Current landscape
SSA activities, including STM, have primarily been conducted in a military context, which has influenced the current capabilities of different space actors. At present, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has the most resources, particularly for the tracking of small objects in orbit. STM systems in countries with ballistic missile capabilities also serve as part of the missile early warning systems. As a result, STM and the data it provides is subject to military secrecy and not as easily accessed as it might otherwise be. However, with the advent of new space actors and new technologies, the military’s dominance within STM capacities is lessening.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a number of commercial STM providers, particularly in the US, which are rapidly developing impressive capabilities and provide a good source for commercial space operators. These include ExoAnalytic Solutions, which can track nearly all objects larger than 10 cm in geostationary orbit (GEO), and LeoLabs, which tracks over 14,000 objects in LEO.10 Although these organizations charge for access to the information, in comparison to the data made freely available by governments, it is a vital resource that assists in providing a more complete picture of the environment.11 However, the high prices charged make it currently impossible for academic researchers and hobbyist satellite observers, who often play an important role in tracking objects, to gain access to the data. It is possible that the proliferation of these providers will lower the costs and remove the barrier to entry, allowing for the fullest range of actors to be involved in these activities with the best possible data.
As the state that has historically been the leader in space activities, it is no surprise that the US has the most mature SSA capabilities in all aspects from tracking to intelligence. The Space Surveillance Network (SSN), operated by the US military, has the largest number of sensors and the most complete catalogue of objects. It has also been improving its coverage in the Southern Hemisphere.12 The control centre for the SSN is the CSpOC, which is intended to improve coordination between the US and its allies, in recognition that STM advancement needs to be an international effort.13
The Russian Academy of Sciences organizes the International Scientific Optical Network, with more than 90 telescopes in 16 countries.
Russia is also involved in detection and tracking of space objects and, after the US, has the largest network of capabilities in this area. As part of its Space Surveillance System (SSS), Russia has a number of dedicated radars and optical telescopes, some located in former Soviet states through bilateral agreements. The Russian Academy of Sciences also organizes the International Scientific Optical Network (ISON), with more than 90 telescopes in 16 countries.14 As with the US, much of the data collected by Russian STM capabilities is not made public, particularly those elements of a military nature.
There is evidence that China, with its increasing space capabilities and activities, has similarly been increasing its STM capabilities, operating a number of tracking stations both in China and in a variety of locations around the globe. For example, in April 2018 operations reportedly began at a Chinese ground station in Argentina.15 It is thought that China’s network is capable of observing and tracking satellites in all orbits, and supports ‘intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning, spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring’.16 Japan has also long been involved in STM. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) describes the activities it performs as: monitoring space debris; database compilation of their orbits; analysis of their approach to satellites; and predestination of their re-entry to the atmosphere.17
Looking specifically at Europe, there is belief among SSA/STM experts that EU member states possess highly capable sensors (albeit there is an opinion that there are too few of them) and expertise. Interviews with individuals in this community show that there is an opportunity for Europe to take advantage of existing capabilities to increase international STM cooperation as well as build new capabilities, and that such activity would be welcome for global efforts. Certain individual European states have the capability and experience to contribute to STM, but others do not. France, Germany and the UK have impressive ground-based STM sensors that contribute to the US SSN through bilateral agreements,18 thereby enhancing global STM, as the SSN provides data to space-track.org, a forum for sharing STM awareness information and services for US and international satellite operators, academics and other interested parties.19 There are also a number of highly knowledgeable European small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)20 and consequently the human capital within the EU that can be brought to bear on STM is significant. As with their US counterparts, the products of European commercial STM data and service providers can rival or dwarf those of individual governments in terms of accuracy, precision and operational relevance. However, there is a weakness in terms of limitation and bias because the information tends to be a result of insular perspectives or capabilities. France, in particular, is highly experienced and capable in conjunction analysis (CA) and support to operators in terms of decision-making. These mature capabilities are used by satellite owners and operators as well as broader STM contributors. France learned from an incident in 1996 in which its Cerise military satellite was hit by a piece of an old Ariane rocket stage21 and in response has built an effective analytical team and software to support CA operations. This expertise could augment US capabilities in this area through providing an independent assessment of potential conjunctions, decreasing ambiguity and ensuring operators have sufficient information to prevent a collision. Germany is leading the way with its Tracking and Imaging Radar (TIRA), the largest of its kind in the world,22 which can provide a significant contribution to LEO tracking and object characterization through its high precision and resolution throughout all phases of a space mission, from launch to re-entry.23 The German SSA centre has developed very effectively and is fast becoming a key contributor to STM activities. Finally, Spain is using commercial experience that is likely to generate greater results in the long run as, unlike governments and militaries, the operators are more consistent and reliable.
The UK has long experience in STM through its partnership with the US, in particular the radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire. This facility provides ballistic missile early warning and space surveillance and it is a key element in UK–US cooperation in this area. However, according to one expert, there is a gap in tracking and characterization radar capability as a result of its primary mission of missile detection. The UK also operates Starbrook in Cyprus, an electro-optical sensor for surveillance of high Earth orbits. Of course, when considering the UK the potential implications of Brexit must be taken into account. The capabilities of the UK in STM should not be dismissed when establishing partnerships, but how this will be decided will depend in part upon how the EU intends to move forward in STM activities and cooperation.
The key contribution Europe can make is geographic, as one of the most important needs for effective STM is to have geographically separate tracking systems that are spaced to optimize support to STM. Europe offers a longitude and latitude that is different from US sites. The positions of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars can be used to illustrate the value of geographic distribution, as they are sited in Alaska, Greenland and the UK (at RAF Fylingdales). In this sense, Europe can also act as a data reception site for space mission data, which is a form of STM. An example is the Maspalomas station in Spain that provided support to NASA’s Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programmes and is still in operation, supporting ESA, JAXA and others.
The key contribution Europe can make is geographic, as one of the most important needs for effective STM is to have geographically separate tracking systems that are spaced to optimize support to STM.
STM’s ‘Achilles heel’ is that most of the support and data is behind a military firewall and not readily shareable, including the sensors that are often utilized for another primary mission. One of the key contributions the EU is making is in developing a civil system, which will be significant in the future as it will make data and support more accessible to commercial operations and governments. The SST support framework was established by the European Commission in 2014 and was followed by a consortium of five EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) in 2015,24 which has now increased to eight member states through the inclusion of Portugal, Poland and Romania. Its purpose is to develop EU SST capability through a series of EU-funded projects. As of August 2019, there was no clear understanding of the impact of Brexit on the SST system.
However, there are gaps in European STM capacities. Limited sensor coverage (owing to limited funding and relatively low prioritization in terms of national spending) has led to over-reliance on the US SSN for comprehensive STM. Similarly, limited national space intelligence capabilities are largely reliant on US-provided space intelligence. Another primary EU vulnerability is its lack of experience. The UK has not capitalized on its experience and although there is expertise in the analysts at Fylingdales they are, according to some experts,25 not effectively utilized, and just one sensor in the UK will not provide full STM coverage.
In addition, European sensors are not as capable as those in the US – they have lower resolution and therefore can only track large objects. To become more complementary and to contribute globally, Europe requires new and dedicated sensors capable of tracking smaller objects. One individual with experience both in the military and commercial aspects of STM expressed amazement that the community talks about the significance of STM but provides little funding for dedicated sensors. The current EU funding for future STM support systems was described as ‘pitiful’ by one expert.26 For Europe to significantly contribute to STM, at union and member state levels, requires additional funding to develop better capabilities.
10 ExoAnalytic Solutions (n.d.), ‘Space Situational Awareness’, https://exoanalytic.com/; LeoLabs (n.d.), ‘Our Data Services’, https://www.leolabs.space/. Information on the capabilities of these companies comes from: Christensen, I. and Weeden, B. (2019), ‘Commercial Space Situational Awareness’, presentation at Space Situational Awareness Workshop: Perspectives on the Future Directions for Korea, Seoul, Korea, 24–25 January 2019, https://swfound.org/media/206343/icplusbw_commercial_ssa_for-kari-jan2019.pdf (accessed 4 Jul. 2019).
11 Lal, B., Balakrishnan, A., Caldwell, B. M., Buenconsejo, R. S. and Carioscia, S. A. (2018), Global Trends in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM), IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute, April 2018, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/g/gl/global-trends-in-space-situational-awareness-ssa-and-space-traffic-management-stm/d-9074.ashx (accessed 8 Aug. 2019).
12 Secure World Foundation (2017), ‘Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet’, https://swfound.org/media/205874/swf_ssa_fact_sheet.pdf (accessed 20 Apr. 2019).
13 Air Force Space Command (2019), ‘Combined Space Operations Center established at Vandenberg AFB’, https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1579285/combined-space-operations-center-established-at-vandenberg-afb/ (accessed 4 May 2019).
14 Secure World Foundation (2017), ‘Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet’.
15 Seligman, L. (2019), ‘U.S. Military Warns of Threat From Chinese-Run Space Station in Argentina’, Foreign Policy, 8 February 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-chinese-run-space-station-in-argentina/ (accessed 4 May 2019).
16 Defense Intelligence Agency (2019), ‘Challenges to Security in Space’, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf (accessed 11 Feb. 2019).
17 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (2017), ‘Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System’, http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/ssa/index.html (accessed 6 Apr. 2019).
18 Denmark, Italy, Spain and Belgium, as well as ESA and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, also participate in the USSTRATCOM SSA Sharing Agreement. See, United States Strategic Command Public Affairs (n.d.), ‘USSTRATCOM, Denmark agree to share space services’, 1 May 2018, https://www.schriever.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1509529/usstratcom-denmark-agree-to-share-space-services/ (accessed 24 Jun. 2019).
19 Space-track.org (2019), ‘Space-track.org’, https://www.space-track.org/auth/login (accessed 6 Apr. 2019).
20 See, for example, Elecnor Deimos: http://www.elecnor-deimos.com/activities/space/space-situational-awareness/.
21 Ward, M. (1996), ‘Satellite injured in space wreck’, New Scientist, 24 August 1996.
22 Fraunhofer FHR (2019), ‘Space observation radar TIRA’, https://www.fhr.fraunhofer.de/en/the-institute/technical-equipment/
Space-observation-radar-TIRA.html (accessed 6 Apr. 2019).
23 Innovations Report (2018), ‘Space observation with radar to secure Germany’s space infrastructure’, 23 March 2018,
https://www.innovations-report.com/html/reports/physics-astronomy/space-observation-with-radar-to-secure-germany-s-space-
infrastructure.html (accessed 6 Apr. 2019).
24 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2019), ‘Satellites and space programmes if there’s no Brexit deal’, 27 March 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/satellites-and-space-programmes-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/satellites-and-space-programmes-
if-theres-no-brexit-deal (accessed 20 Apr. 2019).
25 Author interviews with a number of SSA/STM experts throughout the project, including in person, via telephone and email, and through discussions at conferences, all of whom chose to remain anonymous.
26 Ibid.