Book reviews

International Relations theory

The globalization of international society. Edited by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017. 497pp. £75.00. ISBN 978 0 19879 341 7. Available as e-book.

Thirty-three years after the publication of the highly influential volume *The expansion of international society* (Oxford University Press, 1984), edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The globalization of international society*'s goal is both timely and ambitious: it seeks to reconsider the central parameters and diagnoses of the earlier volume, in the light of the scholarly debates that have taken place in the time since its publication. The general motive is to acknowledge the value of the earlier work and the impact it had, but also to point out its shortcomings and how these might be remedied in providing a more nuanced, and conceptually different, account of the globalization of international society.

Central to this exercise is the editors' engagement in the introduction and in the second chapter, that set the stage for the 20 chapters that follow. Comparing it to four alternative accounts of the globalization of international society, the second chapter praises Bull and Watson's as the only one that 'has a robust conception of the social order that became global'; however, it criticizes it for lacking an 'explicit theory of international social change' (p. 27). While the present book barely offers such a theory itself, its strong core claim is that the globalization of international society must be thought of not in terms of its global expansion from a core of European (colonial) powers, but in terms of its *global production*. International society and its 'expansion' was always a process in which the 'core' European international society was inextricably linked with the 'peripheries' it seemingly expanded to. The 'expansion of international society' always was the globalization of a proto-global society. Offering a systematic and comprehensive exploration of that globalization is a task that the *The globalization of international society* cannot possibly aim to complete. What it does, however, is to supplement the thriving literature in 'global history' with the conceptual content still lacking in that literature. In a sense, it provides the *prolegomenon* of a history of the globalization of international society still to be written. Its success rests on an array of individual chapters that seek inroads into its vast subject by exploring the global context, the dynamics of globalization, its institutional contours and the moments of contestation that characterize global international society.

It is impossible to do justice to each of the volume's 22 individual chapters here. All are excellent (though, not surprisingly for a volume that size, a few have a loser connection to the volume's main theme). Taken together, they serve as an opening, moving beyond the one-directional thrust of the story-line of *The expansion of international society*. They do so to such a degree that sometimes one cannot help but feel that the ties to the earlier book are on the verge of being cut—in a positive sense. What *The globalization of international society*

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shares with *The expansion of international society* are two important characteristics. On the critical side, both leave much to be desired in terms of a serious engagement with theories from beyond the world of International Relations—the discussion of four selected alternative accounts of the globalization of international society in the second chapter simply offers too little in terms of a critical-constructive engagement with them. More important, however, what *Globalization* shares with *Expansion* is that both invariably are snapshots of the intellectual state of the art of their times: *Globalization* is successful in demonstrating that *Expansion* systematically ignored or downplayed global entanglements that existed in the creation and transformation of international society. However, one might wonder whether somewhere down the road *The globalization of international society* might not be chastised for downplaying the role of the enormous structural variation of the great social and political transformations of the 'long' nineteenth century *within* Europe. It is in this sense that this book is not only very good as a kind of 'sequel' to Bull and Watson's 1984 volume; its excellent quality resides in the debates it will surely stimulate.

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Foucault and the modern international: silences and legacies for the study of world politics. Edited by Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo and Frédéric Gros. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2017. 376pp. Index. £104.50. ISBN 978 1 34995 098 0. Available as e-book.

Michel Foucault is undoubtedly among the most influential thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century, and there seems to be no end to (re)engagements with his work across the humanities and social sciences. In the study of world politics, scholars began drawing on Foucault's writings in the early 1980s, to question different aspects of International Relations (IR) as a field of study. This work has been more recently supplemented with a vast body of research inspired by his lectures on 'biopolitics' and 'governmentality' in particular. Published within Palgrave Macmillan's Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, the present volume originated in a conference organized at the Centre for International Studies at Sciences Po in 2014. The organizers' original intention was to bring together two disconnected groups of scholars—prominent 'critical IR scholars' located primarily in the Anglo-American world and 'those known as foucaldians in France and in the field of Contemporary French Philosophy'—and 'work toward the emergence of a *critical and reflexive knowledge that would constitute the International as an object for thought*' (p. 3). A good idea, though it seems few from the second group have contributed to the book, which also includes several articles by scholars from other fields of study.

The book is presented as an attempt 'to make a wide variety of Foucaults live and to build on all these possible Foucaults to suggest other ways of engaging with "international relations" and the implicit conception of the "international" that enabled the constitution of "International Relations" as a field of study' (p. 1), and is divided into six parts, consisting of two or three chapters each. In part one, 'De-disciplining knowledge about the international', Nicholas Onuf outlines how he 'reconfigured' Foucault to serve his specific concerns related to the domain of law; while Didier Bigo emphasizes how Foucault's neglect of existing disciplinary knowledge allowed the reconceptualization of core topics in Political Science and IR; and Michael Walters promotes a re-engagement with Foucault's conception of the 'microphysics of power' as a corrective to the grand theory tendencies found in recent Foucault-inspired scholarship. Under the heading 'Between philosophy and method', the second part includes three of the lectures given at the 2014 conference.

Michael Dillon's chapter on 'political spirituality' is difficult to make sense of, and readers might wish to move on to discussions on Foucault's power conceptions and methods by Mitchell Dean and Michael Shapiro respectively. The book's remaining parts interrogate what Bonditti describes as 'four of the most taken for granted features of our contemporary world: "international", "(neo)liberal", "biopolitical", and "global"' (p. 11), and include a critical engagement with Foucault's silence on colonialism (Marta Fernández and Paulo Esteves); an interesting archaeological study of terrorism (Bonditti); a discussion on Foucault in relation to the historical sociology of globalization (Jean-François Bayart); a basic commentary on Foucault's lectures on (neo)liberalism (Gros); an analysis of neo-liberal bureaucratization (Béatrice Hibou); a great chapter on 'Too-late liberalism: from promised prosperity to permanent austerity' by Laurence McFalls and Mariella Pandolfi; a study of the economic valuation of human life from Malthus to human capital theorists (Luca Paltrinieri); a historical analysis of efforts to govern people through environmental interventions (Ferhat Taylan); an archaeological account of globalization (Armand Mattelart); and an important attempt to bring territory and geopolitics into Foucault's problematic of government (Stuart Elden). In a concluding chapter, R. B. J. Walker stresses that multiple Foucaults have much to say about the international—this, despite Foucault's own silence on it—while also suggesting that 'the modern international may have a lot to say to figures like Foucault who ultimately presume an international quite as much as they show us how it might be understood, engaged and challenged' (p. 320).

Overall, the contributors don't share a conception of either Foucault or the international, and this underpins Bonditti's statement in his introduction that the book 'is all about pluralization: pluralizing Foucault … and pluralizing knowledge about the international' (p. 1). That is a fine goal and should be celebrated, though some readers would likely have benefited from his introduction or Walker's conclusion going further in explicitly spelling out or interrelating the Foucaults and the internationals in question. Irrespective of this, there is no doubt that the book includes several creative attempts to think about the international differently through quite varied and also critical engagements with Foucault's work. While this could lead to a general recommendation of the book, I have been left wondering what audience the editors had in mind for it. Whatever that might have been, the potential readers likely to benefit the most from it are scholars and students with intermediate exposure to the existing literature on Foucault and international relations, and a strong desire for further inspiration to rethink 'international relations'. However, mind the price, which is appalling.

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How statesmen think: the psychology of international politics. By Robert Jervis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2017. 285pp. £79.50. ISBN 978 0 69117 505 8. Available as e-book.

Robert Jervis is one of those rare scholars of International Relations whose work is pathbreaking and enduring in multiple research areas, ranging from nuclear deterrence to political psychology, from intelligence to complexity theory. He is also one of the most successful bridge-builders, together with Alexander L. George and Joseph S. Nye, in the discipline, connecting the worlds of academia and policy-making. That this volume brings together twelve of Jervis's previously published essays on political psychology and international relations is a boon to scholars and practitioners alike. The essays are grouped into four thematic parts and, as the author himself points out in the introduction, there is significant

overlap and transitivity between the topics. Part I provides an overview of central themes in the political psychology of international relations. Part II looks at the role of heuristics and biases, with a special focus on prospect theory. Part III delves into the applications of political psychology's insights in international relations, both as a theoretical and practical enterprise. Lastly, Part IV looks at the implications of research on perceptions and beliefs for national security policies. Taken together, they provide a representative overview of Jervis's scholarship on political psychology.

Different audiences will find some chapters more useful than others. Chapters in part I and part II are particularly relevant for scholars who would like to refresh their memory on the central themes and major arguments in political psychology or for the graduate student who is getting ready for comprehensive exams. Chapter one on understanding beliefs and chapter four on prospect theory are among the most authoritative yet accessible discussions of these subjects in the literature. Parts III and IV will appeal to those working on the scholarship–policy nexus. Chapter five on signalling and perception and chapter seven on the psychology of intelligence assessment and utilization by policy-makers are particularly relevant and timely. Chapter nine on the psychology of deterrence (originally published in 1983) and chapter ten on crisis stability (originally published in 1990) are excellent examples of the enduring nature of Jervis's scholarship at a time when tensions are high between the United States and North Korea due to the latter's nuclear weapons programme. In other words, this collection is an excellent resource for a wide variety of audiences.

What makes Jervis's scholarship so enduring and relevant today? Apart from his methodological and theoretical rigour, I think two aspects are crucial. First is his ability to bring together theories, methods and concepts from multiple academic disciplines, to forge truly interdisciplinary explanations for international phenomena in a way that is sophisticated yet accessible to diverse audiences. Second, Jervis places the individual at the centre of his scholarship. However, individuals, in his formulation, are bounded, constrained and limited not only by psychological factors (beliefs, heuristics, biases, perceptions/misperceptions, risk-taking propensities, etc.) but also by group dynamics, political and bureaucratic institutions and systemic factors such as power distribution in the international system (unlike in rational choice theory). It is this focus on the individual, with all her flaws and limitations, operating under a multitude of constraints, that makes his research enduring and relevant for all who are interested in understanding international politics across time and space. This volume is an excellent starting-point for those who want to understand how statesmen (and increasingly stateswomen) think.

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International history

Decolonization: a short history. By Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel. Translated by Jeremiah Riemer. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2017. 252pp. £22.95. ISBN 978 0 69116 521 9. Available as e-book.

As Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel state in the opening pages of their new book, *Decolonization: a short history*, the 'lingering aftereffects' of European empires' unravelling in the mid-twentieth century continue to inhabit politics from Tunisia to Australia, from North Korea to Zimbabwe to Oxford (p. vii). Situated in a connected, if not *shared*, world history, decolonization was a seismic shift—with the accompanying images of aftershocks, tensions and ruinous debris—rather than a clean break. Jansen and Osterhammel's book is

more compact and conventional than other historians' recent accounts of decolonization-as-global-upheaval. It is neither as sweeping nor as revisionist as Frederick Cooper's work, nor as rich and politically spiky as Timothy Parsons's. To say that this has to do with the built-in limitations of writing 'a short history', is true, but only to a point. Unlike the other two authors, who tend to zero in on the socio-political entanglements and continuities of imperial power and post-colonial politics, Jansen and Osterhammel choose to highlight the most straightforward and familiar lesson of decolonization: the world was once split up into 'a handful of colonial empires', and, after five or six decades, it had become 'a plural world of sovereign states' (p. vii). As a result, this is a decidedly necessary book, without being a sufficient one.

The book's main strengths are in the ways in which it serves as a synthesis of existing research on decolonization as a series of large historical events. It does this in two ways: by contextualizing political and economic transformation in the history of decolonization as a 'moment and process' in *world* history, and by providing an insightful breakdown of the state of decolonization research today. This second feature comes complete with a useful typology of the 'analytical perspectives' and 'explanatory models' often employed (pp. 22–34). Chapter three, 'Paths to sovereignty', takes readers region by region, from south Asia to Africa, recounting imperial decline and power transfer in concise and analytically shrewd packages. Drawing on the latest paradigms in decolonization research, Jansen and Osterhammel convincingly argue that pathways from anti-colonial unrest to political power transfer were of varying lengths and met differing levels of imperial resistance. They remind readers that the World Wars were imperial wars—not merely wars of nation vs. nation—and that the independent nation-state was a 'late development' in the trajectory of anti-colonial struggle (pp. 46–7). Refreshingly, they highlight the importance of women to nationalist struggles (pp. 50–1)—a point that often gets overlooked by world system-level accounts of decolonization. Chapters four and five persuasively frame decolonization as a transformation of international economic and political order. While the large-scale analysis of economic transformation is generally convincing, one could accuse the authors of being balanced to a fault. Emphasizing its predatory and self-interested character in some spots, they conclude by stating that colonial economics was 'highly ambivalent', and ask: 'Were harsh labor relations in mines and plantations worse than having no jobs at all? Were native employers really always more benign than expatriate capitalists?' (p. 138). Such questions should be raised, but not without reference to the centuries of conquest and subjugation to European economic rationality which came before. Perhaps due to the authors' tight historical focus, such considerations are left out of frame.

It is the implication that decolonization was a period in twentieth-century history—with aftereffects, yes, but basically concluded—rather than a term signifying ongoing struggles for a more plural and egalitarian world, that tethers the book somewhat. In the book's shortest chapter, the authors give an overview of the 'ideas and programmes' that underpinned anti-colonial movements. Again the analysis is deft, but the frame seems unnecessarily limited. The authors argue that links in thinking between the anti-colonial past and the post-colonial present are more tenuous than some have made them seem. This, they claim, is due to the inclination of post-colonial theory 'toward an abstract and homogenizing conception of colonialism that on occasion is completely detached from the physical colonial situation' (p. 169). But the authors do not convince that this occasional tendency is a valid basis for the kind of analytical division they are suggesting. Decolonization is more than just a reordering of space and sovereignty—it is a light on the ways in which power rules through standards of normality: whether it be language, ideas about

progress, political form or interpretations of history. It is hard to imagine literary legend Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, an anti-colonial *and* a post-colonial thinker who authored the classic, *Decolonizing the mind* (1986), signing on to such a division.

While *Decolonization*'s clarity and cohesion make it a necessary contribution and an excellent start for newcomers to the topic, veterans might finish the book wondering why Jansen and Osterhammel did not broaden their horizons a little more.

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The Armenians in modern Turkey: post-genocide society, politics and history. By Talin Suciyan. London: I. B. Tauris. 2016. 320pp. £62.00. ISBN 978 1 78453 171 3. Available as e-book.

In her book, *The Armenians in modern Turkey*, Talin Suciyan sheds new light on the circumstances of the Armenian genocide survivors who remained inside Turkey, and had to live in an environment of denial. Not only did the Turkish state deny its act of genocide—and over a century later Ankara still refuses to take responsibility for the annihilation of Armenians and other Christian nations of Asia Minor—but also imposed this denialism on the remaining Armenian communities, who formally became citizens of Turkey.

The genocide of the Ottoman Armenians is the worst mass killing of civilians that took place under the shroud of the First World War; it is equally one of the most under-studied events of the twentieth century. The Turkish Republic established by Mustafa Kemal not only censored any discussion about the genocide, but also continued to destroy any remaining signs of the Armenian past. This official Turkish censorship, and international accommodation with it, was so efficient that scholarly debate on the Armenian genocide only began in the 1980s, and inside Turkey only in the late 1990s. Much of this debate represented a struggle against official Turkish denialism—as well as against a number of Turkish and western scholars and intellectuals who collaborated with it. As a result, the consequences of this mass extermination—the first modern genocide—for the survivors, the perpetrators and international relations, remain to be investigated.

Suciyan's great contribution in this book is to give a voice to Armenians in Turkey and recount how they coped with living in a state where their history—and even existence—was undesirable. Just as the victims of the genocide disappeared from the map, the survivors were forced into shadows. Suciyan brings them back to historiographic life.

The author introduces two analytical tools: the first is 'habitus'—daily practices that normalized denial and the violence associated with it—which she borrows from Pierre Bourdieu. This habitus was perpetuated through violence exercised by the state against the Armenians, with the collaboration of Turkey's Muslim population (including Turks and Kurds), and by the state's material encouragement to perpetuate denial. Periodically, the Turkish press launched racist hate campaigns against minorities. For example, immediately after the end of the Second World War, when tensions were high between Turkey and a Soviet Union pushing territorial demands, the Turkish press attacked its own Armenian citizens as 'internal enemies, spies, a fifth column, traitors, bomb-makers', while at the time 'there was not even a single Armenian among the alleged spies who were tried at court' (pp. 152–3).

The second concept the author analyses is that of diaspora. Armenian communities from Beirut to Los Angeles were formed largely as a result of the genocide and the dispersal that followed. Armenians who remained inside what became Turkey do not consider themselves as diaspora, since they remained on their own land. Yet Suciyan shows how continuous

harassment of surviving Armenians all over Turkey, by closing down schools, destroying churches—over 2,500 churches and monasteries were destroyed or converted into mosques, barns, prisons—kidnapping girls, etc., pushed them to move to Istanbul, the only place in Turkey where they felt relatively safe. This 'displacement' within the 'homeland', as Suciyan calls it, is a metaphor of the existential angst of the survivors: to live on the land of one's ancestors, where a unique civilization was developed over 26 centuries, and yet to be estranged by violence and denial. To illustrate this, she quotes from writer Hagop Mnts'uri, who, in 1915, left his village to seek medical treatment in Istanbul. He was forced to remain in the Ottoman capital and never heard again from his wife, parents and four children. 'I am a hostage and remain to live as a hostage here' (p. 33).

Suciyan's book invites readers to further investigate how the dark denial of the extermination of an entire population was possible. But she warns us that 'the denial of the descendants of survivors and the denial of the descendants of perpetrators should not be considered on equal footing. While both reproduce denial, the descendants of perpetrators continue perpetration through denial, whereas the descendants of victims continue to be victimised' (p. 21). Here, the author creates a dialectical relationship between the crime of annihilation and its silencing, and the Turkish political culture that is conditioned by it and reproduces similar violence and denial elsewhere.

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Governance, law and ethics*

Naked diplomacy: power and statecraft in the digital age. By Tom Fletcher. London: William Collins. 2016. 310pp. Index. £15.90. ISBN 978 0 00812 756 5. Available as e-book.

The future of #diplomacy. By Philip Seib. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2016. 155pp. Index. £40.50. ISBN 978 1 50950 720 7. Available as e-book.

The late Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at the Foreign Office and Director of Chatham House, once perceptively remarked that British foreign policy-makers had a degree of latitude, as they were insulated to a significant degree from public criticism, provided decisions were kept within the bounds of a reasonably wide spectrum of options. At that time, ministers and their official advisers were seemingly able to draw a pragmatic distinction between purely domestic issues and demands and external pressures from a variety of sources.

Of course, in times of crisis, public interest, protest and debate were spurred by intense media controversy, as in the 1973 debate about joining the European Economic Community. Defence, too, provoked argument, especially over the issue of Britain's nuclear capability, but, by and large, foreign policy was bipartisan in character: support for NATO, the special relationship with the United States and the influence accorded to Britain with its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, participation in the Korean War and the Malayan counter-insurgency campaign in the 1950s were clear evidence of Britain's standing as a Great Power with an influential role in world affairs. And this aspiration was rarely challenged by a public beginning to enjoy domestic prosperity following the austerity of the immediate postwar years.

Both books under review address the question: how can diplomacy survive and prosper as a key institution giving structure and substance to an international society of states, despite the stresses and strains of a precarious post-Cold War order? In particular, Tom

* See also Daniel H. Joyner, *Iran's nuclear program and international law*, pp. 989–90.

Fletcher and Philip Seib recognize that the world of 'telegrams and anger' (in E. M. Forster's famous phrase) has expanded into one in which 'anger' no doubt remains a recurring feature of international intercourse, with the difference that policy-makers have to face a battering from social media's intrusion into the rarefied and complex domain of foreign policy decision-making. Thus, no longer the exclusive preoccupation of a mandarin class, Kenneth Younger's 'spectrum' has narrowed, with more and more policy options subject to public demand for transparency, accountability and pressure from intense media scrutiny, WikiLeaks 'revelations' and vociferous single-cause lobbies.

Fletcher's thesis is bluntly asserted: 'with power shifting unpredictably, so must the diplomats of the Digital Age. Diplomatic service—the clue is in the name; like the rest of the political class, diplomats have to find new ways to connect with the public they serve. Of course, international relations are much more than simply public relations, but diplomacy is not yet as social, progressive or democratic as it needs to become. It is not yet connected to the new sources of power' (p. 20). How this is to be done with profit—both economic and political—the author explores with skill, panache and wit. His analysis benefits, too, from a lively opening section which offers a cogent history of diplomacy. This provides a helpful context for the analysis of diplomacy's role in the modern era and how best to cope with the continuing revolution in information technology. To this end, the author draws on his own experience as a senior diplomatic envoy, providing insights into the tasks confronting the current diplomatic service and its successors. This text has added value for the academic study of diplomacy, for the informed layman and indeed the current and future crop of diplomats. Fetcher's argument throughout is robust and always relevant. The fledgling diplomat might well still have to plough through Satow's mammoth volume, but *Naked diplomacy* provides a fine supplementary analysis.

These observations apply equally well to Seib's admirable companion volume to Fletcher's book. He, too, considers the impact of the internet on diplomatic practice; as he argues, 'these new connections are being used for more than mindless chit-chat and the exchange of cute cat videos. People are learning more and more about the world around them, and not in passive ways. They can watch what their own and other governments are doing and participate in debate about those … All this matters to diplomats because during past centuries their work proceeded at a measured pace. Theirs was a closed club—elite, male, and disdainful of anyone outside their circle. No more. The ranks of diplomats have been opened to become more inclusive and egalitarian and the public's attention to their work has grown exponentially' (p. vii). The author cites a telling example: during the Iran nuclear agreement, 'the public's involvement in the debate about the plan provided good examples of the diplomacy that exists beyond the work of professional diplomats … social media [enabled] advocates and opponents to conduct a global debate' (p. vii).

Seib's key concern is to demonstrate the validity of his proposition that 'the future of diplomacy is inextricably linked to the politics of the future of the media' (p. 3). As he evocatively argues, individuals via the possession of personal media tools, are empowered in 'unprecedented ways … everyone can be a journalist of sorts' (p. 3) or, as Fletcher argues, 'if we are to get through a century of significant peril and uncertainty we need the co-existers to fight back. We need citizen diplomacy to kick in' (p. 264). What is crucial is that officials and their political masters continue to enhance their social media skills in pursuit of sophisticated and credible decision-making. The outcome of Brexit might well provide a test case of success or failure in this context.

Seib has much of interest to say about public diplomacy, which he unequivocally distinguishes from propaganda. He explicitly argues that most publics want to feel at ease with

their government's definition and practice of public diplomacy and its projection abroad; he has much of interest to say about the public diplomacy of key actors such as China, Russia and Israel. He makes the valid point that the benefits of public diplomacy, for example student exchanges, are hard to quantify and its full beneficial effect may only be obvious over the long term. If nothing else, both books will provoke argument within foreign offices and beyond.

Both these books demonstrate diplomacy's continuing validity in a world of increasing pressure on governments. Certainly the rise and importance of social media are having a transforming impact on diplomatic performance. We might certainly heed the verdict of George Kennan, one of the great ambassadors of the twentieth century: 'the conduct of foreign policy rests today on an exercise and understanding, truly staggering in its dimension—understanding not just the minds of a few monarchs or prime ministers, but understanding of the minds and emotions and necessities of entire peoples' (p. 162). The learning curve will be steep, but not insurmountable.

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Crisis and institutional change in regional integration. Edited by Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan. New York: Routledge. 2016. 226pp. £120.00. ISBN 978 1 13895 183 9. Available as e-book.

Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan's book investigates the impact of global economic and financial crises on regional institutions. Their main argument suggests that crises affect the dynamics of regional integration, its actors and the structures that surround decision-makers. Primarily, the book seeks to assess whether regional institutions change in periods of economic and financial crisis and to analyse how and why regional institutions react differently to similar circumstances.

The contributors to this edited volume focus on two key concepts: crisis and regional integration. They believe that crises—of a political, military, social, ecological, as well as economic, origin—impact regional integration, institutions and civil society. The central argument defended throughout the book is that the European Union is the regional organization with the most favourable attributes to weather an economic crisis. These beneficial conditions include the nature of power relations among member states, institutional density and the attitude of its citizens to integration. In contrast, regional organizations in Latin America and Asia have lower institutional density and lower levels of civil society collaboration in integration processes.

To test their argument, the authors first turn to analysing the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the European Union, which they consider as an example of a more stable and more mature institution compared to regional organizations in Asia (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN) and in Latin America (Central America Integration System or SICA; MERCOSUR; and the Union of South American Nations or UNASUR). It is interesting to look at the complex analytical framework the editors apply to their case-studies. Saurugger and Terpan seek to understand the effect of crises on regional integration; determine if regional integration and institutions are strengthened by them; understand which components affect the behaviour of institutions and the dynamics of integration; and whether prior social attitudes towards integration can impact how the crisis is resolved.

They hypothesize, first, that 'the higher the relative power of state actors (cognitive, economic, political, military) before a crisis occurs, the higher the probability that these actors influence institutional change in the situation of crisis' (p. 8); and, second, that the

higher the institutional density in the situation of crisis, the likelier the continued commitment of both institutions and member states to regional integration. Finally, they argue that the higher the institutional density, the higher citizens' support for increased regional integration in times of economic crisis, and the stronger the regional integration, the higher probability that civil society organizations support increased regional integration (as shown in table 1.1, p. 12).

The authors build on a historical institutionalist approach associated with new regionalism. Their structural framework attempts to establish a relationship between the institution, collective actors and citizens, which, to this reader, provides an in-depth analysis of crisis and integration. Furthermore, the book's comparative approach allows the authors to more accurately assess the transformations and reactions occurring in the processes of regional integration in Europe, Latin America and Asia.

The book seeks to analyse power relations between the member states and regional organizations in different policy domains and forcefully underlines the power of member states in developing initial answers to specific crisis situations.

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Deliberation across deeply divided societies: transformative moments. By Jürg Steiner, Maria Clara Jaramillo, Rousiley C. M. Maia and Simona Mameli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 238pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10718 772 6. Available as e-book.

The concept of deliberation has attracted significant attention among scholars of social sciences in recent years. Nevertheless, *Deliberation across deeply divided societies* is trying to take a new and refreshing approach to empirical research on deliberation, aiming to speak to theories of International Relations (IR) and conflict management at the local, national and international level.

Based on empirical analyses of deliberation among ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries in Colombia; Serbs and Bosniaks in Srebrenica; and poor community residents and police officers in Brazilian favelas, the book revitalizes Arend Lijphart's consociational theory of deeply divided societies. The authors also draw insights from accommodation theory (as an exclusively institutional approach to power-sharing among political leaders) and John Dryzek's theory of public deliberation (seen as social learning in a process of reconciliation). Because the new empirical practices of mass deliberation in deeply divided societies have been often dismissed as impossible or undesirable, the research methodology seems challenging. While previous research has adopted a purely theoretical or an experimental approach to deliberative practice, the authors focus instead on the micro level of deliberation and the qualitative-interpretative analysis of speech acts.

The book develops the concept of the deliberative transformative moment (DTM). The DTM emphasizes the dynamics of deliberation, from its lowest form to full deliberation. The book's qualitative-interpretative analysis is based on a coding of speech acts and on an identification of deliberative transformative moments. The added value of the conceptualization of deliberative dynamics of speech acts lies in the finding that a quality of deliberation cannot be justified in isolation, but only in its proper context. Therefore the authors advance the concept of DTM by classifying several factors in deliberative dynamics: from the formal feature of democratic deliberation or communicative rationality, to informal/emotional expressions like storytelling and personal narratives, humour or sarcasm. While reason-giving argumentation and personal storytelling are shown to have a significant impact on DTM, humour, along with sarcasm (in a negative way), are much less important

for deliberative transformative moments. Interestingly, the authors also analyse muteness as a response to disrespectful behaviour, deliberative leadership and deliberative spoilers. A response of muteness to disrespectful remarks and aggressive behaviour during discussions showed a positive effect on transforming the DTMs from a low to a high level. Comparably, the unpredictable role of deliberative leaders reveals the frequent positive transformation of deliberative dynamics. On the other hand, deliberative spoilers rarely increased the deliberative dynamics from low to high. Although these factors did not demonstrate a significant impact on DTM, they performed a noticeable role in the further conceptualization of deliberative dynamics.

Deliberation across deeply divided societies is principally advancing the research agenda on formal and informal factors of deliberative transformative moments in deeply divided societies. But the authors' qualitative-interpretative methodology in micro-environments in Colombia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Brazil also helps demonstrate that deliberation among ordinary inhabitants is possible, even in polarized societies. In this regard, the book has implications beyond theories of conflict resolution in social, political and communication studies.

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Conflict, security and defence

Intelligence security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. By Artur Gruszczak. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 298pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13745 511 6. Available as e-book.

This book appears to be a remoulded version of Artur Gruszczak's more informative and better-organized publication which appeared in Polish in 2014. The English-language version is a well-presented dream of a European Union security integration enthusiast. Divided into ten chapters, it provides readers with the history of the establishment of EU intelligence and security structures and the way they—and there seem to be a lot them—operate. The author informs us in a lengthy introduction: 'I intend to show that the EU—regardless of the poor prospects for making a European NSA or CIA—has been creating a specific organizational and functional structure capable of effectively performing intelligence functions' (p. 14).

In the world of constant semantic somersaults and relentless PR campaigns, the meaning of 'intelligence' in the security context has changed considerably and has been misused by many academics and politicians. The EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) was a good name for an organization which processed low-level contributions from member states and procured visas for EU officials. However, its name was changed in 2012 to the Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCENT) purely for PR reasons, although the organization has no acquisition element. The European Council even declared in 2010 that 'neither the SITCEN, nor any other component of the European External Action Service, is an intelligence service' (p. 243).

Gruszczak has read just about everything which has been written on the subject and quotes his sources extensively—even when there is little need for it. For example, his claim that for two known academics, 'secrecy is an indispensable condition of intelligence process' (p. 43) would certainly be shared by absolutely everybody, practitioners and academics, who know anything about the subject. And this is one of the most important reasons why the EU's main analytical intelligence organ, the INTCEN, is unlikely to become a properly functioning intelligence service. It would have been interesting to read the author's own analysis of the issue and his views about the weakest and strongest links of the EU security

network. But he avoids important issues such as who should or should not be on the 'need-to-know' distribution list of more sensitive EU documents. What would be the supervisory role of the European Parliament, who should be responsible for security clearances of the EU officials and what are the legal measures against those who leak or betray the organization?

The harmonization of relevant security law, rules and regulations of the EU member states should also have been addressed, as should the assessment of the differences between their intelligence cultures. A small chapter about the national contributions of intelligence personnel would have been useful because the subject includes several potential minefields, such as quotas, competences—some EU members have no intelligence services—and the impact which national contributions could have on the services of the individual member states.

To be sure, all the EU structures responsible for collecting and analysing information are very well described in the book, but one wonders if any of them produced an advance warning of the possible consequences of overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi or anticipated the flood of refugees. After all, the Frontex Risk Analysis Centre was set up in 2003 and we all had enough time to learn from the mistakes made in Iraq. If such reports were not written, this book would be an excellent place to ask why not, and if they were, why nothing has been done to address these challenges. After all, what is the point of building up intelligence and security structures if the principal decision-makers are either not warned or ignore the warnings? The author avoids asking these and many other difficult questions. Equally, readers will not find anything about the cost of building up the EU security and threat assessment structures, although they may wonder why, in 2012, the EU did equip the Arab Situation Room in Cairo with two million euros' worth of computers and what it received in return.

The book is clogged up with far too much obscure verbiage such as: 'The nodal model of governance offers a valuable theoretical insight into the structure and dynamics of networked relationships' (p. 19), and the author's approach to intelligence analysis is even more confusing. It is also difficult to understand why the US is described as 'the leading NATO ally' and 'the security provider for the EU member states' (p. 200). The first is manifestly incorrect and the second requires an explanation.

This book is a very good source of information for academics, observers and analysts of the EU administration but it has little to do with real life and the challenges facing intelligence and security organs anywhere.

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Quality peace: peacebuilding, victory, and world order. By Peter Wallensteen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 272pp. £64.00. ISBN 978 0 19021 554 5. Available as e-book.

Quality peace is a very accessible book that draws together wide-ranging literatures to make its argument that three conditions are necessary for lasting conflict resolution: dignity for all parties, rule of law and a time-period long enough to normalize peace. Peter Wallensteen draws on an impressive variety of conflict types across the world, from Angola to post-Second World War Europe and Cambodia, although individual cases are not examined in great depth. The writing is clear and engaging and this book would therefore be accessible to both a general audience and anyone with an interest in peace and security studies, whether they be academics or policy-makers.

The book begins with an interesting and useful history of the concept of 'peacebuilding', paying attention to the role of the United Nations in its development, which adds some welcome context for the subsequent chapters. In addition, the second chapter offers readers a helpful exploration of existing peace scholarship. The following, empirical, chapters examine inter- and intrastate conflict as well as state formation and the role of international organizations. The book is logically structured, but a better explanation of how the various aspects of peacebuilding fit together would have been useful in the introduction, to help guide readers through the analysis.

The blurb on the back cover heavily implies that this work is mainly a statistical analysis of the conditions for peace. This is not the case: aside from one or two tables, Wallensteen's own statistical work only begins to appear in any detail from page 81 onwards. One of the strengths of this work is its broad range in time, location and type of conflict examined, so it is a shame that this is omitted from the summary. When they are present, Wallensteen's statistical explanations will engage both those acquainted with quantitative methods and those who are not.

The conclusion is an excellent summary of the book, and would make a good starting-point for undergraduate courses on peace and conflict. The content is partially delivered by bullet-points in this chapter, which allows Wallensteen to cover a very large amount of ground in a short space. This makes it crystal clear how Wallensteen adds to the discipline of peace and security studies in this volume. For example, Johan Galtung's famous exploration of positive and negative peace is nicely complicated by this volume. We might have an idea of what positive and negative peace could look like, but what is *quality* peace? How can *good* positive peace be achieved? What does *good* negative peace look like? Conversely, what does poor peace look like? In a world with evolving security problems, such as increasing attacks on states across the world by non-state actors like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, it becomes all the more important to consider precisely what we mean by 'peace' and how this can be achieved. This volume is helpful in encouraging nuanced thinking about the topic through the use of many empirical examples.

Finally, this book was published in 2015; recent developments such as the British vote to leave the European Union (an institution Wallensteen cites as important for peace on p. 142), the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, and the changing nature of the US relationship with the rest of the world, especially Russia and China, pose some questions for peace and security studies. Among politicians and the general public alike there is a growing sense of uncertainty about the world, especially from a peace and security perspective; it is my hope that our discipline can fill some of this void, and to this end, this book is a worthy addition.

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Political economy, economics and development

Gaining currency: the rise of the renminbi. By Eswar S. Prasad. New York: Oxford University Press. 2017. 321pp. £18.99. ISBN 978 0 19063 107 9. Available as e-book.

Eswar Prasad has written an excellent book about the rise of China's currency, the renminbi (RMB), in lucid and simple language that is easily accessible to the reader. It is a significant addition to the literature on the internationalization of a currency that has emerged during the global financial crisis, as the dollar's global status began to be questioned.

The book is written by a well-known and prominent economist, who already has several landmark publications on currency internationalization under his belt, including *The dollar trap* (Princeton University Press, 2014; reviewed in *International Affairs* 90: 4). *Gaining currency* addresses the ascendancy of the RMB in global finance and trade. It sheds important light on the inner dynamics of the Chinese financial sector and monetary policy in recent years, and analyses China's increasing role in global financial governance as well as its efforts to rewrite and reshape the rules of global governance. This book focuses on China's progress in promoting the RMB as a major global currency and evaluates the prospects for it becoming a global reserve currency on a par with the US dollar. It is divided into ten chapters. The author starts by tracing the historical evolution of Chinese paper currency, beginning with the Tang dynasty in the seventh century, going through 1948 when the RMB formally came into existence, to the present day. He then lays out the core framework for the book, distinguishing between three concepts related to the RMB's role in the international monetary system: capital account convertibility, RMB internationalization and, finally, the RMB becoming a reserve currency that could be used as a 'safe haven' by central banks and foreign investors in times of financial upheavals.

Prasad explains the underlying reasons for China's increasing capital account openness, and closely analyses China's exchange rate policy and how it has evolved over time. One of the most interesting parts of the book is his explanation of China's move to change the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism on 11 August 2011, which triggered a sharp depreciation of the RMB compared to the US dollar; this was the largest single-day depreciation since 2005. Prasad explains that China had merely done what the US had been asking it to do for a long time, but that it had done it in a clever way 'at a time when it was convenient for it but difficult for the rest of the world' (p. 74).

Prasad goes on to address the rising global prominence of the RMB as an international currency, including its rapid expansion in trade settlements, as a payment currency and the increasing issuance of RMB-denominated bonds. He considers whether China's RMB internationalization strategy is sufficient to transform the RMB into a global reserve currency particularly following its inclusion in the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights valuation basket of currencies. He argues that although this inclusion is a significant symbol in the RMB's ascendancy, it is not in itself a 'game-changer'. However, it could be an inflection point that has significant effects on the patterns of global capital flows that encourage China to take further financial reforms, including capital account liberalization and exchange rate flexibility.

In chapter seven, Prasad presents readers with the core argument of his book. He contends that for the RMB to become a global reserve currency and a 'safe haven', China must have a sound institutional framework, an open democratic system and respect for property rights and the rule of law. In other words, Prasad's main argument is that the RMB has to fulfil political as well as economic prerequisites.

Adopting a geopolitical perspective, Prasad discusses how China is using its financial clout to reshape the global agenda. He argues that China is employing a four-pronged strategy to influence and shape the international financial and monetary system. This includes: increasing its influence in international financial institutions (IFIs); establishing new IFIs like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; aligning with like-minded emerging economies like the BRICS to establish new financial institutions (e.g. the New BRICS Development Bank); and finally, using its state-owned enterprises and development agencies to expand its financial clout and promote the RMB globally. Given the nature of China's political regime, Prasad dismisses the prospect of the RMB becoming a safe haven. This

notwithstanding, he stresses that China's increasing role on the global stage will allow it to influence and shape the international monetary system in various ways.

Overall, this is an excellent and stimulating book that elucidates China's unique path in internationalizing its currency, and how China has 'broken the traditional mould' (p. xvi) and 'turned the academic wisdom about the right order of reforms on its head' (p. 176).

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The Palgrave handbook of the international political economy of energy. Edited by Thijs Van de Graaf, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael T. Klare. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 743pp. £170.00. ISBN 978 1 13755 630 1. Available as e-book.

After the first wave of energy research that coincided with the 1970s oil shocks, scholarly interest in energy affairs declined, only to re-emerge at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This second wave of scholarship has considerably widened and deepened the scope of energy studies, well beyond their traditional focus on security of supply and international oil politics and governance. Under the conceptual umbrella of energy security, two handbooks, published by Routledge in 2011 (*The Routledge handbook of energy security*, edited by B. K. Sovacool) and Edward Elgar in 2013 (*International handbook of energy security*, edited by H. Dyer and M. J. Trombetta), crystallized this emerging, extended approach to energy affairs. These studies covered, among other issues, climate change, sustainable development, renewables, energy efficiency, domestic and global energy governance and energy ethics and poverty.

The Palgrave handbook, edited by leading scholars in this emerging field, comes at the right time to advance the debate and research agenda and to close an important gap in the recent literature. Unlike the first wave of works—with which most International Relations (IR) scholars are familiar, through contributions from leading figures such as Robert Keohane, Susan Strange, Stephen Krasner and John Ikenberry—the second wave has developed only a poor connection with the international political economy (IPE) literature. The mainstream IPE literature, as well, has given only marginal attention to the enormous challenges posed by the current energy trilemma 'of how to meet the three demands of securing energy supply, protecting the global climate and (specifically for developing countries) reducing energy poverty' (p. 52). Precisely this gap, or double-gap, which is convincingly demonstrated by the editors, is the focus of the entire handbook and the *leitmotiv* binding together the discussion of several issues, from global energy governance, energy trade and finance, energy transitions and energy conflicts to energy justice and political ecology. The scope of the handbook is thus vast and includes both traditional topics (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the resource curse and the militarization of energy security) and new topics (fossil fuel subsidies, clean energy, carbon markets and biofuels).

This handbook has two stated aims. The first is to 'bring energy into IPE again' (p. 4) as 'IPE offers a powerful framework for analysis on which scholars of energy politics can build' (p. 5). But the second is to consider how 'energy, in turn, offers a rich but largely unexplored testing ground for insights from IPE' (p. 5). Building on this key observation, the handbook embarks on rich, open conversations, revealing the vast potential for fruitful cross-fertilization between these two strands of literature. The capacity of the editors and the contributors (comprising leading scholars and energy experts) constantly to uncover potential for dialogue and fresh insights from combining IPE and energy studies—rather than simply reviewing the state of the art in their areas of expertise—stands as the major

virtue of this handbook. The authors pave the way for this conversation by discussing both issues familiar to IPE scholars (the traditional divide among liberal, mercantilist, Marxist and constructivist approaches and between the American and British schools) and issues new to mainstream scholarship (energy justice, political ecology and energy transitions).

IPE (and IR) scholars, however, must resist the temptation to turn selectively to their familiar topics or to read only chapters with an immediate relevance to international affairs, such as the ones on the Russian gas weapon, energy diplomacy and sanctions and resource wars (although, in the latter case, IR scholars especially can learn how their debates easily fit within energy studies and how market dynamics and actors are essential factors in any serious analysis of international energy relations). The handbook challenges these readers, in particular, to engage in an open conversation at the intersection of energy and IPE. In this regard, an illustrative example is the section on energy transitions, which provides interesting insights into the role of technology and socio-technical systems in energy politics—an often overlooked factor in mainstream accounts of international energy affairs—and into the lessons for IPE derived from transition studies. The discussion on energy justice and political ecology offers an in-depth overview of the several types of conflicts associated with the operation of energy systems from the local to the global level.

Overall, in contrast to most handbooks which review the existing literature and consolidate a new field by building walls and highlighting differences with other fields, the editors of this work opt for a very different approach. At first, the many suggestions for advancing the research agenda might leave readers disorientated, as it seems that much work has yet to be done to achieve the ambitious goals set in the handbook. However, this sensation is soon replaced by the exciting impression that one stands at the beginning of a long journey to which many IR and IPE scholars from different perspectives and research traditions can contribute.

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Energy, environment and global health*

Burn out: the endgame for fossil fuels. By Dieter Helm. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2017. £16.60. ISBN 978 0 30022 562 4. Available as e-book.

Dieter Helm's *Burn out* is an important contribution to the conversation on the coming 'energy revolution' and its likely impact on global economies. Until 2014, we appeared to be facing a global energy crisis driven by skyrocketing oil prices and insatiable energy demand. Dropping oil prices and technological developments are signs that the age of fossil fuel is ending, according to Helm.

Helm identifies three 'predictable surprises' that are the most likely 'to shape the energy sector as a whole, thus affecting geopolitics and the corporate landscape' (p. 13). The first has already occurred: 'the end of the commodity super-cycle and with it the crash of oil, coal, and now gas prices from the end of 2014' (p. 15). He concludes that although the age of fossil fuels is not over, the demand may—and must—decrease, if we are to avoid 'dangerous climate change' (p. 36).

The second predictable surprise is that 'the survival of the oil, gas and coal companies … is not compatible with mitigating climate change' (p. 38). The 'conventional approach

* See also Thijs Van de Graaf, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael T. Klare, eds, *The Palgrave handbook of the international political economy of energy*, pp. 981–2.

[to climate change] has not lowered global emissions' and fossil fuel companies have 'barely noticed a pinprick on their asset values and profits because of climate change policies' (p. 40). Helm shows that gas will not provide a long-term solution to climate change and ultimately will need to be phased out like both coal and oil.

The third predictable surprise is the *threat* of new technologies to fossil fuels. Helm concludes that the consequences of the three predictable surprises are 'very bad news for oil and coal companies, but there are great opportunities for electricity-based companies' and they are 'good news' for climate change mediation (p. 86).

Helm next analyses the geopolitical consequences of these predictable surprises. He describes the US as the 'lucky country', explaining that it is 'emerging at the end of the commodity super-cycle as the great winner', in contrast to 'oil-cursed countries' such as China and Russia (p. 89). The high oil prices in the US in the 1970s and the 2000s 'dented demand and encouraged energy efficiency' and motivated research on renewable resources (p. 97). Thus, markets, rather than policy, drove energy outcomes.

Helm notes that traditional oil-producing countries of the Middle East, with their complicated history of conflict, face challenges including 'mass migration, the export of terror and the risk of "accidentally" triggering wars', in addition to gradually declining oil prices. These countries are therefore 'unlikely to be leaders in the new technologies' (p. 125). Helm also describes what he calls Russia's 'resource curse'—as it is a fossil fuel-based economy—and hypothesizes several possible future scenarios, but concludes that the most likely is for Russia's economy to stagnate and the country to become 'a global mid-ranking country' (p. 142). With respect to China, he argues that the future of energy 'challenges the Chinese model' (p. 161) due to its dependence on coal. Although it does not face the same issues as many OPEC and oil-producing countries, 'the US, not China, looks more like a winner' (p. 161).

The EU, according to Helm, would benefit from a fall in oil prices. Furthermore, as it is 'one big market, and one big democracy', with open information exchange and liberal principles, it is a 'core space for creativity' (p. 162). But in spite of the potential, Helm concludes that 'Europe may not have the lead its intellectual and open societies should give it', because the region's leaders fail to focus on bolstering innovation and research and development (p. 179).

The book's final section considers what the changing energy landscape means for businesses, contending that 'few companies have ever escaped the decline of their price activity and morphed into something else' (p. 183). Helm argues that companies need to evolve to reflect changes in energy markets due to the 'emergence of smart data and the new carbon trading' (p. 225). Future 'winners' must both understand these new markets, and 'redefine economic borders of their companies to reflect these developments' (p. 225).

Helm predicts that the future of energy will be 'surprising', but that the 'three predictable surprises' he outlines will likely occur (p. 243). And, while it is not easy to enact energy policy to meet public rather than private interests, encouraging new technologies is arguably a 'better use of public monies than propping up the incumbent interests' (p. 247). Ultimately, Helm argues that it is 'better to encourage entrepreneurs and accept the many mistakes than try to hold back the tide, and in the process wreck the planet' (p. 247).

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Oil booms and business busts: why resource wealth hurts entrepreneurs in the developing world. By Nimah Mazaheri. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2016. 224pp. £41.25. ISBN 978 0 19049 021 8. Available as e-book.

Despite the vast riches that oil can bring to a nation, many oil-producing countries struggle with economic volatility and are unable to promote diversification, a phenomenon often referred to as a 'resource curse'. In *Oil booms and business busts*, Nimah Mazaheri investigates this conjuncture by looking at how oil and mineral wealth shapes government policies towards the business environment, and how these policies affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-elite actors.

The book draws extensively on empirical data from three cases. It provides rich descriptions of Iranian bazaars, the north Indian coal mafia and Saudi nepotism. The author's in-depth knowledge and the level of detail presented merit special mention.

Mazaheri's main argument rests on the observation that oil windfalls seem to create a hostile business environment for entrepreneurs and SMEs in developing countries. This fact is well documented throughout the resource curse literature as mismanagement or governance failure. However, Mazaheri argues that the regulatory hurdles established in oil-rich countries have their own logic of policy-making, where policy-makers are likely to discount the long-term economic benefits of reforms but overestimate their short-term costs. He offers a probabilistic theory focusing on how an oil windfall sets in motion causal mechanisms that dampen the interests of policy-makers and elites in enabling reforms and blunt the capacity of non-elites to demand them. Basing his argument on a vast scholarship on rent-seeking and policy capture, Mazaheri argues that for policy-makers and private sector elites, the rent-seeking dynamic shapes their interests pertaining to policy reforms.

The three cases are all very intriguing and convincingly presented. However, I would claim that the theoretical argument would have benefited from an analysis of a negative case, looking at the mechanisms present in an oil-producing country without such challenges. The three examples in the book are all quite heterogeneous. Mazaheri introduces readers to the struggling Iranian bazaar economy, the crony coal mafia of Jharkhand in India and the family-centred economic nepotism of Saudi Arabia. But, despite Saudi Arabia being presented as a weak outlier, the cases bear a striking resemblance to each other, and in fact confirm the theory rather than challenging it. It might have been fruitful to include other oil producers as well in the analysis, like Norway, Canada or the United States. That would have constituted a break with the 'developing country' focus of the book; but given that oil production is not limited to developing countries, and that oil windfalls are also prevalent in developed economies, looking at alternative cases where the theory is challenged would have contributed to the value of the text.

Just as the 'developing world' framing of the book seems somewhat limiting to the argument, so does its extensive focus on economically based agency. Mazaheri claims that 'entrepreneurs and firm owners may be economic actors on a fundamental level, but they are also social actors who can press political demands on leaders' (p. 143). It is tempting to propose a twist: that entrepreneurs and firm owners (and policy-makers) are political actors just as much as they are economic actors. Looking at the cases through different prisms (political, sociological, psychological or ethnographic) might produce different insights and reveal other possible explanations to the current governance regimes. There are peculiarities in all three cases that do not necessarily relate to oil windfalls, begging for more cross-disciplinary scrutiny. For instance, state suppression of Iranian bazaars might be just as much a product of political infighting among business sectors. Iranian

bonyads (foundations)—quasi-capitalist cum welfare service providers—could be regarded as alternatives to the state distribution of welfare services rather than simply constituting the preferential treatment of economic elites. Jharkhand's coal mafia might be comfortably connected to the single most profitable resource in the state, irrespective of windfalls. And accounts of business-friendly reforms in Saudi Arabia might be glossing over a total domination of elite-captured enterprises premised on royal connections. Most of these points, while discussed to some extent, are sidelined in favour of Mazaheri's theoretical framework.

All things considered, *Oil booms and business busts* is a well-written and empirically rich endeavour that will be highly appreciated within the resource curse scholarship. It will hopefully inspire other disciplines to fill the gaps and challenge the main hypothesis of the logic of policy-making in the wake of oil windfall, in order to make it even more robust.

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The great derangement: climate change and the unthinkable. By Amitav Ghosh. London: The University of Chicago Press. 2016. 275pp. £15.00. ISBN 978 0 67008 913 0. Available as e-book.

Amitav Ghosh has written a remarkable book that provides thought-provoking insights on the collective inability of writers, scholars and policy-makers to grapple with the global climate crisis. Ghosh notes that history has shown that nature, even in its 'unpredictable' form, was not always far removed from literature and politics. How, then, has the culture of narratives and politics rendered the interconnectedness of Gaia unthinkable? This is the central question explored by Ghosh in his book.

Modernity and science, the author points out, have promoted cultures where instinctive awareness of the earth's unpredictability has been gradually displaced by the predictability of bourgeois life. According to Ghosh, nature and the unheard in modern narratives have been sidelined, while everyday bourgeois life has moved into the foreground. But he also argues that capitalism-centric narratives of the climate crisis overlook an important aspect of global warming: empire and imperialism. Empires' quest for power and security through mastery and conquest led to the building of cities near oceans. Coastline cities including Mumbai, Madras, New York, Singapore and Hong Kong—all brought into being through processes of colonization—are now among those that are most directly threatened by climate change. The colonial art of governmentality through coercive and protectionist measures ensured that colonizing countries had a strong hold over technologies, along with production and consumption of commodities, leading to global inequities. Capitalism and imperialism are dual aspects of the same reality, where authority and markets interact with each other in processes of wealth circulation.

Ghosh traces the historical erosion of the public sphere's ability to alert security and policy establishments to the increasing importance of petroleum to the world economy. Petroleum is not like coal, where organized labour along the production value chain can exert pressure on corporations and the state. Furthermore, with globalization, people cannot put influence on the key holders of power because as mere consumers, they have become far removed from production processes.

Ghosh analyses the texts of two important publications released in 2015: Pope Francis's encyclical letter, *Laudato si*, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. While both these documents accept climate science and the perils of climate change, beyond that, they diverge sharply. The Pope's encyclical begs international, national and local communities

for openness in addressing the climate crisis and social injustice, and does not suggest that a miraculous intervention to halt climate change could be possible. On the other hand, the Paris Agreement repeatedly invokes 'mysterious mechanisms, structures and strange avatars of officialdom' (p. 155) as if they will miraculously realize the aspirational goal of limiting the rise in temperatures to two degrees Celsius and possibly even to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

While treating imperialism as an element of the historical past, the author makes no attempt to look at continuities and instances of mercantilism that are evident even today in state policies of protectionism and deglobalization. Furthermore, as Marx noted, imperialism relied on three equally monstrous pivots: feeding potato to its own working class, misrule in the 'Old World', and slave cultivation in the 'New World' ('The British cotton trade', *New-York Daily Tribune*, 21 Sept. 1861). In this regard, Ghosh offers no distinction between the developments in the 'New World' and the 'Anglosphere', despite their different historical and political economy trajectories. Spatially, Ghosh seems to be fixated on Asia and the Anglosphere, and tends to ignore the 'New World'. The author also does not delve into the history of agrarianism, which would be pivotal in offering vital insights on the differences between the empire, 'New World' and 'Old World', along with the disparities in climate vulnerabilities. Last, although Gosh sees consumerism as key to the disappearance of ecological narratives, he does not make any effort to delve into the culture and history of production and consumption.

Despite some spatial and temporal limitations in Ghosh's narrative, *The great derangement* is an eloquent contribution, one that is sure to provoke discussion and dialogue among thinking people on the role of citizens, intellectuals and politicians and our imperilled planet.

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Europe*

The politics of crisis in Europe. By Mai'a K. Davis Cross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 256pp. £67.50. ISBN 978 1 10714 783 6. Available as e-book.

The politics of crisis in Europe explores the resilience of the integration project in the face of 'repeated shocks, by some perceived to threaten the EU's very existence'. This densely argued book examines the effect on the EU of the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2005 constitutional crisis and the 2010–12 eurozone crisis. The author's thesis is more succinct and nuanced than the summary on the back cover would indicate. Mai'a K. Davis Cross asks why the EU has not gone into reverse during a time of economic stagnation, policy failures and a ringing lack of popular endorsement. How can it be that European integration has continued to deepen against the odds? She proposes the deliciously counter-intuitive argument that crises have provided a chance to 'air underlying societal tensions that would otherwise remain under the surface, impeding further integration' (p. 220). In doing so, this engaging book is no less innovative than Alan S. Milward's seminal work *The European rescue of the nation-state* (Routledge, 1992; reviewed in *International Affairs* 69: 2).

The book examines three recent crises: the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2005 constitutional crisis and the 2010 eurozone crisis. The author traces events as they unfold and the accompanying

* See also Talin Suciyan, *The Armenians in modern Turkey*, pp. 972–3; and Artur Gruszczak, *Intelligence security in the European Union*, pp. 977–8.

media narratives. She finds that European integration not only survived these crises, but also continued to expand, seemingly affirming the established 'integration through crisis' narrative. The three crises examined are interlocked. Although nobody suggested that the EU should have played a role in the 2003 Iraq War, the crisis created a rift that stole the thunder from the EU Constitutional Treaty that was being canvassed at the time. The subsequent failure and rebranding of the Constitutional Treaty into the Lisbon Treaty was tied to the eurozone crisis, though the new treaty made the euro the official currency of the EU and turned the European Central Bank into an EU institution—without the democratic legitimacy that the constitutional treaty was intended to confer.

The author uncovers an interesting trend, whereby crises invariably lead to determined efforts at further integration. In the early 2000s, hardly a year went by without another 'crisis summit' in the EU. It sometimes seemed that every lever was pulled until something started to shift. While some prospered, many of the proposed plans came to nought. The power and reach of the EU can thus be said to have increased. Yet at the same time there is a Potemkin-like quality to the latter-day triumphs of the EU. For instance, the Iraq crisis stunted the growth of the EU Foreign and Security Policy and the decision to implement the treaty that Dutch and French voters had rejected under another name seems to have given focus to political sentiment that later came on display during the Brexit campaign of 2016. Cross sees no such cumulative dissent. She concludes that we have seen dramatic moves forward in the wake of severe crisis.

Cross makes clear on page one that the crises she has singled out for scrutiny are 'to some extent *socially constructed*', what the author dubs 'integrational panics', the result of a 'heavily negative slant' in the media coverage of the EU. The book 'explores the resilience of the European Union in the face of repeat crisis perceived to threaten its very existence' (p. i). Unlike other similar studies, she takes heed of the media-generated narratives, frequently dismissed by other EU scholars, arguing that these debates are relevant, even salutary, for the EU, in that they bring about moments of catharsis (p. 25). Cross argues that crises necessitate serious discussions about how to address a given challenge and reveals that the pooling of power frequently represents a better solution than the alternatives. This thesis is interesting, as it introduces the Freudian notion of catharsis into collective emotions, a realm usually shunned by European studies because of its centrality to nationalism. As is the case with big new ideas, it will require further unbundling: who undergoes catharsis (p. 45)? The EU leaders? The journalists? Europe? The latter would entail some sort of pan-European public discourse, one which surely does not exist for anyone but the elites.

The politics of crisis in Europe is a book well worth reading and a welcome contribution to the ever-expanding European Studies canon. The author puts forward an explanation of why dark predictions for the future of Europe are so frequently wrong and why the Union continues to evolve. In doing so, she provides a highly useful account of the mainstream media commentary on the EU during these years of crisis. It is interesting to see just how much negative coverage the EU has attracted—much of it overblown. Cross concludes that 'the cumulative effects of integration by crises to date provide much more reason to be optimistic about the future of Europe in world politics'. This is a bolder claim than the standard 'growth through crisis' argument, since a more integrated EU will lead to a more pronounced external presence. This has not always been the case in the past and would entail the EU overcoming one of the final bastions of national sovereignty, that of foreign policy. This chimes with a key tenet of the pro-Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom and is bound to draw criticism from those who argue that the spectre of a federal Europe has become a myth that feeds Euroscepticism. At the other end of the spectrum, some readers

will question why positive public opinion is used to explain surges in integration while negative polls do not lead to retrenchment. Might Cross detect a democratic mechanism where there is none?

Asle Toje, The Norwegian Nobel Institute, Norway

A history of the Iraq crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991–2003. By Frédéric Bozo. Translated by Susan Emanuel. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; and New York: Columbia University Press. 2016. 381pp. £34.00. ISBN 978 0 23170 444 1. Available as e-book.

Frédéric Bozo's book was first published in French in 2013, under the rather sexier title: *Histoire secrète de la crise irakienne*. Now translated into English, it will provide a new audience with a uniquely full and authoritative account of the clash between France and the United States during what the author describes as the greatest—and also the best-documented—international crisis since the end of the Cold War.

What makes this account unusual, and often revealing, is that the author gained access to the official archives of both the Élysée Palace and the Quai d'Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Lacking similar access on the American side, he makes up for this through the rigorous use of written sources and interviews with some of the senior US officials involved.

At the heart of the crisis was a dramatic rift between two very different men: George Bush and Jacques Chirac. While in Paris Chirac was very much in charge of policy-making—despite occasional differences with his flamboyant foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin—in Washington Bush was strongly influenced by a group of close colleagues (Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice) with greater experience of world affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, the personal contacts between the two presidents were generally civil. But privately it was a different story: Bush was irked by Chirac's 'pontificating' (p. 86), while, for his part, the French leader was appalled by Bush's contempt for multilateralism and his ignorance of the Middle East. Chirac's (unheeded) warnings were to prove prescient. 'Once you are there [in Iraq]', he told Bush when they met in November 2002, a few months before the start of the war, 'you are going to have to stay there for years, and you run the risk of creating battalions of little Bin Ladens' (p. 159).

The author sets the scene by showing how Bush's predecessors—first his father, George H. W. Bush, and then Bill Clinton—had handled the problem of Saddam Hussein, following his defeat in the war over Kuwait in 1990–91. The younger Bush regarded their policy of containment—of 'keeping Saddam in his box'—as weak and ineffectual. Everything changed with the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, which led the administration to view long-standing threats in an entirely new way. Guided by a CIA assessment that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons and was on the way to acquiring nuclear weapons—an assessment which proved catastrophically mistaken—Bush decided that a 'preventive' war was justified, even if waged unilaterally and without explicit United Nations authorization. Chirac, in contrast, while not complacent about Iraq, did not see Saddam as a strategic threat and believed that any military action required a clear mandate from the UN Security Council. At the heart of the crisis was thus a profound clash of world-views: a choice between multilateralism grounded in international legality and a reckless unilateralism that risked flouting the authority of the United Nations.

Bozo convincingly dismisses accusations that France acted from craven pacifism or visceral anti-Americanism, and shows that Chirac did his utmost to head off a confrontation he did not want or seek. The dispute reached its climax at the Security Council when,

unable to secure a second resolution authorizing force (something the Blair government in London badly needed), the United States and Britain sought to make France the scapegoat for their own failure. The war went ahead, with consequences the world is still living with. Not until 2005, records the author, more in sorrow than in anger, did relations between Washington and Paris return to some semblance of normality.

The author has been unlucky in one respect: he finished work on this English edition a few months before the appearance in Britain of the long-delayed report of the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq War. As it is, his afterword, dated March 2016, is rather disappointing. That is a pity, since his book is a valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on the subject—and one, moreover, whose judgements are notably measured, especially on some of the most emotive aspects of the whole affair. To give only one hotly debated example: in presenting their case for war, did Bush and Blair consciously mislead public opinion? The author's view is that the two leaders really did see Saddam, however mistakenly, as a strategic threat (p. 9). 'In short', he writes, 'it was a matter of "spin" rather than lying, and yet the line between the two was a thin one indeed' (p. 151).

Roger Hardy, University of Oxford, UK

Middle East and North Africa*

Iran's nuclear program and international law: from confrontation to accord. By Daniel H. Joyner. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016. 246pp. Index. £49.00. ISBN 978 0 19937 789 3. Available as e-book.

After decades of confrontation with the West over its nuclear activities, in July 2015 Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany and the European Union, concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve the problem. The JCPOA, which is not a legally binding treaty, 'envisions' that in future Iran's activities 'will be exclusively peaceful', and in return provides for the gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran. Daniel Joyner hails it as 'a major triumph for diplomacy and for the peaceful resolution of international disputes' (p. 244), while US President Donald Trump during his election campaign called it 'the worst deal in history'. He had a point. Since its 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has never dispelled western suspicions about the objectives of its nuclear programme, while in recent times also enlisting unpleasant, albeit conventionally armed, proxies to spread its influence abroad. A little stock-taking is therefore in order.

Joyner has written extensively on the international law of non-proliferation, something of a niche subject, though it raises questions that go to the heart of international law. With the conclusion of the JCPOA, his publisher sensibly allowed a 'fairly substantial reworking' of his original text. The book can be read as a history of disingenuous injured innocence and deep distrust, or as a lesson in the limitations of changing the world through multilateral treaties. Views will differ as to whether the author has sufficiently taken account of those features of the Iranian regime that make the West's attitude to its nuclear programme understandable. Nevertheless, readers will find use for a study that ties the 'accord' to the earlier history of 'confrontation', though Joyner recognizes that the subject remains a 'moving target'—so President Obama features, but not his successor. (Joyner offered a snap analysis of possible outcomes following Trump's election: https://www.ejiltalk.org/

* See also Frédéric Bozo, *A history of the Iraq crisis*, pp. 988–9.

the-trump-presidency-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal-initial-thoughts/. See also the reflections at the beginning of 2017 on the constitutionality of Trump's possible moves by Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the State Department under Obama: www.yalelawjournal.com/forum/triptych's-end.) By the time this review appears, the target will doubtless have moved on.

Iran has always had legally binding commitments as a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its back-up Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under the NPT all states parties have 'the inalienable right … to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. However, nuclear weapon states parties, the haves, are prohibited from assisting non-nuclear weapon states, the have-nots, in acquiring nuclear weapons. Correspondingly, Iran, as a have-not, undertook not to 'manufacture or otherwise acquire' nuclear weapons. The assertion of an 'inalienable right' to peaceful nuclear activities has stimulated interpretation of the precise legal rights and obligations of the parties.

Joyner deals in turn with the multiple layers of rules that constitute the international law of non-proliferation. His treatment of the law is fairly technical; non-lawyers will be grateful for the summary of his argument at pp. 65–72. He concludes that while Iran had been at times in breach of this regime, more recently it has mended its ways. He appears to share the view expressed in 2007 by Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, that the hostile western attitude left Iran 'with no option but to be discreet in its peaceful activities' (pp. 136–7), a formulation which might be thought to beg the question. He also challenges what he regards as the IAEA's excessive deference to relevant Security Council resolutions, pointing out that their language is frequently hortatory, not mandatory, and should not be treated as giving added force to Iran's CSA. But surely even exhortations on a matter as sensitive as nuclear proliferation should carry great weight? Although critical of the IAEA, Joyner acknowledges that it 'has played an invaluable role … and was fully worthy of its Nobel Prize in 2005' (while also appearing to endorse the sorrowful language of the Russian representative deploring the prevalence of 'false allegations generated by interested parties in order to exercise political pressure on a State', and the temptation for the intelligence services of some states to co-opt international organizations [p. 239]).

The legality of a state's conduct matters, not only in its own right but also as an indication of the trustworthiness of the state in question. But while the JCPOA stays afloat attention is likely to be focused on whether it is working, rather than its position under international law. In its latest report to Congress, in April 2017—the first under President Trump—the US State Department announced that Iran was in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA. However, Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, emphasized that 'notwithstanding, Iran remains a leading state sponsor of terror through many platforms and methods'. Pointing to the report as evidence that Iran is still a threat to America's national security, President Trump has ordered an inter-agency review of the deal: 'Iran has not lived up to the spirit of the agreement, and they have to do that. We're analysing it very, very carefully and will have something to say about it in the not-too-distant future'. Nevertheless, on 17 May 2017 America continued its half-yearly waiver of sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA (while imposing further sanctions for the regime's human rights abuses and other activities).

David Bentley

Islamic politics, Muslim states, and counterterrorism tensions. By Peter S. Henne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 238pp. £64.99. ISBN 978 1 10714 322 7. Available as e-book.

Peter S. Henne examines how tensions and cooperation in international security policy between the United States and Muslim countries are shaped by religion–state relationships, differing objectives and Islamic politics. Employing a quantitative analysis of data from 1996 to 2009, he explores US relations with Pakistan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates in order to understand varying state support for the US global 'war on terror'. Henne argues that religion–state relationships are 'inextricably' tied to security policy on religious issues, and where governments have 'close ties to religion' they find it 'difficult to cooperate extensively' with US counterterrorism policy (p. 13). Moreover, he presents a theory that religion serves as a 'transformative force in politics' and a regime's main goal is to 'survive', which means 'religion will only influence a regime's behavior if it affects regime elite's survival calculations' (p. 14). His data support the argument that nations with closer religion–state ties are more likely to be less cooperative with counterterrorism.

The first half of the book explores Henne's theory and the outcomes of his quantitative analysis. Opening with a survey of earlier work on religion and international relations, he discusses how his approach builds on studies about institutions and religious politics, in that institutions structure issues while religion and politics are a discourse that helps shape 'political contention'. Explaining the importance of religion in international relations through state institutions, Henne describes how religious groups can get governments to act. He argues that 'religion–state relationships vary according to the extent of religion–state ties and the size of the winning coalition, with the strongest religious effects on international relations occurring in states with large winning coalitions and extensive religion–state ties' (pp. 35–6). Next, Henne provides an overview of US–Muslim state counterterrorism cooperation since the 1980s and religious politics in Muslim countries generally. He writes that the 'closest religion–state relationships are in states with relatively open political systems and extensive connections to religion' which have governing coalitions that include Islamic parties and have official roles for Islamic scholars and groups (p. 52). On the other hand, a closed political system allows the state to have more control over society and cooperate with the US under diplomatic pressure.

Turning to his large-*n* statistical analysis, Henne explains the variables he uses to measure cooperation and religion–state relations. He then goes on to explore how individual countries' responses to counterterrorism changed during the 1990s, characterized by uncooperativeness with the US; the immediate period after 9/11 which witnessed a growth in cooperation; and during the later 2000s, when this slowly decreased. He uses a dataset from 1996 to 2009, based on the US Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism, to create an original 'counterterrorism cooperation scale' and uses various publicly available sources to measure the closeness of religion–state relationships. Henne finds that, on average, close religion–state relationships had a negative impact on counterterrorism cooperation, due to leaders' concerns that they would lose power, but 'Islamist activity did not appear to affect counterterrorism cooperation at all' (p. 78).

In the book's second half, Henne provides chapter-length discussions on specific countries' religion–state relationships, including a historical overview and qualitative analyses. First exploring Pakistan, he notes how its religion–state relationship allowed for some cooperation with the US, for example on drone activity, but led to non-cooperation in other areas like educational reforms or links with militant groups. He finds that the pressure from

Islamic groups not to cooperate with the US 'was the product of the decades-long interaction between religion and state that produced a state with numerous Islamic laws, intermittent support for Islamic groups, and Islamic groups capable of crippling the government through protests and coordination with the military' (p. 117). In contrast, the United Arab Emirates is officially Islamic, but the government's 'control over society' created distance from religious groups that allowed its policy to align with US counterterrorism initiatives. Henne describes the United Arab Emirates as having 'moderate' cooperation with the US and, after 9/11, the state maintained 'distance' from Islamic groups. Last, Turkey's domestic dynamic created distance between religion and the state, despite a conservative, religiously affiliated party in power, that has allowed the US and Turkey to cooperate more closely on counterterrorism. Henne finds that 'religion can thus explain Turkey's counterterrorism cooperation, although it was the institutional distance between religion and state, not the lack of religious contention or the nature of Turkish Islam' (p. 184). The author concludes by describing how the case-studies represent a 'broader trend', and other countries not included in the analysis, like Azerbaijan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, also confirm that religion–state relationships have an impact on counterterrorism cooperation. Moreover, he explains how the study could help understand responses to the Arab Spring and the Islamic State, and outlines the work's implications for US foreign policy, including the limits of US influence.

Islamic politics, Muslim states, and counterterrorism tensions is a solid comparative analysis of counterterrorism tensions between the United States and Muslim countries. The quantitative data reveal that opposition to cooperating with the US on counterterrorism is not ideological, but a rational strategy rooted in domestic pressure beyond international politics. Henne writes that 'when the United States encounters resistance or hostility from Muslim states over its future international actions relating to contentious religious issues, these reactions arise from such domestic dynamics' (p. 208). The author acknowledges that factors, like aid, also shape cooperation, but not to the degree that religion–state relationships impact leaders' concerns. But, although he touches on geopolitics in the qualitative sections, a further examination of such factors would have been useful for understanding how rivalries, such as Russian relations with Iran and Syria, affect US cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Moreover, Henne's approach raises the question of whether one component of a bilateral relationship can be looked at in isolation. However, scholars can build on Henne's general framework to explore other domestic influences that shape international relations, and academics and government officials will find this a useful study for understanding why religious contention alone does not cause Muslim countries to decline cooperation with US counterterrorism policy.

Ryan Shaffer, Stony Brook University, USA

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ivory: power and poaching in Africa. By Keith Somerville. London: Hurst. 2016. 368pp. Index. £20.00. ISBN 978 1 84904 676 3. Available as e-book.

Keith Somerville's *Ivory* tackles the emotive topic of elephant poaching in sub-Saharan Africa with a journalistic rigour. The book presents readers with clear-eyed analysis, examining and debunking the powerful western narratives permeating the history of the ivory trade and the contemporary conservation debate.

Somerville brings together a comprehensive array of sources to untangle the politics at the heart of the ivory trade, showing how corruption, conflict and crime have perpetuated

it and undermined attempts to preserve the African elephant, including the 1989 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) ivory trade ban.

Somerville highlights a number of caveats on the data for readers to bear in mind. Accurately estimating elephant numbers in Africa is a challenge, particularly as data presented by different actors, including conservation groups and NGOs, elephant specialists, governments, think-tanks and trade experts all carry their own biases and policy motivations. The significance of *Ivory* is that Somerville juxtaposes these different approaches to cut through vested interests, imparting readers with the evidence with which to assess the conservation debate themselves.

Somerville has reservations over the use of the term 'poaching', which has at its heart 'the concept of hunting that has been criminalized by those in a position to try to control the utilisation of wildlife' (p. 7). Throughout his book, he demonstrates that the loss of African agency through the 'white hunter, black poacher' approach (p. 59) continued to inform post-colonial conservation approaches and the current ivory-insurgency discourse.

Power and control frame Somerville's chronological overview of the ivory trade in Africa, in the first half of the book. Although commodification of ivory for tools or decoration dates as far back as 35,000 years, in sub-Saharan Africa ivory 'was not so revered or worshipped … that it led to large-scale hunting, even if some communities became specialised elephant hunters' (p. 11).

It was primarily through the role of external actors that the ivory trade evolved into one of the earliest forms of an externally driven and export-led economy favouring wealth accumulation but not development. Coastal and inland traders were 'gatekeepers' of the export of ivory and import of trade goods (p. 12). Over time, hegemony of the trade favoured European merchants and colonizers who broke the power of local middlemen; such as the Imperial British East Africa Company which in 1894 established a system of hunting licences and export duties, an income policy 'guided by the British government's desire to make settlement pay' (p. 40). Colonial concern for decreasing herds evolved into a conservation movement to protect elephants for a sustainable ivory trade. A conference of colonial powers in London in 1900 agreed on policies to exclude Africans from hunting in most colonies, such as the creation of protected reserves (p. 61).

Somerville writes that these exclusionary policies continued in the post-colonial era, adopted by preoccupied African governments. Western NGOs supported bans and exclusions over 'realistic, community-friendly measures to protect habitats and species' (p. 122). Legal and illegal trade in ivory prevailed, with corruption ensuring that revenues from both flowed to governments as the new gatekeepers, further alienating communities. Occasional success stories of community-based conservation programmes, such as the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources in Zimbabwe, were undermined by conflict and corruption and were reliant on western donors for funding.

Poaching continued to rise, buoyed by the increase in global ivory prices in the 1970s and facilitated by conflict across Africa. This could be to devastating effect, as in Angola, where an estimated 100,000 elephants were killed in the decade when the South African Defence Force assisted Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in poaching and smuggling ivory during the apartheid wars of destabilization in southern Africa (p. 175).

Depleting elephant numbers across Africa prompted fierce debates between western-dominated conservation agencies on how to protect elephants, drowning out African voices including range state governments, many of which favoured 'community-based,

sustainable use approaches' (p. 181). The resulting 1989 ban on the ivory trade in signatory states discounted arguments for a regulated trade from southern African range states with recovering elephant stocks. Western promises to support anti-poaching efforts in Africa fell through; a 1990 donor conference only raised 10 per cent of the $84 million needed to support range states (p. 204).

Despite the ban, poaching has soared—in part due to resurgent Chinese demand fuelled by a booming economy. But poaching in Africa captured western attention once again with the development of a new discourse in the post 9/11 period, centred on insurgency and insecurity. Headline-grabbing reports alleging links between insurgent groups such as the Islamist Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia and the ivory trade 'created a misleading picture and led to skewed policies' (p. 304) with an emphasis on militarization, aligning counter-insurgency with wildlife law enforcement. This discourse was taken up by African states keen to deflect attention from their own corruption and patronage networks, as well as by NGOs willing to adopt the ivory-insurgency narrative in order to boost their profiles and attract government resources.

Such policy shifts have only served to further alienate communities caught up in militarized anti-poaching campaigns, with the 'conservation-capitalism-NGO nexus' (p. 103) of top-down conservation having failed to stop the ivory trade in Africa. Working to reduce demand may help in the short run, but time and again demand has returned. Somerville's argument—that it is essential to ensure the buy-in of local communities and range state governments to protect elephants in a sustainable way—must be considered by policy-makers, governments and conservationists who wish to truly protect this incredible species for generations to come.

Katherine Lawson, Chatham House, UK

The future of African peace operations: from the Janjaweed to Boko Haram. Edited by Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud. London: Zed Books. 2016. 168pp. £70.00. ISBN 978 1 78360 709 9. Available as e-book.

This edited volume on African peace operations is a courageous attempt to give readers a comprehensive overview of the emerging African model of peace operations while providing a heavy to-do list for African policy-makers. As such, it is both a descriptive and a prescriptive book, which takes readers on a journey through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and beyond, to cover the relations between African peace and security actors and their external partners. It is courageous because anyone who has tried to study the African Union (AU), and more particularly APSA, knows that this is an area swamped with numerous ad hoc arrangements, new policies and guidelines which remain in draft form, waiting to be implemented, and institutional organs which at times have so many functions that it is difficult to understand their core task. In other words, the AU and APSA remain embryonic institutions, which are difficult to analyse. For this reason, an organogram of the institutions involved in African peace operations, which would facilitate the understanding of the division of labour between them, will be sorely missed by readers.

Yet the editors, together with leading African experts, have done a fine job in providing a wide-ranging analysis of African peace operations. This involves identifying new security threats and the AU's responses to them thus far and spotting intra-institutional challenges facing the AU, including, but not limited to, how to define what a stabilization mission entails, the tension between the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the dire lack of effective mission support

capabilities. The authors should also be given credit for attempting to provide clear policy recommendations to solve the many challenges facing current and future African peace support operations.

However, the fact that both the AU and APSA are still very much in the making renders the analysis difficult and at times problematic. While aptly identifying the problems and the issues with their current functioning, on occasion the authors appear to take not one, but two leaps forward, to identify tensions and challenges which could materialize only if significant progress occurred first—which is still in doubt. For example, their concerns over the lack of connection between the ASF's stated tasks and the reality on the ground are very valid, yet the wisdom of revising and reforming the ASF even before it has been properly operationalized (or tested) seems questionable. Related to this, the latest initiatives in the field of African peace operations, including the G5 Sahel and ECOMIG in Gambia, appear to confirm de Coning's argument in chapter nine that most of the AU's operations to date are better understood as coalitions of the willing, rather than as products of the ASF concept. Similarly, the concerns around ACIRC contributing to a militarization of African peace operations appear not only to be unfounded, because of the uncertainty concerning the mere existence of ACIRC, but also because current African peace operations already *are* heavily militarized. This is not surprising, given that most recent African operations have been, as the authors observe, stabilization missions, which basically means combat missions in areas that are far from reaching any stable peace agreement. As the authors also note, the UN has taken over most of these operations as soon as a sufficient level of stability had been achieved, thus making it unnecessary for the AU to include a peacebuilding component. However, if the AU should plan its operations—as the authors advise—on the assumption that the UN does not automatically take over its missions, then more attention should indeed be paid to how to build comprehensive peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, with appropriate numbers of police and civilians. Yet given the AU's strong dependence on external support in terms of finance, capacity and expertise, this also seems like an unrealistic scenario.

In sum, this volume is comprehensive and forward looking, warning of problems that are yet to come. It is at times a little too descriptive and technical, and reads more like a dense instruction book than an academic analysis, but this is not solely the authors' fault: it is also due to the difficulty of examining a complicated institution in the making. All considered, this book remains one of the first and most successful attempts to give a complete overview of African peace operations today and what they will look like in the future.

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South Asia

Islam and democracy in Indonesia: tolerance without liberalism. By Jeremy Menchik. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 207pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10711 914 7. Available as e-book.

Islam and democracy in Indonesia was a co-winner of the International Studies Association Religion and International Relations Best Book award in February 2017 and it is easy to see why. The book reveals how one of the world's most influential and populous Muslim countries positively incorporates 'religious tolerance' without embracing secularism or liberalism and in doing so provides us with a new form of religious nationalism. To those accepting the orthodox narrative of human rights as developing in conjunction with

secularism and the enlightenment, this hybrid might seem oxymoronic. Yet Jeremy Menchik shows otherwise, revealing how the promise of religious freedom in Indonesia is predicated on the belief in one God, which entails that the state is involved in religious affairs rather than absent. Menchik terms this 'Godly Nationalism', whereby, 'as long as citizens believe in one of the state-sanctioned pathways to God, they become full members of civil society and receive state protection and other benefits of citizenship'. This contrasts with other forms of religious nationalisms that prioritize one religion over others, such as those found in Poland (Catholic nationalism) or Myanmar (Buddhist nationalism). The author's primary claim is that local social relations and contexts are key to shaping this intriguing relationship between the state and religion. For example, the shared anti-colonial struggle between different groups in Indonesia meant that local Christians were viewed as co-creators of the new state and as citizens, not just as 'people of the book' (*dhimmis*) by prominent Indonesian nationalists. Through detailed archival and fieldwork, the author reveals this cooperation to be more than a 'marriage of convenience', and shows that it has had long-lasting impact on Indonesian Islamic organizations' ideas and priorities about interfaith dynamics and on the role of religion within the state. Additionally, the case of Indonesia demonstrates that while global theologies inform ideas about religious freedom and the rights of minorities, they are constantly reworked and reformulated in the local context. It is in this new conceptual language of Godly nationalism, and in showing *how* the local and global of religious concerns intertwine, that Menchik's work can best contribute to the field of International Relations.

However, what is perhaps missing in the book is a sense of just how controversial and contested these ideas of tolerance are within Indonesia and in global Islamic organizations. He argues that there has been consensus over these ideas, particularly in the dislike of the minority Ahmadiyas, and the book hints at this being an acceptable and even tolerated persecution. Yet there have been open challenges in Indonesia to ideas of communal tolerance and Godly nationalism, and of their application. The 2010 blasphemy cases, although unsuccessful in overturning the prohibition, indicated that the state and Islamists have not entirely suppressed alternative liberal voices. Many have expressed the hope that Joko Widodo's election as president in 2014 would invigorate liberal Islamists in Indonesia and that he would challenge the cosy alliances between conservative Islamist groups and the state, although again this hasn't happened. There is also little by way of discussion in the volume on Indonesia's ongoing battles with secessionist, jihadi-Islamists and indigenous groups who violently resist the state's ideas of nationalism and tolerance.

Menchik has some real insights into the Islamization of Indonesia, and the concept of Godly nationalism offers opportunities to generalize and rethink our understanding of the ways in which religion can operate in the public sphere. His argument is supported by a weight of material and detail, and a careful exposition of the book's methodology. The book's prediction is certainly welcome for specialists of Indonesian politics, but sometimes the broader points and potential arguments get lost in the details. As a result, I recommend this book for scholars interested in Indonesian politics and in religion in global affairs more so than for undergraduate or postgraduate students.

Katherine Brown, University of Birmingham, UK

Pakistan: courting the abyss. By Tilak Devasher. New Delhi: Harper Collins. 2016. 450pp. Pb.: £14.99. ISBN 978 9 35264 177 2. Available as e-book.

I would not normally read a book about Pakistan written by a former Indian diplomat for fear of bias. However, I knew Tilak Devasher when he was posted to the Indian High Commission in Islamabad and was aware of his fascination with Pakistan and of his scholarship. Indeed, this is a thoughtful, meticulously researched and well-written work. It is certainly tough on Pakistan's failings and not quick to identify its strengths (like its vigorously free press and its remarkable resilience), but it is full of insights into Pakistan's bumpy journey since independence.

Devasher is at his best when analysing the history of the Pakistan movement, why it succeeded and how it coloured the new nation-state. He places much emphasis on British assistance to the Muslim League and tells the remarkable story of how the Muslim community, 'sullen' (p. 5) after the defeat of the 1857 Mutiny, gradually recovered, partly due to changing from a Persian to an English educational system. The British helped through the 1871 Minto Resolution on Muslim Education, the 1875 founding of Aligarh University and eventually the establishment of the All India Muslim League in 1906. Yet, in spite of all this assistance, the All-India Muslim League performed poorly in the 1937 elections and, as late as 6 June 1946, Muhammad Jinnah, its leader, was still prepared to accept a united but federal India in place of Pakistan.

The author levels the charge of 'divide and rule' against the British. When trying to cope with a powerful Congress movement which threatened to cripple government it was perhaps natural that Britain welcomed a Muslim League which was altogether less troublesome. This was particularly true during the two world wars and Devasher agrees that Congress made a tactical miscalculation in 1939 by opposing the war effort, whereas Jinnah 'endeared' himself to the British by helping with the recruitment of Muslim soldiers.

However, the author, in my view, goes too far in suggesting an actual conspiracy between the British and Jinnah to create Pakistan. The evidence is too tenuous. He reads much into the supposedly secret correspondence between Churchill and Jinnah, through the former's secretary Elizabeth Gilliatt. By then Churchill was in opposition and not taken seriously on Indian affairs. The Attlee government was mired in debt and focused on domestic priorities. Nobody in London actively wanted to divide India but, if it helped a quick exit, then so be it. Once the decision on Partition was taken, it was natural for the British to make the new Pakistani state as geographically coherent as possible. This is why they undoubtedly colluded in ensuring that both Balochistan and North West Frontier Province became part of Pakistan.

I am sceptical, also, that London was actively thinking about a future Pakistan's place in the emerging Cold War against the Soviet Union. Although Churchill made his famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946 and the Truman Doctrine was announced in 1947, the Cold War did not really begin until the Berlin Blockade in 1948, after Pakistan's foundation. Nobody knew, at that stage, that Nehru's India, though formally non-aligned, would lean towards the Soviets. It is interesting in this context that Pakistani writers felt that Britain actively favoured India during the Partition process and in Pakistan the narrative still remains that Lord Mountbatten did everything in his power to help India obtain Kashmir.

Devasher's account of the first years of Pakistan is intriguing. He makes the point that there was virtually no preparation for the establishment of a new country. It was not until 1956 that Pakistan even agreed a constitution. He argues that years of British 'spoon-feeding and midwifing' (p. 41) meant that Pakistan was ill-prepared (unlike Congress in India) for the actual business of government. As the Muslim elite from India arrived in the

new capital of Karachi, Jinnah enforced Urdu (spoken by only 3.7 per cent of the population) as the national language. Here was one of the many mistakes of this early period and one which alienated both the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Punjabis of West Pakistan. The autonomy which Jinnah had promised ever since 1929 (p. 84) quickly evaporated. Meanwhile the 'tribal raiders' sent into Kashmir in a vain attempt to seize the territory were organized by the newly installed government behind the backs of the British military commanders. At the end of a tumultuous first year, Devasher questions whether Jinnah had fundamental doubts about Pakistan. Jinnah's doctor quotes the dying man as saying, 'I have committed the greatest blunder of my life'.

As we get nearer to the present day, the book's themes become more familiar. The author identifies a shared fear and hatred of India as the factor which binds the disparate strands of Pakistan together. He explores the problems of the army, terrorism, education, madrassas, population growth, power shortages and water stress. Throughout his detailed analysis, Devasher displays no pleasure at Pakistan's woes but little sympathy either. Ironically I was left wondering how, 70 years after independence, (West) Pakistan has managed to survive and in some areas to flourish. For Pakistan is an important country and remains key to south Asian stability, and it is in India's interests, more than any other's, that Pakistan remains cohesive and steps back from the abyss.

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Choices: inside the making of India's foreign policy. By Shivshankar Menon. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2016. 180pp. £21.50. ISBN 978 0 81572 910 5.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and India's economic crisis in 1991 led to the opening up of the Indian economy and subsequent changes in India's foreign policy. In *Choices*, well-known Indian diplomat Shivshankar Menon, who held key positions in the Indian government, including foreign secretary and national security adviser, analyses five key decisions in India's post-Cold War foreign policy. These choices are the decision to sign the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement with China and the Civil Nuclear Treaty with the United States; not using force against Pakistan after the 26/11 Mumbai attack; India's response to the Sri Lankan civil war; and eschewing a first use policy on nuclear weapons. Thus the book is not a diplomatic memoir, as readers might expect, but a keen analysis of Indian foreign policy-making.

Chapters are divided in two, where the first part deals with policy choices within a particular crisis setting and the second expands on India's current and future policy options. In the first chapter, Menon discusses India's decision to sign the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement with China. For the author, it seemed impossible to solve the boundary dispute permanently, as right-wing forces on both sides would never have allowed settlement of the dispute. The China–India agreement succeeded in keeping the peace as it opened scope for engagement. Menon has a positive outlook on India–China relations in general and argues that the 1993 agreement has been one of the best examples of cooperation (p. 28).

Chapter two explores recent changes in the India–US relationship and the factors which have led to these. The author asks why Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh risked his position at home in order to sign the Civil Nuclear Agreement, at a time when much easier options for cooperation with the US were available to him, for example on economic issues. Taking a wider perspective, Menon throws light on the strategic need of both India and the US for each other, which goes beyond clean and cheap energy (pp. 54–8). In this chapter,

the author also discusses India's diplomatic capacity to deal with other states and notes the key role that individual policy-makers play in high-level agreements.

Chapter three, the highlight of the book, discusses India's decision not to respond with force to the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Menon argues that this was a well thought-through decision by the government, as a military escalation would have made the situation worse. Furthermore, it also gained India global sympathy and support, against Pakistan and terrorism. Chapter four and five analyse India's engagement in the Sri Lankan civil war and India's choice to declare itself as no first use nuclear weapon state.

The book also focuses on dilemmas faced by practitioners and decision-making with limited information. Menon gives the role played by individuals (prime ministers in this case) more than enough recognition, but his account lacks details about the views of leaders on these choices. The importance accorded to domestic politics as an obstacle highlights the author's realistic approach. His conclusion, that the style of Indian foreign policy-making is bold in policy conception but cautious in implementation, would have been more convincing had it been supported by a more detailed analysis. Perceiving trouble as opportunity for change could also indicate overdependence on context and a lack of strategic thinking. His definition of strategy, which emphasizes the non-use of force, is very close to complex interdependence and most of the chapters, except on the Sri Lankan crisis, seem to follow this theoretical approach. The book is quite hopeful that India will continue to show wisdom, realism and good sense in the process of becoming a Great Power. In short, *Choices* is a well-written work which will be valued by scholars of Indian foreign policy.

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East Asia and Pacific*

Hong Kong in the shadow of China: living with the leviathan. By Richard Bush. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2016. 377pp. Pb.: £25.50. ISBN 978 0 81572 812 2. Available as e-book.

Twenty years after its handover from British to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong is again making international headlines. The recent catalyst was the protests of autumn 2014—the 'occupy' or 'umbrella' movement—which marked the peak of debate in Hong Kong over political reform, in particular proposed changes to the way that Hong Kong's top official, the Chief Executive, is chosen.

But the protests also brought to the surface a range of structural problems facing Hong Kong, from ineffective governance to growing socio-economic inequalities under the influence of globalization and the rise of China.

Richard Bush's *Hong Kong in the shadow of China* delves deeply into these developments, their interrelationship, causes and likely future trajectories. He takes readers through enough of the historical background to help explain the present, but concentrates mostly on analysing the nature of Hong Kong politics and society today, which he characterizes as a 'hybrid' based on its possession of 'the rule of law and civil and political rights' while not enjoying representative government. He further characterizes Hong Kong as a 'liberal oligarchy': liberal in its possession of most civil and political rights, but oligarchic in the concentration of power, something which he describes as 'conducive' to a 'culture of protest' (p. 64).

* See also Eswar S. Prasad, *Gaining currency*, pp. 979–81.

Detailed exposition of these themes provides the backdrop for two meaty chapters on the debates over political reform before and after the occupy movement (chapters five and six). These are not just detailed, but remarkably well balanced given the passions raised by the issues on both sides—careful and objective analysis on this topic is difficult to find.

Bush's broad conclusion on the failure of this attempt at political reform is that it was not the lack of ideas or fundamental problems with the substance that prevented a deal from being reached, but a lack of trust. Underneath this, though, does lie a fundamental conflict in desired outcomes between those who saw a role for the central government in Beijing as an essential part of selecting the Chief Executive, and those who believed that the political reform process was an opportunity to push for a system in which Beijing would play no substantive role.

Bush's accounts of Hong Kong's economic and social challenges are equally well researched and balanced. For example, he describes the important shifts in the economic relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China (as the rest of China is called in Hong Kong) which took place in the mid-2000s: a changing economic environment in southern China, emerging competition to Hong Kong from other Chinese firms, a shift in China to higher value-added industries, and 'most significantly politically, … a change in the direction of the flow of economic influence between Hong Kong and China' (p. 173).

Taken together with the need to improve governance, as well as competitiveness, and with stark income and wealth inequalities appearing somewhat entrenched in Hong Kong society, the challenges facing the city spread well beyond politics and the thorny question of how to move closer to universal suffrage.

This is an excellent book for readers interested in understanding these issues facing Hong Kong today. It also includes a useful chapter on Hong Kong and Taiwan (chapter 11), and a detailed one (chapter 12) on recent United States policy towards Hong Kong, something which to the knowledge of this reviewer has not received comprehensive treatment elsewhere.

The individual chapters should read well as standalone analyses of the themes they discuss. But for readers who progress from cover to cover there is a certain amount of repetition, and the thematic rather than chronological approach weakens the book's overall coherence. Some key analytical conclusions on why neither side managed to achieve its objective in the 2013–15 debates over political reform are tucked away at the end of chapter six (pp. 142–5).

The one point of substance on which Bush does not explore the debate is the impact of 2047, the year when Bush claims 'Hong Kong's "second system" will disappear and it will become part of Beijing's [*sic*] administrative structure' (p. 19; see also p. 277 and p. 283). This view is widely held, but also strongly contested by many constitutional lawyers and the Hong Kong government, and some discussion of this debate would have been useful.

Overall, though, this is a carefully researched and balanced account which will provide plenty of insights for readers interested in Hong Kong.

Tim Summers, Chatham House, Hong Kong

Cambodia votes: democracy, authority and international support for elections 1993–2013. By Michael Sullivan. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 2016. 341pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 8 77694 187 1.

Authoritarianism has a very long history in south-east Asia. Traditional states in the region were top-down affairs, as were the colonial administrations which supplanted them. Nation-

alist revolutions in the twentieth century promised but, for a multiplicity of reasons, failed to deliver popular sovereignty. Ethnic divisions, conflicts between rival nationalist camps and the escalating violence of the Cold War interfered with the rollout of elections and representative government. Nationalist idiom frequently finished the job; the leaders of post-independence states were all too often construed as patriarchs who held the authority to speak and act on behalf of nascent national collectives. In some countries, political sentiment was forcibly channelled in support of one-party rule. In others, kakistocrats and status quo elites simply took over the business of government. Everywhere, constitutional rhetoric and electioneering theatricals were belied by developments on the ground—the promotion of state and nation-building efforts to the detriment of full-spectrum politics.

Where the fighting was heaviest, politics all but disappeared. In Vietnam and Laos, government became the monopoly enterprise of central committee oligarchs. In Myanmar (Burma), military leaders shut down parliament and set up a one-party dictatorship, at least until a collapsing economy and international opprobrium recently compelled them to pursue political reform. In neighbouring Thailand, reform is taking the country in the opposite direction. Three years in power, an interventionist military is promoting national unity at the expense of political heterodoxy, an increasingly criminalized pastime. Such political groupings that have not been disbanded will be allowed to participate in elections for a lower house next year. The upper house will be hand-picked and quite possibly occupied by generals with plans for a 20-year period of 'oversight'. Then there is the case of Cambodia: a waning imperium recast as a colonial possession; a post-independence Sihanouk patrimony bumped off-stage by a short-lived Khmer republic; a brutal Democratic Kampuchea put to rout by a Vietnamese-backed puppet regime. That democratization has not gone well there is hardly surprising.

Cambodia votes is a well-documented account of where things went wrong. Michael Sullivan rightly observes that the international effort to find a political solution to Cambodia's 20-year civil war was hobbled from the outset by the intransigence of various Khmer factions. Although a party to the Paris Peace Accords, Khmer Rouge fighters were immediately unwilling to hand over their weapons. They also refused to give up control of their territory and in the end remained apart from the whole election process. The incumbent political administration of Hun Sen posed a second set of problems. Feigning adherence to the principle of 'free and fair elections', he and his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) sought to monopolize all of the resources at their disposal in order to win votes, and flatly refused to accept the outcome when they lost. The result was a political standoff that was only resolved with the formation of a two-headed coalition, an unstable arrangement which ended in 1997 when Hun Sen staged a coup against his 'partner' in governance, Prince Norodom Rannaridh.

Although international condemnation helped Rannaridh return to politics a short while later, it failed to keep Hun Sen from consolidating his hold on power. Over the course of the next decade, he continued to intimidate critics and silence opponents by whatever means necessary as he built the CPP into a formidable political machine. Here Sullivan is at his most critical, providing a detailed narrative of how a corrupt autocrat and his party thugs were able to undermine the democratization process in Cambodia while receiving the continued assistance and tacit support of international donors and the local diplomatic community.

Sullivan's assessment speaks for itself and there is little reason to dispute it, but a case can be made in Hun Sen's defence. Cambodia, today, is in many respects better off than at any point in its recent past. Decades of civil war slaughter are now consigned to memory

and dark-tourist infrastructure. Comparative peace and stability have allowed for an expansion of public services: the provision of electricity, telecommunications, education, healthcare and transport infrastructure. Investment, both public and private, has fuelled a rapid economic growth that includes the possibility of improved living standards for at least some members of the majority poor. That Hun Sen can be credited with at least some of these accomplishments is reflected by voter support for the CPP. If the political landscape remains authoritarian, corrupt and violent, it is also in some measure a Cambodian creation.

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North America*

The president's book of secrets: the untold story of intelligence briefings to America's presidents from Kennedy to Obama. By David Priess. New York: Public Affairs. 2016. 384pp. £19.99. ISBN 978 1 61039 595 3. Available as e-book.

For the last 60 years, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has produced the 'President's Daily Brief', a highly restricted intelligence summary commonly referred to as the PDB. Written to suit the preferences and idiosyncrasies of each chief executive, the PDB is more than just an intelligence briefing; it is a weathervane of the relationship between the president and the US intelligence community. It sometimes also emerges as a means of communication across the foreign and defence establishment, providing key leaders with insights into what is on the president's mind. The PDB is probably the clearest indicator of who actually is a policy insider; access to the CIA's most closely guarded briefing book and the president's reaction to its contents is a highly prized privilege in Washington politics.

In this beautifully written and well-researched volume, David Priess describes the evolution of the PDB and the bureaucratic politics surrounding it. Priess notes that the PDB began as 'The President's Daily Checklist', a lively collection of short articles designed to appeal to John F. Kennedy, which gave the CIA access to the President almost on a daily basis. Being able to serve the needs of the president directly, notes Priess, has become a sort of holy grail for CIA directors, managers and analysts ever since. Most coveted were instances where either CIA directors or briefers presented the PDB in person, which permitted feedback that allowed analysts to tailor coverage and analysis to meet the president's needs.

By contrast, when a president generally ignored the CIA or allowed subordinates to screen or summarize the PDB, morale at the Agency plummeted. What the intelligence community wants most in a Director of Central Intelligence is that he has the ear of the president. Ready acceptance of the PDB, let alone a situation when intelligence personnel briefed the president personally, was the clearest sign that the Director of Central Intelligence was serving both the nation and the staff back in Langley. Put more crassly, it is hard to justify in budgetary or human terms the Herculean effort needed to produce a highly classified report on a daily basis when the president or his entourage exhibits minimal interest in the briefing.

Production of the PDB is not without risks—sometimes the CIA finds itself accountable for analytical mistakes and analysis that is overtaken by breaking events. It is embarrassing when articles do not reflect the morning's headlines. Reporting on Iraq's weapons of

* See also Frédéric Bozo, *A history of the Iraq crisis*, pp. 988–9; and Peter S. Henne, *Islamic politics, Muslim states, and counterterrorism tensions*, pp. 991–2.

mass destruction was not only wrong, but the analysis offered was highlighted by what in hindsight were exaggerated banners and headlines that were intended to capture the attention of readers. Sometimes accurate reporting is buried in an endless number of articles—the 9/11 disaster is a case in point. The history of the PDB illustrates one of the toughest challenges faced by the intelligence community—estimates need to meet the demands of the day, but sometimes they also have to meet the test of time.

Priess spins a fascinating narrative about how personalities, bureaucratic battles and the demands of presidents shaped the format, contents, delivery and impact of the PDB. He also illustrates the very essence of the art of intelligence, and the externalities that can emerge when it comes to delivering what the 'chief customer' needs to know in a way that is both useful and well received. *The president's book of secrets* also makes clear that as administrations change, new chapters begin in the relationship between presidents and the intelligence community. One can only wonder what the current 'chief customer' thinks about the PDB.

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Enemies known and unknown: targeted killings in America's transnational wars. By Jack McDonald. London: Hurst. 2017. 256pp. Pb.: £15.70. ISBN 978 1 84904 644 2.

Jack McDonald's *Enemies known and unknown* provides a multifaceted and challenging account of the relationship between domestic and international bodies of law and armed conflict. In this book, McDonald conceptualizes the United States' war against Al-Qaeda as a form of 'transnational war', and argues that this concept relies on a number of specific legal constructions which are embodied in the practice of war (and targeted killing) and which constrain and enable violence in specific ways.

The first three chapters lay out McDonald's constructivist argument, namely that war is a social activity constituted by social and cultural practices, in which law plays a central role. Key to McDonald's point is that the United States' 'war' on terror is, in fact, legally considered an 'armed conflict', which determines a constitutive 'grammar of war' (p. 29) and has deep implications as to the applicable body of international law (p. 23), thus shaping how force is used: at the heart of America's self-interpretation and conception of war lies—at least since the Vietnam War—a commitment to conducting war in accordance with domestic and international legal obligations.

The later six chapters discuss various aspects of the American interpretation of law which underpin the practice of targeted killing. A key focus is the distinction between civilians and combatants and its novel legal construction in a conflict where Al-Qaeda is considered as 'an enemy without a population' (p. 103) and where civilians are deemed bystanders. McDonald devotes considerable attention to the incorporation of legal concerns in the targeting of combatants, arguing that the definition of legitimate targets is achieved primarily through legal principles (p. 179). Yet he also makes the point that the Americans' interpretation of international law involves no absolute moral duty on their part to guarantee the rights to life and security of foreign civilians (p. 134). Ultimately, he argues that while law evidently constitutes every aspect of transnational war, the lack of transparency surrounding these legal constructions renders accountability difficult, casting doubt on the legitimacy of such transnational war.

McDonald's book makes several solid arguments for which it deserves commendation. His systematic demonstration of the intertwining of legal categories in the practice of targeted killing demonstrates convincingly that this practice exists not in a lawless

free-for-all, but rather within a carefully crafted zone of limited legal authority. While McDonald acknowledges that targeted killings do overstep and break a number of legal norms, he argues that these infringements are framed by the United States in relation to wider constitutional and legal arguments; the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and the denial of civilian protections to individuals deemed members of Al-Qaeda serve as examples of these legal constructions. He further does well to reinscribe targeted killings within the wider setting of armed conflict, against arguments (such as in Grégoire Chamayou's *Drone theory*, Penguin, 2015; reviewed in *International Affairs* 92: 1) that targeted killings constitute assassination. McDonald painstakingly points out that, as far as the United States is concerned, targeted killings are part of an armed conflict, and are legally construed as such.

The main weakness of McDonald's argument, however, consists in his downplaying of the extent to which legal norms are transformed by their application, as much as they shape the practices to which they are applied. While he does emphasize that he is concerned with lawfulness—the construction of war in relation to legal principles—and not with legality, a discussion of how warfare shapes legal interpretations would have been an essential addition to this argument. For instance, McDonald quickly dismisses the 'Torture Memos' as a passing mistake quickly corrected (p. 233); these legal opinions, however, remained valid for two years and seem to be rather a case of war practices shaping legal interpretation. Addressing this counter-perspective—that operational necessities in warfare influence the construction of legal boundaries placed on warfare—would have strengthened McDonald's argument. A second weakness is a lack of attention to the concrete and empirical effects of legal interpretations. This flows partly from the focus of the book—legal principles, not empirical or ethical assessments of their application (ethics make a brief appearance in chapters eight and nine). For instance, McDonald dismisses criticisms of signature strikes (killings based on behavioural patterns, not on personal identification) as unprecedented by arguing that personal identification has never been a requisite in warfare. However, as he elides any discussion of the empirical problems of identification, he also avoids discussing the core of these criticisms. This may give the impression that, for McDonald, lawfulness is the sole criterion of validation, irrespective of empirical results (which, of course, do bear on the application of legal principles).

Nevertheless, *Enemies known and unknown* provides a compelling, comprehensive and well-supported argument about the essential role played by legal principles in constructing the practice of armed conflict. As such, this book will appeal to scholars interested in questions of legitimate violence and the changing character of war, as well as those with an interest in the practice of targeted killing and drone warfare.

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The Marshall Plan and the shaping of American strategy. Edited by Bruce Jones, with a foreword by Strobe Talbott. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2017. 132pp. £16.95. ISBN 978 0 81572 953 2. Available as e-book.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the announcement of the European Recovery Program, known as the Marshall Plan. On 5 June 1947, speaking at Harvard University Yard, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, General of the Army during the Second World War, stated that: 'The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirement for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy

lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole'.

Marshall's landmark speech, laying out the rationale for the plan, and his perhaps less famous speech on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 1953, form the core of this book. The first one is a short, unadorned, eleven-minute speech; the second, given in the auditorium of the University of Oslo, is Cold War drama, with King Haakon VII of Norway leading the standing ovation. His Nobel speech not only offers Marshall's thoughts on the plan in retrospect (it had started in April 1948 and ended in December 1951), but also describes his worries about America's long-term engagement with the world. There is a central theme: the need to understand and draw on history as we shape the present. The link between prosperity and security, neglected today, was eventually accepted in the 1940s. The failure of the post-First World War order, the economic lessons of Keynes, and the rise of communism all played a role.

The book also includes the Brookings Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 22 January 1948, which was instrumental in allaying scepticism around the project and enabled its passage through a Republican-dominated Congress in a presidential election year ('can you imagine'—President Harry Truman said in October 1947—'chances of passage in an election year if it is named for Truman and not Marshall?'). Brookings is also the publisher of this book. In his foreword, Brooking's president Strobe Talbott, elucidates the events that drew Brookings into the venture, reminding readers that, as early as 1942, the institution was already looking toward victory and postwar economic order—as Chatham House was also doing on the other side of the Atlantic. Talbott mentions the book *Peace and plans and American choices* by Arthur Millspaugh (The Brookings Institution, 1942), an economist and political scientist who had been treasurer-general of finances in Tehran. Millspaugh saw three options: 1) 'America on its own', which he despised, 2) 'the Union of Democracies', or 3) 'a network of regional alliances' (pp. 4–5).

In the afterword, Bruce Jones and Will Moreland of Brookings look at the foundations of the postwar international order and at the challenges of Great Power cooperation, then and now. They express a deep concern about the present: 'in a return to its inward-looking posture of the pre-World War II era, the United States could choose to walk away from the principles and practises that have kept it safe ever since the war. If the United States does make a fateful choice to abandon the alliances it helped to create and to try to build walls against the international economy, those who make that choice and those who support it will carry the blame, first and foremost, for what we believe will be violent disordering that will almost certainly follow' (p. 127). This concern is most relevant today when risks—both economic and military—are again as high as they were in Marshall's time. Readers might find relief, however, by looking at some historic photographs in the book, including a German worker helping to lay the foundations for one of the housing projects financed by the plan.

The Marshall Plan consisted of $13 billion over four years, equal to around $150 billion at purchasing power parity in 2017—note that the Chinese 'one belt, one road' initiative can mobilize a 1000 billion over ten years. For its scale and scope, the plan is often invoked even today when searching for solutions to the world's inextricable problems. The truth is that the Marshall Plan was not an impromptu response—its foundations were laid out in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Global New Deal: in the Four Freedoms Speech, the Lend-Lease Act, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Furthermore, the

Cold War, for all his horrors, made the western hegemon—and its capitalism—enlightened. On turning the last page, readers might think that today the world lacks a hegemon; but first and foremost we lack enlightenment.

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Afterimages: photography and U.S. foreign policy. By Liam Kennedy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2016. 220pp. Index. £24.00. ISBN 978 0 22633 726 5. Available as e-book.

Afterimages is a powerful book. Contained within its brevity are fundamental questions on the way in which we look at the world, how we see it and, more particularly, the way we regard war and US foreign policy over the last half century from Vietnam to the open-ended wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, clustered within the singular 'war on terror'. Liam Kennedy notes in his 'ecology' of images and photojournalism that 'as the nature of warfare changes so photography must shift its strategies to reflect this' (p. 178). Ultimately, he concludes, 'photography retains the potential to be a critical mirror of international affairs and … will continue to play a significant role in giving form to the intangibilities of war by embodying abstractions and illuminating collective values and assumptions about violence, otherness, and humanity' (p. 179). Such observations are especially apposite as part of the discussion of an era defined by 'postphotography' and the ubiquity of image production in our digital age; they are pertinent too in the age in which war and, to use Mary Dudziak's phrase, 'war time', have become more and more ambiguous. Kennedy's book moves through an analysis of several photographers and images from Vietnam, to the low-intensity conflicts of the 1980s, the 'virtual' war in the Gulf, the humanitarian crises in the Balkans and to seeming 'wars without end; … wars without a principal enemy' (p. 128).

Crucial to Kennedy's enquiry is the question of the role of the image and the photographer in, on the one hand, the tradition of photojournalism's quest to evoke an element of engagement and sympathy, and simultaneously, on the ways in which such images, despite critical content, contribute to US frames of war and hegemonic ways of seeing. The importance of this work and others on war photography lies in the durability and impact, the afterlife of the still image. There is a broader literature on war and the media which relates how the changes from the relative freedom experienced by journalists in the Vietnam War became increasingly restricted in subsequent wars through 'pool' and 'embedded' systems. US policy-makers also increasingly realized the importance of their relationship to the media as it shifted from 'operational' considerations and adjustments to 'strategic' importance as stories, images and video became a part of the centre of gravity. At times, certain media can be ephemeral, but the images traced and analysed in Kennedy's *Afterimages* are those of iconic status, instantly recognized, they are the images that, to paraphrase Susan Sontag, stipulate and instruct the viewer to look this way or that; they are the images that will endure in various forms of collective memory: the Situation Room, the screaming girl, Samar Hassan in Tal Afar 2004, unnamed detainee in Fallujah 2004, Fikret Alić in the Serb detention camps 1992, the incinerated Iraqi soldier on the 'highway of death' 1991.

Kennedy deals brilliantly with that process of impact. The dilemma is captured in his retelling of Susan Meiselas's acknowledgement that while she tried to reframe images and to present images against hegemonic tendencies, in her words 'the larger sense of an "image" has been defined elsewhere—in Washington, in the press, by the powers that be' (p. 162). So given the 'culture of production', Kennedy's book not only frames the life of images through studies of the photographers, the wars and foreign policies they try to depict, but

also the ideological and institutional milieu through which images must navigate and, in the cases we look at, resonate.

To leaf through the pages of this well-illustrated study is to tour the visual imagery of US foreign policy and intervention over the last half-century. Kennedy engages with the Vietnam War through the 'compassionate vision' (p. 19) of Larry Burrows and Philip Jones Griffiths's attempts to 'obliterate distance' through his photography by bringing things that are far away closer to home; for him, Vietnam was a country, not just a war to be depicted, recorded and archived. *Afterimages* works through a multitude of photographers and photographs. Each is set within very particular contexts, of time and place and intention. From central America and Iran to Somalia, the Gulf War, the Balkans; or through Abbas, David Burnett, Gilles Peress, Meiselas, David Turnley, Ron Haviv.

The book unfolds like a series of stories, the so-called 'ecology' of the genre. And even if the wars change in nature, intent, definition and duration and likewise the objectives of the photographer, to change the world or depict it, Kennedy delineates no set patterns—more questions arise from the reading of the book. The life of the images become separated from the image-makers, just as, over time, Americans seemingly become increasingly separated from the wars in which they engage.

Kennedy observes: 'Photojournalism bears a complex relationship to the visual production of American national identity and of foreign policy. It can function to support a geopolitical way of seeing—an American worldview—that frames domestic perspectives of international conflicts, yet can also question the rationality of perception that binds values and security in this worldview, to apprehend the relations of power and knowledge that structure it' (p. 10). *Afterimages* guides us through that important relationship of looking, seeing and cultural knowledge production.

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Latin America and Caribbean

Euforia e fracasso do Brasil Grande: política externa e multinacionais brasileiras da era Lula [Euphoria and failure of Grand Brazil: foreign policy and Brazilian multinationals in the Lula era]. By Fábio Zanini. São Paulo: Editora Contexto. 2017. 224pp. Pb.: £54.30. ISBN 978 8 57244 988 5.

At the heart of traditional Brazilian foreign policy thinking is the idea of 'Brasil grandeza' or a 'great Brazil'. For decades, this was seen as the country's natural destiny, something that would arrive in the future. Lula's Workers' Party (PT) government brought a real sense that the future had arrived, that Brazil was now a major global player. To a significant extent this new status was underwritten by the outward expansion of Brazilian business into African and South American markets. While the subject of a growing scholarly and policy literature, there is little work that provides a more granular, contextualized account of the story. This is the task Fábio Zanini sets for himself.

Researched and written in a sabbatical period, as Zanini moved from being foreign editor to national politics editor at the *Folha de São Paulo* newspaper, this book combines the easy style of travel writing with the perceptive eye of an investigative journalist. For example, the story of Brazil's training of the Namibian Navy and attempts by Petrobras to explore for oil in Namibia are well known. How these companies integrated into the fabric of Namibian society, working through social networks at an elite level is less well understood. The account Zanini provides is one of clear strategic calculation by the Brazilian government and a sense

of wildcat pioneer capitalism by Brazilian entrepreneurs. Zanini describes an influx of 'mini Eikes' (like the Brazilian businessman that had gained and lost a fortune), taking readers on a tour through their now abandoned offices in an attempt to search out what is going on in terms of Brazilian trade and investment in the country and other frontier markets.

Another theme Zanini takes up is that of the Brazilian corporate model, which major firms such as Odebrecht and Vale sell as being more inclusive and humane. Again, the author's use of the travel diary style is particularly compelling in unpacking this rhetoric. In Angola, an economy dominated by Odebrecht, attention is turned to the centrality of Lula's support and the importance of funding from Brazil's National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). The difficulties Brazilian firms face operating in Africa are starkly highlighted, disentangling the public relations spin and pointing to an underlying business case that seeks to maximize the use of local labour to minimize project delivery cost while maintaining quality. Public good is being done because it makes financial sense. For Brazilian firms, as Zanini alludes, this sort of approach is not new and grows from the experience of many projects in the remoter parts of Brazil. It is also consistently hailed by Brazilian firms, corporate observers and African government officials as a strength, but one that is not particularly well exploited by Brazil's government.

The importance of the Brazilian experience for these firms remains as a subtle theme throughout the book, with clearly referenced echoes of the Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) corruption scandal that was taking place as Zanini researched and wrote it. While the close relations between Odebrecht and the ruling Santos family in Angola are not deeply unpacked, neither are they minimized nor their implications discarded. Perhaps more interesting is the discussion of Vale's coal project in the Tete province of Mozambique. The importance of government-to-government relations, particularly mediated by Lula, in winning the concession are made clear. What is perhaps more telling is Zanini's discussion of the mistakes Vale made when resettling people displaced by development of the mine as well as worries about land expropriations that residents in the Nacala corridor fear will take place due to the Japanese–Brazilian ProSAVANA agricultural development assistance project. A history of highly integrated business–government operations in Brazil as part of a sophisticated national industrialization and development strategy resulted in perhaps too much confidence being given by Vale to the Mozambican government's ability to adequately address its side of the social commitments in these projects. The result was a mess, which Vale has addressed but that nevertheless threatens to damage the perception of Brazil in Mozambique and other countries. For Zanini, this was a potentially costly lesson highlighting the extent to which Brazilian firms and diplomats are scrambling to learn how to play the outward engagement game.

This is perhaps the key problem Zanini highlights. Lula's government aggressively helped major national firms expand, but failed to think through the attendant strategic risks and opportunities. Mozambique and Angola are held up as cases of risk. More ambivalent is the bi-oceanic highway through Peru. By Zanini's assessment, the highway is massively over-engineered for traffic levels that remain a distant mirage. The result for some is a boondoggle designed solely to enrich Brazilian construction companies on the back of Peruvian tax-payers. Yet the drive Zanini takes readers on along this road underlines the massive transformation it has had on the micro-level political economy of the region. The story is problematic and complicated, but also positive. The unanswered question is how Brasília is managing and leveraging the narrative.

To be clear, this is not a scholarly book and has no pretensions to being one. Rather, it is a sensitive journalistic record of what is taking place on the ground and a critique of

the Lula administration's lack of strategic planning as it raced to build and deepen links throughout Africa and South America. The question of corruption and the de facto privatization of Brazilian foreign policy to serve the needs of firms that now appear to have been the PT government's paymasters is acknowledged, but as Zanini points out, much of this problematic story broke as the book was moving through the printing press. It is thus an important contextual study for those examining Brazil's South–South relations and the rise of Brazilian multinationals, and a good starting-point for those turning to questions of corruption and presidential foreign policy strategy in the PT years.

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The Salvador option: the United States in El Salvador, 1977–1992. By Russell Crandall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 718pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10713 459 1.

Russell Crandall, a professor of American foreign policy at Davidson College in North Carolina, who served stints at the Pentagon and on the National Security Council during the administration of George W. Bush, is an author who has previously generated a certain amount of controversy. In a 2006 work, *Gunboat democracy: US interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Rowman and Littlefield), he posited that full-scale US military intervention in these three countries, while propelled by broad strategic concerns, did much to strengthen democracy—an especially dubious proposition in the case of the Dominican Republic. His hefty new tome on US 'engagement' in El Salvador between the late 1970s and 1992 is based on a prodigious amount of research in declassified US documents that were not available when the first retrospective accounts of the conflict were written in the 1990s. The author also undertook a rereading of the extensive US press coverage and a number of interviews with participants across the political spectrum. The book, like his previous work, is certain to cause a stir among those with an interest in what has now become in the United States a 'forgotten war'.

The author readily acknowledges that US attitudes in general were shaped by a century-old 'paternalism' that manifested itself in gross interference in El Salvador's internal affairs during the 1980s, as plainly exhibited in the 1982 and 1984 elections when the US manoeuvred in an 'undemocratic' manner to keep the hard right from once more attaining office. He also freely accepts that the roots of the Salvadoran conflict were the result of extreme socio-economic disparities and a concomitant long history of political exclusion; and that the vast bulk of the political murders in the late 1970s and 1980s were carried out by right-wing death squads. What will prove more contentious is his claim that the 'Salvador option'—his unique shorthand for US policy—was 'a remarkable case of nation-building by proxy' (p. 496) in support of a 'precarious democracy' (p. 287), through measures like land reform and through the agency of the 'centrist' Christian Democrats under José Napoleón Duarte—a reflection of the post-Vietnam aversion by both Democrats and Republicans to US boots on the ground to deal with left-wing insurgency. It was a policy whose actual implementation, he avers, was 'in fact carried out in a largely ad hoc fashion in country without strategic guidance from Washington' by 'imperial diplomats and imperial grunts' (pp. 7–8). Crandall further contends that the Reagan administration's initially wayward hardline ideological stance ceded to a more 'pragmatic' approach after 1982 under Secretary of State George Shultz, which recognized both 'privately and publicly the need for a political solution' (p. 9) that had, however, to await a consensus after 1989 when the Cold War was clearly coming to an end. He also suggests that the Reagan administration was

always far more hawkish on Nicaragua than on El Salvador. His conclusion is that, in the circumstances of a resurgent Cold War, the Carter and Reagan administrations pursued the 'least-worst' Salvador option.

Crandall adopts a largely topical approach rather than a strictly chronological one, the work being divided into an incredible 49 chapters. This leads, at times, to a certain over-compartmentalization, which makes for a somewhat disjointed account; this is particularly injurious to those chapters seeking to convey an understanding of the immediate origins of the civil war, for it deprives readers of a feel for the rapid political polarization in 1979–80. He also has a propensity to get ahead of himself, introducing events before he more properly contextualizes them in their own chapter. Apart from objecting to his provocative theses, many will surely balk at some of his loaded terminology as applied to the left, which is painted in broad brushstrokes as 'Marxist' or 'Marxist-Leninist', even when referring to Catholic priests and to the civilian Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), the latter eventually containing many progressive Christian Democrats who disavowed the Duarte line; needless to say, such epithets are rarely attached to characters of the 'centre' and the right. The revolutionary left, moreover, is especially chided for seeking to seize power by force rather than achieve it through the ballot box, even though modern Salvadoran history before 1982 is replete with military interventions designed to foreclose democratic outcomes. Inconvenient facts do not disturb the author's account either: for instance, he does not mention the 1984 Nicaraguan elections that afforded the Sandinistas—at the forefront of his external cast of villains—a degree of democratic legitimacy; nor does he refer to the 1981 Franco-Mexican joint declaration granting the FDR belligerency rights (an omission that is symptomatic of a lack of interest in the way the wider world viewed the Salvadoran conflict and the US role); and in his reproving discussion of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front's (FMLN) acquisition in 1989 of heat-seeking missiles to counter the government's monopoly of airpower, he fails to remind readers that such missiles were provided by the US to the Afghan *mujahideen* in the mid-1980s for the same purpose. Finally, the work contains a number of misleading statements: for example, the timeline for Cuban troop intervention in Angola in 1975 is incorrect and the author repeats the long-discredited assertion of initial Soviet logistical support (p. 105); and the statement that 'Cuba also aided Ethiopia in its war with non-communist Somalia' (p. 106), while *prima facie* true, ignores the fact that Somalia, a Soviet ally, launched a war of territorial expansion and that Cuba was lawfully responding to an Ethiopian request for assistance. Both these casual assertions seem designed to paint an even darker picture of alleged Cuban misconduct.

Crandall's work is by no means without considerable merit, even if its central theses diverge too far from the scholarly consensus and some of the views expressed reflect the author's own ideological predisposition. But there is still much of value to be had from this volume, as it highlights aspects of the conflict that have previously barely been touched on in the more general literature. Crandall is at his most authoritative and assured (as well as neutral) when discussing the strategy and tactics of the Salvadoran armed forces and the FMLN.

Philip Chrimes