Off-road policing: communications technology and government authority in Somaliland

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Ministers in Somaliland’s Ministry of Interior have long regarded security and stability as the most significant achievement of the self-proclaimed republic,¹ located in the arid north-west of the former Somalia, and subject to threats ranging from arms trafficking, illegal fishing, uncontrolled migration and terrorism to drought. Somaliland’s governance (which refers here to the bargaining conducted among relevant actors) is organized around the management of insecurity, with 47 per cent of the state budget of US$251 million spent on security.² Elections are relatively free and fair, but government is decentralized, political culture is militarized, politicians are unaccountable, press freedom is limited, civil society is weak and access to government offices is difficult. In other words, Somaliland is a hybrid state in which conventional state-based structures are grafted onto traditional clan-based forms of governance.³

Despite its failure to achieve international recognition, Somaliland attracts significant levels of support from donors ranging from the UK, the Gulf states and Turkey to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG). But with the exception of DDG’s work in villages,⁴ most of the resulting projects focus on conditions in relatively secure urban areas such as those found in the capital city of Hargeisa (population 750,000), which is where politicians spend their time and most voters live, or the port city of Berbera (population 245,000), Somaliland’s commercial capital and only container and general cargo

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¹ Author’s interviews with Director General, Ministry of Interior (MOI), Hargeisa, 7 Sept. 2011, and Deputy minister, MOI, Hargeisa, 10 Dec. 2015.
² Author’s interview with Deputy Minister, 10 Dec. 2015.
⁴ In 2011, DDG introduced district and community safety committees involving government institutions and civil society into a number of villages, though this has since shifted to forming ‘planning groups’ comprising locally representative groups including, for example, religious leaders, traders, women and youths. See Laura Hammond, Safety, security and socio-economic well-being in Somaliland (Nairobi, Geneva and London: School of Oriental and African Studies, DDG and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 2013), p. 6.
port; little is known about the details of everyday life in remote coastal areas such as those bordering the Gulf of Aden. Formal accounts of the decentralized governance structures found in regions and districts away from the main urban areas are publicly available, with the Somaliland Law website referring to village councils nominated by elders and prominent persons and appointed by district councils, but the practicalities and politics of day-to-day security governance are largely unknown.

This is understandable. Such areas are physically inaccessible, insecure and out of bounds to international advisers and consultants; they do not have the physical infrastructure donors rely on or wish to use; they lack the tax base and technical capabilities needed to sustain services such as police, water supply, education and health; and they are notorious for isolation, unemployment, illegal fishing, piracy, and disputes over land and water rights. Consequently, the precise nature of the working relationships developed between the governance core in Hargeisa and informal security actors in remote and coastal settlements is known only to Somaliland officers, officials and advisers with an appropriate technical or political remit.

Yet communications between the centre and the periphery should be relatively easy because, despite low literacy levels, Somaliland has the cheapest telecommunications rates in Africa, and even in remote settlements people have access to radios or mobile telephones, and subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. Indeed, donors and NGOs working across Africa increasingly promote the use of short message service (SMS) public information messaging, text alert systems and radio phone-ins as means of promoting community safety, engaging communities in problem-solving, improving information management, and developing accountability and transparency in decision-making—but in Somaliland this happens only in urban areas. Despite repeated protestations that a locally appropriate form of development-oriented community policing must be created for rural areas, donors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have yet to implement such a model, with or without information and communications technologies (ICT). Meanwhile, Somaliland’s government enthusiastically welcomes projects exploiting technology, though its support tends to be short-lived. ICT may be a prime example of transnational knowledge that is capable of lessening ‘the distance between government and the citizens and communities it is intended to serve’, but its transfer is uneven.

This article considers whether the use of ICT can recast our assessment of state capacity-building and centre–periphery relations in remote and coastal regions such as those found in northern Somaliland. Put simply, it asks whether ICT

5 Somaliland Law, ‘Regions and Districts Law’, 2012, http://www.somalilandlaw.com/local-government_law.htm. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 4 July 2016.)


Communications technology and government authority in Somaliland has made a difference to the everyday relationship between the government in Hargeisa and settlements in remote coastal areas. However, rather than exploring these issues from the viewpoint of external actors from the North (e.g. the UK’s Department for International Development, DFID) or the South (Ethiopia), or in terms of Somaliland’s political development, it uses the experience of Somaliland’s coastguard and immigration police to indicate empirical perspectives and realities; that is, to explore the relationship between authority and location, and between politics and practice. Specifically, it asks whether ICT can help the non-military law enforcement actors working within Somaliland’s populace to perform a brokerage or mediating function between government officials in Hargeisa and local people living in areas where there is minimal capacity-building and development. It considers whether ICT has the potential to broker a link between the transnational practices and modernity associated with mobile telephones and the state-based police model found in urban areas, and the ways in which security (national and day-to-day) is handled in remote settlements.

Distinguishing between the role and resources of the coastguard and immigration police as sanctioned in Hargeisa and as actually used in remote and coastal areas introduces the notion of brokerage; this is significant in this context because brokerage is embodied in specific social actors, associations, networks or technologies. It is not an abstract function or an empty signifier, since it exists only in the various situations or forms in which it is realized or used. Nor can it necessarily be tied to individuals, because in Somaliland the role of the individual is secondary to that of the group. But using brokerage as a tool that expresses or influences (and is influenced by) locally acceptable processes of security provision and legitimation allows for an investigation of the extent to which ICT affects centre–periphery relations, capacity-building and security governance.

This argument is developed in three parts. Taking Herbst’s observation that the fundamental challenge confronting African leaders is how to extend their authority over sparsely settled lands as its departure point, the first part provides an overview of the environmental and security issues affecting Somaliland’s remote and coastal areas, and of ICT’s potential to make a difference to their security governance. The second explores Somaliland’s broader experience of security-orientated brokerage using the contextualized practices of its coastguard and immigration police. It asks how officers use ICT and whether it makes a difference to their conduct of everyday business or relations with their respective headquarters and the government. The third and concluding part argues that while ICT may be a new variable within existing power networks, it has yet to affect relations between Somaliland’s security-conscious government and the

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9 Unlike security, it is not significant primarily because it is absent. See Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), p. 44.
organizations and populace it must deal with. Centre–periphery relations are less problematic than Herbst thought.

The realities of Somaliland are complex, with every aspect of security governance, politics, policing and daily life permeated by clan-based calculations or consensus. Nevertheless, it offers an opportunity to reassess the relationship between state-based authority and place in a strategically significant and relatively stable entity. This is important because, contrary to Herbst’s insight, the record of Somaliland’s coastguard and immigration police suggests that the government of President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’ does not wish to invest in extending its reach or presence. It is content to manage the periphery indirectly and flexibly from the centre, relying on clan-based consensus and informal decision-making to ensure politically acceptable levels of security and stability in the issues that concern it. Even so, it is clear from the experience of the coastguard and immigration police that the relationship between politics and practice is far from straightforward, especially when it comes to senior appointments.

**Authority and location**

In his seminal *States and power in Africa*, Herbst identified a fundamental problem confronting African leaders: how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely populated regions. The question is as relevant today as it was when his book was published in 2000, not least because the issues it alludes to are particularly problematic for governments in hybrid entities such as the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, which comprises 4 million people in a small number of urban centres set in a sparsely populated, arid, insecure and underdeveloped environment. Further, Herbst’s question can be extended to cover Hargeisa’s response to the international community’s advocacy of a federal Somalia based on Mogadishu.

Even so, there are three main reasons for questioning the applicability of Herbst’s insight to Somaliland. First, the government of President Silanyo is, like its predecessors, very security-conscious: the republic is not recognized internationally, there are recurrent political crises, Al-Shabaab is a persistent presence, and chief security officers are beholden to the President. Yet it governs lightly in the remote and coastal regions where state representatives have long been absent or vulnerable, and its public agenda is dominated by issues such as illegal migration and territorial disputes with Puntland, rather than underdevelopment or radicalization. Second, the rationale underpinning Hargeisa’s approach cannot be attributed to ministerial inexperience or naivety because Somaliland’s officials are drawn from the Isaaq, Somaliland’s largest clan family. Police recruitment and deployment reflect or are aligned to local clan composition. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Somaliland: the strains of success* (Nairobi and Brussels: ICG, 2015), pp. 3–5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/kh/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b113-somali-land-the-strains-of-success.pdf.

Herbst, *States and power in Africa*, p. 3.


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13 Herbst, *States and power in Africa*, p. 3.


and senior officers have many years’ experience of transnational security governance transfers. In the two decades following independence in 1960, its security organizations were trained by, among others, the Soviet Union (including the KGB, which trained many of today’s chief and senior officers), East Germany, West Germany, Israel, Egypt, Sudan, the UK and the United States. However, the legacy of 20 years of military dictatorship means that for many people state incapacity is of less concern than state power in the hands of a rival clan; anecdotal evidence suggests that memories of the Barre era’s repressive approach to ‘directing the people’ (hamuunta) remain strong. Third, the availability of ICT capable of overcoming physical and, perhaps, socio-economic distance introduces a new variable into centre–periphery relations: Somaliland’s society may be primarily pastoral and illiterate, but most people have access to radio communication sets or mobile telephones. The question therefore arises whether ICT can perform a brokerage function between the political and geograpical centre and periphery, and between the reconfigurations of responsibility, social engineering and capacity-building associated with modernity and tradition.16

A key to understanding why the Silanyo government fails to extend its authority overtly and systematically is to be found in the ways in which Hargeisa-based law enforcement actors such as the coastguard and immigration police operate in remote and coastal areas where the state has a minimal presence. There are, however, multiple obstacles in the way of acquiring the knowledge needed to analyse recent developments accurately.

Remote and coastal areas

Notwithstanding the impressive results provided by social and cultural anthropologists working on police and gendarmes in West Africa,17 researching everyday security in Somaliland’s remote and coastal areas is not feasible. Chronic insecurity, land and political disputes, radicalization and the risk of kidnapping mean that it is impossible for non-nationals to ‘go into the field’ in order to understand how people go about their daily routines;18 the EU advisers charged with developing Somaliland’s coastguard are confined to Hargeisa and the port city of Berbera for more than bureaucratic reasons. Consequently, open-source international knowledge is based on the anecdotal or visual: satellite images of coastal settlements along the Gulf of Aden show few signs of habitation, while planes flying to Hargeisa from Bosasso on the north-eastern tip of Puntland follow endless beaches of white sand backed by a few isolated settlements of low-quality housing linked by dirt tracks. For Somaliland officials, the position is different. The government’s few statements on issues relating to coastal areas may be uninformative and its

decision-making on security issues opaque and subject to pressure from, reputedly, individuals such as the President’s youngest wife, but ministry advisers are familiar with the region’s settlements. Wall maps in the headquarters of Hargeisa’s coastguard indicate the presence of many villages with an average population of 50–100, and ministry advisers are familiar with their names and locations.

Ironically, one reason why remote and coastal areas receive little attention outside the ministry is because the state is not overtly present in these regions. Thus security assessments published by the Hargeisa-based Observatory on Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) cover the town of Erigavo in the north-east but do not assess perceptions in settlements such as Hareed or Laasa because no police are present there.19 Like most Somali research organizations, OCVP focuses on perceptions in urban areas such as Berbera, Burco and Sheekh where the police are the main source of security, supplemented in the more remote villages in the districts concerned by informal actors such as elders and local committees. The conflict and security assessment report on, for example, Salahley district, 70 kilometres to the south of Hargeisa and adjacent to the Ethiopian border, focuses on Salahley town, paying little attention to the 28 villages that fall within its ambit.20

Nevertheless, although OCVP does not provide assessments of remote or coastal settlements in Somaliland, some idea of the situation to be found in them can be gained from its reports covering comparable settlements in the neighbouring entities of South-Central Somalia and Puntland. Relevant examples include Hobyo, a district in South-Central where, in the absence of police, security is provided by state-based soldiers and informal groups, or Bandar Beyla and Eyn in Puntland, which in the late 2000s was known as Somalia’s pirate capital. This picture may be supplemented by UNDP assessment missions carried out in Puntland’s remote and neglected districts of Alula and Bargal.21 The road networks connecting Alula and Bargal to other districts and regions are rough and inaccessible for most of the year, especially for heavy vehicles, youth unemployment is estimated locally at over 90 per cent, and there are few local NGOs, contractors or companies. As a UNDP report notes, both ‘were piracy hotspots, remote, almost inaccessible, [where] police presence is very limited and under equipped’, and the state’s only presence was provided by 30 ineffective soldiers.22 ‘There are few formal links between political centres and peripheral settlements in the former Somalia.

This trend also holds for the urban areas in which Somaliland’s police stations and posts are found. Wooden stalls may act as police posts in small settlements beside the road between, for example, Hargeisa and the police training college at Mandeera, 60 kilometres to the north-east, but there are few officers to be found

22 UNDP, Quarterly Progress Report, first quarter, p. 12.
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even in peaceful towns such as Baligubadle, 65 kilometres south of Hargeisa, where the police are the main security provider, albeit with minimal resources. Those in Erigavo, a town of 35,000 people situated 400 kilometres north-east of Hargeisa, lack handcuffs, walkie-talkies and transport, and there is no chance of their responding to a call about a youth snatching a mobile in the middle of the town at night, let alone to a robbery in a remote settlement 230 kilometres away. News reports and OCVP’s respondents regularly refer to instances of youth violence, rape, robbery involving knives and the theft of mobile telephones in urban areas, and to rape, livestock theft and robbery in more rural areas, but Somalis have long dealt with crime informally and people turn first to elders or customary law (xeer) rather than to the police. And policing standards are low. As the Hargeisa-based Human Rights Centre reported in 2015, officers regularly demand payment for responding to crime, while police stations are used as detention centres and as such are avoided. Despite this, OCVP records many people asking for more police.

Successive governments have shown no interest in addressing this situation, least of all in remote areas, and the link between authority and location appears to be more flexible than Herbst suggests. Even so, the question arises whether ICT could help to overcome some of the logistical challenges associated with increasing the state’s presence and enforcement capacity.

**ICT as brokerage**

Although the World Bank’s 1997 identification of a link between ICT and state-building has had little traction in the self-proclaimed republic, Somaliland’s governments have long tolerated donor attempts to improve police–community relations as an aspect of state-building even though—or, more likely, because—such projects do little more than provide desirable resources (e.g. buildings and vehicles) and a professional or democratic veneer. Perhaps because of this, donors are currently showing interest in the potential of ICT to facilitate a reliable, timely and reassuring police response to calls. In the context of Somaliland’s governance, ICT means the use of mobile telephones and text messaging for security-related alerts and crime reporting, although other uses include the mobile money platform Zaad and programmes relating to health or literacy. For donors such as the EU and DFID, ICT is a means for local communities to communicate with police.

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and develop joint strategies for dealing with local concerns. Encouraged by Somaliland’s high rates of access to mobiles, advisers working for the EU believe that ICT can provide a cost-effective and locally acceptable way to do this. The money transfer and telecommunications industries have used ICT to bridge the country’s governance gap, exploiting mobiles to leapfrog the limited number of landlines, banks and roads, and there is no obvious reason why ICT could not help to improve the quality of the police response to calls on it. However, the only example to date of such an initiative is a flawed project in Hargeisa.

Inspired by a text alert system introduced in rural Ireland, in August 2015 EUCAP (a civilian mission forming part of the EU’s External Action arm) introduced a text alert system based on SIM cards at a UNDP-supported model police station in New Hargeisa. The results were disappointing. Ministers supported the initial publicity campaign enthusiastically, but no calls were received in the months that followed, and there are no plans to introduce similar projects elsewhere in Hargeisa, let alone in remote or coastal areas. Significantly, the introduction of a toll-free 888 emergency number in Mogadishu has also failed, though an NGO-run rape crisis line has had some success.

The reasons for Somali reluctance to use ICT to report crime or contact state representatives are debatable—including possibilities ranging from distrust, cultural preferences and memories of repression during the Barre era to concerns about confidentiality and inadequate police resources—but it is clear that donor expectations of ICT helping to facilitate an improvement in police–community relations have not been fulfilled. Widespread access to mobiles has not translated into increased crime reporting, improved response rates or better police–community relations in urban areas, let alone a more meaningful state presence in remote areas.


30 Data from the World Bank and Gallup cite cellphone ownership in Somalia at 70%, i.e. on a par with Kenya and well above the regional median (Gallup, ‘Disparities in cellphone ownership pose challenges in Africa’, 17 Feb. 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/189269/disparities-cellphone-ownership-pose-challenges-africa.aspx). But there are problems with figures based on ownership, rather than access or subscription, because mobiles are often shared and it is possible to subscribe to mobile services without buying a phone, with many people buying a pre-paid SIM card which they use in other people’s mobiles.

31 An analysis of the project forms part of the research underpinning this article. Its key message is that local norms and preferences can negate the availability of globalized technology.

32 Focus groups conducted with 180 respondents in Hargeisa in March 2016 show that people with access to mobiles or SIM cards are comfortable ringing the police, especially when they have been the victim of robbers or wish to ‘tell the government’ (the phrase is significant) about a potential incident, but they do not use text messaging. Asked how they normally communicate with police, 24 respondents said that they use mobiles but 158 said that they visit their local station, which is the recognized site for engagement. This may reflect literacy levels or Somaliland’s oral culture, or it may be no more than an acknowledgement of the police’s inability to respond quickly.

33 A number of districts and villages in the Hargeisa area collaborate with the police to establish night-time community policing or neighbourhood watches. Each pays its community police a small monthly sum of money to safeguard its area at night though the groups cannot afford to pay for mobiles or transport. There are problems associated with this form of policing in that people fear that the groups are managed by the state for its own purpose or infiltrated by Al-Shabaab or ex-criminals, but for most it is an acceptable solution; police stations may be open 24 hours a day but no one expects their officers to respond quickly, least of all at night.
most police business is conducted without the use of technology, and even inclusive and traditional forms of ICT such as radios and paper are scarce. Senior officers and officials in headquarters buildings may have multiple mobiles and SIM cards (they do not have landlines), but with the exception of specialized technical officers in the immigration police and the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), whose masked officers confiscate mobiles, laptops or electronics found during raids, most officers have only recently acquired basic items of uniform. There are problems even with paper-based systems, with few of the occurrence books open on reception desks in stations being kept up to date. Literacy levels among Somaliland’s ageing and uneducated low-ranking general duties police officers remain low, just as they do in the population as a whole.

Although the government’s evaluation of this situation is difficult to assess accurately, it is possible to deduce its political preferences and interest in ICT from discussions held with officials and officers from the Ministry of Interior, coastguard and immigration police in Hargeisa in December 2015. Nevertheless, a degree of caution is necessary. Government priorities for remote and coastal areas may, like the evidence for meaningful statehood, be evident from the resources and support provided to the coastguard and immigration police, but the relationship between politics and practice remains opaque. Thus the resources and attention given to immigration operations in Hargeisa and along the Ethiopian border suggest that uncontrolled migration is of greater concern than underdevelopment, illegal fishing or piracy, but the dismissal in February 2016 of the commander responsible for dramatically increasing the deportation of people with invalid stay permits emphasizes the need to take account of political and clan-based factors. Whatever the explanation behind such events, addressing security developments in remote and coastal areas allows for a discussion of whether ICT has made a difference to officers’ behaviour, and whether or not it is a tool enabling coastguard and specialist police to broker links between the centre and periphery.

‘Soldiering’ in remote and coastal areas

Somaliland governments have yet to engage systematically in capacity-building in the country’s remote and coastal areas, and international commentators know little about everyday security practices in settlements in these areas. This lack of

35 It became clear from interviews at the MOI in Dec. 2015 that the Ethiopian border region received more attention than coastal areas in the north-east or the disputed territories of Sool and Sana Sanaag in the eastern borderlands with Puntland. This may be attributable to Somaliland’s often uncomfortable relationship with Ethiopia or to political sensitivities associated with the forthcoming general election in 2017, but it does not seem to be linked to a fall in the incidence of piracy. Although there were no recorded incidents of piracy in 2015, the preceding five years had seen markedly less attention—international, regional and national—paid to piracy in Somaliland than in Puntland, with Somaliland attracting attention only when it housed convicted pirates (BerberaNews, ‘Nine convicted Somali pirates transferred from Seychelles arrive’, 30 March 2012, http://www.berberanews.com/somaliland-nine-convicted-somali-pirates-transferred-from-seychelles-arrive/). See Jan Stockbruegger and Christian Bueger, ‘Contemporary piracy as an issue of academic inquiry: a bibliography’, 3 Sept. 2015, http://piracy-studies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Piracy-Studies-Bibliography-September-2015.pdf. For an overview of Somaliland’s relations with its neighbours, see AllAfrica.com, ‘Somalia: re-examining Somaliland’s relations with neighboring states’, 21 May 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201405301960.html.
interest is striking, given that Somaliland’s 865 kilometres (520 miles) of coastline on the Gulf of Aden—and its proximity to Yemen (known locally as Aden)—make it of potential strategic significance not only for the government in Hargeisa as it seeks international recognition, but also for donors such as the UK, with its large Somali population and vulnerability to radicalization, and for UK-based companies such as Mott MacDonald, which provides consultancy to the UK-supported Somaliland Development Fund on developing public and private power providers.36 Maritime trading nations such as Denmark and Norway have an interest too, though shipping industry projects on ‘Somalia coastal development’ appear to be confined to Berbera.37 Surprisingly, the formerly high incidence of piracy did not fundamentally affect this approach. Even before August 2015, when the Financial Times reported that there had been no incidents involving Somali pirates in the preceding eight months,38 the international shipping community’s attention was focused on Puntland’s coastal villages, rather than on Somaliland’s, as a source of piracy. Thus a joint venture involving the UNDP, Maersk, Shell, BP, Stena and the Japanese shipping companies NYK, MOL and K Line in a project designed to develop alternative livelihoods to piracy for youths in coastal villages focuses on Eyl, Bandar Bay, Bargalin, Hafun, Gara’ad and the adjacent districts of Adado, South-Galkayo and Abudwaq. Somaliland’s prison for pirates may have been a news story in 2012,39 but its coastal settlements have never attracted attention.

A detailed, coherent and internationally accessible picture of security in Somaliland’s remote and coastal settlements is unlikely to emerge for the foreseeable future,40 yet conversations with officials and advisers in Hargeisa in December 2015 suggest that the government’s own knowledge is substantial (the actionable intelligence provided by the secret police in Hargeisa is reputedly good). For now, the role played by Somaliland’s coastguards and immigration police offers an indicative outline of government-sponsored initiatives and priorities and local realities.

The state’s presence is signified by a small number of coastguards and immigration police officers. These are not civilian or general duties police dealing directly with the public, but are part of Somaliland’s overall law enforcement system and potential sources of government revenue, through port and customs charges in


40 International security contractors escorting survey teams speak about, for example, women in settlements alongside roads leading towards the coast throwing stones at outsiders (author’s discussion with private contractor, Djibouti, 2 Feb. 2016), but most commentators extrapolate from the roles played by elders, women or youths in urban areas. Contrast Said Ismail, ‘Eyl residents concerned about pirate actions’, SomaliaReport, 20 March 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/324/Eyl_Residents_Concerned_About_Pirate_Actions.
Berbera and entry visas at land crossings, and as such are regarded by the populace as representing ‘the government’. Also, Somali notions of ‘policeness’—of what it means to be police—are flexible,41 and functional boundaries between the various forces blur, especially in remote coastal settlements: coastguard, security guard or pirate—their work is the same.42 Coastguards may be theoretically separate from police, being for example answerable to the Ministry of Defence rather than the Ministry of Interior, but both groups are commonly referred to as soldiers and are functionally similar; there is a degree of interoperability between them.43 They probably also share flaws such as casualness, ineffectiveness and impunity, especially when based in isolated settlements where a propensity to look the other way for a small fee is common;44 if qat chewing and a lack of technical skills, discipline and ‘professionalism’ are common in coastguard posts in Berbera, there is no reason to assume that the situation is different in remote areas where officers are few in number and physically vulnerable (that is, they cannot afford to antagonize important local men). If, however, we look at remote and coastal areas from the point of view of senior officers in the forces’ headquarters in Hargeisa, a different picture emerges, one which offers an informative overview of centre–periphery relations and the dynamics underpinning it.

When viewed from this perspective, the Silanyo government’s seemingly relaxed approach to centre–periphery relations reflects Somali preferences for clan-based consensus over the hierarchical processes associated with bureaucratic models of government. The downside is, in Somaliland as in Puntland and Mogadishu, that line ministry representatives are changed unexpectedly, resulting in discontinuities in governance projects and policies. For example, until recently it appeared that the nature of the state’s presence was determined in part by the quality of leadership and resources available to its security agencies, for chief officers are chosen by and beholden to the president. Judging from the record and performance of the coastguard and immigration police, this implied that the Silanyo government prioritized immigration control over responding to illegal fishing and piracy; and that, contrary to the picture Dua identified as emerging in 2011, counter-piracy in Somaliland was no longer (if it ever had been) ‘a form of protection … tied to the project of state recognition’.45 Recent changes to the immigration police’s command suggest that similar considerations may yet apply to immigration.

45 Dua, ‘Piracy’.
The coastguard

Formerly a functioning navy based on the Soviet model, the coastguard or maritime police consists of 600 officers whose formal functions include presence operations, search and rescue, and anchorage patrols. Like the Somaliland police, the coastguard receives significant technical and financial support from international organizations, prominent among which is EUCAP-Nestor, a civilian mission that assists host countries to develop a sustainable maritime security capacity. This is understood as including land-based maritime security in relation to development as well as addressing piracy and threats arising from Somaliland’s proximity to Yemen, which is seen as a source of weapons, terrorists and illegal fishing. EUCAP’s vision of the coastguard has been accepted by Somaliland’s ministries, the Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy, and local NGOs and universities. Its press releases show young coastguards receiving training in skills such as navigation, boat handling, engine maintenance and first aid as well as basic maritime law, customary law (xeer), police work at sea and detecting improvised explosive devices, but the reality is less professional than EUCAP might wish.

International advisers informally define success for the coastguard as evidence of a limited degree of operational capability, but achieving even this is challenging because its technical and functional capacity is inadequate. It cannot patrol the sea or the land because it lacks seagoing boats, vehicles, fuel, communications equipment and land transport, and it cannot build cases against pirates or illegal fishing boats because it lacks the necessary policing (procedural) skills. Cultural issues intrude, too; senior officers do not display a sense of time or urgency while many sailors (or, depending on who is speaking, soldiers) do not understand English, the maritime language, or recognize the notions of a chain of evidence or a manning list, but are too embarrassed to ask for clarification. International advisers say that being a coastguard is regarded as a ‘low’ job. Although many are said to join to gain a sense of belonging, and older men are thought to be prepared to learn, young recruits join for the money but then leave quickly, being unwilling to follow orders, let alone spend months learning new skills. The total budget for salaries is US$56,000 per month, and guards are paid regularly each month—though many also work as guards in hotels and oil installations, which typically provide an extra US$85 a month. ICT’s limited availability has not made a difference to the ways in which coastguards see their role or conduct their business.

The coastguard is significant here because its officers act as police in areas where there is no police but where (or when) illegal fishing, migration (taahrib) or the trafficking of weapons or narcotics is a political issue for the government or for donors. Officers may, for instance, be required to find witnesses, though in practice they rarely show initiative in such matters, and while there was a recent attempt to give them police powers, the practical problems associated with this (e.g.

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46 This section is based on author’s interviews with international advisers, Hargeisa, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18 Dec. 2015, and chief and senior coastguard officers, Hargeisa, 15 Dec. 2015.
managing chains of evidence or engaging in hot pursuit) meant that the proposal was not accepted. More positively, the potential of the coastguard—equipped with ICT—to act as a link between the centre and periphery may be developed by EUCAP’s ‘Maritime Communications and Coastal Safety Initiative’, which is a new coastal safety project that aims to provide fishermen and seafarers with communications equipment. EUCAP is also developing plans to introduce teams of community liaison officers, which will visit coastal communities regularly.

For now, ministry officials in Hargeisa say that the coastguard controls up to 25 points on the coast, most of which are located in places where illegal migrants traditionally cross—and where state representatives are paid to look the other way or, perversely, display an atypical degree of initiative by selling permits for illegal fishing. Approximately 100 officers (‘agents’) work in plain clothes so as to avoid being identified as coastguards. They also recruit informers who tell them when and where illegal activities take place, one or two such incidents being logged each week, and ICT facilitates this. Communication between informants and the coastguard is made using pre-paid text messages on mobile telephones; credit is put onto the informants’ mobiles, with the sum depending on each informant’s record. Although not a conventional form of brokerage, this use of ICT helps to facilitate working relations at the local level and, in some cases, between the periphery and the centre. The extent to which the possession or use of ICT affects the behaviour of individuals is, however, unknown.

The coastguards’ record in the field is uneven, in remote areas as in Berbera, but—and this is a crucial point—it reflects the situation at the HQ in Hargeisa, which in turn reflects the government’s assessment of its functional utility and political value. Thus the commander (admiral) appointed by the President in March 2015 had no background in maritime matters; he came to the post after spending four years as commander of the corrections force, a post which by all accounts he held very successfully, but before that he had spent 37 years in the police. He took over when his predecessor was shunted sideways into the army (along with the vice-admiral, who was moved to second-in-command in the army at the same time). The HQ staff is currently stationed in a small rented compound comprising a handful of dark offices in a single-storey house, although the new headquarters under construction will have an impressive conference centre, lecture theatre, very large offices, kitchens, lavatories and a parade ground. At present, however, the clock in the admiral’s office does not work and the cooks (the only females present) spend their day in a corner of the open compound.

The situation of the coastguard, then, illustrates the nuanced relationship existing between politics and practice, and the limited role that ICT plays in brokering communications between the various elements. It suggests that the activities of low-rankling sailors in coastal areas are influenced by the culture at the Hargeisa headquarters, which is in turn tolerated or shaped by ministers in Silanyo’s government.
The immigration police

The quality of the immigration police working alongside coastguards in remote and coastal areas is difficult to judge. Their technical skills are unlikely to be high, yet their role is relatively high-profile and the quality of the institution they represent is different. On the basis of developments in Hargeisa and at major crossing points in the west of the country, two observations may be made. First, with the exception of the secret police and, perhaps, the RRU, the immigration police is one of the more proficient elements in Somaliland’s law enforcement system. This seemingly owes much to the determination of recent chief officers to develop a force aligned with international standards and ‘global security’, but it must also reflect the government’s prioritization of controlling migration as an aspect of counterterrorism and internal security. Second, politics and practice appear to be more positively linked than in the coastguard, while immigration officers make greater use of ICT.

The immigration police’s functional priority is ‘combating illegal migrants’ entering Somaliland. This it does this via operations from ten immigration centres and posts scattered along the 1,200 kilometres of border (officers refer to five as ‘big’ and five as ‘small’). News reports often focus on migrants from Ethiopia walking to Bosasso, but the conflict in Yemen also drives thousands across the Gulf of Aden to Berbera and Hargeisa. Also, many migrants are deported after their stay permits expire, with the expulsion of 300 illegal immigrants, mostly Ethiopians, in mid-January 2016 being a case in point. But it is uncontrolled migration through the porous border that links politics and practice most closely, because international observers associate it with transnational crimes such as smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism, while the Silanyo government probably assesses it in relation to political insecurity and terrorism. No doubt the government also wishes to use its response as a bargaining chip in its quest for resources and recognition; and indeed, it does this successfully. Hence the UK, which wishes to target terrorism at source, gave security equipment and vehicles to the Somaliland Ministry of Civil Aviation and Air Transport to use at Berbera and Hargeisa airports, and to the Department of Immigration to use at land, sea and air border crossings. The equipment and vehicles provided were accompanied by a training and mentoring package worth £457,263, which aimed to ensure that airport security staff could operate X-ray, explosive trace detection (ETD) and closed-circuit television (CCTV) equipment. Additionally, senior and opera-

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48 This section is based on author’s interviews with immigration police ranging in rank from commander to recent recruits, Hargeisa, 11, 12 Dec. 2015.

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tional staff received the mentoring and professional development necessary for ‘a sustainable and compliant civil aviation sector’. The total cost of £699,465 was met by the UK’s counterterrorism programme.

ICT is seen as playing a significant role within this response. Indeed, the acceptance of a link between immigration control and ICT is evident in the immigration police’s working environment, from the computer room in the headquarters building to visa booths at Hargeisa’s airport. Even in 2012, the then outgoing (and now current) director, Dayib Osman Alin, had specifically promoted technology as a tool for enhancing border control. And the immigration police has undoubtedly been fortunate in the resources it receives. It may lack ICT in some places, for example at Wajale on the border with Ethiopia, Somaliland’s busiest border crossing, but its US$250,000 headquarters (funded by Japan) houses a central database for a passport registration and data collection system. The system, known as the Personal Identification and Registration System (PIRS), was installed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a contribution to improving Somaliland’s migration management capacity. The IOM provided training for ‘hundreds’ of immigration, security and civil aviation officers, the rehabilitation of ports of entry at Hargeisa, Wajale, Borama and Berbera, and, significantly, equipment and IT systems for passenger inspection. Walk-through and hand-held metal detectors, and new uniforms for 100 immigration staff, were also provided.

Five base stations and repeaters and 48 VHF radio handsets were installed as the means for securing communication between immigration’s HQ in Hargeisa and major ports of entry such as Wajale and Berbera.

But the contribution made by ICT should not be overstated. In interviews during December 2015, the then director Mohamed Ali Yusuf said that his budget, resources, equipment, vehicles and logistics were inadequate, and that while officers in Hargeisa and Berbera have IT support, they lack connectivity. In fact, many HQ systems remain paper-based, some records are little more than procedural exercises, it takes a week for photo IDs taken at Hargeisa airport to be uploaded into the system, and the office in Berbera has only two laptops. The new system cannot catch the groups of 10–20 people walking from Ethiopia or Djibouti to Puntland, and officers rely on personal experience when it comes to recognizing false documents or identifying ex-fighters from the marks on their hands and shoulders. And in everyday business, experience counts for more than ICT, as when 200 illegal immigrants were identified in one day in early 2016. Also, as Brigadier Yusuf astutely noted, the receipt of too much technical equipment can be counterproductive, leading to internecine rivalries and a structurally unbalanced security sector.

ICT, equipment and training alone, then, cannot generate capacity-building or meaningful immigration management, least of all along Somaliland’s coastal

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55 IOM Kenya, ‘Somaliland immigration department headquarters opens’. 1075
borders where six immigration officers share police posts at Maydh (50 kilometres north of Erigavo), Hees, Shalaaw (28 kilometres west of the port of Hees), Eil Daraad in Sahil region (whose main city is Berbera), Lughaya (a small coastal town 20 kilometres west of Berbera), Bulahaar (Berbera) and Zeila (towards the Djibouti border). Selected on the basis of clan-based calculations, the officers concerned are reliant on informants (the phrase ‘they tell us’ was used during interviews at the immigration police’s HQ); ICT means little when even radios are a scarce resource.\textsuperscript{56} There is no sign of new or innovative modes of governance emerging.

Although the significance of individuals in shaping institutional development is less than it would be in the West, not least because appointments and tenure depend on presidential wishes and clan-based calculations, improvements in the immigration police’s HQ during 2015 can be explained by Yusuf’s determination to improve officers’ technical capacity and access to ICT while fulfilling the immigration police’s remit effectively and efficiently. Like many Somaliland officers, he has over the years received training from the Soviet Union as well as Israel and EU member states; but, unlike the admiral, he had worked in his department since 1972 and, unlike most of his peers, in interviews in December 2015 he was sufficiently assured and comfortable in his authority to delegate questions and tasks to his staff. However, the government’s support for his tough approach to immigration control lasted only until mid-February, when he was replaced by his immediate predecessor a week after the President made sweeping changes to the cabinet following ‘a trip east’ in preparation for the elections of 2017.\textsuperscript{57} But such departures and reinstatements are not unusual: Yusuf himself had taken over from Alin in 2012 when the latter was sacked after nine years as commander.\textsuperscript{58}

Like all security organizations in the former Somalia, Somaliland’s coastguard and immigration police are subject to political or factional pressure, which leads to dismissals and clashes, as in September 2015 when the deputy head of the immigration service was jailed for defying orders from the Ministry of Interior.

One further feature deserves note. Despite high youth unemployment, both coastguard and immigration police find it difficult to recruit and retain good ICT-literate officers. But the approaches adopted by the two forces are notably different, and that introduced in the immigration police represents a regional innovation. The coastguard is aware of its need to improve recruitment and retention but has yet to make a significant difference, whereas Yusuf deliberately recruited computer-literate, ambitious and focused male graduates between the ages of 20 and 35 years, who do not smoke, chew qat or drink alcohol. In 2015 he recruited five graduates in IT and administration from two of Hargeisa’s universities, four from the Somaliland civil service, five with local training and 35 graduates from local police academies. He introduced a smart uniform of navy trousers

\textsuperscript{56} Author’s interviews with chief and senior officers, coastguard, Hargeisa, 15 Dec. 2015.
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and white shirt (describing it in conversation as ‘the international uniform for immigration officers’) which was intended explicitly to help foster professional pride, and at the time of his dismissal he was developing a career structure that builds on regular training, ‘mentoring’ and ‘little incentives’; the projector in the training room is in regular use and every year two officers receive an ‘officer of the year’ certificate. He also created a basic welfare system to support his plans; US$1 is deducted from the US$300 officers are paid regularly each month (this is more than the regular police are paid), and the fund thereby amassed is used to cover sick leave, the cost of marriage celebrations and other such personal needs. The degree of skimming appeared to be minimal. Equally unusual is the large and detailed organogram of the police and ministry displayed in the conference room. These gestures are cosmetic and do not fundamentally affect centre–periphery relations, yet they indicate an awareness of international approaches to the technicalities of security governance that is rare in Somaliland’s institutions. Overall, this picture suggests that while ICT is at best a minor variable in Somaliland’s law enforcement system, it can be used as a catalyst.

Conclusions

Prompted by the trend among international organizations to see ICT as a tool for development, this article asks whether the use of ICT has—or can—recast centre–periphery relations and capacity-building in a hybrid country such as Somaliland. Given the restricted access to remote and coastal areas, and the lack of knowledge of the details of everyday security, it uses the record and resources of the coast-guard and immigration police to illustrate significant aspects of Somaliland’s law enforcement framework, the relationship between its politics and practice, the practical application of its coercive resources, and the Silanyo government’s priorities and preference for governance based on consensus and coexistence whenever security imperatives allow. On this basis, it suggests that ICT can be a desirable technical or operational tool, or a functional variable in existing power networks, but that its introduction does not represent a new mode of security governance, transfer or brokerage. For now, ICT’s impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of security-related knowledge and practice is minimal. Its availability has not resulted in the integration of state-based and informal security provision into a new, flexible or coherent system of governance, for Somaliland’s mode of governance is weighted towards the centre. This suggests that while spatial metaphors such as centre–periphery help to clarify the situation, the significance invested in them reflects western rationalities rather than Somali realities.

Contrary to Herbst’s observation that a fundamental problem confronting African leaders concerns how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely settled lands, the Silanyo government has not sought to overtly or systematically extend, consolidate or exert its authority in remote and coastal areas. Instead, it relies on clan-based consent or acquiescence to ensure politically acceptable levels of security in respect of the issues that concern it, reproducing and, perhaps,
representing the centre–periphery divide through security practices. Managing uncontrolled migration may be of more pressing concern than illegal fishing or piracy but, as the director of the immigration police discovered in February 2016, ensuring effective migration control does not guarantee presidential support.