Introduction
There is currently much discussion, some of it informed, about whether or not Russia is now preparing for aggressive war in pursuit of expansionist objectives. Statistics are being deployed – not infrequently selectively, and generally relating to military expenditure – in support of various contentions. What is often lacking is much sense of historical perspective or understanding of how historical experience now shapes the Russian mindset. This paper attempts to shed some light on these areas, and to explain how Russia’s perception of the nature of future war helps to drive contemporary military policy and the structuring and deployment of ground forces. Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian army is once again a major-league player, and it wants its possible adversaries to know it. This is not to suggest that Russia regards physical combat between the armed forces of states as the only, or even principal, method of waging war in the 21st century, as a glance at ‘new generation’ warfare will suggest. But this paper will concentrate on the nature of military reform as it impacts Russia’s ground forces. It will address the rationale underlying their peacetime dispositions, their evolving operational doctrine, and their consequent organizational structure.