Global Impacts of the Illegal Wildlife Trade

The Costs of Crime, Insecurity and Institutional Erosion

Katherine Lawson and Alex Vines

February 2014
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AERS African elephant range state
AfDB African Development Bank
AU African Union
AWI Animal Welfare Institute
CAR Central African Republic
CCPCJ Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple)
CoP Conference of the Parties (CITES)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC European Commission
EIA Environmental Investigation Agency
ETIS Elephant Trade Information System
FARDC The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)
FDLR The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda)
GTRP Global Tiger Recovery Program
ICCN Congolese Wildlife Authority (Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature)
ICCCWC International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime
IFAW International Fund for Animal Welfare
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWT Illegal wildlife trade
KWS Kenya Wildlife Service
LRA Lord's Resistance Army
MEA Multilateral Environment Agreement
MIKE Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants
NSAs Non-state actors
RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)
SADF South African Defence Force (1957–94)
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army
TCM Traditional Chinese medicine
TEAM Traditional East Asian medicine
TKM Traditional Korean medicine
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (<em>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</em>)</td>
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Executive Summary and Recommendations

Poaching of endangered species to feed the illicit global trade of wildlife – estimated to be worth between $8 and $10 billion per year excluding fisheries and timber – is rising at an alarming rate. Activity in the illegal ivory trade has more than doubled since 2007 and is over three times larger than it was during the last peak in 1998, with the street value of ivory capable of reaching up to $2,205 per kilogram in Beijing. Rhino horn can sell for $66,139 per kilogram – more than the price of gold or platinum – on the Chinese black market.

This report analyses the global impacts of the illegal wildlife trade, investigating links between the illicit trade in wildlife products and the erosion of national institutions in affected countries, national and transnational security threats and the role of armed non-state actors in civil conflict. Elephants and rhinoceros are most prominent among the animals being killed to feed rising demand for their tusks and horns across the world. On the basis of the evidence provided by a detailed literature review, this report focuses on the illegal trade in elephant ivory and rhino horn originating in sub-Saharan Africa.

Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the illegal wildlife trade in 2012 as 'a global challenge that spans continents and crosses oceans'. This trade can no longer be viewed exclusively as an environmental concern. Although the trafficking of live animals and animal products remains a serious conservation issue, this crime threatens the stability and security of societies involved at every point along the chain. It was the rise in illegal wildlife trade that prompted Mrs Clinton to describe this phenomenon as 'a national security issue, a public health issue, and an economic security issue'.

Across Africa, elephants and rhinos are being targeted by poachers and armed non-state actors – including rebel movements such as the Lord's Resistance Army – to satisfy increasing demand from growing middle classes across the world, particularly in Southeast Asia where ivory products and rhino horn are considered status symbols and used as ingredients in traditional medicine. Meanwhile, transnational organized crime groups and armed non-state actors are able to exploit institutional weakness, civil conflict and legislative loopholes in both source and consumer countries to feed this rising demand for rare commodities, acquiring vast profits.

A discordance between national legislation and institutional capacities for implementation on the one hand, and multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) on the other, means that national legislation often remains inadequate to support these initiatives, protect endangered species and regulate cross-border trade.
Attempts have been made to enhance support for the implementation of national wildlife regulations, such as the creation of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC). However, regulations stipulating which animal products can be legally traded vary greatly by country, resulting in a parallel legal and illegal trade. The legal trade in wildlife products is estimated at over $300 billion per year; a figure that can obscure the lesser but still significant value of the illegal trade.

Just as important as the devastating effects on biodiversity is the evidence in this report that the illegal wildlife trade erodes state authority and fuels civil conflict, threatening national stability and provoking substantial economic losses internationally. But the true scale of the trade is unknown, as are its indirect costs in security and political implications. Restricting an analysis of the global implications of environmental crime to biodiversity considerations limits the focus to wildlife supply countries. The illegal wildlife trade involves poachers, armed non-state actors from source nations, international crime groups and institutional corruption across global network chains and a range of players involved in demand countries – from organized crime syndicates and non-state actors to legitimate authorities.

To combat the threat, leaders in the international community – especially from supply and demand countries – need to collectively expand and deepen their levels of cooperation. Better and shared information will position governments to counter this transnational crime more effectively, as will enhancing the design and implementation of national and regional legislation and invoking stricter penalties against illegal traffickers and traders.

**Recommendations**

This report proposes the following options to investigate the ramifications of the illegal wildlife trade on political stability and security. Further critical examination of this dimension of the issue is urgently needed. These recommendations seek to encourage high-level political cooperation in order to formulate effective policies to counter the illegal wildlife trade through a targeted, collective response.

**Gather empirical evidence on the actors involved in the illegal wildlife trade**

1. Empirical evidence exploring what motivates armed non-state actors to engage in the illegal wildlife trade is lacking. Investigation is needed to understand how reliant these groups are on the ivory and rhino horn trades, and why they have turned to poaching to help sustain their activities. Further analysis is needed to examine how these groups would be affected if successful policies to deter the illegal wildlife trade were implemented. The possibility of these groups turning to other means of funding their activities must be explored, including involvement in other forms of transnational crime.

**Analyze the long-term political and security implications of the wildlife trade**

2. In order to formulate a long-term action plan against wildlife trafficking, targeted research is needed on the long-term implications of the trade for state institutions, development and security. Such information will support political collaboration between all countries involved to sustain policy measures countering the trade, to uphold international treaties and cooperate on transnational movement of goods.
3. The consequences of differing policy responses need to be examined. Unintended negative outcomes from certain measures are possible. For example, non-state actors involved in poaching are more heavily armed than ever before. An armed response to the crisis might thus appear to be the only effective measure, or it might contribute to further destabilization.

4. Analysis to compare previous booms in the illegal wildlife trade, particularly the ivory trade, with the current situation may reveal patterns of behaviour among particular actors, likely consequences of the trade and successful ways to mitigate demand and supply. Historical analysis of high-level involvement in the ivory trade might be helpful in evaluating the extent and level of actors involved.

Map actors and understand the illegal wildlife trade chain

5. The connections between transnational crime syndicates, poachers and armed non-state actors in source countries and traders and consumers in demand countries need to be critically investigated. Efforts to map the links and overlaps between actors and types of transnational organized crimes would make it easier for governments to implement effective strategies. Unless the entire illegal wildlife trade chain is evaluated, transnational organized crime linking the two ends of the trade will continue to erode institutions and threaten stability.

6. Deeper analysis of the rising demand for ivory and rhino horn products is needed. Despite investigations into the growth of the legal and illegal trades in Southeast Asia, there is a lack of evidence-based studies linking historical trends of demand.

Enforce CITES through national and regional legislation

7. Discrepancies between countries in their legislation based on CITES recommendations need to be examined. Countries which have successfully integrated CITES into national legislation (including many in the EU) can support others in their efforts to strengthen legal frameworks and their implementation, particularly those with insufficient resources to enforce legislation and prosecute smugglers.

8. Harmonized law within regions needs to be critically assessed. Although the implementation of CITES through the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations makes it easier to regulate wildlife laws in the EU, other agreements typical of such regional bodies, including the free movement of goods and people, may hinder closer monitoring of illicit activities and smuggling.

9. The ICCWC, a partnership between five intergovernmental organizations – the CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank and the World Customs Organization – which is designed to help national governments implement their national wildlife regulations, can support law enforcement with stronger backing from the international community.
Part I
Political Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade
1 Resurgence of the Illegal Wildlife Trade

Introduction

This report is based on data on the illegal wildlife trade gathered and analysed in the form of a literature review, which was focused on but not limited to the international security implications of the illegal trade in wildlife. The majority of research into the impacts of the illegal wildlife trade tends to focus on the biodiversity and conservation issues of endangered species. This approach is still highly relevant; many endangered species face greater challenges than ever before owing to rapid urbanization, loss of habitat and the illegal trade in live animals and animal parts.

The security implications of the illegal wildlife trade have not been examined as extensively as have the threats facing endangered species; however, the problem now concerns the stability of governments as well as the security of endangered species' habitats. Wildlife trafficking now ranks among the top five most lucrative illicit trades in the world, alongside drug-smuggling, weapons proliferation, counterfeit goods and human trafficking. Organized criminal groups and armed non-state actors involved in wildlife crime channel funds raised from the international trade in elephant ivory, rhino horn or tiger parts into civil conflicts often taking place in the very heart of these animals' habitats.

The report aims to identify knowledge gaps regarding the security implications of the illegal wildlife trade and presents a range of recommendations for further research which could help shape policy to counter this destructive crime. Using published and unpublished literature, journal articles and media reports, as well as data from multilateral environment agencies such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and transcripts from high-level discussions on the topic, over 200 sources were examined. Although a number of information sources are published in Chinese and Russian, in particular, there is undoubtedly some English-language bias in the selection presented in Part II. Of the sources examined, 58 publications and speeches were analysed in detail, under the following categories:

- Transnational organized crime and illegal wildlife trafficking;
- Demand, seizures and policy responses;
- The ivory trade before the 1989 CITES ban;
- Political engagement, legislation and CITES.

Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, this report examines the illegal trade in elephant ivory and rhino horn, originating from Central and East Africa and transported across the continent to Europe, the United States and most frequently to East Asia. The analysis considers links in the wildlife trade chain between consumer and source countries, with a particular focus on the middlemen: the transnational organized crime groups and armed non-state actors that facilitate the transit of wildlife products while fuelling insecurity and state erosion across the entire chain.

Poaching on an unprecedented scale: historical context and revival of the trade

Elephant poaching is now at the highest rate for 20 years, but this is not the first time that killing of elephants has risen. During a period of uncontrolled legal ivory trade from 1979 to 1989, Africa’s elephant population more than halved from 1.3 million to 600,000. A worldwide ban on ivory trade was approved by CITES in 1989, resulting in a dramatic fall in poaching levels for the immediate few years afterwards.

The trading ban was initially resisted by a number of southern African countries which felt that their healthy elephant populations should in fact be periodically culled, with the ivory sold on. The ivory trade was an important source of income for many African elephant range states; and for some it was also a means to power. It has been alleged that during the wars that affected southern Africa from the mid-1960s to the 1990s, members of the Southern African Defence Force (SADF) engaged in an illicit trade in ivory as part of a regional destabilization policy, although it is difficult to prove how far up the chain of command this policy was authorized. Despite the apparently healthy numbers of elephants in southern Africa at the time, the boom in illicit trading and the consequences of war – elephants were reportedly killed by the land mines strewn across Angola – all led to a boom in ivory trading and the installation of the CITES trade ban.

However, CITES is a voluntary agreement, and national legislation regulating trade in wildlife varies according to country. The African elephant (Loxodonta africana) is listed in CITES Appendix I (endangered species threatened with extinction), except in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, where it is listed in Appendix II, after a request from these countries to downgrade the status of their elephant populations owing to their greater numbers. Following calls by countries with healthy populations of elephants, CITES permitted one-off sales of ivory from elephants that had not been illegally killed to Japan in 1999, and again in 2008. It has been argued that despite the intention of these sales to mitigate a growing demand for ivory, in fact this increased, and between 2000 and 2002 more than 1,059 African elephants were found with their tusks removed. On the other hand, in some areas where elephant populations were downgraded from Appendix I to II, such as those living south of the Zambezi River, they continue to live in large and well-managed populations.

Whether or not the increasing demand for ivory was spurred by the one-off sales, the estimated poaching rate of African elephants in 2012 was 7.4 per cent; an unsustainably high level which

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4 Ibid.
current population growth rates of around 5 per cent. The overall weight and number of large-scale ivory seizures (considered ‘large-scale’ when more than 500 kg) exceed those recorded in any previous year.

All rhinoceros in Southern Africa are listed in Appendix I apart from the Southern White rhinoceros in South Africa and Swaziland, which is listed in Appendix II for the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade in live animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations and hunting trophies.10

In South Africa, home to 83 per cent of Africa’s rhinos and 73 per cent of wild rhinos worldwide, over 1,000 rhinos were poached in 2013, compared with 668 in 2012 and 448 in 2011.11 Both rhinoceros species in South Africa, the black (*Diceros bicornis*) and the white (*Ceratotherium simum*), are endangered. White rhinoceros are listed as ‘Near Threatened’ on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species,12 with nearly 20,000 remaining in the wild;13 however, black rhinoceros are categorized as ‘Critically Endangered’, with only 4,880 individuals in the wild as of February 2013.14 If the current rate of poaching continues, rhino deaths could overtake births by 2015.15 According to the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA), poaching is now ‘methodical and calculated’, and poachers are enabled by the financial backing provided by those higher up in the chain.16

Beyond wildlife: organized crime and insecurity

The explosion in elephant and rhino poaching in recent years may be driven by demand for illegal wildlife consumer goods, but instability and the presence of armed non-state actors in source countries has provided the ideal context for large-scale poaching to take place. At this stage, a distinction must be drawn between poaching for subsistence or self-sufficiency, and organized criminal activity.

One illustrative example is the case of Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), strategically located near the Sudanese border. This UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site is remote enough to provide cover for armed non-state actors seeking to avoid the reach of state institutions, but is also wild enough to provide a habitat for large elephant populations which can fall prey to armed groups, and which are vulnerable to increased human activity during conflict. This was seen during the conflict in the DRC between 1995 and 2006, when Garamba was home to refugees escaping war in Sudan, and later on housing poachers from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the army of the DRC (FARDC) and eventually Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) members.17

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Incidents of large-scale poaching on an industrial scale are now being reported; in one week, poachers linked to the Janjaweed from Sudan and Chad allegedly killed over 86 elephants, using automated weapons.\(^\text{18}\) In 2012, 650 elephants were killed in Cameroon’s Bouba N’Djida park, again by heavily armed poachers.\(^\text{19}\) Poaching on such a scale is not driven by opportunism or subsistence imperatives, but by armed non-state actors and organized groups with wider links. Whether the heavily armed poachers or the wars that armed them came first does not matter; the cyclical renewal of heavily armed poachers and armed non-state actors will continue until governments join forces across state boundaries and form regional partnerships to attempt to monitor ungoverned spaces along national borders, often far from institutional influence.

Transnational organized crime flows continuously between continents. Collective interventions at the global level are needed to counter wildlife crime.\(^\text{20}\) Such crime overlaps with other criminal activities, including the illicit trade in arms, money-laundering and drug-smuggling.\(^\text{21}\) Smuggling large caches of wildlife goods such as full-sized elephant tusks can be complex and time-consuming; significant funds and influence are required to be able to transfer illegal goods across borders. Other illicit goods may be smuggled alongside wildlife products to minimize the number of smuggling incidents, thereby decreasing the likelihood of detection.

2 A Global Challenge: The Illegal Wildlife Trade Chain

Drawing upon the literature, the following two chapters consider the global challenges of the illegal wildlife trade, and policy responses at all stages of the transnational trade chain.

From supply to demand

The illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn originates in Central and Eastern Africa and Southern Africa. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report ‘Elephants in the Dust’ highlights that poaching is exacerbated by poverty and food insecurity. Poachers may be driven by poverty, or are exploited by criminal organizations seeking to recruit hunters with knowledge of the local terrain. Poverty and inadequate bureaucracy enable criminal groups to corrupt poorly paid enforcement authorities.22 As noted above, however, poverty is not always a driver of participation in poaching. TRAFFIC’s 2008 report on economic and social drivers of the wildlife trade in East Asia asserts that wealth is a stronger driver of illegal and unsustainable wildlife trade in Southeast Asia than poverty, owing to the dynamics of increasing affluence and wider processes of economic growth in the region.23 Greed can also lure poachers to a trade that is supposedly low-risk and high-profit.

Haken (2011) notes that the global illicit trade in wildlife products inflicts significant harm on developing countries, where ‘economic and structural damage imposed on already weak developing states’ is even more destructive than losses in biodiversity.24 Traffickers exploit poverty and inequality to entice poachers, operating in territories with little government presence. They have a vested interest in preventing source countries from developing economically and structurally.25 Rosen and Smith (2010) also note that illegal wildlife trade undermines the efforts of developing nations to manage their natural resources. This results in the loss of future profits that could be available through development and tourism;26 here it is important to recognize the correlation between insurgency groups and remote, almost stateless wildlife reserves which provide ideal cover and sustenance for rebels fleeing state authority. This ‘loss of earnings’ would be on top of the conservative estimate that the illegal trade in wildlife excluding timber and fisheries is worth $10 billion per year.

Ivory poaching activity is centred on Central and Eastern Africa, particularly National Parks in the Great Lakes region such as Garamba National Park in the DRC, according to Agger and Hutson (2013), The Resolve and Invisible Children (2012) and Titeca (2013). Titeca analyses the

scale of the ivory trade in and around Eastern Africa, noting the transit hotspot of Mombasa, with ivory flows reaching through the DRC and Uganda\textsuperscript{27} to the coast in Kenya ready for shipment to Asia. Traditional poachers, South Sudanese armed groups, Congolese soldiers and, to a lesser extent, members of the LRA are all implicated in the ivory trade. Titeca points out that ivory tusks harvested by the LRA are generally exchanged for arms and food, and that they are less involved in transnational organized crime flows.\textsuperscript{28}

Other publications frequently mention the role of the LRA in ivory poaching, although there is no hard evidence linking the LRA to the transnational flow of ivory. Agger and Hutson (2013) and Lancaster and Cakaj (2013) note that LRA poaching operations fuel instability, but that the collection of ivory marks a significant break with past LRA practices of self-sufficiency, which may suggest that the group is running out of options to survive.\textsuperscript{29}

Other armed non-state actors frequently cited include Somali and Sudanese ivory poachers, noted by Haken (2011), the International Fund for Animal Welfare (2008 and 2013) and Douglas-Hamilton (2013). The Janjaweed are mentioned as the perpetrators of the large-scale elephant slaughter in Chad. Claims that insurgency groups such as al Shabaab are financially supported by the ivory trade have been quick to spring up since the Westgate shopping centre attack in Nairobi, Kenya on 21 September 2013, which focused international (particularly Western) attention on the group. Although these allegations are largely unverified by published literature on the illegal wildlife trade, the Elephant Action League asserts that the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has long been aware of the threat posed by Somali bandits in the country’s north-eastern territory.\textsuperscript{30}

In Southern Africa, illegal rhino poaching is facilitated by a legal loophole that allows rhinos to be hunted for trophies and for live export.\textsuperscript{31} According to Milliken and Shaw (2012), Asian operatives involved across the illegal rhino horn trade have exploited South Africa’s ‘unusually high’ levels of crime and institutional corruption to establish an extremely sophisticated criminal enterprise linking key demand countries such as Vietnam to South Africa.\textsuperscript{32} The (2013) report by the Environmental Investigation Agency states that between 2009 and 2012, 185 Vietnamese nationals engaged in rhino hunts in South Africa, accounting for 48 per cent of total hunts in that period. However, bilateral discussions between Vietnam and South Africa have been taking place, and the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding at the end of 2012 to improve cooperation on biodiversity conservation and to tackle illegal wildlife crime.\textsuperscript{33}

Much more information is needed on the process of transiting wildlife goods from source countries along transit routes to artisans and consumers. Smuggled ivory from Africa to China is processed in China’s registered ivory traders, and exported to Japan, South Korea, the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{34} The EU represents a major transit route for smuggled ivory, as shown by data on seizures from the EU-TWIX database, an online tool to centralize data monitoring illegal

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\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{31} EIA (2013), Vietnam’s Illegal Rhino Horn Trade: Undermining the Effectiveness of CITES, p. 3.


activities related to the trade in fauna and flora covered by the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations. Although legislation regarding the provisions of CITES is standardized across the EU, the Schengen Agreement means that traffickers can move around more easily.

Institutional weakness and state erosion

Transnational organized crime operators and smaller-scale armed groups are drawn to the high profits and low accountability associated with the wildlife crime trade. Variable, contradictory or weak legislation across countries and regions combined with pitiful rates of prosecution ensure sizable profits for the middlemen involved in the trade, who include expatriate Chinese and Vietnamese nationals living in Eastern and Southern Africa as well as Chinese and European nationals in the EU.

According to Douglas-Hamilton (2013), widespread corruption, mismanagement and weak penalties for wildlife crime coupled with a lack of political will to stand up to wildlife crime enables armed non-state actors such as the Janjaweed and the LRA to fund their operations predicated on the dwindling elephant populations of Central Africa. This is not a new phenomenon: IFAW (2008) cites a *New York Times* article from 1989 which claimed that the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels in Angola financed their offensives against the Angolan government through elephant poaching.

Ugandan, Congolese and Sudanese troops are all referred to as possible actors in the illegal ivory trade in the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan (2013), Cardamone (2012) and Beyers (2011). The HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan states that the Ugandan army (the Uganda People’s Defence Force) claimed to have found an ivory cache that had been hidden by the LRA, but this discovery came soon after reports that elephants had been shot from a small plane or helicopter, therefore implying the involvement of a much larger and better-equipped perpetrator. Speaking before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Cardamone (2012) stated that forces accused of poaching include the Congolese Army and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), as well UNITA and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which were found by the Congressional Research Service to have been involved in wildlife trafficking in Angola and Mozambique.

The potential for a legal trade in ivory is explored by Martin (2012), who points out the failure of African elephant range states to implement CITES regulations to control the ivory trade after 1989. Also, Martin notes: ‘Most countries in Africa appear to be unable … to meet the high costs

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required to fully protect their elephants; this could partly be because the regulatory mechanisms adopted by CITES are characterized by a lack of incentives to protect elephants.45 This may soon change following the latest Conference of the Parties, which resolved to improve funding for the elephant range states to administer the African Elephant Action Plan.

Implementation of legislation monitoring the illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn in source countries remains a problem for governments lacking the resources required to protect their endangered species indefinitely. However, the political will to tackle this resurgent problem is growing. The only way in which range states will be able to counter organized crime syndicates exploiting national legislative and institutional weaknesses is to participate in a coordinated response across the illegal wildlife trade chain.

45 Ibid.
3 Policy Response: Tackling the Trade at All Levels

Understanding demand

In January 2014 over six tonnes of confiscated ivory were publicly destroyed in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, a major hub of ivory trade in China.46 This landmark move represented the first time that this country, the lead source of demand for illegal ivory from Central and East Africa,47 has destroyed what is considered a popular commodity by the expanding Chinese middle class. This could well be part of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, although no explicit links can be found connecting the two. A recent trend in high-profile celebrity involvement in the fight against the illegal wildlife trade has spread awareness of the issue among the general public, with globally recognized figures including the basketball player Yao Ming taking a stand against the ivory and rhino horn trade.

According to Haken (2011), the most lucrative products in illegal wildlife trade are elephant ivory, tiger bones and rhino horns, with demand falling into three categories: traditional East Asian medicine (TEAM), commercial products and exotic pets.48 China is the largest consumer of ivory products, and has used rhino horn for traditional medicinal purposes for thousands of years.49 In other Asian countries however, the use of products derived from endangered species has been falling. In South Korea, where tiger parts and rhino horn have traditionally been used for medicinal purposes,50 the demand for these products has decreased substantially since they were banned. Practitioners of Korean traditional medicine have cited the development of effective alternatives – such as herbal substitutes – as one factor contributing to this trend.51

Much of the available literature on consumer demand for ivory and rhino horn products notes that this has been driven by a rising middle class in Asia with larger disposable incomes, although further explanation is lacking. One publication states that since 2004 there has been a 50 per cent increase in ivory items for sale in Guangzhou,52 an important ivory centre in China. There is a need for more empirical data to assess the rise in demand, and probably also for a wider literature review incorporating Chinese and Asian publications.

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51 Ibid.
The Chinese government restricts the selling of ivory to specific registered shops, and the shop owner must record how much is sold and to whom, labelling ivory items with ID cards. However, in 2013 IFAW found that ‘43 per cent of urban Chinese are not aware of the government license system under which you can buy ivory legally but only in certain outlets’; and that among past buyers, ‘18 per cent bought ivory without receiving an ID card’.

Illegal ivory hotspots (which often overlap with the legal trade) where seizures have been made in Asia include Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, where 7.28 kg of rhino horns were seized at HCMC airport in June 2013, and Hong Kong, where ivory worth $1.5 million was confiscated in October 2013. According to Rosen and Smith (2010), most seizures reported by TRAFFIC of illegal wildlife products from 1996 to 2008 originated in Southeast Asia, and are trafficking from the ports of Kenya and Tanzania.

According to the Environmental Investigation Agency (2013), Vietnam is the largest market for rhino horn from South Africa. Vietnam has reportedly not seized a single illegally important rhino horn or prosecuted any traders since 2008. However, Milliken (2012) notes that while there is extensive research into the supply side of the rhino horn trade in South Africa, there is little empirical data for understanding Vietnamese demand. In order to create effective policies to tackle the illegal wildlife trade, it is necessary to investigate more fully the reasons for the demand for wildlife products, including from the perspective of the consumers, which is touched upon in Kang’s TRAFFIC report.

Recent seizures across East Asia indicate that Asian governments are looking to take a public stand against the illegal wildlife trade. The public crushing of 6.1 tonnes of ivory in China, mentioned above, could signify a change in attitude. However, this accounted for a fraction of the 45 tonnes of ivory confiscated between 2009 and 2013 alone. The legal trade of certain types of ivory in China, including antique ivory, mammoth ivory and ivory obtained during the one-off sales in 1999 and 2008, operates in parallel with restrictions against the selling of all other categories. Unless China establishes one distinct rule prohibiting the entire trade, the message carried by public displays of ivory destruction will not trickle through to traders and consumers.

Other efforts to tackle the demand for elephant ivory and rhino horn have included recommendations from CITES. At the sixty-second meeting of the CITES Standing Committee, held from 23 to 27 July 2012, China was called upon to submit a review of its internal trade data and measures taken to comply with CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15), which sets out a range of measures to help regulate the trade in elephant specimens.

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60 The Guardian (2014), ‘China’s ivory crush may be a half measure – but it’s a welcome one’: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jan/07/china-s-ivory-crush-half-measure-welcome.
62 Available at: www.cites.org/eng/res/all/10/E10-1OR15.pdf.
Responses on the ground and political collaboration

There are success stories of policy responses which have led to effective anti-poaching measures. The Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has an efficient training programme for rangers, and is well supported by the Kenyan government and by stakeholders. KWS has sought out cross-border wildlife security collaborative initiatives with Tanzanian and Ugandan Wildlife Authorities, and Kenya recently passed a law with stiffer penalties against poachers, which has been praised by the UNEP. Having suffered the loss of 60 rhinos to poachers in 2013, the Kenyan authorities hope that the new Wildlife Conservation and Management Bill may deter poachers in the future.

Having lost one-third of its forest elephants over the last ten years, Gabon has taken a proactive stance to protect its wildlife. After co-hosting the 68th UN General Assembly side event on ‘Poaching and Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Multidimensional Crime and Growing Challenge to the International Community’ with Germany in September 2013, President Ali Bongo has spoken out at a variety of forums to urge the international community to take wildlife crime seriously. Gabon has taken action to safeguard its elephants, many of which live in the well-protected Wonga-Wongue Reserve.

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**Case study: The Global Tiger Recovery Plan and Operation Prey**

At the International Forum on Tiger Conservation in St Petersburg, Russia in November 2010, leaders of the 13 tiger range countries (TRCs) launched the Global Tiger Recovery Plan (GTRP), vowing to double the number of wild tigers in Asia by 2022. Part of the Global Tiger Initiative, GTRP members remained ‘cautiously optimistic’ on the future of wild tigers in Asia.

However, tiger populations have fallen by over 95 per cent since 1900, and there are now possibly as few as 3,200 remaining in the wild. Three subspecies, the Bali, Javan and Caspian tigers, were extinct by the 1980s. Threats to tigers include habitat loss, poaching and illegal trade, mostly for use in traditional East Asian medicine.

INTERPOL announced the launch of Operation Prey in 2012 to protect tigers and target individual and organized crime groups behind the tiger trade. Working across the 13 TRCs, Operation Prey led to nearly 40 arrests and multiple seizures. Operation Prey was conducted under Project Predator, an initiative to support and enhance the governance and law-enforcement capacity for the conservation of wild tigers.

It remains to be seen whether these collaborative responses to protect Asia’s last wild tigers will work in time.

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a Global Tiger Initiative: http://globaltigerinitiative.org/who-we-are/.
High-level responses to the drastic increase in wildlife crime are gathering pace. The UK government has announced a £10 million grant to support efforts to tackle the illegal wildlife trade in ivory and rhino horn, which will be used to reduce poaching incentives by improving economic opportunities and promoting good governance; providing training and support to agencies addressing the illegal wildlife trade; and raising awareness of the illegal trade in wildlife.

Public displays of ivory destruction are sending messages to the international community and to consumers that the ivory trade now poses an international security threat as well as destroying endangered species. The Obama administration recently crushed all six million tonnes of its confiscated illegal ivory, and US State Department officials now ‘openly refer to wildlife trafficking as a national security crisis.’ The White House has also pledged $10 million to curb illegal trafficking and help stabilize parts of Africa plagued by insurgency. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton issued a ‘Call to Action’ in 2012 against wildlife trafficking. This was followed in 2013 by the launching of President Obama’s ‘Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking’, which has identified wildlife trafficking as an escalating international crisis that must be addressed in the US national interest because of its role in fuelling instability and undermining security.

In 2012, almost five tonnes of illegal ivory worth $9.3 million were burned in Gabon, in order to send a strong signal against poaching. President Ali Bongo stated that ‘Gabon has a policy of zero tolerance for wildlife crime and we are putting in place the institutions and laws to ensure this policy is enforced.’ He also spoke on security threats and illegal trafficking at the 2013 African Development Bank Annual Meeting, noting that there needed to be a global solution with collaboration between governments and transnational organizations. These actions follow similar demonstrations in Kenya, Togo and the Philippines, where five tonnes of ivory were destroyed in June 2013.

The IUCN African Elephant Summit was held in Botswana from 2 to 4 December 2013, with all 30 governments present agreeing to a set of Urgent Measures to ‘halt and reverse the trend in illegal killing of elephants and the illegal ivory trade’. Included among the 14 Urgent Measures drawn up are the need to strengthen existing regulatory frameworks for the arrest and prosecution of suspected wildlife criminals, and the need to implement legislation to classify wildlife trafficking involving organized criminal groups as a ‘serious crime’.

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74. See Urgent Measures 1 and 13.
Another prominent arena in which governments took a stand against illegal wildlife trafficking in 2013 was at the Sixteenth CITES Conference of the Parties in March, hosted in Bangkok. Parties agreed to Resolution Conf. 16.9, which is concerned with improving funding and support for the African Elephant Action Plan, a consensus between all 37 African elephant range states to ensure their continued survival across their range.75

The international community is starting to take notice of the consequences of the illegal wildlife trade beyond environmental concerns, but there is still scope for improved coordination between source, transit and demand countries involved in the illicit trade.

The analysis of the existing literature in the previous chapters indicates that more evidence-based research is required into the true role played by armed non-state actors participating in the illegal wildlife trade. In order to formulate effective policy responses to counter the illegal wildlife trade, the international community needs to understand why these actors have become entrenched in the wildlife trade, and what may happen if they are denied access to these resources. There are four principal dimensions to this issue.

1. Gathering evidence on the actors involved in the illegal wildlife trade

   - It is clear that there has been a sharp rise in the illegal wildlife trade over the past few years. However, the true extent of the trade has not yet been ascertained. This would be difficult to analyse, as this trade may cross over into a variety of illicit trades, including, as noted, drug-smuggling and money-laundering. However, concerted efforts by transnational agencies such as INTERPOL and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have begun to assess patterns and crossovers between these crimes.

   - This review has found no evidence-based study that examines the reasons behind what draws armed non-state actors to the illegal wildlife trade. An investigation is needed to understand how reliant these groups are on the ivory and rhino horn trades. What will these groups do if the illegal wildlife trade is effectively policed by the international community? Why have these groups turned to wildlife poaching, and how did they sustain their activities before?

2. Assessing long-term political implications of the illegal wildlife trade

   - Targeted research is required into the long-term political implications of the wildlife trade, for countries involved at different points along the chain. This is necessary in order to formulate a targeted, long-term action plan against wildlife trafficking.

   - Research is also needed into any negative unintended consequences of security responses in tackling the illegal wildlife trade. If one set of poachers or armed non-state actors is driven away from the trade, will others take its place? How do these dynamics fit into transnational organized crime syndicates?

3. Evaluating the illegal wildlife trade chain

   - In order to break down the illegal wildlife trade chain, transnational links in organized crime need to be evaluated along the entire chain. Currently, much of the analysis on the illegal wildlife trade focuses on one end of the chain: poaching and the role of armed
non-state actors operating in unstable environments created by civil conflict and poverty; or the demand for and trade in consumer goods and medicinal products made from illegally traded elephant ivory, rhino horn and tiger parts in East Asia. While there are in-depth investigations into both ends of the trade chain, there is less consideration of the transnational crime links that connect poachers and insurgency groups in source countries, transnational criminal syndicates and traders and consumers in East Asia, Europe or the United States.

- Transit routes between Africa and Asia need to be evaluated; one example can be found in Knapp and Affre's 1997 report, which looks at transit routes in ivory and other products in Belgium. Why have transit routes not been examined in more detail? What political implications would follow from detailed research into all the connections in the trade, including corruption at the transit side?

4. Identifying poaching patterns

Political connections to the illegal ivory trade have been noted in a number of publications. This is not a new phenomenon: Stephen Ellis noted in 1994 that one of apartheid South Africa's policies of regional destabilization was its role as a 'leading middleman' in the international ivory trade. Using the analysis of historical political involvement in the ivory trade, what can be understood about more recent allegations of high-level involvement in the illegal elephant ivory trade and rhino horn trade? Allegations of such involvement by political entities are mentioned in the literature: are there links in the trade chain (poaching, selling) that are currently connected to political strategies? If so, why?
The illegal wildlife trade is worth at least $10 billion per year. These funds finance further illegal activity including linked transnational crimes, insurgency and political destabilization. This economic loss is exacerbated for countries in which endangered species cannot be easily protected, where the activities of armed non-state actors in poaching and transnational crime hinder development, investment and tourism. If the current rates of poaching continue, the populations of African elephants and rhinos in southern Africa will once again be pushed to the brink of extinction.

The economic gains of perpetrators of the illegal wildlife trade could, if recovered, be used by governments to counter its global impacts, which include the erosion of state authority in countries supplying elephant ivory, rhino horn and tiger parts; the proliferation of civil conflict in these states; and national security threats across consumer, demand and transit countries involved in the trade. The activities of transnational organized crime syndicates which connect the trade, linking poachers in Central and East Africa to traders and sellers in East Asia, Europe and the United States, pose a threat to the stability of all states in a globalized world.

The isolation of habitats and sanctuaries which are home to vulnerable species is sought out by armed non-state actors trying to avoid the reach of state influence during civil conflict in wildlife-product source countries. These states have found the fight against increasingly sophisticated methods of poaching too costly to bear alone. Poaching is driven by a demand for wildlife products that has risen dramatically in the last few years. Ineffective legislation is unable to prevent the flow of wildlife products from source countries to traders in consumer regions.

More evidence-based research is required into the true role played by armed non-state actors participating in the illegal wildlife trade. In order to formulate effective policy responses to counter the illegal wildlife trade, the international community needs to understand why these actors have become entrenched in the wildlife trade, and what may happen if they are denied access to these resources.

International collaboration on this issue must take place. Despite the signing of multilateral agreements such as CITES, renewed commitment to fight against the illegal wildlife trade is needed to implement and enforce legislation prohibiting the trade, to support wildlife source countries (such as the African elephant range states), to tackle the rising demand for these products and to break down the links to transnational organized crime.

Failure to do so will ensure that transnational organized crime operatives involved in the illegal wildlife trade will continue to cause billions of dollars of economic loss to governments, fuelling civil conflict in already unstable states and funding illegal activity across the world, threatening the stability and security of states involved in all aspects of this trade and beyond.
Part II
Literature Review
1 Civil Conflict and Institutional Weakness


Summary: Agger and Hutson set out recommendations to local authorities and the international community following reports that the LRA has been sustaining its activities in the DRC through ivory poaching. During a visit to Garamba National Park, the authors documented evidence of LRA poaching operations which are undermining the efforts of African Union (AU) and US-backed Ugandan troops to combat the movement. Recommendations include expanding US advisory programmes to encourage defections from the LRA and improving governance. The report urges further investigation into the role of the LRA in elephant poaching, noting that the United Nations Security Council’s 2012 call for the UN and the AU to investigate the LRAs logistical networks and illicit funding has not been observed.

Key words: Armed NSAs, DRC, Garamba National Park, LRA, Ugandan army, AU, US


Summary: Using data from distance sampling surveys collected before and after the 1995–2006 conflict in the DRC, the authors observed changes in elephant abundance and distribution in the Okapi Faunal Reserve, a World Heritage Site in the DRC. The results showed that elephant populations declined by nearly 50 per cent, coinciding with a major increase in poaching. From 1996, militia groups moved into the reserve, to be replaced by Uganda-backed rebels. The Congolese army (FARDC) originally cooperated in Operation Tango, a collaborative effort between the ICCN, the military and NGOs to combat poaching, but was later implicated in the ivory trade. The installation of SPLA forces near the park boundaries following civil war in Sudan also caused an increase in ivory poaching.

Key words: Civil conflict, armed NSAs, Great Lakes, elephant poaching, FARDC, SPLA


Summary: In this article, Douglas-Hamilton, founder of Save the Elephants, highlights the deepening crisis of the ivory trade in Africa. Militia groups such as the Janjaweed and the LRA are using the dwindling elephant populations of Central Africa to fund their operations.
Douglas-Hamilton states that the notion of a well-regulated legal ivory trade is ‘utopian’, given widespread corruption, weak penalties for wildlife crime and a lack of political will to tackle poaching. Many African elephant range states cannot finance national conservation schemes indefinitely. According to the author, the root of the problem lies in excessive demand, which must be tackled through greater engagement by the international community with demand countries.

**Key words:** Armed NSAs, Janjaweed, LRA, AERS, international engagement

**Summary:** This paper summarizes a workshop on the nature and control of environmental black markets and the driving force behind international environmental crime. Environmental crime can lead to the erosion of state authority; some forms such as ivory transportation cannot be easily disguised and are reliant on corruption. The author notes that while corruption is not confined to developing countries, it can be more evident and serious when remuneration of enforcement officials is low. National organizations holding responsibility for wildlife protection such as the KWS can bypass existing bureaucracy, but these organizations rely on dedicated long-term funding. International partnerships must be fostered to combat international environmental crime.

**Key words:** Erosion of state authority, institutional weakness, KWS


**Summary:** This publication assesses the LRA in 2013. Following a Ugandan offensive against the LRA in north-eastern DRC in 2008, Joseph Kony’s fighters have been pushed into new territory, and have been forced to adopt new survival strategies. There are ‘unconfirmed’ reports of LRA fighters harvesting tusks from elephants in the DRC, to ‘barter for guns and ammunition’ with ‘Sudanese soldiers or poachers’. On 6 February 2013, the Ugandan army claimed that it had found a cache of ivory tusks in the Central African Republic (CAR) that had been hidden by the LRA, but this came shortly after reports of elephants being shot from the air – most likely from a helicopter – which implies involvement of a much larger group. As the LRA evolves to survive, institutional responses from the UN and the AU have been plagued by inaction and a lack of funding.

**Key words:** Great Lakes, DRC, CAR, LRA, Ugandan army, institutional inaction


**Summary:** An update of IFAW’s 2008 report on the same topic (see below), this report goes further into the illegal wildlife trade’s links to armed non-state actors and organized crime. The international community has become increasingly aware of this problem, highlighted by then Secretary of State

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76 Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/home.html.
77 HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan, ‘Lord’s Resistance Army’, p. 2.
Hillary Clinton’s declaration in November 2012 that the illegal wildlife trade posed a national security threat. According to the report, Somalia- and Sudan-based militias have hunted elephants in Central Africa, and there have been reports of militants affiliated with Al-Qaeda being involved with the illegal trade in ivory, tiger pelts and rhino horns in India, Nepal, Burma and Thailand.

**Key words:** International engagement, armed NSAs, Al-Qaeda


**Summary:** Lancaster and Cakaj discuss disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives to encourage defection in the LRA. It notes disenchantment among certain factions of the movement: some members appear to be unhappy with the group’s recent shift towards sourcing alternative means of supporting themselves, such as the harvesting of elephant ivory. According to this report, ivory has been used by LRA leader Joseph Kony to establish trust among rival poachers and in exchange for safe haven as provided by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the CAR. The report states: ‘It is unclear how much the LRA is now relying on trade in valuable goods to survive,’ but the collection of ivory marks a significant break with past LRA practice, suggesting that the group is running out of options to sustain its activities.

**Key words:** Elephant poaching, Great Lakes, CAR, LRA, SAF


**Summary:** This security brief analyses information from the LRA Crisis Tracker website run by The Resolve and Invisible Children. External support via the ivory trade is noted as one survival strategy of the LRA, although this apparent reliance on ivory needs to be explored further. In April 2012, an LRA escapee reported that LRA militants poached elephants in Garamba National Park on Joseph Kony’s orders. In January 2013, escaped LRA abductees reported sightings of a helicopter which gave LRA rebels situated in the CAR food in exchange for ivory. Following initial reports of elephant poaching by the LRA, the United Nations Security Council urged the UN and AU to investigate LRA logistical networks and ivory trade links regarding illicit financing.

**Key words:** LRA, Garamba National Park, DRC, CAR, elephant poaching


**Summary:** Titeca’s analysis of the ivory trade in and around Eastern Africa compares the scale of the trade in transit hotspots, such as Mombasa, to the limited poaching conducted by the LRA.

80 Ibid., p. 18.
81 Available at: http://www.lracrisistracker.com.
The author states that the LRA cannot be solely responsible for the substantial rise in elephant poaching in the DRC, although much of the ivory passing through Uganda or confiscated in Mombasa comes from Garamba National Park in the DRC. Calls from the United Nations Security Council to investigate the role of the LRA in the ivory trade will bring attention to this issue, although the author notes that a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the ivory trade in East Africa is needed.

**Key words:** Great Lakes, DRC, Garamba National Park, LRA, ivory seizures, UN Security Council


**Summary:** This Rapid Response Assessment analyses data gathered over a decade on elephant poaching and illegal ivory trafficking along the entire ivory trade supply chain. The report finds an upward trend in the illicit ivory trade since 2007, driven by a rising demand for illegal ivory in the rapidly growing economies of Asia and facilitated by conflicts that provide optimal conditions for illegal killing of elephants. Armed non-state actors including the LRA and the Janjaweed are alleged to be implicated in elephant killing raids; exchanging ivory for money, weapons and ammunition. Key recommendations include improving law enforcement along all points of the ivory trade chain, addressing corruption and promoting political collaboration, reducing demand for illegal ivory and assisting funding mechanisms for African elephant protection and monitoring schemes such as the African Elephant Fund, the Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) scheme and the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS).

**Key words:** Armed non-state actors, consumer demand for illicit ivory, ineffective law enforcement, corruption, African Elephant Fund, MIKE, ETIS


**Summary:** In this study, WWF and TRAFFIC urge governments to prioritize the issue of wildlife trafficking as a crime with wide-reaching security implications and not just as an environmental issue. The lack of an effective response could potentially lead to economic losses for governments, and is putting national and international security at risk. The blame for the illegal wildlife trade is passed back and forth between wildlife source and consumer countries, and there must be collaboration across the trade chain to promote accountability. Illegal wildlife crime needs to be tackled alongside other transnational crimes, such as illegal trafficking and money-laundering. According to this report, illicit wildlife trafficking (excluding fisheries and timber) is worth between $7.8 billion and $10 billion per year.

**Key words:** Economic losses to governments, illegal wildlife trade chain, crime crossover

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83 Ibid., p. 41.
2 Transnational Organized Crime and Illegal Wildlife Trafficking


Summary: An executive summary of a TRAFFIC report yet to be published, this report looks at ways to reduce wildlife crime. With an impact that reaches beyond environmental concerns, wildlife crime in a globalized world threatens national and international security owing to the involvement of transnational organized crime groups and armed non-state actors, according to an article cited in this report. The authors state that there needs to be increased awareness from governments in order to formulate strategies and overcome the challenges of wildlife crime.

Key words: Armed NSAs, transnational security threats, international engagement


Summary: This article takes a broader examination of transnational environmental crime (TEC). Elliott notes that high profits and low risk make this crime attractive to organized criminal gangs, who engage in transnational schemes involving multiple participants and criminal nodes, enabling bulk consignments of illegal wildlife products to be moved across borders. Janjaweed operating in Chad and Somali armed groups in Kenya are mentioned in connection with the increase in elephant poaching across East and Central Africa, although the role of these groups in the international illegal wildlife trade is not discussed.

Key words: TEC, TOC, institutional corruption, Janjaweed

EUROPOL, ‘EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment’ (2013)

Summary: In this strategic report, trafficking in endangered species (TES) is highlighted as an area of serious organized crime in the EU. It is a niche market attracting highly specialized organized crime groups, which are innovative in obtaining products – from stealing rhino horn in exhibition halls and museums to theft during auction sales. The perception of low risk and high profitability associated with this crime continues to attract interest from criminal organizations. Crime enablers include the economic downturn, cross-border opportunities and the use of the internet, as well as weak legislation. The report notes that more than 30 per cent of crime groups

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in the EU are poly-crime organizations, although the crossover potential between TES and other areas such as arms-trafficking are not explored. Convergence between organized criminal groups and terrorist groups is briefly noted as a marginal issue in the EU.

Key words: EU, organized crime groups, crime enables, crime crossover

EUROPOL, ‘Threat Assessment 2013: Environmental Crime in the EU’ (November 2013)

Summary: EUROPOL’s threat assessment of environmental crime notes that the EU remains one of the most important markets for the trafficking of endangered species (TES), with rhino horn and ivory comprising typical trafficked animal products. The human impact of TES can lead to the loss of state revenues and impoverishment of rural communities where livelihood options are removed; while corruption associated with wildlife trafficking undermines state institutions and the rule of law. Organized criminal groupings involved in TES in the EU are dominated by EU nationals, who exploit the Schengen Agreement to engage in cross-border transportation of products.

Key words: Trafficking, EU, Schengen, TOC, corruption


Summary: This report analyses the scale and impact of various forms of transnational crime, including the illegal wildlife trade. Developing countries – the biggest source of animals that are poached and trafficked – feel the economic and biodiversity losses the most. Lucrative animal products include ivory, tiger bone and rhino horn, used in TEAM or crafted into consumer goods. Haken notes that smuggling these products can be complex and expensive, but high profits can be made once wildlife goods have reached consumer countries. Militia groups have used these profits to fund military operations across Africa, including Janjaweed militia accused of slaughtering elephants in Chad, and Somali warlords involved in illegal elephant and rhino poaching.

Key words: TEAM, armed NSAs, Janjaweed, high profits of IWT


Summary: This report on the proliferation of the global trade in wild animals and animal parts asks: where does the money go? The global reach of the illegal wildlife trade – facilitated by the internet – has made criminal activity difficult to trace, and legal frameworks are inadequate in comparison with those addressing other illicit trades.86 Militia groups implicated in wildlife crime include the Janjaweed in Chad, and Somali warlords connected to poachers in Kenya. Referring to

a 1989 New York Times article, the report states that some African governments funded military expeditions through ivory sales. However, the original article investigated UNITA’s use of ivory revenues to fund its campaign against the Angolan government in the 1970s.

**Key words:** Internet, Janjaweed, UNITA

International Fund for Animal Welfare and INTERPOL, ‘Project Web: An Investigation into the Ivory Trade over the Internet within the European Union’ (February 2013)

**Summary:** Project Web was an INTERPOL-led information-gathering and analysis campaign that took place in the EU over a period of two weeks. Participating member states conducted surveillance on national auction sites to identify advertisements involving the sale of ivory, and identified 702 advertisements from 83 auction sites. The illegal ivory trade over the internet is stimulated by high profits and the lack of e-commerce-adapted legislation implemented by CITES or the EU.

**Key words:** EU, internet ivory sales, IWT legislation


**Summary:** Knapp and Affre examine data on seizures of CITES-listed species, particularly ivory, in or involving Belgium from 1984 to 2006. Data were derived from the EU-TWIX database, an online tool to centralize data monitoring illegal activities relating to trade in fauna and flora covered by the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations. Knapp and Affre found that for ivory seizures carried out by a third party and involving Belgium, that country was identified as the destination in 87 per cent of cases. A significant number of species seized in Belgium had China as the country of destination. Ties between Belgium and former African colonies and protectorates were demonstrated in the data, with half of all ivory seizure cases made in Belgium involving the DRC.

**Key words:** Illegal ivory seizures, EU, Belgium, DRC, colonial links in ivory trade


**Summary:** This report states that organized crime, including the exploitation of natural resources and trafficking of wildlife products in the Great Lakes region, is fuelled by instability, institutional weakness and lawlessness. In eastern DRC, there are an estimated 6,500–13,000 active members of militia groups benefitting from criminal activity. The ivory trade from Central Africa is classed as a transnational organized crime with a clear commercial motive, unlike the bushmeat trade.

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89 Available at: http://www.eu-twix.org/.
which rarely crosses international borders. This report argues that much of the elephant poaching in the DRC is conducted by elements of the Congolese army as well as armed non-state actors including Mai Mai rebel groups and the FDLR.92

**Key words:** Great Lakes, ivory trade chain, DRC, Congolese army, Mai Mai rebels, FDLR


**Summary:** Environmental resource trafficking is identified as a major transnational organized crime flow, specifically the trafficking of wildlife and wildlife products from Africa to Asia. This report breaks down each stage of the illegal wildlife trade chain. Elephants from Central Africa and rhinos from Southern Africa are routinely poached, with evidence linking the involvement of militant Somali and Sudanese groups. In Southeast Asia, the volumes of wildlife harvested are ‘staggering’, with tigers noted to be on the verge of extinction as the result of poaching. According to this report, the more endangered the species, the higher the profit that can be made.

**Key words:** TOC, illegal wildlife trade chain, tiger parts

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92 Ibid., p. 17.
3 Addressing Demand: Seizures and Policy Responses


Summary: According to AWI, more ivory is being smuggled out of Africa than at any other time since the 1989 CITES trade ban. This is mainly to feed Asian demand. INTERPOL has recognized the involvement of transnational organized crime groups in the ivory trade – notably armed groups such as the LRA, al Shabaab, and the Janjaweed and Abu Tira of Sudan. According to the article, an African poacher can receive $80 for one kilogram of ivory, which sells for $1,800 per kilogram in Thailand wholesale, while the ivory’s street value can reach up to $60,000 for 10 kilograms (2013). The article shines a spotlight on elephant poaching in Tanzania, after abortive attempts by the government to legalize the sale of 101 tonnes of stockpiled ivory to Asian buyers in 2013. It notes the increasing American interest in tackling poaching in Africa, but highlights a lack of analysis of the rising demand from Asia, and of linked criminal activities such as money-laundering and weapons proliferation.

Key words: East Asia demand, INTERPOL, Tanzania, al Shabaab, Janjaweed, Abu Tira, linked criminal activities

Environmental Investigation Agency, A Deadly Game of Cat and Mouse: How Tiger Criminals give China the Run-Around (2009)

Summary: In 2009, the EIA investigated the illegal trade in Asian big cats in China. Targeting retail premises across China, traders revealed trafficking routes and methods of concealment. Traders were aware of the scarcity of wild tigers; this fact was seen as an opportunity to increase profits. In this report, The EIA recommends that China must establish a ‘specialised multi-enforcement unit’ that is able to investigate criminal networks engaged in wildlife trafficking and trade, and that a permanent ban in all trade in all parts and derivatives of tigers and other Asian big cats must be implemented and enforced.

Key words: Asian big cats, tigers, China, regulating tiger trade, enforcement

94 EIA, A Deadly Game of Cat and Mouse’, p. 2.
95 Ibid.

**Summary:** Tanzania and Zambia are major conduit and exporting countries for illegal ivory from other African elephant range states, and also have considerable illegal domestic ivory markets, both for tourists and for large-scale export to China and Vietnam. A significant proportion of recent ivory seizures originated in Tanzania and Zambia, indicating the involvement of organized criminal syndicates. These criminal syndicates rely upon high levels of collusion and corruption between the private sector and government institutions, which undermines enforcement. This article states that there are serious allegations that Zambia has reorganized its stockpile data to favourably reflect its inventory of ivory.

**Key words:** Tanzania, Zambia, corruption, low prosecution rates, stockpiled ivory

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Vietnam’s Illegal Rhino Horn Trade: Undermining the Effectiveness of CITES’ (February 2013)

**Summary:** This briefing argues that by engaging in the trade in rhino horn, Vietnam has diminished the effectiveness of CITES in the trade of rhino products. Vietnam is the largest market for illegally traded and poached rhino horns from South Africa. Vietnam has reportedly not seized one single illegally imported rhino horn or prosecuted traders since 2008 and is using loopholes through sport hunting in South Africa to develop a domestic market in rhino horn. Organized crime syndicates are involved in rhino poaching and smuggling in range and consumer countries. Rhino horn has historically been used for traditional medicine in East Asia, but is increasingly sold as a luxury consumer item and for recreational consumption. Political corruption facilitates the illegal trade; noted in the article is the case of a Vietnamese embassy employee in South Africa who was caught on tape conducting a rhino horn transaction in front of the Vietnamese embassy in Pretoria.

**Key words:** Vietnam, rhino horn trade, CITES, South Africa, institutional weakness


**Summary:** An investigation into the illicit wildlife trade in Asia, primarily driven by the practice of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), this report notes that threats posed by both illegal and legal trade in wildlife include economic loss and the strengthening of organized criminal and militant groups which use the illegal wildlife trade to finance their activities. Animals under threat owing to demand for TCM include tigers and all Asian and African species of rhinoceros. Armed non-state actors and government groups are implicated in the trade, including the Taliban in Asia, Somali rebel groups poaching rhinos in Kenya, UNITA and the Janjaweed poaching elephants, and RENAMO, accused of trading in both rhino horn and ivory.

**Key words:** TCM, Asia IWT, tigers, rhinoceros, Taliban, Janjaweed, UNITA, RENAMO

**Summary:** The unprecedented surge in ivory seizures in 2011 is pointed out in this report: 5,259 elephant tusks were seized worldwide, while China continues to be the world's main consumer of smuggled ivory.\(^96\) Carried out two and a half years after the CITES-approved sale of 62 tonnes of ivory in 2009, which was followed by the establishment of an ivory trade control system in China, this survey demonstrates the widespread selling of illegal ivory laundered through the legal market. The most common violation found in licensed shops was the lack of government-issued ivory identification cards. Far from saturating the market and driving down prices and demand, the selling of ivory stockpiles has failed to reduce prices and control illegal trade.\(^97\)

**Key words:** China’s legal ivory trade, laundered illegal ivory


**Summary:** This report summarizes the findings of an automated web crawling surveillance system developed to monitor reports on illegally traded wildlife.\(^98\) For one year, from 1 August 2010 to 31 July 2011, English-language articles from official and unofficial sources on the illegal wildlife trade were collected and categorized by location and species. Countries with the highest numbers of reports include India, the United States, South Africa, China and Vietnam. Hotspots for illegal wildlife seizures include Ho Chi Minh City, where 7.28 kg of rhino horns were seized at Ho Chi Minh City airport in June 2013,\(^99\) and Hong Kong, where ivory worth $1.5 was confiscated in October 2013.\(^100\)

**Key words:** Illegal wildlife seizures, US, Asia


**Summary:** This report looks at the legal and illegal ivory trade in China, finding that domestic trade control mechanisms in China are unable to regulate the trade in such a way that elephant populations in Africa and Asia are not threatened. Under the current conditions, the legal international trade in elephant ivory will lead to increased elephant poaching, which in turn would make existing controls harder to enforce. The report states that there has been a significant increase in ivory processing and sales since the ivory registration system was implemented in 2004 by the State Forestry Administration. Investigations revealed that illegal ivory was sold on the black market, or alongside legal ivory sold in registered shops. Traders knew about the registration system, but few were able to fully comprehend the legal requirements. Smuggled ivory mainly came from Africa; with Japan, South Korea, the US and Europe constituting the main consumer countries for ivory products processed in China.

**Key words:** Legal ivory trade in China, black market, Western consumers, US, Europe

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96 Gabriel et al., 'Making a Killing'; p. 2.
97 Ibid., p. 3.
99 Tuổi trẻ News (2013), ‘7.28 kg of rhino horns seized at HCMC airport’.
100 AP (2013), ‘HK nabs $1.5 in ivory in 3rd big bust since July’. 
Kang, Sue and Marcus Phipps, ‘A Question of Attitude: South Korea’s Traditional Medicine Practitioners and Wildlife Conservation’, TRAFFIC East Asia (June 2003)

Summary: This TRAFFIC report profiles the attitudes of South Korea’s traditional medicine practitioners towards the use and conservation of wildlife species in traditional Korean medicine (TKM), including tiger and rhinoceros. Under CITES and South Korean laws, the trade in tiger and rhinoceros is banned. A survey of 256 traditional medicine practitioners found that there was a substantial decrease in 1993 and 2001 in the use of tiger bone and rhino horn, and that practitioners were aware of wildlife regulations. TKM practitioners used substitutes for all species and would do so more often if their equivalent efficacy were proven. Few practitioners felt that campaigns to reduce demand would be effective to ensure the survival of threatened species; rather, a total ban on trade would be most effective.

Key words: TKM, Korean wildlife laws, traditional medicine substitutes


Summary: This report summarizes TRAFFIC’s work investigating the escalating illicit trade in rhino horns from South Africa to Vietnam. Although there is extensive research into the supply side of the trade in South Africa, the authors point out that there is little empirical data for understanding the demand on the Vietnamese side. Hunting is allowed but restricted for South Africa’s rhino populations (black rhinoceros and white rhinoceros), but for a range of socio-economic and political reasons South Africa is exposed to unusually high levels of crime and corruption, and the illegal wildlife trade exists alongside legal hunting activities in the game industry. Asian operatives are involved across the illegal rhino horn trade, as the organization of South Africa’s trade in this commodity has evolved into a sophisticated criminal enterprise.

Key words: South Africa, Vietnam, rhinoceros horn, South African rhino hunting law


Summary: This report summarizes TRAFFIC illegal wildlife seizure reports from 1996 to 2008, including seizures of ivory, tiger skin, live reptiles and other wildlife products. Most seizures originate in Southeast Asia. Alongside the possible threat of emerging diseases being spread by illegal wildlife trade, it is noted that this crime also undermines the efforts of developing nations to manage their natural resources, resulting in economic loss to governments and the threat of violence and corruption through criminal gangs.

Key words: TRAFFIC, illegal wildlife seizures, emerging diseases, economic loss, institutional corruption

**Summary:** Although focusing on the illegal wildlife trade within Asia, this study provides a useful overview of attempts to understand the economic and social drivers of illegal markets for wildlife. Southeast Asia is noted as a major consumer and supplier of wildlife products, with severe implications for conservation and development at local, national and regional levels. It was found that wealth was a stronger driver of illegal and unsustainable wildlife trade in Southeast Asia than poverty, owing to the dynamics of increasing affluence and wider processes of economic growth in the region.101

**Key words:** Southeast Asia, wealth as a driver of IWT


**Summary:** According to this bulletin, rhino poaching in Southern Africa is on the rise, largely driven by consumer demand in the Far East where the street value of rhino horn is worth more than gold ($65,000 as opposed to $52,000 per kg).102 The hub of the rhino poaching epidemic is South Africa, where 93 per cent of world’s white rhino population and 40 per cent of black rhino populations live. A trophy-hunting legal loophole is being exploited by organized criminal syndicates, which use hunting permits to export illegal rhino horns to the Far East.

**Key words:** Rhino horn, Southern Africa, legal loopholes, Asian demand


**Summary:** According to this threat assessment carried out by the UNODC, demand for ivory in Asia has fuelled a rising rate of ivory poaching in East Africa, which is trafficked through ports in Kenya and Tanzania, making both countries source and transit points along the trade chain. Increasingly, poaching in East Africa involves armed non-state actors, ‘particularly Somali gangs’.103 Expatriate Chinese residents living in East Africa may operate as middlemen, with Thailand and China remaining two of the most important destinations for illegal wildlife products.104

**Key words:** East Asia demand, East Africa, TOC, armed NSAs

104 Ibid.
4 The Ivory Trade pre-1989 CITES Ban


**Summary:** Ellis states that South Africa pursued a policy of destabilization across southern Africa during the 1980s, funded by its involvement in the ivory trade. According to the author, officers of the South African Military Intelligence Directorate imported raw ivory from Angola and Mozambique to export to Far East Asia.\(^{105}\) Regarding debate that led to the CITES ban on ivory trading in 1989, South African authorities and conservationists asserted that elephant herds in South Africa were healthy and growing, necessitating periodic culls. Although these assertions were correct, Ellis points out that elephant culls produced no more than seven tonnes of ivory annually, whereas South Africa was exporting around 49 tonnes of ivory in 1985, ‘reflecting the country's growth as a conduit for the illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn.’\(^{106}\)

**Key words:** South Africa 1980s ivory trade, Angola, Mozambique, elephant culls


**Summary:** According to Ellis, during the wars affecting southern Africa from the mid-1960s to the 1990s, SADF and its Chief of Staff (Intelligence) as well as RENAMO, UNITA and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, traded in ivory ‘partly as a means of paying for South African aid in weapons and other services, and partly as a technique of destabilization.’\(^{107}\) Ellis analyses the 1989 interview of former SADF soldier Colonel Jan Breytenbach by the Environmental Investigation Agency’s Ros Reeve. Col. Breytenbach alleged that SADF and the CSI were implicated in the ivory trade in Angola in the 1970s, although Ellis points out that ‘considerable doubt’ remains as to the precise nature of SADF involvement. Breytenbach’s claims were refuted by the South African Police in 1993.

**Key words:** South Africa 1980s ivory trade, SADF, RENAMO, UNITA, Rhodesian Selous Scouts, ivory trade pre-1989

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\(^{105}\) Ellis, ‘Of Elephants and Men’, p. 53.
\(^{106}\) Ibid., p. 63.
**5 Political Engagement: Collaboration, Legislation and CITES**

Bongo Ondimba, Ali, HE President of Gabon, speaking at the 2013 Panel Discussion held by the African Development Bank, 30 May 2013

**Summary:** At the 2013 African Development Bank (AfDB) Annual Meeting, President Ali Bongo was asked by the AfDB’s President Donald Kaberuka to highlight the growing problem of wildlife trafficking. He stated that this is ‘not simply an environmental issue’: wildlife crime excluding illicit trafficking in fisheries and timber is worth up to $10 billion per year. Poachers have moved into regions rich with natural resources across Africa, perpetuating civil conflict. Wildlife crime poses a serious threat to the sovereignty and stability of many African countries, destroying natural assets and deterring investment and ‘hindering [the] growth of entire nations’. He cited instability in the CAR in 2013 as being directly linked to the destabilizing nature of wildlife crime. In Gabon, park rangers are increasingly being attacked by poachers, and Gabon has lost a third of its elephants over the last ten years. The president called upon the AfDB to launch an emergency fund for ‘environmental crises’, and for international collaboration on the issue of wildlife crime.

**Key words:** AfDB, Gabon, elephant poaching, civil conflict


**Summary:** Cardamone, Managing Director of Global Financial Integrity, spoke on the connection between illegal wildlife trafficking and threats to American national security. Action taken by the American government to combat terrorism following the September 11 terrorist attacks drove groups such as Al-Qaeda to seek new sources of funding. Al-Qaeda affiliates must now raise funding on their own, and the illicit wildlife trade, with its low risks and high profit potential, is a major new source of revenue, which is also being accessed by armed non-state actors in Africa. Across Central and East Africa, armed non-state actors and some government forces accused of poaching for profit include Shabaab and the SPLA, the Congolese Army, the FDLR and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in the DRC. UNITA and RENAMO were found by the Congressional Research Service to have been involved in wildlife trafficking in Angola and Mozambique.

**Key words:** National security, Al-Qaeda, al Shabaab, SPLA, FDLR, CNDP, UNITA, RENAMO

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**Summary:** The African Elephant Action Plan was presented by the African elephant range states at the CITES CoP15 to address the situation on the ground concerning the protection of African elephants. This plan is aimed at accessing resources towards strengthening enforcement capacity in African elephant range states, enhancing capacity-building and development programmes and implementing the CITES 'Action Plan for the Control of Trade in Elephant Ivory' (adopted at CoP13, 2007). It provides a mechanism for the international donor community to channel funds into elephant conservation through a process managed by all African elephant range states.

**Key words:** African Elephant Action plan, AERS, CITES

CITES, ‘Control of Trade in Ivory in China’, Sixty-second meeting of the Standing Committee (July 2012)

**Summary:** This document was submitted by the CITES Management Authority of China. Measures taken by China to address the growing trade in ivory are discussed, including the labelling of raw and worked ivory in the domestic legal trade of ivory, the setting up of the Inter-agency CITES Enforcement Coordination Group, improved border controls regarding ivory smuggling, prosecutions in ivory-smuggling cases and regulation of the online trade in ivory. Given the rise in poaching and smuggling, it is suggested that the ban on international trade in ivory has failed and that CITES parties should consider the use of legally obtained and confiscated ivory.

**Key words:** China ivory trade measures

CITES, ‘Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing and Ivory Trade’, SC62 Doc. 46.1 (Rev. 1) (July 2012)

**Summary:** At the sixty-second meeting of the CITES Standing Committee, held from 23 to 27 July 2012, this document was prepared by the Secretariat to identify parties whose controls of the internal trade in ivory are inadequate following consultation of updated MIKE and ETIS data. Recommendations directed to the parties centred on implementing sufficient measures to ensure efficient controls to stem the illegal killing of elephants. China was called upon to submit a review of its internal trade data and measures taken to comply with CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15),

**Key words:** CITES, MIKE, ETIS, China, internal ivory trade


**Summary:** Douglas-Hamilton noted the recent upsurge in elephant poaching, which has reached similar levels to those witnessed before the 1989 ivory trade ban, and the need for international action to address this issue. Despite concerted action to protect African elephants by American
political entities and conservation groups, local poachers are contravening conservation efforts, as 'local ivory prices have reached a point at which criminals are willing to target even well protected … populations'. Implications for security include transboundary militancy funded by poaching (noted here with ties to Sudan and Somalia), related transnational organized crime activities and corruption. The author cites success stories where increased security measures were taken to reduce levels of illegal killing, including the anti-poaching tactics of the KWS and action taken by the Gabonese government to protect forest elephants in Wonga-Wongue Reserve.

**Key words:** Security implications of poaching, KWS, Gabon, political action

Eliasson, Jan, UN Deputy Secretary-General, remarks at 68th UN General Assembly side event on ‘Poaching and Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Multidimensional Crime and Growing Challenge to the International Community’, 26 September 2013

**Summary:** Jan Eliasson noted the links between the illegal trade in wildlife and drug-smuggling, arms-smuggling and human trafficking, citing the trade as a threat to the three pillars of the United Nations: human rights, peace and security, and development. Fragile states are particularly vulnerable because they lack the means to prevent exploitation of natural resources and control borders, and fall victim to armed militia groups such as the LRA. Poaching is a national and sub-regional security threat, which needs a coordinated inter-agency effort to counter it. He urged member states to strengthen penalties against wildlife crime and work to quash demand through education.

**Key words:** UN, security threats of poaching, international cooperation

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Enforcement Not Extinction: Zero Tolerance on Tiger Trade’ (February 2011)

**Summary:** This article looks at key recommendations on law enforcement in the tiger trade following the International Tiger Forum, held in November 2010 in Russia. Then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, leader of the tiger range countries (TRC), endorsed the Global Tiger Recovery Program (GTRP) to double the tiger population by 2022, the next Year of the Tiger. However, many strategies advocated in the Forum have not been implemented by TRCs. The EIA calls upon governments to improve enforcement to combat the tiger trade, to strengthen international cooperation to disrupt transnational crime networks and to tackle corruption in wildlife crime. There is also a lack of understanding in the tiger conservation community about the nature of the trade, and greater multi-agency intelligence sharing is needed where transnational organized crime activities overlap.

**Key words:** TRC, GTRP, Russia, law enforcement, institutional weakness

Summary: This report reflects the theme of the 22nd session of the UNODC’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: ‘The challenge posed by emerging forms of crime that have a significant impact on the environment and ways to deal with it effectively’. The report aims to stimulate action on criminal justice issues relating to wildlife crime, by promoting international adoption of the UN Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit. Wildlife crime operates across borders, constituting a threat to territorial integrity and security, with the involvement of many militia groups including the Janjaweed, Somali rebels and FDLR. Wildlife crime overlaps with other criminal activities including illicit trade in arms, corruption and money-laundering, and undermines governments’ ability to halt illicit activities.

Key words: CCPCJ, UNODC, Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit

Summary: The EU Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo, Marcel van Opstal, noted the international community’s increasing awareness of the dangers posed by the illegal wildlife trade, which threatens state stability and the rule of law. The EU’s response to the illegal wildlife trade comprises three tactics: conservation, security and governance. The European Commission (EC) supports the IUCN’s project Biodiversity and Protected Area Management (BIOPAMA) which addresses threats to biological diversity in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, while reducing poverty in protected areas. The EC also encourages African countries to institute or improve national laws to protect wildlife.

Key words: EU, BIOPAMA, legislation

Summary: Favre sets out the management dilemmas of maintaining elephant populations within the legal context of CITES. By listing African elephants in Appendix I or II, CITES seeks to regulate the international trade in ivory; however, the down-listing of elephant populations in Southern Africa raises the inherent conflict between managing elephant populations that are not threatened with extinction and the need to protect endangered populations.

Key words: CITES, international law, legal ivory trade

Fedotov, Yury, UNODC Executive Director, remarks at 68th UN General Assembly side event on ‘Poaching and Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Multidimensional Crime and Growing Challenge to the International Community’, 26 September 2013

**Summary:** Yury Fedotov spoke of the ‘devastating impact’ that poaching and wildlife crime has on communities, the environment and on security. Criminals participating in the illegal wildlife trade are fuelling corruption and violence, and undermining the rule of law. He noted that the international community needs to strengthen legislation and treat poaching and wildlife trafficking as ‘serious criminal offences.’ He highlighted the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), an alliance formed in 2010 between the CITES Secretariat, the World Bank, the World Customs Organization, INTERPOL and the UNODC. The ICCWC is a mechanism for delivering a coordinated approach to wildlife crime, and through the ICCWC, The UNODC developed the *Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit* to assist member states to strengthen their national criminal justice systems.

**Key words:** UNODC, ICCWC, *Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit*

Hague, William, UK Foreign Secretary, remarks at 68th UN General Assembly side event on ‘Poaching and Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: A Multidimensional Crime and Growing Challenge to the International Community’, 26 September 2013

**Summary:** Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that the illegal wildlife trade, worth ‘up to 19 billion dollars each year’, funds terrorism and undermines stability and development. He noted that the illegal trade in species such as rhinos, elephants, tigers and orang-utans feeds corruption and undermines stability in fragile states, while funding criminal gangs and terrorism. He stated that the international community must take action, to understand fully how the illegal wildlife trade causes instability, and to establish a political commitment to address the trade at the highest levels of government.

**Key words:** Weak states, security threats, international collaboration

HRH The Prince of Wales, speaking at the ‘Wildlife Trade: Meeting of Governments’ conference at Clarence House, 21 May 2013

**Summary:** HRH The Prince of Wales highlighted one impact of serious environmental crime as the potential destabilization of global economic and political security. He noted that profits from wildlife trafficking have been linked to organized criminal networks and in some cases terrorist groups. He urged the participating heads of state to prioritize tackling the illegal wildlife trade, in time for the forthcoming Heads of State Conference in 2013.

**Key words:** Economic loss, state security, political collaboration

113 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-remarks-at-illegal-wildlife-trade-event.
114 The British government hosted 22 governments from key range, transit and destination countries affected by the illegal wildlife trade, with the aim to initiate dialogue on tackling this phenomenon. Speeches were made by HRH The Prince of Wales, HRH The Duke of Cambridge and Owen Patterson, Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs, among others.
Kerry, John, US Secretary of State, ‘Ivory and Insecurity: The Global Implications of Poaching in Africa’, Chair’s Statement at the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2012

Summary: As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, US Secretary of State John Kerry spoke about the global implications of poaching in Africa. He emphasized the human costs of illegal wildlife trafficking: the security threat of armed poachers operating in areas of weak governance, the spread of corruption and the devastation of opportunities for tourism and development. Stating that ‘poaching is interwoven into some of Central and East Africa’s most brutal conflicts’, Kerry alluded to poaching activities by all parties involved in conflict in the DRC (including the Congolese Army), Sudanese poachers operating in the CAR, and Somali actors poaching and smuggling out ivory from Kenya.

Key words: Central and East Africa, civil conflict, TOC, corruption, illicit elephant poaching


Summary: This report investigates the conditions under which an international trade in ivory could take place. A notional design for a process in ivory trade suggested is the establishment of a Central Ivory Selling Organization (CISO), to regulate a trade in ivory produced through natural mortality, culling and trophy-hunting. Intra-Africa trade in raw ivory would not be allowed, but Appendix II states would benefit through levies on ivory sales, which would also fund the CISO.

Key words: Legal ivory trade


Summary: The Secretary-General of CITES stated that the scale of the illegal wildlife trade poses an immediate risk both to wildlife and to people and their livelihoods. To address this risk, coordinated enforcement at global, regional and national levels must take place; additional financial and human resources are needed, and the demand driving illegal trade must be addressed. Strong political messages from the highest possible levels are required to combat the illegal trade in wildlife.

Key words: International coordination, tackling demand


Summary: This report investigated the impact of the first CITES-approved ivory sale on elephant poaching. Following the transferral of the elephant populations of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia from CITES Appendix I to II in 1997 (upon their request), a single ‘experimental’ export of raw ivory from declared stocks was declared from these countries to Japan. ETIS and MIKE were systems created to monitor and report legal and illegal ivory trade as a condition of
renewed ivory trade, but the burden of proof to adhere to these systems was shifted to the African elephant range states from the CITES Standing Committee. Following the experimental sales in Zimbabwe, poaching has increased, with Kenya emerging as a major ivory trade route, and seizures of ivory en route to Asia have soared.

Key words: Appendix II African elephants, ETIS, MIKE, ivory auctions


Summary: The Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit provides an overview of the main issues related to environmental offences and legislation in affected countries. In Africa, the Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna is mentioned; this is intended to encourage and facilitate wildlife law enforcement in Africa with a task force seconded by CITES parties. Following reports that many armed non-state actors have diversified into the illegal wildlife trade, many offences may fall within the scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Insurgent groups may target wildlife to raise funds for militancy, as seen in the Great Lakes region, and are implicated in the illegal wildlife trade chain. However, the Toolkit does not investigate this in more detail.

Key words: TOC, MEAs, legislation, illegal wildlife trade chain, Lusaka Agreement, CITES, Great Lakes


Summary: In this report to the United States Congress, Wyler and Pervaze state that wildlife smuggling poses a transnational security threat, involving transnational organized crime syndicates, armed non-state actors and, according to anecdotal evidence, terrorist groups. Increased recognition of the consequences of wildlife trafficking has evoked new international responses, with the issue highlighted by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012, and by President Obama’s Executive Order 13648 on Combating Wildlife Trafficking in 2013, which identified wildlife trafficking as an escalating international crisis that must be addressed in the US national interest because of its role in fuelling instability and undermining security.

Key words: US government, legislation, high-level engagement

115 Thornton et al., Lethal Experiment, p. 6.
116 Ibid., p. 19.
117 Ibid., p. 30.
118 Available at: http://lusakaagreement.org/.
121 Ibid., p. 147.
1. Reference Guide to Species

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<td>Appendix I and II (in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa)</td>
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<td>Southern White Rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum simum)</td>
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<td>Tiger (Panthera tigris)</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
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2. CITES Appendices

According to the CITES Appendices website [abridged]:

- Appendix I lists species that are the most endangered among CITES-listed animals and plants. They are threatened with extinction and CITES prohibits international trade in specimens of these species except when the purpose of the import is not commercial.

- Appendix II lists species that are not necessarily now threatened with extinction but that may become so unless trade is closely controlled. International trade in specimens of Appendix-II species may be authorized by the granting of an export permit or re-export certificate. No import permit is necessary for these species under CITES (although a permit is needed in some countries that have taken stricter measures than CITES requires).

- Appendix III is a list of species included at the request of a Party that already regulates trade in the species and that needs the cooperation of other countries to prevent unsustainable or illegal exploitation. International trade in specimens of species listed in this Appendix is allowed only on presentation of the appropriate permits or certificates.

123 The CITES Appendices: www.cites.org/eng/app/.
3. The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) [abridged]\(^{124}\)

ETIS is a comprehensive information system to track illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products. Its aim is to record and analyse levels and trends in illegal trade. The central component of ETIS is a database on seizures of elephant specimens that have occurred anywhere in the world since 1989.

The fundamental objectives of the monitoring system are:

- Measuring and recording current levels and trends, and changes in levels and trends of illegal trade in elephant range States, and in trade entrepôts;
- Assessing whether and to what extent observed trends are related to changes in the listing of elephant populations in the CITES appendices and/or the resumption of legal international trade in ivory;
- Establishing an information base to support the making of decisions on appropriate management, protection and enforcement needs;
- Building capacity in range States.

4. Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) [abridged]\(^{125}\)

The goal of MIKE is to provide the information needed for African elephant range States to make appropriate management and enforcement decisions, and to build institutional capacity within the range States for the long-term management of their elephant populations.

The objectives of this goal are:

- To measure levels and trends in the illegal hunting of elephants;
- To determine changes in these trends over time;
- To determine the factors causing or associated with such changes, and to try and assess in particular to what extent observed trends are a result of any decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties to CITES.


5. African Elephant Range States\textsuperscript{126}


6. Tiger Range Countries\textsuperscript{127}

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Russia, Thailand, Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{126} As listed under CITES African Elephant Action Plan, CoP15 Inf. 68.

\textsuperscript{127} As listed under the Global Tiger Initiative: http://globaltigerinitiative.org/news-blog/by-tag/tiger-range-countries/.
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Global Impacts of the Illegal Wildlife Trade

The Costs of Crime, Insecurity and Institutional Erosion

Katherine Lawson and Alex Vines

February 2014