Introduction
In recent years political tensions in the Middle East have reached new heights over the intersecting crises stemming from the Syrian civil war, the unravelling of the Iran nuclear agreement, the war in Yemen, and the Qatar crisis. The common denominator in these events is the direct or indirect involvement of Iran. The country’s increased regional activity since its 2012 intervention in Syria has stoked anger and anxiety in the Gulf states, which fear Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions. The Gulf states felt abandoned by the US under the Obama administration, which they believed prioritized the nuclear agreement ahead of pressuring Iran over its regional policies. From the perspective of the Gulf states this has led to Iran’s destabilizing influence spreading, which is evidenced by its support for Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, its military support for the Houthis in the Yemen civil war, its ongoing relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and its relations with Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Iran has also repeatedly been accused of fomenting unrest and supporting the principally Shia opposition in Bahrain.
Map 1: Iran and the GCC states
— Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/mideastr.pdf. The boundaries and names on this map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by Chatham House.
Map 1: Iran and the GCC states
In response, Iran argues that its regional relationships and activities are by invitation, that they are purely defensive, and are designed to achieve the strategic depth needed to repel threats away from Iran’s borders. For the last four decades, Iran’s regional position has been motivated by opposition to Israel and hostility with the US, which has a significant military presence in the Middle East. Tensions with Saudi Arabia have also become a factor in Iran’s regional calculations, especially as Saudi Arabia has sought to build an anti-Iranian regional coalition. In concert with Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the US, since the election of President Donald Trump, Saudi Arabia has made efforts to roll back Iranian influence and has repeatedly accused it of inflaming sectarian divides and sponsoring terrorism in the region. To counter this coalition, President Hassan Rouhani has tried to reduce the tension with Saudi Arabia through mediation by Kuwait and Oman in 2017. He has also argued for an all-inclusive regional security architecture. However, for the time being, pervasive mistrust on both sides has rendered such initiatives moot.
Iran argues that its regional relationships and activities are by invitation, that they are purely defensive, and are designed to achieve the strategic depth needed to repel threats away from Iran’s borders.
Iran is perceived across the region to be successful and strategic, but in fact its policies are opportunistic and it lacks a grand strategy. Opportunism has become Iran’s principal avenue for relationships in the region, which has entrenched feelings of distrust towards it. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the country has had little by way of deep, conventional interaction with its Gulf neighbours. Rather than build strong bilateral relations based on shared national, economic or regional interests, Iran’s ties with the Gulf states are based on convenient openings stemming from intra-Arab tensions and the miscalculations of others, such as Saudi Arabia. Iran has managed to bolster its regional position by taking advantage or widespread frustration and heightened tensions among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE – particularly since the outbreak of the Qatar crisis in 2017. Over the years, Iran has cultivated mutually beneficial and pragmatic bilateral relations with the smaller GCC states of Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE. In doing so, Iran has brought itself out of regional isolation, diversified its relationship portfolio and gained political capital by exploiting divisions within the council. These relationships tend to be fleeting, but they provide Iran with economic and political lifelines.
To better comprehend the drivers and divisions in regional relations, at a time of heightened tensions, this paper explores Iran’s opportunistic foreign policy towards the Gulf states with a principal focus on Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE – the four countries that have maintained and developed regular relations with Iran. Understanding the history, nature and orientation of these various relationships can shed light on the limits of, and opportunities for, broader regional engagement with Iran and for regional de-escalation. The paper draws upon research, interviews, workshop discussions and conversations with political actors and analysts in Iran and the GCC countries.