

Book reviews

International Relations theory

Before anarchy: Hobbes and his critics in modern international thought. By Theodore Christov. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 297pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10711 453 1. Available as e-book.

This ambitious study of the impact of Thomas Hobbes's writings on international theory has much to commend it, in terms of both scope and substance. Theodore Christov is primarily concerned to challenge the 'common assumption that has come to dominate the theory and practice of statehood: that the spheres of the domestic and the foreign are fundamentally distinct from each other'. What is seen to be their 'radically binary nature' remains uncontested: 'the internal creates peacefulness and order from within, whereas the external perpetuates warfare and anarchy from without' (p. 3).

Christov cites English School thinking as a more convincing alternative to orthodox 'crude' realism with its emphasis on *realpolitik* unconstrained by law and morality. By contrast, Hobbes's international theory supports a more nuanced interpretation of his thought, in particular of an 'international society of states' governed by rules and norms which provide a 'relatively stable and self-regulatory international order, albeit the same label of "anarchy" is now attached to an alternative model of global organisation' (p. 20).

Part one of the book is concerned with elucidating what Hobbes really said 'about the relationship between the domestic and the foreign' (p. 27). Part two examines how Hobbes was received 'before the emergence of a "discourse of anarchy" in the 20th century' (p. 27).

Space will not permit a detailed exegesis of the individual chapters in the first part. All four provide fascinating, indeed original, insights into Hobbes's views on the relationship between the internal and external domains; the fourth, 'Hobbes against anarchy', is perhaps the most challenging, calling into question the view—as the author makes abundantly clear—that 'Hobbes serves as a form of shorthand for international lawlessness deprived of a normative system in any sense' (p. 104).

The next question to ask, Christov claims, is 'how does Hobbes oppose anarchy?' (p. 105). There follows a penetrating critique of realism—classical, neo-realist and structural—together with rational choice interpretations. Again, reference is made to the work of English School theorists—Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull in particular—who, Christov argues, have claimed rightly that 'the absence of an overarching power does not necessitate the Realist view that states live in a permanent condition of a Hobbesian state of nature', devoid of any moral constraints (p. 108). There is, too, a detailed discussion of Hobbes's views on international law which, Christov argues, lack 'systematic treatment' (p. 116). Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of Hobbes as anti-imperialist.

The second part of the volume productively engages with three key thinkers of the early modern period: Pufendorf, Rousseau and Vattel. Christov cites the work of David

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Armitage and Quentin Skinner as major influences on his work and, in particular, on his attempts to bridge the intellectual gap between political theory and its international counterpart.

To this end, we are offered a detailed, indeed exhaustive, discussion of Pufendorf's writings, conclusively demonstrating that there is an 'intellectual convergence' (currently unacknowledged in the literature) between the political theory of Hobbes and Pufendorf, who is described as a 'closeted Hobbesian who strategically works to create a gulf between himself and his predecessor' (p. 28). Furthermore, in chapter six, the author claims that behind his 'international sociability' there lurks a 'fundamental agreement with Hobbes: states voluntarily enter into alliances of utility in closely replicating the strength of defence confederacies among natural men' (p. 28). Similarly, the analysis of the works of Rousseau and Vattel, and their relevance for an understanding of Hobbes, is well done: for Christov, Rousseau 'remains trapped in his own pessimism about international peace: a permanent state of war amongst states is the price to pay for maintaining their domestic liberty' (p. 28). By contrast, Vattel 'squares the circle of state sovereignty with duties to humanity' (p. 28).

These brief summaries do scant justice to the intellectual depth of Christov's text. What is impressive is the richness of the analysis, based—as it is—on a formidable trawling of abundant primary and secondary sources. Indeed, throughout the book, the author has practised, successfully, what he preached in the opening chapters: the need to focus on the 'mutually reinforcing dynamic' between 'the domestic and the foreign' in the thinking and practice of statehood (p. 3). This book provides ample evidence of Christov's skill in demonstrating the creative and crucial overlap between orthodox political theory and its counterpart in the international sphere. Realists of all persuasions will ponder the author's view that his book 'defends a distinctive and underappreciated Hobbes for Political Theory as an international theorist with deep commitment to universal norms and a keen sense of global justice in a world of sovereign states. His followers throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries remained equally committed to an international sphere that respects state autonomy and upholds a set of normative rules as desirable for their continued autonomy' (p. 270).

The book concludes with some personal reflections on the future direction of both theory and practice in the study of International Relations. *Before anarchy* deserves a wide readership; it will certainly stimulate debate and in general provide a benchmark for future research in this area.

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Terrorism and the right to resist: a theory of just revolutionary war. By **Christopher J. Finlay**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 339pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 10704 093 9. Available as e-book.

Christopher Finlay is reader in political theory at the University of Birmingham. Before that, he taught at those rival establishments in Dublin, Trinity College and University College, which may account for his generosity in examining views with which it turns out he has little sympathy. He quotes for instance the armchair revolutionary Slavoj Žižek's 'provocative' challenge to those who believe in 'equality, human rights and freedoms' to 'gather the courage' to acknowledge 'the terror needed to really defend and assert' those values. In fact, Finlay's 'nuanced, careful' but rigorous approach (p. 9) is exactly what the subject requires. It becomes plain that important issues of moral and political philosophy are engaged with.

What, then, is ‘just revolutionary war’? Just war theory asks when one state is justified in going to war against another (*jus ad bellum*) and what rules should govern the way they fight (*jus in bello*, the laws of armed conflict). But modern conflict is increasingly asymmetric, setting states against a variety of non-state opponents. Finlay’s study embraces non-violent resistance to the state (as a possible option), rebellion and revolution. Terrorism, though, as Žižek’s summons to arms shows, is probably best regarded as a means to an end, however ill-defined that end may be.

To appreciate Finlay’s approach, it is helpful to start from a simple definition of terrorism. The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 for instance strikes at the use or threat of serious acts of violence (and more recent ways of causing harm) designed to influence governments or intimidate people, ‘for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause’. Whether the cause is good or bad, or the victim is a policeman, soldier or ‘innocent non-combatant’, is irrelevant. Parliament has not been attracted by the terminology that makes such distinctions. (See, too, the interpretative declaration made by the UK government on signing the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, excluding terrorism from their ambit.) This is surely the right stance for a liberal, democratic society when confronted by those seeking change through violent means. But there are bad regimes, where peaceful resistance would be futile or lead to worse consequences for their subjects (as of course might violent resistance). What then? Are no holds barred in resisting? Finlay works his way through the possible forms of organized violent resistance to such regimes, proposing a set of rules, or codes as he calls them, adapting the standard rules where necessary to govern the use of violence.

Part one (‘Theory and principles’) is about *jus ad bellum*. It asks whether there is ever a right, even a duty, to resist. Carefully hedged about with qualifications, the answer is yes. But to ‘say that the use of torture, wrongful killing and so on [by the state] provides a prima facie case for the initiation of armed resistance does not mean that force is necessarily the best way to meet the threat’ (p. 78). The prospects of success must be weighed against the costs; see, too, the ‘proportionality paradox’ graphic at p. 152. Part two, ‘Wars of liberation’, examines the applicability of the laws of war to liberation movements. So long as one bears in mind that their endeavours often end in tears for those they claim to be liberating, Finlay’s dissection of the arguments for allowing them a bit of leeway in the methods they use is exemplary.

In part three, ‘Fighting beyond the law of war’, Finlay advocates a specifically ‘terrorist *jus in bello*’, as preferable to trying to apply the ordinary law of armed conflict to the activities of the terrorist. But, unlike the Terrorism Act 2000, he draws a distinction between ‘legitimate’ and arguably legitimate targets, and what he regards as the real test case, ‘terrorism’ as the deliberate targeting of the innocent non-combatant. ‘The chief point of analyzing the hypothesis that terrorism could be morally justifiable in some conceivable circumstances ... is not to mandate or condone it in any historical cases, but to provide the theoretical equipment we need in order to be able to specify how such cases generally fall short of the necessary justifying conditions. We must, that is, clarify the exception as a means of proving the rule that terrorism ought not generally to be regarded as a legitimate tactic’ (p. 285). Despite Finlay’s subtle analysis, I believe Madame Roland at the guillotine in 1793 got it right: ‘O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!’

Some may feel Finlay’s enterprise is a little unrealistic. Trying to keep the members of regular armed forces in line is hard enough. Things will happen that violate the Geneva Conventions, albeit sometimes under severe provocation. A retired soldier once told me you had to keep a tight grip (demonstrating what he meant by that) on the men under your command. Certainly, those who can shrug off the consequences of their timers that went

off prematurely, or their brutal methods with villagers who just wanted to be left alone, are unlikely to acknowledge any code of conduct. But Finlay is not aiming at such people: they won't read this book. It is for those willing to follow a sustained argument, whether or not they agree with the conclusions, and in that he undoubtedly succeeds.

David Bentley

International history*

The intelligence war in Latin America, 1914–1922. By **Jamie Bisher.** Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 2016. 440pp. Pb.: £70.00. ISBN 978 0 78643 350 6. Available as e-book.

Jamie Bisher is an unusual historian. A graduate of the US Air Force Academy and a Cold War veteran, he is a senior technical writer for an unspecified electronics company in Maryland. Intelligence history is his hobby and passion. This is his second book and apparently the first one ever written in English about intelligence operations in Latin America during the First World War.

The author had to fuse together a bewildering number of stories from many parts of the world. The result is impressive. The book is divided into three main parts: 'European war in Americas, 1914–1916'; 'Strategic side show in Latin America, 1917–1918'; and 'Endgame of the intelligence war in Latin America, 1919–1922'. Bisher's 1922 cut-off date is a good decision, as it allows him to cover the postwar winding down of intelligence operations, which in many cases look like preparations for future conflict.

One of the book's strongest points, and there are many, is the coverage of the German intelligence network in Latin America and Berlin's changing relations with governments in the region. Bisher's depiction of the mostly unstable dictatorial Latin American governments trying to navigate between the main protagonists of the First World War is precise and dispassionate. The German intelligence strategy in Mexico and Argentina is covered particularly well, but the Berlin diplomatic and intelligence campaigns in other Latin American countries are also entertainingly narrated, although many archives in the region have nothing to offer historians researching intelligence during this period. The author admits that his book 'suffers from a reluctant overreliance on US records' and this may be the reason why the coverage of the British operations in the Americas and its cooperation with the US is rather modest, although some Royal Navy operations are well described.

The Germans were a formidable, effective, inventive, tenacious and usually remarkably flexible enemy. All this was not surprising for their European opponents, but with dogmatic and naive foreign policy-makers in Washington—like State Secretary William J. Bryan and President Woodrow Wilson—the US was not in a position to understand its European enemies. Even in January 1917, President Wilson still hoped to mediate a peace in Europe, in spite of 200 acts of German sabotage perpetrated on US soil (p. 86). In September 1919, Wilson admitted not knowing, until the United States entered the war, that Germany was not the only country that had an intelligence service and that the only difference between the German and other intelligence services was that the Germans 'found out more than the others did'. The Germans were well prepared for the intelligence war and even produced a chunky intelligence manual for operators and their commanding officers: 'Instructions for investigative agent of intelligence service who is to be sent to work outside Germany' [*sic*]. Bisher's descriptions of German intelligence and relevant naval operations in and around

* See also Sheila Fitzpatrick, *On Stalin's team*, pp. 1281–2.

both Americas are very interesting, as are the accompanying photographs, some of which are here published for the first time. He is also excellent at explaining the Japanese intelligence and sabotage operations on both continents. Tokyo's openly hostile activities and sabotage in the US continued until the American entry into the war in April 1917. In the postwar period, the Japanese were probably the only member of the allied coalition with a clearly defined intelligence agenda, and their use of foreign intelligence 'subcontractors' after the war was something which other victorious allies simply ignored. The book ends with a chapter describing the postwar lives of the main heroes of the book.

One of the most remarkable lessons of the First World War, which needed to be relearned at devastating cost a quarter-century later, is the threat posed by German submarine warfare and its future potential. The allies suffered tremendous losses and made serious efforts to stop the Germans from deploying their submarines in Latin America—in which they were strangely helped by the Kaiser himself, who delayed deployment of German submarines because he believed in building up the fleet 'before antagonizing Germany's remaining friends and neutrals' (p. 223).

The protagonists genuinely believed that they were waging the war to end all wars. But in parallel with this, Bisher's book is good evidence that 'hybrid war' and 'information warfare' existed long before the authors of today's articles and books on these two fashionable subjects were born. The British use of a small Rhode Island newspaper for publishing scoops about German intelligence and sabotage operations is a perfect example of the seeding of information in mainstream media that would be classified today as information warfare.

Well documented and well presented, this book is a professionally woven tapestry of true and never seen before stories from the First World War.

Henry Plater-Zyberk, The Russia/Ukrainian Defence and Security Review, Czech Republic

A Korean conflict: the tensions between Britain and America. By Ian McLaine. London: I. B. Tauris. 2015. 343pp. £62.00. ISBN 978 1 78453 098 3. Available as e-book.

Anyone reading this book should begin on page 318, where the reader will find the statement that 'in the time between his death and the publication of this monograph, Dr Ian McLaine's footnotes cardfile was lost. The [nineteen] notes below are either the results of archival crosschecks by a posthumous editor or marginal notes that could be confirmed'. This is a great pity because Ian McLaine clearly consulted a wide range of British and American sources—the only major gap being the valuable diary of Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office throughout the period covered by the book—and, as his fellow-Australian, Robert O'Neill (author of the official history of Australia's role in the Korean War), justifiably states in the blurb: 'This is an extremely well-written and important book on a major episode in international relations'.

This is not a strictly chronological study; the book is divided into seven often chronologically overlapping chapters, each one dealing with a particular theme. Indeed, the first chapter, which covers events until the end of 1950, does not concentrate on the Far East at all, but deals mainly with American suspicions of Britain's 'socialist' government and pressure for increased British and west European rearmament. There is no discussion of the communist insurgencies in Malaya or Indochina, which were an important backdrop to the decisions taken when the Korean War broke out.

Subsequent chapters deal with the question of the recognition of the People's Republic of China, over which the two allies disagreed; the outbreak of the Korean War itself;

the British decision to send troops—strongly opposed by the Chiefs of Staff—and the fascinating debate over how to deal with opponents of the war, ranging from the British Communist Party to the former Foreign Office official Sir John Pratt; futile Indian–British overtures to the Soviet Union to enlist Russian support for an end to the war; the fateful decision to cross the 38th parallel; the Chinese intervention; and, finally, the role of General MacArthur until his dismissal in April 1951.

McLaine effectively demolishes some myths. Why, for example, was it a victory for Britain to secure the omission of the phrase ‘centrally-directed Communist imperialism’ from the first draft of Truman’s public announcement of 27 June 1950 on the outbreak of the war, when the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, referred to ‘a world-wide conspiracy against the way of life of the free democracies’ in a broadcast a month later (p. 120)? The author has also coined some memorable sentences: ‘With Munich in their minds and the Americans at their heels ... the British leaders rushed in to support the United States’ (p. 125); ‘The crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations forces in October 1950 was one of the most critical decisions taken in international affairs since 1945’ (p. 201); ‘Like a man trying to take out insurance after his house has started to burn, the West continued to use an increasingly anxious India as a go-between, bearing implausible placatory messages to Peking’ (p. 228). Some of these will doubtless appear in future university examination papers, followed by the command: ‘Discuss’.

On the other hand, was it true that ‘after Chinese intervention the British were dragged along in the wake of the Americans and obliged, ruinously, to add to their already burdensome arms programme ... [as] the *quid pro quo* for Washington’s assurances that the atomic bomb would not be employed against China, and that the war would be contained’ (pp. 201–202)? This reviewer knows of no evidence to support that assertion, except perhaps the assurances given by President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee at their meeting in December 1950. This meeting was in fact prompted precisely by off-the-cuff remarks by Truman at a press conference on 30 November 1950, when asked about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea. It is therefore surprising that McLaine did not discuss this meeting and the nature of the assurances Attlee thought he had obtained. Indeed, he barely mentioned it. Neither did he discuss the occasion in January 1951, when Kenneth Younger, deputizing for the ill Ernest Bevin, succeeded briefly in persuading the cabinet to vote against the United States in the General Assembly of the United Nations on a resolution condemning China as an aggressor. These are important gaps in the author’s narrative. Nevertheless, *A Korean conflict* remains an essential book for anyone interested in the Korean War and the nature of the so-called ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States.

Geoffrey Warner

Governance, law and ethics*

Between Samaritans and states: the political ethics of humanitarian INGOs. By **Jennifer Rubenstein.** Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2015. 472pp. £49.50. ISBN 978 0 19968 410 6. Available as e-book.

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, refugee camps in Burundi, Tanzania and (what was then) Zaire became host to almost 2 million Hutus. The camps in Zaire quickly became highly militarized, with the ex-Rwandan Defence Forces (FAR) regrouping,

* See also Zachary D. Kaufman, *United States law and policy on transitional justice*, pp. 1291–2.

rearming and diverting enormous quantities of humanitarian aid. The international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) working in the camps therefore faced a dilemma over whether to withdraw and consequently deprive legitimate refugees of vital services or to remain knowing that their presence would continue to enable the 'ex'-FAR. This, and other types of ethical conflict facing humanitarian INGOs, is the focus of a new book by Jennifer Rubenstein, *Between Samaritans and states*. Claiming to be the first book-length English-language account of humanitarian INGO political ethics, it seeks not only to explore the ethical challenges that humanitarian agencies face, but also to ask whether, using the right ethical framework, INGOs might be better able to navigate these predicaments in the future.

In contrast to popular ideas of humanitarian agencies as angelic good Samaritans, 'swashbuckling heroes', 'do-gooding machines'—or, alternatively, as 'naïve miscreants or cold narrowly self-interested and profit-driven corporations' (p. 2)—Rubenstein treats humanitarian INGOs as organizations that can do considerable good, but whose actions also have serious limitations and unintended negative effects. While these organizations can't avoid challenging ethical predicaments, they also genuinely wish to navigate these challenges in an ethically sensitive way. What has been lacking up to this point, however, is a satisfactory framework to support and inform INGOs, in part because the classic principles of humanitarian action (impartiality, independence, neutrality and the humanitarian imperative) fall badly short in terms of providing an adequate or reliable account of the realities of humanitarian political ethics on the ground.

To explore alternative norms and frameworks to guide and evaluate INGOs' humanitarian action, Rubenstein adopts what she terms a 'cartographic approach', seeking to construct a metaphorical 'map' that highlights the various ethical responsibilities and practical constraints that INGOs routinely have to navigate. She establishes some basic coordinates using a combination of abstract democratic, egalitarian, justice-based and humanitarian norms that she suggests are all implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the majority of humanitarian INGOs. After establishing why these norms are useful and relevant, and explaining how they improve on other extant political and ethical frameworks, Rubenstein sets out to apply them to the analysis of a number of distinct types of ethical predicaments that she suggests are particularly pervasive and problematic. These include, for example, the 'cost-effectiveness conundrum' that raises moral issues connected with INGOs' allocative decision-making in their control of large-scale aid resources. She starts from the premise that most 'routes' open to humanitarian INGOs in the face of ethical dilemmas require at least some moral sacrifice or compromise, so the question isn't so much how to avoid moral compromise, but which compromises to reject and which ones to accept. Whatever INGOs' intentions or the apparent intrinsic value of their activities, for Rubenstein, it is the *consequences* of INGOs' acts and omissions that are of paramount importance.

Rubenstein emphasizes at the outset that this is a work of political theory and political ethics, not a work of anthropology or journalism or an aid worker's memoir, so the book contains no ethnography, and 'only a few good stories' (p. 3). But her overall approach could have benefited substantially from a much deeper historical grounding. One of the linchpins of Rubenstein's overall analysis, for instance, is the assertion that INGOs are 'somewhat governmental' and 'highly political' (p. 4)—hence the assumed relevance of the democratic, egalitarian and justice-based norms. Precisely how the governmental and political attributes of INGOs have played out in the context of international humanitarian response is not properly charted or explored in a way that puts any real historical detail into the map that she is charting. Drawing more directly on work by historians, political economists and political theorists might not only have provided better substantiation of her

ethical ‘map’, but also have led to a less arbitrary selection of ethical predicaments to focus the analysis on. It might have revealed, too, that the path into humanitarian political ethics is not quite as untrodden as she claims.

Rubenstein’s analysis would also have been strengthened by paying closer (historical) attention to the nature of the wider humanitarian sector and its systemic qualities and hence to humanitarian INGOs’ role and position within the sector. Rubenstein never explains why her focus is specifically on INGOs, as opposed to government donor organizations or UN agencies. In fact, government donors and UN agencies are all but invisible throughout the book: where Rubenstein discusses donors, she is focused almost entirely on private individuals who donate to INGOs. Hence the real-life political and institutional influences, imperatives and constraints created by the wider political economy of the sector—accounting for so much of what is or isn’t done by humanitarian INGOs—are left all but entirely unexplored. Meanwhile, governments are depicted as ideal-type abstractions, based on the notion of a benign and democratic form of government which bears little resemblance to the often hostile and far from democratic regimes that tend to dominate the political landscapes that international humanitarian actors have to navigate to reach people affected by conflict or crisis.

This book certainly has the feel of a pioneering venture into a still under-explored political and ethical territory at the centre of contemporary international governance. Readers might be left wondering whether the ‘map’ that Rubenstein offers to guide them on this journey is really the best one. Nevertheless, she successfully brings to light the extreme ethical complexity and ambiguity of international humanitarian action, while demonstrating the importance and utility of developing and applying a robust framework of political ethics to understanding and addressing the many serious ethical challenges, compromises, conflicts and dilemmas that humanitarian actors face. She rightly highlights the hazards associated with a blind allegiance to the philosophy of humanitarian ‘duty’ without proper regard for the consequences of humanitarian action, and so underlines the need for INGOs and other humanitarian actors to understand and systematically analyse the crisis contexts that they operate in and their role in those contexts. As Rubenstein observes in her conclusion, at the end of the day ethical action will always be as much a matter of developing the appropriate virtues and capacities for judgement as it will be about abiding by particular rules or principles. This, perhaps, is the most important and immediate challenge for humanitarian INGOs if they are not to lose their way in the complex humanitarian crises of the future.

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After violence: transitional justice, peace, and democracy. By Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella Malca and Trine Eide. Abingdon: Routledge. 2015. 217pp. ISBN 978 1 13802 008 5. Available as e-book.

Although the first truth commission was established in the 1970s, the proliferation of transitional justice mechanisms is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1990s. *After violence* represents an important contribution to the literature on transitional justice and continues, in a way, the well-cited seminal research by Priscilla Hayner on truth commissions (*Unspeakable truths*, Routledge, 2001). By enlarging the scope of transitional justice mechanisms to include not only truth commissions but also trials (domestic and international), reparations and amnesty laws, the authors attempt to explore whether these mechanisms matter—i.e. whether they make a contribution to building democracy and peace. Using structured comparative analysis, Elin Skaar, Camila Malca and Trine Eide investigate how

various transitional justice initiatives operate across different settings and across time.

In the first two introductory chapters, the authors discuss contemporary literature on transitional justice and clarify their methodology. While the literature review is systematically organized to highlight the diversity of views, the methodology section—though impressive and detailed—is somewhat lengthy and abundant in academic jargon. The authors include two case-studies from Latin America (Uruguay and Peru) and two from Africa (Rwanda and Angola). Taking peace and democracy as dependent variables, transitional justice mechanisms as independent, and national, regional and global factors as ‘contextual’ variables, they seem to suggest that transitional justice mechanisms inevitably lead to democratization—quite a strong and problematic claim, which is later questioned by the authors themselves when they examine the African cases. In the subsequent chapters, the four case-studies are discussed in detail. While the authors should certainly be praised for their vigorous comparative focus, their analysis, at times, seems sketchy, with little resort to primary sources.

Furthermore, questions can be raised about the importance of domestic ‘veto players’, who might be reluctant to succumb to outside pressures, thus undermining the effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms. A better analysis of domestic political processes is needed in order to judge the extent to which transitional justice mechanisms can be regarded as independent factors capable of influencing policy-making or if they are merely instruments used by the government to pursue certain political ends. Closely related to this is the question of individual personalities. While there is a brief mention of the ‘brave’ and ‘liberal’ judges who took up cases (Peru), readers might be left wondering whether individual members of truth commissions, courts or other mechanisms were able to impact outcomes or if they were agents of the government with certain political agendas.

Throughout the book, the authors assume that civil society pressure is important for putting an end to impunity. It is difficult to grasp, however, what they mean by ‘civil society’: domestic non-governmental organizations, religious groups, victims’ groups, international NGOs, the media? What explains the presence of civil society pressure in some cases (Uruguay and Peru) and not in others (Angola and Rwanda)? It is not clear what exactly the role of civil society is, since the case of Rwanda shows that in the absence of civil society pressures, transitional justice mechanisms might still work, albeit in a selective manner. In the absence of civil society pressures, the authors argue, there must be some other kind of pressure. This leads to a further question relating to what the authors call the ‘selectiveness’ of international involvement: is it a facilitating condition for transitional justice initiatives or an impediment to domestic reconciliation processes, given the variety of international actors involved in post-conflict processes, ranging from intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs to profit-oriented multinational companies?

The link between public perceptions of transitional justice and the way these mechanisms work is also insufficiently explored. Statistical sources, questionnaires and interviews to examine public dynamics could have made this research more illuminating. The question of public perception is connected to the availability of modern technologies: how do transitional justice initiatives interact with the public? To what extent do modern technologies facilitate this interaction? On a number of occasions, the authors make claims which remain unsubstantiated: for instance, in the case of Uruguay, ‘the public is divided over what to do with the past’ (p. 88) or the Angolan population ‘has accepted the amnesty and has shown no appetite for digging into the past—at least for now’ (p. 169). Lastly, a minor omission on the part of the authors is not listing the East Timor Special Panels among mixed courts, alongside Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Lebanon (p. 42).

In general, this book is clearly written and the authors systematically guide readers through their narrative. It can certainly be regarded as one of the best recent examples of transitional justice research.

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Legitimate targets? Social construction, international law and US bombing. By **Janina Dill**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. 385pp. £49.95. ISBN 978 1 10705 675 6. Available as e-book.

The US airstrike on the Kunduz MSF hospital on 3 October 2015 has recently called into question the definition of legitimate targets—this has been the most deadly incident in the organization's history. Janina Dill's *Legitimate targets?* is, therefore, a timely publication. Reviewing the interconnection between constructivist International Relations (IR) and legal theory, Dill identifies a gap in the literature, namely that 'IR scholarship fails to entertain the possibility that recourse to IL [International Law] in the process of actualizing interests and normative beliefs could have a distinguishable effect on behaviour' (p. 44). According to the author, focusing on the practice of international law can reveal its nature and therefore enhance theorizing about it.

Dill introduces the logics of efficiency and sufficiency as two concepts which govern how belligerents are to balance humanitarian and military imperatives. While international humanitarian law (IHL) requires the latter, belligerents are increasingly acting according to the former. Dill identifies two interpretations of the logic of efficiency, a moderate and a radical version. According to the moderate logic of efficiency, belligerents can target their enemy's 'military capabilities in three or fewer causal steps' and the attack should be expected to reduce those targeted capabilities and further the belligerent's political, moral or other goals (p. 350). According to a more radical version of the logic of efficiency, belligerents can target objects and persons in order to achieve their overall political, moral or other goals in the quickest and most direct way (pp. 350–51). The central principle of IHL, the principle of distinction, is ignored in this case. This principle appears in Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the key legal documents in the law of armed conflict, and states that all parties involved in armed conflict shall, at all times, distinguish between the civilian population and combatants. Therefore IHL, Dill argues, is only compatible with the logic of sufficiency. According to this logic, belligerents should target their enemy's capabilities in one causal step in order to reduce their military capabilities, helping the belligerent to achieve a generic military victory, but not advancing political, moral or other goals. However, Dill questions whether even the logic of sufficiency is compatible with prevalent normative beliefs.

Dill uses her case-studies—the bombing of North Vietnam between 1965 and 1972, the air war against Iraq in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) and the Iraq invasion in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom)—to demonstrate how US air warfare has shifted to the logic of efficiency. The author has conducted several dozen interviews with military personnel of various ranks. One theme that might strike readers is the increased involvement of lawyers in air warfare, especially since Operation Iraqi Freedom. One interviewee notes that legal compliance has become a complex and technical task (p. 160).

What do these considerations mean for legitimate targets in warfare? According to Dill, the task of international law is to mediate between normative beliefs and instrumental considerations (p. 67). But international humanitarian law lacks clear guidance to help evaluate the consequences of an attack and is rendered vague by purposive, consequential

and semantic indeterminacies (p. 96). Dill's conclusion is that, in the twenty-first century, there is no such thing as a target which is both legitimate and complies with normative beliefs centred on the notion of protecting individual rights, since this would require applying the logic of liability—renouncing the right and capacity to use large-scale collective force—'which is impracticable' (p. 301).

Legitimate targets? raises important questions about targeting in warfare and the conduct of warfare itself and makes a vital contribution to current debates. However, Dill's analysis would be enhanced by a more thorough consideration of the effects of language and discourse on the constitution of international law as well as of the changing nature of warfare. While Dill points to the interpretative nature of norms and rules and the dependence of international law on those, she seems to have a rather static interpretation of international law in the second part of the book—when assessing the definition of a legitimate target in positive law—failing to acknowledge changing meanings in different contexts. On a related note, the increasing urbanization of warfare is an important factor that should be taken into account. Dill's analysis of the 2003 invasion of Iraq might have been improved by a consideration of how targets are discursively linked and justified—in this case by the global 'war on terror'—and hence become legitimate. This is inextricably linked to the growing death toll among the civilian population in armed conflict, where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is becoming increasingly blurred. Dill's analysis would have benefited from considering this crucial issue in assessing the meaning of legitimacy in targeting.

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Political culture, political science and identity politics: an uneasy alliance. By **Howard J. Wiarda.** Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. 2014. 214pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 47244 228 4.

Culture has become a buzz word in political science, but its meaning and boundaries are very much contested. Some would ascribe a deterministic logic to culture, arguing that behaviour is solely dependent on cultural factors. Others, based on theories of rational decision-making, would deny this. Howard Wiarda's book occupies the middle ground between these two extremes, arguing that behaviour is partly explained by culture and partly by rationality, and that there is a need to create a cultural–rational bridge in order to understand the diversity of political phenomena around us.

Wiarda identifies cultural variables for explaining politics in various key texts, from ancient political thought up to post-modernist theories. The book is organized into ten chapters. After arguing against the deterministic nature of cultural explanation in the introductory chapter—but underlining its role as a potent variable for explaining behaviour—the author, in chapter two, considers culture from the perspective of western philosophers. Aristotelian realism and Plato's idealism both include the reformation of existing authority in their respective societal contexts—a key aspect of culture: 'The values, the belief systems, and the behaviour of the peoples in all these political systems ... are political culture variables' (p. 16). Similarly, the writings of Church fathers called for a 'single, universal global political culture' (p. 18). The brief treatment of modern political thinkers like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, De Tocqueville and Comte also proceeds along similar lines, with Wiarda discussing various aspects of their political thought and the societal and cultural context in which they lived. For example, Weber's *Verstehen* approach, which called for the interpretation of behaviour through cultural variables, is juxtaposed with Marx's exclusive emphasis on the economic superstructure determining human relations—Wiarda favours the Weberian technique over Marxist explanations.

In chapter three, the author brings to light the role played by cultural anthropology in the development of political science, especially through the adoption of the comparative method, fieldwork, interviews, ethnography, participant observation and cultural relativism. The work of key political scientist-cum-anthropologists like Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead and Clifford Geertz are discussed, albeit briefly. In chapter four, Wiarda turns to national character studies in which cultural characteristics were used to stereotype a whole country, nation or race and warns against labelling countries as friends or foes on account of a few cultural traits. Chapter six is also worth highlighting. Here, Wiarda attempts to counter the objection that cultural explanation is tautological, unsystematic, vague, residual and impressionistic, through a review of the work of major political scientists. In chapter seven, the author describes what he calls the post-Cold War 'renaissance of political culture' (pp. 105–24), in the work of scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, Francis Fukuyama, David Landes and Seymour Lipset. However, very little space is given to non-western political culture studies—examined briefly in chapter eight—which is an underemphasized part of this otherwise excellent book. The work of Edward Said especially would have deserved a more in-depth treatment. Similarly, when he turns to the impact of culture and identity politics on International Relations in chapter nine, the work of social constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, Jutta Weldes, Peter Katzenstein, Jeffrey Checkel, Vaughn Shannon and Ted Hopf, isn't given due recognition.

Overall, though, Wiarda's book represents the state of the art in political culture studies. Although it does not provide readers with a new theoretical approach for understanding the cultural logic of political phenomena, it does an excellent job of bringing together major works in the field of political culture studies.

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Rising powers and multilateral institutions. Edited by Dries Lesage and Thijs Van de Graaf. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 298pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13739 759 1. Available as e-book.

Dries Lesage and Thijs Van de Graaf's book investigates the relationship between rising powers and multilateral institutions. The main puzzle they are interested in is 'how multilateral institutions and negotiations respond, or fail to respond, to shifting global power configurations' (p. 7). The editors state that the purpose of the book is 'to delve into the deeper mechanisms' (p. 11) that shape the processes and preferences of international institutions, by looking at geopolitical factors, crises, government composition and personalities. Their approach is eclectic, drawing on a combination of rational choice and discursive/constructivist theories and historical, sociological and institutionalist approaches, which is a remarkable attribute of the book.

The book's conceptual framework is divided into two complementary parts. The first concerns our understanding of 'rising powers'. In their introduction, Lesage and Van de Graaf present a brief literature review. They note that they have chosen to adopt a pragmatic and issue-specific definition of rising powers, based on the assumption that a particular dynamic plays out within each issue area. The second part of the book turns to the concept of multilateral institutions. Here, 'multilateral institutions' are seen as more than persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behaviour, they also constrain activity and shape expectations. As the editors focus on institutions that engage in some policy coordination among more than three states, they prefer to refer to them as 'multilateral' rather than 'international'. Furthermore, they are most interested in institutions

that have ambitions for global governance or ones that create multilateral settings in which rising and established powers interact more or less on an equal footing.

The basic theme uniting the chapters and individual case-studies is the contributors' attempt to verify if the rising powers depend on a greater engagement with the multilateral institutions or, alternatively, if these institutions must adapt their policies and practices to them. Each chapter focuses on a specific institution. Gregory Chin provides a preliminary literature review of rising powers and multilateral institutions, mapping out its evolution and pinpointing gaps, while searching for a future research agenda. Except for Chin's chapter, the book is divided into three parts. Part two looks at 'western exclusive clubs' or restricted membership clubs. Each chapter consists of a case-study, examining the actions of these institutions during a period when rising powers have been gaining ground. The chapters on NATO and the OECD are especially noteworthy. NATO is perceived as basically a European institution and without much function outside the region, especially with the rise of China and India. On the other hand, the OECD has attempted to become less restrictive and more global, moving away from its European origins. Finally, John Kirton examines the case of the G7/G8. He argues that the G7 has sought to deal with emerging powers on equal terms. However, after the suspension of Russia in 2014, the G7 'has retreated from any bold overt aspirations to serve the political steering group for the world, but still attempts to operate as the leading group of liberal democracies and the free market economies' (p. 13). Part three focuses on those global institutions whose governance structure is not democratic, including the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The section on the attempted 'voice reform' within the World Bank, which has not lived up to expectations, is especially interesting. Finally, part four turns to global institutions with equal governance structures, such as the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the G20. Here, the contributors find a greater preoccupation with the democratic bias of multilateral institutions and China stands out as a powerful actor that has modified the structure of these institutions through more active participation.

Unquestionably, Dries Lesage and Thijs Van de Graaf have produced an edited volume that will become required reading for anyone interested in international political economy in general and for those who seek to understand how emerging powers can change the post-Cold War international order through institutional engagement and how these institutions must adapt to them.

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Conflict, security and defence

The hacked world order: how nations fight, trade, maneuver, and manipulate in the digital age. By Adam Segal. New York: Public Affairs. 2016. 308pp. £15.50. ISBN 978 1 61039 415 4. Available as e-book.

Internet wars: the struggle for power in the 21st century. By Fergus Hanson. Haberfield, Australia: Longueville. 2015. 231pp. Pb.: £15.00. ISBN 978 1 92068 196 8.

It is telling that the academics and experts who have most to say about the reshaping of power and international relations in the early twenty-first century are American. The last four years have seen much global attention—not to say grievance—surrounding the United

States' supremacy over the internet. Therefore, a handful of American experts have sought to question both the profound disruption caused by the internet in the fields of security and conflict, diplomacy and trade, and Washington's role in global internet policy. Adam Segal's book addresses precisely these issues: as a foreign policy expert (at the Council on Foreign Relations) and a China specialist, he focuses on the different dimensions of conflict in cyberspace, favouring a multidimensional approach which does not restrict him to purely military topics—as the prefix 'cyber' might erroneously indicate.

For Segal, the period between 2012 (when major cyber attacks labelled with esoteric names—Stuxnet, Shamoon—involving the US, Israel and Middle Eastern countries were revealed) and June 2014 (when Edward Snowden's first disclosures on Washington's large-scale electronic surveillance surfaced) markedly reshaped international politics. The consequence, as Segal puts it, is that we now live in a 'hacked world order', defined by high vulnerability, as well as huge economic, diplomatic and security opportunities for states able to articulate a clear cyber strategy. Given the large number and density of the topics developed in the book, this review will focus on a few core ideas.

First, although cyber power may be 'a particularly ephemeral form of power' the internet is nonetheless altering the global economy of power. This is partly due to a rapidly shifting geographical centre of gravity when it comes to internet users: today, about 70 per cent live outside the western world. In other words, the internet is internationalizing as the access of emerging countries increases, highlighting that global internet governance and digital economy no longer fit into a sole transatlantic framework. Chinese internet and telecommunications companies are able to protect their domestic markets and are starting to behave more assertively overseas. Internet firms in China or Russia now seek to enter new markets, which will inevitably change the overall physiognomy of the internet. Unsurprisingly, Segal argues that this 'de-westernization' also stems from the logic of international politics, as competitors seek to balance what they perceive as US hegemonic power over the internet (infrastructures, protocols, the domain names system, normative influence, etc.).

Second, the immediate future of internet power politics is highly likely to be defined along the lines of US–China rivalry and by the 'rules' that will emerge from this dispute. Segal quotes Henry Kissinger, who drew in his 2014 book *World order* (Allen Lane; reviewed in *International Affairs* 91: 1, January 2015) a parallel between nuclear weapons and digital technologies, arguing that the latter should have their own theory and doctrine. It is imperative, in his view, that the world's two Great Powers develop a common language in this area, as the US and the Soviet Union did with respect to nuclear weapons during the Cold War. According to Segal, the US and China are the only true cyber superpowers: both have large numbers of web users and competitive technology companies, they have created new political institutions and directly competing internet governance models, while hacking and cyber espionage remain major irritants in the relationship.

Third, this new cyber age is inherently complex. The 'fourth industrial revolution'—also the 2016 Davos Summit's main theme—has begun. After the steam engine, electricity and computing, today the convergence of data economy, the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence is overwhelming not only production but also societies and the world's balance of power. The consequences of this could be immense: the digital revolution is adding new risks, on top of those created by the aftermath of the 2008 world economic crisis, financial bubbles, global warming and new strategic threats. Segal is right in arguing that the power politics emanating from this context are enormously complicated by the growth of interdependence and the role of the private sector. Indeed, almost everything the US does in cyberspace requires a blurring of the line between the public and the private:

private firms own the networks necessary for attacking and defending the telecommunications, energy and financial sectors.

Fourth, the leaks by former National Security Agency (NSA) subcontractor Edward Snowden destabilized foreign relations and had a large impact on the geopolitics of cyberspace. Today, a number of technologically enabled individuals are able to disrupt the highly choreographed diplomacy of nation-states: from Julian Assange's WikiLeaks to Snowden, international politics has blended with individual action and the development of multinational corporations in a way never seen before. The revelations about the scale of data collection by the NSA exceeded all previous suspicions about the degree of US surveillance over data exchanges. Although Russia's opportunistic behaviour in granting asylum to Snowden stood out, Brazil also promptly expressed its dissatisfaction: then President Dilma Rousseff, herself a victim of NSA wiretapping, took the lead of a 'virtuous crusade' against the status quo—with the loss of US moral leadership, its stewardship over the agencies which manage the internet is less tolerated. Brasilia then intensified its diplomatic offensive by announcing an international summit on internet governance. In the meantime, Brazilian authorities promulgated the Marco Civil bill, a sort of constitution for the internet which guarantees freedom of expression, protection of privacy and net neutrality. Interestingly, Segal notes that Brazil appears to be taking the middle ground between two governance 'models' that have been under discussion so far—the multi-stakeholder and the multilateral. Rousseff's response fits into a longer-term strategy, which sees the internet as a new international scene where Brazil can play a leading role, compensating for the relative failure of former president Lula da Silva's plan to make the country a key player in international security issues.

Even though the book is clearly written from a US-centric perspective, it takes a quite dispassionate view of US interests and explicitly describes American mistakes. Governments in a number of regions around the world see Google, Facebook and Twitter less as beacons of innovation and invention and more as the handmaidens of the NSA. This has increased a push to impose 'digital sovereignty' in many countries, from Russia to India, and even in European states. Segal rightly claims that American exceptionalism blinded US decision-makers to how other countries defined their own interests and interpreted US actions, in turn exaggerating a sense of US power and influence.

Finally, the issue of data and of their transmission, storage and processing—both by private companies and by governments—has acquired fundamental importance for the global governance of the internet. The 2015–16 dispute between Apple and the FBI has confirmed that data encryption has deserved a prominent place among the key problems of the modern world. It is here that the tension between state interest and the popular demand for privacy has come to a head. The argument that social conflicts of this kind distinguish democracies from authoritarian states seems increasingly moot: western democracies, including the UK and France, have passed laws that increasingly threaten data privacy.

Fergus Hanson's *Internet wars* is written in a similar vein: it aims to address, in a very accessible manner, both the positive and the negative global consequences of the internet and the way it has become both an object and an instrument in international politics. The internet has accelerated the diffusion of power, which for a long time was solely in the hands of nation-states, to a whole host of social actors. The information revolution has spectacularly decreased the costs of data transmission and has created the possibility for everyone to publish content. Hanson argues that this diffusion of power has accelerated the debate not only on the degree of 'democratization' and 'transparency', but also on 'disinformation' and 'manipulation' of foreign policies. Diplomats need to deal with a new set

of circumstances, which is both decentralizing and de-sanctifying them. For Washington, digital diplomacy is a key concern, rooted in the concept of smart power, the aim of which was, initially, to boost moral authority partially dilapidated during the George W. Bush presidency. It involved the country positioning itself as an ‘informational and ideological hub’ and to serve a ‘global media empire’, as Hanson put it in a 2012 study (*‘Revolution@ State: the spread of e-diplomacy’*, Lowy Institute), able not only to shape world opinion but also to split it in accordance with given objectives.

Neither of these authors provides a comprehensive remedy for the problems highlighted in the two books. Instead, they offer proposals that might temper them in a world where states still clash, where it is increasingly hard to distinguish the ‘border’ between national and international politics, and where American influence is likely gradually waning.

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Atomic anxiety: deterrence, taboo and the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By **Frank Sauer.** Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 207pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13753 373 9. Available as e-book.

By focusing on the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States, Frank Sauer sets himself a challenging task: to shed new light on a phenomenon (and on a country case) that has been explored already in detail and from different perspectives—which he successfully tackles. His pragmatism-inspired study introduces fear as the emotional basis of nuclear decision-making, and by doing so, makes a theoretical contribution by complementing and provoking existing explanations, as well as an empirical contribution by reinterpreting the political, institutional and personal context of nuclear non-use.

Sauer constructs his argument in five steps which include several deductive and inductive loops. Chapter two offers a concise introduction to the dominant theoretical accounts of nuclear abstinence: the rationalist account with its deterrence models and the constructivist account with its concept of the nuclear taboo. Sauer points readers to the potential of his own account by highlighting the—shared—blind spot of the state of the art: its explanatory research logic conceals the practice of nuclear non-use created by decision-makers as individuals experiencing emotions. To reveal this practice, chapter three designs an epistemological and methodological alternative that the author calls ‘understanding nuclear non-use’, echoing Martin Hollis’s and Steve Smith’s well-known distinction. In this second analytical step, he criticizes the very effort to conceive of non-events like nuclear non-use causally and proposes instead to ‘div[e] into its *meaning* for decision-makers’ (p. 52, author’s emphasis) by reconstructing it from the actors’ beliefs and practices via the study of language.

The concepts of contingency and agency theoretically underpin Sauer’s reconstructive endeavour: by emphasizing reasoning, interpretation and choice in crisis situations, the author rejects deterministic law-like explanations and aims to uncover ‘how things turned out one way and not the other, what situated choices were made by actors to cope with reality in a given social context’ (p. 57). Instead of theory testing, he elegantly incorporates existing explanations into his inquiry by conceptualizing them as (potential) sense-making tools for decision-makers. The third step—an empirical examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis based mainly on White House tape recordings—yields several important results. It exposes President Kennedy’s inner conflict arising from moral constraints and strategic requirements. On a theoretical level, this not only demonstrates how the nuclear taboo might thwart deterrence. Even more importantly, it demonstrates the power of

agency over structural constraints: the crisis could be solved precisely because Kennedy—and Khrushchev—chose an option (de-escalation) that was contrary to what deterrence strategies suggested. Moreover, in addition to rational calculus and moral considerations, Sauer observes a third factor at play during this crisis: human emotions, fear in particular. This insight is further theorized in the study's fourth step. After asserting that theorists of deterrence and of the nuclear taboo rely on an underspecified notion of human emotion, the author conceptualizes emotion as a social, intersubjective experience, fundamental to both rationality and morality. Accordingly, he claims that the shared—and culturally processed—experience of 'fear of death en masse' (p. 127) is fundamental to all beliefs about nuclear weapons, deterrence-related as much as taboo-related. In the subsequent empirical tracing of atomic anxiety over time (step five), which is perhaps the most illuminating part of the book, Sauer interprets various facets of the nuclear age, such as Cold War antagonism, arms control and missile defence, as modes of coping with fear.

The book is rich with inspiring insights—and it still leaves room for more. Even though Sauer states that 'there is no paradigm war to be fought here' (p. 53), the argument comes with some paradigmatic ballast. While this makes sense within the logic of the discipline, less of it would allow the author to further exploit the potential of his ideas. A major case in point is Sauer's caution of causality, which appears to be grounded in a narrow notion of the term, namely as deterministic, law-like and bound to external events. This representation is quite common for critics of positivism, who prefer to label their arguments as constitutive instead of causal, as does the author (p. 135). However, it is not only perfectly possible but also promising to reconcile Sauer's central concepts—such as agency, sense-making and beliefs that rule action—with a broader, say critical realist, notion of causality. Fear, whose powerful effects on decision-makers, on societies, on war and peace the book reveals, of course deserves the status of a causal factor—without having to preclude nuclear use once and for ever. Following a causal trail could allow the author to reconceptualize the relationship between the causes of nuclear non-use: while nuclear taboo and deterrence are suggested to be complementary in the existing literature and conflicting in Sauer's case-study (p. 164), another possibility is that they are equifinal—but as mechanisms rather than as causes. This view would elevate the status of fear to that of a root cause, which under different conditions generates two (or more) different mechanisms that are sufficient for the outcome of interest: nuclear non-use. Thus, even if the taboo undermines deterrence in cases of taboo-sensitive decision-makers, the outcome is still non-use because the taboo works; in cases of deterrence-prone and taboo-sceptical decision-makers, the taboo does not interfere, and the outcome is again non-use because deterrence works.

It is worth outlining the value added by the book beyond the phenomenon of nuclear abstinence. Regarding research design, Sauer skilfully navigates between utilizing, criticizing and enriching the state of the art, and between methodological reflexivity and pragmatism. Regarding theory building, his micro-level focus on individuals, as well as on emotions and fear in particular, opens up new perspectives for research on international norms and for International Relations in general. Hence, there is still much to learn about and from nuclear non-use.

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US missile defence strategy: engaging the debate. By Michael Mayer. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2014. 205pp. Index. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 626 37150 7.

This book is likely to be of particular interest to readers who are new to the topic of ballistic missile defence (BMD), or who, after a period away, wish to catch up with recent developments. In the relatively short time it takes to read it, the book provides a valuable, clear and authoritative assessment of where BMD has got to and of its prospects. It also properly reflects competing views in the literature to give readers a clear understanding of the nature and scope of the contemporary debate. Michael Mayer addresses ballistic missile defence policies at the grand strategic level, noting that threat and strategy are logically linked and asking whether strategic missile defence (MD) goals make sense from a US grand strategic perspective.

Chapter two looks at the core concepts that underpin the US approach to missile defence in turn. Reflecting competing views throughout, the chapter identifies defence, deterrence, dissuasion—inducing restraint and thus potentially obviating deterrence—and assurance as core concepts and lays out the factors and thinking that are employed in order to seek to achieve effective defence. Mayer's evaluation of successive policies relies on a wealth of authoritative sources. He takes care to explain terms and concepts in light of the relevant strategic considerations, including the complications associated with the post-Cold War environment.

It is in the context of these policy objectives that chapter three examines the technological constraints on missile defence, including ballistic missiles and their flight phases, the notions of theatre, national MD systems, the factors that influence effectiveness and the technological options for developing defences. A discussion of sensors, interceptors and battle management infrastructure completes the picture, giving readers an understanding of the strengths and vulnerabilities of contemporary technology. It is on this basis that evolving US policy is evaluated.

Chapters four, five and six evaluate the records, respectively, of the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations in this field. For each, missile defence policy was part of the grand strategic context confronting them. The Clinton administration paved the way for subsequent MD deployment (p. 98); the Bush administration developed a conceptual strategic framework while deploying, it is contended, systems of questionable or untested effectiveness (pp. 141–2); and during the Obama administration, questions as to the military effectiveness of its MD systems persisted, while ambition seems somewhat to have outstripped established technical performance. Policy priorities, however, focused on regional threats, consistent with the administration's wider objective of encouraging regional defensive frameworks (p. 180).

In the final chapter, Mayer sets out a cost–benefit analysis of missile defence, based on its tendency to inspire circumventing efforts, the investment that such programmes require, diplomatic tensions and how US MD is perceived by potential adversaries and allies. While there are arguments about the effectiveness of current systems, any assessment of their adequacy must inevitably depend on which possible threat they are being designed to counter. The conclusion that 'the empirical record to date offers more conclusive evidence of the [MD] system's costs than of its benefit' (p. 205) is admirably supported by the preceding analysis. Anyone wishing to understand the purpose of these programmes, the technologies that they employ, the strategic contexts in which such policies sit and their future prospects would be well advised to consult this book. Readers will find it to be a well-written, informative and carefully balanced treatment of a most important subject.

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Political economy, economics and development

Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization. By Branko Milanovic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2016. 320pp. £22.95. ISBN 978 0 67473 713 6. Available as e-book.

Inequality represents one of the greatest policy challenges of our time—something that could permanently undermine the viability of the current socio-economic model. *Global inequality* by Branko Milanovic, a senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study Center in New York, is essential reading for those wishing to gain an understanding of the deepest roots of the unequal wealth and income distribution in a historical and global context.

The book begins with a simple, if stark, observation. Income inequality is rising within nations but it is declining globally. In the emerging world, the rapid process of economic convergence with the West has produced a burgeoning middle class, contributing to partly close the gap with the advanced world. At the same time, globalization and skill-biased technological change have benefited a small elite of highly qualified professionals in Europe and North America, whose remuneration has increased exponentially over the last few decades. This is the top 1 per cent that controls almost 50 per cent of global wealth.

Squeezed between these two winning groups, the western middle class has not experienced any noteworthy improvement in its standards of living since the end of the Cold War. The earnings of its members have been eroded under the global pressure of cheap labour, while the lack of appropriate redistributive and progressive tax policies within their home countries has benefited those at the high end of the skill distribution.

To explain these trends, Milanovic introduces the concept of ‘Kuznets waves’, an innovation on the older concept of the Kuznets curve. In the 1960s, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets argued that inequality is low at low levels of development, rises during industrialization when the pool of workers is large and wages stagnate and then falls again when the economy gets close to full employment. However, economists have struggled to reconcile this theory with the huge increase in inequality that the rich West has experienced in recent times. Adopting a more dynamic approach, Milanovic believes that inequality flows in cycles, continuously moving up or down as a result of the interaction of economic, demographic and political forces. GDP growth, technological progress and lobbying by powerful interest groups boost inequality, whereas wars, diseases and redistributive policies push it down. Hence, there is not just one Kuznets curve, but many successive ones.

In the pre-industrial era, these waves were governed by Malthusian dynamics. Inequality used to rise when both population and income expanded and then it declined when wars or famines brought the economy back to subsistence levels. In modern times, instead, technology and globalization have been the main drivers of inequality. The first modern Kuznets wave started at the end of the nineteenth century when industrialization and economic integration led to a spike in inequality. Then, the two world wars, political upheavals during the 1960s and increased educational attainments squeezed inequality to low levels by the 1970s. Since then, the world has entered a new Kuznets wave, propelled by information technology revolutions and the Washington Consensus.

Although in many places inequality is reaching unsustainable levels, we are not yet close to the wave’s turning point. In Milanovic’s theoretical framework, a number of benign forces might intervene to attenuate income disparities. More progressive taxation, massive investment in education or the reshoring process might all contribute to offset inequality.

But, as history teaches us, there are malign forces like wars, populism or social upheavals that might intervene too.

In the second part of the book, Milanovic turns his attention to inequality among nations. Between 1988 and 2011, the global Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, dropped from 72.2 to 67. This is the first time since the Industrial Revolution that global inequality has significantly declined. Before the economic fate of the 'West and the Rest' started to diverge in the nineteenth century, class was the main source of inequality across the globe. When GDP growth took off in the West, location replaced class as the main driver of global disparities—70 years ago, a poor person in Germany was rich by Indian standards. Today, the process of economic convergence is levelling off location-related income gaps, reviving the role of social status.

The book ends with a discussion of what is likely to change in the near future. Milanovic convincingly argues that, in China, inequality will likely decline as a result of a shrinking workforce that creates upward pressures on wages. On the other hand, in the United States, instead, the top 1 per cent might continue to steer the decision-making process in its favour, while in Europe populists might take over. In general, Milanovic wonders whether democratic capitalism will survive or collapse.

While the material presented in the book is tremendously rich, its prose style and the narrative are quite poor. The book's style resembles more that of an obscure academic paper (especially the first chapters) than that of an engaging non-fiction book. Around the world, there are plenty of revealing anecdotes about the growing disparities between plutocrats and the rest that would have made the text more intriguing, without compromising the depth of the analysis. However, the boldness of the theory is such as to overshadow any stylistic flaws.

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Accommodating rising powers: past, present, and future. Edited by T. V. Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016. 313pp. Index. £64.95. ISBN 978 1 10759 223 0. Available as e-book.

The challenges inherent in managing states growing in power and influence are perennial concerns for both theorists and practitioners. Much of the recent literature on rising powers has focused, however, more on the prospects for military conflict between established and emerging states during so-called power transitions. This book takes a welcome step back from these arguments about the causes of war, in order to take a fresh look at the management of what used to be called, in the 1930s, 'peaceful change'.

In his opening chapter, T. V. Paul argues that in times of power transition, as new powers are rising, conflict can be avoided if established states adopt strategies of accommodation and rising states tread carefully, seeking only incremental adjustments to the existing order. These accommodation strategies can involve a number of different things—'status adjustment, the sharing of leadership roles ... and acceptance of spheres of influence' (p. 4)—and can be applied in different combinations according to the nature of the rising power and its intentions. Paul notes that a rising power can be accommodated either fully—given equal status, commensurate special responsibilities and be permitted to exercise significant influence over its region—or partially, as its new standing is acknowledged by established states in one or two areas, but not in all.

The remaining 13 chapters examine different theoretical approaches to accommodation, as well as four historical case-studies and four contemporary ones. In the first section, on theory, Steven Lobell provides an overview of realist thinking about power transitions,

including an intriguing account of how ‘components of power theory’ might better explain the lack of an overt challenge to American preponderance in the Asia–Pacific than balance of power theory. Philip B. K. Potter asks whether trade and other factors of interdependence, like high interstate social mobility, diminish conflict between established and rising states. His conclusion is a qualified ‘yes’. Krzysztof J. Pelc, for his part, explores the role of international institutions and law in peaceful change, taking E. H. Carr as his guide. Finally, Mlada Bukovansky rounds out this part of the book with a thoughtful chapter on what she calls ‘the responsibility to accommodate’.

The second section turns to the historical case-studies: to the accommodation of a rising United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Great Britain; the accommodation strategies employed by the US towards China from the late 1960s to the late 1970s; the oscillation between accommodation and containment in British policy towards Germany from 1900 to 1939; and the US approach to Japan in the interwar period. Each case generates some intriguing arguments. Ali Zeren and John A. Hall suggest that the US ‘seized’ (p. 129) hegemony from a failing Britain, rather than being subject to a process of accommodation. Lorenz M. Lüthi notes that the US pursued an accommodation strategy towards China well before it began to rise, responding to changes in Chinese foreign policy that made the country less threatening to western interests and to the shifting strategic balance with the Soviet Union. In a similar vein, Martin Claar and Norrin M. Ripsman argue that Britain used accommodation when Germany was perceived as a less serious and immediate challenge to its interests than France or Russia, and resorted to containment only when the rising challenger posed a greater threat than its other rivals. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro identifies a rather different problem in his chapter, arguing that Japan’s assertive grand strategy of the 1930s was driven by Tokyo’s perception that the country stood on the brink of decline, as other Great Powers pressed into its strategic space. He concludes that if Britain and the US had responded, at this point, with a strategy of accommodation, it would have failed, but had such an approach been used earlier, in the 1920s or before, it might have succeeded in assuaging Japanese concerns about the country’s prospects.

The final part of the book explores the challenges posed by the rising powers of China, India and Brazil, as well as by ‘resurgent’ Russia, and the accommodation strategies that have been used, or might be used, to manage them. Kai He provides a cogent account of China’s bargaining strategies, focusing on its use of costly signalling, self-restraint, socialization and legitimation in its interactions with the US. Aseema Sinha argues that India is a different kind of actor to a traditional rising power, since it seeks ‘a seat at the table, not to initiate ... conflict’ (p. 223). She notes too that other states—notably the US—have moved to accommodate India faster than its material capabilities have developed. Brazil, too, is seeking reform rather than revolution, David R. Mares suggests, and aims to act as a kind of ‘normative power’ in areas like nuclear non-proliferation or international trade. By contrast, Nicola Contessi notes that Russia is displaying a ‘new determination to play by its own rules’ (p. 270), which makes accommodating it difficult. Bravely, Contessi nevertheless explores the accommodation strategies—territorial, institutional and normative—that might be implemented, despite Russia’s recent behaviour.

In the concluding chapter, Theodore McLauchli makes the case for careful calibration in accommodation: negotiating territorial disputes individually, on their merits, rather than seeing concessions as grand strategic defeats; bargaining empathetically, using costly signalling and self-restraint; showing flexibility on norms and rules; and engaging respectfully.

This is, then, a thought-provoking book that addresses theoretical and practical problems of pressing concern. It fits with the general movement in the study of International Relations away from structural theories and towards mid-range theorizing about diplomatic practice. As such, it is a welcome and important volume.

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Energy, environment and global health

The global governance of climate change: G7, G20, and UN leadership. By John J. Kirton and Ella Kokotsis. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. 2015. 401pp. Index. £75.00. ISBN 978 0 75467 584 6. Available as e-book.

When Laurent Fabius's gavel came down to signal the adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change on 12 December 2015, most commentators hailed it as a triumph of UN-led diplomacy. The lion's share of scholarly attention on global climate governance has focused on formal UN intergovernmental negotiations. This book, by contrast, takes a different tack. It examines the role played in global climate governance by the Group of 7 (G7), Group of 8 (G8) and Group of 20 (G20), which the authors collectively term 'plurilateral summit institutions' (PSIs).

John Kirton and Ella Kokotsis set themselves three overarching tasks. First, they seek to redress the imbalance in the existing climate governance literature by adding a new focus on the role of PSIs. They achieve this task very well, though their analysis would have benefited from being linked to the broader climate governance literature. This literature has, in fact, been broadened beyond its previously narrow focus on the UN process, to consider the wider climate change 'regime complex' including an array of formal and informal governance institutions. Nonetheless, the authors are correct in their assertion that insufficient attention has been paid specifically to the G7/8 and the G20.

Their second aim is to trace and account for the pattern of engagement of the G7/8 and the G20 with climate change over time. Much of their discussion includes insightful analysis of the preparations for, and conduct of, each summit. One of the most interesting elements of their narrative comes in part two, covering the period from 1979–88. They highlight that the G7 was the first institution of global climate governance, predating UN attention to the issue by a decade.

In their analysis, the authors measure summit performance based on the outcome documents of the various summits using six different metrics. They go beyond simple word counting by including a 'direction setting' score measuring whether climate change was mentioned in the preamble/opening section of the document indicating prominence, or linked to other summit themes such as human rights or democracy. They count the number of specific climate change commitments contained in each summit document and, importantly, they give primacy to 'delivery' of these commitments. Nonetheless, there are some unanswered questions regarding this metric. Compliance is scored only in respect of some of the commitments for each summit. To take just one example, the 1998 summit document contained ten commitments, but delivery of just three commitments is assessed for that year (p. 144). There is no explanation of which commitments were selected for scoring and why, and no details are provided of how compliance scores were reached in each case. Further details on this matter, perhaps in an appendix, would have been helpful.

The authors' third aim is to explore how informal and formal governance institutions interact to produce global governance. They argue that these PSIs created global climate

governance in the late 1970s and 1980s, shaped the UN climate regime from 1989 to 2004 and then increasingly replaced the UN as the focal point of global climate governance from 2004 onwards. However, their analysis at times appears to give these PSIs undue primacy. While these institutions have indeed played an important role in shaping global climate governance, it is hard to escape the impression that, particularly towards the latter stages of their analysis, the authors' claims are not completely supported by the evidence.

For example, in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement, the authors' concluding claim that 'the process of replacing the old, divided, development-first, failing UN-led climate control regime with a new, inclusive, environment-first, effective one led by the G7/8 and the G20 is now well underway' (p. 306) will come as a surprise to many observers of contemporary climate governance. While it marked a significant change from its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement was also characterized by strong legal, institutional and political continuities, and it remains firmly embedded in the UN framework. It is certainly true that the G7/8 and the G20 played a role in shaping the UN regime, but the UN regime has also shaped the G7/G8 and G20's treatment of climate change in important ways. One such example was the 2015 negotiating deadline set by the Durban climate conference in 2011. This looming deadline pushed climate change to the top of the global policy agenda, including in the G7/G8 and G20.

Moreover, nowhere in the book do the authors consider at any length the normative implications of their strong advocacy of G7/8- and G20-led global climate governance. Given that climate change will disproportionately impact those without a seat at the table of such institutions, the lack of any reflection whatsoever on this question is a curious omission.

Nonetheless, this book is an important contribution to our knowledge of global climate governance and will be of interest to scholars and practitioners alike. It adds a welcome focus on the important role played by the G7/8 and G20 in shaping global outcomes, and opens new avenues for future research.

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Europe

Britain's Europe: a thousand years of conflict and cooperation. By Brendan Simms. London: Allen Lane. 2016. 352pp. £13.50. ISBN 978 0 24127 596 2. Available as e-book.

Britain's referendum on European Union membership was never going to answer what David Cameron called Britain's 'European question'. Instead, as Brendan Simms sets out to show, it was the latest episode in a thousand-year history of conflict and cooperation between Britain—and before it England—and the rest of Europe. As Simms makes clear from the start, it matters how that history is told. Taking the approach of 'our island story'—setting Britain apart from the rest of Europe—fails to adequately grasp how Europe made Britain and Britain made Europe. With Brexit now unfolding, there is a more urgent need than ever for the British to appreciate the flaws of believing they can turn their backs to the continent.

Simms offers readers a chronological history of British–European relations, successfully setting out his case for viewing developments from the Vikings to David Cameron in a joined-up way. He is unapologetically 'Whiggish' in his approach, seeing a clear line through that long history. His focus is on foreign policy and constitutional matters, leaving aside economics, society and culture, which makes for a book many readers of international

relations will be comfortable with, but which neglects the role of domestic factors in the development and politics of Britain. Nevertheless, throughout the book, the importance of viewing Britain's history through a European lens is hammered home again and again. Whether it is the military campaigns of King Henry V, the Acts of Union between England and Scotland, the acquisition and dissolution of the British empire, the development of the British state's institutions, all are explained in part by Britain's strategic focus on the politics of Europe. This focus, Simms argues, has been as much ideological as security-based: in the last few hundred years the defence of liberty and the defence of the European balance of power were often linked in British thinking.

Appearing throughout the debate is the question of whether there should be a continental or a maritime focus in British foreign policy. 'They talk as if England were not in Europe,' was Edmund Burke's retort to those who believed that being an island was sufficient to secure the country from the chaos of the French Revolution. Europe is, as Churchill said before the First World War, 'where the weather came from'. Such quotes are found throughout, as Simms critiques the desire to turn away from Europe and think only of the wider world. Such an approach has sometimes paid off, but often only when non-European efforts were designed to serve Britain's interests on the continent. On the other hand, imperial hubris sometimes led the country to ignore it, leaving its politics to change in ways that did not suit Britain. On occasion, this left Britain unprepared for developments elsewhere in Europe—which it later had to scramble to reshape.

That it has often fallen to Britain to change the shape of continental politics is due, Simms argues, to its exceptional place in Europe. Towards the end, the book changes from a historical study to something of a political manifesto, as Simms sets out his case for the future of British–European relations. A chapter is dedicated to rejecting the declinist thesis of British power, instead making the case that Britain's exceptionalism makes it the last European Great Power. That doesn't mean Britain can lead Europe or the EU in the way Germany can, by stumping up the cash to keep the eurozone afloat. Instead, Britain is a security provider and a political model. The EU, Simms argues, needs to follow the example of the UK—and its imitator the US—in making the step to a United States of Europe an *event* (as the Acts of Union or the Declaration of Independence were) followed by a *process*, rather than an interminable *process* (i.e. European integration so far) that works towards some distant undefined *event* ('ever closer union'). Europe needs Britain, and more importantly it, and the West as a whole, need this British-style birth of a United States of Europe.

Whether Britain is so exceptional will be the first point of contention many outside the country (and some within it) will take up with the book. The EU might indeed need an event, but the processes by which Britain is governed—and the 23 June referendum itself—have left few observers confident in its ability to lead or set an example. Britain's indifference over Ukraine means doubts abound as to whether it could provide for the security of countries in eastern Europe. The referendum result might not have been won wholly on an isolationist ticket, but such voices were heard. Victorious Leave campaigners also included those who supported the maritime strategy Simms dismisses as a strategic dead end—unless it works towards some goal in wider European politics. The central warning of *Britain's Europe* is against Britain entering another period where the country forgets that its primary reference point in international relations is Europe and that all others are secondary.

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The lure of technocracy. By Jürgen Habermas. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity. 2015. 176pp. £50.00. ISBN 978 0 74568 681 3. Available as e-book.

In its first version, published in German in 2013, this book was the twelfth in a series of 'small political writings' by Jürgen Habermas. The books in this series contained collections of Habermas's thoughts in diverse formats, such as essays previously published in newspapers, interviews, manuscripts of speeches, etc. Although often concentrated on pertinent issues of their time, some of these writings are thematically more coherent than others—quite unavoidably so.

In this context, readers will find a relatively strong focus on the future of European integration in *The lure of technocracy*. Written in the midst of the euro crisis, the first two parts of the book either deal directly with problems facing European integration—particularly with the problem of democratically legitimizing deeper integration—or they address general conditions that provide the frame for European integration, such as the tension between global capitalism and the national fragmentation of politics. The third part carries the title 'German Jews, Germans and Jews' and contains contributions on the legacy and impact of German Jewish thinkers.

Given the diversity of contributions in this book, it makes little sense to assess them on an individual basis. However, it is quite clear that they all support one basic line of argument. First, the project of European integration is in trouble, as most recently evidenced by how European institutions have dealt with the euro crisis; there is a problem with the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Rather than seeking to increase that legitimacy, European institutions and member-state governments have been lured into technocratic solutions that potentially increase rather than decrease this legitimacy problem. Second, given the vast challenges faced by European countries—ranging from issues of demographic change to the difficulties of democratically constraining a global economic system increasingly decoupled from the lives of citizens—a renationalization of politics and less integration is not the solution.

More integration is required, but its democratic legitimation cannot be achieved within the current institutional settings and the legal set-up of the European Union. What is needed is nothing less than a reconstitution of the union. Habermas calls for a novel kind of entity that is not a federal state, but a polity based on shared sovereignty by the people *and* the member states: an 'idea that *citizens and states (that are already constituted by citizens) can participate on an equal footing* in constituting a supranational democracy' (author's emphasis, pp. 57–8).

Lastly, the reconstitution of the European Union is a formidable task, not only because of its sheer size, but particularly because no political party in the member states at present would openly campaign for it. This is where Habermas, as well as the assessment of his book, could end: he presents convincing, well-founded arguments for a deepening of European integration that, alas, face no prospect of realization under present conditions.

Arguably, this seems to be the context in which Heinrich Heine found himself in witnessing the political situation and the social and political consequences of rampant capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century. However, Habermas finds consolation in the fact that this did not lead Heine to give up on his underlying cosmopolitanism: 'the mood of resignation is spreading that nothing works any more even though everything is changing. Yet, a century after Heine's abortive revolution of 1848, we saw that progress was possible, at least in the domain of legality. Heine's anticipatory liberal notions of democracy in Germany have prevailed. Why shouldn't his European notions of overcoming national prejudices with the aid of the cunning of economic reason be able to come true?' (p. 153).

The chapter on Heine is the last one of the book. The preceding two, although excellent treatises on Jewish philosophers and sociologists as returnees in the early Federal Republic of Germany and on Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue, at first glance might seem somewhat misplaced. However, the issue is not what they say, but where and when they do so. Between the call for more integration and a rather pessimistic outlook as to its feasibility in the first two parts, and the glimmer of hope offered through Heine in the last chapter, they serve as a reminder that between Heine and the present stood the re-founding of Europe and the integration of Germany with the ideas of Jewish thinkers who had decided to return despite the Shoah and to contribute to its reconstitution. If this reading is correct, then this book is nothing else but a reminder of the historical dimensions of what is threatened by both rampant Euroscepticism and Eurotechnocracy alike, and by the failure to adopt new approaches.

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Mes chemins pour l'école [My pathways for education]. By Alain Juppé. Paris: Éditions Jean-Claude Lattès. 2015. 305pp. £9.00. ISBN 978 2 70965 046 5. Available as e-book.

Pour un État fort [For a strong state]. By Alain Juppé. Paris: Éditions Jean-Claude Lattès. 2016. 265pp. £9.00. ISBN 978 2 70965 615 3. Available as e-book.

Cinq ans pour l'emploi [Five years for employment]. By Alain Juppé. Paris: Éditions Jean-Claude Lattès. 2016. 263pp. £9.00. ISBN 978 2 70965 692 4. Available as e-book.

Alain Juppé, a former prime minister of France, is competing for the nomination of the country's main centre-right political party, Les Républicains (LR), to stand for election in the spring of 2017 as the LR candidate for president of the French Republic. These three books constitute the linchpins of Juppé's political platform in pursuit of that nomination, which will result from the LR intraparty primary elections in November 2016.

Juppé is a pure product of the French meritocratic educational system, including the École Normale Supérieure, Sciences Po Paris and the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA). He was an early protégé of former president Jacques Chirac, who famously described Juppé as 'probably the best among us' on the centre-right of French politics. He was twice appointed minister of foreign affairs, briefly held the portfolio of minister of defence and was elected mayor of Bordeaux 1995–2004, a position to which he was re-elected in October 2006 and in which he has served to wide admiration and acclaim.

His political career has been twice tarnished. In 2004, he was convicted of abuse of public funds—though not for his own benefit—while serving as deputy to Chirac, then mayor of Paris. On appeal, Juppé received a 14-month suspended jail sentence and was barred from holding an office of public trust for a year, which he spent teaching in Montreal. This stain seems largely consigned to the dustbin of history since his return to office in Bordeaux. A more sombre cloud remains his time as Chirac's prime minister, 1995–7, when ill-begotten reforms resulted in widespread strikes and economic and political upheaval. These are the background issues to Juppé's three books, alongside his personal reputation as brilliant—he was known at ENA as 'Amstrad', the name of a powerful computer of the time—but capable also of being distant and cutting.

Mes chemins pour l'école was the first of these books to be published, in August 2015. The title is a gentle play on words meaning both 'my outlook for education' and, as a child might put it, 'the ways I go to school'. *Mes chemins* begins with a charming—and very humanizing—20-page introduction in which Juppé describes his own schoolboy years in

his hometown of Mont-de-Marsan, the capital of the department of Les Landes, a marshy and pine-forested area of Aquitaine beneath Bordeaux and above Biarritz, on the Atlantic coast of France. Juppé continues his paean to the value of education as he traces his own academic and then teaching career, including his year in Montreal, addressing readers more and more directly. Then nearly half the book (pp. 33–140) consists of ‘Paroles de professeurs’ and ‘Paroles de parents’, a recital by Juppé of what he has heard about educational issues from teachers and parents, which shows him to be a listening candidate, in contrast to his chief rival on the right, former president Nicolas Sarkozy, who is often suspected of listening only to himself. The second half of the book (pp. 165–253) is devoted to an exceptionally wide-ranging interview with Juppé about education; this interactive format once again puts readers at ease and situates Juppé as thoughtful and accessible. There is a brief closing section with 20 main policy points, under the headings of re-emphasizing the importance of nursery and primary school, giving more value to the importance of teachers and teaching staff, promoting grading systems that do better service to students and, most importantly, improving France’s woeful vocational training. None of these policy prescriptions comes across as especially concrete, however—a gap which the next two books seek to repair.

Pour un État fort was published in January 2016, and takes full account of the terrorist attacks at the Bataclan theatre and elsewhere in Paris on Friday, 13 November 2015. Here, Juppé is moving to the right, to capture some of the tough-guy bravado that Sarkozy excels at. The introduction begins: ‘France is at war. Let’s not be afraid to say so.’ In the shorter, ‘Paroles’, section of this book (pp. 37–90), readers are introduced to citizens, policemen, gendarmes and magistrates. Juppé’s interview (pp. 91–217) again covers a multitude of topics, from the state of emergency and the Schengen area to Islam in France, and seems designed chiefly to show his grit and grasp of so many difficult issues. *Pour un État fort* ends with somewhat more specific policy proposals (pp. 219–34) focused especially on tightening policing, the efficiency of the justice system and defending the French version of secularism known as *laïcité*.

Cinq ans pour l’emploi again is a slight play on words, meaning ‘five years for employment’ or suggesting ‘five years on the job’, the duration of the presidential term of office in France. The format is much the same: an introduction which engages readers quickly (‘I wish to dedicate this book to the young people of France’, p. 9); a section this time entitled ‘Paroles des Français’ (‘the French in their own words’, pp. 25–58); followed by a long interview (pp. 59–200); and, this time, a series of detailed policy reforms (pp. 201–35) which nonetheless recap many of the known problems and their oft-touted solutions—greater freedom in employment and labour law, less complex and lower taxes, more favourable regulations for entrepreneurs, more emphasis on science and investment.

All the candidates for the LR primaries have written books. Juppé’s are both more readable and better researched than most. Each of these volumes concludes with a series of statistical and analytical appendices which add further to the impression that this man has what it takes to define France’s problems and identify solutions.

Juppé’s principal challenge, however, is likely to emanate more from politics than from policy. Sarkozy, despite being defeated by the pusillanimous François Hollande in 2012, has managed to wrest the party apparatus of Les Républicains from his competitors, which as party leader he controls as much as anyone. Juppé’s electoral strategy, from the beginning and in these three books, has been that of a *rassembleur*, a unifying candidate appealing across partisan divisions. His goal is to capture votes from the Socialists so disenchanted with their standard-bearer Hollande. By contrast, Sarkozy’s strategy is to veer to the right and capture votes from the disaffected partisans of Marine Le Pen’s Front National. As the French people continue to feel threatened and insecure in the face of new incidents of terrorism—Nice

on 14 July, Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray less than a fortnight later—it remains to be seen whether Juppé's calm, confident, competent approach will prevail against the belligerent bombast of his rival.

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Russia and Eurasia

Russia, Eurasia and the new geopolitics of energy: confrontation and consolidation. Edited by Matthew Sussex and Roger E. Kanet. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 252pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13752 372 3. Available as e-book.

Central Asia has become an increasingly important focus of Russian foreign and security policy in recent years, both because it is considered to be within Russia's 'zone of privileged interest' and because of concerns about the potential for instability emanating from Afghanistan following the drawdown of international troops post-2014. The region is also attracting considerable attention from other actors, notably China and the West, largely the result of its substantial reserves of oil and gas. A long series of issues have elevated the significance of the region within the contemporary security environment, including its key strategic location, proximity to major regional powers, energy security and the growing influence of external actors. This volume, edited by Roger Kanet and Matthew Sussex, is the second in a series that explores changing power dynamics across the post-Soviet space. The first volume in the series analysed the evolution of Russia's foreign and security policies *vis-à-vis* the post-Soviet space, focusing on the factors shaping politics and security across the region (*Power, politics and confrontation in Eurasia*; reviewed in *International Affairs* 91: 3, 2016). This second volume examines patterns of cooperation and confrontation in Eurasia, with an emphasis on central Asia and the role that oil and gas play in politics across the region. As in the first volume, a range of authors cover a broad array of topics, from Russia's perceived 'revanchism' to regime stability in the central Asian states, oil and gas production and the role of national energy companies.

Reflecting these themes, the book is divided into two parts: part one covers the geopolitics of confrontation and the growing competition between Russia and the West, while part two looks at resource diplomacy and energy security across Eurasia. Matthew Sussex explores Russia's revanchism, defined here as its rapid resurgence after a period of decline. He argues that revanchism and the reconsolidation of Russian power constitute the principal components of the country's grand strategy in Eurasia. These objectives are being sought through the construction of its own regional architecture, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which, Sussex contends, demonstrate Moscow's desire to secure its 'immediate' area through institutionalization, a form of 'constrained primacy' (p. 27). Russia does not see its future linked to western-centric regimes and is seeking to construct an alternative order. Dina Moulioukova's chapter examines the factors that influence Russia's behaviour as an international actor, including the policies of the West and a desire for multipolarity. The final chapter in part one focuses on the role of Armenia and the south Caucasus in Great Power politics. It sets out to examine Russian foreign policy towards the south Caucasus since the end of the Cold War, arguing that it is 'nothing other than the attempts to centralize power within Russia and the near abroad' (p. 65). This is perhaps the weakest part of the book, partly because it seeks to cover so much, providing a brief overview of the evolution of Russian foreign (and domestic) policy under Putin and the growing centralization of power, before introducing the issue of 'state-sponsored nation-

alism', the potential reasons for Armenia's sudden change of heart in 2013 when it decided to join the EEU, a comparison of the choices made by Armenia and by Georgia *vis-à-vis* foreign economic relations, a section on Azerbaijan's defence spending and its domestic political structure, and finally a look at the role of Turkey and Iran in the region.

The majority of the chapters in this volume are in part two, which has a wide remit, addressing the broad theme of resource diplomacy and energy security across Eurasia. The first chapter in this section, by Charles Ziegler, looks at how the central Asian states have responded to the emerging norms of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, demonstrating that, for the most part, they share Russia's opposition to these norms and are aligned with Moscow's views on state sovereignty. Russia considers sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states to be inviolable principles of international relations, and will not tolerate any form of perceived challenge to its own sovereignty. Ellen Pirro broadens the discussion of the foreign policies of the central Asian states, examining their relations with Russia, China, the United States and the EU. She explores how these actors have dealt with the region as a whole and the divergences in their approach, particularly with regard to normative issues.

Nikita Lomagin examines Russia's apparent shift to the east in terms of energy. He argues that the Russian pivot has been driven by strong economic impulses from national energy companies (NECs) such as Rosneft, Gazprom and Rosatom, stating that the 'interests of pragmatic (business-driven) actors embedded in NECs coincided with those of the military and security elites (*siloviki*)' (p. 140). Wayne McLean explores the relative stability of the central Asian region, which has endured despite its dependence on resource receipts and extensive Great Power rivalry. He argues that authoritarianism has become the 'preferable' state model precisely because of this combination of resources, authoritarianism and Great Power pressures. Rémi Piet looks at the foreign policies of the three energy-producing states in central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while in the final chapter, Graeme Herd explores the impact of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership on central Asia. On the whole, this book makes a useful contribution to the literature on Eurasia. However, the chapters are less coherent as a whole than in the previous volume in the series and, as noted above, there are some chapters which do not sit comfortably within the overall structure.

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Pluralism by default: weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics. By Lucan Way. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2015. 274pp. Pb.: 29.00. ISBN 978 1 42141 812 4. Available as e-book.

In her trenchant study of the rise of Vladimir Putin (*Putin's kleptocracy*, Simon and Schuster, 2015), Karen Dawisha coined the memorable aphorism that Russia is an authoritarian project in the process of succeeding rather than a democratic project in the process of failing. Lucan Way's reappraisal of regime development in the former Soviet Union may be understood as a variation on this theme. He argues that different degrees of authoritarianism across the region are a consequence not of differing democratic commitments but of variance in pluralism. Such pluralism imposes limits on the capacity of authoritarian leaders to establish control, but does not necessarily support democratization. Rather, pluralism resists the consolidation of any regime, democratic or authoritarian. The result is weak governance and hybrid regimes that combine 'genuine democratic competition and serious authoritarian abuse' (p. 8).

Way attributes this 'pluralism by default' to two factors: the weak organizational capacity of leaders (failure to monopolize the means of coercion and economic resources) and political divisions within the titular nationality—an intriguing twist on identity politics, the significance of which is normally assumed to lie in *inter-ethnic* divisions. Where these factors are present, no leader will be able to exert unchallenged authority or be confident of a long incumbency. Way's argument helpfully dismantles some false assumptions embedded in the discourses of democratization theorists and advocates alike: for example, that pluralism necessarily fosters democratization (rather than merely fostering weak rule as such), and that an effective state is necessarily conducive to democracy (in the wrong hands such states can repress very effectively too).

Way elaborates his argument through case-studies on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. However, his ambition to develop a more general theory, beyond insightful discussions of these three countries, runs into two difficulties. First, the further the theory travels, the more qualifications and amendments are introduced. Way acknowledges that 'a range of other factors also shaped regime trajectories' (p. 164). These include, in the case of central Asia, the 'regional context'. The importance of leaders' personalities is also acknowledged and a distinction between weak states and collapsed (i.e. fatally weak) states is introduced too.

Second, and more fundamental to his theory, the two key explanatory factors—strength or weakness of leaders' resources and unity or division in the titular nationality—turn out to be dependent as well as independent variables. This raises the question of why they change over time and whether they are themselves merely expressions of deeper underlying causes that do the real explanatory work.

Russia, a country no longer 'pluralist by default'—which any account of post-Soviet change should be able to explain—illustrates this. In charting its movement towards authoritarianism, Way notes not only the personality differences between Yeltsin and Putin but also the 'extraordinarily weak' organizational capacity of the former compared to the latter (pp. 147–9). Here, organizational strength was rapidly increased by a determined leader of authoritarian bent; it emerges as a consequence—of leadership change and new priorities—rather than a cause. Way accepts that, across the former Soviet Union, 'the level of authoritarianism generally rose or fell in line with changes in organizational capacity' (p. 163). But what drove that change in organizational capacity in the first place? The same question arises when looking at the second explanatory variable, titular nationalist cohesion. A Russian nationalist challenge to Yeltsin—manifested in movements such as Pamyat, leaders like Alexander Prokhanov and Alexander Barkashov and the far-right newspapers *Zavtra* and *Den'*—once seemed possible. The real question is why it did not develop into a powerful force. The answer in both cases—and the deeper cause of change in both state strength and nationalist mood—may lie substantially in elite choices and strategies. This is an argument expounded in Henry Hale's superb *Patronal politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), which Way acknowledges.

Way offers many interesting observations, for example that even an imperfect privatization disperses ownership and so constrains a leader's ability to monopolize economic resources. The attention he pays to external factors—western democratizing pressure and Russian influence—is also welcome and warrants further study. The book's major finding, that nearly all leaders with strong organizational resources and national unity enjoyed long incumbency, is true if unsurprising. Ultimately, it begs the question of how they secured these.

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On Stalin's team: the years of living dangerously in Soviet politics. By Sheila Fitzpatrick. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2015. 384pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 0 69114 533 4. Available as e-book.

This political history of Stalinism is immensely important for at least three reasons: first, Sheila Fitzpatrick, who is a well-respected scholar of the USSR, challenges the monolithic perspective on the totalitarian leader as an increasingly paranoid hermit dictating his erratic choices to a group of spineless sycophants; second, it documents, using previously inaccessible archival material, the workings of the team (*komanda*), which the author correctly portrays as a gang of power-thirsty and often competitive magnates; and third, it offers a synthesis of the revisionist and the totalitarian schools in a conceptually comprehensive manner. The very fact that Fitzpatrick respectfully pays tribute to the work of authors as varied as E. H. Carr, Leonard Schapiro, Robert C. Tucker, Robert W. Daniels and T. H. Rigby is telling. Even one of her longstanding critics, Harvard historian Richard Pipes, published a favourable account of this book in the *New York Review of Books* in December 2015.

Stalin's team previously has been studied by historians, political scientists and Soviet dissidents (e.g. by Roy Medvedev in his *All Stalin's men* in the 1980s). Yet, Fitzpatrick succeeds in highlighting both the absolute nature of Stalin's ideocratic rule and his reliance on this group for enthusiastically and, quite often, effectively carrying out his policies: 'the fact is that, unchallenged top dog though he was, Stalin preferred—as his contemporaries Mussolini and Hitler did not—to operate with a group of powerful figures around him, loyal to him personally but also operating as a team' (p. 2). Indeed, while this was not what Lenin had understood by collective leadership, it was not a rigidly vertical command structure in which individuals such as Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan, Klim (Kliment) Voroshilov and, until 1952, Andrey Andreyev—the enduring core quintet—were robotic executants of the tyrant's whimsical decisions. They shared his worldview, partook in his ideological obsessions and were ready to sacrifice everything, including their family lives, to Stalin's desires and suspicions. Emblematic in this respect is Molotov's reluctant readiness to have his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, expelled from the party and deported to Kazakhstan until Stalin's death in March 1953.

Fitzpatrick proves that the team had developed an *esprit de corps* based on shared memories, affinities and anxieties. During his final month, Stalin refused to socialize with Molotov and Mikoyan and indicated that he saw them as politically unreliable. The team, however, resisted and pre-empted the leader's attempt to unleash a new purge. In order to achieve its institutional authority as a functional ruling elite, the group needed to distinguish itself from Lenin's closest associates. With the exception of Stalin, and to a much lesser extent Molotov, none of the faction's members had worked closely with the founder of the Bolshevik regime. Discontinuity, often a bloody one, rather than continuity marked the relationship between Lenin's and Stalin's teams. The emergence of this nucleus occurred in the fierce struggle for power and the battles around Stalin's strategic goals: ending Lenin's New Economic Policy, initiating the brutal, uncompromising collectivization, ideological regimentation—in brief, the revolution from above. Fitzpatrick accurately demonstrates that Stalin's arch-rival Leon Trotsky misread both his intellectual personality and the bureaucratic skills of the magnates. In addition to the core nucleus mentioned above, the team included, in different periods, protégés of either the leader himself or his lieutenants. This explains the rise of influential apparatchiks such as Nikita Khrushchev, Lazar Kaganovich or Lavrenty Beria who, after the Second World War, replaced Molotov as the most frequent

visitor to Stalin's office. For the general secretary, it was extremely important to ensure elite mobility and expand his inner circle beyond the boundaries of the original tightly knit gang. One example can illuminate this policy of top-level rejuvenation: 'Nikolai Bulganin, who became a candidate member of the Politburo in March 1946, was another newcomer. Ethnically Russian, like the other recent recruits to the team, he was appointed Stalin's deputy as defence minister in 1944 ... his great characteristic seems to have been high-level sociability. His family already had multiple social connections with the team: his wife was a friend of Khrushchev's wife; his daughter Vera ... was in school with Svetlana Stalina and Svetlana Molotova and a friend of Rada Khrushcheva and Valentina Malenkova; his son Lev was a friend of Vasily Stalin's' (p. 179). Thus, the team was a dynamic structure of friendships, kinship, visible and invisible alliances, expectations, hopes and in some cases, such as for the victims of the alleged 1948–50 Leningrad Affair (Nikolai Voznesensky and Alexey Kuznetsov), disasters.

In many respects, the team members were simulators taking to an extreme the art of histrionics, servility and duplicity. This permanent pretence of infinite loyalty reached its climax in Beria's schizophrenic behaviour, and to a lesser extent, in Khrushchev's. None of the team members had expected the chief of the secret police to be the first radical de-Stalinizer. In the same vein, Stalin's former barons, still a top level majority, abysmally underestimated Khrushchev's political abilities. This led to the crushing of the so-called Anti-Party Group in June 1957. As Sheila Fitzpatrick compellingly shows in this indispensable book, the political defeat of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Dmitry Shepilov—who joined them—meant the demise of the team. By the end of his life, Stalin worried about his acolytes' ability to rescue his legacy. One cannot but agree with Fitzpatrick's conclusion: "You would be lost without me," he used to tell them. *But, come March 1953, they weren't* [author's emphasis]. That's the big surprise at the end of this book, and I hope scholars will take note and reexamine their assumptions about late Stalinism accordingly' (p. 279). This reviewer fully shares the author's hope.

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Middle East and North Africa

The Gulf states in international political economy. By **Kristian Coates Ulrichsen**. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 288pp. £68.00. ISBN 978 1 13738 560 4. Available as e-book.

The six monarchical states of the Arabian peninsula, grouped together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), present some of the most striking economic, demographic and foreign policy evaluations to be observed in recent history. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen offers a comprehensive overview of the factors, dynamics and patterns that have characterized these states' development policies and trajectories, and their evolving linkages to the international political economy. He focuses, with much empirical detail, on the last two decades—fundamentally different in several ways from those preceding them both in pace and nature—but anchoring the account firmly in the historical context.

The book, in part two, offers an in-depth examination of four crucial areas where these linkages and policies are particularly in evidence: finance, trade and investment, aviation and the phenomenon of migrant labour. This examination is preceded by part one, which provides the historical and analytical context. The author shows how these states—even prior to their emergence as 'states' proper—have experienced, for centuries, an ebb and

flow of connections to the international political economy, as for instance with the pearl trade. The advent of the Middle East oil era from the 1940s transformed these linkages, followed by a speeding up of development and wealth accumulation from the 1970s in the context of the post-1945 international architecture. But it is since the 1990s that a real acceleration has been in evidence, based, as Coates Ulrichsen suggests, on a combination of accumulated wealth and experience, a generational shift in local leadership and an increasingly diffuse and multipolar global political economy—and politics—which these states have, it is compellingly argued, adjusted to pragmatically and taken advantage of. As the author puts it, the processes by which these states ‘have “gone global” ... have proliferated beyond recognition since the 1990s’ (p. 4). In a changing global context, where new coalitions of states can emerge and states can reconfigure their relative positions, the Gulf monarchies have been among the most recent and active players. Their leaders have adopted ‘aspects of economic globalization and focused on practical measures of global engagement, over any attachment to ... normative concepts of “global governance”’ (p. 5). This assessment is borne out by the Gulf states’ focus on developing active participation in shifting and multifarious international economic relationships; on taking part in shaping the ‘rules of the game’ of global economic governance (from international financial architecture and aviation to climate change); and on firmly resisting any ‘western’ political and cultural connotations of globalization.

This has also brought about the sort of confident projection of power regionally and beyond on the part of small states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (albeit not predominantly of the ‘hard’ sort), that might constitute a puzzle for many traditional International Relations scholars. What the book does rather overlook, though, is that these states were never without agency and relative autonomy—actively pursued for over a century, as I have argued elsewhere (*Analyzing Middle East foreign policies*, Routledge, 2005). But it is clear that the proactive international reach is indeed new.

Chapter three offers an extremely welcome and balanced overview of these states’ particular strategies for state capitalism, especially by the pursuit of branding and exploiting strategic niches. It is a little odd that sports—serving both as branding and as a niche economic sector within the context of MICE (Meeting, Incentives, Conferences and Exhibitions) track of developmental ambition—are discussed at the end of chapter two instead of being highlighted alongside other niches pursued such as renewable and alternative energies, higher education and the knowledge economy, and refined products and petrochemicals. Chapter three provides a very useful comparative overview of the origins and aims of various development ‘visions’.

In the second part of the book, Coates Ulrichsen turns to the internationalization of Gulf finance (including Islamic finance and sovereign wealth funds) and the rebalancing of capital flows to Africa, Asia and the MENA region; shifting patterns of global trade, where multilateral trade negotiations are being superseded by the development of bilateral relations (with the EU losing out); and a case-study of the food–energy security nexus, with particular attention now being paid to Asia, Africa and Latin America. One striking statistic the author cites is that China’s share of GCC exports increased threefold from 2001 to 2013, with China expected to become the GCC’s largest export partner by 2020.

The chapter on global aviation—paying particular attention to Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad specifically—is an excellent synthesis, with a good deal of added evidence, of a much-debated area of development policy and international commercial competition. The purposeful emergence of these three ‘global super-connectors’ is set against the historical emergence of aviation as a regional and international connector in Bahrain, Kuwait and

Sharjah. The sector serves as a particularly apposite example, since it is both central to the broader development strategies of these states and exemplifies how these ostensibly small players have been able to shake the 'global aviation markets to their core' (p. 159).

The chapter on the inevitable labour migration component of these economic strategies is both nuanced and balanced—drawing on some of the best recent work on the subject—including some produced by my own institution. It also exemplifies how development ambitions and engagement with the global economy are simultaneously producing tensions—not least the soft power ambition—with non- and trans-state actors in the new international political economy, such as human rights and international organizations. Once again, the discussion, perhaps not surprisingly for an author trained as a regional historian, is usefully tied into the historical context of migration in the Gulf, pointing out, for instance, the crucial importance of the migration of the (Arab and Persian) merchants of Linga to Dubai in the emergence of the sheikhdom in the early part of the twentieth century. Clearly, the nature of migration changed fundamentally with the oil era from the 1940s, and then changed again from the 1980s and especially 1990s onwards from what had been largely Arab to predominantly non-Arab migration—not least for political reasons. Indeed, Coates Ulrichsen rightly argues that management of migration and citizenship policy is motivated as much by politics as economics.

The discussion of security in the final chapter reminds readers that the issues raised by the Arab Spring cannot be avoided for long by the GCC states, and that the development choices within an evolving international political economy will be central to addressing them. In theory, the GCC leaderships have been grappling with these questions for some time in the schemes to evolve more sustainable, diverse and job-creating economies. The practical test cannot be put off for much longer.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

South Africa's political crisis: unfinished liberation and fractured class struggles. By Alexander Beresford. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. 153pp. £65.00. ISBN 978 1 13743 659 7. Available as e-book.

'The ANC's [African National Congress] nationalist project may well take a kicking in the near future, but it is far from "exhausted" just yet' (p. 23). In the municipal elections of August 2016, the ANC, South Africa's liberation movement turned political party, received below 60 per cent of the aggregate vote for the first time since overcoming the apartheid regime in 1994. Given the party's previous dominance, this represents an unprecedented electoral punishment. The party of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo has seemingly lost its appeal. Its leader President Jacob Zuma faces corruption allegations and the party has failed to deliver on citizens' expectations of a non-racial political economy.

South African bookstores are well stocked with commentaries that seek to explain this phenomenon to the casual observer, with a special focus placed on the failures of the ANC and its leadership. Alexander Beresford's book is an original addition to this canon—offering a nuanced and longer-term analysis of South Africa's labour movement, outlining the significance of labour to the fortunes of the ruling party and to underpinning progressive economic change in South Africa. Specifically, Beresford seeks to explain the political significance of the 'NUMSA moment'—the expulsion of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) from the country's largest federation of unions, the

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), that governs South Africa as part of a tripartite alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

Relations both between and within the trade unions mirror the factionalism and infighting of the ANC. A core constituency within both the unions and the party is supportive of the status quo. This constituency sees the future of COSATU as remaining aligned with the ANC and it is supportive, albeit sometimes tacitly, of President Zuma. Within the ANC, this status quo position is challenged by neo-liberal internationalists, such as the former and current ministers of finance, Trevor Manuel and Pravin Gordhan. Within the unions, the governing alliance has been challenged by a pro-worker movement that views the ANC's National Development Plan, which sets out the party's core policies, as part of a neo-liberal orthodoxy that defers social change and postpones economic restructuring (p. 28). These opposing forces led to the 'NUMSA moment', but do not fully explain South Africa's current political landscape.

The broad characteristics of the political machinations of South African unions are well documented in existing literature. Beresford's book adds a valuable ethnographic dimension, based on his research with members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) employed by the state power company, Eskom. Through first-hand accounts and observations, he reveals that younger, better-educated and better-skilled workers tend to have a weaker affiliation to the union and the ideal of collectivism. Their individualistic aspirations are serviced by the unions through promotion and access to office. Older, less educated and lower-skilled workers are left behind. And yet the ability of the unions to contribute to upward social mobility is dependent on grassroots participation and social democracy.

Furthermore, Beresford's research presents evidence that contrary to the popular idea that the ANC suffers from 'post-nationalism' or 'exhausted nationalism', the allegiance of workers to political parties still runs deeper than class allegiance. Rather than rallying against the ANC's new-found neo-liberalism, 'workers see the post-apartheid state and, by extension, the ANC government as a largely benevolent if somewhat dysfunctional force in their lives' (p. 120). But the ANC makes material interventions into citizens' lives, and importantly, is still looked to for 'ethical leadership'. Continued support for the presidency is explained by one worker who is quoted as stating, 'Zuma understands the way we grew up' (p. 128).

Beresford provides depth and detail on the complexity of class politics in South Africa. The book does not seek to develop a theoretical analysis, but its academic nature may make it inaccessible to some readers. Future editions would benefit from an update on the role of former NUM leader and ANC presidential hopeful Cyril Ramaphosa. Beresford states that Ramaphosa's leadership of the NUM is fondly remembered as a time when the union was winning (p. 110). However, Ramaphosa's reputation has been tarnished by the view, popular among South African workers, that he was complicit in the Marikana massacre of 2012.

South Africa's labour movement, internationally revered and romanticized for its militancy, is at risk of being undermined by a declining participatory culture. The value added by Beresford's research is through his insight into the internal organization of the NUM, and how competition for jobs and access to office for material self-advancement is becoming a determining feature, at every level, of South African politics, from the shop floor to the office of the presidency.

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South Asia

Pakistan at the crossroads: domestic dynamics and external pressures. Edited by **Christophe Jaffrelot**. New York: Columbia University Press. 2016. 346pp. £44.00. ISBN 978 0 23117 306 3. Available as e-book.

The Obama administration considered Pakistan ‘the most dangerous country in the world’ (p. 235) and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff worried about insurgents there gaining control of nuclear weapons (p. 255). So understanding Pakistan really matters. In nearly 25 years working in and dealing with Pakistan, this edited volume is among the best I have read and some of the chapters are outstanding.

One of the challenges of thinking and writing about Pakistan is to understand how the scar tissue of its short history influences policy today. The traumas of Partition are well known, but several other historical events helped shape modern Pakistan. The India–China war of 1962 led directly to China becoming Pakistan’s ‘all weather friend’. The ‘loss’ of East Pakistan in 1971 was a crushing blow and prompted the army to adopt the role of guarantor of territorial integrity. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the army’s ill-fated flirtation with terrorist and insurgent groups and by degrees to the escalation of the Kashmir conflict in the 1990s.

Is Pakistan at a crossroads or does it remain on an inexorable path towards disaster? Was the Army Public School massacre of 2014 really the moment when the army decided that ending internal subversion was the main national security priority, ahead of countering India? I would dearly wish to believe so, but must own to scepticism. First, the army’s whole rationale is based on enmity towards India, buttressed by an array of anniversaries, of which 1947, 1965 and 1971 are just a few. Second, the army believes that India (sometimes with Afghan help) has been supporting secessionist and terrorist groups in Sindh, Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkwa and the tribal areas. Indeed, some even see India’s covert hand in the Peshawar atrocity itself. And third, the army may have a vested interest in the status quo, as the benefactor of military assistance programmes since 1979 and with tentacles reaching into the commercial, industrial and financial spheres.

However some of the contributions provide the basis for some cautious optimism. Philip Oldenburg’s chapter on the rise of the judiciary focuses on the ‘exhilarating’ Lawyers Movement of 2007–2009 (pp. 89–91) and the activism of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. While accepting that the gains of the judiciary are fragile, it suggests that it is now the third leg of a new ‘troika’ (p. 37) of which the government and army constitute the other two. Several contributors rightly point to the symbolic importance of Asif Zardari having been allowed to complete a full term of office as president.

Shahid Javed Burki, in his chapter on the economy, argues that Pakistan could have been a BRIC nation had it not been for the bouts of political uncertainty. Disconcertingly, however, the best growth rates were recorded during the periods of military rule under Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf. Burki also points to Pakistan’s inability to raise sufficient taxes and its tendency towards dependence on overseas support.

In his chapter on the US relationship, the editor Christophe Jaffrelot describes it as ‘clientelistic’. I would question this assertion. Both in 1979, and again after 9/11, Pakistan made sure that it accepted US assistance on its own terms. During the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan required all US aid to flow through government agencies. And after 9/11, Musharraf adopted the twin track ‘compartmented’ approach which enabled Pakistan to provide vital assistance to the US in tracking down Al-Qaeda

terrorists, while at the same time ensuring that groups such as the Haqqanis and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba remained relatively untouched. It was their belated recognition of this pragmatism that prompted such US fury when they discovered that Osama bin Laden was living near the Pakistan Military Academy at Abbotabad in 2011.

The discussion of the Chinese relationship also contains a misconception. Pakistan has never ‘oscillated’ (p. 281) between US and Chinese support. The latter has been a constant since 1962. By contrast, US aid has depended on particular security circumstances, a fact which provokes much sardonic comment in Pakistan; 59 per cent of Pakistanis are said to see the US as an enemy (p. 249). However, the two aid programmes are very different and it would be naive to think of China as an uncritical supplier of largess. One of several areas where China will require an improved Pakistani response is against separatists: Chinese workers are threatened as they work on the new economic corridor to Gwadar both in Xinjiang and in Baluchistan.

Finally, this volume is replete with Pakistan’s many ironies. It is well known that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, ‘the Frontier Gandhi’, opposed Partition, but much of Baluchistan resisted too, as did Maulana Maududi’s Jama’at-e-Islami and the Deobandi sect which is so influential in the frontier regions today. A second irony is how a humiliating military defeat in East Pakistan encouraged the army to don the mantle of protector of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and even of its democracy. For an important point is that the army always views its political interventions as temporary, to last until a ‘reliable’ civilian government can be installed. In spite of all its years under military rule, Pakistan has always seen itself as a democracy. Here at least is a real cause for hope.

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East Asia and Pacific

China’s strong arm: protecting citizens and assets abroad. By **Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel**. London: Routledge. 2015. 160pp. Index. Pb.: £12.99. ISBN: 978 1 13894 726 9. Available as e-book.

With an ever-growing library of books on the implications of China’s rise, Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel have managed to write an original and timely analysis that answers a question not adequately addressed to date: given China’s adherence to the policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, how will it respond when its nationals are threatened in fragile or unstable states?

The Chinese government officially endorsed the ‘going out’ policy in 2002, in an effort to expand its commercial interests overseas. Especially relevant to Chinese interests were energy and mineral extraction, which became a focus for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which are less risk-averse than the Chinese government. Because much of the low-hanging fruit in global resource markets had long been spoken for before the going out policy was initiated, China’s SOEs operate in states that other multinational corporations deem too risky. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals are working in countries like South Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Iraq, where they face security risks ranging from kidnapping to murder. While the number of incidents involving Chinese nationals is relatively small—the authors found approximately 80 casualties in attacks targeting Chinese between 2004 and 2014, against an estimated 5 million Chinese citizens working and living abroad—it adds new variables to an increasingly complex foreign policy decision-making process.

Flipping the maxim of trade following the flag, the authors describe Chinese foreign policy as driven less by grand strategy than by the need to protect the country's commercial assets and citizens abroad. During incidents where Chinese citizens have been killed overseas, media scrutiny and public outrage have driven leaders to take more assertive measures. These domestic pressures are an important consideration when studying China's foreign policy, which the authors see as a reflection of 'the evolving relationship between public opinion, government legitimacy, China's evolving security interests and its gradual move towards great power status' (p. 59).

This book provides four case-studies where the Chinese government has had to take action in order to address either violence or threats against Chinese expatriates: Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Mekong River delta, Libya and Sudan. Each of the case-studies indicates a more assertive foreign policy when protecting Chinese citizens abroad, not as part of a strategic calculus to stake a claim to Great Power status, but rather as an unavoidable by-product of pursuing commercial relations with weak or fragile states. In some cases, China has had to engage with non-state actors, such as militias or rebel groups, in order to protect its interests, signalling a greater involvement in the domestic affairs of these fragile states. While the policy of non-interference has long been central to China's international relations, its commitment to this principle will be tested. The authors borrow the phrase 'creative involvement' from Peking University's Wang Yizhou—describing a set of diplomatic tools that can be deployed to influence events within a state in order to protect Chinese interests without resorting to outright intervention—that can cover mediation, diversification of interlocutors and power projection. Given the projected expansion of China's interests across Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa, with its 'one belt, one road' initiative, the Chinese government can expect this to become the 'new normal' in its diplomacy.

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When China goes to the Moon... By Marco Aliberti. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 2015. 336pp. £99.00. ISBN 978 3 319 19472 1. Available as e-book.

When looking back at China half a century ago, the year 1966 is usually remembered for the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. But, as we learn from Marco Aliberti's stimulating *When China goes to the Moon...*, it was also the year when China sent its first dog into space (p. 80), one year after the first proposal to put Chinese astronauts in space. This was part of a period of huge strategic and revolutionary ambition during which Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's then putative successor, played a key role until his suspicious death in a plane crash in 1971. It was not until 1986 that the revival of China's space programme began.

Aliberti's book, part of a series of studies in space policy, gives a detailed and thoroughly researched account of this programme, with a particular focus on plans for a human lunar mission. This is a balanced assessment of the programme's feasibility, covering its technical as well as strategic elements. Chapter two traces the institutions and structures through which policy is made, demonstrating the complexity and nuance required to understand Chinese policy-making processes in general. Chapter three sets out the motivation for China's lunar ambitions, showing that they are not just driven by their role in 'regain[ing] the status of great power' (p. 56) and the message of regime legitimacy that the achievement of successful milestones brings, but also by deeper Chinese cultural imaginings about the moon. Chapters four and five assess these plans as being broadly feasible, as long as China's development trajectory remains solid, while showing the gradual and cautious nature of their implementation (targets originally set in the 1990s had proved too ambitious).

The first half of the book concludes that China's space programme is not part of an effort to gain global hegemony and that China sees space as a basis for cooperation, not competition. The second half of the book explores this theme further, with chapter six examining debates about space races in Asia and between China and the US, and chapter seven offering an in-depth account of the state of and potential for Europe–China space cooperation.

Aliberti's conclusion is that the current space dynamics in Asia, between Japan, India and China, do not constitute a regional space race, though there is some diplomatic ('soft power') and commercial competition between China and Japan, for example in the provision of space-related services (p. 207). The more complex issues are between China and the US. Aliberti argues that China does not see itself in competition with the US and has been willing to cooperate. But this cooperation would not be on American terms—tellingly, NASA understands 'international cooperation as the acceptance by other partners of a programme conceived, planned, and directed by NASA' (quoted on p. 238)—and the decision to exclude China from the international space station was one motivation for Beijing to push ahead with its own programme (p. 108). Whether there is a US–China space race therefore depends primarily on whether the US wants one or if it is prepared to engage in genuine cooperation.

This is where Europe enters the discussion. Aliberti questions whether a 'space race' is a useful paradigm in a post-bipolar world (p. 215). He recounts the European decision in 2003 to open up its Galileo satellite programme to Chinese participation and then close it off again in 2008, primarily due to US concerns. Nonetheless, he argues that Europe should act as a 'bridge builder' in international space cooperation, and while he is realistic about the extent of European capabilities, he suggests that Europe's ideational and material strengths allow it to offer alternatives to both China and the US. Space can therefore become a symbolic field for a European role in avoiding a return to a two-bloc world, this time featuring China as the US's strategic 'other'.

This book is well argued and thoughtful, and the ideas deserve wider consideration by European policy-makers grappling with other implications of China's rise. Needless to say, there will be some, in the US especially, who are not persuaded by this approach, but anything which addresses the growing security dilemma between China and the US should be seriously considered. This book not only offers an excellent resource for understanding China's lunar ambitions, but is a stimulating contribution to these wider debates.

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Metamorphosis: studies in social and political change in Myanmar. Edited by **Renaud Egreteau and François Robinne.** Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. 2016. 450pp. Pb.: £35.50. ISBN 978 9 97169 866 9.

This is an especially timely book, published the year after Myanmar's (Burma) landmark democratic elections. *Metamorphosis* seeks to address some of the pressing issues which the newly elected government is likely to face: the relationship between the military and civilians; ethnic tensions, and especially the disputes between Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist majority; and protests by farmers against the acquisition of land for development projects.

In the first chapter, Renaud Egreteau acknowledges the frictions between the armed forces and civilians. He notes that 'antagonism and mutual distrust between the Burmese armed forces (or Tatmadaw) and the civilian sphere have long characterized Myanmar's post-independence politics' (p. 15). Tatmadaw publications and official discourse blame the

civilian politicians for Burma's problems and claim that the army remains a binding force for the nation. While highlighting some of the changes in this relationship, the author highlights an important way in which the army has ensured its crucial position in the nation's politics. Article 6 (f) of the constitution categorically states that the army is 'able to participate in the national political leadership role of the state' (p. 22). Interestingly, the army, while wanting to play a role in national politics, has been wary of getting involved in party politics. EgretEAU ends the chapter with insightful concluding remarks: first, the army may see no incentive to withdraw from political institutions, and second, a pragmatic, non-confrontational approach towards it on the part of the civilian government may be the most advisable way forward.

Ethnic tensions are a key challenge for Myanmar and they are addressed in appropriate detail by several of the contributors. The second chapter by Alexandra de Mersan deals with the 2010 election and with problems afflicting the Arakan region. Mersan highlights some of the initiatives, such as promotion of Arakanese culture, proposed by U Maung Nyo, a parliamentarian from the region, to reduce the rift between Rakhine State (formerly known as Arakan Province) and the rest of Myanmar. In chapter four, Maxime Boutry gives an overview of Burmese nationalism, pointing out that General Ne Win, founder of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and military leader of Myanmar for 26 years, especially targeted Indians during the 'Burmanization' of the country (p. 111). According to Boutry, the National League of Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, itself is not free from policies promoting Burmese domination. In chapter seven, Carine Jacquet examines the Kachin conflict. Fighting in the region erupted again in 2011, and Jacquet argues that despite the political transition in 2011 and the ceasefire and peace talks of 2013 and 2014, there is not much hope for the Kachins. The book also provides readers with a strong background on the Rohingya dispute.

The key role that civil society has played in raising important economic and social issues in Myanmar is widely recognized. Chapter three, by Elliott Prasse-Freeman, is devoted to grassroots movements, especially by farmers against the forcible occupation of their land. One interesting example is the protest against land acquisitions for a Chinese copper mine project. NLD leader and current foreign minister Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed head of a commission which ultimately concluded that the project had to go ahead. Chapter nine by Susan Banki, which focuses on transnational activists, is especially important given the crucial role activists in the Burmese diaspora have played in raising awareness of political issues.

Apart from ethnicity and the role of civil society, the gender issue in Myanmar is also indirectly addressed by some of the contributors. Chapter eleven, by Hiroko Kawanami, examines an interesting aspect of this: the role of Buddhist nuns in social and political life. Nuns are playing an increasingly prominent role within society, even though this had been previously discouraged. 'Buddhist Nuns are increasingly co-opted by the state to work as ritual functionaries alongside monks and as state missionaries who could promote a peaceful image of Myanmar abroad' (p. 318). Their biggest contributions have been in the charitable and educational spheres. Interestingly, NGOs and welfare organizations have been arguing against the 'subservient stance' of nuns *vis-à-vis* monks. While social frictions are often flagged as one of the serious problems afflicting Myanmar, not enough space is given to the challenges faced by the health care sector. Chapter ten by Celine Coderey looks at the abysmal state of health care in Myanmar. Two key reasons for this are the fact that only 2 per cent of GDP is allocated to health and that due to international sanctions, not much attention has been paid to this area. In any democracy, health and education should receive the highest priority.

Finally, while some contributors draw comparisons with those south-east Asian countries that have dealt with challenges similar to Myanmar's, some use of south Asian examples—Pakistan comes to mind—would have been welcome and relevant, given the issues surrounding civil–military relations and religious frictions. The potential role of important Asian powers in the consolidation of Burmese democracy is another question that is left unexamined. And while the editors have identified some key issues in Burmese politics, the volume's structure could have been more cohesive.

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North America*

United States law and policy on transitional justice: principles, politics, and pragmatics. By Zachary D. Kaufman. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016. 382pp. £55.00. ISBN 978 0 19024 349 4. Available as e-book.

From the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals in the 1940s, to the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals in the 1990s, the United States has often demonstrated a commitment to transitional justice and a particular penchant for courts. In *United States law and policy on transitional justice*, Harvard Senior Fellow Zachary D. Kaufman examines why. In tracing inconsistencies across four cases, Kaufman underscores the limitations of the 'liberal norms of justice' in explaining America's historical approach to transitional justice—thus posing a direct challenge to Gary Bass's leading theoretical framework of 'legalism'. While Kaufman acknowledges that beliefs matter, he develops a new theoretical approach—'prudentialism'—to better account for the role played by politics and pragmatism in the US decision to support legalistic or non-legalistic transitional justice options in various cases, including the 1988 Lockerbie bombing and 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Seeing that certain methods of transitional justice can alternatively contribute to or detract from international security, the puzzle for those studying it is why states would accept the risks inherent in prosecution. In *Stay the hand of vengeance* (Princeton University Press, 2000), Bass explains that liberal states will often pursue prosecution for war criminals because they believe this to be right, even if action could inflict political costs. Pointing to the manifold non-legalist alternatives liberal states sometimes support—from inaction, lustration, amnesty and truth commissions to exile, indefinite detention and lethal force—Kaufman disagrees. Not only did the design of the four major international criminal tribunals (ICTs) differ along key dimensions, but the importance of 'prosecution' as a tool of transitional justice varied significantly in its importance across time.

Even when the United States felt a heightened obligation to prosecute war criminals for their behaviour, that did not preclude it from using non-legalist options more in line with its interests. As perhaps the most striking illustration of pragmatic calculation, Kaufman explains how, after the Second World War, the US diluted its commitment to prosecute Nazi war criminals through a secret amnesty programme called 'Operation Paperclip'. According to the programme, the US identified and then hired more than 1,600 German scientists who had previously been associated with the Nazi Party. The father of the US space programme, Dr Wernher von Braun, was apparently one of those identified—having designed and developed the V-2 rocket that Nazi Germany showered on the UK during the Second World War. Similarly, in Japan, the United States granted amnesty to more than 50

* See also Frank Sauer, *Atomic anxiety*, pp. 1266–7; and Michael Mayer, *US missile defence strategy*, p. 1268.

leading war criminals and over 3,600 officials, scientists and physicians involved in human experimentation during the war.

Emphasizing that legalist pursuits by liberal states are often tempered by pragmatic and political considerations, Kaufman further rejects Bass's notion that liberal states are somehow inherently or uniquely legalistic. Kaufman demonstrates that illiberal states have—and do—support legalistic transitional justice options. Not only did the United States initially favour using lethal force to punish Nazi perpetrators, Kaufman argues that the Nuremberg tribunal 'might not have been created without Stalin's early, constant, and forceful lobbying' (p. 89).

Relying on rich historical illustrations throughout the book, Kaufman illuminates not only the limits of legalism but also the importance of particular policy-makers in shaping the balance of politics, pragmatism and normative beliefs, thereby refusing to accept US behaviour as the inevitable result of a monolithic state. While normative beliefs featured significantly in planning the Nuremberg tribunal, they did not influence thinking to the same extent in the case of Tokyo. In Libya and Iraq, they ostensibly played no role at all.

Kaufman's book is invaluable for those seeking to understand the legal structure of ICTs and why—given varied US motivations—the design of ICTs changed over time. While some might prefer to rely on narrower conceptions of what constitutes transitional justice, this book is unique in the comparisons it affords of ICTs before and after the Cold War. Some might also question whether Kaufman would have reached the same conclusions about US foreign policy had he focused principally on cases where the US had less of a strategic geopolitical interest, as Annie Bird did in her 2015 *US foreign policy on transitional justice* (New York: Oxford University Press). Perhaps legalism is more compelling when there is less at stake. Either way, Kaufman's conclusion is clear and convincing: the US enjoys a panoply of options regarding how and why to support transitional justice. Its calculations can be principled, yes, but not because the US is inherently legalistic and consistently devoted to liberal conceptions of justice.

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The unquiet frontier: rising rivals, vulnerable allies, and the crisis of American power. By **Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell**. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2016. 240pp. Index. £22.95. ISBN 978 069116 375 8. Available as e-book.

Creating enduring alliances is a difficult task and maintaining them is even harder, especially when the arch-enemy against which the alliance defined itself dissolves into thin air. Alliances cost money and political capital for Great Powers. Weaker allies need assurances that they will not be abandoned in case of war; for the Great Powers this creates a looming risk of being dragged into war for local interests of minor allies. The temptation to give up and scale back on overseas commitments and retreat is particularly acute for the insular Great Powers, such as the United States, which are protected by large bodies of water. That would be a grave mistake, as Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell forcefully argue in their recent book. Their central message is that 'in both the bipolar and unipolar international settings, allies have been indispensable to maintaining the global order that has allowed for peace and prosperity of the "American" century' (p. 5). It is a rallying cry against calls for American political and military retreat from the world, variously labelled as 'offshore balancing', 'restraint' or, more pejoratively, 'isolationism'.

The book is divided into six chapters. After the introduction in chapter one, the authors examine the deprioritization of alliances in American grand strategy. They focus

on geographic, technological and ideological reasons for 'downgrading the importance of allies' (p. 17) and discuss why alternatives to allies, such as seeking a Great Power settlement or relying on technological superiority, are misleading and inadequate strategies. Chapter three deals with revisionist powers (such as Russia, China and Iran) and their strategies to challenge the western liberal order. The authors focus on probing as the dominant strategy of revisionist powers. Probing is defined as 'a low-intensity and low-risk test aimed at gauging the opposing state's power and will to maintain security and influence over a region' (p. 43). Revisionists, Grygiel and Mitchell argue, resort to probing 'when they think that the existing great power is retreating' (p. 44). Probing 'aims to revise the order gradually and carefully, starting from the outer layers of the rival great power's influence' (p. 48). This behaviour is central to the book's argument and is presented in a very well-thought through and well-written chapter on revisionist strategy, which has been understudied to date. Chapter four shifts the focus to the response of US allies. The authors discuss various strategies adopted by allies in three regions—Asia, the Middle East and central and eastern Europe—against three revisionist powers—China, Iran and Russia—in response to the perceived American retreat and the weakening of extended deterrence as a result of this. These strategies range from balancing (military self-help or regional caucusing), to bandwagoning (accommodation or avoidance/hedging). The net result of such strategies by American allies, the authors argue, would be 'highly destabilizing for regional security orders, stymieing US efforts at containment, fuelling disputes among allies, and creating a greater "critical mass" in support of revisionism in the global balance of power' (p. 114).

Chapter five makes the case for maintaining and strengthening the US alliance system. The authors discuss, at some length and with considerable nuance, the geopolitical, military and geo-economic benefits of both historical and contemporary alliances. This chapter convincingly demonstrates why downgrading alliances in American grand strategy would be a very costly mistake with long-term, unintended consequences for the United States as well as for the future of the western democratic liberal order. The last chapter offers a series of detailed, well-thought-out and specific recommendations for American foreign policy at the global and regional level that 'seek to restore American credibility and thus the strength of our alliances' (p. 157). Grygiel and Mitchell do an excellent job in this respect: it is refreshing to see concrete and practical advice on how to go about countering revisionist powers' probing behaviour on the frontlines of geopolitical competition.

I have two minor criticisms. First, the discussion on the domestic politics of American grand strategy is rather limited. The changes to American foreign policy advocated by the authors require countering the calls, coming from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, for American retreat from the world. How can such a domestic coalition be established and how can different audiences be persuaded? A separate chapter on how to muster and sustain the political will necessary to change the course of American grand strategy would have been a great addition to the book. Second, surprisingly, Turkey is missing among the frontline allies that Grygiel and Mitchell discuss. There is a single mention of Turkey (p. 45) and that is within the context of the 1853 Crimean War. This omission is puzzling, given that Turkey, a long-time NATO ally, is literally situated between two of the three revisionist powers (Russia and Iran). Turkey has a long history of antagonism with both countries, punctuated by periods of cold peace. This reviewer would have expected Turkey, a major regional military and economic power, to feature more prominently in an American grand strategy that aims to counter revisionist powers and strengthen regional allies.

Book reviews

Overall, however, *The unquiet frontier* is an excellent example of how policy-relevant scholarship on grand strategy and foreign policy should be done. The arguments presented in the book are persuasive, well articulated and nuanced. Policy-makers, academics, as well as general readers interested in American grand strategy and the future of the western liberal order will definitely find it worth their time.

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