Europe’s Political Tribes
Exploring the Diversity of Views Across the EU

Summary

• Chatham House and Kantar Public surveyed over 10,000 Europeans about their views on a range of political and social issues. The data reveal six political ‘tribes’: broad segments of voters with distinct attitudes about the EU. These attitudes, which lie below the surface of the debate about Europe, show a rich cross section of public opinion, and how voters’ preferences are clustered across countries.

• The largest tribe consists of what can be termed ‘Hesitant Europeans’. They sit in the middle on many issues, and need persuading on the merits of the EU. They tend to be apathetic about politics, are concerned about immigration and tend to prioritize national sovereignty over deeper EU integration.

• ‘Contented Europeans’ are optimistic and pro-European. Often young and broadly socially liberal, they feel that they benefit from the EU but tend to favour the status quo over further integration.

• ‘EU Rejecters’ are angry about politics and the EU. They are least likely to feel any benefits of membership, and overwhelmingly view the EU as undemocratic. Most feel negative about immigration and are socially conservative.

• ‘Frustrated Pro-Europeans’ want a more integrated EU driven by progressive values. They support the idea of richer states helping poorer ones, but are more mixed about immigration than are other pro-Europeans.

• ‘Austerity Rebels’ want a looser, more democratic EU driven by solidarity, with powers returned to member states. They tend to think that richer states should support poorer ones, and that each state should accept its fair share of refugees.

• ‘Federalists’ make up the smallest tribe. They support a deeply integrated ‘United States of Europe’, feel that the EU has benefited them, and are the most positive about immigration. They tend to be wealthier, older and disproportionately male, with strong and diverse social networks.
Introduction

This year, there has been a noticeable shift in the political mood within the European Union (EU). Following the shock of the vote for ‘Brexit’ in the UK in June 2016, and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election in November of that year, 2017 has been marked so far by a resurgence in optimism among pro-EU liberals and political commentators.

This began with the Dutch elections in March, when the anti-EU populist Geert Wilders failed to cause a major upset, and continued in May with the French presidential election, in which Emmanuel Macron defeated the Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen. Public perceptions of the EU also appear to be improving. The spring 2017 Eurobarometer poll showed rising confidence and levels of trust in the EU, and that an increasing number of citizens had a positive image of the EU (40 per cent, up five percentage points from the autumn of 2016).1

This optimism has been further entrenched by rising economic growth and employment. At the time of writing, in November 2017, the eurozone has enjoyed 17 straight quarters of growth, with economic confidence reaching its highest level since 2001 in the third quarter of 2017.2 Meanwhile, the political pressures generated by the refugee crisis have eased, as the flows of people from the Middle East and Africa travelling to Europe have fallen from previous highs.

Though Macron’s popularity has declined in opinion polls since his election, France nonetheless appears regenerated as an engine at the EU’s centre. Moreover, the Brexit process has served to divide Britain and unite the rest of Europe, reinforcing positive narratives about the EU’s resilience. Combined, such events have fuelled a belief in some quarters that – finally – the EU might be moving beyond the populist challenge.3 In September 2017, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, in his annual ‘state of the European Union’ address to the European Parliament, pronounced that ‘the wind is back in Europe’s sails’.4

Yet clear challenges to the EU remain. Since the political revolts of 2016, both pro-EU and anti-EU movements have made progress. In the Netherlands, Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) finished second in the general election, gaining both votes and seats.5 Euroscepticism also remains much in evidence in France: notwithstanding Macron’s victory, 46 per cent of voters still endorsed candidates opposed to European

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integration in the presidential election’s first round of voting, in April; in the second round, in May, one in three voters opted for Le Pen.6

This political conflict between more socially liberal voters and those with a more conservative or authoritarian-minded outlook was also underlined by the 2017 general election in the UK, in which the Labour Party drew much of its support from middle-class and university-educated voters, whereas the Conservative Party enjoyed one of its strongest results among more socially conservative working-class voters and those without formal qualifications. In September 2017, the challenge from nationalistic populism was again underlined at the German federal election, in which the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party won almost 13 per cent of the vote in a country that had long been thought impervious to the narratives of the far right.7

Such results have encouraged a wider debate about the new divide in Europe, which has been characterized in various ways: as a clash between competing visions of an ‘open’ and ‘closed’ Europe; as a broadly economic conflict that pits the ‘winners’ from EU integration against the ‘losers’ from that process; and as a contest of values between cosmopolitan liberals and more nationalist or authoritarian-minded people. Yet, as we argue in this paper, binary debates around concepts of pro- and anti-EU orientation do not capture the nuance and rich picture of public attitudes. A more detailed understanding of the distinctive groups of voters that exist across the EU, and of the different values and visions that they hold, is needed.8

Our previous work suggests that distinctive groups exist across Europe with competing sets of attitudes, and that individuals in these groups often have different life experiences and patterns of voting behaviour. Our goal in this paper has been to identify and understand these unobserved groups. We have sought to determine who is most likely to be in a particular group or ‘tribe’, and how each group’s characteristics contrast with those of other groups. To do this, we have used a technique called latent class analysis (see Box 1 and the appendix to this paper for fuller explanations).

We have identified six ‘political tribes’ that exist within the EU today, each corresponding to a different attitudinal profile. The mosaic of priorities and concerns that these profiles represent offers a richer understanding of how voters’ attitudes are clustered across countries. It also offers clues as to how popular attitudes may shape and influence the direction of the continent’s politics in the years to come. Each tribe’s profile is based on data from a unique survey conducted by Chatham House researchers, in conjunction with Kantar Public, across 10 countries in Europe in late 2016 and 2017 (see Box 1). In this paper we set out who the tribes are, and why they matter for the EU and its future.

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Europe’s political tribes: who are they?

We have assigned names to each of the six political classes or ‘tribes’ identified, based on their attitudinal profiles. In order of size, from largest to smallest, the tribes are:

- Hesitant Europeans (36 per cent of the sample)
- Contented Europeans (23 per cent)
- EU Rejecters (14 per cent)
- Frustrated Pro-Europeans (9 per cent)
- Austerity Rebels (9 per cent)
- Federalists (8 per cent)

These tribes differ in terms of their members’ social and demographic characteristics and attitudes towards a wide range of issues, including European integration, immigration and political responsiveness.

1. Hesitant Europeans

Hesitant Europeans sit in the middle on many issues. They tend to feel moderately satisfied with life, feel as though they have some control over their circumstances, and have average experiences of social hardship. Hesitant Europeans tend to be in the centre or to the right of the political spectrum. People in this group are concerned about immigration – indeed, Hesitant Europeans are among the most negative tribes when it comes to this issue.

Although members of this tribe tend to be proud to be European, they need persuading on the EU’s merits. They tend to prioritize national sovereignty over European integration: most want more powers returned to the nation state. They are more likely than others to be apathetic about politics, and the most likely to feel indifferent about the EU, reflecting Peter Mair’s description of voters across Europe more generally: i.e. as people who are indifferent to politics and the perceived ability of transnational organizations such as the EU to remedy their day-to-day problems.9

Thirty-six per cent of respondents are closest to this attitudinal profile, making the Hesitant Europeans the largest of the six tribes. Its members are spread relatively evenly across the age range, and are more likely to be women than men. In fact, the probability of female membership is higher for this tribe (at 57 per cent) than for any other tribe. Hesitant Europeans tend to be on low or moderate incomes, while their networks of friends across different occupations are more confined and less dense than those of many other tribes. Members of this tribe tend to be scattered throughout Europe, although they are slightly more likely to live in Central and Eastern Europe.

2. Contented Europeans

Contented Europeans tend to be younger and pro-European. They are the second-largest tribe, accounting for 23 per cent of the sample. They tend to be happy with their lives and feel that they have a great deal of control over what is happening around them. They believe that they have benefited from being in the EU and are proud of being European. On issues such as the refugee crisis, they are supportive.

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of a common EU quota system, favouring the idea of each country in the EU having to accept a share of refugees proportionate to its size. They are more likely than most groups (second only to the Federalists) to think that immigration has brought positive effects. They are more likely than any other group to think that the balance of powers between the EU and member states is about right.

Members of this tribe are generally socially liberal: Contented Europeans are among the most likely to support same-sex marriage, and the most likely to oppose capital punishment. They also believe that all EU member states share a similar set of values. They tend to have broad networks of friends across different occupations, although their networks aren’t as dense as those of a couple of the other tribes.

Members of this tribe are likely to believe that the EU is democratic and working for them. They consider themselves well informed about how the EU works, and generally feel positive, happy, confident and optimistic about the EU and the status quo. Despite this, they are not, on balance, especially positive about the idea of living in a ‘United States of Europe’.

Contented Europeans have the highest probability among all the tribes of being 18–29 years old, and include a disproportionately high number of students. They are more likely than average to be female than male, to have gone to university and to speak more than one language. They are unlikely to have experienced social hardship. Contented Europeans are spread across Europe, although they are slightly more likely, relative to population size, to live in Eastern Europe. This perhaps reflects the existence in that region of a new generation of voters who appear to be quite positive and optimistic about the opportunities that accompany EU membership.

3. EU Rejecters

EU Rejecters are notably angrier than members of other tribes about politics and the EU. They are the least likely to feel as though they have personally benefited from the EU, do not feel proud to be European, and are the least likely of all to feel a sense of solidarity with their EU neighbours. EU Rejecters represent around 14 per cent of respondents and are the third-largest tribe in Europe. They feel that immigration has been bad for their country. Many would like immigration stopped altogether, and members of this tribe are more sensitive than others to rapid social and cultural changes. Unsurprisingly, they tend to locate themselves on the right wing of the political spectrum, and this is reflected in their general values. For instance, they are the most likely to support the death penalty and the least likely of all the tribes to support same-sex marriage – although they are split on the issue.

They overwhelmingly feel as though the EU is undemocratic, and want powers returned to member states. Almost everyone in this group thinks that the EU has too much power. When asked how they feel towards the EU, they tend to reply that they feel angry, disgusted, afraid or pessimistic. They are the least likely to feel well informed about the EU’s workings.

This tribe is dominated by men, and its members tend to be middle-aged. Relatively few EU Rejecters are young (although it is important to note that young people have accounted for large shares of electoral support for populist right parties in Europe: in France, Marine Le Pen’s votes were concentrated among the under 40s, while the
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Freedom Party of Austria has won significant support among young males; both phenomena perhaps suggest that the younger supporters of right-wing populist parties come from other tribes in Europe).

EU Rejecters tend to have lower levels of education, generally at secondary or below, and are more likely than members of other tribes to be manual workers or self-employed, two groups that have provided significant support to openly nationalist parties across Europe. These voters are the most likely to speak only one language. Many are on low incomes, although a significant number of wealthier Europeans also feature in this tribe. This could be explained by the fact that incomes are generally not as strong an influence on voting behaviour as are other factors, such as values and personality dispositions. It could also be because this tribe represents a coalition of affluent Eurosceptics alongside alienated working classes. EU Rejecters are more likely to live in northern Europe – in countries such as the UK, Austria, France or Belgium – and are often friends with people who work as cleaners, factory workers, bus drivers or postal workers.

4. Frustrated Pro-Europeans

Frustrated Pro-Europeans are, as their name implies, positive about European integration but unhappy with the status quo. They want an EU that is driven by progressive values, but they do not feel as though this is the case at present. Members of this tribe tend to think that more powers should be transferred to the EU, but many such individuals do not currently feel the benefits of EU membership. Most feel that the EU is only moderately democratic. Frustrated Pro-Europeans tend to be left-wing. They are generally supportive of a common European approach to the refugee crisis, and support the idea of richer member states helping poorer ones. However, they are more mixed in their attitudes to immigration than are the other pro-European tribes. This group has mixed feelings about the EU: combining pessimism, pride and indifference. Like Hesitant Europeans, they need to be won over.

Our model suggests that 9 per cent of respondents belong to this tribe, making it the fourth-largest group. Frustrated Pro-Europeans are slightly more likely to be male (51 per cent) than female (49 per cent). People in this tribe are split relatively evenly across age groups, tend to have moderate incomes, and work in non-manual jobs. They are more likely to come from France, Belgium or Italy, and most likely to have friends in working-class or lower middle-class jobs.

5. Austerity Rebels

Austerity Rebels are dissatisfied with politics and the EU. They tend to feel that the EU is undemocratic, and hardly anybody in this tribe feels as though they have benefited from the EU. Most do not feel proud to be European, and most want to see powers returned from the EU to member states. But people in this group are likely to want richer member states to support poorer ones. They also strongly support the idea of each state accepting its fair share of refugees. People in this group tend to be on the centre or left of the political spectrum. Our analysis suggests that 9 per cent of respondents belong to this tribe.

Austerity Rebels want to see an EU driven by a greater sense of fairness and solidarity. People in this group are likely to feel angry, disgusted, afraid and pessimistic about the EU; they do not think that new countries should be able to join the EU in the future.
6. Austerity Rebels

Austerity Rebels tend to be middle-aged, and to live in cities or towns rather than rural areas. They are more likely than members of the other groups to be unemployed, and are more likely than average to have experienced social hardship. They tend to be located disproportionately in southern European countries that have been affected by recent economic crises – in particular Greece and Italy. They tend to have broad social networks, with friends from a variety of professions.

Federalists

Federalists are the most pro-European group and also, on average, the wealthiest. People in this group are the most likely to feel that they have benefited from the EU and to feel very satisfied with their lives. This group is also the most positive about immigration. Its members want a more deeply integrated EU, and support the eventual creation of a ‘United States of Europe’. This group tends to be split across the political spectrum, although its members are the least likely to occupy the centre. They feel happy and confident about the EU. Our analysis suggests that 8 per cent of respondents belong to this tribe, making it the smallest of all the groups.

Federalists are spread across the continent, but are most likely to live in southern Europe. This tribe is firmly committed to the idea of a ‘closer union in the EU’.

Box 1: Developing the tribes

**Data**

Our classifications for the six tribes featured in this paper were developed using data from a Chatham House–Kantar Public survey of the general publics of 10 European countries. The survey was conducted between December 2016 and January 2017 among representative samples of the populations of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK. At least 1,000 interviews per country were conducted online. Quotas were applied in respect of age, gender and region, and deviations were corrected with post-stratification weights. The total sample size was 10,195. The questionnaire was translated into the language(s) of each country, and a three-stage process of revision was applied.

**How did we identify the tribes?**

‘Latent class analysis’ is a commonly used statistical tool to generate sub-types or classes from multivariate categorical data, such as types of attitude structures from survey responses. It is mainly used when the indicators chosen to determine the measurement of responses are binary or ‘polytomous’ (i.e. have more than two options, as in the case of survey questions with three-point responses – for example, agree/neutral/disagree – or where a five-point Likert scale is used). In other words, latent class analysis is a kind of cluster analysis that puts people into a small number of groups based on their responses to many questions. For the purposes of this paper, we refer to these groups as ‘tribes’.
Latent class models consist of two parts. One assigns a probability to a person of belonging to a particular class or type. The other describes the relationship between each type and the responses to survey questions. The survey consisted of a broad range of questions providing a wealth of data on attitudes to the EU, and to politics more generally. In order to isolate distinctive groups of opinion, we used the survey responses to eight particular questions or statements:

- **‘People like you have benefited from being a member of the EU’**
  - Strongly agree – Tend to agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Tend to disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know/no answer.

- **‘How democratic do you think the EU is?’**
  - 0 = not at all democratic; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10 = very democratic.

- **‘The EU should become a United States of Europe with a central government’**
  - Strongly agree – Tend to agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Tend to disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know/no answer.

- **‘In the EU, richer member states should financially support poorer member states’**
  - Strongly agree – Tend to agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Tend to disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know/no answer.

- **‘Regarding the refugee crisis, which of the following statements comes closest to your view?’**
  - Every EU member state should have to accept the same proportion of refugees according to the size of its population – Individual member states should be able to decide what proportion of refugees they accept – No EU member state should have to accept any refugees – Don't know/no answer.

- **‘Thinking about how the EU should develop in the future, which of the following statements comes closest to your view?’ (one answer only)**
  - The EU should get more powers than it currently has – The EU should have no more or less powers than it has now – The EU should return some of its powers to individual member states – Don't know/No answer.

- **‘Immigration has been good for [country]’**
  - Strongly agree – Tend to agree – Neither agree nor disagree – Tend to disagree – Strongly disagree – Don't know/No answer.

- **‘How proud are you to be European?’**
  - Very proud – Quite proud – Not very proud – Not at all proud – Do not feel strongly either way – Don't know/No answer.

In our analysis, we used traditional socio-demographic characteristics – age, education, gender, income, employment status, etc. – as explanatory variables. For each of the eight items above, there were either three possible responses, or responses were grouped (e.g. strongly agree and tend to agree) in order to provide three options. These data were then used in the latent class model to detect the unobserved classes across Europe (the ‘political tribes’) and to estimate the probabilities of an individual belonging to a certain type given his or her responses to the questions above.

Determining the number of tribes was a key part of the process. Our initial aim was to seek the most ‘parsimonious’ model, i.e. one that provided the best fit to the observed data using conventional model-fit statistics. However, such statistics are not definitive, and can lead to situations in which creating too many tribes would be more misleading than creating too few, and vice versa.
Indeed, just such a dilemma arose with our project. Using the above-mentioned statistical tools, we initially identified more tribes than eventually featured in our analysis. However, these extra tribes consisted of very small numbers of individuals (less than 2 per cent of the model, and with consequently numerically low sample sizes). Including such tribes in our classification would have blurred conceptual and substantive meaning. Instead, we chose to balance the statistical evidence, the substantive meaning of each type solution, and theoretical expectations. Utilizing this more pragmatic approach, we identified a six-type solution for the data. A more detailed explanation of, and reflection on, the process used to identify the six tribes can be found in the technical appendix at the back of this paper.

Comparing tribe profiles

The distinctive profile of each tribe is made clear by comparing its attitudes and responses to some of the political and social questions that were asked in the survey. Table 1 highlights key differences across the tribes. For every tribe, the table shows the probability of individuals offering responses that reflect positive views of the EU (e.g. a respondent feels he/she has benefited from the EU; supports the transfer of more powers to the EU, etc.). Answers range from 0 (no probability of agreeing) to 1 (optimum probability of agreeing).

Both Federalists and Contented Europeans are overwhelmingly positive about the EU. However, Contented Europeans have a low (0.21) probability of agreeing with the proposition that the EU should gain more powers, suggesting that most members of this tribe are happy with the EU having the powers it does. EU Rejecters and Austerity Rebels are overwhelmingly negative about the EU, although there are clear differences in attitudes between the two groups over immigration, and in terms of their support for a common approach to the refugee crisis and financial redistribution. The probabilities suggest that the two remaining tribes – Hesitant Europeans and Frustrated Pro-Europeans – are similar in some ways (on European identity; whether they have benefited from the EU; and whether it is democratic). However, there are also areas in which they diverge. Hesitant Europeans are far more sceptical around issues of sovereignty, and somewhat more sceptical about EU financial redistribution and obligatory refugee quotas. Meanwhile, Frustrated Pro-Europeans are far more positive (with a probability score of 0.86) in terms of being likely to want more powers transferred to the EU; indeed, their score on this indicator is roughly in line with that of the Federalists.
Table 1: Attitudinal profile of each tribe (probability of supporting a statement or view if an individual is a member of a tribe)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe size (share of overall sample)</th>
<th>Hesitant Europeans</th>
<th>Contented Europeans</th>
<th>EU Rejecters</th>
<th>Frustrated Pro-Europeans</th>
<th>Austerity Rebels</th>
<th>Federalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has benefited from EU membership</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of European identity</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports a ‘United States of Europe’</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes rich EU states should help poor EU states</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes that EU is very democratic</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports European-level refugee quota system</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports transfer of more powers to EU</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes immigration has been good</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Have benefited from EU membership (probability)
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Figure 2: Should the EU have more or less powers? (probability)

Implications: what the tribes mean for Europe
Looking at Europe's electorate through the prism of tribe segmentation suggests a number of political implications.

First, it reveals the limitations of debates that focus only on binary distinctions between ‘pro-EU and ‘anti-EU’ orientations, ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies, or ‘more integration’ and ‘less integration’. Many in the EU have spent 20 years discussing issues around the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from European integration, or from globalization generally. It is now time for this debate to move forward, and to acknowledge that a richer tapestry of voters and views exists in today's EU. The six tribes represent not only many different life experiences and stories, but often also very different values and attitudes – all of which shape responses to political issues. Forcing some of these groups into a binary debate risks alienating and frustrating their members, not least because several of the tribes cannot be lumped simply into a ‘pro-EU’ or ‘anti-EU’ category.

Second, some tribes are likely to play a key role in determining the direction of travel regarding the future of the EU. There is a degree of polarization at the extremes of the spectrum, between the EU Rejecters and the Federalists – two tribes of voters who hold strong and diametrically opposed views, and for whom reconciliation appears a remote, if not impossible, prospect. Given their respective roles, on the one hand, in driving the rise of radical populist parties that oppose the EU and, on the other, in providing the impetus and vision for a more deeply integrated EU, these two tribes wield a level of influence disproportionate to their size; less than a quarter of the sample falls into these two groups. Federalists represent fewer than one in 10 voters but arguably punch well above their weight in elite circles. EU Rejecters,
similarly, are a comparatively small group, yet debates over the radical right have been a major feature of European politics over the past decade, amplified by sections of traditional and social media which advance their cause.

In terms of relative size and orientation, the key tribe is the Hesitant Europeans. This tribe includes many voters who appear to want the EU to work, but who also hold real and pressing concerns that will need to be addressed if they are to support the EU project over the long term. Many in this group are also simply disengaged or indifferent about lots of political issues. Hesitant Europeans feel anxious over sovereignty and immigration, and should be seen as part of a broader wave of Euroscepticism that has spread across the continent since the 1970s and 1980s. Voters are now far less willing to defer to politicians on the key issues that surround European integration. As EU leaders consider the future shape of the Union, and as discussions about the deepening integration of the eurozone continue, the challenge will be to engage this group, despite its apathy, and to address its concerns about sovereignty and immigration.

Third, the six tribes do not currently map directly on to party politics in many EU member states; nor do they map on to the existing political groupings in the European Parliament. For example, whereas EU Rejecters may find that they are represented by the populist right, the Hesitant Europeans and Frustrated Pro-Europeans are not so easily absorbed into party politics or represented coherently in political debate. This suggests that, at present, some of the tribes have greater agency and capacity for political influence.

Fourth, these tribes are not static. Though Hesitant Europeans represent the largest tribe in our sample, there is no reason why, over time, this group should not grow or shrink, become differently defined or see members on its margins shift into other tribes, such as the EU Rejecters or Contented Europeans.

Over the past three decades, Western democracies have witnessed a number of trends: falling political party membership, loosening political affiliations, declining electoral turnout and rising volatility. Many countries have seen significant changes to their party systems, driven in part by the way that issues such as immigration and European integration have cut across traditional left/right or class-driven politics. The political tribes identified here reflect Europe's shifting political sensibilities. They also show how important fault lines in European politics run across countries, and not just between them.

Technical appendix: latent class analysis

How it works

Latent class analysis identifies typology groups or classes whose attitudes to Europe will vary depending on membership of these classes. Individuals' attitudinal patterns are based on indicators 'u1…u n', and can be assigned to different levels of a latent variable (class ‘C’ in Figure 3). From this, it is possible to identify different classes or 'political tribes' that exist across Europe today. Latent class analysis usually assumes local independence and estimates two essential parameters: latent class probabilities (the probability of an individual being in a particular group/type or 'political tribe'); and conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities are analogous to factor

The political tribes identified here show how important fault lines in European politics run across countries, and not just between them.
loadings, and are the probabilities of an individual in class ‘t’ of the latent variable ‘C’ being in a specific level of the observed variable.\textsuperscript{10} For this reason, latent class analysis is commonly regarded as the measurement part of this type of statistical model.

The second part of the model describes the relationship between the classes and the observed variables. To understand the approach taken, we provide a simple path diagram in Figure 3, where the subscript ‘\(u\)’ defines a categorical variable (in our case, an ordered category) of interest (e.g. whether the EU is democratic; whether the EU should have more/the same/fewer powers), and where the circle encapsulating the ‘C’ is an underlying latent class measure (can include 1, 2, 3…n classes). The indicator variables arise from the unobserved latent class measure and are subject to measurement error. As noted, this is the measurement part of the latent class model.\textsuperscript{11} The ‘X’ variables influencing the latent class measure are covariates or control variables (e.g. age, education, income, employment status, etc.). This second component provides structure to the model, and enables the researcher to detect and describe differences between the latent class groups according to the theoretically informed explanatory variables or covariates. Broadly speaking, a MIMIC model is a simultaneous method of latent class analysis and multinomial regression. We use Latent Gold, so that we can include covariates during the model estimation. While the addition of covariates reduces classification errors,\textsuperscript{12} this one-step approach ensures unbiased estimates of the covariate effects in the model and removes the need to correct for such biased estimates if an alternative two-step procedure (additional logit or multinomial analysis) is used.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Figure 3: Simple path diagram – example depicting a latent class model}

Our model: deciding on the ‘six tribe’ solution

As outlined in Box 1, our aim was to determine the appropriate number of ‘political tribes’ that exist across Europe. Latent class analysis enabled us to estimate the probabilities of an individual belonging to a certain type given his or her responses to the questions asked. The majority of the items or indicator variables selected asked respondents whether they agreed/were neutral/disagreed, with three alternative options also given. Hence we use a trichotomous ordinal variable for each of these indicators. The latent class model does not distinguish between unordered and ordered categorical data. For the latter (in line with Clogg, 1979), we supplied additional equality constraints to the model to accommodate the ordered nature of the variables and to ensure that the results would be consistent with the ordering of the response levels.

It is conventional to measure the appropriate number of types in the data using ‘goodness of fit’ statistics. In other words, our initial aim was to seek the most parsimonious model that provided the best fit to the observed data. The most widely used model is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), in which a model with a lower BIC value is preferred over a model with a higher BIC value. However, this and the commonly used Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) are both penalized likelihood criteria, which in practice can result in the different selection of types. As Dziak et al. note, the BIC is preferred to the AIC in situations in which creating too many classes would be more misleading than creating too few, and vice versa. In our case, using the statistical tools, we identified more types than the six-type solution we eventually opted for, but these additional types comprised a very small number of members (less than 2 per cent in type size, and numerically low sample sizes). As part of the process, we computed a number of models in which we allowed for local dependencies between the variables with the highest bivariate residuals. However, these models did not differ much from the models without local dependencies. The conundrum, therefore, was either to balance the larger, more statistically robust class solution or to accept the possibility of low power and precision in identifying ‘political tribes’ relative to the other much larger classes but to enhance the substantive meaning. We chose to balance the statistical evidence, the substantive meaning of each type solution, and theoretical expectations. Utilizing this more pragmatic approach, we identified a six-type solution for the data.

15 Magidson and Vermunt (2004), ‘Latent class models’. In addition to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), we examined the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) goodness-of-fit measures.
16 The BIC penalizes model complexity more than the AIC does. In practice, simulations have shown that the AIC can indicate a model with more latent classes than the BIC, regardless of the sample size. The BIC has a larger chance, for instance, than the AIC for any given sample size of choosing too few classes.
19 Ibid.
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