Emma Ross
Welcome to the Chatham House weekly COVID-19 webinar with our Distinguished Fellow, David Heymann. Today, we have a special guest with us again, Professor Ilona Kickbusch, one of the world’s leading experts in global health, diplomacy and governance. She’s here to guide us through the geopolitics of this pandemic. Besides her being Associate Fellow at Chatham House for more than ten years, she is the Founding Director and Chair of the Global Health Centre at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. We’ve worked closely, over the years, with the Graduate Institute, particularly through our EFCA Global Health Leaders Fellowship. Ilona has been dubbed by The Lancet Journal as, “A global health reformer and the consummate insider, familiar with the workings and politics of agencies, governments and diplomacy that form the International Health Enterprise, but sufficiently outside the fray to maintain a critical savvy and a sense of humour about its pitfalls.” So, really exciting to have you with us today, Ilona.
Just, as always, some back – housekeeping briefly, first. This briefing is on the record and you can tweet using the #CHEvents. Questions can be submitted through the ‘Q&A’ function on Zoom. Please do upvote questions you like the look of, or that are similar to the one you want to ask, ‘cause the most upvoted ones are more likely to be selected, and please do state your name, ‘cause we don’t select anonymous questions.
So, it’s a great, great pleasure to have you both with us on the webinar this week, and I think it’s a great time to have you with us, Ilona, given that Monday was quite an important moment in the geopolitics of the pandemic, with the EU starting a Coronavirus Global Response Online Pledging Conference for Heads of State and other world leaders, to accelerate the development, production and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics.
I just want to start by zooming out a bit, before we go onto what’s actually happening in the geopolitics in the pandemic. Can I ask each of you to first briefly orient us by sharing your views on the importance of global co-operation and also, what are the implications, if we can’t get that together? So, who wants to go first? Ilona, you go first.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Yes, I can start, yes. Thank you very much for inviting me. It’s a delight, even though I would have loved to be there personally, as I love London. So, yes, where are we at, why do we need global co-operation? Obviously, we need global co-operation because we have significant global challenges and global problems, and the most tangible of those is a global virus that threatens us all, but, of course, we’re facing other global challenges in the trade arena, in the environmental arena. There is no limit of global challenges, and unless we have strong global institutions that everyone is willing to contribute to, we will not be able to resolve these problems. And, therefore, the push on the one hand, by one group of countries, is towards strengthening and, to some extent, reforming existing institutions, the United Nations system, which, of course, is over 70 years old and you sometimes say, you know, “Couldn’t it work a bit differently?” And then, there are the others who say, “We don’t believe in that system anymore, we want to go it alone.” And that’s basically where we’re at right now.
Professor David Heymann CBE
And maybe – yeah, maybe I would just add that we’ve seen, in previous pandemics, such as the influenza pandemic and the threat of an influenza pandemic with avian influenza, that countries really don’t have access equally to what’s available in the world. And it’s just not fair in the world today, to have countries that, for example, can’t procure vaccines, either because industrialised countries have all bought them up, or because there just isn’t enough production of those vaccines. So, there needs to be some way that this inequality is better mitigated within the world, and one of the major ways to do that is through a strong co-ordinating body, such as the World Health Organization, which has shown in the past that it can do this in certain areas, especially in the area of pandemic influenza, where there’s now, in place, a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework that does provide vaccines that are available to developing countries, as well as those which can afford to pay for them.
Emma Ross
So, just to follow-up on that, well, David, I think, Ilona, I think you did answer this, is if we don’t have the level of co-operation that, you know, makes things fairer, what happens? I mean, how – what are the implications if we don’t do it?
Professor David Heymann CBE
Well, we’ve already seen that, it’s…
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, it’s two things…
Professor David Heymann CBE
Oh, go ahead and go ahead.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, it’s two things, basically, as I think we alluded to. One is that unless we all work together, we all won’t be safe, so it’s something that applies to the whole world. But the other issue is, if we don’t work together, we are going to increase global inequalities. We are going to exclude poor and vulnerable countries and populations, and we’re going to give up at least what we have considered to be our Western values. So, it has those two components, you know, there’s a level of enlightened self-interest, as some people say, if we help others, if we work together, we’ll all be safe. But there is also a true moral imperative that I believe Western civilisation has always been proud of, that we are also there for the weaker parts of society and of the world.
Professor David Heymann CBE
And, Emma, I would just add to that, we’ve seen the headlines already where some countries have, for example, bought the masks that were destined for another country and paid a higher price to get them. We’ve seen unfairness just between industrialised counties, let alone any of the equalities getting to the developed – developing countries. And, in addition, as airlines begin to unlock, it’s going to be very important that everybody has a standard policy, or you might land in one country and end up in a hotel quarantine for two weeks, not understanding that you couldn’t go to that country. So, if there’s a disarray, as airlines, for example, begin to unlock and begin to fly again, that will cause great damage internationally and not permit the recovery that we’re all looking for.
Emma Ross
Thank you for that, both of you, for answering the question very fully. So, Ilona, I was hoping you could give us an overview of how you have seen the geopolitics play out in this pandemic generally, and what you think is most notable about what’s going on geopolitically.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, as David has already alluded to, this is the very first time, and, you know, we’ve had a number of outbreaks, epidemics, pandemics over the last 20 years. This is one of the very first times that we find ourselves in the middle of a geopolitical spat between, in this case, two countries, China and the United States, where one country, the United States, is particularly adamant that the present system of international co-operation, specifically the World Health Organization, is not up to the job. So, we are in the situation where major players are going to one, not willing to work together and are attacking each other at all levels and actually health, to some extent, has become a proxy fight for other issues that are at stake. That’s one dimension of it.
The other dimension of it is that, of course, if you compare it with the Ebola outbreak, about five years ago, where, for example, the United States, under the Obama administration, took on a very clear leadership role, where American stellar institutions, like the Centers for Disease Control, were there for the whole world to help resolve this issue, we’re seeing that major gap. So, on the one hand, we have an attack from a major country. On the other hand, we miss the expertise and the excellence from that country, that has always been so central for global health. So, that’s one part of the picture.
The other part of the picture is that some of the countries are still sort of sitting on the fence, not quite clear where they stand, in terms of this, you know, new multipolar world, and this very political virus, also because, to some extent, they have not yet resolved how they are dealing with it inside their own country, I’m thinking of Russia, for example, I’m thinking of India. So, there are a number of other big players that are still waiting to position themselves, but they have not expressed, you know, any major attacks at the World Health Organization or at the institutions. What they have not done is join the initiative that you referred to, which is one of the first times that the European Union and the European Commission has taken such a proactive stance in global health.
So, with the United States having sort of moved sideways, there is obviously a gap and the question is, you know, who’s going to fill the gap? I won’t call it a void, but I’ll call it a gap. And the new Commission that started its work at the end of last year, explicitly saying, “We want to be a geopolitical Commission,” has taken up this ball and has said, you know, “We want to play a strong role, supporting multilateralism, point one, supporting WHO, point two, and supporting global co-operation, particularly in the area of science and innovation.” And so, we’re seeing a new dynamics here, where we don’t yet know how it will play out. It’s interesting also because it’s been the European Union as well, through the workings of the Commission and its representation in Geneva, that has taken the initiative for a very strong WHO resolution to support and continue the work of WHO on COVID-19.
So, we’re seeing some shifts here. We don’t yet know how they’ll play out, and interesting will be if they also play out, not only in terms of the money raised now, but also in continuous support, also financial support, to the WHO.
Emma Ross
I wanted to pick up on the WHO thing actually, with both of you, ‘cause you’ve both worked at a high level within WHO, and you both work closely with them now, as external Advisors. Obviously, we know that WHO has been criticised in the past for its handling of global health crises, but how does what’s going on now compare, in terms of the threat to WHO’s standing and its role in the global health architecture? Is WHO feeling particularly threatened right now and where do you think this is all going?
Professor David Heymann CBE
Yeah, thanks, Emma. Maybe I’ll start by saying that I think WHO, as it has been in the past, is continuing to be a very strong technical leader. We wait to hear the daily press conferences or the thrice weekly press conferences, where WHO does provide the information necessary. And we’ve seen that the technical people at WHO are willing to speak to countries, they’re willing to speak in television, in radio, to really provide the information that is being collected by them and being reviewed by their external advisory bodies. So, WHO continues to function as this important clearing house of information, analysing that information and providing best practice information, based on the evidence. And, at the same time, we see a world where others are joining in with this, for example, the medical journals are rapidly peer reviewing and publishing information on the websites, in front of their paywalls, so that everybody has access. So, WHO, the medical journals, and everybody are really working quite closely together, including those two countries that you – were mentioned earlier by Ilona, the US and China, they continue to share their information to the advisory groups of WHO and to WHO itself, while publicly posturing in a different way.
Emma Ross
But, David, do you think that what is going on now, the attacks on WHO, are particularly worse than we’ve seen ever before, or is this par for the course with these global health crises, that WHO gets in the line of fire? Is there something special about what’s going on now?
Professor David Heymann CBE
WHO has always been in the line of fire, that’s clear, and it depends on what countries want and what countries want WHO to deliver, but I think, if you look generally in the world, the demand for WHO is still there, even in countries that might be, at the geopolitical level, posturing differently, because there are weekly calls with the Director General, where all countries that are invited participate, including the United States and China, at very high levels, talking with the Director General about this pandemic. So, what’s visible publicly is not what’s occurring at – within the WHO. But Ilona will have other views on that as well, I’m sure. Ilona?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Yeah, I think, first of all, we need to add that WHO is, you know, not just Geneva and some people like to think of Geneva being this, you know, strange bureaucracy where bureaucrats sit around pushing papers. I mean, WHO now has very well-functioning regional offices, particularly the African office, that used to be very, very weak ten years ago, is working hard to address this pandemic within African countries. There are country offices that are working. The WHO works with so many of the other UN organisations, the World Food Programme, the other health programmes, like the Global Fund, like Gavi, etc. It’s a very, very tightly-knit network. So, often when we just say WHO does, it’s rarely WHO alone, it’s often WHO at various levels of activity and very frequently – I mean, if you go to the WHO Constitution, WHO is the Secretariat and its member states, and frequently, when we see weaknesses of the WHO, I would maintain that it is related to weaknesses in the member states, like not fulfilling their international health regulation responsibilities. Or its chickens coming home to roost, because member states were not willing to give WHO more authority in certain areas, like, for example, assessing countries like going into countries, etc.
So, in a way, what you see is also always a political gain. In normal situations, many countries would aim to actually keep the normative, standard setting, authority side of WHO weaker because countries want to maintain their sovereignty. In other cases, you know, when then, that weakness comes to bear, like in a pandemic situation, some of these countries, who have kept WHO weak, also financially, will be some of the first that are attacking it and saying, “You’re not doing what we want you to do,” particularly if it’s another country. You know, if you want WHO to act like weapon inspectors, then it’s not only about sending someone to China, or to some developing country, then it’s sending someone to the United States, to Germany, and to India, as well.
Emma Ross
To get back to the global co-operation, given that the things that are being discussed have been recommended for a while, and despite these commitments we’ve heard about and the money raised, what are the prospects for this global co-operation really happening now, I mean, especially given the national protectionism we’re seeing over supplies? Do you think the environment is ripe? Is the threat of this pandemic enough to push this finally into action? Either both of you, that’d be great.
Professor David Heymann CBE
Yeah, you know there are many new institutions in the world as well that are working together on this outbreak and others. In Africa, for example, the WHO office has been strengthened, but there’s also the Africa Centre for Disease Control, which is based in Addis Ababa with the African Union. That has tremendous political power within Africa and has been bringing counties together in a way sometimes that WHO has not been able to bring them together, but it is working with WHO to make sure that this power reflects the importance of WHO’s standards and norms as well. So, we’re seeing new institutions becoming involved in this and, at the global level, we see institutions like Gavi and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria, that are also now working together with WHO and with the international community, planning for vaccines, should they be available, and also, at the same time, helping with procurement and making sure that procurement is done in a way that’s already been learned by the Global Fund, so that they can, in fact, contribute to this global effort against COVID, rather than just maintaining their vertical focus on AIDS, TB and malaria. And I know Ilona, again, has thoughts on this.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Yes, I think, first of all, we see that the global health organisations are working much better together, and David has named a whole number of them, and in the work that all the co-operation mechanism that they have created, the Global Action Plan on Health and Wellbeing, they are now also shifting their work to the country work that is needed right now in relation to COVID-19. And that’s an incredible strength, if you look at that list of 11 institutions and we’ve named a whole number of them, but the World Bank is part, UNDP is also part, etc. So, that combined effort is something very central and I think we’re seeing much more, particularly under the present Director General, that he is taking the role of WHO, set out in the Constitution as a co-ordinating body, very, very seriously, of reaching out, of not working in competition with other agencies, but saying, “We can only resolve these global problems together.” And that is really a very, very big move that we see, it’s a change of mindset, that is absolutely critical.
And, therefore, in response to your question, you know, how will it play out? We can either, you know, be doomsayers and say, “Well, you know, it all looks so tragic, we’re not going to get anywhere.” On the other hand, you know, as a Political Scientist, we speak of cosmopolitan moments, where, you know, the – a crises allows you to put into focus what you actually need and that within such a crises, very frequently new leaders also emerge, that take something forward. And I think, with the initiative of the European Union, we’re starting to see that new leadership emerge.
We saw the leadership emerge with the resolution put forward by Mexico at the United Nations. We’ve seen the leadership emerge in Saudi Arabia, how they are handling the health issues around the G20. We’ve seen Italy already now saying, “We will continue with leadership in global health, we want to move this forward, when we take on our G20 Presidency next year.” And, of course, Germany will be leading the Presidency of the European Union, as of 1st of July, and already Germany has defined that Presidency as a Corona Presidency, a Presidency where it wants to strengthen multilateralism, where it wants to pull the European member states, large and small, together, and where it wants to strengthen the health responsibilities of the European Union itself. You might know there is also, we mentioned the Africa CDC, there is a European CDC, it’s located in Stockholm, and voices have gotten louder and louder, within the European member states, that this European CDC needs to be strengthened considerably and work in new ways with the national CDCs.
So, we’re seeing, you know, some interesting rays of light, and I feel our role would be to see how can we support them, how can we build alliances with countries all around the world, and, here, the European Union is reaching out, particularly to African countries and the African Union. The very first trip the new President of the European Commission took was to Addis Ababa, was to the African Union, and so we’re starting to see new kinds of alliances emerging that we would need to strengthen and move forward, and over time, I think others will need to join as well.
Emma Ross
Just before I move onto questions, ‘cause time goes so quickly, you’ve alluded a little bit to the how, but I think there seems to be a lot of intention and a lot of willingness and statements of commitment, but how – to what degree are we moving onto the how? How do we do this? What mechanisms are being discussed, and what’s emerging as feasible options? I mean, are there things going on already that we can build on and – or is it too early to talk about the how, when we still have more work to do on the commitment?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
No, there is a lot of how that is already there and that can be expanded also, to the COVID-19 challenges. I mean, David already alluded to one of the important international frameworks on pandemic influenza, that could well be expanded to other areas of vaccination. We have tremendous experience with market commitments, that Gavi is using – advance market commitments that Gavi has been using, the Vaccine Alliance, to have funding for vaccine development. We have the procurement experiences of the Global Fund. We have, you know – and, of course, we have the International Health Regulations. Now, you know, step one would definitely be, come on, let’s finally implement, at country level, what we have agreed to do in the International Health Regulations about 15 years ago. Now, that would be a really, really nice step forward. There are, in the reform proposals that are being put forward, repetitions, I would say, of other suggestions that, again, have been around at least ten years, of, you know, where those International Health Regulations could be adapted, where WHO could be strengthened, where countries might need to give some of their sovereignty.
So, we have a lot of instruments. We can visit them, we can say how can we use them, how can we make them better? There are some people who say we should take the framework convention on tobacco control as an example, and develop a framework convention on pandemic preparedness and response. So, there’s a load of models there that I believe, with a significant amount of political will and some countries showing, as one says, leadership, that one could move forward and learn lessons.
Professor David Heymann CBE
Emma, I would just add also that we’ve talked a lot about the public sector and what the public sector, in these various organisations, have to offer. Really, the untapped potential still lies in the private sector and in a world today where the private sector should be playing an equal role, it’s not always been possible that that occur. Sometimes it’s because of WHO, with its caution in dealing with the private sector, sometimes because of other reasons, but the private sector has just not jumped in as fully as it could be, in making sure that they are contributing to the global pandemic response, for example, not only in the countries in industrialised world, but in countries where they have – and are working in developing countries, to make sure that they’re linked with the governments and with the response, so that if they can provide a logistics platform, or a transportation platform, or something that the country doesn’t have, they can do that.
So, we need to really be working to bring the private sector in, and I know there are many initiatives to do that, and WHO is actually trying to increase its ability to work with public sector, without having an undue influence on its best practice and evidence. But, you know, it’s still an untapped resource, as far as I’m concerned, that needs to be brought in and I know World Economic Forum and others are trying to bring it in, but it needs to come in, in full force, to complement what’s going on in the public sector.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Emma, if I can just add one dimension here that is really important. We frequently talk, you know, of the companies and the large private conglomerates, one could say, also of the big tech industry, etc., which is becoming more and more important in this context. But I think one area of actors that we are starting to look at more and more, in this new global environment, are the investors, and actually, the investors can have significant influence on how the various companies in which they are investing, how they act, what global responsibility they show, etc. So, we’re seeing an increasing communication of the World Economic Forum, also of other organisations, also of the WHO, with investors, and that also includes sovereign wealth funds where they invest. That includes our pension funds where they invest, etc., and it includes the private equity investors, that can really shape companies and can help shape our future, and that’s an enormous responsibility and they must also be held accountable, not just the individual companies.
Emma Ross
Okay, thank you for that. I must move onto questions now. The most upvoted question is from Sumbal Javid, “Would you consider COVID-19 pandemic a failure of global health diplomacy? What has this pandemic taught us, in terms of global health diplomacy?”
Professor David Heymann CBE
Ilona?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Shall I?
Professor David Heymann CBE
Please.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, it’s definitely, to some extent, a failure of international co-operation and that is, you know, the issues that we have talked about before. So, the health diplomacy is basically starting now, or the special focus of the health diplomacy is now how do we find better instruments, mechanisms, approaches, financing, etc., for the crises and, therefore I think, you know, that needs to be the focus of global health diplomacy right now. There is also a very important dimension, and David alluded to it earlier, is that global health diplomacy and science diplomacy are coming together more and more, that, you know, the international co-operation of scientific institutions, of researchers, of innovators is becoming so critical, as we want to develop and develop vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics, and, therefore, that coming together of the health diplomacy side and the science diplomacy side will be critical, particularly as some countries definitely would prefer that, you know, certain scientific results would first be available to themselves only, initially, rather than sharing. And I think the greatest challenge to global health diplomacy right now is to make sure that the vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics become a global public good.
Emma Ross
Can you – both of you actually, and this is something I forgot to ask you, this concept of global public good, could you briefly explain what that means and why that’s important and where we are with it?
Professor David Heymann CBE
Well, the global good, in my view, is either information or guidance to countries, or an actual product, and certainly a vaccine will be considered a global good, because it’s necessary, in all countries of the world, if we want to stop this pandemic at the rate that it’s going now. Remember, we don’t know the destiny yet of this virus, but assumptions are that it will continue to be with us, at least for a time, and should there be a vaccine developed, we need to treat that as a global good. As a good which is important for all countries and is made available to all countries, so that we can all have equal benefit. So, a global good, in my view, is equal benefit to technologies that are developed, with contributions from many different countries and institutions.
Emma Ross
Ilona, do you think labelling something a ‘global good’ changes the way it is viewed or the way it’s treated? What – is there a political dimension around calling something a ‘global good’, or resistance to labelling it that?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Yes, definitely, and it falls back, you know, into some of the geopolitical divisions. If you watch all the statements that were given on Monday and ten days before, on the Friday, when the accelerator was launched, it was interesting how often the speakers actually referred, particularly to vaccines and diagnostics, as global goods or global public goods. It’s a term that’s been around for a long time. It was developed also, in the context of the UNDP, where some excellent work was done, but it sort of disappeared and now, in the context particularly of the need to find a vaccine and diagnostics and therapeutics for COVID-19, it is sort of re-emerging and it’s becoming the expression of actually stating by countries we want to contribute to make this truly available to all. We give a commitment that, you know, if this were to be found in our country, we would share the knowledge and the product with everyone, and, meanwhile, we are all working together on trying to create the mechanism to do that, because already now we have to work on production sites, distribution mechanisms, financing mechanisms, etc. So, I think it is a political expression to multilateralism and sharing and to equity and human rights that I find very, very important.
Emma Ross
And does resisting adopting that terminology create an opportunity for those who believe in it to kind of browbeat those who resist it, shaming them into behaving and co-operating? Is there an element of that, or have I just made that up completely?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, you know, in global health and particularly also in the negotiations that the World Health Organization, one actually tries to avoid that. One tries to avoid shaming people. One tries to find language that everyone will agree to, and those that have been through such negotiations will know how important language is, including commas and semicolons and, you know, sometimes people get very frustrated and upset about that. But that is really, you know, the very, very difficult consensus finding, there are words that some countries will not accept and we’re seeing that now in the whole area of sexual and reproductive health and rights, where some countries are just no longer willing to go down that road, and that leads to very difficult negotiations. And even the word ‘solidarity’, that seems, you know, rather matter of fact to some of us Europeans, is a no-no word, in certain international negotiations. Sometimes one doesn’t even know which words will raise the hairs of which countries. So, it’s a very difficult thing, but initially, you know, you make your position clear and you make your position clear through a word, maybe like global goods, and then you negotiate to find the consensus. And I think starting with a position and then finding the common interest is the really important thing, no matter what we call it in the end.
Emma Ross
David, you’re smiling, what’s up with that?
Professor David Heymann CBE
No, I think that it’s right, and what you can see is that health has always been a good tool for negotiation, because people will – are willing to stop – to call a ceasefire for vaccination activities or whatever, and what we have to do is make sure that it doesn’t become a hostage, and some countries have used it for a hostage and continue to use health issues as a hostage, rather than as a global negotiating point. That’s why I smile.
Emma Ross
Okay, great. Good to know why the smiling. It’s always good to see. Okay, I’ll go to another question now. Let’s see, there’s a little bit more on WHO and US and China, and this one from Benson Kosh, “What are the consequences of USA pulling out of funding WHO?” And Barbara Birungi, from Nigeria, “Do you see the contribution of China to WHO increasing sustainably in years to come?” And I apologise that I had hiccups right in the middle of saying that.
Professor David Heymann CBE
Maybe I’ll start by saying that it’s important to understand WHO’s budget, and the budget is both a regular budget, which is from assessed contributions of countries, which belong to the UN system, or the WHO system, as well as extra budgetary funding. And just as an example, the United States is one of the major donors, along with the United Kingdom and the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation, Rotary International and UNICEF, to polio eradication. And if the US should withdraw its specific funding for polio eradication, it would set back that programme even more than it’s already been set back because of the COVID pandemic.
So, funding at WHO is both core budget, or assessed contributions, and extra budgetary. Ilona can talk a lot about the core budget and what that might do, but the extra budgetary funding, from a country like the United States, is very important for specific activities. But at the same time it does skew the way that WHO works, to work where there is more money, and Ilona has some good views on that, I know, so I’m going to turn over to Ilona, to complete what I’ve said.
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Well, thank you, David, and I think, you know, the starting point is the assessed contributions that have been kept at zero nominal growth since the 1980s, actually, because of US President Reagan, who also threatened to stop funding the WHO at one point. He actually threatened to defund the United Nations and then Ted Turner came in to pay the arrears of the United States, and the compromise was that the assessed contributions to the UN, of the US, were slightly reduced. It used to be 25%, and also that, at least in the organisation of the WHO, there was no more budgetary increase of the assessed contributions.
That led to the problem that we have now, that the work of WHO, which member states have expanded continuously in the programmes of work, is now funded 20% by the assessed contributions and 80% by voluntary contributions. There is a move to say this cannot continue, and there have been proposals to increase the assessed contributions and there will be a new initiative to do so. Actually, some commentators are suggesting if China wants to play a stronger role in the World Health Organization, it could do nothing better than to spearhead the movement towards an increase in assessed contributions of at least 50%. Germany and some countries, and some of the Commissions and Committees after the Ebola crisis, suggested a 10% increase, which is, as we say in German, a drop on a hot stone.
So, there’s very much a strategic necessity to say let us revisit this relationship between assessed and voluntary contributions and particularly if countries want a strong emergency response programme of the WHO. Interestingly enough, you know, that programme was only funded 80% by the member states, even though they created it, and also, the Contingency Fund for Emergency Response, which the member states created, was long dependent on contributions by about two or three countries, because nobody took it seriously. So, I think, you know, there’s a lot that member states have to think about, and I’m sure we will probably see a renewed push to increase the assessed contributions, with a particular view to strengthening the emergency response programme, making sure it can work properly, it can probably expand, and that it can respond very, very quickly.
Emma Ross
Okay, thank you. We’re running low on time, so I’m going to ask the last question, and I’m sorry about this, but it keeps coming up and it has been revived this week, with the statements from the US administration. I think it’s got a scientific element and a geopolitical element, and this is – the question’s being raised about the origin of the virus. So, this seems to have been linked to the Nobel Prize Winner, Luc Montagnier, who, you know, was involved with discovering the AIDS virus, said he thinks the virus was artificially created in the Wuhan lab and the claim’s been dismissed by many Scientists as a conspiracy theory, but it’s still lingering, stoked up by – recently by President Trump’s expressed suspicions about a link with the lab. So, David, maybe you could explain the sciencey bit, in terms of whether there are hallmarks of a manufactured virus, versus a natural virus, the possibility that there could have been a biosafety slip, and, Ilona, I’d like to ask you whether you think there maybe any geopolitics at play here, with this seemingly persistent theory that keeps popping up?
Professor David Heymann CBE
Well, I would start, Emma, by saying, again, that it doesn’t matter how this virus originated in human populations, it’s there and we have to deal with it and not be distracted from that. There are many different conspiracy theories. The fact remains that the virus, which causes this pandemic, is almost identical, genetically, to a virus that’s carried by fruit bats in the area of Wuhan where the outbreak is thought to have originated. How that virus got from bats to humans can be hypothesised. It could’ve gotten directly into humans through bat excreta, which then contaminated humans. It could have infected animals that then infected humans, or there could have been other ways that humans got infected. But now is not the time to worry about that. Now is the time to worry about stopping this pandemic, as best we can, and moving on forward. There will be time after that to look back and to make some hypotheses as to what might have occurred and try to prove those hypotheses.
Emma Ross
Ilona, any parting shots on that?
Professor Ilona Kickbusch
Yes, I think it’s a lot of smoke and mirrors. I think we’re seeing, as the initial focus was the attack, that China did not act appropriately. Then the next thing was WHO did not act appropriately, and there was not that much international support for these statements. So now, the whole discussion and the geopolitical blame game has moved to the origin and the irresponsible handling, basically, and everything that David said applies. So – but what is very interesting is the undertone here and that is that a virus becomes increasingly, on the one hand, political, but on the other hand, it increasingly becomes part of a much larger security debate, in terms of, you know, potentials in bioterrorism, cybercrime and other such things, and the role of intelligence agencies becomes very important. And you can see how, in the United States, there is actually, also, a significant tension between the American intelligence agencies, that seem to be saying they don’t have proof of this, and on the other hand, the White House, that continues to insist. I’m sure we’re probably going to see this taken also to the UN Security Council. So, it also shows you how incredibly intersectoral this whole issue is, how quickly viruses become political, and how they actually don’t only effect the economy, they effect security matters and a whole range of other very, very difficult issues to resolve, that definitely cannot be resolved in the World Health Organization.
Emma Ross
Thank you, that’s a really sobering way to end. Thank you both for being with us, a really fascinating conversation, I found, today. And so, we’re going to close up now, just to say that the full recording of this will be on the Chatham House website this afternoon. If there are any Journalists that may want to follow up with David or Ilona, please go through the Press Office to book an interview. And if you want to see more of Ilona’s take on the geopolitics, she has a rather nifty hashtag that she uses on Twitter called #politvirus, and it’s all there. So, other than that, please join us same time next week, when we’ll be talking all things vaccines with David and Vaccines’ Global heavyweight, Professor David Salisbury.
