Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa

JONATHAN FISHER AND DAVID M. ANDERSON*

In the wake of 9/11, the politics of western aid and international development in general have become ‘securitized’ and ‘militarized’, most especially in those areas that are considered ’hot spots’ in what has been called the ‘global war on terror’.1 Despite differing interpretations of what this process entails, there appears to be widespread agreement on two related issues: first, that ‘securitization’ has had an unwelcome and negative impact on key development areas, such as social development, human rights and governance reform; second, that the security agenda of the global war on terror has been devised and promoted by western actors imposing a securitized approach upon passive and vulnerable states in the South. This article offers a corrective to both of these arguments by focusing on the role of governments in Africa that have eagerly embraced the securitization agenda, actively promoting its practice.

Drawing on the emerging literature on ‘illiberal state-building’ in Africa, we argue that for many African governments ‘securitization’ of the relationship with western donors is neither unwelcome nor problematic. From Ndjamena to Kigali, a range of regimes, many emerging from civil war and out of military guerrilla organizations during the 1980s and 1990s, have conducted their state-building around a set of authoritarian and militarized practices, readily adopting and, crucially, adapting the securitization agenda. These governments have regularly used military means to settle problems at their borders, frequently resorting to harsh repression of internal dissent. Despite these authoritarian tendencies, western enthusiasm for supporting, training and arming the military and security services of these states has grown unabated. As a consequence, illiberal states are emerging and growing stronger in Africa, supported by securitization and the enthusiasm of western governments to put security above all else.

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This gives rise to crucial questions about African agency in managing the securitization agenda. Through their willingness to take ownership of the security agenda, African regimes have played a conscious role in securitizing their relationship with donors. Securitization is not something that the West has done to Africa, but rather a set of policy imperatives that some African governments have actively pursued. African governments are thus not victims of securitization, but often its advocates and beneficiaries.

In making these arguments, we analyse below the activities of four African states: Chad under the Idris Déby regime (in power since 1990); Ethiopia under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime (since 1991, under first Meles Zenawi and now Hailemariam Desalegn); Rwanda under the Paul Kagame regime (since 1994); and Uganda under the Yoweri Museveni regime (since 1986). All feature prominently in donor security funding and training initiatives since the 1990s, and all have deployed troops to donor-funded peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Somalia, Mali and elsewhere. All four regimes also emerged from guerrilla movements, and all have constructed and entrenched authoritarian systems of rule in their respective states, which rely, ultimately, upon military force and militarized governance (rather than democratic legitimacy) to function and maintain authority. On the donor side, the primary focus will be on the United States, United Kingdom, France and the EU, these being the leading western funders of securitization initiatives and major donors to these African states.

Debating securitization in Africa

Originating in academic debates of the 1990s on ‘human security’ and the relationship between security and development, the ‘securitization of development’ notion became increasingly prominent following 9/11. Since then, the covert but very obvious militarization of development in Afghanistan has brought the issue to wider public attention in the West. In Africa, the securitization debate has become entrenched as a consequence of military activities, including peacekeeping operations, the creation of AFRICOM (US Africa Command) in 2006, and the increased use of western military and security forces to undertake a range of ‘development’ activities, for example in northern Kenya.

2 Kagame did not become president of Rwanda until 2000, but is widely viewed as holding de facto executive leadership in the country following his appointment as vice-president in July 1994.
4 AFRICOM is the ‘Unified Combatant Command’ of US armed forces dealing with Africa. It is headquartered, at present, in Germany and is responsible for command and control of all US military operations on the continent.
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drawing the West into conflicts in places such as Mali in an effort to regulate ‘ungoverned spaces’.

There is, however, a lack of clarity as to what is meant by ‘securitization’. Influenced by the Copenhagen School of security studies, many scholars have employed the concept as outlined by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, understanding the phenomenon as a ‘speech act’ of—usually—western policy-makers, whereby an event or space (‘Africa’ or ‘ungoverned spaces’) is presented as an ‘existential threat’ to a referent object (western states and populations), thereby legitimizing an ‘exceptional’ response outside the accepted realm of political activity. Bigo, Abrahamsen and Williams, among others, have offered important critiques of this concept within an African context. Taking a global development perspective, however, Duffield presents securitization more generally than the Copenhagen scholars—as part of a broader western enterprise to regulate the lives and activities of those in the developing world—while Woods sees securitization simply as the ‘hijacking’ of aid and development policy by defence and security actors in the interests of western states. In contrast, those within security studies have accepted securitization as a legitimate, if not always overt, policy direction in pursuit of a donor’s military and national security objectives.

The apparent concentration of donor aid in regions and locations where conflict, or the threat of it, predominates is seen as indicative of the ‘securitization of development’. Increasing levels of donor military assistance, funding of security sector reform programmes, regional peacekeeping operations and support for state security institutions are all presented as measures of securitization. The provision of aid by donor security personnel—particularly in Afghanistan, but also in recent years in northern Kenya—is considered to be an important element of this phenomenon, reflected in the physical and spatial relationship between ‘garrisoned’ aid workers and ‘the locals’—what Duffield calls ‘the bunkerization of aid’.

This uncertainty about what precisely securitization means stems, in part, from the amorphous nature of the term ‘security’ itself; ‘as an intersubjective concept’, Williams notes, ‘security has no objective meaning … [it is] what people make of it’.15 The difficulties this poses affect measurement as well as meaning. Establishing credible ‘evidence’ of securitization is more difficult under some definitions (particularly those relating to donor intentions) than others (such as those where public donor discourse—in the form of policy-makers’ statements, speeches and publicly released policy documents—is the object of analysis), leaving plenty of scope for politicians and security practitioners to reject or challenge academic interpretations. Thus, when western policy-makers and practitioners discuss the ‘securitization of development’, they are often referring to something rather different from what their academic peers understand by the phrase. Troubling though this can be, it should not distract us from the substantive reality that the term ‘securitization of development’ indicates: simply stated, it is that military and security sector assistance has empirically increased, that national security objectives have been given increased priority, and that these two trends have combined to support African governments in authoritarian actions both against domestic dissent and threat and against threats lying across their borders.

This has occurred in parallel with another key trend in the management and delivery of aid in recent years—the revival of the state as donors’ preferred ‘partner’ in development.16 This can be seen in a variety of contexts, including intra-institutional debates within major donor organizations and the growing prominence of ideas of ‘big development’ in the policy prescriptions of favoured donor economists and thinkers such as Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier.17 At a broader level, it can be seen in the embrace of ‘partnership’ and ‘country ownership’ by most European donors and the World Bank since the late 1990s. This has involved a de jure transfer of agenda-setting initiative from donor to recipient (albeit in cooperation with the donor) in the development policy-making process and a genuine investment by donors in recipient state institutions and machinery, most notably through budget support.18 This so-called ‘new orthodoxy’ in aid policy and management—like the securitization of development—has consciously sought to strengthen the capacity, reach and power of the state, embracing both democratic and semi-authoritarian states.

The scholarly debate on securitization of development is therefore multifaceted, but it has nevertheless reached a consensus on two key issues: first, that the phenomenon is largely negative for those in the developing world, especially with regard to social policy; and second, that the agenda is driven and governed by

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western states—particularly the United States. An array of convincing evidence has emerged on the first point in relation to civilian populations. The argument is less convincing, however, when applied to many of the governments of these states. As Jones, Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven point out, a number of African regimes are engaged in state-building through accessing resources made available by security relationships with external donors. Crucially, they argue, these regimes have done so in a conscious and long-term effort to build ‘illiberal states’, framed by a political economy of authoritarianism. Citing Kagame’s Rwanda and Meles’s Ethiopia, they persuasively, albeit implicitly, demonstrate how valuable the securitization of development has been for these regimes in building and maintaining power.

This proposal emphasizes the deliberate and calculated actions and strategies of African regimes, moving forward a research agenda first developed in the late 1990s by Clapham and Bayart, and subsequently taken up by others. Reacting to International Relations’ perceived disciplinary ‘neglect’ of Africa, this literature highlights African state agency within the international system. A range of conceptual and empirical studies now challenge the notion that aid dependence and comparative economic and military weakness render African states passive and impotent at the global level. Instead, it is argued, several African regimes have increased their leverage over western donor states through aligning with donor support on security and regional stability notably in their calibration of counterterrorism policies with the global ‘war on terror’ and other western regional agendas’ priorities.

Securitizing development

Using the broad definition devised above, there is clear evidence that aid and development have become increasingly securitized over the past decade. A range of bilateral aid reviews carried out by Australia, Canada, the UK and Sweden between 2007 and 2011 starkly reveal the increased priority being given to ‘fragile


and conflict-affected states’, particularly in Africa.\textsuperscript{23} The US, UK, France and the EU have also sought to invest in security sector reform, regional peacekeeping and ‘stabilization’ missions in the continent since 9/11—including in Somalia, Darfur, Mali and central Africa—often explicitly to serve donor ‘national security interests’\textsuperscript{24}. Washington has consistently increased military and security programmes abroad at levels far higher than development: its Economic Support Fund account has grown by over 50 per cent since 2000, in contrast to 14 per cent for the Development Assistance account.\textsuperscript{25} It also established a range of new programmes and machinery in the later 2000s—notably AFRICOM—to increase its military presence in Africa and cooperation with African militaries. One of the most prominent of these programmes, ‘Section 1206 funding’, was enacted in 2005 as a temporary measure to provide the Pentagon with authority to ‘train and equip foreign military forces’ for counterterrorism and ‘military and stability operations’, but has since been regularly extended. Section 1206 funding, which has amounted to nearly US$2 billion since 2006, has especially favoured east European and African states: Uganda was the third highest recipient in 2011/12.\textsuperscript{26}

In several African states, the securitization of development has played an ambiguous role in the gaining and maintaining of power by political elites. In Kenya and Tanzania, for example, perceived US interference in governance has had a negative impact upon incumbents’ electoral chances, particularly among both states’ sizeable Muslim populations.\textsuperscript{27} In more authoritarian states, however, the phenomenon has become an important resource for regime maintenance. This is particularly so for regimes that originated as guerrilla movements, which construct the state around military institutions, are governed by military personnel, and rely upon the use of force to maintain order and legitimacy. These are the illiberal state-builders of Jones, Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven’s analysis, but are also referred to as ‘post-liberation regimes’;\textsuperscript{28} they include the current governments of Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda.

Some of these regimes have been less successful in managing their relations with western donors than others—Eritrea, for example, radically turned its back on the international community in 2004.\textsuperscript{29} The South Sudanese government, though it has hijacked a donor-funded disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)


\textsuperscript{24} Stephanie B. Anderson, \textit{Crafting EU security policy: in pursuit of a European identity} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

\textsuperscript{25} Oxfam, ‘Whose aid is it anyway?’, p. 13.


programme since 2009 to fund the extensive military patronage network upon which it relies, has seen its relations with donors return to a short-term, crisis footing since the country’s relapse into civil war in December 2013.\(^{30}\) The Chadian, Ethiopian, Rwandan and Ugandan regimes, however, have clearly benefited from the securitization of development over a sustained period and have used this process to build semi-authoritarian and illiberal states.

Chad’s Déby regime, for example, has relied heavily on French military assistance to maintain and augment its power since the 1990s, and this support intensified following the Mali crisis of 2011.\(^{31}\) Paris maintains a sizeable military contingent in Chad of some 1,100–1,500 personnel, and these troops directly assisted Déby in quashing rebellions in 2006 and 2008.\(^{32}\) France was also instrumental in persuading the EU, and later the UN, to send a peacekeeping force to Chad in 2008; although this was ostensibly to address the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the east of the country, many EU officials viewed the initiative as a French scheme to bolster Déby,\(^{33}\) who used the intervention to strengthen Chad’s security apparatus and purchase weapons from France.\(^{34}\) Revenue from an oil pipeline project funded by the World Bank and launched in 2000 was also illegally but overtly used to purchase weaponry.\(^{35}\) Training and military assistance from France and—under first the US$100 million Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and then Section 1206—the United States has enabled the regime to build and maintain the largest army in Francophone Africa.\(^{36}\) All this has facilitated Déby’s entrenchment of an increasingly violent and authoritarian regime that has crushed its internal political opponents.

The Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes have also made extensive use of western security initiatives since the 1990s to build militarized, strongly authoritarian states. In both cases, authoritarianism has not diminished but has grown over time, providing further support for the ‘illiberal state-builders’ thesis. In Uganda, the relatively free press and ‘broad-based’ approach to government of the 1990s has


given way to a more restrictive, personalized and autocratic regime which relies on corruption and military force to maintain power. In Ethiopia, the key features have been Meles’s personal entrenchment of power following his near-overthrow by colleagues in 2000, and the consolidation of single-party domination after an unexpectedly close election in 2005. Following Meles’s death in 2012, the military has become the de facto political power in Ethiopia, with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn dismissed by a range of officials as a ‘regent’.

Western support for both states’ security forces has been extensive and sustained since the early 1990s. The United States in particular has been a major provider of training and logistical support, as well as weaponry. Direct operational support is both covert and public, including the Frontline States Initiative, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative, African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA). This assistance has been particularly linked to Uganda’s fight against domestic rebel movements (notably the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA), Ethiopia’s operations against Islamic militants in Somalia, and both regimes’ opposition to Sudan’s government under Omar al-Bashir. Since the later 2000s, Washington has supported Museveni’s struggle against the LRA, dispatching 100 military advisers to assist Ugandan troops in 2010, and has given strong support to the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in which Uganda’s army is playing the leading role and which greatly furthers Ethiopian interests. Recent US defence packages bound for Kampala have even included the supply of drone aircraft to Ugandan forces for use against Islamists in Somalia.

Significantly, Ethiopian and Ugandan engagement in Somalia has also led to an increased level of support and training being provided by western donors with less history in this area—notably the UK and EU, but also Sweden and other states. Prior to 2005, European donors, together with the World Bank, supported these two regimes’ militaries primarily through funding for DDR programmes and defence reviews, both of which were manipulated for illiberal state-building purposes. In more recent years, however, a tendency has emerged among these donors to decrease or redirect poverty reduction budget support funds (from


2005 in Ethiopia, and beginning in 2010 in Uganda) while continuing to increase military assistance and cooperation. This trend is further evidence of the securitization of development.

Rwanda’s Kagame regime has had fewer opportunities to access donor counter-terrorism funds, but its military has nevertheless received substantial assistance. This began in 1994, with American special forces training the recently victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in ‘psychological operations, combat and military management’. Continued donor military support, particularly from the UK and US (via ACOTA) since the early 2000s, has been linked to Rwanda’s prominent involvement in regional peace support operations, particularly in Darfur. This has been undertaken in spite of what one British defence official has called Rwanda’s ‘nefarious activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, where the Kagame regime has repeatedly sponsored rebel groups since the 1990s. In 2012, renewed accusations on this subject led Washington to suspend a small amount of foreign military financing bound for Kigali, but this appears not to have diminished the enthusiasm of western donors in their support for Rwanda’s military over the longer term.

More broadly, US and UK military support for the Rwandan Defence Force and Rwanda’s security sector has allowed the Kagame regime to bolster and augment an increasingly violent and oppressive state apparatus in recent years. As in Uganda during Museveni’s first decade, Rwanda during the first few years after the genocide of 1994 was governed by a diverse coalition of interests, albeit dominated by the RPF. Since the early 2000s, however, Kagame has removed non-loyalists, particularly those from outside his Tutsi ethnic group, and has constructed a political system explicitly opposed to majoritarian rule. The army and security services have been crucial in implementing this state-building project and have also been used to arrest, intimidate and even assassinate opponents of the regime—including some based abroad. The securitization of development has therefore been vital to Kagame’s regime in maintaining power.

Overall, the increased focus on budget support in donors’ relations with these regimes has greatly enhanced the ability of African governments to extend and reinforce state authority domestically. This has been realized directly in the

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44 ‘Military role of the US in Rwanda was extensive’, International Herald Tribune, 18 Aug. 1997.
augmenting of civilian security structures and bureaucracies. It has also been realized indirectly—as Unwin has shown in the case of Uganda—through providing leeway in national budgets for the reallocation of funds earmarked for social development towards defence and security.51

The Museveni, Kagame and Meles/EPRDF regimes have all benefited from budget support during the 2000s, with a significant percentage of their expenditure being financed by this means. This emphasis is a reflection of the relative faith western donors—particularly the UK and World Bank—have had in the strength and integrity of the Ugandan, Rwandan and Ethiopian systems of public financial management under these governments. In November 2012, for example, UK Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell stressed that donors could ‘trust’ the Rwandan fiscal system and that ‘they [Rwanda] do exactly what they say with our money’; this is a sentiment that has frequently been expressed by aid officials in London and Washington and across eastern Africa in relation to Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda over the past decade.52

This focus also reflects, however, the heavy emphasis placed by senior officials in all three regimes on government ‘ownership’ of development and on the centrality of state management and control in securing developmental outcomes.53 Though arguably progressive from an economic and social perspective, the governing philosophies of these regimes—based on Meles’s ‘democratic developmental state’ or Museveni’s ‘democratic centralist state’54—have nevertheless espoused illiberal political positions. The ‘developmental state’ model pursued by Addis Ababa and Kigali especially has, for example, combined a deeply ambivalent approach to political pluralism with a vision of the state that is highly interventionist, managerial and controlling.55

Crucially, this agenda has not simply been embraced by these regimes following its promulgation in western donor capitals, but has been devised as part of a dynamic interaction with the donor system: indeed, western approaches themselves have often evolved or changed course as a consequence of these interactions.56 In other words, the rise of ownership, budget support and the developmental state paradigm has come about to support these semi-authoritarian regimes in the consolidation of their authority not by coincidence, but rather by design.

54 Interview with former senior NRM (National Resistance Movement, Uganda’s ruling party) cadre, Kampala, March 2013.
Similarly, it is important to recognize that each of these regimes not only passively benefits from securitization, but has acted to manage and direct the process in a conscious state-building strategy. Though their political economies and relationships with donors differ, their attempts to securitize these relationships have followed similar patterns. The next section of the article will explore this behaviour by considering four major strategies employed by these regimes in consolidating the securitized relationship with donors. These strategies can be divided into two categories: those indicating a ‘reactive approach’—regimes acting as western proxies in regional conflicts and leveraging increased support for their militaries by enthusiastically opening up non-security-related policymaking to donor influence; and those indicating a distinctly ‘proactive approach’—persuading western states to formally recognize de facto militarized interventions as legitimate, and persuading donors to view local and regional opponents of these regimes as ‘national security threats’ to regime and donors alike. Combined, these strategies demonstrate a conscious effort on the part of these African governments to manage and augment the securitization of links with donors and, thereby, to secure agency in the international system.

**African securitization strategies**

**Playing the proxy: ‘African solutions to African problems’**

Following the disastrous failure of US Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993 and the recriminations in western capitals in the aftermath of Rwanda’s genocide the following year, donors rapidly stepped back from direct involvement in African peacekeeping efforts. This key moment of change in donor relations with the continent has been skilfully brokered by the Ugandan, Ethiopian and Rwandan regimes through their championing of the ‘African solutions to African problems’ agenda. Bolstered by pan-Africanist and nationalist rhetoric in equal measure, this enterprise has seen the three regimes continuously volunteering and committing troops to peacekeeping missions in regional trouble spots where donors have a key geostrategic interest but are reluctant to deploy soldiers themselves. Thus Uganda has contributed troops to peacekeeping in Liberia, volunteered troops for missions in Sudan and, since 2007, been the largest contributor to AMISOM. Ethiopia has done the same in Burundi, and has maintained a continuous intervention in Somalia—most of the time with tacit US approval—against Islamist ‘extremists’ since the late 1990s (and as part of AMISOM since 2014). Likewise, Rwandan troops have played a leading role in both African Union and United Nations missions in Darfur since 2004, earning considerable praise from senior US military officials. Déby in Chad was slower to grasp the opportunities of

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peacekeeping, but since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya the Chadian army has responded to the security threat in West Africa, participating with French forces in the Malian intervention in 2012 and most recently (July 2014) providing the key elements, and a training and deployment base, for the French-sponsored anti-Islamist regional security initiative.\(^{59}\)

The Meles and Museveni regimes also played a crucial role in ferrying military and logistical support from Washington to the south Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during the 1990s as part of a wider mission to undermine Khartoum, with one former senior US official privately acknowledging that these two regimes did a ‘lot of heavy lifting’ for the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.\(^{60}\) As well as dispatching troops to Mali, Chad under Déby allowed EU and UN peacekeepers to operate from its territory to address the humanitarian situation in neighbouring Darfur. These activities served important domestic, regional and ideological purposes for these regimes. The impetus for the initiatives sometimes came from the donor side: Déby reportedly needed to be ‘persuaded’ by Paris of the merits of the EU mission in Darfur,\(^{61}\) whereas Museveni and Meles were proactive in persuading donors to support what eventually became AMISOM (and western enthusiasm for ‘African solutions to African problems’ undoubtedly helped to support and reify this initiative from the outset).

Should these activities be viewed as the proactive promotion and augmentation of securitized relations with donors by African regimes, or as the behaviour of subordinate proxies? Certainly, all four governments have benefited instrumentally from the arrangements, but it is notable that senior regime officials have not been afraid to condemn western policies in Africa by continuing to wave the ‘African solutions’ banner—as Museveni did in relation to France’s involvement in Côte d’Ivoire and, along with Déby, NATO’s intervention in Libya during 2010–2011.\(^{62}\) They have also on occasion refused offers of military training from donors and expelled western peacekeepers (as Chad did with the UN in 2010), abandoned missions (as Chad did in Mali in 2013) or threatened to abandon them (as Uganda did with AMISOM in 2012).\(^{63}\) These actions, undertaken owing to each regime’s dissatisfaction with the nature or extent of donor support, display a clear understanding of negotiating capacity and leverage. Furthermore, donor perceptions of the geostrategic importance of such missions are influenced by longer-term interactions with the African regimes, complicating the notion that African states are simply ‘hitching a wagon’ to a predetermined western security agenda.

Privatizing security, socializing development: ‘What’s mine is yours, what’s mine is mine’

This ‘exchange’ is also apparent in a second major strategy employed by African regimes to securitize relations with donors. Several governments, including those in Sudan, Eritrea and (before 2008) Zimbabwe, have consciously sought to restrict donor involvement in their policy-making, while others, including those in Kenya and Malawi, have formally accepted donor conditionality and prescriptions with little intention of implementing them. Yet others, according to Whitaker, have publicly opposed donor security arrangements while simultaneously accepting increased military assistance. All these strategies, to varying degrees, have bred mistrust between donor officials and their African counterparts in these states.

In contrast, the four regimes considered here, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad, have all adopted a quite different approach, building trust within the donor relationship yet gaining increased control over securitization. This has involved each government explicitly permitting donors a major role in some areas of policy—‘socializing’ policy-making in social development and economic sectors in particular—while simultaneously pursuing the explicit ‘privatization’ of other areas, especially defence and security policy. This ‘drawing of red lines’ has generally been accepted by donors, albeit reluctantly. It has meant that these African regimes have been able to build large militaries and intervene unilaterally in neighbouring states with donor support, but with only limited donor oversight or censure.

While Ethiopia’s governments have fiercely defended their sovereignty in engagements with outside actors, the Meles regime (like those of Kagame and Museveni) nevertheless enthusiastically welcomed donor involvement in reorienting its economic policies during the 1990s ‘ownership era’ as well as in embedding ‘poverty reduction’ goals within its approach to governance. The level of influence these regimes permitted western actors at times made it difficult to distinguish between ‘donors’ and ‘policy-makers’. Museveni frequently turned first to US officials for economic advice during the late 1980s, according to a former donor official, allowing Uganda’s finance ministry to become ‘populated’ with World Bank, British government and Overseas Development Institute (UK) personnel throughout the 1990s. Some of these advisers were even invited to sit in on Ugandan cabinet meetings. Kampala and Ndjamena also ‘socialized’ HIV/AIDS policy in the 2000s, while Kigali has enthusiastically offered up Rwanda to British politicians as a ‘laboratory’ for development and governance initiatives; former prime minister Tony Blair’s ‘Africa Governance Initiative’ began work in

the country ‘at the request of the Government of Rwanda’ in 2008 and maintains
an office within the presidency.69 The Chadian regime has also allowed western
actors free rein over dealing with internally displaced persons and other aspects of
the humanitarian situation in the east of the country during parts of the 2000s—
with EU and UN missions in the latter part of the decade premised, at least implicitly,
on the argument that Ndjamena had little inclination or ability to do so.70

The four governments have, however, made it very clear to donors that their
defence and security arenas are ‘off the table’ in discussions, and that western actors
can either support them in these ventures or ‘stop questioning them’ altogether.71
During the 1990s, for example, donors consistently tried to persuade Uganda,
Rwanda and Ethiopia to reduce their defence spending, only to be met with defi-
ant refusals and a dressing-down from former guerrilla fighters who made clear
that what they considered ‘a reasonable level’ would be based on their own secu-

Kampala and Kigali also attacked donors who condemned their interventions in the DRC since the late 1990s. In 2001, for example, Kagame made clear that ‘either we are in the DRC to protect ourselves or we die. Until concrete solutions are found by the international community we shall remain in the DRC.’ 73

The Ugandan and Rwandan regimes have frequently refused to ‘open up the books’ on their defence spending to donors during budget discussions, even at times when donors have directly funded over half of government spending.74 Moreover, both Kampala and Addis Ababa have declared their intentions to invade neighbouring states in pursuit of enemies (DRC and Somalia respectively) ‘with or without’ western support or approval.75 In doing so they have presented donors not with the opportunity to dissuade them (as Kenya did during discussions with US officials regarding its ‘Jubaland Initiative’ in 2009),76 but rather with an ultimatum to ‘like them or lump them’. A similar dynamic was at play in Chad’s relations with the World Bank during the latter 2000s, with Ndjamena pointedly refusing to honour an agreement with the Bank that 86.5 per cent of revenues from a Bank-funded oil pipeline project be spent on health, education and rural development, instead diverting substantial amounts to purchase arms and finance defence spending. Déby justified the decision on the grounds that ‘security has been named as a priority sector’.77

72 Comments by Donat Kaberuka (Finance Minister) on Radio Rwanda (BBC Media Monitoring, 29 Aug. 1999);
comments by Museveni during 1995 donors meeting on defence spending, cited in The Bank, the President and
the pearl of Africa, Channel 4 television documentary, originally broadcast in two parts on 17 November 1998
and 24 November 1998.
73 Comments by Kagame to editorial board of Washington Post, reported by Rwanda News Agency, 31 Jan. 2001
(BBC Media Monitoring).
74 Interviews with UK and European diplomats formerly based in Kigali and Kampala, May 2009, July 2009,
77 Styan, ‘EU power’; ‘Chad switches oil cash to buy arms’, Daily Telegraph, 6 April 2007.
Strategies of socializing development while privatizing security have strengthened the hand of these regimes in their interactions with donors. In response, donor anxieties appear to overwhelm their judgement. Fearing a loss of influence in other areas, many donors hesitated to impose sanctions upon Kampala regarding defence spending until 2002–2004, for example, even though the issue had been raised persistently since the early 1990s. Even the aid cuts eventually applied were very limited and rapidly rescinded. The same is true of the World Bank in respect of Chad’s oil revenue, support being cut off only in 2008, more than five years after evidence emerged that arms had been purchased. Though donors condemned Ugandan and Rwandan intervention in the Congo from the late 1990s, few made significant aid cuts, and Washington consciously decided to ‘like’ rather than ‘lump’ Ugandan interference in the DRC and Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in the later 2000s when presented with the choice.

These strategies have allowed African regimes to further securitize their relations with donors. By proactively excluding donors from security decision-making, but including them prominently in other areas of policy, the regimes have been able to secure continued funding for their military budgets and security sectors—either directly or through diverting aid intended for other purposes—without unwelcome western oversight or management of these activities. Donors appear to have come to accept that any serious attempt to demand oversight would prove an exercise in futility, tacitly acknowledging that they are not ‘in control’.

Making donors complicit: legitimizing de facto security arrangements

These strategies of defiance and privatization have also been developed by some regimes to fundamentally reorientate the focus of the donor–African security relationship, ultimately placing the African governments themselves in the driving seat. Ethiopia provides the clearest example. Following the Somali Union of Islamic Courts’ (ICU) capture of Mogadishu in June 2006, senior US officials entered into extensive and detailed debate with their Ethiopian colleagues about how to respond to this ‘extremist government’. During this dialogue—partly captured in embassy cables now available from WikiLeaks—Washington made clear that it did not favour direct Ethiopian intervention to resolve the situation for fear of Somalia becoming ‘Ethiopia’s Iraq’, that it was ambivalent about supporting the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) over a coalition of warlords, and that it had very substantial reservations regarding a proposed IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) mission to the country, fearing that this might ‘rally … Somalis against the TFG’. Defying this advice on all counts, Ethiopian officials stuck firmly to their own line: support for the TFG

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was the only credible option and ‘a radical change of US attitude’ was required. This argument was backed up by the clear statement of Addis Ababa’s willingness to ‘go into Somalia’. Should this happen, Ethiopia also declared the intention to support a post-intervention IGAD peacekeeping mission led by Uganda. In the face of this intransigence, and unable to take effective action without Ethiopian support, the United States eventually supported the Ethiopian invasion of December 2006, albeit covertly. Then, when Ethiopia privately announced its intention to withdraw from Somalia early in 2007, having vanquished the ICU, the US and other interested western states had little option but to support the proposed IGAD mission to prop up the TFG, under the banner of the AU, having been further persuaded by Kampala of the merits of such a mission.

Subsequently, US, UK and EU relations with Ethiopia and Uganda have revolved very substantially around continuing involvement with the two countries in supporting (Ethiopia) and leading (Uganda), the AMISOM mission. This has brought with it unprecedented levels of western military assistance, training and cooperation for Ethiopian and Ugandan forces—used by both regimes to more deeply embed illiberal state-building policies. While Washington has enthusiastically supported AMISOM since 2007, the Ugandan-led mission, and the Ethiopian invasion that made it unavoidable, did not constitute a plan devised by US officials. Indeed, it is clear from the tenor of US officials’ language during the latter months of 2006 that a ‘political solution’ or continued support for Somali warlords was the preferred US approach, and that the military option was kept open only at Ethiopia’s insistence.

A similar dynamic of these African regimes determining security relationships with donors, rather than taking a more passive role, can also be seen in the changing approaches to Ugandan regional interventionism. Kampala’s invasion of the DRC in 1998, officially to neutralize the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group in the east of the country, was strongly condemned, mostly in private, by western donors, some of which, including the United States, temporarily reduced aid disbursements in a symbolic demonstration of disapproval. Donors also raised concerns, even more privately, regarding Ugandan military involvement in southern Sudan during the later 1990s. This activity, officially aimed at pursuing another rebel group, the LRA, was tacitly supported by Washington as


85 Interviews with former Clinton administration officials, Washington DC, Oct.–Nov. 2009.
part of its policy of assisting the SPLA until the early 2000s—when the Ugandan presence in Sudan begun to undermine peace talks between Khartoum and the SPLA sponsored by the United States and other donors.86 Kampala has nevertheless continued to insist that it is entitled and willing to intervene militarily in neighbouring states in pursuit of enemies, ‘with or without’ donors’ support.87 This unbending attitude became particularly salient in the later 2000s as the LRA was forced from Ugandan territory into parts of southern (later South) Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR). In response, donors have attempted to legitimize Uganda’s cross-border military activities by lobbying neighbouring states to sign cooperation agreements with Kampala permitting such actions. Western donors were, for example, central in facilitating a 2002 agreement between Sudan and Uganda allowing the latter’s armed forces to legally pursue the LRA within Sudanese territory. Washington also played a prominent role in enabling the signature of a similar agreement between Kinshasa, Juba (then the government of an autonomous territory within Sudan) and Kampala in 2008, which saw theoretically joint Ugandan/southern Sudanese/Congolese, but de facto predominantly Ugandan, forces launch an attack against the LRA in Garamaba, DRC.88 Washington also provided logistical and financial support to Kampala during this enterprise and lobbied for an AU-led mission against the LRA. Launched in 2012, this mission has also involved Ugandan troops pursuing the rebel group outside its borders but alongside neighbouring armies.89

Like Somalia, the LRA issue has increasingly become a major focus in donor (particularly US) relations with Uganda in recent years, and has been used to justify ever closer military cooperation between western capitals and Kampala. Indeed, in 2011 US President Barack Obama dispatched 100 US military advisers to the region to work alongside Ugandan and other central African troops in tracking down the rebel movement.90 Crucially, however, what has changed since the 1990s is not so much the actions of Ugandan troops—they continue to pursue the LRA beyond their borders—but the attitudes of donors to this behaviour. Formerly condemnatory, donors now seek to promote, facilitate, support and legitimize Uganda’s regional activities in the hunt for the LRA. This change in attitude is a reaction to Kampala’s own fixed position, which has been consciously designed to wear donors down into accepting and eventually supporting the status quo as determined by Uganda. This, again, represents a securitization of relations with donors determined from an African perspective.

87 Interview with former White House official, Washington DC, Nov. 2009.
Constructing ‘national security threats’: our enemy is your enemy

The success of these strategies has ultimately relied on a far more fundamental securitization strategy by African regimes. This has involved each of the four regimes considered here seeking to persuade donors that threats to the African state’s national security also represent threats to donors’ security—a crucial seizure of the initiative which, when successful, has resulted in an entrenched and longer-term dominance of the securitization agenda by African actors. In its public and private discourse on the Islamist terror threat posed by a variety of groups in the Sahel, for example, Ndjamen has consistently stressed that ‘Chad is on the front line’, Déby reminding European allies that ‘it’s very easy to cross the Mediterranean Sea with arms and ammunition’ and that terrorism may spread quickly to ‘Europe and the Mediterranean’.

Likewise, in characterizing Ethiopia’s Islamist opponents in Somalia to donors, Meles regularly emphasized how ‘US and Ethiopian interests converge’ in this area and how the two states ‘have parallel interests in Somalia … because of the global threat posed by Islamists’. The late Ethiopian leader also frequently labelled the ICU as a ‘Taliban’ intent on ‘Talibanizing all of Somalia’ during interviews with western journalists and in meetings with donor officials during 2006, again linking Ethiopia’s enemy directly to that encountered by US and UK troops in Afghanistan.

The Museveni regime has employed the same tactic in its presentation of the ADF and, particularly, the LRA—even though the latter’s links to Islamic fundamentalism are barely credible. Weeks after 9/11, the Ugandan leader informed journalists that Al-Qaeda, via the ADF, had plotted to assassinate him in 1999 and that ‘[Osama] bin Laden took [the ADF] for terrorist training in Afghanistan.’ Ugandan officials also lobbied successfully for the LRA and ADF to be added to the US State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion List in the same year, and have since characterized both as ‘terrorists’ when dealing with international actors, also repeatedly stressing that both groups are ‘directly linked to world terrorism’.

The Rwandan regime has adopted a variant on this approach, rooted in the uniquely tragic context of its coming to power in the midst of genocide. As a variety of scholars have observed, since the early 2000s Kigali has increasingly placed the 1994 genocide at the heart of its discussions with donors—defending its interventions in the DRC before international audiences in terms of preventing a ‘genocide against Zairian Tutsi’, and explaining its involvement in the AU

94 The LRA received support from the Islamist Sudanese government between around 1994 and the early 2000s in Khartoum’s campaign to destabilize Kampala.
96 Fisher, ‘Some more reliable than others’, p. 17.
Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa

Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as tied to a commitment to ‘preventing genocide in Darfur’.98 In doing so, however, it has invariably stressed the international community’s unreliability and abdication of responsibility in 1994 and subsequently. In 2009, Kagame told western policy-makers and scholars that Rwanda had had ‘no option’ but to invade the DRC because ‘the international community did not intervene’ to prevent a future genocide.99 Rwandan officials have also described their motives for joining AMIS as linked to a desire not to ‘remain silent in the face of genocide’.100 This discourse is aimed not at convincing donors of a current threat of genocide (although the reputational damage of failure to act could be severe), but at shaming them for their silence and ‘failure to act’ in 1994. US and UK support for the Kagame regime has been partly founded upon guilt that neither donor made significant efforts to prevent the genocide of 1994, in which over a million Rwandans were killed.101 In continuously reminding donors of this shameful neglect, Kigali seeks to persuade them of their moral obligation now to support and bolster the Rwandan state, built by the force that ended the genocide.

In some cases, such as the Mali intervention and Ethiopia’s role in Somalia, these strategies have primarily backed up and augmented views and fears already held by western donors about threats to their own security. They have nonetheless rendered certain policies or funding packages more feasible or necessary than previously. In others, however, African regimes have succeeded in convincing donors that a course of action is in their direct security interests when, in fact, this claim is highly questionable. In announcing his dispatching of 100 military advisers to Uganda in 2011, for example, Obama stated that pursuing the LRA was in his nation’s ‘national security interests’.102 The idea that a small rebel group in central Africa with no clear links to global terror networks and no stated political platform could pose any threat to the United States is unconvincing—as many commentators have pointed out.103 Obama’s announcement represents the successful culmination of a securitization strategy employed by Kampala since the early 2000s, persuading Washington that US military assistance to Uganda is in America’s own national security interest.

Implications

The strategies outlined above give meaning to the manner in which African governments have restructured their relationships with western donors through the securitization agenda. We have argued that the process of securitization is

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102 Barack Obama, ‘Letter from the President’.
not an accidental or coincidental outcome of the global ‘war on terror’ in the four countries we have examined, but rather is the consequence of a deliberate and clear-minded set of policy decisions on the part of those African regimes. Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Chad each has its own unique set of political conditions, but there are strong similarities in their behaviour towards donors in the field of security policy. They have to some extent learned from one another: each has found leverage in its relations with donors, and each has successfully imposed its own priorities onto the security policies of its western allies, often at the expense of other development aims and goals, especially in the area of social and governance policies.

How is it that apparently weak, sometimes fractured regimes of this kind have been able to successfully manipulate western policy for their own ends? This very question may reflect a crucial misunderstanding of the character of the relationship that exists between Africa’s security authoritarians and their allies in the West. The lack of ‘commitment’ on the part of western donors to specific social development goals in their dealings with foreign aid recipients is well established. Donors are often willing to sacrifice social development and governance goals in exchange for perceived advantages in the security realm, even if doing so involves the marginalization of civil society actors. This tendency has a particular significance in the case of authoritarian regimes, themselves already heavily committed to militarism and according a high priority to security policy. Such regimes know what they want from their relationship with donors, whereas the donors themselves remain unclear as to what their goals should be and how these should be prioritized.104 Authoritarian regimes thus negotiate with donors from a position of strength, not weakness.

Might other African countries, then, follow the example of our four case-studies? We have already indicated that South Sudan and Eritrea show similar propensities, and Angola is included among the illiberal state-builders counted by Jones, Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven.105 All of these are ‘post-liberation’ regimes, and it might reasonably be argued that their transition towards a less authoritarian, less militaristic mode of governance is merely a question of time: transitions after liberation struggles are seldom trouble-free. But it can now be noted that other types of African states, including those in which democratic institutions and participatory politics appear to be well entrenched, are adopting some of the same strategies we have described here in their dealings with donors. The response of Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigerian government to the challenge of Boko Haram gives some indications of this trend,106 while, perhaps most surprising of all, Kenya’s politics since the invasion of southern Somalia in 2011 has undergone a dramatic securitization.107 Many institutional factors exist that will prevent

105 Jones et al., ‘Africa’s illiberal state-builders’.
107 David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Kenya at war: al-Shabaab and their enemies in eastern Africa’,

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Nigeria and Kenya from following the model described above, but the adoption of certain behaviours and strategies towards securitization are nonetheless apparent and these will have impacts.

Finally, at a moment when the dominance of western donor assistance in Africa is coming under challenge from other external actors, we might consider the likely impact of greater Chinese engagement in security policy on the continent. Regimes in states such as Uganda, Ethiopia and Angola, with old-fashioned armies, a military–state complex in place and being reinforced, and a growing tendency towards buying military loyalty through the use of economic incentives, hold no surprises for the Chinese government. These regimes, and others with less economic or regional weight, are already forging their own military aristocracies, placing military actors at the heart of statist politics and giving them a vested interest in the maintenance of a securocratic approach to government. For those who hoped to see the strengthening of human rights in Africa, with increasing governmental accountability and transparency, and with more inclusive and participatory forms of politics, this would not be good news. Is the securitization of the past decade and more, then, to be viewed as just a bump in the road? Or will we look back on the 1990s as nothing more than a false dawn in Africa’s long-heralded retreat from authoritarianism and ‘return to democracy’?

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