In August 2023, the three countries inaugurated a ‘new era’ of cooperation at the Camp David summit. President Biden, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida outlined a new strategic ‘vision’ that recognized that the security of their countries was interconnected, and sought to institutionalize their partnership, deepen cooperation in security and defence and broaden it to include economic and technology security.
Since then, the trilateral mechanism has encouraged the normalization of Japan–South Korea ties, enabled Seoul to play a fuller role in the region, and led to greater strategic alignment in policies on China and North Korea. In just two years, officials have met at least 80 times across all levels of government. Additional dialogues have also taken place on strengthening economic, financial, technological and people-to-people exchanges.
These developments were driven by three factors in particular. First, the three countries aligned on both the degree and level of priority given to threat perceptions regarding China and North Korea, and shared a common outlook on the way to check those threats. All three countries have published their own Indo-Pacific strategy documents, which include similar strategic outlooks and visions for the region. For example, having long been reluctant to take on a greater role in regional security, South Korea published its first Indo-Pacific strategy in 2022. In these documents, the countries all recognized the imperative for deeper integration to preserve the regional balance of power in their favour.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has forced the leaders to reckon with the increasing interconnectivity of threats posed by a nascent alliance between China, North Korea and Russia, and the need for a coordinated response.
For the US, trilateral cooperation allowed for partnering with allies as ‘force multipliers’ to project US power in the region. For Japan and South Korea, it offered a way to keep the US engaged in East Asia, while reinforcing ties with one another. Japan, in particular, has emphasized constructing a multi-layered security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has brought war to the fore as an instrument of foreign policy, forcing countries to prioritize national security above everything else. It was no coincidence that at the G7 summit in March 2023, Kishida stated that ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’. Russia’s war also forced the leaders to reckon with the increasing interconnectivity of threats posed by a nascent alliance between China, North Korea and Russia, and the need for a coordinated response.
Second, the individual leaders of the three countries at the time of the Camp David summit were deeply invested in the idea of trilateral partnership. Driven by a commitment towards alliances as the way to win the strategic competition with China, Biden urged Japanese and South Korean counterparts at multiple instances to meet with him at a trilateral summit. Meanwhile, Yoon took steps to promote bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan, including the resolution of historical issues (including financial reparations for forced labour of Korean citizens during the Second World War) and the rolling back of trade restrictions. Just as crucially, Kishida was willing to respond favourably. At certain instances, Yoon and Kishida asked the US to allow their two countries to talk without US mediation – representing a break from the recent past. These developments were critical in creating a new strategic vision for cooperation and encouraging the three countries’ bureaucracies and other stakeholders to forge deeper partnerships.
Finally, the domestic political environments in the US and Japan were conducive to trilateral integration. The Biden administration entered office with a strong will to maintain US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific through allied cooperation. To deal with the strategic competition with China, Biden officials tried to create a ‘latticework of cooperation’ in the region through a ‘self-reinforcing’ coalition of allies. The rational was to forge minilateral groups to allow allies to cooperate on issues over which there was an alignment of interest, while gently nudging them to move closer over issues of diverging perceptions. Unlike before, the strategic vision of trilateral cooperation under Biden was not just to optimize coordination on specific issues, but more importantly to push for broad cooperation among the three actors. The shift from issue-specific coalitions to actor-specific coalitions enabled the countries involved to develop a broad strategic vision, integrate capacities and play bigger roles in upholding security in the region.
A receptive domestic environment in Japan was critical for the success of this policy. Kishida’s party held a majority in both houses of parliament, and was willing to increase cooperation with South Korea. In South Korea, despite domestic opposition, Yoon and his right-wing People Power Party (PPP) have historically also believed in strengthening ties with the US, increasing coordination with Japan and enhancing deterrence against North Korea. Public polling shows that the PPP’s voter base views Japan more favourably than voters for other parties and is receptive to efforts aimed at improving ties.
Up to the Camp David summit, the domestic and international reinforced one another, allowing for a deepening of existing cooperation, especially on matters related to North Korea, and broadening to new avenues of cooperation, especially with regards to economics and technology. Even though the three countries diverged on certain matters, especially over the prioritization of security threats from China, trilateral cooperation was not intended to lead to a complete overlap of threat perceptions and strategic prioritization. Nonetheless, the converging interests allowed for an expansive framework of cooperation.
