

South–South in retreat?

The transitions from Lula to Rousseff to Temer and Brazilian development cooperation

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South–South cooperation (SSC) has a history that stretches back decades,¹ but recent years have witnessed a significant increase in intensity. Longstanding southern partners such as China and India have substantially increased their financial, institutional and diplomatic investments in a wide spectrum of South–South flows and relationships. A growing number of other partner states—Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Thailand and South Africa, to name just a few—are also stepping up their activities in this area and burnishing their SSC credentials.² These efforts have prompted many observers to suggest that northern hegemony in respect of the norms and institutions of international development has come under serious challenge.³ However, a number of southern partners are themselves confronting a variety of challenges. Some of these are products of ‘success’, such as the risks accompanying geographical extension, closer domestic scrutiny, and a larger footprint leading to greater exposure to external risk. Other problems result from the volatility of domestic and international circumstances—commodity prices, conflict and global economic conditions, for example.⁴ Many southern partners are actively consolidating their SSC capacities and practices, seeking to strengthen institutional capabilities and the monitoring and oversight of loans and projects.⁵ There is also evidence of contraction by some partners—notably Brazil. The aim of this article is to assess critically the partial contraction of Brazil’s SSC programmes,

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¹ There is no agreed definition of either South–South cooperation or South–South development cooperation, and they appear to mean the same thing for most researchers. We have opted to use SSC in this article. We take this to cover grants, debt relief and loans, technical assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and cultural programmes conducted in relation to countries in the global South. In all these areas, SSC activity blends with that of state-owned enterprises and private investment and trade.

² Sachin Chaturvedi, Thomas Fues and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, eds, *Development cooperation and emerging powers: new partners or old patterns?* (London: Zed, 2012).

³ Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot, ‘Does “DAC-ability” really matter? The emergence of non-DAC donors: introduction to policy arena’, *Journal of International Development* 23: 5, 2011, pp. 711–72; Emma Mawdsley, ‘Cooperation, competition and convergence between “North” and “South” in international development: provincialising development?’, *Progress in Human Geography* 41: 1, 2015, pp. 108–117.

⁴ Devon Curtis, ‘China and the insecurity of development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’, *International Peacekeeping* 20: 5, 2013, pp. 551–69.

⁵ See e.g. Government of China, ‘China’s second white paper on foreign aid’, *Xinhua News*, 10 July 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 2 April 2017.)

resources and profile. While the contexts and circumstances examined are highly specific to Brazil, we suggest that there are broader lessons here for other southern development partners in the context of more challenging domestic and international environments. Furthermore, most recent theorization of SSC has been formulated in a period of rapid expansion. It may be that times of 'retreat' are just as revealing.

The article starts with a brief outline of the recent history of Brazilian development cooperation. We then present the two arguments that are generally advanced to explain the recent relative downturn: first, differences between the political priorities and personal preferences of former President Rousseff and those of her predecessor, Lula da Silva; and second, economic problems in Brazil, which, to different degrees for different analysts, are said to reflect the reverberations of the global financial crisis and/or structural weaknesses in the Brazilian economy. While we find merit in both of these explanations, we first suggest that the 'retreat' has not been quite as deep as is sometimes suggested. Development cooperation continues, albeit articulated less in high-minded terms of South–South solidarity and more in the 'pragmatic' language of economic interests. Second, we argue that the downturn can in part be traced back to the weakly anchored and vulnerable nature of the Brazilian development cooperation project. Three issues to note here are: (1) the difficulties of achieving legislative change and institutional reform in the agencies and ministries tasked with development cooperation; (2) the challenge of creating public and political constituencies for SSC within Brazil; and (3) the impacts of enduring interministerial rivalry. The final section of the article comments on some of the early indications of Temer's presidency for development cooperation, following the impeachment process against Rousseff in 2016. We conclude by reflecting on the implications for SSC and the changing development landscape more broadly. The article is based on several years of research on Brazilian development cooperation, including a PhD thesis on Brazil–Mozambique relations by Marcondes,⁶ with a strong focus on Brazilian domestic politics, institutions and individuals.⁷

The rise and (relative) fall of Brazilian development cooperation

From the 1950s to the 1990s Brazil was a net recipient of foreign aid, although from the 1970s it started to engage in its own development partnerships via the provision of technical cooperation to Latin America and to Lusophone African countries. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*, ABC) was created in 1987 as a division within the Brazilian foreign ministry to

⁶ Danilo Marcondes, 'Brazilian South–South cooperation in Africa: policy transfers in health and agriculture to Mozambique', PhD diss., Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, 2016.

⁷ The thesis involved extensive fieldwork in Brazil and Mozambique, including interviews with key Brazilian officials based at the ministry of foreign affairs and other government institutions, civil society representatives and academics. As part of the research, a considerable amount of Brazilian diplomatic communication related to SSC, particularly regarding projects developed with Mozambique, was analysed. In this article, we have also used articles and opinion pieces from the Brazilian press, but to illustrate the tone of reporting in what is a highly biased media landscape, rather than as evidence to support our arguments.

improve coordination. Cooperation was expanded in 1996 with the creation of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP). For example, in 2002, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), Brazil launched a Programme for International Cooperation to combat HIV/AIDS in developing countries, targeting countries in South America and Africa. This initiative reflected a trend of providing cooperation in areas in which Brazil had acquired domestic expertise, in this case anti-retroviral (ARV) provision.

Expansion under Lula: 2003–2011

In late 2002, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT)—became president, the first successful left-wing candidate in Brazil's political history. The Lula government was marked by considerable expansion of Brazilian development cooperation, and the widening and deepening of relations with the global South was identified as a key foreign policy goal. According to Vaz and Inoue: 'The presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva placed stronger emphasis on "South–South cooperation" than previous governments, in terms of policy attention and resources.'⁸ This emphasis was also given political and diplomatic backing with, for example, the opening of 67 diplomatic missions between 2003 and 2010.⁹ Africa was a particular focus of attention, receiving 33 visits from Lula during his two terms as president.¹⁰

The significance of the expansion of cooperation under Lula should not be underestimated: ABC's budget for technical cooperation projects with developing countries increased by a factor of 70 between 2001 and 2005.¹¹ A 2010 survey conducted by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, IPEA) estimated the value of Brazilian development cooperation over 2005–2009 at US\$1.43 billion.¹² The expansion in resources and in the number of projects was accompanied by an increase in the overseas presence of Brazilian public institutions involved in the provision of technical cooperation. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, EMBRAPA), for example, which is connected to the ministry of agriculture, opened an office for Africa in 2006 in Accra (Ghana) and one in Caracas (Venezuela) in 2008, responsible for overseeing IPEA initiatives in Venezuela. Under the Lula presidency, Brazil became engaged in a variety of innovative cooperation initiatives. For example, in 2008 Brazil created the Cotton-4 programme in order to support Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in improving their cotton

⁸ Alcides Costa Vaz and Cristina Inoue, 'Brazil as "Southern donor": beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25: 4, 2012, pp. 507–34.

⁹ Isabel Fleck, 'Após expansão sob Lula, Dilma segura vagas na diplomacia', *Folha de São Paulo*, 4 April 2013.

¹⁰ Lula was re-elected in 2006 for a second presidential term that would end on 1 Jan. 2011.

¹¹ See Wladimir Valler Filho, *O Brasil e a crise haitiana: a cooperação técnica como instrumento de solidariedade e de ação diplomática* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão [FUNAG], 2007), pp. 89, 97.

¹² The IPEA uses a different methodology from that of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in its calculations of official development assistance, and included Brazilian budgetary contributions to the UN system, assistance to refugees and scholarships for foreigners studying in Brazil.

production industries, expanding the scope of cooperation to partners beyond Lusophone African countries. In Haiti, Brazil has led the military component of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) since 2004; it is also engaged in bilateral cooperation and triangular cooperation initiatives here with a diverse range of partners including Cuba, Argentina, Canada and Spain.

Throughout this period, Lula projected himself very personally as leading Brazil's global partnerships in the South. Lula's own experience of overcoming poverty and hunger proved to be a powerful message for partner audiences, and during his time in office, Lula was identified as embodying Brazil's national development trajectory from a developing country to an emerging economy. At the same time as he promoted overseas the social policies that were expanded domestically under his administration, Lula's government was also committed to increasing the presence of Brazilian multinationals, especially in the mining and engineering sectors, which included expanding Brazilian partnerships in the global South.

Retreat under Rousseff: 2011–2016

For the presidential election of 2010, the PT launched Dilma Rousseff as its candidate. Rousseff, who had been arrested and tortured for her opposition to Brazil's military regime (1964–85), had served in the Lula administrations as energy minister (2003–2005) and as chief of staff (2005–2010). During the campaign, Rousseff was portrayed as the only candidate able to provide continuity with the progressive policies implemented by Lula; this imposed on her a significant burden of expectation, some of it created by Lula himself. For example, during a visit to Cape Verde in 2010, Lula stated that 'whoever comes after me is morally, politically and ethically committed to do much more [for Africa]'.¹³ When asked in 2011 if 'South–South' would continue to be a strong foreign policy orientation, Rousseff's foreign minister, Ambassador Antonio Patriota, responded positively, given the high profile, reputation and momentum generated under Lula. However, there were also expectations on the part of civil society actors that Rousseff would reorientate some aspects of Brazilian foreign policy, for example taking a stronger position on human rights, given concerns about Lula aligning Brazil with regimes in the global South that had poor human rights records.¹⁴ Rousseff's choice of Patriota, a former ambassador to the United States, as her foreign minister was interpreted as signalling a more pragmatic and less antagonistic relationship with Washington. Shortly after Rousseff's inauguration, Patriota stated that 'continuity did not mean repetition',¹⁵ and that there would be some shifts in emphasis in foreign policy under the Rousseff presidency.

¹³ As quoted in Pablo Uchôa, 'Quem vier depois de mim terá que fazer mais pela África, diz Lula em Cabo Verde', BBC Brasil, 3 July 2010.

¹⁴ Camila Asano, 'Dilma: esperava-se mais na política externa', *Folha de São Paulo*, 21 Feb. 2013. For example, after being elected president but before taking office, Rousseff criticized Brazil's abstention on a UN vote on the human rights situation in Iran. See 'Dilma diz ser contra a posição do Brasil em relação ao Irã', *Folha de São Paulo*, 6 Dec. 2010, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/p00612201002.htm>.

¹⁵ Interview with Antonio Patriota, *Veja*, 9 June 2011, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-entrevistas/4573-continuar-nao-e-repetir-veja-09-01-2011>.

Initial perceptions of foreign policy under Rousseff were that she was inaugurating a ‘low-voltage diplomatic period’,¹⁶ in contrast to the Lula years. This was not interpreted at the time as a sign that Brazil’s international influence was declining.¹⁷ Rather, Rousseff’s foreign policy was understood as centred on Brazil’s domestic interests, particularly on how foreign policy should address the impact of the 2007–2008 economic crisis.¹⁸ By the beginning of 2012, however, some in the Brazilian press were suggesting that Rousseff should be more active in presidential diplomacy, for example by taking advantage of the Rio+20 summit hosted by Brazil.¹⁹ By 2014, many commentators were adopting a more critical tone about the President’s apparently low level of interest in international affairs and criticizing ‘her impatience with diplomacy and its rituals’.²⁰ Hard facts and figures seemed to support this view. The foreign ministry’s share of the federal budget fell from 0.5 per cent in 2003 to 0.28 per cent in 2013.²¹ By 2015, ABC’s budget had experienced a 25 per cent reduction compared to figures from 2012, leading to a fall in the number of projects from 253 in 2010 to 161 in 2014.²² By May 2015, in Rousseff’s second term, Brazil owed US\$258 million to the UN, making it the organization’s second largest debtor behind the United States. This represented a 52 per cent increase from the 2014 debt of US\$169 million.²³ And whereas Lula had made visits to 27 African countries, Rousseff visited only six.²⁴

Dominant accounts of the ‘retreat’

Two arguments are generally advanced to explain foreign policy (including SSC) contraction under Rousseff. The first focuses on Rousseff’s personality and personal preferences. From the beginning of her first term, differences in foreign policy were often portrayed in terms of the respective personalities of the successive PT heads of state. Rousseff tended to take a more discreet approach, stating in 2011, for example, that ‘Brazil cannot have an opinion about everything’, in that case in relation to the political crisis in Egypt.²⁵ This illustrated a more sober and cautious approach: ‘continuity with less intensity’.²⁶ Others

¹⁶ Clóvis Rossi, ‘Diplomacia de baixa voltagem’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 28 Aug. 2011.

¹⁷ Rossi, ‘Diplomacia’.

¹⁸ Clóvis Rossi, ‘O mundo de Dilma é o Brasil’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 22 Sept. 2011.

¹⁹ Clóvis Rossi, ‘Dilma, diplomacia e espanto’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 1 Jan. 2012. Spektor commented that, unlike Lula, Rousseff never realized how diplomacy could be used to increase her domestic authority. See Matias Spektor, ‘Diplomacia da transição’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 29 Oct. 2014.

²⁰ ‘Descortesia diplomática’, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 Nov. 2014.

²¹ Alexandre Vidal Porto, ‘Não economizem o Itamaraty’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 27 Dec. 2014.

²² Patricia Campos Mello, ‘Brasil recua e reduz projetos de cooperação e doações para a África’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 22 March 2015.

²³ Jamil Chade, ‘Dívida do Brasil na ONU aumenta em 52% e chega a R\$781 milhões’, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 6 May 2015.

²⁴ These were: Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea (for the Africa–South America summit) in 2013; Ethiopia (for the African Union’s 50th anniversary) and South Africa (for the BRICS summit) in 2013; and Angola, Mozambique and South Africa again in a three-day tour of the continent in 2011.

²⁵ Eliane Oliveira, ‘No Itamaraty, “calibragem” imprime tom mais firme, e também discreto’, *O Globo*, 6 Feb. 2011.

²⁶ Adriana P. F. Albanus, ‘“Continuar não é repetir”: a política externa dos governos Lula e Dilma em perspectiva comparada’, *Revista Neiba–Cadernos Argentina–Brasil* 4: 1, 2015, pp. 1–12.

interpreted the shift slightly differently. Piccone suggested that ‘Brazil more or less continued on course, though with less drive and skill’.²⁷ Lula’s *savoir faire* and political skills proved hard to emulate. During a G20 summit in London in 2009, President Obama described the former Brazilian President as ‘the most popular politician on Earth’.²⁸ Lula’s character and his ability to connect with both leaders and ordinary men and women in the countries which he visited were considered significant assets by the foreign ministry. Foreign Minister Amorim stated that Lula’s personality, as well as his foreign policy vision, was indispensable to Brazil’s international prestige.²⁹

Media and policy analysis of Rousseff’s political role was often marked by negative remarks about her personality and personal image. She was portrayed as rude and difficult to work with, and as often engaging in what the media described as ‘public dressing downs’ of political allies and close aides.³⁰ An *Economist* article stated that ‘many Brazilian politicians think that the president is dogmatic or incompetent’.³¹ A negative focus on Rousseff’s physical appearance as well as her personality was unrelenting. Personal characteristics, preferences and charisma do of course differ between individuals, but male politicians in Brazil and across the world do not attract a fraction of the number of highly personalized and openly gender-discriminatory remarks that were levelled at Rousseff.

The emphasis on personality was reinforced by the ‘personalization’ of foreign policy under Lula, which made it more difficult for Rousseff to create her own international agenda.³² One observer has pointed out that the Lula–Amorim period was one in which the ‘projection of President Lula’s positive image merged with that of the country’.³³ When Rousseff took over, it did seem that, to some extent at least, a lack of time and interest dedicated to foreign policy limited what could be accomplished, undermining the dynamic which had worked so well between Lula and Amorim. In the case of Minister Patriota, the press reported a ‘lack of voice in the government of a president with little international interest’.³⁴ When Patriota was replaced at the foreign ministry in 2013, the press speculated that Patriota and Rousseff had never been able to establish a relationship comparable to that between Lula and Amorim.³⁵ While analysts should be wary of press interpretation, and of structures of gender discrimination that personalize the political, there is some truth in the assertion that Rousseff’s agenda was less strongly orientated towards foreign policy than Lula’s. In particular, Rousseff’s

²⁷ Ted Piccone, *Five rising democracies and the fate of the international liberal order* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), p. 110.

²⁸ ‘Brazil’s Lula: the most popular politician on Earth’, *Newsweek*, 21 Sept. 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355>.

²⁹ Eliane Cantanhede, ‘Entrevista do Ministro Celso Amorim’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 15 Nov. 2010.

³⁰ Andrew Jacobs, ‘Dilma Rousseff, facing impeachment in Brazil, has alienated many allies’, *New York Times*, 1 May 2016.

³¹ See ‘Brazil and its president, dealing with Dilma’, *The Economist*, 28 March 2015.

³² Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, ‘Dilma se afasta do Itamaraty, e o Brasil perde espaço no mundo’, *Interesse Nacional* 7: 26, 2014, pp. 46–55 at p. 46.

³³ Sérgio Fausto, ‘Palpite infeliz’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 5 Aug. 2013 (author’s translation).

³⁴ Lissandra Paraguassu, ‘Itamaraty terá novo “vendedor” do Brasil’, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 15 Dec. 2014 (author’s translation).

³⁵ João Fellet, ‘A diplomacia perdeu espaço no governo Dilma?’, *BBC Brasil*, 27 Aug. 2013.

South–South agenda reflected a different view of the South from that shared by Lula and Amorim. For Rousseff, the South mattered not so much for the geopolitical considerations that had loomed so large for Lula and Amorim, but more as a market for Brazilian goods.³⁶ As Burges and Chagas Bastos suggest, Brazilian political leadership can be extremely influential in enacting innovation in foreign policy.³⁷

The second generally accepted reason for the foreign policy shift between Lula and Rousseff lies in the economic and political difficulties the latter confronted during her terms of office. The domestic and international scenario during Rousseff's presidency was substantially different from that enjoyed by Lula. Much of the diplomatic agency that Lula could leverage derived from a favourable external environment, which benefited Brazilian exports and generated an overall positive atmosphere about Brazil's upward trajectory. Phillips, for example, observes that:

Gripes over how much personal credit Lula deserves for Brazil's current boom persist. Some describe the outgoing leader as the country's luckiest ever president, pointing to how his time in power has coincided with a lucrative commodities boom and the discovery of massive offshore reserves of oil that could turn Brazil into a major crude oil producer.³⁸

This situation had already changed towards the end of the Lula administration, and conditions deteriorated further after Rousseff took office. The negative spill-overs of the global financial crisis combined with domestic political and economic crisis to undermine Rousseff's funding and governance capacities. The fragility of her situation was even more evident at the beginning of her second mandate in January 2015. Piccone notes that 'her victory was narrow, and public opinion [had] turned highly negative in the wake of high-profile corruption scandals and a weakening economy'.³⁹

Both the economic argument and, to some extent, the personal preference/personality argument, explain much of the shift between Lula and Rousseff in foreign policy, and more specifically in Brazil's commitment to SSC programmes and projection. In the next section, we nuance this generally accepted version in two ways: first, identifying continuity under Rousseff, and second, shortcomings under Lula.

Contributory factors

First, we suggest that while there was certainly a contraction of financing, projects and high-level visits, the 'retreat' of SSC under Rousseff should not be exaggerated. For example, under her leadership, the Brazilian government supported the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2012 with the organization of the first interregional meeting on SSC and intellectual property governance

³⁶ Interview by Danilo Marcondes with Brazilian diplomat, Brazilian mission to the UN, New York, Nov. 2014.

³⁷ Sean Burges and Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos, 'The importance of presidential leadership for Brazilian foreign policy', *Policy Studies* 38: 3, 2017, pp. 277–90.

³⁸ Tom Phillips, 'Lula era comes to an end in Brazil', *Guardian*, 31 Dec. 2010.

³⁹ Piccone, *Five rising democracies*, p. 127.

issues;⁴⁰ and it was during her first year in office that the Brazilian government, together with the World Food Programme, inaugurated the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger in Brasília.⁴¹ In 2013, the ABC inaugurated in Sotuba (Mali) an emblematic experimental station to provide technical support for Mali, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso as part of the Cotton-4 project. There was an effort to increase Brazil's role as a provider of humanitarian assistance, with Brazilian contributions to the UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) increased from US\$26.6 million in 2010 to US\$54.4 million in 2012.⁴² Efforts to promote Brazilian social policies to partners in the global South also continued. For example, between 2011 and 2016, 455 delegations from 107 different countries visited Brazil to familiarize themselves with the country's poverty reduction strategy.⁴³

Relations with Africa, which had expanded considerably in the Lula–Amorim period, are often used as a benchmark by which to criticize Rousseff's relative lack of attention towards the global South. Nonetheless, Rousseff's visits to several African countries (noted above) show that relations with Africa did not disappear from the agenda, but acquired a different emphasis, reflecting a 'change in style and intensity regarding SSC and the African continent'.⁴⁴ Even though Rousseff tended to adopt a more pragmatic focus on economic issues, the rhetoric of solidarity, non-interference and mutual benefit that had characterized the Lula–Amorim period was not absent. During her participation in the events commemorating the 50th anniversary of the African Union in May 2013, Rousseff stated: 'Brazil is not only interested in establishing commercial relations, investing here, selling to the country, but also in setting a South–South standard of cooperation. What is this standard? It is a non-oppressive cooperation, based on mutual advantages and shared values.'⁴⁵

Thus SSC did not decline dramatically under Rousseff, but experienced a partial contraction and a shift in narrative framing away from older, more affective claims of South–South solidarity, and towards a more commercial and strategic tone as well as practice. This met with some approval from the Brazilian media, especially at the beginning of Rousseff's mandate. An editorial published in October 2011 in *O Estado de São Paulo*, entitled 'Where the foreign ministry is right', praised the minis-

⁴⁰ 'State of South–South cooperation: report of the Secretary General', UN General Assembly, A/69/153, 17 July 2014, p. 8.

⁴¹ 'State of South–South cooperation', p. 11.

⁴² As part of the recognition of Brazil's growing importance in humanitarian assistance, the 2013 UN appeal for humanitarian resources took place in Brasília. See Jamil Chade, 'De olho em obter maior influência política internacional, Brasil multiplica por 50 ajuda a governos estrangeiros em menos de 10 anos', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 6 March 2013.

⁴³ In 2016 alone, the 11th international seminar on social policies for development hosted 42 overseas delegations out of a total of 60 delegations, including those countries represented by their embassies in Brasília. See <http://wfp.org.br/en/events/xi-international-seminar-on-social-policies-for-development/>.

⁴⁴ Carlos Milani, 'Brazil's South–South cooperation strategies: from foreign policy to public policy', occasional paper no. 179, Global Powers and Africa Programme (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014), p. 11.

⁴⁵ See 'Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, na cerimônia de comemoração do Cinquentenário da União Africana', Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25 May 2013, <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-o-planalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discorso-da-presidenta-dilma-rousseff-na-cerimonia-de-comemoracao-do-cinquentenario-da-uniao-africana>.

try's decision to allocate more resources and personnel to commercial disputes and the promotion of Brazilian products overseas, including domestic and overseas training for diplomats on issues related to World Trade Organization negotiations and disputes.⁴⁶ After a few months in office, Rousseff told Patriota that she was interested in a results-orientated diplomacy, with more concrete achievements and less 'symbolism'.⁴⁷ This emphasis continued during her second term. Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira (2015–16) stated that the 'valuable symbolism of [diplomatic] presence could not replace a diplomacy of results—results measured with numbers'.⁴⁸ Against the background of a less favourable international scenario, the Rousseff administration was under considerable domestic pressure to deliver concrete foreign policy results from the diplomatic capital that had been invested under the previous administration.

A second set of contributory factors date back to Lula's period in office. For a variety of reasons, we suggest, these left SSC in a somewhat vulnerable position. The Lula–Rousseff transition in part reflects the limitations of an SSC strategy that outpaced necessary legislative reforms and institutional adaptations, reflecting the fact that, in the Brazilian case, the 'institutionalization of procedures for SSC is still in the early stages'.⁴⁹ We examine these factors under three subheadings below.

Failure to reform legislation and institutions

As early as 1999, Brazilian diplomats were pointing out the need to reform ABC in the light of growing demands from southern partners for Brazilian cooperation.⁵⁰ The rapid increase in the number of projects under Lula led to some changes in the way ABC provided cooperation. After 2008, the agency began to prioritize what it described as structural cooperation (*cooperação estruturante*), that is, projects that had a long-term social and economic impact and that would improve local capacity. These were seen as guaranteeing 'greater local ownership and sustainability'.⁵¹ However, the reorganizing of priorities in project allocation was not the same as carrying out an actual institutional reform that could provide the ABC with appropriate personnel, financial and logistical resources to manage the increase in demand and in the complexity of the projects with which it was engaging.

Another reform in SSC that was left undone was the creation of a civil service position of 'development worker'. In the continuing work of SSC, certain ministries and agencies have to allocate some of their staff to handling the daily management of specific projects. In most ministries, SSC is an activity that civil servants

⁴⁶ See 'Onde o Itamaraty acerta', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 11 Oct. 2011.

⁴⁷ Natuza Nery, 'Dilma cobra do Itamaraty diplomacia de resultados', *Folha de São Paulo*, 28 March 2011.

⁴⁸ Flávia Foreque, 'Vieira cobra "engajamento" de diplomatas', *Folha de São Paulo*, 3 Jan. 2015 (author's translation).

⁴⁹ Milani, 'Brazil's South–South cooperation strategies', p. 7.

⁵⁰ Sebastião do Rego Barros, *Política externa em tempo real* (Brasília: FUNAG, 1999).

⁵¹ Bruno Ayllón Pino, 'Nuevos horizontes en la cooperación brasileña: proyectos estructurantes, sistemas de información y triangulación', in Bruno Ayllón and Tahina Ojeda, eds, *La cooperación Sur–Sur y triangular en América latina. Políticas afirmativas y prácticas transformadoras* (Madrid: Catarata, 2013), p. 68.

(increasingly) have to do in addition to their existing functions, an extra demand that in some cases overburdens their professional schedule and working responsibilities. There are also issues related to how engagement in SSC is valued within institutions. Staff in the offices of international affairs of individual ministries often have to convince their colleagues in other divisions that engagement in SSC is important and that it justifies the expenditure of time on, for example, hosting foreign delegations and explaining Brazilian policies to them.⁵²

When it comes to the Brazilian civil servants who are actually sent on missions abroad, sometimes in order to handle complex initiatives, such as the Fiocruz⁵³ office in Africa, the main problem is that their own secondment is not very clearly defined and mandated under existing Brazilian legislation. Each government ministry, and sometimes each unit within a ministry, has different norms regulating its staff, including the circumstances in which they can be seconded overseas.⁵⁴ These differences in legislative framework, and the lack of a career path explicitly centred on development cooperation, can have surprisingly profound repercussions. For example, the Fiocruz representative in Maputo was not legally empowered to be away from Brazil for more than three months at a time, making it impossible for the representative to establish a permanent presence in Mozambique. This in turn compromised his capacity to oversee the projects that were being implemented in the country, to interact with other donor representatives and to expand Brazilian health cooperation with other African countries, as initially intended.⁵⁵

The challenges mentioned above show that in some ways Lula's and Amorim's political support for SSC as a foreign policy tool did not translate into efforts to formulate specific legislation that would provide the necessary legal backing and sustainability to those initiatives. Specific legislation was and is still necessary to manage resource allocation, the creation of effective mechanisms to manage SSC initiatives, and the involvement of Brazilian civil servants in those initiatives. Rousseff's inauguration generated expectations regarding the continuity and evolution of SSC, especially the 'creation of permanent staff for ABC and the development of a specific state policy towards SSC'.⁵⁶ However, this form of institutionalization did not occur, and Brazilian SSC continues to be marked by a lack of coherence and predictability.⁵⁷ A good example of this can be found

⁵² Interview conducted by Danilo Marcondes at an (anonymous) government institution, Brasília, July 2014.

⁵³ The Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, known as Fiocruz) is the most prominent science and health technology institution in Brazil. Founded in 1900, it works closely with the ministry of health in policy and service delivery.

⁵⁴ For example, Fiocruz and EMBRAPA have different laws concerning the allocation of their staff overseas, based on the fact that Fiocruz is a foundation and EMBRAPA is an enterprise, which grants them different legal standings within the Brazilian bureaucratic and legal structure: interview conducted by Danilo Marcondes with staff from the Brazilian ministry of health, Maputo (Mozambique), Nov. 2013.

⁵⁵ Interview conducted by Danilo Marcondes with Fiocruz staff member, Maputo, Nov. 2013.

⁵⁶ Iara Costa Leite, 'O governo Dilma e o futuro da cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional', *Boletim Mundorama*, Nov. 2010 (author's translation).

⁵⁷ There is an effort under way within the foreign ministry to provide further institutionalization to underpin Brazilian SSC, and ABC staff members have worked on specific legislation that would provide legal and institutional backing for SSC initiatives. However, given the persistence of a politically and economically sensitive situation in Brazil, actors within the foreign ministry see that this is not the proper moment to present to

in Rousseff's remarks at the African Union in May 2013. Rousseff announced the creation of a revitalized ABC, involved in the promotion of cooperation and trade.⁵⁸ This statement increased uncertainty regarding the future of the agency and led to criticism from former diplomats of the idea that the provision of technical cooperation could be connected with investment and commercial interests, and warnings about the risk of losing technical cooperation as a foreign policy instrument. The fact that up to the time of writing in early 2017 no reform has yet been implemented, and that ABC continues to be a department within the foreign ministry, reveals the difficulty of implementing change in Brazil's development cooperation bureaucracy.⁵⁹ Change has been inhibited by a combination of lack of commitment to reform—particularly because of a concern within the foreign ministry that it could lose its prerogatives in managing SSC if ABC were to become autonomous—and interministerial fragmentation, illustrated by the ambiguous relationship between the implementation agencies and ABC.⁶⁰

Looking at the foreign policy changes between Lula and Rousseff, Lima observes that foreign policy decisions under Lula were influenced by an overly optimistic view that 'the emerging powers were gaining more power and that this movement would allow for a country like Brazil to achieve a less subordinate position in the international system'.⁶¹ One significant expression of this view was an intensification of efforts to obtain support for Brazil's claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in a future reform of that body, which Brazilian decision-makers thought would be possible. These efforts included expanding the number of embassies, increasing SSC and demonstrating greater willingness on the part of Brazil to take over responsibilities deemed to be in accordance with 'Great Power status'.⁶²

One consequence of this optimistic perception was that foreign policy agents adopted 'a more voluntarist view and did not make efforts regarding the institu-

the Brazilian Congress legislation dealing with the allocation of Brazilian personnel and resources overseas: interview by Danilo Marcondes with ABC staff, Brasília, Jan. 2016.

⁵⁸ Rousseff's remarks were given during a press conference and the President made reference to the creation of a new agency that would combine trade and development cooperation and would have a focus on Latin America and Africa. The remarks are available at the official Youtube channel of the Brazilian presidency: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1SZ35ZOT_g. Several interviewees commented that both the Lula and Rousseff governments considered different proposals regarding the future of ABC, including options in which the agency would become independent from the foreign ministry and options in which it would remain within the structure of the foreign ministry but would be granted more autonomy: information provided in different interviews conducted by Danilo Marcondes with Brazilian diplomats and ABC staff between 2013 and 2016.

⁵⁹ The repercussions of Rousseff's statement on the future of ABC are available, in Portuguese, in Isabel Fleck, 'Governo mudará agência de cooperação', *Folha de São Paulo*, 19 July 2013, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2013/07/1313410-governo-mudara-agencia-de-cooperacao.shtml>.

⁶⁰ Information provided in various interviews conducted by Danilo Marcondes with staff members at the ministry of foreign affairs between Nov. 2012 and Jan. 2016.

⁶¹ Maria Regina Soares de Lima, 'Autonomia na dependência: a agência da política externa', *Boletim OPSA [Observatório Político Sul-Americano]*, no. 1, Jan.–March 2015, p. 3.

⁶² Some of the challenges related to Brazil's quest for greater global influence, including a more prominent position in the UN Security Council, are addressed in Andrés Malamud, 'A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy', *Latin American Politics and Society* 53: 3, 2011, pp. 1–24.

tionalization of innovative practices initiated under Lula'.⁶³ Lima includes SSC among her examples of this phenomenon. For Lima, while presidential diplomacy is important for a country like Brazil that relies on soft power, a weak institutionalization of previous initiatives, alongside a more 'restrictive international and domestic scenario', increased the risk of Brazil's international status deteriorating.⁶⁴

Difficulties in marshalling political and public support

Encouraging political and public support has never been a key component of Brazil's foreign policy formulation. Throughout its existence, the foreign ministry has been able to perform its constitutional role of advising the Brazilian president on foreign policy issues with considerable autonomy and insulation from other sectors of the Brazilian state and society. During the political and economic opening up of Brazil in the 1990s, at a time of growing complexity in the international agenda—particularly in areas such as trade and the environment—other specialized ministries and agencies expanded their international responsibilities. Nonetheless, the foreign ministry has managed to preserve its pre-eminence and has adopted a cautionary approach to sharing its prerogatives.⁶⁵ By and large, the complexity of the changing international agenda, sometimes with direct repercussions for Brazilian society, did not translate into growing public awareness about Brazilian foreign policy.

The Brazilian Congress is one site where the political and public ambivalence towards SSC can be observed. Rousseff's political opponents used Brazil's SSC initiatives to criticize the allocation of resources to certain projects overseas and to protest against the debt renegotiation between Brazil and its African partners in 2013. In the case of Brazil's engagement with Haiti, while the opposition recognized the gravity of the situation, especially after the 2010 earthquake, it nevertheless emphasized Brazil's own domestic problems in criticizing the costs associated with providing cooperation and maintaining a military contribution to MINUSTAH. In a somewhat different register, some criticism from activists and academics also emerged in relation to the limited role perceived to be accorded to civil society organizations in Brazilian SSC. The PT benefited from a historical connection with social movements, and there was widespread support for the social policies implemented and expanded under Lula, such as Bolsa Família. Whereas the domestic success of these social policies was to some degree related to the direct participation of civil society organizations, in the vast majority of cases when such programmes were 'exported' to different contexts the civil society component was absent.⁶⁶ This came about as a result of the strict emphasis on non-interference and the demand-driven approach adopted by Brazilian SSC, which favoured technical cooperation with the aim of strengthening state institutions and was cautious

⁶³ Lima, 'Autonomia na dependência', p. 3 (author's translation).

⁶⁴ Lima, 'Autonomia na dependência', p. 3 (author's translation).

⁶⁵ Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de Faria, 'O Itamaraty e a política externa Brasileira: do insulamento à busca de coordenação dos atores governamentais e de cooperação com os agentes societários', *Contexto Internacional* 34: 1, 2012, pp. 311–55.

⁶⁶ Alex Shankland and Euclides Gonçalves, 'Imagining agricultural development in the South: the contestation and transformation of ProSAVANA', *World Development* 81:1, 2016, pp. 35–46.

about exposing itself to any suggestion of interference in other states' domestic affairs. Under both Lula and Rousseff, civil society organizations criticized the support given by the Brazilian government to the expanding presence of Brazilian multinationals, especially within the construction and mining sectors and in Latin America and Africa. Controversies arose around Brazil's support for sometimes contradictory policies such as agribusiness and family farming.⁶⁷ Specific development cooperation projects such as ProSAVANA⁶⁸ attracted the attention of civil society organizations, given their potential for negative impacts and the blending of SSC with commercial and investment interests.

Interministerial rivalry and fragmentation

One of the main challenges faced by Brazilian SSC is related to its highly fragmented nature: a total of 110 government agencies and ministries are involved in Brazilian cooperation.⁶⁹ This fragmentation has raised issues of accountability, monitoring and evaluation as well as financial responsibility. One of the main problems raised by staff in the various ministries and agencies involved the distribution of power and mandates within these ministries and agencies, and the relationships between them and the foreign ministry and ABC, which are not always clearly delineated.⁷⁰

Within government ministries, the provision of activities related to development cooperation involves a wide arrange of departments and sub-units. For example, in the health sector, cooperation regarding HIV/AIDS with a foreign partner will include the ministry of health's office of international affairs (AISA), the HIV/AIDS and STDs department and possibly also Fiocruz, all of these being institutions within the same ministry. The implementation and follow-up of a cooperation initiative is made more difficult by the complex relationships between these different institutions. The department of HIV/AIDS and STDs has a unit for international cooperation, and within Fiocruz there are several units with a mandate that includes international cooperation, such as the international cooperation unit at Farmanguinhos (Fiocruz's pharmaceutical company) and Fiocruz's centre for international relations (CRIS). Fiocruz falls under the aegis of the ministry of health but enjoys a degree of autonomy from the ministry. There are other practical logistical challenges: Fiocruz's headquarters (including CRIS and

⁶⁷ Sean Burges, 'Brazilian development cooperation: here to stay, but how strong?', *Development Policy*, 5 March 2014.

⁶⁸ ProSAVANA is a trilateral cooperation programme initiated in 2011 and coordinated by the ministry of agriculture of Mozambique, the Japanese Cooperation Agency and ABC. The initiative aims to improve agricultural conditions in the northern part of Mozambique. ProSAVANA is inspired by the agricultural cooperation programme developed by Brazil and Japan in the Brazilian *cerrado* region between the 1970s and the late 1990s. EMBRAPA is an implementing agency within ProSAVANA, acting in the specific phase that involves supporting the Mozambican Institute of Agricultural Research.

⁶⁹ Marco Antonio Macedo Cintra, ed., *Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional 2005–2009* (Brasília: IPEA, 2010). Abdenur, describing the organization of Brazilian SSC, refers to the lack of coordination represented by the broad network of implementing organizations that lead Brazilian technical cooperation, rather than a centralized coordinating agency. See Adriana Abdenur, 'Organization and politics in South–South cooperation: Brazil's technical cooperation in Africa', *Global Society* 29: 3, 2015, pp. 321–38.

⁷⁰ Multiple interviews by Danilo Marcondes between 2013 and 2016.

Farmanguinhos) are located in Rio de Janeiro rather than in Brasília, where the ministry is located.

Another complicating factor is the relationship between each ministry and the foreign ministry.⁷¹ In almost all cases, the direct institutional relationship is handled by the offices of international affairs of the ministries. These offices tend to be headed by Brazilian diplomats who are seconded to each specific ministry. However, they can be headed by political appointees. For example, during an interview at one of the ministries, members of staff expressed the view that relations with the foreign ministry were much better when the head of the office was a career diplomat.⁷² Additional complications derive from the fact that, for example, EMBRAPA (part of the ministry of agriculture) and Fiocruz are implementing institutions which do not report directly to ABC, illustrating the ambiguity of relations described above.

The foreign ministry itself provides another example of fragmentation in Brazilian SSC. ABC is not involved in humanitarian cooperation, which was the responsibility of CGFOME (the Office of General Coordination of Actions against Hunger).⁷³ The agency is also not responsible for educational cooperation, which is handled by the division for educational themes within the ministry's department of cultural affairs.⁷⁴ ABC shares with the ministry of defence some responsibilities regarding cooperation in the defence sector with countries in Africa. Within the foreign ministry, one of the elements that increased the fragility of Brazilian SSC in the Rousseff period was considerable internal criticism, a highly unusual situation in an institution known for hierarchy and discipline. For example, a strike in 70 different Brazilian diplomatic missions took place in June 2012, the first time in the history of the ministry.⁷⁵ In August 2014, a total of 342 diplomats of the most junior rank, representing around one-quarter of all Brazilian diplomats, wrote a letter to the foreign minister complaining about problems in career progression owing to the large number of diplomats admitted in the period 2006–10 and the lack of reform within the ministry to accommodate this rapid increase in numbers. The Brazilian press pointed out that the 'target of the letter was Rousseff, blamed for the dismantling of the foreign ministry'.⁷⁶

⁷¹ The relationship between the foreign ministry and other ministries experienced some difficulties under the Rousseff administration because, according to Lins da Silva, President Rousseff shifted some of the foreign ministry's competencies and responsibilities to the ministries of finance and of trade: see 'Dilma se afasta do Itamaraty', p. 50.

⁷² Interview conducted by Danilo Marcondes at an unspecified ministry, Brasília, July 2014.

⁷³ CGFOME, which had been created during President Lula's first term in office, was abolished in 2016 by the Temer government. Some of its functions were transferred to ABC and to other units within the foreign ministry. See Gabriela Valente, 'Itamaraty extingue departamento de combate à fome', *O Globo*, 13 Sept. 2016.

⁷⁴ Fernando Abreu, 'O Brasil e a cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento', in Perpétua Almeida, Luciana Acioly and André Bojikian Calixtre, eds, *Os desafios da política externa brasileira em um mundo em transição* (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2014), p. 172.

⁷⁵ Lisandra Paraguassu and Gustavo Chacra, 'Greve afetará 60 postos do Brasil no exterior', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 19 June 2012; Lisandra Paraguassu, 'Greve fecha postos diplomáticos do Brasil em 70 cidades', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 20 June 2012.

⁷⁶ Natuza Nery, Rodrigo Vizeu, Favlia Marreiro and Patricia Campos Mello, 'Diplomatas criticam anomalia no Itamaraty', *Folha de São Paulo*, 28 Sept. 2014.

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An additional complicating factor related to the ministry's ability to manage and coordinate Brazilian SSC includes the staffing of the diplomatic posts to which most of the SSC requests are channelled. Even with the expansion in the number of diplomats (an additional 400 between 2006 and 2010), the ministry was never able to achieve full occupancy in Brazil's embassies in Africa. Furthermore, owing to the financial crisis which hit the ministry particularly hard after 2014, some of these embassies were unable even to fund their day-to-day expenses.⁷⁷

Overall, and to conclude this section, we suggest that it is not valid to blame entirely Rousseff herself, or the economic context within which she was operating, for the shift in or 'retreat' of SSC. Rather, any explanation of these trends must incorporate a recognition that the very considerable expansion achieved under the charismatic leadership of Lula was insufficiently anchored in Brazil's legislative frameworks, public/political support, and institutional reform to achieve sustained coherence. To attempt this would certainly have been a challenging agenda, but not taking it on left the provision of Brazilian SSC—and Rousseff—more exposed than they might otherwise have been.

The impeachment process and the Temer administration: implications for SSC

Although there was already a reduction in the visibility of foreign policy initiatives associated with the global South and with SSC under Rousseff, her impeachment in August 2016 has led to significant foreign policy changes. Michel Temer, Rousseff's vice-president and successor, chose José Serra, a senator from the main opposition Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) and a former health minister (1998–2002) under President Cardoso, to serve as foreign minister.⁷⁸ In his inaugural speech on 18 May 2016, Serra made the following reference to SSC under Lula and Rousseff:

Contrary to what was promoted, modern Africa does not ask for sympathy but hopes for an effective technological and investment exchange. Pragmatic solidarity towards countries of the global South will continue to be an important strategy of Brazilian foreign policy. This is the right South–South strategy and not the one that was practised for publicity purposes with low economic benefits and high diplomatic investments.⁷⁹

Under the Temer government, some South–South relationships have come under strain—particularly, but not exclusively, those with other Latin American

⁷⁷ Patricia Campos Mello and Isabel Fleck, 'Faltam luz e água em embaixadas brasileiras, dizem diplomatas', *Folha de São Paulo*, 21 Jan. 2015.

⁷⁸ On 7 March 2017 Serra was replaced as foreign minister by Senator Aloysio Nunes, also from the PSDB. Nunes's inauguration speech is available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/15829-texto-base-para-o-discurso-de-posse-do-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-aloysio-nunes-ferreira-palacio-itamaraty-7-de-marco-de-2017>.

⁷⁹ Author's translation. Serra's speech, in Portuguese, is available at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/14038-discurso-do-ministro-jose-serra-por-ocasio-da-cerimonia-de-transmissao-do-cargo-de-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-brasilia-18-de-maio-de-2016>.

governments closely aligned with the PT, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and El Salvador. This emerging tension has implications for Brazilian SSC. For example, the government of El Salvador protested at Rousseff's removal, describing the decision as illegitimate and a 'coup', and announced that it would not recognize the Temer government.⁸⁰ In response, the Brazilian foreign ministry issued a statement in May 2016 asking the El Salvadorian government to reconsider the decision, and openly reminded El Salvador that the country is the largest beneficiary of Brazilian technical cooperation in central America.⁸¹ Analysts in the Brazilian press said that by issuing the statement, Brazil was using the implicit threat of ending the provision of technical cooperation to put pressure on the government of El Salvador to adopt a more favourable posture towards the Temer administration.⁸²

Serra has ordered the foreign ministry to conduct a study of the costs associated with the embassies in the Caribbean and Africa opened or reopened under Lula and Rousseff.⁸³ As noted above, the idea of closing embassies was already being circulated before Temer and Serra took office, and Brazilian diplomats have pointed out that such closures carry political costs as well as the costs associated with the termination of local contracts and the need to relocate diplomats elsewhere.⁸⁴ The closing of embassies would also limit Brazil's SSC commitments, and the idea has already attracted criticism from those associated with the PT government. After being replaced by a career diplomat,⁸⁵ Marco Aurelio Garcia, a former special adviser to the presidency on foreign affairs during the Lula and Rousseff administrations, branded the Temer–Serra foreign policy as 'mediocre and submissive', and criticized the suggestion that the Brazilian diplomatic presence in Africa and the Caribbean might be reduced.⁸⁶

Former Foreign Minister Amorim, who also served as defence minister under Rousseff, cautioned that the inauguration of Serra represented a 'turn to the right' (*guinada à direita*) in Brazilian foreign policy. Amorim criticized the harsh tone of the statements in which Serra complained about the Latin American countries that had opposed Rousseff's removal. The former minister criticized the lack of

⁸⁰ See 'Presidente de El Salvador diz que não reconhecerá governo de Michel Temer', *Folha de São Paulo*, 14 May 2016, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2016/05/1771412-presidente-de-el-salvador-diz-que-nao-reconhecera-governo-de-michel-temer.shtml>.

⁸¹ For the official note of the Brazilian foreign ministry about criticism from the El Salvadorean government, see <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/14032-declaracoes-do-governo-de-el-salvador-sobre-a-situacao-interna-no-brasil>.

⁸² See 'Após El Salvador tirar embaixadora, Itamaraty alerta sobre cooperação', *Folha de São Paulo*, 16 May 2016, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2016/05/1771783-apos-el-salvador-tirar-embaixadora-itamaraty-alerta-sobre-cooperacao.shtml>.

⁸³ See Patricia Campos Mello and Johanna Nublat, 'Serra pede estudo de custo de embaixadas na África e Caribe', *Folha de São Paulo*, 17 May 2016.

⁸⁴ Brazilian diplomats interviewed in the course of the research believed that the Brazilian government would not close any embassies, but have indicated that in order to reduce costs, the Brazilian representation for the disarmament conference in Geneva was closed and merged with the Brazilian mission to the UN agencies in Geneva: interview by Danilo Marcondes with Brazilian diplomat, Brasília, Nov. 2016.

⁸⁵ See Patricia Campos Mello, 'Diplomata substitui Marco Aurélio Garcia como assessor da presidência', *Folha de São Paulo*, 17 May 2016, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2016/05/1771983-diplomata-substitui-marco-aurelio-garcia-como-assessor-da-presidencia.shtml>.

⁸⁶ Carla Araújo, 'Marco Aurelio Garcia diz que política externa de Temer tem visão preconceituosa e atrasada', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 31 May 2016.

emphasis on Africa and the Arab region in Serra's inauguration speech, which Amorim described as reflecting a celebration of the 'hegemonic unipolarity of the Cold War period'.⁸⁷ In the light of recent domestic and international criticism, there appear to be efforts under Serra to redress the underemphasis on the global South. For example, in May 2016, Serra visited Cape Verde while on a visit to Paris to attend an OECD conference. The ministry announced that the visit, Serra's second visit as minister after a trip to Argentina, was a demonstration that Africa continues to be a priority for Brazilian foreign policy, and denied rumours that embassies would be closed in Africa.⁸⁸

While the change in leadership of the foreign ministry may have the most direct impact on Brazilian SSC, the domestic changes implemented by the Temer government could also have implications for Brazil's development cooperation policies. After taking office, Temer initiated a restructuring of the number of government ministries in order to reduce government spending. One consequence was the secretariat responsible for women, racial equality and human rights losing ministerial status and being incorporated in the Ministry of Justice. Another was the merger of the ministry of agrarian development (MDA) with the ministry of social development (MDS), now renamed the ministry of agrarian and social development. Under the PT, both the MDS and the MDA were key institutions in the provision of technical cooperation in areas such as family farming and social policies. Although there have been no mergers or abolitions to date in the health sector, the ministry of health has seen the resignation of several career civil servants, such as the head of the HIV/AIDS department, who criticized the health minister chosen by Temer. Criticism has focused on the new health minister's comments regarding the need to reduce the costs associated with the Brazilian national health system (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS),⁸⁹ which is the home of some of the 'model' Brazilian health policies that are 'exported' to other developing countries, including ARV provision. Under the Temer administration, it is possible that the Brazilian Congress may be able to play a larger role in the formulation of foreign policy, especially now that Senator Aloysio Nunes, former chairman of the Senate's Foreign Affairs and Defence Commission, has replaced Serra at the foreign ministry, and in the light of a report published in December 2016 which sets out the financial costs associated with maintaining Brazil's diplomatic network. Any embassy closures in the near future could have a direct impact on handling demands for Brazilian SSC and providing follow-up to existing projects.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ See the opinion piece by Amorim in the Brazilian press: Celso Amorim, 'Guinada à direita no Itamaraty', *Folha de São Paulo*, 22 May 2016. Amorim's piece generated a response by retired Ambassador Rubens Barbosa, associated with the Cardoso administration, who referred to the Rousseff–Temer transition as a foreign policy turn 'in favour of Brazil'. See Rubens Barbosa, 'Guinada do Itamaraty a favor do Brasil', *Folha de São Paulo*, 23 May 2016.

⁸⁸ See 'Serra diz que não há decisão sobre embaixadas na África e critica PT por onda', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 30 May 2016. For a summary of Serra's visit to Cape Verde, see 'Visita do Ministro José Serra a Cabo Verde', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note 192, 28 May 2016, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/14097-visita-do-ministro-jose-serra-a-cabo-verde>.

⁸⁹ Natalia Cancian, 'Diretor do departamento de Aids pede demissão e critica governo Temer', *Folha de São Paulo*, 27 May 2016.

⁹⁰ The report was widely discussed in a full-page story in the Brazilian newspaper *O Globo*, published on 5

Conclusions

Changes in political leadership, and more challenging domestic and international circumstances, have led to palpable shifts in attitudes to the global South and SSC under successive Brazilian political leaderships. As part of these shifts, we observe the expression of Brazilian solidarity with the 'South' being reframed more openly and assertively as a site for the expansion of Brazilian economic and investment interests. This perception of the economic importance of the South was already present under Lula and became more pressing under Rousseff, with the need to deliver on the results of the expansion of relations undertaken between 2003 and 2010. While the global South has continued to be an area of engagement for Brazilian foreign policy, its political value changed between the Lula–Amorim period and the Rousseff administration, and further under the Temer government.

In this article we suggest that, rather than Rousseff's term being seen as a moment of foreign policy discontinuity, it is the Lula years that could be seen as the exception, with Rousseff's administration seeing a return to 'normalcy'.⁹¹ Rousseff offered some degree of continuity with a longstanding theme of Brazilian foreign policy engagement, including that of the Cardoso era, which emphasized the pursuit of SSC through relationships with key actors, such as Angola and Mozambique, rather than through a range of scattered initiatives with multiple partners.⁹² Lula can be seen as an anomaly owing to his intensive use of presidential diplomacy and his government's expansion of SSC and of Brazil's diplomatic network overseas, made possible by favourable domestic and external factors.⁹³ This unprecedented expansion of activity proved hard to sustain in the light of more hostile domestic and international circumstances, a lack of legislative and institutional reform and adaptation of the Brazilian development cooperation system, a lack of legislative support for SSC engagement, inter-bureaucratic disagreement and budgetary limitations.⁹⁴ However, despite the differences in contexts, priorities and ideological dispensations under both Rousseff and Temer,

March 2017 ('Estudo de comissão do Senado aponta para corte de embaixadas'), which highlighted the costs of maintaining Brazil's diplomatic network, particularly embassies located in the global South which were created under the PT governments. The report was prepared by Brazilian Senator Tasso Jereissati (PSDB) and is part of an effort by the Brazilian Congress to play a larger role in evaluating the implementation of public policy, including foreign policy. The document suggests a possible reduction of the number of embassies.

⁹¹ See Dawisson Belém Lopes, 'Recuo estratégico ou normalização da curva?', *Folha de São Paulo*, 17 March 2014. This contribution was published as a response to comments initially made by Oliver Stuenkel, 'O risco do recuo estratégico brasileiro', *Folha de São Paulo*, 10 March 2014, who indicated the risks for Brazil of a 'strategic retreat' in foreign policy during the Rousseff period. We use the term 'normalcy' here not to deliver a value judgement on any foreign policy direction pursued by Cardoso, Lula or Rousseff, but to indicate that Rousseff's foreign policy can be interpreted as a return to a model which existed prior to the Lula administration.

⁹² Carlos Afonso Iglesias del Puente, *A cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira como instrumento da política externa* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2010).

⁹³ Lopes, 'Recuo estratégico'.

⁹⁴ See Lidia Cabral, 'How Brazil missed its golden South–South co-operation moment', *Huffington Post*, 16 March 2016; Lidia Cabral, 'Brazil's development cooperation with the South: a global model in waiting', ODI blog, 21 July 2010, <https://www.odi.org/comment/4952-brazils-development-cooperation-south-global-model-waiting>. These contributions make reference to the Brazilian SSC model as a 'model in waiting', given the institutional and operational difficulties that have limited the full implementation of Brazilian SSC under Lula and Rousseff.

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commitments to SSC cannot simply be rolled back to the *status quo ante*. While SSC initiatives and commitments may be vulnerable to political and economic reversals, they are to some degree and form here to stay. It will be up to the political opposition, academics, civil society organizations and social movements to put pressure on the government, especially the foreign ministry, to maintain the Brazilian commitment to SSC, reinforcing the idea that Brazil's engagement does not derive solely from ideological motivations but also benefits the country's international interests, national development and those of its partners.

