Separating and resolving active conflicts can, over time, and through confidence-building measures, increased communication and trust-building, set the basis for a cooperative security project to emerge.
Since 2019, Russia, China and Iran have all put forward proposals to establish a security framework for the region, and for the Gulf region in particular. Although each proposal emphasizes multilateral engagement, none has gained any real traction, and it is almost certain that all will come to languish alongside the many other tried, tested and failed initiatives of past decades. In essence, these proposals were broad brushstrokes of ideas, with very little detail to build on, rather than offering anything particularly new or substantive.
Russia’s concept, first shared in a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and members of the Security Council in July 2019, proposed consolidating ‘in a single counter-terrorism coalition, all stakeholders interested in eliminating the hotbed of extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and ensuring sustainable political settlement in Syria, Yemen, other countries of the region’. It recognized the need to mobilize public opinion ‘in Islamic and other countries’ in favour of its mission. Membership of the coalition, with the longer-term objective of creating a security and cooperation organization in the Persian Gulf (PGSCO), would include Russia, China, the US, the EU, India, the Arab League, the OIC and other interested parties. The coalition would adhere to the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions and international law. The proposal emphasized that a new regional security system would need to recognize the interests of all regional and other parties, and, in doing so, be universal and comprehensive in its scope. Although no specific details were provided, it noted the importance of confidence-building measures for the process to succeed.
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov further outlined the proposal when chairing the UN Security Council meeting on Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Comprehensive Review of the Situation in the Persian Gulf Region, held via videoconference on 20 October 2020. It is unlikely, however, that the Russian proposal will move forward, as framing regional insecurity as a symptom of counterterrorism is problematic for so many reasons. First, it is far too simplistic a framework. Instead of placing human security at the centre of the paradigm, it omits it altogether. Making counterterrorism the core of a security framework would militarize the endeavour and only serve the narrow interests of regime elites. Second, the lessons learned from the failings of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ are clear. The US focus on counterterrorism over the past two decades has not served the Middle East well, and arguably contributed to fostering current conflicts by prioritizing the security interests of regimes over the welfare of people. Amplifying such an approach into a security framework for the region, with buy-in from permanent members of the UN Security Council, would mean consigning its people to further decades of impoverishment, human rights abuses and conflict.
The US focus on counterterrorism over the past two decades has not served the Middle East well, and arguably contributed to fostering current conflicts by prioritizing the security interests of regimes over the welfare of people.
At the same UN Security Council meeting, on 20 October 2020, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi proposed the creation of a multilateral platform, with equal participation of all stakeholders, to de-escalate tensions in the region. The platform would work towards enhancing mutual understanding among stakeholders through dialogue, and exploring political and diplomatic solutions to security issues based on three organizing principles: first, applying and adhering to international law; second, utilizing the UN and regional organizations as mediators and seeking common ground and upholding good neighbourliness; and third, promoting fairness and justice to contribute to stability without the intervention of ‘biased’ non-Gulf players. Like the Russian proposal, this initiative is not expected to move forward. It is predicated on some basic but essentially symbolic principles – given the context – and the prospect of excluding ‘biased’ non-Gulf players, which may be read as Israel, the US, the UK and the EU, is a non-starter. There are echoes of the Iranian proposal put forward a year earlier, even though China would not be a part of that process.
President Rouhani introduced Iran’s HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavour) initiative at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 2019. The initiative proposes building a collective security arrangement based solely on intra-regional dialogue. The foundations of the dialogue would be based on the principles of: respect for all participating parties’ national, religious and historical sanctities and symbols; commitment not to participate in any military coalition or accord against participating parties; and cooperation to eliminate terrorism, extremism and sectarian tensions. Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif has subsequently indicated that the initiative would entail dialogue, confidence-building, freedom of navigation, energy security, non-aggression, and non-intervention.
Although an overwhelming majority of interviewees argued for a regionally led security process, Iran’s proposal will go nowhere. First, there is the issue of the significant trust deficit, which would prevent Gulf Arab states stepping back from US support and directly into a dialogue with Tehran. Second, Gulf Arab states will never forgo the advantage of being part of a coalition that serves their collective security interests. Third, there is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism, and, for the most part, Gulf Arab states believe that Iran is a state-sponsor of terror. While the inclusion of dialogue, confidence-building, freedom of navigation and energy security might be welcome, the notion that Iran is willing to sign up to – let alone promote – non-aggression and non-intervention would be a point of bewilderment for most Gulf Arab leaders, given Tehran’s support of proxies across the region. As such, the HOPE initiative is a non-starter.
Pathways to de-escalation
Drawing together our assessment of the regional climate, the trajectory of tensions and past contributions to regional security in the region, the data gathered through our interviews suggest that regional security should be addressed through a de-escalatory process. There is certainly an urgent need for a regional security framework: as shown in Figure 2, a significant majority of respondents in all 15 countries saw this as being of critical importance. The lowest level of support was among Israeli respondents, 67 per cent of whom saw a regional security framework as a productive way forward. Respondents from Israel were perhaps more sceptical because they saw their country as having been more successful at managing its security independently. Overall though, while respondents overwhelmingly agreed that a larger process would be beneficial, they were consistently doubtful that one could emerge given, as one put it, ‘the current competitive dynamics in the region’. As such, our analysis suggests that an incremental conflict resolution process is needed initially. Separating and resolving active conflicts can over time, and through confidence-building measures, increased communication and trust-building, set the basis for a cooperative security project to emerge.
