Since the end of military rule, numerous anti-corruption reforms have been attempted but have yielded uneven results.
Addressing corruption and impunity was a prominent demand from Nigerians after the end of military rule in 1999. The country’s first civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, made anti-corruption a priority and duly enacted The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act as his first legislative bill, signing it into law in June 2000. This bill led to the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2001, joined in 2003 by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Obasanjo retired military officers who had occupied political positions, reviewed projects initiated by previous military regimes and inaugurated inquiries into various public institutions. His administration also pursued broader public sector reforms aimed at curtailing monopolies through accelerated privatization and deregulation of public enterprises, asset recovery and transparency in public revenue collection and expenditure.
But while Obasanjo is recognized as having laid the foundations for important economic, governance and political reforms, the effectiveness of these measures was hampered by a multitude of factors, including fluctuating political will, insufficient funding, a lack of personnel, legal loopholes, operational constraints, and Nigeria’s slow and inefficient judicial system. The political class at the subnational level also pushed back against Obasanjo’s reforms, claiming that the rights of Nigeria’s autonomous federal states were being infringed. These challenges came alongside concerns that Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign had been politicized by those implementing the reforms, with key instruments like the EFCC being accused of ‘political selectivity in its operations’. This situation rapidly descended into a crisis of legitimacy for the president, which culminated with an unsuccessful attempt to amend the constitution to pursue a third term in office.
During their initial years under Obasanjo, Nigeria’s key anti-corruption leaders and institutions garnered substantial public support for their dynamism and efficiency. However, they experienced a decline in reputation as their efforts were influenced and ultimately limited by a political system that is fundamentally designed to reward rather than punish corrupt practices. The EFCC concentrated its efforts on high-profile corruption cases involving prominent political figures and other financial crimes like advanced fee fraud, while the ICPC and the older Code of Conduct Bureau, despite having statutory powers that exceeded those of the EFCC on paper, largely refrained from taking a similar ‘big fish’ approach. Significantly, the EFCC’s arrest of James Ibori in December 2007 put in motion money-laundering cases against him domestically and then in the UK.
In 2007, Obasanjo was succeeded as president by Umaru Yar’Adua, who made contributions toward anti-corruption reform. These included continuing the prosecution of high-profile cases and establishing the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC). This committee united a range of stakeholders – including civil society, opposition parties, development partners and the diplomatic community – around the issue of electoral corruption. Pressure from civic coalitions such as the Transition Monitoring Group led to important electoral reforms, including the passage of the Electoral Acts of 2010 and 2022, as well as innovations in electoral processes in 2011 and 2015.
Under Jonathan’s administration, the Freedom of Information Act was finally passed in 2011, after a decade of advocacy by the Freedom of Information Coalition, which comprised more than 150 organizations.
Following Yar’Adua’s death in 2010, his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, was sworn in as president and went on to win the 2011 elections. Under Jonathan’s administration, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was finally passed in 2011, after a decade of advocacy by the Freedom of Information Coalition, which comprised more than 150 organizations. This collective effort by civil society and supportive lawmakers underscored the capacity of Nigerian civil society organizations and activists to establish and maintain an agenda in public discourse. It also illustrates that institutional reforms often depend on sustained, cross-cutting pressure and the presence of supportive individuals within the government.
Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress defeated Jonathan at the 2015 presidential election, after a campaign primarily focused on anti-corruption. The mixed results of Jonathan’s anti-corruption efforts and the widespread public perception that government corruption had in fact worsened in the years leading up to the election both contributed to his loss. In his campaign, Buhari vowed to address the interconnected challenges of corruption, terrorism and economic disparity.
Once in office, Buhari’s anti-corruption reform efforts included, among others, technocratic interventions in public financial control, a whistleblower policy, establishing a Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption, the Open Government Partnership commitment and significant examples of stolen assets being recovered by Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies.
However, these efforts were again severely undermined by the sustained politicization of this campaign, with key agencies such as the EFCC continuing to be perceived as partisan and the country’s graft-driven party politics having caustic effects on public perception. Politicians who defected to the ruling party ensured their misdeeds were overlooked, while those who aligned with the opposition risked increased scrutiny from anti-corruption agencies. Additionally, the Buhari administration failed to institutionalize some of its key accountability measures, such as asset declaration for public officials, the whistleblower policy and the fiscal sustainability plan. As a result, Nigeria’s anti-corruption reform trajectory remained inconsistent.
While Buhari’s willingness to reference corruption and push forward reforms like the whistleblower policy encouraged many Nigerians to engage with the anti-corruption fight, his administration’s inability to fully embed this agenda into Nigeria’s politics ultimately further entrenched the common belief that the country’s political system is rigged against the public’s interests. Furthermore, Nigeria experienced recessions during both terms of Buhari’s presidency, including double-digit inflation, record unemployment, a heaving debt burden and an increase in violent conflict. The Buhari government’s inflexible implementation of foreign exchange controls also opened new opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption, while the country’s corruption and governance rankings deteriorated during Buhari’s time in office.
Unlike Buhari, current president Bola Ahmed Tinubu did not emphasize corruption as a central theme in his successful 2023 presidential campaign, instead prioritizing Nigeria macroeconomic stability and growth. But although there is a compelling argument for radical economic reforms in Nigeria, the Tinubu government’s approach to fuel-subsidy removal and exchange-rate harmonization, for a country that lacks a robust and reliable social security system, triggered a cost-of-living crisis as household incomes and purchasing power were diminished. These harsh economic conditions sparked nationwide protests in the second half of 2024. Under the campaign slogan #EndBadGovernanceinNigeria, the protest movement has focused on issues of mismanagement, soaring food inflation – which reached 39.2 per cent in October 2024 – and rising fuel prices, which tripled immediately after Tinubu introduced his reforms on assuming office.
Nigeria’s macroeconomic reforms and stability would be made more effective if coupled with a robust commitment to greater transparency, efficiency and accountability of governing institutions. In a speech delivered by vice-president Kashim Shettima, at the 6th annual general assembly of the Network of Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa (NACIWA), Tinubu acknowledged the detrimental impact of corruption. While the president expressed support for Nigeria’s anti-corruption bodies through non-interference, adequate funding and providing a building for NACIWA’s headquarters in Abuja, his speech lacked updates on measurable progress and did not detail comprehensive action-oriented commitments or specific institutions needing reform.
