Other interviewees viewed what they described as Iran’s predatory regional behaviour, especially in Iraq and Lebanon, as ultimately self-defeating. This is because Tehran does not invest in building sound political infrastructure, instead relying on infiltration and networks to exert pressure and influence. The protest movements in both Lebanon and Iraq seen since 2019 point to growing dissatisfaction with a status quo that supports elite interests over those of the people. Iran’s role has also been targeted by the protests. ‘No one loves the Iran model,’ said one American interviewee. A majority of respondents saw the protest movements as a constraint on Tehran’s scope for manoeuvre. In Iraq, in the view of one Lebanese analyst:
When considering how to respond to Iran’s regional influence, interviewees offered a number of pertinent suggestions that we have grouped into three categories: country-level solutions; broader GCC engagement; and a mix of incentives and pressure. One analyst captured the predicament over Iran’s presence thus:
Another Iran analyst suggested: ‘If you want to limit Iran’s role, the solution should come from inside those countries.’ All of this requires a more nuanced understanding of local problems and greater empowerment of local governance and local actors. We discuss these issues and opportunities later in this chapter, drawing on the country-level analysis shared by expert interviewees.
There is a need for broader engagement in the region by the Gulf Arab states, not only to balance against Iran’s presence, but also to take on a more proactive and all-of-region strategy that is not solely predicated on containment. Respondents commented that continued Western and regional reliance on sanctions and containment policies is a reflection of limited creativity and capacity in developing more robust Iran policies. Interviewees saw the GCC members as having ‘washed their hands’ of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, withdrawing financial assistance but also limiting their political participation. While the GCC countries are indeed working to engage economically in Iraq, their strategy appears halting and slow. Gulf support does not have to be about ‘money only’, argued one Lebanese analyst. Engaging with a broader network of local actors and political players would be more effective than the current pattern of only talking to like-minded groups. Another analyst suggested that the GCC should ‘take a page from the Iranian playbook and engage with policymakers and actors across the political spectrum’.
For their part, the US, the UK and the EU urgently need to develop a set of responses that goes beyond sanctions. Respondents recommended having a mix of carrots and sticks. Engagement, too, would broaden awareness and understanding of mutual red lines. Under the Trump administration, the red line for the US was loss of American life. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken directly about establishing red lines on Iran’s enrichment levels. One Iran analyst commented: ‘Iran responds well when they know the limits of restraint.’ Making those limits heard and understood would lessen tensions between Iran and Israel and with the GCC states. For instance, the GCC states have publicly called for revisions to Iran’s constitution so as to end a policy of exporting the revolution, alongside ceasing support for non-state actors. But such demands are essentially non-specific, and provide no clarity on achievable limits. Instead, the GCC states could state unequivocally that Qods force activity outside Iran must cease. Interviewees from the E3 countries and the US identified an end to lethal aid transfers as their red line demand to Iran. Establishing deterrence was also cited as being effective, with one German analyst putting it starkly: ‘Killing [Qassem]Soleimani worked unexpectedly. It got their attention and taught them a lesson.’
At the same time, interviewees considered that US engagement in the region should not be viewed solely through a military and security lens. Building economic, diplomatic and civil society relationships would result in stronger soft power ties that would improve perceptions of the US and strengthen local social bonds. These points have been also made by Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson and colleagues. Establishing communication channels or hotlines was often mentioned as an important element in progressing towards regional discussions. The creation of back-channels to reduce conflict between Iran and Israel, as well as between Iran and Saudi Arabia, was also repeatedly cited as a potentially constructive move towards de-escalation. The appointment of envoys to engage in shuttle diplomacy was additionally seen as a productive measure that could help in defining and managing negotiation parameters.
The appointment of envoys to engage in shuttle diplomacy was seen as a productive measure that could help in defining and managing negotiation parameters.
Returning to the Iran analyst’s comment, captured earlier in this chapter, that in order to limit Iran’s influence, the solution should come from within target countries, it is clear that GCC states, in particular, need to develop a more nuanced understanding of their neighbourhood if they are to deepen their own engagement and curtail that of Tehran. The country-level analysis in the remainder of this chapter captures suggestions put forward by interviewees on how states can leverage their own advantages in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.
Iraq
Most interviewees attributed the strategic importance of Iraq to Iran to the impact of the eight-year war between the two countries, which has left generations of Iranians with deep psychological scars. In fact, many Saudi interviewees expressed a sympathy and understanding of Iran’s trauma from that conflict. Nevertheless, the majority of Iraq experts interviewed for this paper argued that Iran’s policy towards Iraq will come to undermine its interests, as it has helped reinforce a system of governance that is inimical to Iraq’s long-term national interest. Thus, if Iran’s interventions continue in the same vein, they will naturally hit a brick wall at some time to come. As one interviewee said: ‘Iran doesn’t realize that mitigating challenges in Iraq [is] in its interests.’ Helping Tehran understand that point, then, would better serve both Iraq and Iran. Indeed, interviewees suggested a number of measures to accelerate that understanding. Given that Trump’s maximum pressure campaign failed to constrain Iran’s actions and resulted in even greater Iranian investment in militias, the Biden administration should learn from the US’s past mistakes and build much wider networks in Iraq, engaging not only with government institutions and agencies but also with a wide range of civil society organizations across the whole country.
Instead of focusing primarily on security issues and prioritizing pushback against ISIS, the US should place more emphasis on economic and political development in Iraq. In other words, one way to counter Iran’s influence is by buoying up Iraq’s economy and tackling issues that affect the everyday lives of its people, especially young Iraqis. Listening to the demands of the protesters who want to see political change, greater transparency and job creation would give the US and its partners fresh routes by which to engage with large sections of Iraqi society who feel marginalized as well as increasingly frustrated by Iranian influence.
Another recommendation to manage Iran’s role in Iraq was the creation of ‘accountable mechanisms for all actors operating in the Iraqi state. It needs cohesive accountable institutions that can stop violations of Iraqi law.’ Again, it was argued by a number of interviewees that, instead of investing in security, the US and the EU should take a longer-term approach to Iraq, and invest time and effort in helping reform – from within – its political system of checks and balances, without trying to engage in a state-building enterprise. Another interviewee developed this point, making the case that ‘tactical US and GCC investment could create competition in the economic space’. It was further reinforced by an Israeli interviewee, who commented that Iraq cannot be expected to limit Iran’s influence ‘without alternatives’. A number of respondents proposed that Iran, for its part, could engage more productively by supporting and engaging in annual strategic dialogues with Baghdad where grievances and opportunities for improved bilateral ties could be discussed.
Palestine
None of the Palestine experts interviewed believed that Iran has significant influence in the West Bank or Gaza. It was repeatedly noted that Iran’s influence is largely limited to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza, and that because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria it has alienated most Islamist parties in the Palestinian territories. However, Tehran has continued to reach out to Fatah, which is the dominant force in the West Bank, finding favour with some of its leadership, as it has with leaders from other smaller ‘secular’ parties that continue to sympathize with the Assad regime and which welcome Iranian support. Most interviewees believed that Tehran’s influence in the West Bank and Gaza could achievably be curbed, though not extinguished, by ensuring that other key regional actors – namely Jordan, Qatar and Egypt – are actively engaged in working with their Palestinian partners. Working to reduce Palestinian factionalism was another recommendation that could limit Tehran’s influence.
Lebanon
Lebanon was commonly identified by interviewees as the country most penetrated by Iranian influence, as Tehran has successfully embedded its key regional ally, Hezbollah, in the country’s political framework. Many respondents viewed the Tehran–Hezbollah axis as the most durable and important one across the region, although some suggested that Hezbollah could survive even without Tehran’s financial help. However, a number of interviewees also argued that this factor itself had made Hezbollah vulnerable to the vagaries of the Lebanese political system: its leadership now has to share responsibility for the impending collapse of the state, and that would ultimately undermine its influence. Nevertheless, a number of measures could still be introduced to moderate Iranian influence in Lebanon, including, for the Biden administration, reinserting democracy promotion and human rights in US policy towards the country.
Respondents considered that the Trump administration had missed an easy win after 2019 by passing up multiple opportunities to support the protesters in Lebanon, and Biden could now make a clear commitment to do so. The US, the UK and the EU could invigorate programmes that both support civil society in building better local governance systems and help tackle corruption. Similar to the situation in Iraq, there is widespread dissatisfaction in Lebanon with the current political system, and an emergent nationalism among Lebanese youth intent on challenging the status quo from the ground up. As some interviewees saw it, the Obama administration had ultimately relied on the region’s dictators to restore order, but the Biden administration now has the opportunity to make amends and lend support to grassroots organizations that want to build a more sustainable political system. GCC states also have an opportunity here to engage more broadly within the Lebanese system.
Syria
Syria experts interviewed for this paper suggested a number of ways to curtail Iran’s influence. However, most Syrian respondents – whatever their political leaning – argued that Tehran would remain influential in the country, and that this could be welcome as long as its engagement is channelled through legitimate means and towards the economy, trade and culture rather than security. As set out in Chapter 8, Russia is seen as key to curbing Iran’s influence in Syria. The US, on the other hand, was routinely criticized by interviewees for simply, as one put it, ‘dumping money and weapons rather than investing in diplomacy’. Unsurprisingly, 67 per cent of Syria experts made clear that the US should now re-engage diplomatically with its international and regional partners, and also use its relationship with Israel to arrive at a broader understanding with Russia.
Israel’s Syria policy was considered by many interviewees to be highly effective at enforcing red lines, and to have demonstrated the clear limits of Iran’s capabilities – and indeed its vulnerabilities. Israeli interviewees emphasized that their objective in Syria is not to manage the conflict or even push towards a resolution, but to contain Iran and make sure Syria is not a safe haven for the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. Other respondents noted that the GCC states are keen on re-engaging with Damascus in a bid to pull Syria not just from Iran’s orbit, but out of Turkey’s shadow as well. Over the past four years, however, US policy has continued to serve as a major constraint to these objectives. To overcome this, before any substantive move can be made to better manage Iranian influence in Syria, an understanding must be reached between Moscow and Washington on Assad’s future role.
Yemen
Unlike Lebanon and Iraq, Yemen was identified by respondents as an area where Iran is relatively less invested, and where its influence could be rolled back at little cost to all parties – including Tehran. Most interviewees considered the ongoing UN-led diplomatic process to be the way to achieve this goal. Many respondents made the case that one option for the Biden administration to explore is pushing Saudi Arabia to end its military campaign in favour of a diplomatic route. The aim would be to develop an agreement that not only recognizes the legitimate right of the Houthis to share power, but also encourages Riyadh to underpin the deal with significant financial support.
To have the best chance of bringing this about, a number of interviewees believed that Qatar, Oman, Iran and even Hezbollah should be involved in the talks. It would be difficult to envision Hezbollah joining a negotiation track, but Iran’s participation would help ensure that it is linked in with political discussions. This would mean Hezbollah’s interests would be taken into consideration, and its chances of spoiling a final agreement better managed. Doha and Muscat were cited as being critical to any process, as they would have the ability to bring together all the warring parties, assist with implementation, and also take on some of the economic burden of reconstruction.
