A partial handover of political power through an orchestrated transition takes Kazakhstan into uncharted territory. Will it be able to pursue modernization and reform, and break from its authoritarian past?
2. Governance
Kazakhstan’s formal political system is largely decorative, with true power exercised via a ‘hidden constitution’ built on patronage. A rising protest mood is increasing pressure for reform.
Despite myriad signals that Kazakhstan’s First President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was preparing the ground for a political transition,24 most observers were still surprised by his eventual decision to step aside in March 2019, in the first ever voluntary resignation by a Central Asian leader. Nazarbayev handed over the presidency to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a former diplomat and prime minister, with the transfer of power validated – at least nominally – in an election on 9 June 2019.
However, the extent to which Tokayev wields real political control is highly debatable. Upon entering office, he inherited a weakened presidency. His room to manoeuvre has consistently been undermined by his predecessor, notably through legal measures prior to the official change in leadership (see below) and, most recently, in an October 2019 decree increasing Nazarbayev’s behind-the-scenes role via the powerful Security Council. The constraints on the new president, and the contradictions and potential conflicts inherent in what is an effective sharing of power, will play a large role in determining Kazakhstan’s stability, political trajectory and reform prospects.
For almost 20 years, Nazarbayev had steadily adopted measures to secure his position, both in office and in the case of his resignation. These measures included amending the constitution (see Box 1) and eliminating all vestiges of opposition to his rule. In the months prior to his resignation, Nazarbayev had ordered ministerial reshuffles25 and introduced social policies designed to alleviate public discontent. The aim was to provide a safe environment in which to begin the transition. While it was clear that – barring disaster – Nazarbayev would never fully relinquish political control in his lifetime, the idea of anyone replacing the man who had shaped Kazakhstan’s political economy was difficult to envisage.
Autocratic legacy
The election of a new president marks an important inflection point for Kazakhstan, and an appropriate juncture from which to review the evolution of the country’s governance and assess how its institutions are preparing for its next phase of development. Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan evolved from a Soviet republic with an outdated economic model into an impressive global player, the recipient of significant foreign investment in its natural resources. However, Nazarbayev’s ‘economy first, then politics’ motto meant that political reforms lagged under his presidency.26 The country has failed to develop the necessary institutions – including an independent judiciary, a properly functioning parliament and a trusted constitution – to abet its otherwise stable development.27
While an opaque and informal neo-patrimonial system of governance still shapes the political economy, popular patience with the Nazarbayev-era settlement is wearing thin. In terms of their size, demands and demographics, the protests around the June 2019 presidential election illustrated the magnitude of the task for Kazakhstan’s leaders over the next few years. Key among the challenges for the administration will be to introduce transparent and inclusive institutional governance, in order to bridge the gulf between the population and the ruling elite.
After Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991, Nazarbayev had pledged to dismantle Soviet-era institutions and introduce democratic governance, modern political institutions and a market economy.28 Until the Soviet era, Kazakhstan had had no written constitution,29 and after the collapse of the USSR the leadership chose to look westwards towards a democratic constitutional model. In 1993, the government enacted a new constitution, proclaiming Kazakhstan a ‘democratic, secular, rule of law and social state’, with power divided between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.30
Although this constitution appeared broadly balanced between the three branches of government, in practice the system allowed the president to increase his executive authority. The regime justified this as being necessary to overcome the challenges of the post-Soviet transition period – which included addressing economic decline and countering threats to the unity of a large, multi-ethnic state. Nazarbayev insisted throughout his presidency that only strong leadership could guarantee stability and keep ethnic conflict, religious extremism and social unrest at bay.31 Yet his recent departure, conceivably timed to occur before already high levels of social disaffection potentially increase, suggests this is not the case.
A long-planned transition
In 1995, following parliamentary crises caused in part by a lack of clarity in the 1993 constitution and by parliament’s obstruction of government and presidential policies, a new constitution was enacted by referendum.32 Based on the French constitution, this version introduced a bicameral parliament and maintained the nominal separation between the branches of government. However, the president was given more extensive powers, including the right to dissolve parliament at will. The constitution has since been amended several times (see Box 1), with the changes doing little to strengthen formal democratic institutions.33 Most political reforms and constitutional amendments have served only to entrench Nazarbayev’s power while in office, as well as to safeguard his future position after leaving the presidency.
Box 1: Kazakhstan’s constitutional amendments to increase Nazarbayev’s powers
Since independence, multiple constitutional amendments have consolidated President Nazarbayev’s power and position. In April 1995, a national referendum extended his term to the end of 1999.34 In October 1998, parliament extended the president’s term from five to seven years and eliminated the presidential age limit of 65.35 In May 2007, the presidential term was restored to five years, but the two-term limit was lifted for Nazarbayev.
In parallel to these amendments, several other constitutional manoeuvres occurred. A new law in 2000, amended in 2010, introduced the concept of the ‘First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ and ‘Leader of the Nation’, thereby giving Nazarbayev certain powers for life, such as the right to address the people of Kazakhstan, parliament, government agencies and officials on matters of domestic and foreign policy and national security.36 And legal and constitutional amendments in 2007, 2010 and 2017 respectively provided Nazarbayev with an unlimited number of terms in office, legal immunity, and immunity of his family’s property.
In a further constitutional amendment in May 2018, the Security Council, hitherto a consultative body, received the status of constitutional organ. This rendered all its decisions legally binding, making it an alternative to the presidency. In effect, it became a mechanism for the bifurcation of presidential power while Nazarbayev is alive.37 At the same time, the law awarded Nazarbayev lifelong chairmanship of the Security Council.
The current system enables Nazarbayev to continue to wield power from behind the scenes
The current system enables Nazarbayev to continue to wield power from behind the scenes, notably through positions he has retained in the Security Council (a constitutional organ which sets the guidelines for foreign and domestic security policies), the ruling Nur Otan party, and the Constitutional Council. In particular, as chairman of the Security Council, Nazarbayev can control the overall political system through the security structures. At the same time, he continues to dominate an extensive informal system of power through an advisory role similar in some respects to the ‘minister mentor’ model adopted in retirement by the late Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding figure. His influence in this advisory role is rendered more pervasive, moreover, by his direct and indirect control of key economic sectors and state institutions. This positions Nazarbayev as an indispensable arbiter between business groups, as well as Kazakhstan’s principle interlocutor with key international partners such as Russia and China.
None of this suggests the political transition will be straightforward. Competition between Nazarbayev and Tokayev could result in instability. Nazarbayev has dismissed the idea of a formalized duopoly of power,38 as have Tokayev and his advisers. Indeed, the new president is using his formal office to develop his own ‘brand Tokayev’ and team. In line with a pattern of post-succession tensions elsewhere in Central Asia over the past decade, this raises concerns about the sustainability and efficacy of a system divided between two leaders. As a Kazakh proverb states, ‘You cannot boil two heads of mutton in one bowl.’
A move to curb the new president’s power
In March 2017, Kazakhstan introduced constitutional amendments that purported to strengthen democracy by offering a more rigid and precise separation of powers and formally diminishing the president’s role
In March 2017, in another signal that Nazarbayev was looking towards the eventual transition, Kazakhstan introduced constitutional amendments that purported to strengthen democracy by offering a more rigid and precise separation of powers and formally diminishing the president’s role. The amendments increased the powers of the legislative branch at the expense of the presidency, suggesting Nazarbayev was seeking to limit the authority of any successor. The cabinet now reports its main initiatives to parliament as well as to the president, and in theory parliament now has more sway over the appointment and sacking of cabinet members – including the prime minister. The president can no longer issue legal decrees or override parliamentary votes of no confidence in cabinet members. However, without a competitive party system, the changes to the system will have little substantive effect on the parliamentary checks on the president.
The 2017 constitutional amendments were introduced not long after events in neighbouring Uzbekistan had starkly highlighted the importance of succession planning. In September 2016, President Islam Karimov, who had ruled the country since Soviet days, died in office. The subsequent political adjustment, in which members of Karimov’s network were sidelined and his legacy in part discarded, clearly unnerved Nazarbayev. Notable were efforts to dismantle Karimov’s personality cult, with Uzbekistan’s media prohibited from mentioning his name more than once per broadcast or reporting positively about his rule.39 Loyalists were stripped of power and his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, installed his own people (such a development would be anathema to Nazarbayev). Several days after Karimov’s funeral, and even before the extent of this shake-up became clear, Nazarbayev moved to cement his own position, appointing his influential former prime minister, Karim Massimov, as head of Kazakhstan’s powerful security service (KNB). Several senior officials were arrested in order to ensure the loyalty of the security services during the transition period.
The hidden constitution
Although Kazakhstan’s constitution formally defines the distribution of power, it is a largely decorative construct. This makes the political transition all the more unpredictable, because it is vulnerable to being amended to suit the whims of Nazarbayev’s successor(s). The irony of the situation is that it weakens the cogency of the very constitutional amendments introduced by Nazarbayev in multiple attempts to entrench his power.
Rather, it is the ‘hidden constitution’ that truly defines how Kazakhstan is governed and provides the leadership with its authority.40 This opaque decision-making process is played out among informal patronage networks. As president, Nazarbayev sat (and still sits) at the apex of a carefully maintained vertical power structure, managing a shrewd system of checks and balances on different interest groups. By facilitating the distribution of rents to family members and elite figures close to him, Nazarbayev has manipulated informal networks to create a buffer of loyalists who cleave to him, rather than to Kazakhstan’s institutions. One of the consequences of this system is that it has impeded the country’s full development into a globally competitive market economy.
Kazakhstan’s political economy is centred around the Nazarbayev family and its associates. Like a corporation, the system relies on a top-down command structure. Rents accrue to an individual according to his or her position within the hierarchy, with those in closest proximity to Nazarbayev benefiting the most. The most valuable economic assets typically belong either to his family or to presidential gatekeepers. From the early days of independence, Nazarbayev relied on such aides or ‘treasurers’ to manage the patronage system. Each individual was used for different purposes, so that no single figure had full visibility over his affairs.
Various family syndicates have developed over the past 20 years, at the core of which are several key figures: Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva; his son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev (married to Nazarbayev’s second daughter, Dinara); and his nephew, Kairat Satybaldy. These three individuals, along with their spouses, children and those close to them, influence a large proportion of the national economy.
This informal network is not static. It has undergone significant changes over the past two decades, as different actors have risen to prominence or disappeared from the scene. Two particular developments have been significant. One is the rise of Kulibayev. In 1998, the government suspended privatization of the oil sector, following years of factional infighting. This enabled Kulibayev to seize control of important oil and gas entities, and the result was a generational shift in the oil industry. (All three of Nazarbayev’s daughters have competing interests in the energy sector through their husbands.) The other was the death in 2010 of Nazarbayev’s confidant, Vladimir Ni, which resulted in a vacuum in the president’s inner circle.
Rival interest groups, including the extended Nazarbayev family, often come into conflict over commercial and political matters. Kulibayev’s rise to prominence, in particular, has not been entirely smooth. Benefits and impunity are quickly removed from those who exceed their designated privileges, fail to share profits with the ruling family, or become involved in public scandals. That said, disgraced figures have often been allowed to return into Nazarbayev’s circles on payment of financial penalties for ‘misdemeanours’ and/or particularly when the president has felt the need to rebalance the system.
Over the past few years, as the issue of political succession has loomed larger, tensions have increased between factions and individuals competing for proximity to Nazarbayev. There is inevitable uncertainty within the elite as to what comes next, and how the spoils of the patronage system will be divided in the future. The extent to which Nazarbayev will continue to regulate this system is a key question as he cedes some power to his successor, and if or when he becomes less able to mediate between vested interests. After Nazarbayev ultimately leaves the political scene, a significant economic power struggle is likely.
Dual governance models
Kazakhstan’s deft foreign policy in a geopolitically contested region, combined with its importance as an investment destination owing to its energy resources, has sustained an external image of the country at odds with how it truly functions
Kazakhstan exhibits different governance models to different audiences. It extols its democratic principles to its Euro-Atlantic partners, vaunting Kazakhstan’s ‘subtle balance between stability and democracy’.41 To its principal economic, political and security partners – Russia and China – the administration acknowledges the utility of authoritarian governance. The government’s successful multi-vector foreign policy and achievements on the Western security stage, including the attainment in 2017–18 of a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council and the convening of the ‘Astana process’ of peace negotiations on Syria, mask a reality of increasing detachment from the West’s value-based norms.
Engagement with the international system has provided the regime with legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Kazakhstan’s deft foreign policy in a geopolitically contested region, combined with its importance as an investment destination owing to its energy resources, has sustained an external image of the country at odds with how it truly functions. As a result, Kazakhstan has been largely misunderstood by Western policymakers, and the true deficiencies of its political system overlooked. The republic is increasingly sophisticated at presenting itself as a progressive, ambitious nation, and at using international public relations companies and media publications to control its narrative.42
In spite of significant democracy promotion after the Central Asian states gained independence, Western governments and institutions have played only a weak role in developing Kazakhstan’s formal system. The importance of informal governance has also been poorly understood.43 Kazakhstan welcomed Western support in helping it to determine its sovereignty, gain political independence and win much-needed investment. However, the country has felt threatened by its interlocutors’ democracy agendas.44 This is now reflected in opinion among segments of Kazakhstan’s population, who do not necessarily regard the West as a role model and who – abetted by the Russian media – question Western governments’ intentions.
Freedom House classifies Kazakhstan as a consolidated authoritarian regime with a weak bicameral parliament.45 Formally, the constitution stipulates that the prime minister should be appointed by the president with parliament’s consent (although the legislature has never objected to the president’s choice of prime minister).46 To date, the prime minister and the executive have always been figures close to the First President, entirely subjugated to his will. Nazarbayev has imposed his own checks on these individuals, removing or reshuffling them frequently in a kind of political ‘musical chairs’. While this has prevented any individual from amassing enough power to threaten his rule, it has also resulted in a short-term outlook in policymaking. Initial signs suggest that this is unlikely to change under the dual leadership.
Informal governance stymies Kazakhstan’s potential
During the era of high energy prices in the 2000s, when Kazakhstan’s GDP growth reached double digits,47 Nazarbayev’s ‘economy first’ policy was acceptable to the population. The president was genuinely popular among the largely apolitical electorate. Kazakhstan’s success in avoiding instability in a largely restive region reinforced support for Nazarbayev, as did the fact that living standards were higher than in neighbouring countries.
However, a slowdown in the economy in 2014, prompted by the collapse in oil prices and the repercussions of sanctions against Russia over the crisis in Ukraine, exposed many governance issues. These included the weakness and inefficiency of formal institutions, corruption, a shrunken civil society, and the lack of citizen participation in policy processes. Some of these issues were inherited from the Soviet era, and some a product of the country’s present system. All impede sustainable and inclusive economic growth, just as they also prevent Kazakhstan from progressing towards an open society based on free markets, respect for human rights and the rule of law. These grievances are now being voiced by an emboldened tranche of protesters.
Informality and weak institutions go hand in hand with corruption. In Kazakhstan, the patronage system obfuscates the lines between the legitimate and the corrupt, the private and the public, the formal and the informal, and the political and the economic. Corruption and inadequate rule of law inhibit economic growth. They render the country less capable of providing employment, healthcare and adequate education to citizens. The failure of government structures to reach vulnerable parts of society is leading to increased use of Muslim governance or community structures (see Chapter 5).48 Meanwhile the elites, uncertain of their status in the post-Nazarbayev landscape, have sought to use Western institutions to legitimize their wealth outside Kazakhstan. This has resulted in significant capital flight, with the total since independence exceeding $140 billion.49 Global Financial Integrity, a US-based think-tank, ranks Kazakhstan 18th worldwide for illicit financial flows.50
Anxiety over rising socio-economic disaffection prompted the regime to call an early presidential election in April 2015 and a parliamentary election in March 2016. It may well also have been a factor behind Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019.51 In his 2015 election manifesto, Nazarbayev announced policy objectives designed to address governance issues. Upon being re-elected (with almost 98 per cent of the vote), Nazarbayev reduced the powers of the presidency and gave more independence to the government and parliament. He announced a ‘100 concrete steps’ programme of reforms, the goals of which include the formation of a professional state apparatus; streamlining of the civil service, police and courts; improved transparency and public accountability; and increased support for the rule of law.52
The authorities publish almost no information on the progress of this programme, although some improvements to the judiciary have been noted.53 Implementation has been hindered by political inertia and the leadership transition, the latter of which has added further bureaucratic layers as well as caution to the decision-making process in Kazakhstan.
Unpopular top-down initiatives over the past few years, undertaken without public consultation, have angered people and led to expressions of political discontent
The administration is also implementing the second stage of its 2013–20 local governance strategy, which includes transferring greater administrative and financing powers to local authorities. An ambition of increased public participation in budgetary and other discussions is laudable, but meaningful engagement has suffered from the government’s tendency to install its own people, rather than create opportunity for members of civil society to enter public councils.
Growing gulf between elite and grassroots
Unpopular top-down initiatives over the past few years, undertaken without public consultation, have angered people and led to expressions of political discontent. Controversial decisions have included the renaming of the capital, Nur-Sultan (previously Astana);54 the merger of pension funds; the selection of a Latin script to replace the Cyrillic alphabet in the Kazakh language; and land reforms. The constant reappointment to important roles of ministers who have failed in previous positions has also fuelled popular discontent. The perception that Nazarbayev over-reached in setting unachievable goals, including that of making Kazakhstan one of the 30 most developed countries by 2050,55 has added to the cynicism and frustration of the population.
Proposals to change the constitution elicit dissatisfaction. Middle-class segments of the electorate have become cynical about reform and governance rhetoric
Immense financial resources have been spent on prestige projects, including the EXPO-2017 trade show, which have produced no tangible benefits for the population and have almost invariably ended in corruption scandals. The establishment in 2018 of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), intended as a global finance hub similar to the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), is one example of a project that has had difficulty getting off the ground. The AIFC’s legal system is partly based on common-law principles. Kazakhstan has chosen to emulate the DIFC model, which includes the creation of new and unique laws, rather than the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) financial centre model, in which English law has direct application. But the amalgamation of common- and civil-law norms and principles in the drafting of AIFC legislation has led to confusion. Kazakhstani lawyers have also complained in private conversation with the author that the government should be addressing the failings of the judicial system nationwide rather than providing a silo where the rule of law exists. Concerns therefore exist that the country will not only have a dual system of law, but that the AIFC will not be able to operate efficiently given its hybrid legal system.
Social media commentary frequently criticizes the profligacy of the government in holding lavish conferences and subsidizing officials’ transport costs. Proposals to change the constitution also elicit dissatisfaction; middle-class segments of the electorate have become cynical about reform and governance rhetoric.
Economic difficulties have further contributed to popular discontent. A recovery in official GDP growth, associated with increased production at the Kashagan oil field and spikes in oil prices in 2018, masks harsh socio-economic conditions and the lingering impact of the 2015 currency devaluation on real wages. Over the past few years, several violent security incidents and an increasing number of labour and civil protests have unnerved the government. These have coincided with a more febrile situation in the patronage system as members of the elite have competed for dwindling state resources. An anti-corruption drive – involving a substantial element of selective justice – between 2015 and 2018 resulted in an unprecedented number of arrests of current and former government ministers. State control is on the rise. The KNB is assuming an ever more pervasive role, and there has been increased surveillance and monitoring of civil society. This leaves little room for a move towards more liberal governance.
Following the nomination of Tokayev as Nur Otan’s candidate for the June 2019 presidential election, thousands of protesters in cities and towns took to the streets, in the country’s largest demonstrations in several years.56 Protests during and after the campaign illustrated unprecedented civil courage in the face of the republic’s repressive law enforcement agencies. While the protests were small in scale compared with anti-government protests seen during the Arab Spring or recently in Hong Kong, Chile and Bolivia, they reflected a diverse demographic in terms of age, gender and social background, mirroring widely held disaffection. With Kazakhstan standing at a political crossroads following the signal that Nazarbayev could be stepping back from the scene, the population sensed an unprecedented opportunity to demand a say in its political future.
Kazakhstan 2.0
With his most trusted people gathered in the Security Council and the executive council of Nur Otan, Nazarbayev’s future ability to maintain his authority will be based on the loyalty of these power centres and the security agencies. However, the introduction of a bifurcated power architecture is simpler in theory than is likely in practice. History of the independent post-Soviet states in Central Asia has repeatedly demonstrated that a supposedly loyal successor will accrue real power over time and then challenge the system from which he emerged. Moreover, Kazakhstan has embarked on an experiment that no other Central Asian country has attempted: a transition of power with a political tandem, which is even more testing. While Nazarbayev will want to reinforce his long-cultivated image as ‘Leader of the Nation’, Central Asian societies tend to rally around the individual with the most formalized authority to deal with domestically relevant issues. In Kazakhstan’s case, this means Tokayev. However, for this to become a reality Tokayev will have to assert himself, potentially setting him up for conflict with Nazarbayev or his associates.
Experience in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan offers a potentially salutary lesson. In 2017, Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev, unable to stand for re-election because of term limits, hand-picked Sooronbay Zheenbekov as his successor. Benefiting from the state’s administrative resources, Zheenbekov then secured victory (by a relatively narrow margin) in the October 2017 presidential election. However, Atambayev was reluctant to retreat from power completely, prompting Zheenbekov to strip his former mentor of immunity and have him and central figures from the previous administration arrested.57
Similarly, the managed presidential transition in Turkmenistan, following the death of Saparmyrat Nyýazow in 2006, failed to have the intended effect of entrenching the pre-existing elite. Rather, it precipitated a purge of the old guard as Nyýazow’s anointed successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, shook off his predecessor’s watchdog-generals to promote networks favouring his own family.
To avoid similar scenarios for his relatives and confidants in the future, Nazarbayev could conceivably adopt a model from across the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, where power was transferred from father to son. This could involve Tokayev eventually abdicating to Dariga Nazarbayeva, a former deputy prime minister and currently speaker of the Senate (and therefore constitutionally next in line). However, for some segments of the Kazakhstan population, the continuation of Nazarbayev family rule would be the least welcome outcome. The Security Council, headed by Nazarbayev, will be a key player in any succession scenario, as it will have insight into presidential appointments. In theory, this would allow the ruling family to rotate technocratic presidents in and out of office while maintaining control of the key institutions of power via the Security Council. Dariga Nazarbayeva, or alternatively a loyal but less-known family member, would be among the leading candidates for such a role.
New consultative powers on appointments, introduced in October 2019, render Nazarbayev’s position on the Security Council even more influential
New consultative powers on appointments, introduced in October 2019, render Nazarbayev’s position on the Security Council even more influential. At this stage, there are no contingencies for the chairmanship of the Council to be passed from Nazarbayev in the case of his death or resignation – the law on the Security Council awards him lifelong chairmanship of the body. This plays into a wider concern about the future role of Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan’s political system. The question of what would happen to his powers in the case of his incapacitation remains unresolved in the current constitutional arrangement. Some of Nazarbayev’s powers are granted to the ‘First President’ so they would presumably depart with him, but the particular powers to oversee appointments are granted to the chair of the Security Council and so, in theory, should pass to its next chair.
Although Kazakhstan is the Central Asian region’s economic powerhouse, Nazarbayev’s governance has not delivered the results that many expected of the country, given its unparalleled mineral wealth and well-educated population. Much of this has been due to the regime’s failure to establish institutions. Prospects for improvement under the new president seem slim.
As interim president, Tokayev’s first act was to rename Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan in honour of his predecessor. The decision prompted widespread derision and confirmed suspicions that Tokayev was nothing more than an instrument of Nazarbayev. Since his election in June, Tokayev still finds himself in a secondary role in Kazakhstan’s political economy, pledging to stick with Nazarbayev’s strategic course. Nevertheless, he has been quietly working to change his image and differentiate his presidency from that of his predecessor. With a limited ability to build a power base among the political elite, Tokayev appears to be attempting to build legitimacy among the general population by displaying technocratic competence and delivering populist policies.
Since the first extended meeting of Tokayev’s government in July, the new president has demonstrated an excellent grasp of detail across a range of policy issues. His performances at televised meetings have developed an image of efficiency and competence. His ability to quiz ministers on specific detail contrasts with Nazarbayev’s approach, which was often to excoriate his ministers in emotional outbursts or resort to folksy aphorisms. Tokayev has also focused on delivering specific technocratic measures that are easily understood by the population. His state-of-the-nation address in September avoided references to major state programmes and outlined specific measures focused on quality of life, governance and social issues. These included tax holidays for small businesses and increases in benefits for vulnerable groups. In October, he increased the penalty for drink-driving, cancelled the construction of a controversial ski resort and announced the transfer of city heating systems from coal to gas, solving a major environmental concern for residents. His speech also strayed into areas that could undermine Nazarbayev family interests.
These policy announcements have allowed Tokayev to create some distance from his predecessor. He has actively criticized some decisions taken by Nazarbayev and his supporters, and has highlighted the shortcomings of city planning in Nur-Sultan – a notable step given Nazarbayev’s close personal association with the development of the capital. Tokayev has also called for revision of the alphabet selected for the planned shift from Cyrillic to Latin script in Kazakh, another policy closely associated with Nazarbayev.
Tokayev is also taking steps to build a base of support within the civil service. He has invested considerable political capital into the new National Council of Public Trust. Ostensibly set up to defuse public tensions following pre-election protests, the council includes representatives of independent civil society and operates as an independent policymaking body for the president. Meetings between Tokayev or his subordinates and various members of the council are held weekly. The president has also sought to recruit 300 individuals by year-end for a fast-track programme to develop new leaders in the civil service.
With Nazarbayev peering over his shoulder, Tokayev is unlikely to be able to undertake meaningful structural and institutional economic reforms
Tokayev’s approach has certainly inspired some confidence among the public, who view him as competent and well-intentioned. However, such victories are relatively minor, and too infrequent for him to develop a loyal following among the elite or the wider population. His focus on administrative policies, for all its popularity, is also a symptom of his relative powerlessness on strategic issues, such as major investment decisions and management of economic assets held by the National Welfare Fund, Samruk-Kazyna. Moreover, his announcements are overshadowed by more frequent and better-covered public appearances by Nazarbayev and, increasingly, Dariga Nazarbayeva.
With Nazarbayev peering over his shoulder, Tokayev is unlikely to be able to undertake meaningful structural and institutional economic reforms, as this would threaten the financial bases of many influential people and prompt an examination of how they acquired their assets.
Owing to these governance factors, as well as problems associated with geography and geopolitics, ensuring a smooth transition will be a challenge. The demonstrators’ demands in mid-2019 were more varied than in former protests, mostly addressing the nature of Kazakhstan’s political system and long-standing socio-economic complaints. Tokayev has announced populist measures that include raising the salaries of state employees and extending the scope of state benefits. These spending commitments will increase the fiscal burden, however, and it will subsequently be harder both politically and financially to assuage systemic grievances.
In October, following disagreements with Nazarbayev over appointments, Tokayev signed a decree requiring his office to coordinate numerous senior appointments with the chairman of the Security Council (i.e. Nazarbayev himself). The positions covered by the decree include those of general prosecutor, National Bank chair and head of the KNB, as well as ministers and akim (mayors) of cities and regions. Appointments of the foreign, defence and interior ministers remain outside the remit of the decree. Its publication signalled that the dynamics of the transition are still evolving and that Nazarbayev is wary of Tokayev acting independently. Although the requirement to consult Nazarbayev is discretionary, Tokayev lacks the political capital to ignore the will of his predecessor.
As previously mentioned, the decree boosts the status of the Security Council, already the recipient in 2018 of vast powers (at the expense of the presidential office) that include the authority to give orders to any other state institution. This body thus has the potential to become a kind of ruling council, similar to a Soviet-era politburo or the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China. It should also be noted that the Security Council is filled with close associates and family members of Nazarbayev, including Kalmukhanbet Kasymov (secretary of the Security Council) and Interior Minister Yerlan Turgumbayev.
The creation of the National Council of Public Trust in July 2019 demonstrated that Tokayev is aware of the inevitable need for structural reform. Change to the electoral system, perhaps the introduction of single-member constituencies and laxer requirements for the registration of parties, could deprive public protests of oxygen and strengthen the political system institutionally. If parliament gains more genuine political weight (as envisaged in constitutional amendments in 2017), it could serve as another insurance policy for Nazarbayev, and a means to keep Tokayev in check; equally, however, it could serve as a tool for Tokayev to legitimize his decisions. Tokayev knows that the current parliament, with its old cadres, is incapable of responding to emerging socio-political developments and grassroots demands. The new president, therefore, is attempting to circumvent traditional channels of communication with the public by setting up social media accounts and encouraging ministers to follow suit, as well as by introducing online platforms where citizens are offered the opportunity to file complaints.
Forthcoming parliamentary elections will signal the evolution of Kazakhstan’s governance. The elections are officially due in 2021 but could be held earlier in order to wrongfoot opposition forces. The authorities are likely to allow some semblance of pluralism, via the participation of government-picked opposition candidates. But registration of truly independent parties would assuage some of the protest mood. Aware of the gradual erosion of Nazarbayev’s power and his irreplaceability, members of the elite could also start to use the legislature to strengthen their power bases if the former president starts to retreat from public life. In particular, the elections could provide a new platform for his eldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, who has been increasing her political profile recently. Her continued advocacy of greater legislative power over the executive, and her encouragement of renewed activism within the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, could provide a nationwide base of support for her.
Yet the chances of fair and more pluralistic parliamentary elections are slim. The most vocal grassroots movement, ‘Oyan, Qazaqstan’, was not invited to participate in sessions of the new National Council of Public Trust. New parties face the onerous administrative hurdle of finding 40,000 active members, with at least 600 members required for each registration in the 17 regions. Currently, only six registered parties are allowed to run for election – all on government-sanctioned platforms.
If permitted, Tokayev could seek to restore faith in the constitution and government by showing that he is able to implement genuine change, even if this occurs on a piecemeal basis. The constitution creates, empowers and checks the institutions that govern Kazakhstan’s society, and is thus closely linked to the provision of public goods. With more attention to the formal constitution rather than to the informal, hidden constitution, and through tangible steps to introduce the rule of law and reduce corruption, Tokayev could be remembered as an effective caretaker. But only after the ultimate exodus of Nazarbayev will we see his true colours.
24 In a BBC interview in June 2018, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev anticipated that Nazarbayev would not be running in the next presidential election. In June 2019, Tokayev admitted that the succession question had been internally discussed since 2016. See BBC (2018), ‘Tokayev: ‘I don’t think Kazakh president will run in 2020’’, 20 June 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-44546885/tokayev-i-don-t-think-kazakh-president-will-run-in-2020 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019). See also Tengrinews (2019), ‘3,5 года тому назад он мне сказал – Токаев о решении Назарбаева’ [3.5 years ago he told me – Tokayev on Nazarbayev’s decision], 17 June 2019, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/35-goda-nazad-mne-tokaev-reshenii-nazarbaeva-371525/ (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
25 Nazarbayev dismissed the government in February 2019, four weeks prior to his resignation.
26 Kazakhstan Today (2002), ‘Конституция РК “не исчерпала своей возможности” – глава государства’ [The possibilities of the constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan have not been exhausted], 29 August 2002, http://nomad.su/?a=3-2002 08300014 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
27 Radio Azattyk (2019), ‘Алмазбек Атамбаев заключен под стражу до 26 августа’ [Almazbek Atambayev detained until 26 August], 9 August 2019, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30100875.html (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
28 For example, see Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations (2019), ‘Address of the Head of State Nursultan Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan’, 19 March 2019, http://kazakhstanun.com/address-of-the-head-of-state-nursultan-nazarbayev-to-the-people-of-kazakhstan/ (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
29 Schatz, E. (2005), ‘Reconceptualizing clans: kinship networks and statehood in Kazakhstan’, Nationalities Papers, 33(2): pp. 231–254, doi: 10.1080/00905990500088594 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
30 ‘Конституция Республики Казахстан от 28 января 1993 года’ [Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 January 1993], https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=1010212#pos=1;-110 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
31 Gabdulin, B. A. (2010), ‘Роль президента Н.А.Назарбаева в укреплении института президентства и демократизации общества на современном этапе’ [The role of President N.A. Nazarbayev in strengthening the presidency and democratization of society at the present stage], Articlekz, https://articlekz.com/article/7623 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
32 Kanapyanov, T. (2018), ‘Role and place of the parliament of Kazakhstan in the system of checks and balances’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 51(1): pp. 81–87, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.01.007 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
33 Isaacs, R. (2010), ‘Informal politics and the uncertain context of transition: revisiting early stage non-democratic development in Kazakhstan’, Democratization, 17(1): pp. 1–25, doi:10.1080/13510340903453773 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
34 Radio Azattyk (2011), ‘Конституция дополнена термином «Елбасы», который может править без выборов’ [The Constitution is supplemented with the role of “Elbasy”, who can rule without elections], 15 January 2011, http://rus.azattyq.org/content/referendum_nursultan_nazarbayev_power_prolongation/2276376.html (accessed 6 Nov. 2019).
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37 ‘Закон Республики Казахстан: О Совете Безопасности Республики Казахстан’ [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan: On the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan], https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38039248 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
38 Regnum.ru (2019), ‘Назарбаев о двоевластии: «Есть один президент, и он главный»’ [Nazarbayev on power sharing: ‘There is one president and he’s in charge’], 16 May 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/2629530.html (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
39 Fergana News (2018), ‘Журналисты уточнили норму упоминания Ислама Каримова на узбекистанском ТВ’ [Journalists specified standard rules for referring to Islam Karimov on Uzbek TV], 24 August 2018, https://www.fergananews.com/news/32240 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
40 Isaacs, R. (2009), Between Informal and Formal Politics: Neopatrimonialism and Party Development in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, doctoral dissertation, Oxford: Oxford Brookes University.
41 BBC Hard Talk (2018), Chairman of the Senate of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev, 21 June 2018, https://archive.org/details/BBCNEWS_20180620_233000_HARDtalk/start/120/end/180 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
42 Tynan, D. (2012), ‘Kazakhstan: Top-Notch PR Firms Help Brighten Astana’s Image’, Eurasianet, 18 January 2012, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-top-notch-pr-firms-help-brighten-astanas-image (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
43 Oliker, O. and Shlapak, D. A. (2005), U.S. Interests in Central Asia. Policy Priorities and Military Roles, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG338.pdf (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
44 Tengrinews (2019), ‘Токаев об отчете наблюдателей ОБСЕ: Знаю эту кухню’ [Tokayev on the report by OSCE observers: ‘I know everything about this routine’], 10 June 2019, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/tokaev-ob-otchete-nablyudateley-obse-znayu-etu-kuhnyu-371041/ (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
45 Freedom House (2018), ‘Nations in Transit: Kazakhstan’, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/kazakhstan (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
46 Article 44/1.
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48 Seydakhmetova, B. (2018), ‘Fighting patriarchy in Kazakhstan: problems and perspectives’, openDemocracy, 19 June 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/fighting-patriarchy-in-kazakhstan/ (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
49 MK.ru (2015), ‘Отток капитала из Казахстана в офшоры составил 140 млрд. долларов’ [Capital outflow from Kazakhstan to offshore companies amounted to 140 billion US dollars], 21 May 2015, https://mk-kz.kz/articles/2015/05/21/ottok-kapitala-iz-kazakhstana-v-ofshory-sostavil-140-mlrd-dollarov.html (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
50 Global Financial Integrity (2019), Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 Developing Countries: 2006–2015, https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GFI-2019-IFF-Update-Report-1.29.18.pdf (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
51 Information received by the author during interviews in Astana in March 2019.
52 Consulate General of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Sydney (2015), ‘The 100 concrete steps set out by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to implement the five institutional reforms’, 20 May 2015, http://mfa.gov.kz/en/sydney/content-view/100-konkretnyh-sagov-sovremennoe-gosudarstvo-dla-vseh (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
53 International Monetary Fund (2018), ‘Kazakhstan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission’, 28 June 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/06/28/ms062818-kazakhstan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2018-article-iv-mission (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
54 MK.ru (2019), ‘Мемы о переименовании Астаны в Нурсултан заполонили соцсети’ [Memes on renaming Astana to Nursultan flooded social networks], 20 March 2019, https://www.mk.ru/social/2019/03/20/memy-o-pereimenovanii-astany-v-nurs… (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
55 Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012), ‘Strategy “Kazakhstan-2050”: new political course of the established state’, state-of-the-nation address, 14 December 2012, http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-state (accessed 28 Oct. 2019).
56 BBC (2019), ‘В Казахстане большинство голосов набирает Токаев. На улицах беспорядки, задержаны более 500 человек’ [In Kazakhstan, Tokayev is winning the majority of votes. Riots in the streets, more than 500 people detained], 9 June 2019, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-48572464 (accessed 22 Aug. 2019).
57 Radio Azattyk (2019), ‘Алмазбек Атамбаев заключен под стражу до 26 августа’ [Almazbek Atambayev detained until 26 August].