


**Introduction**

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, *International Affairs* published three articles analysing JFK’s legacy in the world beyond the United States. Apart from the crisis points of Germany (Berlin, more precisely) and the former Indo-China, one other area stood out. This was the region of Latin America, understood as the huge landmass south of the US–Mexican border, and the islands of the Caribbean. The ‘pearl of the Antilles’ and the largest and most important island politically is Cuba, site of the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 and the nuclear missile crisis of October 1962. Both episodes, in which Kennedy played crucial if differing roles, were part of a much longer history of US attempts to determine Cuban politics, stretching back to the early nineteenth century. In a narrower focus, both episodes were responses to the onset of the Cuban Revolution following the ousting of the pro-American caudillo Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar by forces led by Fidel Castro Ruz.

Only weeks after his inauguration in January 1961, and a month before the authorization of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy formally proclaimed his support for a western hemispheric ‘Alliance for Progress’. The proposed alliance was presented as a $100 billion, ten-year programme of peaceful economic, political and social development throughout Latin America, with most of the non-private external financing coming from US governmental sources. Confidential materials within the US government have since confirmed the public interpretation of the alliance north and south of the border: that the Cuban Revolution was the catalyst for Kennedy’s initiative. But the longer-term origins of the alliance lay in changed policies within the previous Eisenhower administration, themselves a positive response to calls from Latin Americans for a new economic and political dispensation from the ‘colossus of the north’.

The events compressed in the preceding paragraphs formed the background and subject-matter of Part I of this two-part article, which ended with the historic meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961, where leading political figures from 19 Latin American republics joined with the US delegation in signing the two foundational documents of the Alliance for Progress: the inspirational but shorter ‘Declaration of the Peoples of the Americas’ and the lengthy agenda contained in the ‘Charter’. (As was noted in Part I, the Argentine Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara led the Cuban delegation; but Cuba abstained from endorsing programmes implicitly levelled against its revolutionary government.) The following pages will briefly survey the historiography of the alliance and then examine in greater detail some major aspects of recent alliance scholarship, within the broader history of US policy towards Latin America in general and the Cuban Revolution in particular.

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1. *International Affairs* 89: 6, Nov. 2013, including the first part of this article, ‘Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress: countering revolution in Latin America. Part I: from the White House to the Charter of Punta del Este’, pp. 1389-1409.
Fifty years of scholarship

The literature produced by major actors and authoritative observers of the Alliance for Progress is best conceived in terms of a series of overlapping periods, during which particular aspects of the alliance interested writers. The first and most clearly defined period coincides with the ten years initially projected by Kennedy himself for the life of the alliance. During this decade, leading American figures published their accounts of the evolution of the alliance, while the official recording of programmes, expenditures and results was undertaken by such multilateral bodies as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) as well as the US AID agency. The end of the decade saw the publication of what remains the single best general study of the alliance, *The alliance that lost its way* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970). Written by Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, the book, designed for the interested layperson, encapsulated the findings of literally scores of scholarly and technical monographs dealing with aspects of the programme so dramatically launched in August 1961. On the outcomes of the lengthy charter of Punta del Este the verdict was disappointing: economic development, institutional reform and political and social progress had been minimal, with ‘economic integration’ (cooperation more accurately) in Central America the one agreed, if limited, success. Indeed, far from attaining the proclaimed political goals of the alliance, the decade had witnessed a reversal in the expansion of democracy. To early critics, this negative assessment simply underlined the conceptual flaws inherent in the alliance: that its fundamental goal, as conceived in Washington, was the building of barriers to a ‘second Cuba’ in the hemisphere and the overthrow of the *fidelista* regime in Cuba itself.2

Historiography—no more than the raw material of historical events themselves—rarely lends itself to neat temporal boundaries; and so it is with the literature on Kennedy and the alliance. Following the magnificent and loving political biography of JFK’s ‘thousand days’ in the White House by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr (*A thousand days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Houghton Mifflin, 1965), scholars offered their own contributions to the growing literature, one foreign scholar giving special attention to the alliance as the latest episode in the promotion of the US national interest from the early nineteenth century.3 These works constitute a second, overlapping stage II in the literature from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s. None could make any better claims for the success of the alliance—except in preventing a second Cuba—than Levinson and de Onís. Two themes did emerge, however, which would be echoed by later writers: one was an authorial ambivalence towards the personality and politics of Kennedy; the other was a trend to move beyond Kennedy himself, to examine those within his sphere of (conditional) confidence. Known variously as members of the ‘Court

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1 For a *fidelista* expression of this judgement, see *Alianza para el Progreso y gorilismo: bloques, bases y pactos militares Yanquis en América Latina* (Havana: N. P., 1967).
of Camelot’ (somewhat romantically), the ‘New Frontiersmen’ (latter-day Teddy Roosevelt-type rough riders), the ‘Best and the Brightest’ (ironically) and ‘Action Intellectuals’ (grandiosely)—these became the creators and subjects of historical writing. Contemporaneously, political scientists and economists examined general conditions in Latin America with the alliance as a reference point, concentrating on two particular areas: the reversion to authoritarianism and the validity of ‘underdevelopment’ theory—or rather theories. Such questioning could be found in the 1960s, but it then gained more strength in the early 1980s, as the administration of Ronald Reagan embarked on its less than covert offensive against perceived communism in central America and the Caribbean.

President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) and the Alliance for Progress are a rare combination, as the historiographical record all too clearly shows. Though committing himself publicly and fulsomely to making the alliance Kennedy’s living legacy, in reality Johnson’s political energies were directed elsewhere: south-east Asia abroad and the Great Society at home. Indeed, historians have tended to judge LBJ by his appointment of Thomas C. Mann (a ‘free enterprise ideologue’, in the bitter words of Arthur Schlesinger) to various positions inside the Department of State as proof of the President’s downplaying of the reform elements of the alliance agenda. Not until the late 1980s and subsequent decades did historians pay much attention to LBJ’s Latin America policy: an irony (to anticipate a later, much used term) for a president who prided himself on knowing how to handle Latin Americans. The publication of a volume dedicated to Raúl Prebisch (L. Ronald Scheman, ed., The Alliance for Progress: a retrospective, New York: Praeger, 1988), which contains some two dozen contributions from an impressive number of important participants and leading scholars reviewing the quarter century since the death of President Kennedy, represented a peak yet also something of a pause in the study of the alliance: what may be called, for convenience, the end of historiographical stage III. Nothing new was added to the conceptual framework within which the alliance was first conceived and then discussed by later observers; two contributions underlined flaws at the very heart of the project, repeating but crystallizing arguments expounded over many years. The shorter chapter by a leading Colombian economist and OAS top-ranker, José Luís Restrepo, sketched out the administrative shortcomings of the alliance and the gap between its implicit multilateralism and functional bilateralism, with the US as the crucial political and economic determinant. The other, longer chapter, by a North American academic Howard Wiarda—‘Did the alliance “lose its way” or were its assumptions all wrong from the beginning and are those assumptions still with US?’—reopened the fundamental question of the differing political principles and ideologies which had been blended in the common language of the


Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress

alliance. It was not so much that the alliance had ‘lost its way’, but rather, that its goals and pathways had never been clear, let alone plausible, in the complex and divided societies which constituted Latin America. One might add that Wiarda’s criticism was not entirely correct: all signatories at Punta del Este in 1961 had agreed to the ‘No Second Cuba’ policy; but what that might mean in any one country was by no means unambiguous—and certainly did not lead to the promotion of democracy by each of the 20 signatories.

Later scholars turned their attention to current events and their background, noticeably the debt crisis affecting many of the major Latin American economies (especially Argentina and Mexico) and the brutal civil wars and domestic repression characterizing much of the 1970s and 1980s—the latter a new, but not unprecedented chapter in US–Latin American relations, with Washington supporting opponents of the left, whether these ideological allies were in government or outside. Central America was a case in point: President Reagan’s promotion of the Honduras-based Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ (contrarrevolucionarios) against the government in Managua was matched by his bolstering of military regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador.

The 1990s saw publications in a number of areas which added detail rather than new perspectives on the alliance: biographical studies; the re-examination of the roots of and possible remedies for underdevelopment, with some criticism of earlier diagnoses and solutions—certainly those under the ‘dependency’ rubric; and contributions to more general economic history, especially of bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. Thus the intellectual and academic groundwork was laid during what can be called stage IV of historiography for the six works under review in these pages.


For an early (British) study see Jenny Pearce, Under the eagle: US intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982).

The memoirs of a former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (a post held by Thomas Mann) and ambassador to Brazil Edwin McCammon Martin, Kennedy and Latin America (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994); A. W. Maldonado, Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997), a study of an important Alliance official.


Access to new archival sources, the willingness of local participants and officials to talk, political developments in particular countries, the publication of biographical materials—such factors explain why certain countries, Bolivia and Colombia most obviously, became the means for examining broader aspects of the alliance. (The revelations of truth and reconciliation commissions and similar investigations in countries which had suffered massive human rights abuses are touched upon below.) In the United States, a growing interest in the sociology and ideology of the architects and planners of the alliance led to the publication of a number of studies dealing with those dubbed the ‘mandarins [of] modernization theory’, particularly those with academic bases around Boston who had held advisory roles in successive administrations—the pundits known as the Charles River School.12 (It may be added parenthetically that one of the key theoretical works in the intellectual shaping of the Alliance was W. W. Rostow’s *Stages of economic growth*, which began life as a series of lectures in Cambridge, England, in 1958 and with no reference to Latin American theorization.)13 But the more US scholarship scrutinized the non-Latin American progeny of the alliance, the less the alliance appeared in the pages of standard reference works. So those readers approaching our six works with a relatively ignorant—but open—mind will not gain much prior information from apparently promising works produced by major publishing houses. Economic histories of Latin America, handbooks of political economy or political history—the entries for the alliance are often minimal. Not all such works, of course, show selective gaps; and the sheer complexity of the issues might encourage an editor to solicit only the barest detail.14 Fortunately the six books under review elaborate a number of important aspects of the alliance, with the two most substantial volumes placing it firmly in its appropriate context: the political impact of the Cuban Revolution and the American ‘mission’ to project abroad its espoused democratic values. However, since both these works take as an accepted background the conventional narrative of US policy towards Latin America during the Cold War, it will be convenient to begin with a work designed for the uninitiated, by one of the leading scholars in the field of diplomatic history.

**The Alliance for Progress: context and content in recent analysis**

Stephen Rabe has written a number of monographs on US–Latin American relations in the post-Second World War years, two dealing with President Kennedy in particular.15 In his latest, recently revised work, Rabe retains something of his

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15 Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: the foreign policy of anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
favoured presidential framework, but the unifying theme is the death and destruction that US policy has brought to President James Monroe’s ‘southern brethren’, in a pattern established long before the Second World War. The new readers Rabe has in his writer’s mind may have an inkling of this terrible story; but they may perhaps not be prepared for the sheer numbers of those tortured, raped, killed or simply ‘disappeared’ during the ‘dirty wars’ from the 1960s to the 1980s—overwhelmingly victims of regimes or murderous gangs supported by the US government. As Rabe acknowledges, his critics will cite the outrages committed by the opposition; but in winning the unspeakable numbers game and for ultimate responsibility, Rabe is in no doubt that Washington’s allies are the victors and chief culprits—and by a wide margin, as various official truth commissions and ecclesiastical investigations corroborated in forensic studies of events in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and a number of Central American countries.  

Though Rabe often charges Washington with complicity in this ‘horror and savagery’ (p. xxxiv) he cannot quite shake off his reluctance to say that official US communications disingenuously used the language of defending democracy against alleged communist or simply left-leaning opponents. Instead, there was an ‘irony’ in the gap between brutal reality and elevated rhetoric (pp. 97, 111, 118, 129, 205). Perhaps, like other critics of US policy before, during and after the Cold War, Rabe cannot free himself from the ideals he learned in earlier life and his belief in the essential goodness of the US.

Rabe’s account is strengthened by the many official and authoritative sources he cites from north of the border. Overtly to destroy the Cuban Revolution and to prevent a second Cuba—on the grounds that Castro’s Cuba had destroyed freedom and democracy at home and planned to export its revolution—presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan backed all manner of repressive authoritarians, invariably of a military stripe (ch. 6). Without Rabe making the point (even metonymically), the White House stood also for the majority of Congress: the conflation often called ‘Washington’ by scholars. It took the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens by the Chilean military in 1973 and the contemporaneous failure of American policy in the Vietnam War to prompt any serious legislative opposition to US policy in Latin America—an opposition that was shown to be pretty ineffective in the subsequent Reagan years.

In this pervasively frightful context, the Alliance for Progress seemed to offer a peaceful alternative. But, as Rabe shows using familiar evidence, its material successes were few and far between and certainly did nothing to change the dynamics of Latin American society (ch. 5). Instead, early general funding and

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later earmarked resources from the US went to maintain, and indeed strengthen, the instruments of social control.18 As his narrative closes the 1960s with the formal ending of the ‘Decade of Development’, Rabe tosses up the state of democratic play throughout Latin America. Once again, readers encounter an ‘irony’: the mid-to-late 1950s is dubbed the ‘twilight of the tyrants’, as ten ‘military dictators fell from power’, while during the years of the Alliance for Progress 16 ‘extraconstitutional changes of government shook’ Latin America (pp. 89–91) and led directly or effectively to rule by the military—the ‘apogee of military power in Latin America’, in the judgement of Michael Gambone, himself a former serving officer in the US armed forces.19 Such an outcome, at odds with Kennedy’s public rhetoric—if not his private priorities—might appear to tarnish the ‘Kennedy legacy’.20 What, then, of the catalyst of the Alliance for Progress and the dangerous force which drove US Latin American policy for half a century: the Cuban Revolution?

_Fifty years of revolution_, edited by Soraya Castro Marín and Ronald Preussen, promises much but will surely, ultimately, disappoint both beginners and those more familiar with the subject-matter. The product of numerous ‘conferences, workshops and lectures’ (pp. vii, 2), the volume is a handsome addition to the flourishing series on ‘Contemporary Cuba’ published by the University Press of Florida under the general editorship of the prolific John Kirk, but its diverse origins in North America and Cuba make for a fragmentary collection with little controlled focus. As the book’s provenance suggests, the authors comprise established scholars and more youthful and lesser-known writers. But the _peces gordos_ are not above rehearsing earlier work and ideas (chs 14, 16); though the contributions from Lars Schoultz, Ronald Pruessen and Louis A. Pérez (chs 1, 2, 7) can be read by both tyros and veterans with distinct profit. Schoultz’s contribution is to be commended for answering the explicit question on the ‘exceptionalness’—not of the US: an established trope—but of US policy towards Cuba before, during and after the Cold War.21 Pérez also deserves credit for neatly summing up the substance of his own surveys of the strategic, economic and cultural aspects of US policy towards Cuba over many decades prior to the revolution. Pruessen, too, employs this broad-brush approach, citing Pérez himself on the interplay of foreign and domestic interests in the creation and maintenance of ‘hegemonic’ structures (p. 46). Here, scholars will recall Armando Uribe’s powerful observation when analysing the US-backed coup against Allende in 1973: all empires require allies on the inside.22 Somewhere between the two ranges of individual styles and argumentative novelty, lies the contribution from Joaquín Roy on Cuba and the

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20 Theodore Sorensen, _The Kennedy legacy_ (New York: Macmillan, 1969), deals with both JFK and his assassinated brother, Robert Francis Kennedy; while over two dozen scholars offer their individual assessments of JFK in _Selverstone, ed., Companion to John F. Kennedy._
22 Armando Uribe Arce, _El libro negro de la intervención norteamericana en Chile_ (Mexico, DF: Siglo XXI, 1974).
European Union. This is a chapter inadvertently offering a gift for the United Kingdom Independence Party, given its lucid analysis of EU policy-making and bureaucratic dysfunctionality, though its concluding section on future prospects is bafflingly obscure.\(^\text{23}\) The chapter covering the Bush Senior and Clinton years, including the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity (Helms–Burton) Act of 1996 is written by one of the leading scholars in the area of US–Cuban relations, Jorge Domínguez; and while the material seems largely recycled, the impact of partisanship and presidential electoral politics shines powerfully through, with candidate and later President Clinton displaying his less attractive side in courting Cuban lobby votes inside and outside Congress (ch. 14).\(^\text{24}\)

While contributors to *Fifty years of revolution* offer little analysis of the alliance (the major concern of this review article), surely their readers could expect much more discussion of the Cuban Revolution's impact on or irrelevance to mainland Latin America, if not to the world beyond the western hemisphere? This is a huge subject either omitted or minimized by various authors, with the only real exception being Candace Sober's chapter (ch. 3), dealing *inter alia* with Cuban involvement in Angola and the ideological influence of Guevara. (The CIA rightly assessed the minimal impact of Guevara in Bolivia, but readers will be surprised how little discussion there is of this flagrant attempt to 'export' revolution to Latin America: p. 62.) Angola represents another 'irony'—or paradox at least. In supporting the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) against the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) during the Angolan civil war, Cuban armed forces helped to establish a rather traditional governmental structure and were pejoratively dubbed mercenaries of the Soviet empire (p. 72).\(^\text{25}\) This point is confirmed throughout the volume, where the conservatism of the USSR and indeed local communist parties towards armed revolution in Latin America is emphasized in various contributions (see for example ch. 10).\(^\text{26}\)

Unsurprisingly, *Fifty years of revolution* shares some themes with both Part I of this article and Rabe's monograph. We find further examples of Washington's policy of 'carrots and sticks' towards Cuba (ch. 1),\(^\text{27}\) while much more evidence of the divisions within the Washington bureaucracy is revealed from archival


\(^{26}\) Corroboration comes inadvertently in Soviet analyses. One particular study from the Latin America Institute of the USSR's Academy of Sciences in Moscow is a good example: Anatoliy F. Shul'govskiy and Anatolii N. Glinkin, eds, *Latinskaia Amerika: problemy edinstva antitimperialisticheskikh sil* [Latin America: problems in the solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces] (Moscow: NAUKA, 1974).

sources showing justified scepticism—to say the least—concerning the revolutionary, even destabilizing effects of Cuban policy in Latin America (ch. 3). And how are we to describe Bush Junior’s encouragement of a coup in Cuba, when the US was intervening in Afghanistan and Iraq to defeat ‘terrorism’ (ch. 15)? President James Monroe is often cited by contributors, but a hugely significant element in his famous pronouncement, that Latin Americans could not be trusted to make their own choices, is often left unmentioned. The more familiar quotation from Monroe’s Message to Congress of 1823 reads: ‘It is impossible that the [monarchical and reactionary European powers] should extend [their] political system to any portion of either continent [i.e. North and South America] without endangering our peace and happiness’. But then immediately comes the rider: ‘nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord’ (emphasis added).  

Any number of examples are given throughout this collection of the Monrovian presumption that what the US does in Latin America generally, and towards Cuba in particular, is in the best interest of the recipients.

We encounter a very different kettle of fish in Tony Smith’s America’s mission. Smith’s essential argument first appeared over two decades ago, with the narrative time-frame then ending in the early months of the first Clinton administration. A reading of the main text and an examination of the relevant bibliographical references suggest that this ‘expanded edition’ has not been subject to much revision in the first eleven of 13 chapters. (Some 30 concluding pages are arranged as an epilogue and an appendix, the epilogue being new to this edition.)

The critical examination of the official (and, indeed, unofficial) American promotion and exporting of democracy was fashionable among liberal scholars in the 1990s—undoubtedly an academic, if belated, response to the disingenuous rhetoric of the Reagan administration. Smith himself contributed to this literature, though his analysis already showed a reluctance to criticize Kennedy and a failure to define democracy. Where Smith made and continues to make a distinctive, though not unique, contribution, is by filtering American foreign policy through the concept of Wilsonianism. From these pages, readers may understand Wilsonianism as the verbal celebration of democracy and the wish, indeed sometimes the effort, to bring this system of government to politically impoverished foreigners. So far, so conceptually good, but what of the reality, the purely empirical results? It is here that things get tricky, for Smith argues that for the century after Wilson, US foreign policy has sought ‘security’ for the homeland and the requisite ‘stability’ abroad (pp. 81–3). So the many hundreds of pages of America’s mission are a repository of examples of US officials, from presidents down to field-officers, backing authoritarian and invariably repressive

28 Eldon Kenworthy is unusual in quoting the all-important Monrovian qualification in America/Américas: myth in the making of US policy toward Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 2–3.
military regimes. Such is the actual outcome of policies couched as ‘selective liberal democratic internationalism’ (emphasis in original: pp. 122–3, 181, 427).

Now, it would be quite possible to draw attention to this discrepancy; and indeed Smith frequently does so. But where another scholar might employ an obvious term such as hypocrisy—even ‘realism’—to describe the clash between official word and deed, Smith’s twofold, yet fundamental belief that US foreign policy is both driven by and ought to be driven by noble and disinterested ideals has him resorting to ‘ambiguity’ or ‘irony’ or ‘dilemma’ or ‘shortcomings’ (pp. 128, 139, 188, 211) to bridge the gap between traditional, elevated rhetoric and actual, non-democratic practice abroad (e.g. epilogue: ‘The irony of American liberal internationalism’). Readers may try to pick apart the philosophical traditions and presumptions that are implicit rather than articulated in Smith’s text, which owes so much to his own favourable reading of Woodrow Wilson (chs 1, 4 and appendix). There is, further, an inadvertent confirmation of the author’s misplaced idealism. Smith is fond of citing the Monroe Doctrine; yet when we have an extract from the famous 1823 proclamation (prefacing chapter five on Smith’s favoured embodiment of both realism and idealism, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 213), Smith omits the crucial rider on the improbability of the ‘southern brethren’ making up their own minds about the appropriate political system for their country.

Smith’s and Rabe’s analyses coincide in that they both contrast the ‘bully pulpit’ of Theodore Roosevelt (Wilson’s bête noire) with acts on the ground. Where they also agree is in their basic evaluation of the Alliance for Progress as a failure—though Smith’s sources remain those used in his earlier analysis. Smith devotes the whole of chapter eight to the alliance, though he strangely dates his coverage to 1961–5 and, revealingly, places the alliance as the third link in a chain from Monroe’s presumptions by way of Teddy Roosevelt’s 1905 Corollary (pp. 221–2).30 But where Rabe brings no obfuscating model to his analysis of the alliance’s all-round failure, Smith argues that ideals underpinning the alliance were a blend of the thinking and method of his twin heroes, Wilson and FDR—with the addition of land reform. (Smith describes the very early years of the alliance somewhat dismissively as a ‘throw-back to Wilsonianism’: p. 82.) But land reform was precisely one major aspect of the alliance which not so much ruined it as made it fatuous in conception—Smith’s sketchy account of events in Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic manages to confirm the general thesis. In one other area there is an overlap between Smith and Rabe: they identify a swing to authoritarianism in Latin America contemporaneously with the promotion of the alliance. Here, Smith is even more critical than some other scholars: by his calculation and using the first half decade as the yardstick, there were nine coups ‘against constitutional, civilian governments’—somewhat above the usual estimate (pp. 223–7).31 Even without subjecting the evidence to anything like the space given to the fuzzy notion of Wilsonianism, Smith does raise the question of whether

31 Martin calculated ten during JFK’s ‘thousand days’: Kennedy and Latin America, p. 460.
there is any necessary correlation between the existence of a middle class and the practice of representative democracy (pp. 217–18). Proponents of the alliance were apt to assert that modernization caused the growth of this amorphous middle class, but Smith rightly hints that economic liberalism may work against political liberalism (p. 344). That such an undefined middle class might side with authoritarian regimes seems a possibility often and conveniently overlooked by celebrants of US foreign policy and the Alliance for Progress in particular.32

To summarize: Smith makes a bold attempt to bring some theorizing into the chronicle of US foreign policy, as the epilogue and appendix both demonstrate. If attributing presidents to concepts helps illuminate an obscure argument, we can note that FDR, Truman and JFK are ‘Wilsonians’; Bush Senior and Clinton, on the other hand, are ‘selective liberal democratic internationalists’. It was, asserts Smith, the neo-Wilsonians who ‘hubristically’ promoted the Iraq War of 2003 (pp. 322–6, 354–61). But Smith’s framework is, to this reviewer, not merely unhelpful but confusing. The lines between ‘facts’ (dare we say) on the ground and the ‘fiction’ of conscious rhetoric and unconscious presumptions are continuously blurred, with Smith himself often appearing unsure whether he is stating what happened or should have happened according to his model. Ultimately, what appears to be the hidden dynamic within the policy-making establishment—implicitly accepted, even endorsed by the great American public, until disaster occurs—is ‘hubris’: the very self-delusion which led Thucydides’s Athenians into the disastrous Sicilian campaign, there to be punished for their imperial presumptions. (A number of the authors reviewed here as well as other Alliance scholars like to cite Thucydides in support of their cause.) Now this is history on a grand scale; history as the great teacher. No harm in that; we surely all draw our own lessons from the past. So what emerges from this complex text is not so much a Jekyll and Hyde Columbia or even a two-faced Statue of Liberty, but rather an even more general sense of the pervasive allegorical nature of mainstream American historiography, that models the past through representative figures within a set of concepts familiar to fellow Americans.33 This is a true paradox: a historiography designed to educate North Americans of the world beyond the US is written in a language whose vocabulary is essentially that of these self-same North Americans.

Facts on the ground are very much the concern of the two monographs on Bolivia. James Siekmeier’s The Bolivian Revolution and the United States has the broader chronological scope; Thomas Field’s From development to dictatorship concentrates on the alliance and the role it played both inside Bolivia and in Bolivia–US

33 Frank Ninkovich, The global republic, ch. 3, presents ‘Three faces of Wilsonianism’ (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014). A classic case of this allegorical historiography (and political criticism) is J. William Fulbright, The arrogance of power (New York: Vintage, 1966), where the antagonistic forces within the US are symbolized in Lincoln (and Adlai Stevenson) vs Theodore Roosevelt (and ‘the modern superpatriots’). Such allegorical historiography and political rhetoric also find favour south of the border. José Martí, virtually synonymous with Cuban nationalism, was one such model: e. g. Salvador Allende Gossens, Punta del Este: la nueva estrategia del imperialismo (Montevideo: Editorial Diálogo, 1967), where Martí is linked with Walt Whitman and Abraham Lincoln. The tradition continues: see Joaquina Santana Castillo, Utopía, identidad e integración en el pensamiento latinoamericano y cubano (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2008).
relations. Before we examine the authors’ common themes and differences, it may be helpful to remember that while Mexico is well known for its early twentieth-century revolution, Bolivia also experienced its own in 1952, leading to the advent of universal suffrage, the beginning of land reform and the nationalization of the great tin-mining companies by the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), an ideologically diverse coalition of self-proclaimed leftists and rightists and those in between these relative and imprecise categories. While this review cannot possibly scrutinize these particular topics, readers of Siekmeier and Field will soon become familiar with the way both Bolivians and their American counterparts invoked the 1952 revolution and its embodiment in the MNR to justify their actions. This political-historical appeal is particularly marked in Field’s analysis; but since Siekmeier describes a wider segment of Bolivian history, it will make sense to begin with his contribution to our understanding of US–Bolivian relations and the Alliance for Progress.

Once readers move past a lengthy list of Siekmeier’s mentors, helpers and numerous friends and colleagues north and south of the border (pp. ix–xiii), they will find a confident and well-referenced survey of the nature and impact of the Bolivian Revolution. Borrowing a theme from his earlier comparative work, Siekmeier designates Bolivia the great Latin American ‘trailblazer’ (pp. 13–37, 152, 178): anticipating the Mexican nationalization programme; gaining access to US funding in the 1940s and 1950s for developmental schemes foreshadowing the Alliance for Progress in their implementation of ‘modernization theory’, despite an apparently left-wing orientation (pp. 54–5, 94); two decades later leading the hemispheric economic neo-liberalism known as the Washington Consensus (with the associated austerity and political repression, pp. 155–8); and in 2005 electing as president Evo Morales with his indígeno and cocalero (coca grower) background, so different from the urban and urbane criollos who had dominated Bolivian politics. These aspects of Bolivian history mark the country out to be a forerunner, but there is a twist to Siekmeier’s analysis. Given the country’s need for development capital and its early promotion of ‘economic nationalism’ (p. 21), Bolivia turned its ‘dependency’ on foreign aid and investment into leverage over foreigners themselves, in this case the United States. Raising the Cold War spectre of Soviet-style communism (later Castro-communism, in Washington parlance) inside as well as outside Bolivia, the MNR under President Víctor Paz Estenssoro

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gained more foreign aid dollars than any other Latin American country during the 1950s—a success rate maintained (on a per capita basis) during the years of the alliance. Moreover, while total US aid to Bolivia more than doubled in the opening year of the alliance, military aid went up a staggering 17 times from 1960 to 1963 (pp. 7, 48, 94–8 and appendix).

The Bolivian military (necessarily lacking a blue-water navy in a land-locked country) played a minor role in the formation of the MNR, apparently rather in awe of the militant and well-armed mining militias. Senior army and air force officers enjoyed excellent relations with their US counterparts, and through alliance funding promoted ‘civic action’ programmes as one means of diminishing the sources of discontent among the campesinos.38 (The top brass relied upon the campesinos in their conflicts with the dynamite-laden miners.) Such ostensibly peaceful methods of dealing with the ‘rebellion in the countryside’ (ch. 4) were part of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Kennedy–Johnson–Nixon presidencies and were one area where US funding, under the Military Assistance Program, increased rather than fell during the formal period of the alliance. (The ‘vast … literature’ on Guevara’s Bolivia campaigns receives proper examination on pp. 103–21.) As for the alliance itself, Siekmeier joins those who ask the question: ‘Why did the Alliance fail?’ His answer comes when analysing the ‘splintering’ of the MNR and the 1964 ouster of President Paz Estenssoro—the first in a series of military takeovers which led to repression under the regime of Air Force General Hugo Banzer Suárez in the 1970s. Skimming over some of the usual answers, such as the alliance’s ‘lost way’ and that it was curtailed by JFK’s assassination, Siekmeier seems to fall on the right answer to the wrong question. The alliance had been devised essentially to defeat revolution—yet with no serious commitment, let alone mechanisms, to solve the ‘structural problems of the region’. But with respect to this prime goal, the alliance had been a great success (pp. 88–9).

Field prefaces his study of the Alliance for Progress with an even longer ‘thank you’ list to friends, collaborators and sponsors; fortunately, as with Siekmeier’s work, the published results are admirable. Field’s secondary materials are impressive—but not nearly as impressive as his archival and other unpublished sources.39 As for substance, Field complements Siekmeier’s broader coverage. The first two chapters on modernization theory and practice in Bolivia give readers a clear image of President Paz Estenssoro as Washington’s favoured politician to implement ‘authoritarian development’ under the Alliance for Progress ‘rubric’. (Such military-led modernization was often referred to as the ‘Brazilian model’, referring to practices adopted after the 1964 coup.)40 Paz Estenssoro was a favoured politician, but only conditionally so: throughout his presidency Washington kept open the possibility of backing a coup against him and the ruling MNR. Paz

39 Both authors reference Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign aid as foreign policy: the Alliance for Progress in Latin America (London: Routledge, 2007), which focuses on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the Dominican Republic.
Estenssoro was no innocent, of course; and Field enumerates the coups alleged by the President to justify yet more military hardware and aid dollars from his watchful patrons. Where Bolivia is Siekmeier’s ‘trailblazer’, Field cites examples of Washington’s insistence that Bolivia be the ‘test case’ for the success of the alliance (pp. 10, 23–4, 61; cf. Siekmeier, p. 92). The primary documentation shows that the goal was not social, economic and political improvement measured by the criteria set at Punta del Este; rather, the task was to defeat International Communism and avoid a second Cuba (Fields, chs 1 and 2). ‘Washington’ is used as shorthand in this paragraph; but it can stand also for US officials in Bolivia. Where the metonym is suspect is in disguising the real debate at all US official levels about the true value of Paz Estenssoro: in the most significant example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk disagreed profoundly with Ambassador Ben Stephansky on the commitment and success of Paz Estenssoro in fighting the communist threat to Bolivia and the wider Andean region. But Paz Estenssoro was—at least until 1964—a more acceptable alternative to a military junta or the left.

There are, of course, differences in emphases in Field’s and Siekmeier’s accounts. One area may be mentioned: what Field calls the ‘targeting of Bolivian Labor’ (ch. 2) and the combined and successful efforts of the US, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Federal Republic of Germany in the aptly named Triangular Plan to break the power of the miners and divert resources from the state mining company (Corporación Minera de Bolivia: COMIBOL) to promote the development of the oil sector and agriculture. Such diversification might have been rational economically; but the goal and the methods, discussed at length by Field, appear to have been more designed to weaken labour while advancing the interests of local and international capital and strengthening the relative power of the campesinos: a policy of dividing and ruling the workers in one of the most impoverished countries in Latin America. To conclude: while neither book is directed at beginners, readers who, for example, are already familiar with Rabe’s work can benefit greatly from these two monographs. Likewise, such readers would also gain from the brief but complementary analysis by Kirk Tyvela of the operation of the alliance in the neighbouring Paraguay of General Alfredo Stroessner—a Paraguay which paranoid FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover portrayed as a likely second Cuba.41

Readers can find quite a different perspective on the Alliance for Progress in Carlos Caballero Argáez’s Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy. This is the alliance which was, of course, directed against Castro, Cuba and communism (pp. 32–43), but it was one in which Colombia played a part second only to Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek’s ‘Operation Pan America’ and Kennedy himself.42 Indeed, Colombians were said to have identified themselves so closely with Kennedy’s project that his assassination was compared to ‘losing one’s own father’—the

41 Kirk Tyvela, ”‘A slight but salutary case of the jitters’: the Kennedy administration and the Alliance for Progress in Paraguay’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 22: 2, 2011, p. 311.
very ‘father of all the poor people’ (p. 133). Thus the anthology is a eulogy not just to JFK but also to Alberto Lleras Camargo. The latter has been described as the most important Colombian statesman of the twentieth century and is known inside and outside Colombia not only as president from 1958 to 1962 (after briefly serving in the mid-1940s) but also as a leading figure in the OAS—not least in promoting the expulsion of Cuba—and Kubitschek’s collaborator in seeking to strengthen the multilateral dimensions of the alliance. The links between the book’s subjects and provenance go further: Lleras Camargo was rector of the University of the Andes before his presidency, and these chapters (containing much material derived from the Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston) have been published under the aegis of the eponymous School of Government at the university in Bogotá. But while readers will approach this collection with the now fashionable ‘due diligence’, cynicism would be misplaced. The contribution from Marín Suárez on one of the alliance projects in Bogotá, Ciudad Techo, shows precisely why some mourned the death of Kennedy so greatly—the US President who had come to visit their city in the early months of the alliance (pp. 133–43).

For those readers eager to see a more detached Colombian view of the alliance and the problems it proposed to address in Latin America, a pair of works written by two leading politicians and international economic experts close to Lleras Camargo has long been available. Together, they suggested the scale of the task and how the original elevated ideals had been shaped by ‘pragmatic’ anti-communism towards fulfilling the strategic and economic interests of the United States—LBJ’s appointment of Thomas Mann being presented as the very symbol of the shift. Some four decades after those early contributions from Agudelo Villa and Sanz de Santamaría came a concise, critical audit by Luís Eduardo Fajardo of the very ‘shift’ in the goals and methods of the alliance. In the case of Colombia, traditionally the ‘showcase’ of the alliance, US aid dollars went increasingly to stabilize the economy, not least in compensating for the decline in coffee prices, and to back one set of political actors against another. Without making the obvious comparison with Bolivia, Fajardo argues that the dollars sent into country had served to make the United States dependent on the political and economic situation in Colombia.

Some two years after JFK’s assassination, Sherwin J. Markham, a Department of State official, wrote, on returning from Latin America, that the people in general ‘appear to have an extremely romanticized memory’ of the dead President—and consequently have ‘negative to neutral feelings toward’ LBJ, quoted in Gambone, Capturing the Revolution, p. 98.


Fajardo, From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: a retrospective look at US aid to Colombia (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003); see also (from a different perspective) the excellent and comprehensive Congressional Research Service, Colombia: background and US relations (Washington DC: CRS, 2014).

Conclusion

What, then, are we to make of these six works? And, by implication, what are we to make of Latin America itself—that vast and complex area seemingly so near, yet so far (in the Mexican adage) from Washington DC? This last subject would require more than one book, let alone a single review article. But what can be said, on the basis of the works under discussion and the material cited in the footnotes, is that for at least half a century it has been a case of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: commentators in the mid-1940s, economic theorists in the 1950s, alliance promoters in the 1960s and retrospective analyses of the 1970s and 1980s all conclude that, although the region is huge and diverse, it is characterized by pockets of enormous wealth and grinding poverty.49 As was so rarely pointed out during the formal life of the alliance, GNP could grow, even at a rate above population increase, yet there was absolutely no reason in logic or economics—or as it turned out in reality—why that growth would be equally or even equitably shared. The rise of ‘Bolivarian’ political movements across the northern Andes in the 1990s and the 2000s would suggest that this arithmetical truism had found political expression.50

The United States has taken a long time to readjust Cuban policy. As the writers have noted, only President Jimmy Carter showed any real interest in ‘normalizing’ relations; successive administrations matched Cuba’s sobriquet in remaining ‘ever faithful’ to a policy of bullying by Washington unmatched in modern history—a policy disingenuously cloaked in the language of democracy promotion.51 This rhetoric coexisted with US promotion of detente with one side of the Moscow–Havana axis (and later the People’s Republic of China), while any closeness between Cuba and the wider Soviet bloc and the USSR itself was denounced and frequently punished. Trade with Cuba was forbidden, except for ‘humanitarian’ essentials, while exporting US goods, especially agricultural surpluses, to the USSR was promoted. Such ‘contradictions’ must be understood primarily in domestic, electoral terms: the nationwide farm lobby punching its weight alongside the Cuban lobby—the latter in Florida especially.52 The local power of the Cuban lobby and the fear of the electorally ambitious that they would be tarred as un-American—all this inhibited any easing of anti-Cuban sanctions, the latter

49 Literally hundreds of books have discussed these topics; so perhaps the author may be permitted to cite his earlier reflections (which appear still to hold true, judging from recent works cited here and in Part I): Political change in Latin America: implications for the region, US, EU and Asia-Pacific, Report on Wilton Park Conference, No. WP823, June 2006.


presented as opposition first to Fidel, then brother Raúl Castro—not the Cuban people. President Barack Obama did indeed reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba in the summer of 2015, an enormous step towards ‘normalization’ after more than 50 years—using the scope of his executive discretion when otherwise constrained by federal statute. But it may still puzzle readers why and to what extent previous administrations, both led and backed by Congress, pursued a vendetta inherited from the Kennedy years. That quite exceptional policy remains even now much more the Latin American legacy of the anti-revolutionary President than the noble social, economic and political goals proclaimed in JFK’s Alliance for Progress.