
Reorganizing Russian formations to meet the demands of the future
Changing perceptions of strategic interests combine with changing perceptions of the nature of future war to produce adjustments in force posture. They also require reorganization of force structures according to the different demands of likely future conflicts. The army’s cadre-mobilization model suited a Soviet Union that anticipated an existential struggle with NATO that would require harnessing all the resources of the state and society to achieve victory. The much-diminished Russia that emerged from the collapse of the USSR had more modest ambitions: preventing further disintegration (the purpose of the two Chechen wars); and maintaining dominant influence in former Soviet republics (the rationale behind the war with Georgia). The impetus for military reform came from the army’s poor showing in those conflicts. The post-2008 remodelling of the ground forces reflected the new priority: the creation of high-readiness forces capable of reacting within hours to the short-notice demands that may result from an unpredictable geopolitical environment.
The reforms introduced by Anatoliy Serdyukov (Russia’s defence minister in 2007–12) envisaged the elimination, or at least downgrading, of the divisional level of command. As a relatively large and cumbersome formation, a Soviet-style ground forces division required considerable time and resources to move long distances – more than a fast-developing crisis might allow. Henceforward, the rapid-reaction forces would rely on two elements. The first comprised the airborne (actually, mostly air-assault) troops whose utility was emphasized by their successful employment in Ukraine. The four airborne and air-assault divisions, currently comprising two manoeuvre regiments apiece, are each in the process of forming an additional regiment (eventually making 12 regiments in total); in addition, there are two air-assault brigades. The manpower establishment now aimed for is 60,000 by around 2020, an increase of 60 per cent, or of nearly 100 per cent in the case of the spetsnaz element. They are also to be re-equipped with better-armed airborne combat vehicles and reinforced by permanently assigned tank units and increased combat support to bolster their capabilities in conventional conflicts.27 The second consists of modular ground forces brigades containing usually four of the basic building blocks of these high-readiness forces – the battalion tactical group (BTG). Many BTGs are held at (theoretically) two hours’ notice to move. In early 2016 there were 65 of these, approximately one per brigade (though this figure includes all those fully manned by professional soldiers),28 and by 2018 there were to be 125.29 Together, the airborne, acting in conjunction with an appropriate number of manoeuvre brigades, should be able to deal with potentially short-warning and short-duration, possibly complex and certainly decisive operations in the ‘near abroad’ before a defence could be properly prepared, much less before outside powers become involved. They were – and are – geared to conventional, possibly high-end war fighting rather than the peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations that have preoccupied Western powers for the last two decades.
The new brigade, typically with four organic manoeuvre BTGs, superficially resembles the Soviet regiment with its three motor-rifle and one tank battalions (vice versa in tank units). In fact, the brigade is considerably stronger as it possesses combat and service support resources that are almost of divisional scale. The new motor-rifle brigade has two self-propelled and one multiple-rocket-launcher battalions, two air-defence battalions, and battalions each of reconnaissance, anti-tank and engineer troops, and electronic warfare, UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle, popularly known as drone) and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) companies.30 This reflects the diminishing role of tanks and infantry in determining combat outcomes through direct-fire engagements. Increasingly, actions are being decided by the manoeuvre of indirect fire concentrations and precision strikes delivered by reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike complexes.31 The tank and motor-rifle troops are employed to complete the destruction of the enemy and exploit into its depth to decisive effect.
Capable of autonomous operations, such a brigade would deploy four BTGs supported as deemed necessary to accomplish the mission by the other brigade assets, supplemented on critical axes by others from higher level. Such minor formations, by virtue of their small size, have the great merit of being agile and speedily deployable. They enable the army to react quickly in unexpected crises and are adequate for operations in the ‘near abroad’ or in other neighbouring countries where the opposition is likely to be neither as numerous nor as combat-effective as the Russian forces. On the other hand, as experience in Ukraine has indicated, the span of command and control can overstretch the brigade headquarters.
There was much opposition to the reforms within the Russian military and defence industries, which ultimately contributed to the dismissal, in late 2012, of both Serdyukov and his Chief of the General Staff, Nikolay Makarov. Subsequently, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its efforts to change the geopolitical orientation of the rest of Ukraine began to exercise a profound influence on the army. As already touched on, the conflict fixed a substantial proportion of Russian ground forces in geographical locations that would enable their rapid advance into Ukraine to deal with any outside intervention in the event of escalation. It also accelerated changes in force structure. It demonstrated that, while brigades, and their subordinate BTGs, are well suited to rapid response where policy requires the conduct of limited operations in low-level armed confrontations or regional conflicts, they were not going to meet the demands of prolonged, sometimes intense combat, let alone those of major war.
Heightened confrontation with NATO means the possibility of large-scale, conventional manoeuvre warfare, constantly under conditions of possible escalation to nuclear use. This requires at least a number of minor formations that are harder hitting and more sustainable in the face of serious casualties. This has led to the revival of the division as an important element of operational manoeuvre. In 2013 there were just two divisions left in the force structure. By the end of 2017 there were three full-sized divisions, with two more being formed – each by putting together two brigades, one building up from one brigade and one started essentially from scratch. Of these, four are in the Western Military District, two in the Southern and one in the Central. In future, the order of battle will comprise a mix of divisions and self-sufficient brigades to preserve balanced groupings capable of fulfilling different missions.32 It is, however, too early to be sure what the typical ‘new-look’ tank or motor-rifle division will look like, though it is unlikely to be as relatively cumbersome as its Soviet predecessor. Will it comprise three manoeuvre units (i.e. regiments) or four, and what will be the composition of units? What level of organic combat and service support will it enjoy, and to what extent will it be reliant on augmentation from major formation resources? Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it is plain that the possibilities of an escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, and/or a major contingency in the Caucasus, are being taken seriously.
It is likely that the revival of the divisional level was intended to send a signal to possible enemies – for instance as part of a reaction to NATO forward-deploying ‘tripwire’ units into the Baltic states in response to actions in Ukraine – that Russia is back in the ‘big league’ of serious military players, and is prepared to use military force if necessary to achieve its goals and retain what it regards as by rights its territory and influence. There is, however, much more to this reorganization than political messaging. Substantial investment is being made – despite the economy’s current weak rate of growth – to build up the breadth and depth of combat capability that a major, high-end war would require. To be effective, groups of divisions and brigades must be organized and controlled by an operational-level headquarters. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, the Western and Southern military districts fielded four armies and two smaller corps. They had each added another army headquarters by late 2014 and early 2017 respectively. This increase will allow for a possible expansion of force levels in the west, and at the same time build in a prudent degree of redundancy. Of course, an army headquarters alone is insufficient to add significantly to theatre capabilities. It must also be able to reinforce the efforts of its minor formations on important axes with substantial levels of combat and service support. A full army set comprises most or all of the following assets: a command and control brigade; reconnaissance, surface-to-surface missile, artillery, rocket artillery, air defence and logistics brigades; and spetsnaz, engineer, bridging, electronic warfare, CBRN and helicopter regiments. Much of the equipment in such units is more powerful and longer range than that held in minor formations. The army commander will mass elements – or their effects in the case of strikes – on his chosen axis or axes of main effort to enable the advance of his minor formations in accordance with his concept of operations.33
Of course, the forces deployed initially in an intervention or local conflict may prove inadequate, or a situation may develop unfavourably as did that in Donbas in 2014. This may require the deployment of further ready forces. Even so, there is the possibility that the forces committed cannot achieve the required end state and still more are required. Russia’s military reform has anticipated this eventuality. Five dedicated storage and maintenance bases have been established in the Western Military District, and another one in the Southern Military District (and a further 15 in the Central and Eastern districts). These, similar to the US Army’s POMCUS (Prepositioning Of Materiel Configured in Unit Sets), contain pre-positioned, properly maintained brigade-level assets, and 2.5 units of fire for all equipments. Troops from elsewhere in Russia can be flown in to activate the kit, leaving their organic equipment behind. Doctrine requires that such brigades be ready to take the field within 24 hours. The airlifting of significant numbers is regularly practised by Military Transport Aviation, which is capable of transporting the personnel of up to five motor-rifle brigades in a single lift. Further expansion of air transport is also planned once current procurement problems have been overcome.34
Any conventional conflict that involves – or potentially involves – NATO carries with it a danger of escalation, growing with time, to the nuclear dimension. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union hoped to minimize the threat by advancing so rapidly and so deeply that enemy tactical nuclear systems would be progressively destroyed or kept on the move, and their logistic support and command and control disrupted. They expected, moreover, that opposing forces would become so intermingled as to make targeting problematic. The USSR’s confidence in success was not, however, high enough to outweigh its fear of the catastrophic consequences of being mistaken. The Soviet army trained seriously for theatre nuclear conflict (arguably more so than did NATO), but awareness that its likely outcomes would be to precipitate the demise of the USSR militated against risk-taking. It is far from clear that a similar constraint applies today. Hints are dropped about Russia’s preparedness to resort to nuclear use in the event of major armed conflict. Some Western commentators and officials interpret these, and other statements taken out of context, in alarmist ways – including touting the now prevalent idea that Russia inclines to a new ‘escalate to de-escalate’ concept.35 This may be more a case of perception management on Russia’s part than actual intent. What is clear is that the army’s force posture now suggests that an improved capability could be used to convert words into deeds. At the strategic level, ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) forces have been modernized to reinforce the credibility of Russia’s deterrent posture.
At the operational level, the old nuclear delivery systems, principally the Scud and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, have been phased out as too inaccurate or too short-range. The ground forces now field 11 brigades each of 12 Iskander-M, a very accurate missile with a range of 400–500 km and capable of delivering a conventional, nuclear or fuel-air warhead.36 Each army has a subordinate missile brigade. Operational-level commanders can mass nuclear or precision and/or thermobaric (fuel-air) strikes on chosen critical targets in support of their plans of manoeuvre; and these can of course be supplemented where required by air- and sea-delivered missiles. Each army also possesses a CBRN defence regiment, and each military district a CBRN defence brigade. These units have an offensive function, being responsible for flame and thermobaric weapons and the handling of chemical munitions, and an offensive/defensive role in generating bispectral smoke and aerosol screens to shield important units and areas from enemy observation. Their principal role, however, is the detection and evaluation of chemical, biological and radiological contamination, and subsequent decontamination of affected troops and equipment. Why would Russia invest considerable resources in creating offensive and defensive capabilities for the conduct of nuclear war if it was not prepared, or even did not intend, to do so? Is this part of a far-sighted, comprehensive preparation for war, or is it part of an influence operation to deter and intimidate potential enemies?