The hardening of US policy towards China in recent years has largely been framed by America and its allies as a response to economic and political changes in Beijing implemented by Xi Jinping, the Chinese president and general secretary of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC). But the relationship between these two great powers vying for global influence is much more complicated and is shaped by complex two-way dynamics. While much has been written in international relations circles about changing US perceptions of China, there has been much less analysis of the shift in Beijing’s own strategic thinking under intensifying US–China competition. Some influential Chinese academics and policy experts have long expected, and some even desired, an era-defining showdown with the US. But, even with the centralization of power and the further erosion of space for public debate under President Xi, until recently, there was still a relatively broad discussion within China’s strategic community – policymakers, influential academics and those associated with the People’s Liberation Army – about the space for co-existence and cooperation with the US.
Some in Beijing’s policy circles hoped that the election of US President Joe Biden in 2020 might herald a softening of the confrontational China policy of his predecessor, Donald Trump. However, those hopes have been dashed as President Biden has pursued a similarly tough China policy, executed in a more sophisticated, coordinated and substantive manner. As a result, the predominant view in Beijing has shifted from a sense of cautious optimism that China can bide its time in a long-term, low-intensity rivalry with the US to a bleaker assessment that, as Xi himself has stated, the country faces ‘protracted competition’ with the US. The Biden administration says that it is not seeking to ‘contain’ China or launch a new Cold War. However, Beijing sees clear evidence of a containment strategy in Washington’s intensifying efforts to maintain its own technological supremacy, curb China’s access to global markets and build a coalition of allies to tackle the ‘China challenge’.
Decision-making in Beijing does not take place in a vacuum. This sense of China being ‘under siege’ will shape Beijing’s future policies, as it prepares for long-term enmity with the world’s largest economy. In a similar way to the call by Christopher Wray, the director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, for a ‘whole-of-society’ response to what he termed the ‘China threat’, China’s policymaking towards the US has now become a ‘whole-of-country’ approach beyond the realm of foreign affairs, which involves stakeholders and resources across the country. Policy initiatives such as ‘dual circulation’ as well as those aimed at scientific self-reliance and boosting the values of Chinese exports are all parts of the response to the perception that Washington is pursuing containment.
Although Chinese policy debates about the US span many subject areas, this paper concentrates on four particularly thorny issues that reflect the breadth of contestation between the two countries and the increasing inflexibility of Chinese views of the US: the struggle over the global order, economic security, regional flashpoints including Taiwan and the South China Sea, and the war in Ukraine. Despite the centralization of power under Xi, the leadership of the CPC still turns to a small array of influential academics and policy experts for advice. By critically examining their writing and analysis, it is possible to better understand the shifting direction and contours of Chinese foreign policy and how it is changing in response to hardening China policies across Washington’s network of allies and partners.
Evaluating the nuances of China’s US policy remains a fraught task. The Chinese political system is at its most opaque when it comes to foreign affairs priorities. As the space for debate within China has shrunk, it is inevitable that outsiders assume that the political elites and strategists speak with one voice regarding the US. But the analysis here of the public remarks of Chinese leaders, opinion pieces in the media, and academic and think-tank publications shows that there is still a range of views, even if this range is narrowing.
This paper attempts to answer three vital questions across the four issue areas discussed here: 1) to what extent has the Chinese political elite changed its view of the US?; 2) what are the key factors in driving those changes?; and, 3) who are the established and emerging players shaping China’s policymaking towards the US? In addition, the paper will offer an early assessment of how Beijing might perceive a possible return of Donald Trump as the 47th president of the United States (see Box 1).
The research here draws on a combination of selected recent influential publications of top Chinese strategists, official remarks, state-media editorials and private conversations with leading Chinese and Western strategists. While there are many Chinese voices commenting on the country’s relationship with the US, this paper focuses on those who exert policy influence, either through direct access to senior leaders or through indirect channels, such as by shaping public opinion through media appearances and articles.
