulchre's book on Chinese investment in Europe. Its title, *China's offensive in Europe*, rather gives the game away. The authors have a point to make, namely that Chinese investment in Europe somehow threatens Europe, as reflected in phrases such as Chinese multinationals being ready to 'conquer Europe' (p. 66).

However, the main weakness of the book is that the authors never really explain why they reach this judgement, or whether there is something specific about Chinese investment which makes it more threatening than investment from elsewhere. They also highlight a number of factors—culture, management, challenges of integration and public scepticism—which taken together mean that it is actually highly unlikely that Chinese investment will take over Europe.

Otherwise the book collates some useful data on Chinese investment flows and provides some readable context on China's economic and commercial development (e.g. the categorization of Chinese companies in chapter three) which will be of particular use for general readers.

Tim Summers, Chatham House, Hong Kong

Poised for partnership: deepening India–Japan relations in the Asian century. Edited by Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2016. Index. 307pp. £29.00. ISBN 978 0 19946 648 1.

India and Japan may not seem like the most obvious political and economic partners. Separated by most of the Asian continent and possessing very different cultures and history, the two were on opposite sides in the Second World War and the Cold War, and followed diverging economic models. The contributors to this volume seek to show that theirs is now a budding relationship that has much promise not only for Tokyo and New Delhi, but for all of Asia. This book gives a concise overview of the key elements in Japanese–Indian ties and, unlike many edited collections, stays fairly consistent across various chapters. While not the most exciting description of a bilateral relationship, it should be added to the reading list of anyone seeking a better understanding of how these two countries deal with each other.

The editors, Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki, point out that, though Indians and Japanese have interacted for decades, a strong political and economic relationship can only be traced to the 1990s. That was not an auspicious time for the bilateral tie, as the two countries did not see eye to eye on India's development of nuclear weapons or the Kashmir issue, but a number of private and low-level government initiatives kept the two sides talking, and this culminated in then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to New Delhi in 2000. The last 16 years have seen a blossoming strategic relationship, largely driven by shared worry over the rise of China to Great Power status. India's shedding of its pro-Soviet foreign policy and its warming relationship with the US also assisted the change. The parallel development of economic ties centred on a wave of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) into India.

Shujiro Urata and Mitsuyo Ando suggest that the two economies are complementary, and both countries can benefit from improved contacts. Japan suffers from serious structural problems, such as its aging and shrinking population and workforce, and India can serve

as an excellent outlet for Japanese FDI and production networks. They are optimistic that obstacles such as poor Indian infrastructure and lack of transparency can be overcome, and the recent Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, which includes a free trade agreement, will be helpful. Furthermore, Japan still gives India significant overseas development assistance. Devesh Kapur and Rohit Lamba agree with this optimistic assessment in their outline of the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor, which is shaping up to be a major conduit for Japanese FDI.

Energy, similarly, presents opportunities for mutual cooperation. Nobuo Tanaka and Yazaki discuss various partnership initiatives, such as a joint crediting mechanism and the creation of an energy security forum. Shyam Saran and Radhika Khosla insist that the two countries can work together on climate change problems, since India now realizes that it relies too much on coal and that it is greatly impacted by global warming. This is a major shift in policy direction, but the book should have stressed that this now puts India in direct competition with that other big Asian polluter, China, for regional leadership on climate issues.

In the end, the economic and energy relationships are fairly small potatoes, so to speak. The security ties are far more important, as two of the most fruitful articles examine. Noboru Yamaguchi and Shutaro Sano point out the shared democratic perspectives and national interests that have led the two nations to cooperate in UN peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, nationbuilding, counterterrorism and cyber-warfare. They feel that the looming threat of China is a secondary consideration, but this is probably a bit off base: in truth, the Chinese Dragon is the main force driving these two very different countries together, as noted in the subsequent chapter by C. Raja Mohan and Rishika Chauhan. Yamaguchi and Sano rightly point out that warming Indian–American relations make it easier for Tokyo to reach out to New Delhi, while Mohan and Chauhan correctly note the various constraints on full development of bilateral cooperation. The latter include bureaucratic resistance to new foreign policy-thinking; Indian isolationism paired with Japanese pacifism; and India's history of non-alignment vs the bedrock Japanese–American alliance.

The principal weakness of the volume is its bias towards the positive assessments of India–Japan relations. If the book were written by the Indian Chamber of Commerce that would make sense but, as an academic work seeking to disinterestedly assess the two countries, it should be more neutral. Also, readers are often left thinking, 'so what?'. Is the India–Japan relationship really so important that it deserves a whole book? The authors have not truly demonstrated this, and maybe a monograph would have been sufficient. A related problem is that, in an effort to balance Japanese and Indian authorship, the book includes two overlapping chapters on each major topic. Though it covers most of the main issues in India–Japan relations, and the quality of the contributions is fairly high, the work is all a bit too dry and emotionless. Perhaps a chapter on the human dimension of the relationship would help, as would more discussion within the individual chapters about the key people who forged paths to better mutual understanding. An in-depth case-study or two, such as Suzuki Motor's joint venture with Murati, the oldest such Japanese venture in Asia and briefly mentioned in the book, would also bring economic cooperation to life. I would recommend that the editors and authors go back and try again.

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North America

The Hillary doctrine: sex and American foreign policy. By Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl. New York: Columbia University Press. 2015. £17.90. 432pp. ISBN 978 0 23116 492 4. Available as e-book.

Following the defeat of Hillary Rodham Clinton in the 2016 United States presidential election, does *The Hillary doctrine* have any political purchase? The answer is an affirmative in light of the authors' contention that this foreign policy doctrine is not solely about Clinton, its most fervent champion, but about the growing—albeit patchy—attention in US policy circles to 'the proposition that the empowerment of women and girls is a stabilizing force for peace in the world, and should thus be a cornerstone of American foreign policy' (p. 4). The fine-grained account of the evolution and implementation of this doctrine, particularly in parts one and three of the volume, suggests that while individual proponents and detractors are crucial, advancements made in terms of specific policy mechanisms and the establishment of offices would be difficult to dismantle in the immediate future.

From the outset, Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl address the expected critique of the doctrine being a manifestation of 'imperial feminism': women in the global North protecting women in the global South from local threats. They recognize that this foreign policy approach tends to be interventionist and non-pacifist, characterizing it possibly as a 'feminist hawk' position. Reflecting on the potentially harmful effects of such a doctrine on women, as in the case of Iraq, and mindful of the fallout of earlier US support to the Afghan *mujahideen*, the authors propose the 'Steinem test' (named after the American feminist Gloria Steinem): 'in a conflict where one side aspires to create (or has created) a worse situation for women than the other side, *the United States should not back that side*' (p. 328; emphasis in original text).

The richly detailed narrative presented by the authors is built on a combination of scholarly and journalistic research and analysis. It must be said, however, that many of the insights from the commendable field research and literature review in part two will come as a revelation primarily to those foreign policy experts who have managed to shield themselves from the brutal realities of gendered violence which are an integral part of contemporary international security practices (and which have been highlighted in feminist scholarship and advocacy literature for decades). It is in the discussions on Saudi Arabia and Yemen (chapter four) and Afghanistan (chapter six), the latter described as the 'litmus test for the Hillary doctrine', that a more complete picture of the implications of US foreign policy with regard to gender relations, especially persistent discrimination and violence against women, is presented by Hudson and Leidl.

The authors' strongest contribution appears in chapter five on 'the good, the bad, and the ugly of implementing the Hillary doctrine', which focuses substantively on the effects on the ground of the reformulated mandate and structure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). This is tied to discussions—in part one—on administrative developments in Washington DC, and gives a thorough analysis of the Hillary doctrine in action. Throughout the volume, Hudson and Leidl bring to light creative strategies adopted by proponents of the doctrine, such as Clinton's reportedly consistent engagement with local civil society actors during her international visits, thereby also providing them legitimacy in domestic and international policy negotiations. Further, the authors help readers gauge the wider setting for the evolution of the doctrine, with their references to concurrent developments at the United Nations, especially the passage of the Security Council

resolutions on 'women and peace and security', and the crucial work of UN Women as well as relevant US and global women's groups.

In their extensive discussion on Afghanistan, and indeed other countries such as Guatemala, India and China, the authors engage with domestic and regional factors that impede advancements on gender equality. The ensuing domestic instability that is then perceived to threaten US national interest, and international peace and security, forms the rationale for the Hillary doctrine. A similar, more in-depth, exploration of domestic gender and race relations, as well as corporate interests within the US, would have provided a greater understanding of the context within which the contentions around the Hillary doctrine play out within the country's policy and diplomacy apparatus. The authors do not shy away from this discussion, taking note, for instance, of the fact that the US is one of the few countries that has not ratified the hard-won and seminal UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The glass house of the US—an analogy used also by Hudson and Leidl (p. 314)—revealed a spectacle of domestic gender politics in the 2016 presidential elections which may well block further realization of the Hillary doctrine in the coming years. Writing well in advance of this more recent development, the authors had faith in the frameworks (and offices) that have been put in place, and provide concrete recommendations for the future. There is continuing need for the 'good' part of the doctrine. If the progress made so far—as charted with careful attention and expertise in this book—can be maintained under the incoming administration, that in itself would be tremendous.

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A sense of power: the roots of America's global role. By John A. Thompson. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. 2015. 360pp. £24.60. ISBN 978 0 80144 789 1. Available as e-book.

In this judicious book, John A. Thompson sets out to explain why the United States came to play a prominent role in world affairs. Focusing on the period from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, this is a study of the evolution of US foreign policy and internal discussions about it, particularly how Americans debated and practised foreign affairs. It may be deeply unfashionable in some quarters, but Thompson shows how the diplomatic history approach, when utilized effectively and skilfully, continues to have relevance and can make a key contribution. His core argument is that power is the overlooked dimension to understanding how America approached foreign policy. He finds the most commonly cited strategic and economic explanations unsatisfactory. Realism, at least in terms of upholding national security and financial interests, only tells us so much. Ideology is also only briefly cited—curiously briefly given the broad historical attention to ideological factors; it too, according to Thompson, does not account for why the US assumed a truly global role. Debates on the latter often boil down to value judgements on the merits or virtue of American leadership. Yet Thompson is providing a non-polemical answer to an intellectual question, instead of advocating or moralizing. The result is a nuanced and persuasive work of scholarship.

Offering a wide-lens account of seminal moments and debates concerning America's role in the world, *A sense of power* is not a detailed chronology of the events of the first half of the twentieth century. The major conflicts—chiefly the two hot World Wars and the onset of Cold War—are present of course, but considered in the context of deeper US international involvement. Rooted in a wider reading and engagement with vast secondary literatures, Thompson offers a superb historiographical deconstruction of historical and political

science scholarship, revealing the limits of realist and revisionist frameworks. However, amid this careful and fascinating discussion, his argument is occasionally on the sidelines rather than centre stage. Furthermore, he sees power in fairly conventional terms—relating to geopolitical capabilities, military–industrial capacity and productivity, responsibilities and costs—rather than the multifaceted political, economic, ideological and cultural ways it is constructed and projected. There is, for example, little concern for foreign influences, be they state or non-state actors, on debates about America's role in the world.

A sense of power is nonetheless an adroit, thoughtful intervention on how the US assumed the position of unrivalled global power. It presents a number of important conclusions and key insights. Thompson argues that 'since the late nineteenth century, there have been no "wars of necessity" for the United States' (p. xi), which in less subtle hands could easily be construed as a call for non-involvement. His crucial point is that the US outrivalled others in terms of power and has been relatively free from dangers of external attack, resulting in a plethora of choices when acting abroad. In other words, going to war is never a necessity. Thompson opens the book by noting that the origins of the study lay in his puzzlement during the Vietnam War, as a graduate student engaged in epochal debates, as to why the US was fighting given the evidently tremendous costs this entailed. In many ways, the price and sacrifice required of US foreign policy are the crucial themes in *A sense of power*, present if under the surface (pp. 24 and 283), and provide part of the response to the author's original motivating query. When the costs and sacrifices required—whether in terms of lives, resources, finance or political capital—have so frequently been moderate to low, if not negligible, it is far from surprising that the US has pursued and projected a sense of power widely and consistently.

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Chasing ghosts: the policing of terrorism. By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016. 408pp. £19.00. ISBN 978 0 19023 731 8. Available as e-book.

Fifteen years after the collapse of the iconic towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the scope, intensity and repercussions of US-led counterterrorist campaigns continue to dominate global affairs. While scholars since then have written extensively on multiple aspects of terrorism and the fight against it, policing and intelligence *within* the US' domestic domain are sometimes overlooked features. In their new book, *Chasing ghosts*, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart attempt to take a holistic approach to just this subject. Why, the authors ask, has the American government created a massive and incredibly costly counterterrorism apparatus to tackle what appears to be a very limited problem: terrorism at home? The proportions are extreme indeed: 'the United States has created or reorganized *more than two entire counterterrorism organizations* for every terrorist arrest or apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the country' since 9/11 (p. 2). So, have these efforts been effective at least, or has the US been driven by some form of paranoia?

Drawing on rich material, Mueller and Stewart draw a bleak picture of US authorities constructing the image of an immensely threatening terrorist adversary after 9/11. Doing so, the government as well as institutions such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have fuelled public anxiety, exaggerating the extent of terrorist threats, the potential destructiveness of plots and overblowing the ideological division between 'them' and 'us'. When the narrative of yet to be found sleeper cells of Al-Qaeda operatives in the US was not convincing anymore several years after the 9/11 attacks, new threats were

identified, such as home-grown terrorists, lone wolves and—most recently—foreign fighters returning home to the US from the war theatres in Syria and elsewhere.

The insistence on a considerable domestic threat of terrorism to the US continues to shape national security institutions. Trillions of dollars have been spent on allowing organizations, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and the National Security Agency, to prioritize the identification and tracking of potential terrorists, the disruption of plots and the creation of threat assessments. Terrorism has been trumping all other security concerns. As FBI Director Robert Mueller emphasized: 'I'll fight tooth and nail for more criminal agents, but I'll never at the end of the day take an agent out of counterterrorism and national security' (quoted on p. 17). Mueller and Stewart correctly suggest that acknowledging that terrorism might not be an existential threat after all would be a painful process for these institutions which are themselves fighting for power, prestige and budget increases. Instead, the authors argue that the security authorities somewhat desperately continue to 'chase ghosts'. Aimed at suspects considered to be at the brink of radicalization or the actual use of terrorist means, for instance, the controversial sting operations conducted by the FBI have led to a point where 'police operatives embedded in terrorist plots in the United States have considerably outnumbered actual would-be terrorists' (p. 31).

Though broadly convincing and consistent, much of this argument is already known from Mueller's enjoyable book *Overblown* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). What undermines Mueller and Stewart's account in *Chasing ghosts* is their light-touch engagement with the literature on terrorism and radicalization and, in particular, their rejection of the motivations and psychological aspects of terrorist suspects and actual offenders. They repeatedly argue, for example, that (attempted) attackers in the past have simply been 'young hotheads' (p. 165). In a similar vein, while the authors have delivered excellent evidence to show how authorities have often exaggerated the threat of terrorism to the US since 9/11, they too readily dismiss the fact, for example, that there arguably is some real danger stemming from frustrated, radicalized and militarized foreign fighters returning home to the US. Moreover, the authors' argument is not helped by the self-righteous and partly sarcastic tone and repetitive style of the book.

One of the major questions arising from reading this book is: how can the effectiveness of counterterrorism be measured? Establishing a cost–benefit analysis, as Mueller and Stewart have done, is a useful but insufficient attempt. Such calculations fail to adequately account for the emotional and less tangible aspects of (counter)terrorism. The authors are right, of course, in suggesting that 'avoiding overreaction is by far the most cost-effective counterterrorism measure' (p. 252). Yet what really works against an adversary which might 'only have to be lucky once', as the Irish Republican Army famously stated, is a question ultimately not answered in this, nevertheless, thought-provoking book.

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Making the unipolar moment: U.S. foreign policy and the rise of the post-Cold War order. By Hal Brands. New York: Cornell University Press. 2016. 416pp. £22.90. ISBN 978 1 50170 272 3. Available as e-book.

In today's political climate, debates around the nature, shape and reality of America's global decline are part of the *Zeitgeist*. Indeed, a considerable amount of ink has been spilt publishing a voluminous amount of material on this subject. The same can also be said of the many publications on the Cold War era. Given this, it is somewhat difficult to make a distinctive, or especially exciting, contribution that can speak directly to these two large debates. Yet

Hal Brands's new book not only does this, but also exceeds high expectations with its depth, nuance and clarity that are further enhanced by a stimulating and readable style. Brands's central thesis is that to better understand the rise of the unipolar moment in the 1990s, it is necessary to trace America's rise back to historical phenomena in the 1970s. For Brands, the 1970s set the stage for the Soviet Union's irreversible decline, the onset of globalization regenerating America's global advantage in free trade, and the mobilization of the transnational human rights movement coinciding with the third wave of democratization. Yet unlike other volumes, this book does not see the rise of the unipolar moment as simply a structural phenomenon, an accident of history, or 'something that just happened'. Rather, Brands sets out a methodological platform that challenges both structural and agent-centred accounts of this period in history, further adding to the distinctiveness of the volume.

Central to Brands's account is that while deep structural shifts within global politics were occurring in the 1970s, it was a combination of structure and strategy that ultimately led to an era of American supremacy. Herein lies the importance of the book. Brands does not get caught up in ontological, epistemological and axiomatic concerns, but rather sets out a methodological premise that overtly recognizes the dialectic nature of structure and agency in historical processes. This is to the author's credit. Premising his analysis on an explicit assertion that foreign policy actors strategize within strategically selective contexts allows the book to distinguish itself from its peers. Accordingly, as sequential chapters take readers from the 1970s to the early 1990s, this central theme is drawn out further, demonstrating how the trajectory of underlying international shifts became appropriated into highly attuned US strategies. The combination of global trends and US leaders' ability to understand, mobilize and harness them is put forward as the explanation for America's exceptional rise to power in the 1990s, with the analysis being reinforced by new archival material. The importance of this is that Brands shows how, in spite of perceived US weakness and decline in the 1970s, a larger diachronic analysis uncovers a very different historical picture to what is traditionally presented. This is pertinent in today's political climate of perceived American decline and raises new questions about the current trajectory of American power.

The contemporary importance of Brands's analysis is further enhanced in chapter five, where the author presents events in the greater Middle East as an essential counter-point to the decisive application of US power. While larger global trends were working in the US' favour from the 1970s to 1990s, events in the Middle East and North Africa were becoming increasingly resistant to the application of American strategy. As Brands demonstrates, instability in the Gulf, the emergence of radical political Islam and a surge in international terrorism were a clear demonstration of the limits of American power. These events laid the foundations for many of the issues the US still faces in the region, and it is to Brands's credit that he identifies the centrality of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran as the nexus of structural challenges that Washington has faced from the 1970s onwards. Tracing events in the region and setting out the mixed and conflicting legacy of American policy in that time become all the more pertinent given that one of the first and most defining crises of the unipolar era emerged from the inability to deal with these regional issues. Moreover, this chapter points directly to the theoretically balanced and empirically rich account that Brands conveys throughout the entire volume. The author is able to develop this nuanced and thought-provoking account throughout all six chapters, which makes this an important book that will no doubt serve to influence contemporary debates as much as it provides a revisionist account of America's rise to power in the 1990s.

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Latin America and Caribbean

Latin America confronts the United States: asymmetry and influence. By Tom Long. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 260pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10712 124 9. Available as e-book.

Where we used to consistently read that Latin America suffered 'under the talons of the eagle' and that the region had little sense of agency in the face of the North American giant, a recent bevy of extremely well-researched scholarship is indicating that such a view is mistaken. Tom Long's book is the latest contribution to this critical rethinking of US power in the Americas. Making extensive use of archival sources in and outside the US, as well as in-depth elite interviews with key protagonists across the hemisphere, Long convincingly argues not only that the US did not always get its own way, but also that it is possible for presumably powerless countries in the region to move US policy.

Rather than focusing on standard realist readings of Latin American history predicated on arguments of hierarchy, Long turns his attention to the question of asymmetry, casting it as a situational challenge and not as a blocking obstacle. He asks how a country can move another country's foreign policy when it has no realistic recourse to the mechanisms of coercion commonly associated with the practice of international relations. His answer is that it has to deploy different strategies in an attempt to gain influence. Tellingly, the skill and persistence of national leadership and diplomatic services enter into this frame as central not only to selling the US on accepting this influence, but also as a fulcrum of personal relationships on which to bend this lever.

The book is built around four analytical narratives that are developed with a process-tracing methodology, making extensive use of archival material and elite interviews. Chapter one looks at Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek's *Operação Pan-Americana,* arguing that his goal was to shift US thinking to make Latin American development a priority in Washington, necessitating Marshall Plan-style economic assistance. While Kubitschek's larger ambitions were quite Brazil-centred and his original proposition not particularly successful, Long argues that these objections miss the larger point. The goal was to link development in the region with the US fixation on anti-communism, a connection that was artfully built and embedded in the US psyche through the constant push for *Operação Pan-Americana* after Nixon's motorcade was attacked in Caracas. Brazil did not get its flagship project, but the region did get the Alliance for Progress, representing an important hemispheric relationship.

In the second case-study, Long discusses Panama's quest to regain complete control of the Canal, which was not a natural outcome or even an option for the US. Throughout the narrative, the persistence and creativity of the Panamanian regime emerge as key, as it worked tirelessly to get other regional and extra-regional partners to raise the issue with Washington and create a global sentiment that devolution of the Canal was the right thing to do. When married with a measured approach to negotiating and a patient pattern of sustained engagement, the confidence needed to instil this major change in US policy was created and a small Central American country was able to succeed in moving against powerful actors in Washington.

Mexico's efforts to secure the North American Free Trade Agreement is the subject of the third case-study and is presented as an example of what determined presidential leadership can achieve. Here personal relationships between the US and Mexican presidents were central, creating the drive needed to push the agenda. An additional factor Long

artfully addresses and one which has subsequently become a hallmark of effective embassies in Washington is the importance of lobbying Congress. As Long charts throughout the chapter, all of this was possible because of an internal critical examination of Mexico's long-term interests that saw the US shift from being an ever-present threat to a critical partner offering rich future possibilities. Selling this win–win narrative not just to the US, but also to Canada resulted in what is now one of the most dynamic economic blocs in the world.

Finally, Long takes on Plan Colombia, charting how the Colombian government engaged the US and actively sought an increase in military support and cooperation as a key part of efforts to end the country's decades-long civil war. Long carefully documents how the Pastrana presidency came up with the basic idea for Plan Colombia, but at first was unable to sell it to a reluctant White House. The critical juncture came through extended discussions with senior policy-makers, particularly Thomas Pickering and Barry McCaffrey, who helped the Colombians craft the idea into a plan that would fly in the US policy context. In many ways, this chapter emphasizes a central unifying point from all four of these cases of hemispheric countries driving substantial change in US policy. In each case, the shift in Washington's view came about through a process of extended engagement grounded in solid personal relationships and clear analyses by the Latin American governments of what both sides wanted even if their American counterparts were less open-minded.

A central point to the book is not that Washington is hostile to policy innovation and change driven from the Americas, but rather that the policy space is crowded with competing priorities and that clear strategies of engagement are consequently necessary and must be sustained. Sullen silences and vituperative sulks simply will not get results. This book is an excellent contribution to our understanding of US–Latin American relations and an important read for anyone interested in this area.

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The Obama doctrine in the Americas. Edited by Hanna S. Kassab and Jonathan D. Rosen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2016. 344pp. Index. ISBN 978 1 49852 399 8.

This 14-chapter edited volume consists of a dozen case-studies of US policy towards individual countries in the Americas, book-ended by a brief introduction and an opening chapter on policy challenges throughout the hemisphere, and a concluding chapter by the editors on variations on US policy approaches across subregions of the Americas. Readers interested in understanding the Obama administration's interactions with specific countries, particularly on security matters, will benefit from the largely descriptive, but sometimes insightful, accounts provided by the contributors, many of whom are respected country specialists.

But we can already draw on studies that surpass this volume in both breadth and analytic depth. For example, more useful sets of case-studies are available in *Shifting the balance*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead and published by the Brookings Institution in 2011, and in the second edition of a collection edited by Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, entitled *Contemporary U.S.–Latin American relations* (Routledge, 2016). Neither of those books is flawless, but both are intelligent and well written.

By contrast, beyond the value of its uneven country case-studies, the book under review is disappointing. Its introduction and concluding chapters are conceptually thin, poorly constructed and awkwardly written. These components of the book laboriously convey the obvious point that Obama's government sought to replace a Bush Doctrine anchored

in unilateralism with an 'Obama doctrine' characterized by a preference for multilateral collaborations, in which the United States would play a leadership role while recognizing the legitimacy of partner country concerns and treating interlocutors with respect. Alternating lengthy quotes from the administration's detractors and supporters, and veering—seemingly randomly—from one policy domain to another, the editors establish that with regard to Obama's engagement with the Americas, as elsewhere in the world, sentiment among academics and pundits was sharply divided. For critics, the president's stance represented an abandonment of US exceptionalism and ambition to lead, while for supporters it amounted to an acknowledgement of an increasingly multipolar world in which go it alone strategies by an arrogant hegemon were neither appropriate nor effective.

Following the editors' introduction, the book's first chapter, by Ted Galen Carpenter, offers an overview of key issues in US–Latin American relations during the Obama years, noting that only Mexico attracted much attention at the outset, and that otherwise Washington assigned low priority to the hemisphere while grappling with pressing challenges elsewhere. Carpenter concludes with a plea for the administration to devote its final year to engaging the region more actively, mustering the 'courage' to promote a more ambitious trade agenda, acknowledging the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, and moving beyond antiquated approaches to drug policy (pp. 18–19). Laudable though such steps might seem to this reviewer, Carpenter simply asserts that the administration 'needs' to pursue them. He does not offer a compelling account of precisely why the interests of the United States or of the Americas require such a 'course correction', nor does he reflect on the domestic or external factors that might impact the prospects for this wish list being fulfilled.

As Barack Obama prepares to hand over the reins of power to the reality television star turned politician Donald Trump, and as individuals who have railed against the administration's foreign policies return to office determined to undo what they perceive to have been the damage wrought by Obama's presidency, questions abound as to the durability of changes that Obama brought about in the western hemisphere and beyond. Have conditions internal to the region, or to Latin America's place in the world, changed in the twenty-first century in ways that will impact Obama's legacy? How did Obama's vision of the world draw from or have to confront institutional capacities and constellations of interests in the United States that inevitably condition the country's relations with its neighbours in the hemisphere and constrain any presidency seeking to effect change? Did the 'Obama doctrine' in the Americas encompass shared governance around such issues as climate change, energy and technology that previous administrations did not face, and if so, to what extent were developments since 2009 a reflection of changes in the world rather than the priorities of a specific administration? These are among the themes that will be taken up during the coming years in the literature on US relations with the Americas, and there is as much space as ever for inquiries on such matters, as this book provides little to shed light on them.

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A history of political murder in Latin America: killing the messengers of change. By W. John Green. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2015. 382pp. Index. £74.00. ISBN 978 1 43845 663 8. Available as e-book.

Latin America is a continent with a reputation for violence in all its varied forms. Over the last few decades, scholars of all stripes have devoted considerable effort to analysing the phenomenon, both as it has occurred in the history of individual countries such as Colombia—which even refers to a particular period of its recent history simply as *La*

Violencia or 'The Violence'—and in comparative terms. W. John Green's new book, with its arresting title and intriguing subtitle, is a work of comparative synthesis that ranges broadly over the course of modern Latin American history, yet at whose core are the sanguinary 'dirty wars' waged in the 1970s and 1980s by the newly installed military regimes in the Southern Cone and in Central America with its more immediate Cold War dimension.

Political murder, according to Green, is such a ubiquitous phenomenon because of its utility for different elite groups (paradoxically, themselves in a state of flux due to new entrants such as Colombian 'narcos' and Guatemalan military entrepreneurs) as 'a mechanism of domination' (p. 2), a means to eliminating periodic challenges—'big or small' (p. 8)—to their hegemony from disadvantaged socio-economic sectors advocating change. This instrumental use of political murder, moreover, is not confined to dictatorships, but can also take place in ostensible democracies. Not all members of the elite partake of such violence: prominent dissident members can also be counted among the victims, and reformist sectors of the military belie its conventional reputation as solely the Praetorian Guard of the wealthy. The political culture of murder 'is not a static, immutable, universal presence in the region. It is subject to expediency and happenstance' (p. 10). Political murder, Green contends, is predominantly the province of the right: it 'drives the creation of guerrilla movements, not vice versa' (p. 11).

The book is divided into six thematic chapters plus a substantive appendix, which provides a rapid and very effective summation of each country's particular historical trajectory and acquaintance with political murder, that for some readers might prove a useful first port of call. Chapter one identifies the actual or potential victims of political murder, defined as 'all those deemed sufficiently subversive, threatening, or prone to challenge the status quo' (p. 17), who are the same kinds of people in country after country. These are the 'messengers of change' of the book's subtitle. Mass slaughter, less focused and more indiscriminate, is no less politically motivated, for it represents 'the shift toward attacking the message of change through the murder of its possible audience' (p. 36). Chapter two switches to the perpetrators, discussing the operational modalities of the various bodies involved, such as death squads and paramilitaries. The author considers the relationship between death squads and the state, a question that has pervaded the literature. Those of a squeamish disposition may wish to skip chapter three, since it covers the deliberate political manipulation of corpses: the gruesome ways adopted to display them as a frightful warning to others or alternatively how to dispose of them without trace. Bodies can come back to haunt or to expose the perpetrators. Chapter four attempts to fathom the psychology of the latter by looking at what motivated them and at what rationale they used to justify their actions: some sought to dissimulate when later called to account, while others glowed with pride from patriotic duty fulfilled. It is here that Green examines the perverse influence of national security doctrine. Chapter five will be of most interest to students of international relations, as it analyses the international connections of the perpetrators: the networks of regional cooperation as exemplified by Operation Condor in the 1970s and the extent of US involvement in political murder. Green contests the commonplace assumption among analysts that the United States was the driving force behind it; rather, it played the—still invidious—role of facilitator. The US' role helps to 'explain the huge bulge of political murder in the 1980s' (p. 154), but not before. US policy was not consistent over time, and the Latin American elite had its own agenda irrespective of Washington. Chapter six is more reflective, entering the debate on the efficacy of political murder as a strategy for popular demobilization or alternatively as a potential source of long-term 'blowback', pondering the means employed to achieve accountability and justice, and noting the continued resort to political murder.

I have a few quibbles about this otherwise stupendous book. First, the author rightly points to the differences in each country's experience of political murder, yet he fails to address adequately the factors at the root of the varying incidence of violence. More emphasis ought to have been placed on race as a reason for higher levels of violence in Guatemala and Peru. Furthermore, why did Brazil, with the highest level of socio-economic inequality in the continent, suffer a comparatively low level of political murder? What accounts for the absence of political murder in Costa Rica and Venezuela? Second, Green exonerates the left too readily, glossing over revolutionary violence. As the country profile of Peru in the appendix states, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, the Communist Party of Peru) was guilty of more than half of the killings in the 1980s and 1990s, evoking minimal sympathy in urban areas and ensuring support for the armed forces' dirty war, yet Peru is largely absent in the comparative chapters. Although not justifying the disproportionate response, the criminal-like activities of the Montoneros in Argentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay assuredly helped to create the climate for repression. Finally, the book contains far too little discussion of the way the actual killers were recruited into the assorted death squads.

This intellectually satisfying, if extremely unsettling book succeeds in conveying the bigger picture of Latin America's deep-rooted and pervasive political culture of murder that a host of often jargon-bound specialized studies cannot do for a broader audience. It is an excellent portal into this grim topic.

Philip Chrimes