Ukraine’s current predicament is desperate, and the focus of Western countries has been on providing military supplies, financial support and safe passage for Ukrainian refugees. The UK has a geopolitical interest in helping Ukraine restructure economically and politically after the conflict, since a post-war Ukraine could become a key European ally on the border of a threatening adversary. Additionally, there is likely to be significant political will and a sense of moral obligation within the UK to help Ukraine restructure. In the immediate term, many developing countries rely on Ukraine as a source of grain, making the restoration of grain exports an urgent priority to prevent mass hunger and potentially famine in some parts of the world.
If Putin’s original plans for the conflict had succeeded, Ukraine’s government would have been brought down and replaced with a regime sympathetic to the Kremlin. But this outcome appears increasingly less likely as the conflict continues. Ukraine’s armed forces and citizens have put up a remarkable defence against Russian armed forces lacking in morale, strategy and technology. The Ukraine that emerges from the conflict is likely therefore to look very different to the Ukraine that Putin originally envisaged.
One possible outcome is a divided Ukraine, with certain regions (such as Donetsk and Luhansk) coming into Russia’s orbit in some form. This would by no means be a just outcome: the future of Ukraine ought to be decided by the Ukrainian people, not by violent aggression. However, for the parts of Ukraine that remained free of Russian influence, such an outcome could hasten a political and economic liberalization, perhaps even of the kind seen in South Korea and other countries in the 20th century.
The lesson from examples such as South Korea or Taiwan is that the citizens of countries that have experienced real threats to their freedom can end up embracing liberal ideals more wholeheartedly than those in long-standing democracies. While counter-examples like Afghanistan and Iraq make it impossible to draw any general rules from the trajectory of countries post-conflict, it is at least possible that Ukraine could emerge from this war with a greater sense of national purpose, a commitment to liberal norms and values, and stable political institutions.
Since 2014, support for liberal values and democracy has been growing in Ukraine, and the war is likely to catalyze this existing trend. For decades, as exemplified by the ‘Euromaidan’ revolution of 2013 and 2014, many Ukrainians have sought a closer relationship with the EU. The current conflict could be the culmination of, rather than just another chapter in, this struggle. Even if the war ends with parts of Ukraine under Russian control, the majority of the population could emerge proudly European and economically liberal.
A 2017 Chatham House report argued that ‘…the Euromaidan revolution was, at its heart, a rejection of Ukraine’s corrupt system and a demand for the creation of an economy and society based on Western and European norms’. Support among Ukrainians for joining the EU was already high prior to the outbreak of war – with 72 per cent favouring EU membership in February 2021. But this has increased significantly since, reaching 89 per cent by May 2022.
Ukraine’s push for EU candidacy has also encouraged economic liberalization, as the country strives to meet the structural requirements for membership. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement have increased trade between the EU and Ukraine, and are both structured to prepare Ukraine for future EU membership. The UK agreed its own Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement with Ukraine in 2020, which includes clauses encouraging economic liberalization measures.
As a financial services centre of global importance, the UK could play a major role in financing the rebuilding of Ukraine during and after the war.
This pro-Western outlook could make post-war Ukraine an attractive site for inward investment and trade, including from the UK. Before the conflict, Ukraine already had a burgeoning technology sector, and there is no reason why this could not grow as in other former Soviet countries like Estonia and Lithuania.
A recent Chatham House expert comment highlighted the urgent importance of funding, stating that ‘[w]ith the new school year and winter approaching, cities must build bomb shelters, repair and increase housing stock, provide emergency funding to SMEs, build new transport connections to export via the EU, and stockpile materials to prepare for future damage to critical infrastructure, which is inevitable’. Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan specifically mentions financing as an important way for partners to support the country’s post-war restructuring. As a financial services centre of global importance and Europe’s largest technology centre on many measures, the UK could therefore play a major role in enabling the rebuilding of Ukraine during and after the war.
UK overall trade has fallen significantly since the end of the post-Brexit transition period in 2021 (see Figures 6 and 7) and the Government’s new trade agreements have failed to fill the gap left by declining trade with the EU. In the short to medium term, the UK’s priority will be to find new, non-EU trading partners, but it may also have to strengthen its trading arrangements with the EU.
