

Chatham House Report

Leena Koni Hoffmann and Raj Navanit Patel

Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria

A Social Norms Approach to Connecting Society and Institutions



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Africa Programme | May 2017

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Charity Registration No. 208223

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ISBN 978 1 78413 217 0

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Latimer Trend

The material selected for the printing of this report is manufactured from 100% genuine de-inked post-consumer waste by an ISO 14001 certified mill and is Process Chlorine Free.



Cover image: Aerial view of Lagos island and Lagos harbour, Nigeria, on 17 March 2016. Copyright © Frédéric Soltan/Getty

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Executive Summary and Recommendations

That corruption is a destructive and complex practice is openly acknowledged in Nigeria, yet it remains ubiquitous in the functioning of society and economic life. The consequences of corruption for the country and its people are, moreover, indisputable. Acts of diversion of federal and state revenue, business and investment capital, and foreign aid, as well as the personal incomes of Nigerian citizens, contribute to a hollowing out of the country's public institutions and the degradation of basic services. All the same, corruption is perhaps the least well understood of the country's challenges.

It has been estimated that close to \$400 billion was stolen from Nigeria's public accounts from 1960 to 1999,¹ and that between 2005 and 2014 some \$182 billion was lost through illicit financial flows from the country.² This stolen common wealth in effect represents the investment gap in building and equipping modern hospitals to reduce Nigeria's exceptionally high maternal mortality rates – estimated at two out of every 10 global maternal deaths in 2015;³ expanding and upgrading an education system that is currently failing millions of children;⁴ and procuring vaccinations to prevent regular outbreaks of preventable diseases.

Corruption tends to foster more corruption, perpetuating and entrenching social injustice in daily life

Corruption tends to foster more corruption, perpetuating and entrenching social injustice in daily life. Such an environment weakens societal values of fairness, honesty, integrity and common citizenship, as the impunity of dishonest practices and abuses of power or position steadily erode citizens' sense of moral responsibility to follow the rules in the interests of wider society.

Nigeria has sought to tackle corruption through 'traditional' legal and governance-based measures, emphasizing the reform of public procurement rules and public financial management, anti-corruption laws and the establishment of various agencies tasked with preventing corruption and punishing those who engage in it. This focus on transparency and legal sanctions is critically important, but innovative and complementary approaches are needed to foster a comprehensive shift in deeply ingrained attitudes to corruption at all levels of society.

President Muhammadu Buhari has shown sincerity in his commitment to lead anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria, including through strengthening whistleblowing incentives and protections, high-profile investigations of prominent individuals for large-scale theft of public funds, and the recovery of billions of naira by Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies. These efforts are essential, but cannot by themselves foster

¹ UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), 'Anti-Corruption Climate Change: it started in Nigeria', speech by Antonio Maria Costa at 6th National Seminar on Economic Crime, Abuja, 13 November 2007.

² This figure represents some 15 per cent of the total value of Nigeria's trade over the period 2005–14, at \$1.21 trillion. In 2014 alone illicit financial flows from Nigeria were estimated at \$12.5 billion, representing 9 per cent of the total trade value of \$139.6 billion in that year. See Global Financial Integrity (2017), *Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005–2014*, April 2017, http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GFI-IFF-Report-2017_final.pdf, pp. 30–34 (accessed 4 May 2017).

³ Nigeria accounted for 19 per cent of global maternal deaths in 2015 and was recorded to have made 'no progress' in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of reducing preventable maternal mortality rates by 75 per cent between 1990 and 2015. See World Health Organization (2015), *Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2015: Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the United Nations Population Division*, https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Trends-in-MMR-1990-2015-Full-report_243.pdf (accessed 17 Apr. 2017).

⁴ Nigeria's rapid population growth and poor investments in education have put enormous pressure on the number of schools, facilities and teachers available for basic learning: see https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/children_1937.html. Moreover, at an estimated 10.5 million, Nigeria has the world's largest number of out-of-school children: see <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education.html> (accessed 17 Apr. 2017).

a sustainable, comprehensive reversal of long-established assumptions and practices in the absence of a decisive shift in public apathy and a collective will to achieve collective behavioural change. Nigeria's ongoing anti-corruption efforts must now be reinforced by a systematic understanding of why people engage in or refrain from corrupt activity, and full consideration of the societal factors that may contribute to normalizing corrupt behaviour and desensitizing citizens to its impacts. This holistic approach would better position public institutions to engage Nigerian society in anti-corruption efforts.

Understanding why certain practices persist in Nigeria, and how they can be changed

This report aims to diagnose what drives corrupt behaviour in Nigeria, and the types of beliefs that support practices understood to be corrupt. Its findings are based largely on a national household survey jointly developed by the Chatham House Africa Programme and the University of Pennsylvania's Social Norms Group (PennSONG), in collaboration with Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics as well as a network of academics and practitioners from Nigerian universities and NGOs. The findings present new evidence of the social beliefs and expectations that influence some day-to-day forms of corruption in Nigeria. Fuller details of the survey and associated research are given in the body of the report, as well as in the annex to the main text.

The research project conducted as the basis for the report explores corruption in Nigeria as a collective practice – one that is primarily an aggregate of individual behaviours that are sustained by particular social beliefs and expectations.

How people think and act is often dependent on what others think and do. Corruption is difficult to curb because it is motivated by many factors, including expectations about how other people are likely to behave. Efforts to change the beliefs of a few individuals are not in themselves enough to induce a sustainable change in collective behaviour. That requires a systematic approach that is context-specific – and that, crucially, is undertaken, owned and sustained by a critical mass of local actors who want to forge a 'new normal'.


The report examines corruption in Nigeria from the perspective of the social norms that serve as embedded markers of how people behave as members of a society and have a strong influence on how they choose to act in different situations. These social influences determine accepted forms of behaviour in a society, and act as indicators of what actions are appropriate and morally sound, or disapproved of and forbidden.

Disapproval of a practice, and the social consequences of failing to adhere to community expectation – such as gossip, public shaming, or loss of credibility and status – have a powerful influence on the choices people make. Equally powerful are the approval, social respectability and esteem attached to behaviour that is evaluated within one's community as right or acceptable.

In the context of anti-corruption in Nigeria, understanding these underlying social drivers helps to identify which forms of corruption are underpinned by social norms, and which practices are driven by conventions, local customs or circumstances (as shown in figure 1). Identifying the specific social drivers of specific collective

practices is critical to designing targeted and effective policy interventions to change those practices. This is because not all collective practices, regardless of how pernicious, are driven by a social norm.

Figure 1: Identifying different behaviours: What is a social norm?



Source: Adapted from Bicchieri, C. (2016), *Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Key findings and critical challenges

- **Social norms of corruption are limited to specific contexts and sectors in Nigeria.** Social norms exist around specific sectors and practices, for example, law enforcement and bribery, but are not as widespread as people may assume. The findings of this research project show that social norms drive the solicitation of bribes by law enforcement officials, whereas the giving of bribes is influenced more by circumstances and by people's beliefs about what other people are doing. There are thus opportunities for targeted interventions to address the specific beliefs and expectations that motivate corrupt behaviour in specific sectors and practices.
- **If the environment or options change, behaviour will change.** A clear majority of respondents in Nigeria's rural and urban areas know when a practice is illegal, and think that others know this too. But individuals may engage in a practice that they know is wrong because they observe others doing so, or as a rational response to a situation. In many of the scenarios analysed in this study, corrupt behaviour was rationalized as a response to the choices and pressures that people face.
- **Collective action is sometimes impeded because people have misconceptions about what other people really think.** Survey respondents frequently underestimated the extent to which fellow citizens believe corruption to be wrong. If people were aware of how commonly held their personal beliefs are, they would be more motivated to act collectively against

Anti-corruption efforts may have the greatest chance of success if they stem from a shared sense of responsibility and urgency – and thus foster collective grassroots pressure

corruption. Anti-corruption efforts may have the greatest chance of success if they stem from a shared sense of responsibility and urgency – and thus foster collective grassroots pressure. President Buhari is certainly not alone in his high-profile stance on corruption; a significant number of Nigerians agree that it is morally unacceptable. The crucial step is translating this shared belief into an effective and sustainable coalition for collective social action.

- **In Nigeria, the social contract between government and the people is very local and not national.** There is a deep-seated lack of confidence in official institutions, or in the universal application of a fair and neutral rule of law. This severely weakens the consolidation of a Nigerian national identity based on common and equal citizenship. Instead, less effective social contracts are forged particularly around ethnic or religious identities – an arrangement that fuels intercommunal distrust – and increasingly fragmented social identities impede the construction of a national social contract that could form the basis of collective action to overcome corruption.
- **The true costs and consequences of corruption are hidden within the normal interactions of daily life.** People tend to engage in certain forms of corruption as a practical response to obstacles and inefficiencies in Nigeria's administrative and economic systems. Clear information is needed on how individuals' seemingly innocuous routine interactions can collectively impose a heavy cost on society as a whole, damaging the public institutions Nigerians are supposed to rely on to provide security and essential administration and social services.
- **Tough talk and fear-based messaging cannot substitute for authenticity and exemplary behaviour.** As long as the Nigerian government's interactions with citizens continue to be marred by extortionate behaviour and expectations of bribery, the state deprives itself of the moral basis to lead in addressing the country's corruption problem. Routinely abusive behaviour by public officials is an obstacle to building public trust and stimulating collective action. Instead, it fosters public cynicism, apathy and a sense that different rules apply to different groups. Government-led anti-corruption campaigns will only be perceived as sincere if they are self-examining and self-correcting.

Policy approaches to influence collective action against corruption

- **Changing incentives in contexts where corruption is a rational response or is environmentally driven.** Administrative and institutional reform could remove some opportunities for officials to exert the leverage that encourages or forces citizens to engage in corrupt practices. It should be less costly and more efficient to abide by the law.

The procedure for complying with penalties for traffic violations is, for instance, needlessly complicated and time-consuming, and penalties are sometimes unclear or disputable, creating opportunities for extortion by law enforcement agents. Online and mobile technologies should be used to simplify the direct payment of official fines, the adjudication of disputed penalties, the handling of complaints and the safe reporting of demands for corrupt payments. Clear information on how to report corrupt behaviour by state agents, and how to follow up cases, should be made widely available in accessible formats and local languages.

- **Reducing official fine rates would erode the scope for state agents to solicit petty bribes from citizens in return for escaping official penalties.** Relative to the real income level and average living costs of most Nigerians, official fines are very costly, creating a strong incentive to pay a lesser sum in the form of a bribe. There must be clear and enforceable negative sanctions for corrupt behaviour, and equally clear and meaningful positive incentives not to engage in corruption.
- **Targeting sectors and communities with information on the human costs of corruption.** Anti-corruption campaign messages should be reframed to resonate in affected communities, contexts or sectors by using pertinent and positive norms, values and expectations. Showing how these are undermined by corruption can help render the drivers of corrupt behaviour socially unacceptable. Messages about the cost of corruption will be more effective if they seem relevant to a specific audience, rather than generic and unfocused.

Local design and applicability is key. Respected local figures – such as religious and community leaders – who exert social influence can help to convince people to accept evidence of the cost of corruption and overturn notions that a corrupt route is a more efficient way of doing things.

Messages targeted to engage Nigeria's large youth population will be vital in inculcating a lower tolerance of corruption in the next generation. Social and community media can be effectively used to spread social norms messaging among the youth population, and over time this can have a positive influence on opinions and attitudes in wider society. Television and community radio can also show the true human and moral costs of corruption to the futures and life chances of young people. Age-appropriate interventions could, moreover, be integrated into citizenship and civic education programmes in primary and secondary schools nationwide.

- **Reframing the approach to anti-corruption messaging and interventions.** Research suggests that the way in which messages about problematic behaviours are framed is critical to the effectiveness of social campaigns. Official anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria have tended to use tough, intimidating and sometimes aggressive language; but such messages often fail to be sustainable or convincing because the behaviour of the government and its agents is perceived as unchanged or hypocritical.
- **Highlighting and empowering trendsetters (both real and fictional) to drive behavioural change.** Leadership on anti-corruption can only be successful if it is by example. The behaviours and actions of Nigerian political actors play a major

role in setting social trends, forging public trust and inspiring positive behaviour. As key trendsetters, political actors and officials must measure up to higher standards of integrity, honesty and transparency in order to send a powerful signal regarding the government's commitment to changing negative social norms and regaining public trust.

Trendsetters tend to show high levels of autonomy, and are willing to disregard the norms to which most members of the community conform. In cases where negative norms are widespread but people believe that different practices would leave everyone better off, trendsetters from public, private or civic sectors can help shift people's behaviour in beneficial directions.

Behavioural interventions should thus be targeted towards trendsetters who can be persuaded to abandon certain practices and persuade others to follow. Where trendsetters cannot be identified, the media may be used to exemplify alternative lifestyles and behaviours and thus encourage change. Education entertainment ('edutainment') has been used successfully by governments and international organizations to promote behavioural changes and disseminate useful information.

- **Using trendsetters and social marketing strategies to overturn the false beliefs that tend to drive corrupt practices.** Where people would like to see change but wrongly fear that others do not share their beliefs, trendsetters can play a key role by being willing to incur the cost of violating a norm. In taking this step first, a trendsetter reassures other citizens that they are not alone in believing a norm should be abandoned.

The evidence of the survey that informs this report is that many people in Nigeria already regard corrupt behaviour as morally unacceptable. Trendsetters and social marketing strategies to spread information about what people really think and believe can play a crucial role in helping to stimulate the collective development of social sanctions to curb corrupt practices.

Social marketing strategies that urge people to act in keeping with their personal aversion to corrupt practices can be highly influential, and can generate critical mass support for social change. There is also scope to boost public awareness of the laws governing the behaviour of public officials and setting out their responsibilities towards citizens. Accountability channels – such as confidential text-message hotlines – can allow citizens to make complaints and report corrupt acts by officials without jeopardizing their personal safety.

- **Integrating behavioural insights into anti-corruption strategies.** Behavioural drivers influence the attitudes that people adopt towards corruption, and the choices they make about how to act. Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies should therefore systematically integrate an informed understanding of behavioural drivers as part of the long-term approach to their mandates.

The findings of this report highlight important options for the trial of interventions to shape positive social norms, and for monitoring their impact over the long term. For instance, there is scope for smaller exercises to identify trendsetters for behavioural change and to design interventions using this tool within specific sectors such as the Nigeria Police Force and other branches of law enforcement.

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Executive Summary and Recommendations

A careful understanding of the factors that drive relevant behaviours should be a critical component of government actions to reduce corruption. It is recommended that an interagency unit be established in Nigeria to review and hone anti-corruption messaging, and to advise how behavioural lessons can be practically, ethically and most effectively applied at all stages of policymaking – from diagnostics to design, implementation and evaluation – rather than as a separate approach that produces ‘behavioural policies’ as add-ons.

1. Introduction

Although corruption impacts countries differently through its various manifestations, it ultimately erodes trust in institutions and plays a negative role in development.⁵

Many of Nigeria's pressing concerns – including slow economic recovery, grinding poverty and insecurity – have been exacerbated and prolonged by corruption.

It has been estimated that close to \$400 billion was misappropriated from Nigeria's public accounts from 1960 to 1999.⁶ Illicit financial flows (IFFs) from the country between 2005 and 2014 are estimated to have totalled some \$182 billion.⁷ This stolen common wealth represents the investment gap in building and equipping modern hospitals to reduce Nigeria's exceptionally high maternal mortality rates – estimated at two out of 10 global maternal deaths in 2015;⁸ expanding and upgrading the education system, which is failing millions of children under 15 years of age⁹ – over 40 per cent of the country's population; and procuring vaccinations to prevent regular outbreaks of preventable diseases.¹⁰

Issues of corruption have frequently dominated scrutiny of Nigerian politics since the country's return to civilian government in 1999, and successive administrations have engaged in efforts to curb the problem. Notwithstanding such efforts, Nigeria has ranked consistently poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index – ranking 136 of 176 countries assessed in 2016 – a sign of the phenomenon's pervasiveness and the scale of the challenge of curbing it.

The traditional legal and governance-based measures for combating corruption that have so far been adopted have emphasized the need to reform public procurement rules and public financial management systems. They have also resulted in the promulgation of a substantive body of anti-corruption legislation,¹¹ and in the establishment of various agencies tasked with preventing corruption and punishing those who engage in it.

This approach to tackling corruption is targeted at making its practice more perilous or costly to an individual or organization through punishments and penalties. But,

⁵ While there seems to be a causal connection between high levels of corruption and lack of economic growth, some countries seem to be outliers in this regard. For example, China has historically demonstrated high economic growth and high levels of trust despite high levels of corruption. Uslander, E. M. (2008), *Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law: the bulging pocket makes the easy life*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 82; Sindzingre, A. (2002), 'A comparative analysis of African and East Asian corruption', in Heidenheimer, A. J. and Johnston, M. (eds) (2002), *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction, p. 441.

⁶ UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), 'Anti-Corruption Climate Change: it started in Nigeria', speech by Antonio Maria Costa at 6th National Seminar on Economic Crime, Abuja, 13 November 2007.

⁷ This figure represents some 15 per cent of the total value of Nigeria's trade over the period 2005–14, at \$1.21 trillion. In 2014 alone illicit financial flows from Nigeria were estimated at \$12.5 billion, representing 9 per cent of the total trade value of \$139.6 billion in that year. See Global Financial Integrity (2017), *Illicit Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries: 2005–2014*, April 2017, http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GFI-IFF-Report-2017_final.pdf, pp. 30–34 (accessed 4 May 2017).

⁸ Nigeria accounted for 19 per cent of global maternal deaths in 2015 and was recorded to have made 'no progress' in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of reducing preventable maternal mortality rates by 75 per cent between 1990 and 2015. See World Health Organization (2015), *Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2015: Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the United Nations Population Division*, https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Trends-in-MMR-1990-2015_Full-report_243.pdf (accessed 17 Apr. 2017).

⁹ Nigeria's rapid population growth and poor investments in education have put enormous pressure on the number of schools, facilities and teachers available for basic learning: https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/children_1937.html. Moreover, at an estimated 10.5 million, Nigeria has the world's largest number of out-of-school children: <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education.html> (accessed 17 Apr. 2017).

¹⁰ At the time of writing, Nigeria was grappling with yet another meningitis outbreak, with more than 4,000 cases recorded since the outbreak began in December 2016. The disease has killed more people in communities in northwest Nigeria, where, as noted in one report, 'access to hospitals is low and poverty is high'. See Oduah, C. 'Nigeria tackles deadly meningitis outbreak amid vaccine scarcity', 12 April 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-tackles-deadly-meningitis-outbreak-amid-vaccine-scarcity/3806872.html> (accessed 17 Apr. 2017).

¹¹ See for example Obuah, E. (2010), 'Combating Corruption in Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)', *African Studies Quarterly*, 12(1), p. 18.

while legal repercussions are essential, and the importance of public-sector reform to increase transparency in Nigeria cannot be overstated, the risks and consequences of a practice that is considered corrupt are not always apparent or urgent to the person engaging in that practice at the time. Moreover, enforcing legal rules and administering punishments for corrupt offences is both costly and impossible to undertake for every single incidence or each individual wrongdoer. Not everyone who has benefited from corruption in Nigeria will be punished, nor every corrupt transaction prosecuted.

The assumption that has informed such traditional efforts has been that by themselves new legislation and the establishment of anti-corruption bodies will lead to a discernible reduction in the incidence and popular perception of corruption.

President Muhammadu Buhari has shown sincerity in his commitment to lead anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria, including through the consolidation of government payments and receipts through the implementation of a Treasury Single Account,¹² strengthening whistleblowing incentives and protections, high-profile investigations of prominent individuals for large-scale theft of public funds, and the recovery of billions of naira by Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies.¹³

These efforts are essential, but cannot by themselves foster a sustainable, comprehensive reversal of long-established assumptions and practices in the absence of a reversal of public apathy and a collective will to achieve collective behavioural change. The relatively modest record of achievement of Nigeria's anti-corruption strategy, and the evident persistence of this complex and pernicious phenomenon, suggest that there is a critical need for innovations aimed at addressing societal expectations and other characteristics driving corruption. This would support improved anti-corruption outcomes in Nigeria by stimulating necessary collective action.

Conspicuously absent hitherto from Nigeria's anti-corruption strategy has been a systematic effort to go beyond legal and institutional frameworks in order to better understand corruption as a social practice and to identify the underlying causes of citizens' decisions to engage in – or avoid – corrupt activity. Corruption, like any other practice, whether negative or positive, is primarily an aggregate of individual behaviours that are sustained by particular social beliefs and expectations. To understand and tackle corruption, Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts must now be reinforced by a systematic understanding of why people engage in, or refrain from, corrupt activities.

Measuring complex collective behaviour

There has been extensive empirical and theoretical research into corruption, with the aim of understanding and curbing it. Specialist tools have been developed to measure perceptions of corruption, and explanations have been presented about the

¹² In August 2015 the Buhari administration directed the implementation of a Treasury Single Account to consolidate and manage all government revenue.

¹³ SBM Intelligence estimates that over \$696 million was recovered by Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies between October 2015 and April 2017. This figure is the total recovered amount in local and foreign currencies and was collated by SBM Intelligence from open sources in the media and from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission website. For a breakdown of reported monetary recoveries, see http://sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/201704_EFCC.pdf (accessed 27 Apr. 2017).

Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts must now be reinforced by a systematic understanding of why people engage in, or refrain from, corrupt activities

causes and the persistence of this collective practice. Simple perceptions surveys that are commonly used in studies of corruption aim to understand how people feel or think about a particular topic. This method can be used to evaluate needs, establish baselines and analyse trends. Such survey techniques are predominantly qualitative and designed to measure views, perceptions and opinions rather than facts. In a typical perceptions survey, the key focus is to gather data on what people think rather than on their actions or behaviours. At their best therefore, these types of studies are an indirect way to measure the causes of behaviour, and particularly of complex collective behaviour.

A better understanding of how people respond to the different contexts in which corruption takes place, and of the beliefs or incentives that influence their behaviours and actions, can lead to more effective and context-specific strategies for tackling different forms of corruption.

Simply put, in order to change behaviour, it is necessary to understand the causes of that behaviour. This is critical especially with regard to designing prevention activities in an environment in which corruption is perceived to be rife and legal measures are complicated. A holistic approach to tackling corruption in Nigeria must consider those societal characteristics that may normalize corrupt behaviour or desensitize people to its impacts.

Why do certain practices persist, and how can they be changed?

People's behaviour is often influenced 'by what others do and by what others think should be done'.¹⁴ This means that the way people think and act is often dependent on what others think and do. These social influences also apply to corruption. Corruption has proved very difficult to curb, in large part because there are multiple drivers of corrupt practices, including preferences that are dependent on expectations about other people's beliefs around other people's behaviour.

Understanding the contextual meanings, norms and networks that influence individual behaviour can support policymakers in better addressing how these social frameworks encourage, reinforce or dissuade certain patterns of corrupt behaviour. This understanding is critical to designing innovative and effective policy interventions and messages to curb corruption.

Around the world, and across governments, regulatory bodies, public organizations and various sectors, lessons from the study of human behaviour and collective practices are increasingly influencing the design and implementation of public policy, drawing on empirical evidence about how people behave and, importantly, why they behave as they do.¹⁵ Insights from the fields of behavioural economics, social psychology and sociology have been shown to offer generally simple, convenient and cost-effective solutions to societal challenges while avoiding an increase in rules

¹⁴ Bicchieri, C., Lindemans, J. W. and Jiang, T. (2014), 'A structured approach to a diagnostic of collective practices', *Frontiers in Psychology*, 5 December 2014, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01418> (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

¹⁵ For an in-depth discussion of the use and reach of behavioural insights in various policy sectors around the world and an analysis of over 100 applications, see OECD (2017), *Behavioural Insights and Public Policy: Lessons from Around the World*, Paris: OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264279480-en> (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

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Introduction

and penalties. Critical lessons can be drawn from the successes and failures of social campaigns targeted at curbing pernicious collective practices such as corruption.

By applying rigorous social science research methods to understanding what people believe others think and do, and why people do what they do, with regard to corrupt practices, it is possible to start delineating the different social drivers of corruption in Nigeria and, critically, the levers for influencing behaviour in the desired direction. On this basis, it is possible to design targeted interventions to help produce effective messaging and collective action that empowers communities against corruption.

To design and implement successful policy interventions capable of effecting the level of behavioural change required to make a significant contribution to tackling corruption in Nigeria, it is important to understand whether, and if so what kinds of, social beliefs and expectations support the persistence of corrupt practices. This in turn means it is crucial to ask whether people's corrupt practices are motivated by what they think other people think and believe, and/or approve or disapprove of. If corruption, or at least certain forms of corruption, is in reality underpinned by a system of social beliefs, policy responses must seek to change these beliefs on a community-wide, broad-based, collective level.¹⁶

Moreover, if corruption in Nigeria manifests itself as a social practice, attempting to change the beliefs of a few individuals will not be enough to induce a change in collective behaviour.¹⁷ The scale of behavioural change required must be pursued using a persistent and systematic approach that is highly context-specific, and undertaken, owned and sustained by a critical mass of local actors seeking to forge a 'new normal'.¹⁸

Despite a large body of research into the causes and consequences of corruption, evaluating the success or failure of policy interventions towards collective action or engagement on anti-corruption remains an unclear process. For instance, are policy interventions successful when more people go to prison for corruption? Is effectiveness measured through the reduction or elimination of the consequences of corruption, such as poverty, underdevelopment and poor public-service delivery? How can it be determined whether corruption has been reduced? Perceptions-based surveys that have traditionally been used to determine how successful countries have been at reducing corruption simply measure what people think about the practice, and not what drives the behaviours, how these have changed, or how problems of collective action might be better addressed.

The research underlying this report examines, from a 'social norms' perspective, the beliefs and expectations that sustain certain forms of corruption in Nigeria. Social norms are a particular kind of behavioural beliefs, expectations and values shared and endorsed by a particular group or society. This means that people's behaviours are strongly influenced by what those around them are doing and think should be done.¹⁹

¹⁶ Fisman, R. and Golden, M. A. (2017). *Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 256.

¹⁷ Bicchieri, C. and Mercier, H. (2014), 'Norms and beliefs: how change occurs', in Xenitidou, M. and Edmonds, B. (eds) (2014), *The Complexity of Social Norms*, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 37–54.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bicchieri, C. (2005), *The grammar of society: the nature and dynamics of social norms*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Disapproval of a practice, and the social consequences of failing to adhere to one's community's expectations – such as gossip, public shaming, or loss of credibility and status – are usually a powerful influence on the choices people make

Social norms are embedded markers of how people behave as members of a society, and have a strong influence on how they choose to act in different situations.²⁰ They determine accepted forms of behaviour in a society, and act as indicators of what actions are appropriate and morally sound, or disapproved of and forbidden.

Disapproval of a practice, and the social consequences of failing to adhere to one's community's expectations – such as gossip, public shaming, or loss of credibility and status – are usually a powerful influence on the choices people make. Equally powerful are the approval, social respectability and esteem attached to behaviour that is evaluated within one's community as being right or acceptable.

In the context of anti-corruption in Nigeria, understanding these underlying social drivers helps in diagnosing which forms of corruption are underpinned by social norms, and which practices are driven by conventions, local customs or unmitigated circumstances.

This report makes the case that anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria can be designed or adjusted, based on lessons drawn from behavioural studies, to support greater gains in reducing practices such as bribery, extortion, nepotism and embezzlement. It presents new evidence on key social drivers that influence people's decisions to engage in or avoid corrupt activity, as well as factors that may impede collective action against corruption. It also highlights lessons from some case studies of successful social campaigns and the critical ingredients for success or failure.

Chapter 2 summarizes the objectives and methodology of the study. Chapter 3 presents the survey data regarding the motivations that exist with regard to specific corrupt practices and behaviours. Chapter 4 analyses the research findings and the implications for anti-corruption policy interventions in terms of informing behavioural-change campaigns and stimulating collective action. In conclusion, the report proposes the integration of behavioural lessons in anti-corruption policymaking, and advocates strategies for expanding Nigeria's knowledge base and capacity concerning behaviour- and social norms-based interventions and solutions.

The annex at the end of this report contains a methodology note that outlines the sampling methodology and implementation of the survey.

The effectiveness of the proposed interventions is highly sensitive to context and conditions. Therefore, any policy tools that are designed using the research findings and lessons in this report will need to be tested for suitability to each context, adjusted for what works (or does not) and then adapted to improve results. And critically, in order to be effective, anti-corruption messaging and interventions must be authentic and must connect with the target audience. Through clear and careful framing, they must also give ownership and agency to Nigeria's citizens within the context of its impact.

²⁰ Ibid.

2. A New Approach to Anti-corruption

This report is based on an analysis that examined social norms messaging and interventions as potential policy tools for increasing collective action and desired behaviour towards corruption in Nigeria. It aims to diagnose what drives corrupt behaviour and the types of beliefs that support practices understood to be corrupt. The findings, resulting from an innovative behavioural approach, present new evidence of the social beliefs and expectations that influence some day-to-day forms of corruption in Nigeria.

The social norms approach used measures directly the underlying causes of social practices such as corruption, and offers specificity to policymakers, anti-corruption advocates, NGOs, civil society and other stakeholders to support the formulation of effective, context-specific interventions against the phenomenon.

Methodology

The findings of the report are based largely on a national household survey jointly developed by the Chatham House Africa Programme and the University of Pennsylvania's Social Norms Group (PennSONG), in collaboration with Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) as well as a network of academics and practitioners from seven Nigerian universities and NGOs.

The survey lays the foundation for using behavioural insights in policymaking in Nigeria, and provides evidence of how collective practices such as corruption can be systematically investigated and explained for the purposes of designing or fine-tuning policy interventions and messaging.

The project's 'Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey' was designed to measure if social norms of corruption exist in Nigeria, and whether these are a driver of or disincentive to certain corrupt behaviours.²¹ The survey was conducted in urban and rural areas in six states: Adamawa, Benue, Enugu, Lagos, Rivers and Sokoto; and in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (FCT).

The report is also based on field research undertaken in Nigeria from October to November 2015, and in July, August, September and December 2016. Researchers from the Chatham House Africa Programme and the University of Pennsylvania's Social Norms Group (PennSONG), conducted research in five states: Benue, Cross River, Enugu, Lagos and Sokoto – representing five of the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria – as well as in the capital, Abuja. Virtual and telephone interviews were conducted in Adamawa and Rivers states. A roundtable discussion was also organized by the Chatham House Africa Programme in November 2015 with anti-corruption advocates and civil society leaders. Survey supervisors and implementers participated in a two-day training workshop on diagnosing and measuring social norms, organized in Abuja in September 2016 by the Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG.

²¹ It should be noted that care was taken during the survey process to avoid explicit use of words such as 'bribe', 'bribery' or 'corruption', or any local variants of these terms. Survey questions and vignettes referred to 'direct payment', and similar phrasing. Survey implementers made it clear to respondents that the questions and vignettes concerned an illegitimate informal payment.

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Over the course of the project, wide-ranging interviews were conducted with experts, academics, anti-corruption practitioners, civil society representatives, federal government officials, and anti-corruption officials at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, as well as researchers at the Anti-Corruption Academy of Nigeria and members of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption. Most interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule²² and included interviewees' experiences as victims, witnesses or participants in acts of corruption.

More than 120 interviews were conducted by the Chatham House Africa Programme and the University of Pennsylvania's Social Norms Group (PennSONG) research team.

Fuller details of the survey are included in the annex at the end of this report.

Survey instrument

For a diagnostic tool to measure adequately the presence of social norms, it must include the following components:

- **Behaviour** – What did you do?
- **Prudential reason** – What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of the behaviour?
- **Empirical expectations** – What do you think other people do?
- **Personal normative belief** – What do you think about the practice?
- **Normative expectation** – What do you think other people think should be done?


When tackling a problem like corruption, it helps to delineate the different kinds of motives for behaviour, and it is important to note that several motives can be present at the same time. So, practical and moral reasons as well as social expectations can drive a single behaviour.

Using a social norms approach that relies on survey questions and vignettes (i.e. relatable short scenarios), the survey explored respondents' expectations in order to uncover and then measure the behavioural causes of four common corrupt practices: bribery, extortion, embezzlement and nepotism.

²² When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

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Map: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, by state, 2016



Note: Field research was conducted in Cross River State, although the formal survey was not undertaken there.
 Source: Chatham House. Note that the boundaries and names shown and designations used on this map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by Chatham House or the authors.

3. The Drivers of Collective Participation in Corrupt Practices

The results of the survey suggest the following:

- Social norms exist in soliciting bribes,²³ but not in giving them.
- People consider giving an unofficial payment or dealing with extortion in certain contexts (e.g. a nurse asking for a cash payment in a publicly funded hospital) less objectionable than in other contexts (e.g. a law enforcement agent asking for an unofficial payment at a vehicle checkpoint).
- People think that women are less likely to engage in corruption, and judge them more harshly if they do.
- A local social contract determines people's opinions and evaluation of corrupt behaviour related to embezzlement and nepotism.

Law enforcement and traffic law violations

Nigeria's motorists are subjected daily to vehicle checks by the various agencies responsible for enforcing traffic laws and regulations, and for providing civic protection and crime prevention. These agencies include the Nigeria Police Force, the Federal Road Safety Commission and the Vehicle Inspection Office Driver and Vehicle Licensing Administration.

While many officers from these agencies do conduct themselves in a professional manner, interactions with citizens tend to be a rich context for bribery demands and extortion on the part of armed police officers, road safety corps officers or vehicle inspection officers. Motorists accused of violations of traffic laws are often the prime targets, and responses to the survey conducted for this report reflect the choices and preferences people are typically faced with. An individual who refuses or fails to pay a bribe in such a situation is likely to suffer a range of negative treatments, variously including lengthy delays at checkpoints, detention at the agency office, threats of arrest and/or other violation charges, vehicle impoundment or tyre deflation.

The study reveals that in such interactions in which bribery and extortion can occur, there is no social norm among motorists or other road users of giving bribes to avoid the penalties for traffic violations. However, there is a social norm among law enforcement agents of soliciting bribes to negotiate enforcing or withdrawing penalties for traffic violations.

The findings show that Nigerians hold strong negative personal beliefs about being asked for a bribe during a traffic violation check. In circumstances like these where people do tend to give bribes, the survey results indicate that they do so because this is what they observe others doing, but also that respondents overwhelmingly believe that other people think that it is wrong and illegal to give a bribe. Furthermore, most respondents say that few people would think that law enforcement agents should ask for a bribe, but that people would offer bribes because they think others in similar situations will do the same.

The responses given in interviews conducted both before and as part of the survey also indicate that giving a bribe to a law enforcement agent to avoid a penalty for

²³ As previously noted, survey questions and vignettes did not explicitly use words such as 'bribe', 'bribery' or 'corruption', or any local variants of these terms, although survey implementers made it clear to respondents that the term 'direct payment', and similar phrasing, used in questions and vignettes concerned an illegitimate informal payment.

a traffic law violation can be less costly, less risky and less time-consuming than would be going through the official procedure for the violation.²⁴ This indicates that in the specific act of giving a bribe, most people do so as a rational response to their immediate and pressing circumstances. Drivers of commercial passenger vehicles can, for example, find themselves under pressure from their passengers to pay a bribe to a law enforcement agent because of the potential inconvenience to their journey of following the official process.²⁵

Typically, when a motorist is accused of a traffic law violation, their vehicle is impounded until a fine is paid. The prescribed fine must be paid at a designated bank and the payment receipt delivered to the agency office before the vehicle can be retrieved. This process is cumbersome and particularly complicated in rural areas with fewer banks and poor road connectivity.²⁶ These types of challenging conditions for resolving traffic violations by official means contribute to an environment in which law enforcement agents make bribery demands and extort money from citizens so that charges can be overlooked or rescinded. To avoid the complex official process, people engage in giving bribes even when they know this action is wrong and illegal.

In many cases, the amount of money that is asked for by a law enforcement agent to avoid a fine is less than the actual amount of the supposed traffic violation. A law enforcement agent may, for example, ask for or accept a bribe of ₦5,000 or less to rescind a ₦10,000 fine.²⁷ If a person refuses to pay the officer who has solicited the bribe, the penalty becomes hefty in terms of the time required for filing paperwork and going to the bank in order to pay the fine. Law enforcement agents who ask for bribes have incentives to increase the overall cost to the motorist of going through the official process by using their discretion to draw out those processes.

On interstate roads and highways, for example, because of the frequency of corrupt behaviours involving bribery and extortion by law enforcement agents, drivers of commercial passenger vehicles tend routinely to carry small bundles of banknotes specifically to facilitate the on-the-spot settlement of bribes to various agency officials at the multiple vehicle checkpoints they are likely to encounter.²⁸

In order to address such normalized corrupt behaviours, interventions to support corruption avoidance and make playing by the rules less costly must focus on ensuring that going through official processes and paying official fines is more attractive than bribing officials.

Whose expectations count?

Within the law enforcement community, the research for this report shows that as regards bribery- and extortion-rich interactions, there are both 'upward' (junior to senior officers) and 'downward' (senior to junior officers) pressures to engage in corruption.

²⁴ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

²⁵ The majority of commercial drivers apparently know the amounts expected of them in bribes by different agency officials. The fixed amount expected by a police officer or road safety agent is generally the same for any of their colleagues. Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Sokoto, August 2016.

²⁶ According to World Bank estimates, about 52 per cent of Nigeria's population – roughly 95 million people – live in rural areas, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=NG> (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

²⁷ Anecdotal evidence suggests that police officers tend to accept smaller bribes than do federal road safety officers.

²⁸ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

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Senior law enforcement officers expect lower-ranking officers to solicit bribes from the public – and believe they do so – and monies collected from such ‘informal fines’ are split across the corps as well as making their way up the chain of command.²⁹ Lower-ranking officers believe and expect that senior officers are also engaged in corrupt activity, but on a larger scale involving public funds allocated for the running of the agencies.³⁰

This context creates and powerfully reinforces impunity, with the effect that those who go against these layered expectations (i.e. who go against the ‘norm’) are viewed as a threat and as ‘norm violators’, despite the fact that the norm in this case concerns a negative behaviour. Thus, a perverse pyramid of expectations highlights the incentives within law enforcement to keep bribery and extortion going, and those who try to avoid the practice are likely to face negative sanctions.

These sanctions take various forms, and can be quite severe – including workplace exclusion or isolation, loss of position or work, financial loss, demotion or professional stagnation. However, less tangible social sanctions can also be very effective in determining people’s choices and sustaining behaviour.

Enforcing behaviour through social sanctions and rewards

The language used to describe behaviour or people engaging in particular practices provide very useful insights as to societal values and how these are enforced. Moralistic and value-laden terms such as ‘wicked’, ‘mean-spirited’ or ‘evil’ that are used to ‘judge’ corruption norm violators, as well as language suggesting that individuals are expected to ‘carry others along’ by engaging in a particular practice, tend to be powerful sanctions that are used to perpetuate a culture of corruption in many sectors and contexts in Nigeria.³¹

The presence of these types of sanctions is a strong indicator of a social norm that will drive and sustain a collective behaviour or practice. Even where people know that a behaviour or practice has a negative impact, they will engage in it to keep favour with their reference network. If a person’s relevant reference network – for example peers, colleagues or members of their family or community – is likely to think that person is being ‘wicked’, ‘mean-spirited’ or ‘evil’ for refusing to engage in a practice that is corrupt, the risk of this judgment creates a social pressure to comply. As one interviewee in Lagos noted: ‘These are not just expectations from your kin, but also of colleagues in your office.’³²

The risk of a loss of status, position, access or trust within a person’s reference network is a powerful incentive for most to comply with the expectations of the majority within their network. Belonging to a network, and gaining the trust of those inside that network, typically requires an adaption to the environment of the network. Thus, if corrupt exchanges are expected and the norm, then there are social pressures to conform, and consequences for non-conformity.

A perverse pyramid of expectations highlights the incentives within law enforcement to keep bribery and extortion going, and those who try to avoid the practice are likely to face negative sanctions

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Authors’ interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Lagos, August 2016.

The presence of a social norm of soliciting for bribes in the law enforcement community in Nigeria suggests that agents of the state ask for bribes because they think that their colleagues do, and that they are also expected to do so. Such beliefs and expectations create an environment that sustains corrupt behaviour. This type of group dynamic plays a decisive role in the degree of tolerance of corruption within law enforcement institutions in Nigeria, and in the lack or ineffectiveness of the public's poor perception of law enforcement in Nigeria³³ as a deterrent to corruption. Over time, constant exposure to a culture of bribery or extortion can lead to the normalization and entrenchment of a tolerant environment in which such practices flourish. The formal and legal ways of doing things remain in place, but this is paralleled and possibly overwhelmed by an informal, normalized system of corrupt practices.

Indeed, perhaps the most important aspect as to whether people respect and abide by the rule of law is the collective understanding that current legal arrangements are as they should be and do not stray too far from existing social norms. So, where bribery is supported by a social norm and is seen as a fact of everyday life, the enforcement of laws against bribery will be extremely difficult. This is because where bribery is part of routine interactions, those who engage in it will not be stigmatized. Furthermore, where key agents responsible for enforcing compliance with the law are embedded in a context where there are powerful social norms of corruption, laws to change that behaviour will suffer as legal enforcers look the other way – implicitly endorsing the illegal activity they are charged with prohibiting.

A culture of widespread petty bribery and extortion may seem innocuous, or even beneficial, in some circumstances, since it may at face value be cheaper for an individual to pay a modest bribe rather than incur the greater costs involved in paying a prescribed penalty fine or going through official processes.³⁴ One interviewee in Sokoto, for instance, noted: 'People only see grand corruption as the "real" corruption. Petty corruption is not really corruption.'³⁵

However, the cumulative effect of petty corruption is harmful, and has been particularly corrosive to Nigerian society. First, widespread and seemingly innocuous acts of corruption disproportionately target the poor, and help keep them poor.³⁶ Second, petty corruption diverts resources away from legitimate and beneficial activities to illegitimate and unproductive ones.³⁷ Third, it tends to be linked to, or indicative of, more substantial forms of corruption, as senior officials or employees allow petty corruption by junior ones to continue so that collusion in systemic corruption is assured.³⁸ Fourth, and perhaps most important, the aggregate effects of widespread petty corruption serve to undermine the legitimacy of government

³³ Human Rights Watch (2010), 'Everyone's in on the Game: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force', <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/17/everyones-game/corruption-and-human-rights-abuses-nigeria-police-force> (accessed 29 Mar. 2017).

³⁴ Elliott, K. A. (1997), 'Corruption as an international policy problem: overview and recommendations', in Elliott, K. A. (Ed.) (1997), *Corruption and the global economy*, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, pp. 175, 177, 197.

³⁵ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Sokoto, August 2016.

³⁶ Johnston, M. (2002), 'Party systems, competition, and political checks against corruption', in Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds) (2002), *Political Corruption*, p. 778.

³⁷ Ibid. See also Rose-Ackerman, S. (2002), 'When is corruption harmful', in Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds) (2002), *Political Corruption*.


³⁸ Rose-Ackerman, S. and Palifka, B. J., (2016), *Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 82.

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institutions in general, and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law.³⁹ The fact that more people are likely to be more directly affected by petty corruption in their day-to-day activities – for example, time spent detained at a road safety corps unit command – than by grand corruption exacerbates these four negative effects.⁴⁰

Figure 2: Beliefs about bribery during a traffic violation check



Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.

Across Nigeria, most of those surveyed concerning experiences during traffic violation checks indicated in their responses a high level of knowledge of legality. However, there are some notable distinctions. For example, although nine out of 10 people (over 90 per cent of respondents) in Enugu State considered that it is wrong and illegal for law enforcement agents to ask for a bribe, five out of 10 (50 per cent of respondents) there said that their fellow citizens thought these agents should ask for a bribe. This suggests that citizens seem to be making systematic mistakes about what others in their community believe, a phenomenon termed pluralistic ignorance.


Respondents in Enugu thus appeared to have mistaken beliefs about other people's beliefs in a way that might sustain a set of negative practices. This is because people are less likely to challenge a certain behaviour if they think others widely accept it, which creates a sense of inevitability or fatalism around it. As one interviewee in Calabar put it: 'If you think about corruption in Nigeria you will just be disheartened. It is a situation that defies a solution.'⁴¹

³⁹ Elliott (1997), 'Corruption as an international policy problem', pp. 175, 177, 193.

⁴⁰ Grand corruption refers to corruption that permeates the highest levels of a national government and involves the diversion or subversion of the central tasks of government. This sort of corruption is significantly different from petty corruption. Petty corruption involves favours or illegitimate transactions of small amounts of money within routine government frameworks and procedures.

⁴¹ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Calabar, August 2016.

Figure 3: Beliefs about other people’s beliefs regarding bribery during a traffic violation check



Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.

In societies in which both corruption and the belief that corruption exists are widespread, people tend to think that success has more to do with luck or with having connections, and that dishonest behaviour is necessary to get ahead.⁴² This may result in a vicious cycle, as people are more likely to engage in corruption if they think others are doing so too.⁴³ Moreover, it is very difficult to implement anti-corruption strategies or to encourage different behaviour if corrupt practices are considered incontestable and/or impossible to overcome. It becomes even more difficult when beliefs about the hopelessness of tackling corruption are combined with mistaken beliefs that other people do not share a person’s own moral beliefs about corruption.

Enugu and similar settings could benefit from a well-developed social marketing campaign that seeks to improve communication through multiple formats and channels within the community about what citizens actually believe with regard to certain practices. Raising awareness and improving communication in cases of pluralistic ignorance can help dispel false beliefs that drive the behaviour and the cynicism or apathy towards questioning things as they are, while also galvanizing support and action for people’s true beliefs.

Where most people engage in practices that are contrary to their personal beliefs and values, there is an opportunity for effective communication of people’s shared beliefs to stimulate collective action (e.g. against giving bribes) while much-needed interventions are introduced in the other direction (e.g. reducing the drivers of bribery solicitation).⁴⁴

⁴² Uslaner (2008), *Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law*.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Drivers of bribery solicitation may be associated with poor financial oversight and accountability, together with poor wages, but this is an area for further research.

It is not uncommon for priority of care to be given to those who can make an informal payment, rather than on the basis of how critical and serious the medical emergency is

Accessing health services in a government-funded hospital⁴⁵


Under Nigeria’s policy on the basic standard of primary healthcare at the ward level (specifically from the level of primary health clinics), publicly funded facilities are to have a minimum number of inpatient ward beds.⁴⁶ In principle, citizens needing these beds while receiving medical treatment should not be asked to pay for admission, but the norm and practice deviate sharply from this policy. Many government-run hospitals in Nigeria are severely underfunded and poorly equipped.⁴⁷

Years of deficits in public funding for healthcare, coupled with massive embezzlement and financial mismanagement, have led to an availability and quality crisis in the sector that has fostered a culture of routine demands for bribes by health workers and experiences of extortion in public healthcare settings in order to keep services going and regulate their distribution. It is not uncommon for priority of care to be given to those who can make an informal payment, rather than on the basis of how critical and serious the medical emergency is.⁴⁸

Additionally, in many health facilities there are no clearly displayed lists showing the cost implications to users of services or procedures, and charges often seem arbitrary and can be negotiated down. Even where official-looking receipts are issued, users cannot be sure whether they have been extorted or if payments have been legitimately directed into the hospital’s accounting system.

In this context of uneven experiences of government-provided healthcare, the survey attempted to measure beliefs surrounding particular behaviours and practices that may typically occur when respondents or members of their household have required admission for in-hospital care.

Figure 4: Frequency of corrupt behaviours (comparison between traffic violation and government hospital admission scenarios)



Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.

⁴⁵ This study encountered considerable difficulties in identifying a single public good or service across the spectrum of health, education, sanitation, water provision and security that every Nigerian citizen – irrespective of ethnicity, state or region – could expect and be guaranteed that the government would provide. The lack of a sense of government presence and positive impact in everyday life through the provision of social services cannot be separated from ongoing challenges to encourage the Nigerian public to participate in and support anti-corruption efforts.

⁴⁶ Nigeria’s Basic Healthcare Provision Fund was established by the National Health Act, No. 8 of 2014. See *Guidelines for the Administration, Disbursement, Monitoring and Fund Management of the Basic Healthcare Provision Fund*, August 2016, <http://www.health.gov.ng/doc/BHCPFG.pdf> (accessed 29 Mar. 2017).

⁴⁷ Nigeria also operates a mixed model of healthcare financing whereby certain services, for example preventive interventions like immunizations, are supposedly available free of charge to the public while other services such as hospital care are subsidized. The reality is very mixed, because actual availability of free and subsidized services is very poor and there are considerable variations in modes of financing and availability of public healthcare from state to state.


⁴⁸ Authors’ interviews, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

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The survey shows there is a difference in the frequency of behaviour across states as regards being charged by a health worker for hospital bed spaces in a government-funded facility. For example, almost seven out of 10 respondents in both Enugu and Rivers states (67 per cent and 66.4 per cent of respondents respectively), and more than four out of 10 in Adamawa State (44.7 per cent of respondents), said that they had been charged for a hospital bed, as against just over one in 10 in the FCT (12.3 per cent of Abuja respondents). Respondents in Enugu and Rivers also indicated that they expected half of people in their community would be asked to make an unofficial or questionable payment at a government health facility, whereas respondents in the FCT indicated that they expected only 10 per cent of people in their community would be asked for a payment. This may reflect the fact that health facilities in Abuja receive more funding and that services are more even in the capital than is the case in Enugu, Rivers or Adamawa, or that the likelihood of a government hospital employee being exposed for wrongly asking for payment from the public is greater because of the higher concentration of public-sector employees among healthcare users in Abuja. It is, however, highly notable that respondents hold very different beliefs as regards interactions with employees in government health facilities from those regarding law enforcement officials, even though corrupt activity can occur in both situations.

Figure 5: Beliefs about other people's beliefs regarding frequency of corrupt behaviours (comparison between traffic violation and government hospital admission scenarios)



Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.


Respondents' beliefs around informal monetary demands and extorting behaviour on the part of government health workers are also quite different from those held concerning law enforcement officials. While most people surveyed know that it is illegal for an employee to charge or extort money for a hospital bed space that should be free, most think that the employees should ask for payment, and few think it is wrong for them to do so. In some states, people considered that other people would think it is wrong for a health worker to ask for a payment for admission to a government hospital, even though most respondents thought that these employees should ask for a payment. Here again, people are mistaken about the expectations of others.

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This contrasts with respondents' beliefs around illegitimate and extorting charges by law enforcement officers in the context of checks for traffic violations. Where most respondents think that the government health workers should ask for payment, and few think it is wrong for them to do so, most respondents did not think that a law enforcement official should demand a bribe or extort money, and many think it is wrong for them to do so.

Figure 6: Beliefs about other people's beliefs regarding unofficial payments at a government-run hospital



Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.

The research interviews and survey results suggest that people do not hold negative beliefs towards practices that can be described as bribery and/or extortion if they think the transaction is necessary for the running of a public institution and they are receiving the required service. People are able to rationalize the replacement of what ought to be public transfers from the government for an essential service with private transfers to fill the gap. This amounts to a kind of regressive taxation that is most often imposed on those who can least afford it. The wealthiest in Nigeria are often able to choose private, for-profit hospitals and schools, but the poorest must make do with public services that are routinely underfunded and poorly equipped. The outcome of these circumstances is a greater burden on those who can bear this the least.

With a high proportion of Nigerians living in poverty,⁴⁹ the burden of bribes and similar informal payments is unbearable for those with a typically meagre income, and the penalties for resisting the demands can be profound.

⁴⁹ No comprehensive calculations of poverty rates in Nigeria have been published since the rebasing of the country's gross domestic product in 2014. A partial reassessment conducted by the World Bank in 2014, using general household survey panel data made available by Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, and based on a poverty line of ₦180 per head per day in 2010 (US \$1.4 per day at international purchasing power parity), estimated a poverty headcount of 33.1 per cent in 2012/13. This suggests that roughly 56 million Nigerians were living in poverty. See World Bank (2014), *Nigeria Economic Report*, July 2014, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19980/896300WP0Niger0Box0385289B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, pp. 16–17; and United Nations Development Programme (2015), *National Human Development Report, 2015: Human Security and Human Development in Nigeria*, December 2015, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_national_human_development_report_for_nigeria.pdf, p. 21 (both accessed 9 Apr. 2017). In its 2017 *Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals*, the World Bank put the number of people in Nigeria living in extreme poverty (defined here as living on less than \$1.9 per day at 2011 purchasing power parity) at 86 million. See World Bank (2017), *Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals 2017: From World Development Indicators*, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26306> (accessed 5 May 2017).

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
A broad cross-section of respondents concurred that people in Nigeria engage in corrupt practices because doing so helps to circumvent bureaucracy that is less efficient than corruption

In critical contexts in which people are seeking medical assistance or protection, or simply trying to get on with their daily lives, they may know that a behaviour they are about to engage in is illegal and wrong but feel in that moment that they have no choice. It can be for efficiency's sake, or it can be a matter of life and death. Whatever the reason, such interactions and the types of behaviours and practices that tend to occur help to sustain the system of corruption that keeps the public services they need far out of reach. People are very often trapped in a cycle of corruption. The Nigerian government must think hard about policy interventions that make playing by the rules less costly than is participating in corruption. Engaging collective action to reduce corruption will remain an uphill task for as long as people know that there are benefits and incentives in cutting corners and avoiding official processes. In an environment where formal and transparent bureaucratic functions are poorly established and easily subverted, corrupt transactions assume a paradoxical type of efficiency, and concerted efforts are required to substitute for this efficiency. A broad cross-section of respondents concurred that people in Nigeria engage in corrupt practices because doing so helps to circumvent bureaucracy that is less efficient than corruption.⁵⁰

Gendered norms of corruption

Not only is the embezzlement of public funds widely acknowledged as a crucial factor affecting the capacity of the Nigerian state at all levels to manage resources and deliver public goods and services, but very strong gender biases are evident in expectations and judgments surrounding embezzlement. The gender of a government official or employee who takes government funds for personal use tends to be an important factor in people's beliefs and expectations about the corrupt behaviour.

Figure 7: Beliefs about gender and corrupt behaviours



*Mr/Mrs (random but local name) was recently elected to a legislative position.
How likely do you think Mr/Mrs (random but local name) will take funds for personal use?*

Source: Chatham House Africa Programme and PennSONG, Local Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey, 2016.

⁵⁰ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

The general trend from the survey indicates that most Nigerians think that women are less likely than men to engage in corruption. Almost six out of 10 people (59 per cent of respondents) thought it was extremely unlikely for a female government official to take public funds for personal use, as against four out of 10 (41.1 per cent) for male officials.⁵¹

This finding supports evidence collected in interviews suggesting that most people hold the belief that women are less likely to engage in corruption and that people judge women more harshly when they do. Again, the presence of a negative sanction indicates the presence of a gendered norm of corruption whereby women are sanctioned more harshly than men. This sanction is enforced through the kinds of moralistic and value-laden language used to judge the behaviour of women who engage in corruption.

The research revealed two important and related contextual rationalizations that seem to be commonly used to explain the belief that women in Nigeria are less likely than men to engage in corrupt practices. The first is rooted in a general, religious-based view that women are 'purer' than men and therefore ought to act in a more righteous and less selfish manner. This quality of moral purity is perceived as God-given and presumed to be inherent to the nature of women. The second is that men are not only thought to be less charitable or altruistic than women, but they are also thought to bear greater financial and social responsibilities that make them more prone or pressured to engage in corruption. These ideas, and the rationalizations they lead to, are rooted in religious-based values and social norms of gender roles.⁵² In this context, a man's corruption can be explained by what is assumed to be his more exploitative and less nurturing nature, as well as by the financial responsibilities of being the 'breadwinner' in his household. One interviewee both rationalized and justified corrupt behaviour by a man in this way:

Imagine you have a wife, and she wants enough money to buy a new purse, and she says to you, 'I love you, and I need money for this new purse. If you love me, you will get me this money for this new purse.' And if, under the threat that she might leave you, you steal from the state or do something corrupt to get the money for your wife, whose fault is it? Is it your fault? No ... it's your wife's fault.⁵³

The judgment and expectations surrounding corruption practised by women in Nigeria are in effect an inversion of the rationalizations of men's corruption, and the sanctions towards women are generally harsher. Thus, corruption by a woman would be judged as more 'avaricious' because of the assumption of a more nurturing nature and the absence of the financial and social responsibilities attached to the role of breadwinner in a household. Another interviewee claimed: 'When people hear of a woman being corrupt, they say, "if she's corrupt, imagine how evil her husband must be."⁵⁴ This conveys a stronger moral judgement towards women even when the practice may be the same.

⁵¹ The gender used in each case was randomly changed throughout the survey so there was an equal chance per interview of getting a male or a female name in the question.

⁵² For a wide-ranging discussion of societal expectations of men and women in Nigeria and factors influencing perceptions and behaviours, see Voices 4 Change (2015), *Being a Man in Nigeria: Perceptions and Realities*, <http://www.v4c-nigeria.com/being-a-man-in-nigeria-perceptions-and-realities/>.

⁵³ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

⁵⁴ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

A justificatory rationale is given for men's corrupt behaviour, whereas corruption by a woman is viewed as a behaviour that goes against a pure and righteous nature

These kinds of judgments reflect a gender bias that is rooted in Nigeria's broader patriarchal values – i.e. when men are corrupt, this is because they may need to be and/or they are wired to be corrupt; when women are corrupt, this is because of an uncharacteristic greed. A justificatory rationale is given for men's corrupt behaviour, whereas corruption by a woman is viewed as a behaviour that goes against a pure and righteous nature.

Many such social beliefs in Nigeria towards corruption are rooted in religious and moral values, as evidenced by people's perception of women and corruption. More broadly, cultural and social values, concepts of wealth and power, morality and gender roles are all intertwined, and they all strongly influence popular expectations of women in public and private domains, and their access and integration into corrupt networks.⁵⁵

While further research is necessary in order to understand the complex relationship between gender and corruption in Nigeria, the findings of the research for this report, as well as anecdotal evidence on social beliefs and expectations around this subject, suggests that the sanctions component of anti-corruption interventions in Nigeria should be designed with a consideration of the potential gender impact. Further evidence may also show if women and men actually respond to sanctions differently, and the gender differences that may apply to different forms of corrupt behaviour.⁵⁶ For instance, do women seem to engage less in corruption because of unequal access to power and opportunities in the private and public sector? Moreover, do reference networks where social norms of corruption exist influence the behaviours of men and women at different rates? The answers to questions like these may contribute to the tailoring of more gender-sensitive anti-corruption efforts. However, due to the particularities of societal expectations of women, gender-sensitive anti-corruption efforts should be designed carefully and in a manner that does not disproportionately burden women with social sanctions, but which instead increases female participation in the public and private domain at all levels. This is because women are usually more heavily affected by corruption⁵⁷ but are often under-consulted, or excluded from, policymaking on anti-corruption. Interventions and actions designed seemingly to include women can unintentionally disempower them and create even greater gender inequality.

Local vs national social contract

There are systemic factors that combine with social drivers to sustain corruption in Nigeria. The nature of the social contract, which in the context of this report refers to the voluntary agreement between members of society to secure and regulate the provision of goods such as protection, welfare and general resources in a given

⁵⁵ For an in-depth discussion of spirituality and how power and wealth are perceived and acquired in Nigeria, see Ellis, S. (2016), *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organised Crime*, London: C. Hurst & Company.

⁵⁶ Boehm, F. (2015), Are men and women equally corrupt? (And what it means for development policy), Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Brief (2015:6), published via Chr. Michelsen Institute, <https://cmi.atavist.com/men-women-corrupt> (accessed 4 April 2017).

⁵⁷ Hossain, N., Musembi Nyamu, C. and Hughes, J. (2010), *Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections, Primers in Gender and Democratic Governance*, New York: United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Development Fund for Women, <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/womens-empowerment/corruption-accountability-and-gender-understanding-the-connection/Corruption-accountability-and-gender.pdf> (accessed 4 Apr. 2017).

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community, is one such factor.⁵⁸ Crucially, there appears to be a local social contract that governs the relationship between citizens and state officials in Nigeria.

Corruption tends to be rife in societies characterized by local social contracts and a lack of a universal (or national) social contract. In societies in which only local social contracts operate, trust and resources are allocated according to social (i.e. personal) relationships and patronage, rather than according to neutral and fair rules. In this environment, people's expectations of the behaviour of people with access to government resources is that they would and should use these for the benefit of those with a personal or social link to them, thus creating a local social contract.

Expectations surrounding corrupt practices turn a great deal on the nature of these social contracts. Interviewees across the country indicated a strong in-group/out-group effect with regard to expectations and judgments surrounding corruption. For example, if a person from a particular village or town becomes the governor of a state or takes up a political appointment, then the people from that village or town expect benefits from having a 'home-grown' or 'son of the soil' government official. An anti-corruption expert working in a government agency in Abuja commented:

Nigeria is a society where one is expected to look after their family and extended family, and perhaps even other members of their ethnic group. So, there is an expectation that, if you are in a position to exploit your position of power for personal gain, you will do it. This expectation is from the people who will benefit from your exploitation of power.⁵⁹

When people turn to – or are socialized to rely on – their own ethnic or religious communities for the provision of public goods or opportunities, corrupt practices and a lack of fairness become easily entrenched. In such a society, politics is more about 'sharing spoils' rather than 'promoting overall prosperity'.⁶⁰ An academic in Enugu State expressed the view that:

Given the generally poor state of the social contract between citizens of Enugu and the state government, most citizens view seats in the state government as an opportunity to obtain a slice of the "national cake" as opposed to a way to equitably distribute shared resources.⁶¹

In-group behaviour further instils a sense of trust in an individual's own ethnic and religious community, and fosters hostility or low trust towards out-group (other) communities.⁶² In Nigeria, this has weakened the consolidation of a strong national identity based on shared and equal citizenship, and drives competition for public goods based on informal links and access. A majority of the interviewees agreed with the view that 'to get ahead or get something done [in Nigeria], you must know somebody'.⁶³

The research underlying this report suggests that these beliefs and expectations are very widespread and identifiable in many parts of Nigeria. As such, the incidence of communal tolerance of corruption must be taken into consideration when designing anti-corruption campaigns. Particularly as they may inform local understandings

⁵⁸ Classic conceptions of the social contract come from the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1651) and John Locke (1689).

⁵⁹ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, August 2016.

⁶⁰ Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016), *Corruption and Government*, p. 131.

⁶¹ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Enugu, July 2016.

⁶² Uslaner (2008), *Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law*: p. 50.

⁶³ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, Adamawa, Calabar, Enugu, Lagos, Makurdi and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

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of what constitutes corrupt behaviour and judgments of the actions of members of their community accused of corruption, it is important that local actors are educated about the impact of corruption on their community and how national identity is undermined. Drawing such a direct line between practices and their impact is critical for coalescing support against corrupt behaviour and impartial grassroots assessment of corrupt practices, especially when they are committed by members of one's community.⁶⁴

Social beliefs about, and expectations of, people in government in Nigeria are that they do and should use their positions to benefit themselves and others in their community. Again, there is evidence of the presence of a social norm of corruption because of the moralistic and value-laden sanctioning language that surrounds the non-compliance with these expectations of a government official. In the same way, there is moralistic and value-laden sanctioning language surrounding the non-compliance of women with social beliefs and expectations regarding their engagement in corrupt activity. A banker in Lagos argued:

Once you are in political office [in Nigeria], you are expected to be richer, people expect you to steal, you are a fool if you don't. You are not sharp if you don't.⁶⁵

Such value-laden language indicates a view that a public official who does not engage in corruption may be negatively sanctioned, as opposed to being rewarded for choosing to not be corrupt. Another interviewee noted: 'The more people you help [in your community], the more influential you are and respectable.'⁶⁶

Also in this context, government officials who violate the norm by refusing to focus benefits on an in-group are viewed as 'squandering the opportunity' of being so close to political power and state resources.⁶⁷ An academic in Sokoto commented:

People will judge a person's time in power by how many people you helped in your community. You are expected to give gifts at every celebration or occasion; from births to burials and chieftaincy title conferment. How does a public official afford to be part of their community in this way without engaging in corruption?⁶⁸

This expectation is paired with the belief that people in government will use their position to enrich themselves. A student in Benue State argued that even though a person would typically expect a government official to direct benefits to their community, there is also the sense that: 'The government is not for them [i.e. the people], but instead, the government is a way for people in the government to improve their own lot.'⁶⁹

It is important to note that these are the types of beliefs and expectations that animate a very local social contract. Expectations and judgments of corrupt practices switch on the basis of the relationship between the person making the judgment and the person engaging in the practice. When a person from town X sees the federal minister from

⁶⁴ For a historical examination of how corruption in Nigeria has been used as a label and a practice across social settings and the range of linguistic dynamics, administrative norms and moral expectations that tend to be drawn together to evaluate corruption, see Pierce, S. (2016), *Moral Economies of Corruption: State Formation and Political Culture in Nigeria*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press.

⁶⁵ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Lagos, August 2016.

⁶⁶ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Lagos, July 2016.

⁶⁷ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Lagos and Sokoto, July–August 2016.

⁶⁸ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Sokoto, August 2016.

⁶⁹ Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Benue, July 2016.

town X stealing government funds and distributing cash payments to people from town X or providing jobs to people from town X without proper meritocratic competition, then that person might simply view that government official as enforcing their end of the 'contract' – i.e. doing what they are supposed to. According to this rationale, the official is in a position to exploit an opportunity to engage in corruption in order to provide resources for their people, and so they should. However, when a person from town X sees a federal minister from neighbouring town Y engage in a similar sort of corruption by virtue of being in a position to exploit state resources to provide cash or jobs for the people of town Y, then the person from town X sees the governor of town Y as engaging in an unjustifiable and reprehensible form of corruption. The application of this type of subjective assessment as to the appropriateness or otherwise of acts of corruption, whereby only corrupt practices by a member of an out-group truly count as corruption, contributes to some local resistance to efforts by anti-corruption agencies to carry out their duties of investigating and prosecuting corrupt individuals.⁷⁰

The kind of corrupt governance norms that drive beliefs and behaviours towards the distributive logic for public goods are central to political processes in which winners and their associates view the state as a means to enrich themselves and sometimes their constituents at the expense of the citizenry at large.⁷¹

Patronage and the exploitation of social relationships are central to how government business is conducted

Nigeria's politics is still fundamentally structured in this way. Patronage and the exploitation of social relationships are central to how government business is conducted, as opposed to the provision of resources in the name of the public interest. Such a governance norm results in the unfair allocation of public resources and an undersupply of public goods and services. The role of the government moves further away from being the primary supplier of goods and services for all, to that of an instrument for the personal and/or mutual enrichment of the very few.

Nigeria's anti-corruption efforts will be undermined if governance norms that sustain such primacy of the local over the national social contract persist. Collective action to support any government effort is difficult in an unfair environment in which the allocation of state resources is based on partial rules rather a fair logic of the public interest. Ultimately, corruption is reinforced in an environment where these types of negative governance norms persist.

A society governed by local social contracts makes it difficult to use the legal system to combat corruption. Citizens are less likely to perceive laws as legitimate and thus less likely to abide by them. Laws might work effectively in shifting social norms if the legal system is perceived as fair and the enforcers of laws are seen as honest. But when laws or the legal system are not seen as fair, laws can be ineffective. When laws and the general procedural aspects of governance that produce them are not considered to be fair and neutral, anti-corruption campaigns are ineffective legal interventions because they are seen as overtly political or unfairly targeting certain groups – for example, critics of the government, political opponents or people with no connections to the powerful in society.⁷²

⁷⁰ A number of the interviewed anti-corruption agents shared personal accounts of threats, intimidation and confrontations with community members of individuals facing corrupt charges during investigations. Anti-corruption prosecutors also claimed that prosecutions were sometimes prevented or frustrated by community members of individuals charged with corruption. Authors' interview under the Chatham House Rule, Abuja, August 2016.

⁷¹ Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013), 'Controlling corruption through collective action', *Journal of Democracy*, 24(1), doi:10.1353/jod.2013.0020 (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

⁷² Bicchieri (2016). See also Bicchieri, C. and Duffy, J. (1997), 'Corruption Cycles', *Political Studies*, XLV, pp. 477–495.

4. Towards Collective Action Against Corruption: Policy Approaches

The research conducted for this report finds that, within different contexts, powerful factors associated with cumbersome official procedures, inefficient institutions (political, government and law enforcement), overall weak governance, gendered norms of corruption and an ineffective local social contract influence the environment in which corrupt practices occur in Nigeria. While societal beliefs and expectations have an important role in shaping behaviours and choices about corruption, a governance environment persistently characterized by harmful norms and practices entrenches these negative responses and undermines the implementation of, and public support for, policies against corruption.

Combined with contextual drivers, the corrupt behaviours examined in this study are supported by social beliefs and expectations that must be addressed in order for collective change to take place.

The findings suggest the following policy approaches:

Changing incentives in contexts where corruption is a rational response or environmentally driven

The examination of collective practices through a behavioural approach shows that it is essential to employ a whole-system approach in assessing government procedures and seeing these from the point of view of the citizens. Such an approach makes it easier to pinpoint where interactions between government officials and other state employees and citizens are open to corruption, or where officials are tempted or pressured to engage in corrupt behaviour in the performance of their duties. In this way, it becomes much easier to design interventions that address the specific contexts and thereby increase the opportunities for people to act honestly.

Procedural and institutional changes are needed to remove administrative hurdles that create opportunities – or even the necessity – to engage in corrupt practices, in order to make abiding by the law less costly and more efficient.

In the case of petty bribery and extortion, the frequency of such behaviours reflects the nature of the interactions between law enforcement agents and citizens – an environment that is highly conducive to corruption because of the official procedures and practices of the institutions involved.

Across government, encouraging or sustaining positive behaviour by rethinking the routine functions of providing services to the public would go a long way in addressing the environment that encourages corruption in Nigeria. Behavioural insights suggest that individuals can be encouraged to engage in positive behaviour if procedures are simple, and are clear to respond to and comply with.

Corruption avoidance needs to be the practical option

Options for the settlement of fines should include well-developed and user-friendly online and mobile platforms,⁷³ and individuals should be able to lodge

⁷³ While this report was being compiled, Nigeria's Federal Road Safety Corp launched an online portal for payments for traffic offences, driving licences, vehicle number plates, etc. Mobile phone platforms are critical particularly in rural areas, where many people do not have conventional computer and internet access.

complaints about disputed penalties as well as to report instances of soliciting for bribes and extorting behaviour without fear of reprisal. Where possible, non-material incentives should be developed to encourage the use of these platforms, such as by providing free-call numbers for mobile users. In the case of bribery and extortion by law enforcement agents, the procedure for complying with penalties for traffic violations is needlessly complicated, and penalties are sometimes unclear or open to dispute. Mobile technology can be a powerful tool for facilitating the reporting of corruption, the direct payment of fines, complaints handling and fines adjudication. Furthermore, information should be made widely available on how to formally report corrupt individuals, demands and activities, as well as on how to follow up on cases. Through such procedural changes, citizens who are issued with penalties or who have complaints would not need to travel long distances in order to pay a fine or dispute a penalty. Traffic and vehicle monitoring using technology can also reduce the frequency of direct human contact between motorists and agents, which tend to be susceptible to bribery demands. The goal should be to make it more convenient for people to pay fines, make complaints and settle disputes by providing numerous accessible means of doing so. The system of addressing complaints and disputes should also be transparent and widely available.

Reducing official fines so they are not easily undercut through bribery and extortion may serve as a disincentive to some corrupt practices. Interactions between motorists and law enforcement agents during vehicle and traffic checks that result in penalties tend to foster undue pressure in favour of corrupt exchanges and present hardly any incentives for corruption avoidance. To influence a change in behaviour, fines can be reduced to reflect the real income level and average living costs of most Nigerians. Currently, the minimum fine for a vehicle or traffic violation is ₦2,000, and the maximum – for dangerous driving – is ₦50,000.⁷⁴ Clearly, there is a greater incentive for a motorist to pay a much lesser sum in the form of a bribe than to incur the monetary and time cost of an official fine.

Procedural changes should be complemented by interventions designed to encourage social norms that foster integrity and honesty within law enforcement agencies

There must be clear and enforceable negative sanctions for corrupt behaviour, and equally clear and meaningful positive sanctions and rewards for not engaging in corruption. Norms, old and new, do not enforce themselves; rather, it is the system of incentives and sanctions in place that does so. With a focus on preventing negative behaviour, campaigns targeting social norms within this sector – traffic law specifically, and law enforcement more broadly – should present a realistic and clear vision of the new norms that agents will be expected to follow. These expectations can be further reinforced by a large-scale effort to identify and call out high- and low-ranking officers found to be engaging in corruption. This effort must be broad and impartial enough to avoid accusations of witch-hunting.

⁷⁴ Nigeria's Federal Road Safety Corp lists 37 traffic offences. All of them carry a monetary penalty in addition to licence points for 34 offences. Seven offences variously carry fines of ₦2,000 and ₦5,000 fines, 10 offences fines of ₦3,000, five offences fines of ₦10,000, and two offences fines of ₦20,000. The maximum penalty fine of ₦50,000 also applies to the offences of inadequate construction warning, and medical personnel or hospital rejection of road accident victims. For a full list of traffic offences and penalties in Nigeria, see <http://frsc.gov.ng/offences-and-penalties> (accessed 6 Apr. 2017).

However, the ‘naming and shaming’ and punishment of those who engage in corruption should not overshadow the more sustainable and consensus-building approach whereby positive behaviour is acknowledged and rewarded. In most instances, highlighting and incentivizing positive behaviour may be more socially impactful and sustainable than are punishments for negative behaviour.

Targeting sectors and communities with critical information on the human costs of corruption

More effective communication regarding the actual costs and casualties of corruption is necessary. Specific information concerning the aggregate costs of corrupt interactions to the under- and unserved in terms of public services can generate a sense of local responsibility and incentivize collective action. If the reality of the costs of corruption remains vague or impersonal, people are likely to struggle to connect with the issues. Cynicism and apathy can also further complicate the challenge of making anti-corruption relevant and actionable. Clear and targeted communication can be used to create a shared sense of the harmful consequences, and thus form the basis of collective action. This approach can reorient an issue that has previously been considered vague and unsolvable so that comes to be perceived as an urgent challenge requiring a collective response.

Many interviewees commented on problems of accessing information on public funds. One, for example, expressed the view that, generally: ‘Citizens don’t have the critical information to hold [the] government accountable. They do not know what their rights or entitlements are.’ Another stated: ‘Citizens don’t expect that projects would actually get done. People are not informed. They are left in suspense by the government.’⁷⁵

Anti-corruption campaign messages can be reframed to resonate in affected communities, contexts or sectors, using pertinent and positive norms, values and expectations. Showing how these are undermined by corruption may help to make the underlying behaviours of a culture of corruption socially unacceptable. Instead of generic and unfocused communications, messages about the costs of corruption are more likely to be effective if they are understood by a specific audience to be relevant and salient. More personalized statements using credible and relatable evidence can therefore be more effective in incentivizing a community to act.

Local design and applicability is key. Respected local figures – such as religious and community leaders – who are able to exert social influence can also help to convince people to accept evidence of the cost of corruption and overturn notions that a corrupt route is a more efficient way of doing things. For example, the community action organization Follow the Money collects, publishes and visualizes data with the aim of supporting communities in tracking government expenditure against results on the ground. The organization leverages traditional and social media networks, including by translating findings into local languages and communicating with communities with poor internet access via SMS.⁷⁶ Tracka⁷⁷ is another community

Instead of generic and unfocused communications, messages about the costs of corruption are more likely to be effective if they are understood by a specific audience to be relevant and salient

⁷⁵ Authors’ interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Adamawa and Enugu, July–August 2016.

⁷⁶ For more on how Follow the Money tracks, visualizes and advocates for transparency in government spending in rural communities in Nigeria, see <http://followthemoneyng.org>.

⁷⁷ See <http://tracka.ng/impact/>.

action project developed by BudgIT,⁷⁸ a civic tech organization, which provides a project tracking tool that is currently used in 17 federal states. These projects provide social platforms powered by digital and social media technology to support citizen-led tracking of budgets and public developmental projects. Tracka and Follow the Money are examples of how social media and traditional networks can be leveraged to inform citizens about projects in their communities and empower them to monitor public-service delivery.

This type of advocacy for public-sector transparency can promote greater financial literacy at the grassroots level, and may likely generate the kind of momentum necessary for reinforcing efforts to counter corruption. Consistent and reliable information on public sector finances contributes to building public trust and addressing perceptions of secrecy, as expressed by one interviewee in Enugu State:

Information on public funds [controlled by the state or local governments] is not available, so people don't know what to expect from the government. The feeling is that whatever they get from government, is what they get. It's their luck.⁷⁹

Targeting young people may help to instil a low tolerance of corruption in the next generation. Anti-corruption messaging can be made more effective through targeting a specific segment of population, such as young people or a particular community, either by highlighting how the behaviour affects people like them, or by referencing their local area. Such communications should, however, be simultaneously rolled out via community media networks to maximize their reach.

For example, using social media to disseminate social norm messages can be part of a strategy to target people from the ages of 15 to 35 in Nigeria⁸⁰ in order to influence opinions and attitudes among younger people as regards corruption. With more than half of the population aged under 30,⁸¹ Nigeria's youth population is considered a prime audience for citizen engagement against corruption. Traditional broadcast media (television and radio),⁸² online platforms and social media campaigns can all highlight the real or potential human and moral costs of corruption to young people's futures and life chances. Social media can also provide a platform for analysing and advocating for anti-corruption policies, strategies and measures as well as information gathering and crowd-sourcing. For example, the BudgIT platform compiles infographics with the aim of simplifying public budgets and spending to support public engagement on transparency and accountability in government. Equally critical are age-appropriate interventions targeting the school-age population under 15 that can be integrated within citizenship and civic education programmes in primary and secondary schools nationwide.⁸³

It should be noted, however, that the outcomes when young audiences are targeted for such social messaging can be unpredictable, particularly as heightened awareness may lead to protests against political impunity, abuses of power and government

⁷⁸ See <http://yourbudgit.com>.

⁷⁹ Authors' interviews under the Chatham House Rule, Enugu, August 2016.

⁸⁰ Nigeria's 2009 national youth policy defines the country's youth population as citizens aged between 18 and 35 years. 'Nigeria: Country Factsheet', <http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/nigeria/>.

⁸¹ National Population Commission (2017), 'Nigeria's population now 182 million', <http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/80-publications/216-nigeria-s-population-now-182-million-dg-npopc> (accessed 6 Apr. 2017).

⁸² This can include community media talk shows and drama series as well as phone-in programmes.

⁸³ According to the National Population Commission, over 40 per cent of Nigeria's population are under the age of 14: Nigeria Population Commission (2017), 'Nigeria's population now 182 million'.

secrecy. The potential for heated collective action against corruption – particularly corruption in the public sector – is high if the government’s anti-corruption efforts are not perceived to be sincere and self-examining.

Reframing the approach to anti-corruption messaging and interventions

Research suggests that the way in which messages about problematic behaviours are framed may also be important to anti-corruption campaigns. Fear-based messaging,⁸⁴ which is common in campaigns against smoking and drink-driving, for example, may command popular attention at first, but over time this approach can provoke resistance and reinforce the negative behaviour it is intended to counter.⁸⁵

Sensationalist and extreme language surrounding corruption seems to mischaracterize the nature of corrupt behaviour. The research for this report suggests that in many cases corrupt behaviour stems from citizens responding to a system of incentives or conforming to particular norms. The difficulty in changing a particular behaviour is partly due to collective beliefs – specifically the beliefs that people have about the beliefs of others. Overly tough and extreme language is unlikely to bring about behavioural change if citizens do not think that the recommended behaviour will result in a reduction in corruption. Instead, overly sensational language may be a cause of apathy in the target population.⁸⁶

There is evidence that repeated exposure to extreme language or messaging results in the desensitization of the public in certain contexts.⁸⁷ Desensitization through overexposure to sensationalist anti-corruption messaging makes it hard to induce behavioural change, as the public becomes apathetic and habituated to prevention campaigns.⁸⁸ This may unintentionally lead to the normalization of corrupt practices.⁸⁹ To avoid habituation and desensitization, anti-corruption messaging must be carefully crafted to balance exposure while continuing to communicate effectively the negative impacts of corrupt behaviour.⁹⁰ The normalization of corrupt practices further adds to the difficulty of fostering collective action to reduce corrupt behaviour.

For example, a pilot study in Indonesia tested whether different anti-corruption messages influenced people’s views about corruption and about anti-corruption efforts.⁹¹ The survey sample of 1,500 households in Jakarta were randomly assigned

⁸⁴ Mann, C. (2011), *Behaviour changing campaigns: success and failure factors*, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Transparency International and Chr. Michelsen Institute, 21 February 2011, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ab140f0b652dd000854/expert-helpdesk-270.pdf> (accessed 9 Apr. 2017).

⁸⁵ UK Cabinet Office (2012), *Applying behavioural insights to reduce fraud, error and debt*, http://38r8om2xjhh125mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf (accessed 30 Mar. 2017).

⁸⁶ Eagle, L. (2009). ‘Social marketing ethics’, National Social Marketing Centre, <http://www.nsmcentre.org.uk/component/repository/NSMC-Publications/Social-Marketing-Ethics> (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

⁸⁷ Cho, H., and Salmon, C. T. (2007), ‘Unintended Effects of Health Communication Campaigns’, *Journal of Communication*, 57(2), p. 303.

⁸⁸ Messerlian, C., and Derevensky, J. (2006), ‘Social marketing campaigns for youth gambling prevention: Lessons learned from youth’, *International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction*, 4(4), p. 303.

⁸⁹ Ashforth, B. E. and Anand, V. (2003), ‘The normalization of corruption in organizations’, *Research in organizational behavior*, 25, pp. 1–52.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Peiffer, C. (2017), *Message received? How messages about corruption shape perceptions*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Development Leadership Program, March 2017, http://publications.dlprog.org/Peiffer_Messages.pdf (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

to five groups. Four groups received and read a different awareness-raising message on corruption, while the fifth – the control group – received no message. Two of the messages were positive: the first described the government’s successes in fighting corruption, while the second focused on how easily ordinary citizens could report and be involved in tackling corruption. The other two messages were more negative: one focusing on sensational grand corruption cases, and the other on statistics about widespread petty corruption in Indonesia. Initial analysis of the survey data suggests that both the positive and negative messages heightened respondents’ anxieties about the impacts of corruption on development in Indonesia; reduced confidence in the government’s efforts; and, perhaps most significantly, reduced their belief that ordinary citizens could stand up to corruption. This finding shows that getting the messaging right on anti-corruption is a delicate process, particularly in societies where people already think corruption is an insurmountable challenge. In the context of anti-corruption messaging in Nigeria, it is important to safeguard against anti-corruption messages backfiring or having no impact; and to ensure that the processes of drafting and disseminating messages are empirically tested for effectiveness.

Highlighting and/or empowering (real or fictional) trendsetters to drive behavioural change

Leadership on anti-corruption can only be successful if it is by example. The behaviours and actions of Nigerian political actors play a major role in setting social trends, building public trust and inspiring positive behaviour. This was reflected in the view of an academic in Calabar who argued:

Corruption is a top-to-bottom matter in Nigeria. The actions of the people at the top matter a lot to how the people at the bottom behave.⁹²

As key trendsetters, political actors and other government officials must measure up to higher standards of integrity, honesty and transparency

As key trendsetters, political actors and other government officials must measure up to higher standards of integrity, honesty and transparency in areas such as personal asset and income disclosure, public finances, procurement and service delivery, in order to send a powerful signal of the government’s commitment to changing negative governance norms and rebuilding public trust.

Trendsetters typically exhibit at least two behavioural traits that make them more likely to violate norms. First, trendsetters tend to show high levels of autonomy, which sends a message that they are willing to disregard customs and norms, despite widespread conformity in a community, because they perceive themselves to be free from the influence of others.⁹³ For instance, a police officer may be willing not to engage in bribery in an environment in which there are widespread social norms of corruption whereby an officer would be expected to go along with an embedded culture like the rest of the department. This individual will typically display high levels of autonomy and independence from the expectations of others – reflecting, for example, a strong sense of moral obligation, justice and fairness that shapes his or her sensitivity to the norm. Trendsetters can also be fictional – such as characters in popular radio and television shows.

⁹² Authors’ interview under the Chatham House Rule in Calabar, August 2016.

⁹³ Bicchieri, C. (2016), *Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Trendsetters are also likely to have strong beliefs in their own ability to succeed in specific tasks. These kinds of beliefs are closely related to the perceptions that individuals hold about how influential their own actions are.⁹⁴ What typically drives ‘first movers’ is the belief that behavioural change will lead to benefits that accrue personally or across a community and which may lead others to adopt similar behaviours. Police officers and other law enforcement agents who have strong personal normative beliefs against corrupt practices are more likely to resist corrupt practices. They may also believe that they are setting an example for others to follow.

In cases where negative norms are widespread but people believe that different practices would leave everyone better off, first movers or trendsetters help shift people’s behaviour in beneficial directions. Although most people complying with a norm will not be willing to bear the cost of being the trendsetter, for fear that they will find themselves in the minority by violating the norm, there are nonetheless trendsetters who, for a host of reasons, will take the risk of violating norms and can drive behaviours that change practices for the better.

Where potential trendsetters can be successfully identified in a community, behavioural interventions should be targeted towards them since they represent the highest likelihood that a particular practice will be abandoned. If trendsetters cannot be identified, or do not exist within a community, successful interventions can make use of community media to exemplify alternative lifestyles and behaviours to encourage behavioural change.

In India, for example, exposure to cable television and soap operas in which characters are seen to lead liberal lifestyles is associated with higher levels of autonomy for women and girls, and lower tolerance of spousal abuse.⁹⁵ Moreover, educational entertainment (so-called ‘edutainment’) has been used by international organizations and governments to promote behavioural changes and disseminate information.⁹⁶ For example, the Peruvian television soap opera *Simplemente María*, about a young maid who learns to read and becomes successful through hard work, led to increased enrolment at adult literacy classes and a rise in the social status of maids in Peru and neighbouring countries.⁹⁷ And in a notable case in India, people in the village of Lutsaan, in Uttar Pradesh, were so affected by a radio soap opera intended to encourage gender equality that 184 villagers signed a large poster petition stating: ‘Listening to *Tinka Tinka Sukh* has benefited all listeners of our village, especially the women ... Our village now actively opposes the practice of dowry – they neither give nor receive dowry.’⁹⁸

From Nigeria, an example of edutainment as a tool for promoting positive behaviour change is the television soap opera *Shuga*, developed by MTV Staying Alive Foundation. The drama, which is filmed in Nigeria and broadcast by MTV in over 70 countries, raises awareness among young people about the health dangers

⁹⁴ Ibid. Self-efficacy may be defined as the ‘perceived capacity to exercise control over oneself and the events in one’s life’.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. See also Singhal, A., Obregon, R. and Rogers, E. M. (1995), ‘Reconstructing the story of *Simplemente María*, the most popular telenovela in Latin America of all time’, *International Communication Gazette*, 54(1), 54(1), doi:10.1177/001654929505400101 (accessed 26 Apr. 2017).

⁹⁸ Ibid. See also Singhal, A. and Rogers, E. M. (1991), ‘Hum Log story from concept to after-effects’, in Indian Institute of Mass Communication (1991), *Communication 2000 AD: Silver Jubilee Commemorative Volume*, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Mass Communication.

of risky sexual behaviour and spreads knowledge about HIV. An impact study found that, among 5,000 participants, those who watched the show in community screenings over a six-month period were twice as likely to get HIV-tested.⁹⁹ According to the same study, within the participant group, chlamydia infection rates dropped by 58 per cent among women, and people were less likely to have multiple sex partners. These findings provide further evidence that edutainment can potentially be more impactful and cost-effective than traditional behavioural change campaigns.

Trendsetting individuals will flout standing social norms in order to adopt alternative lifestyles, whether they came to know about alternative ways of behaving through carefully crafted media, or because they decided independently to abandon a practice.

Uncovering false beliefs around what other people believe about corrupt practices and developing communication strategies to make this known

In cases in which people believe a practice should be changed but hold false beliefs about how other people feel about the same practice, trendsetters can also be key to driving behavioural change. This is because they are willing to incur the cost of moving first and violating a norm, which then signals to others that they are not alone in believing a norm should be abandoned. Trendsetters are able to provide valuable information to fellow community members about the beliefs of others and the possibility of moving away from seemingly entrenched practices, and the information signalled by their actions can influence other individuals to recognize the illusion that others feel differently from them.

There is significant evidence from norm-based interventions to show that behavioural change is possible where there is enough coordination for collective action to overturn practices that almost all but a small minority consider harmful.¹⁰⁰ Trendsetters can be key actors in coordinating collective actions.

Even if there is widespread dissatisfaction with corrupt behaviour in Nigerian society, influential and audacious individuals or groups will need to move first to show what sort of governance will be acceptable.

A national social contract must be enforced by social sanctions that signal that corrupt governance will not be tolerated

Trendsetters will be key in shifting communities from local social contracts to a national social contract by signalling new expectations based on values such as fairness and equality. A national social contract whereby the distribution of public goods and services is not based on personal or social relationships requires normative constraints on the actions of individuals with the power to abuse their position.¹⁰¹ In other words, a national social contract must be enforced by social sanctions that signal that corrupt governance will not be tolerated. The research for this report shows that in many instances in Nigeria, people already think that corrupt behaviour is morally

⁹⁹ Banarjee, A., La Ferrara, E. and Orozco-Olvera, H. (2016), 'Experimental Evaluation of MTV Shuga: Changing Social Norms and Behaviors with Entertainment Education', World Bank, Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Development Research Group, <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/438421467236362785/Entertainment-Edu-workshop-Flyer-6-3-16.pdf> (accessed 29 Feb. 2017).

¹⁰⁰ Bicchieri, C. (2016), *Norms in the Wild*.

¹⁰¹ Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), 'Controlling corruption through collective action'.

unacceptable. Trendsetters will be critical in helping to coordinate collective action that translates into effective social sanctions to curb corrupt practices.¹⁰²

This type of scenario underscores the role social marketing can play in the context of informing the public about shared personal beliefs and thereby reinforcing the negative moral judgment for corrupt practices, prompting awareness about the cost of corruption in terms of poor services from government institutions, and raising popular understanding of the drivers and consequences of corruption with a view to influencing behavioural change.

Social marketing strategies¹⁰³ built around urging people to act in keeping with their personal beliefs and aversion to corruption have the potential to form a critical component of anti-corruption education in Nigeria, and can drive public approval for an idea or initiative and generate critical mass support for social change. Such interventions can be effective in establishing new norms of behaviour over time by strategically prompting a collective rejection of negative behaviour and encouraging social sanctioning of the rejected behaviour. Social marketing interventions can also raise public awareness of the laws that should be guiding the behaviour of enforcement agents and their responsibilities towards citizens. And social marketing can also publicize accountability channels for public complaints and safe reporting – such as via a confidential text-message hotline – of corrupt acts by offending officials.

¹⁰² This is similar to what Alina Mungiu-Pippidi refers to as 'ethical universalism in governance'. See Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015), *The quest for good governance: how societies develop control of corruption*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰³ For an in-depth discussion of the role of social marketing strategies in tackling norms of corruption, see Kindra, G. S. and Stapenhurst, R. (1998), *Social Marketing Strategies to Fight Corruption*, Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/590511468762008812/pdf/multi-page.pdf> (accessed 21 Apr. 2017). See also World Bank (2015), *World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior*, pp. 42–73, Washington DC: World Bank, doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0342-0 (accessed 21 Apr. 2017).

5. Conclusion: Integrating Behavioural Insights into Anti-corruption Strategies

The findings of the research that has informed this report would be bolstered by an expansion of the survey project to other Nigerian states and to test for social norms around other corrupt practices. While the sample size of 4,200 and the survey's reach across seven jurisdictions is sufficiently representative of each survey location to offer a robust methodology for identifying behavioural drivers, the scope for very broad extrapolation is more modest.

The findings highlight important options for the trial of social norms and other policy interventions, as well as for monitoring impact. For instance, there is scope for smaller exercises to identify trendsetters for behavioural change and to design interventions using this tool within specific sectors such as the Nigeria Police Force and other branches of law enforcement.

As behavioural drivers influence people's choices and preferences around corruption, Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies should systematically integrate these methods into the long-term approach to their mandates. A discrete unit, operating across the various agencies, could be established to review and hone anti-corruption messaging, and to advise how behavioural lessons might best be applied to public policy against corruption. This inter-agency unit should receive training and guidance in behavioural methods for systematically evaluating interventions through randomized controlled trials to test what works best across the country.¹⁰⁴ The unit's approach should be holistic, integrating empirical findings about people's behaviours surrounding corruption across all stages – from diagnostics to design and eventual implementation and evaluation – of policymaking, rather than a separate approach that produces 'behavioural policies' as add-ons.

Nigeria's entire system of anti-corruption laws and policies can operate more effectively if these are more deliberately premised on influencing collective behaviour in a desired direction. Simply put, a careful understanding of the factors that drive relevant behaviours should be a critical component of government actions to reduce corruption. In fact, all aspects of government policymaking aimed at countering corruption would benefit from the application of rigorous, observed evidence of how citizens will react to measures in practice, in order to maximize effectiveness while minimizing costs.¹⁰⁵ The potential outcomes should serve as an impetus to the Nigerian government to explore and build up its knowledge base and capacity concerning behaviour- and social norms-based interventions and solutions, drawing on successful – as well as less successful – case studies to inform policymaking for tackling corruption.

Nigeria's entire system of anti-corruption laws and policies can operate more effectively if these are more deliberately premised on influencing collective behaviour in a desired direction

¹⁰⁴ A mixed panel of Nigeria-based and international academics, policy experts and practitioners could provide regular training, policy guidance and advice. Establishing links between the unit and the behavioural sciences community in academia both within Nigeria and internationally will support capacity-building and the ethical application of expertise.

¹⁰⁵ Hallsworth, M. (2016), 'Seven Ways of Applying Behavioural Science to Health Policy', in Cohen, I. G., Lynch, H. F. and Robertson, C. T. (eds) (2016), *Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Annex: Methodology Note

Survey design

Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has developed and adopted a National Integrated Survey of Households frame for covering all 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. This frame was used to select the Enumeration Areas (EA) and households for the survey. Forty EAs were selected per state (including Abuja, which was evaluated as a state). Fifteen households were systematically identified per EA, resulting in 600 households being selected in each state plus Abuja. The total of 4,200 households met the NBS's empirical threshold for a robust estimate at national level.

A series of reviews with the methodology and IT team at the NBS led to the finalization of the survey instrument and its subsequent programming into the Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing application by experts from NBS. The final application was deployed on Android tablets and customized for NBS data collection alongside printed copies of selected households sheets and EA maps. Surveys were translated into 10 local languages,¹⁰⁶ with back-translation to check for uniformity.

The scope of the survey implementation focused on the following aspects: household identification; household demography; Kish Grid method for selection of respondents within households; respondents' basic information collection; and the administration of 25 survey questions. The format of some of the questions followed the randomized response technique and vignettes.

Survey teams

Adamawa: Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola

- Supervisor: Elizabeth Adebayo, professor of agricultural economics
- Survey Team: Philomena Mathew Demshemino, Maryam Muhammad Jika, Abba Hakim Abubakar, Mark Polycarp

Benue: Benue State University, Makurdi

- Supervisor: Dr Euginia Member George-Genyi, Department of Political Science
- Survey team: Tough Benjamin Terzungwe, Dr Rhoda Dewua Ebi, Ingyer Mercy Mnguzamber, Adole Raphael Audu

Enugu: University of Nigeria Nsukka

- Supervisor: Dr Anthony Ajah, lecturer, Humanities Unit, School of General Studies
- Survey team: Ijeoma Igwe, Elias Chukwuemeka Ngwu, Doris Ijeoma Okohu-Ajah, Chukwudi Christopher Nwokolo

Federal Capital Territory: National Bureau of Statistics

- Supervisor: Rakiya Mohammed, state officer
- Survey team: Oguniyi Fatai, Hilary Osemene, Blessing Onyechere, Usman Alhassan, Gimba Isiaku, Aishat Ahmed, Emmanuel Uzoanya

¹⁰⁶ The survey was translated and administered in the following languages: Fulfulde, Hausa, Idoma, Igbo, Igede, Ikwere, Ogoni (Khana), Pidgin English, Tiv, Yoruba.

Lagos: Lagos Business School, Pan-Atlantic University

- Supervisors: Dr Kemi Ogunyemi, senior lecturer, business ethics, managerial anthropology and sustainability management; Christopher Kolade, director, Centre for Research in Leadership and Ethics
- Survey team: Atinuke Ann Adigun, Enitan Tunde-Ibironke, Adenike Afolabi, Azeezat Ajibola

Rivers: Stakeholder Democracy Network

- Supervisor: Dr Tubodenyefa Zibima, senior project officer, environment and resource governance
- Survey team: Samuel Okpolagha-Abel, Joseph Ekiye, Joseph Paulinus Ekong, Olumide Oyebamiji

Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto

- Supervisor: Tukur Baba, professor, Department of Sociology
- Survey team: Hauwakulu M. Dantake, Abubakar Jibril, Amina Abdu Gusau, Muhammad Shehu

Survey completion

The survey achieved almost 99 per cent completion in the seven jurisdictions.

State	Households selected	Households visited	%
Adamawa	600	591	98.5
Benue	600	593	98.8
Enugu	600	600	100.0
FCT	600	600	100.0
Lagos	600	600	100.0
Rivers	600	578	96.3
Sokoto	600	600	100.0
Total	4,200	4,162	99.1

Survey

The survey questions were not concerned with factual events surrounding corrupt practices. Instead, as the core goal was to uncover personal and social beliefs rather than to pinpoint corrupt practices, the questions were aimed at measuring beliefs surrounding particular practices. To that end, survey implementers were trained to avoid priming particular kinds of responses from the respondents by making reference to corruption or corrupt practices.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ The survey was conducted with a social-desirability bias in mind. The social-desirability bias is the tendency for survey respondents to provide the answers they think are appropriate in a given situation – i.e. that are ‘correct’ (morally or legally, for example) rather than a reflection of their beliefs. Specifically, survey questions concerning potentially sensitive topics were designed to be impersonal, using vignettes to elicit as best a reflection of the true beliefs of the respondents as possible. Separate questions were specifically targeted at eliciting respondents’ beliefs about the moral and legal beliefs (i.e. the questions were crafted in a way that allowed separate analysis of different types of beliefs). See Bicchieri, Lindemans and Jiang (2014), ‘A structured approach to a diagnostic of collective practices’.

To introduce the survey, implementers explained that they were interested in people's experiences with government officials and institutions in their community and everyday life. The academic expertise and field experience of the survey supervisors and implementers ensured a high standard of neutrality during the exercise.¹⁰⁸

The survey explored the types of social norms or other motivations that influence everyday situations in Nigeria in which bribery, extortion, embezzlement and nepotism tend to occur, so as to determine if a link exists between identified norms or motivations, corrupt behaviour and public engagement in anti-corruption efforts. The word 'corruption' was not used in the survey, nor were 'bribe', 'bribery' or similar terms, but survey implementers made it clear to respondents that the questions concerned illegitimate informal payments. The survey investigated whether in everyday situations in which corrupt activity occurs, people believe that most people around them behave in certain ways and expect others to behave in the same way.

The local understandings, expectations and experiences survey

Survey questions

1. Traffic violations

To test the frequency of experiences, types of beliefs and behaviours that occur during vehicle checks by law enforcement agents for traffic violations, respondents were asked:

- The frequency of the experience of being stopped for a traffic violation;
- The frequency of the behaviour of asking for a direct payment¹⁰⁹ by a law enforcement agent;
- Their expectations of the average number of people out of 10 who are asked at checkpoints for direct payments, rather than going through the official process for a traffic violation;
- Their beliefs about whether law enforcement agents should ask for a direct payment when checking for violations of traffic law;
- If they thought it was wrong for law enforcement officers to ask for a direct payment when checking for violations of traffic law;
- If they thought it was illegal to ask for a direct payment in this situation;
- How many people out of 10 they thought would think other people thought that law enforcement agents should ask for a direct payment;
- How many out of 10 people they thought would say it is wrong for a law enforcement agent to ask for a direct payment instead of going through the official process for a traffic violation; and
- Their expectation of the behaviour of a law enforcement officer who has learned that almost all/very few law enforcement officers at a traffic stop ask for a direct payment and almost all/very few people in the community think it is wrong.

¹⁰⁸ Experienced NBS field supervisors monitored the survey exercise in each state and the FCT to ensure the strict adherence to survey instructions and protocol.

¹⁰⁹ Care was taken during the survey process to avoid explicit use of words such as 'bribe', 'bribery' or 'corruption', or any local variants of these terms. Survey questions and vignettes referred to a 'direct payment [to a law enforcement official]', and similar phrasing. Survey implementers made it clear to respondents that the questions and vignettes concerned an illegitimate informal payment.

2. Admission in a government-run health facility

Respondents were asked:

- Whether they or a household member was admitted to a government health facility in the last 12 months;
- The frequency of being asked to pay to be admitted in a government-funded hospital;¹¹⁰
- Their expectations of the average number of people out of 10 who are asked to pay for a hospital bed space;
- If they thought that government health-facility employees should ask for a direct payment for a hospital bed space;
- If they thought that it was wrong for government health-facility employees to ask for a direct payment for a hospital bed space;
- If they thought it was illegal for a government health-facility employee to ask for a direct payment for a hospital bed space;
- Whether they thought people thought that others thought that government health-facility employees should ask for a direct payment for a hospital bed space; and
- Their expectation of the behaviour of a nurse who has learned that almost all/very few nurses at a hospital ask for a direct payment and almost all/very few people in the community think it is wrong.

3. Gendered norms

This section of the survey was aimed at assessing whether expectations and judgments surrounding the corrupt practices of fraud and/or embezzlement showed any gender biases. Respondents were indirectly asked about their and others' beliefs and expectations about corrupt practices likely to be committed or committed by a male or female protagonist in a vignette. The genders of the protagonists of the vignette were randomly assigned without the respondents knowing the other gender could equally have been assigned.

Respondents were asked about:

- The likelihood of a male or a female elected official taking government funds for personal use;
- Their personal beliefs about whether a male or a female elected official should take government funds for personal use;
- Their personal beliefs about whether it is wrong for a male or a female elected official to take government funds for personal use; and
- Whether they thought a male or a female elected official should take government funds for personal use because everybody else in that official's position does this.

¹¹⁰ Care was taken during the survey process to avoid explicit use of words such as 'bribe', 'bribery' or 'corruption', or any local variants of these terms. Survey implementers made it clear to respondents that the questions and vignettes concerned an illegitimate payment – i.e. an informal payment in order to receive a hospital bed.

4. Local vs national social contract

The final section of the survey was designed to measure people's beliefs and expectations of a protagonist in a vignette who had been recently appointed as a federal minister. The name of the protagonist was randomly selected so that it corresponded or did not correspond with the respondents' own ethno-religious grouping.

Respondents were asked about:

- The likelihood of someone in or out of their community helping someone else in or out of their community to get a job in the protagonist's ministry;
- Whether someone in or out of their community should help someone else in or out of their community to get a job in the protagonist's ministry because it is the 'right' thing to do;
- Whether it would be wrong for someone in or out of their community to help someone else in or out of their community to get a job in the protagonist's ministry; and
- Whether someone in or out of their community should help someone else in or out of their community to get a job in the protagonist's ministry because this was a practice everybody engaged in.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ The study did not find a statistically significant effect for the last set of in-group/out-group questions, perhaps because difficulties were encountered in the randomization of names necessary for the question to reflect perceivable religious or ethnic differences.

About the Authors

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Acknowledgments

This report is the outcome of a project exploring whether social norms of corruption exist in Nigeria. The Africa Programme at Chatham House worked closely with two partner organizations: the University of Pennsylvania's Penn Social Norms Group (PennSONG); and Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Seven academic networks, statistical partners and NGOs together determined the key questions for the survey and the implementation of the survey across Nigeria. These teams were led by Professor Elizabeth Adebayo (Adamawa), Dr Euginia Member George-Genyi (Benue), Dr Anthony Ajah (Enugu), Rakiya Mohammed (FCT Abuja), Dr Kemi Ogunyemi (Lagos), Dr Tubodenyefa Zibima (Rivers) and Professor Tukur Baba (Sokoto).

The study drew particularly on the expertise and involvement of Cristina Bicchieri, SJP Harvie Professor of Social Thought and Comparative Ethics at the University of Pennsylvania; Thomas Noah, a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and member of PennSONG; and Annalisa Marini and Erik Thulin, also members of PennSONG.

The authors are very grateful to the many interlocutors who engaged with them during the research, and who shared insightful perspectives for this report.

The authors would also like to thank Elizabeth Donnelly, deputy head of the Africa Programme at Chatham House, for providing research guidance and editorial input; Daragh Neville, Africa Programme projects officer, for logistical support and research assistance; Tighisti Amare, Africa Programme manager, for logistical support and field management; and Paul Melly, associate fellow of the Africa Programme, for editing the executive summary.

Special thanks are due to Nicolas Bouchet and Jo Maher for their skilful editing of the report, and to Autumn Forecast of Soapbox for typesetting and design work.

Chatham House would like to thank DFID Nigeria (UK Department for International Development) for its generous financial support for this project.

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