Russia’s ground-based offensive capabilities may continue to become degraded, but its forces can still make it difficult for Ukrainian troops to advance from strong defensive positions. Expecting that the Russian ground forces will simply collapse at some point due to heavy losses is not a safe assumption.
Of all of Russia’s armed services, its Ground Forces have been the most heavily committed in the war on Ukraine. These forces have also sustained the heaviest losses, both to personnel and equipment. As a result, their ability to regenerate will depend to an even greater extent on how and when the Russia–Ukraine war ends than is likely with the other services. While Russia has improved its manpower situation by recruiting many volunteers, equipment losses are likely to prove more difficult to sustain. Russian forces also struggle to conduct combined-arms operations beyond the company level effectively. Nonetheless, capabilities have improved in reconnaissance, precision-guided munitions and dynamic targeting.
State of play
One of the most significant factors in the Russia–Ukraine war in 2023 was Russia’s success in improving the manpower situation in its various ground forces. In 2022, manpower was the most acute problem for the Russian military in Ukraine, and was a key factor behind Ukraine’s successful offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts. After mobilizing 300,000 personnel in the autumn of 2022, Russian officials reportedly set a target of recruiting 400,000 volunteer soldiers in 2023. While that figure is unlikely to have been reached, Russia probably managed to recruit 300,000 or more soldiers last year, sufficient to make up for losses and generate new units for its winter offensive. The primary motivation for many volunteers is financial. New-contract soldiers are offered a signing bonus and a starting monthly salary of R204,000 (US$2,280 as of 3 June 2024) or higher depending on the position. This is more than twice the average salary in Russia as a whole, and more than five times the average in some regions. Signing bonuses have increased even further in 2024, reaching more than $15,000 in some cases. As a result, the Russian military began 2023 with approximately 360,000 soldiers in Ukraine, but had an estimated 460,000–470,000 in the country at the beginning of 2024. Russia reportedly continued to recruit an estimated 30,000 contract soldiers per month at the beginning of 2024, likely sufficient to sustain the current rate of assaults. However, it is unclear whether Russia will be able to sustain this rate of recruitment of volunteers. According to an announcement in December 2022 by Sergei Shoigu, at the time Russia’s minister of defence, the ambition is to increase the size of the overall Russian Armed Forces to 1.5 million personnel.
Nonetheless, the quality of Russia’s ground forces varies considerably. This is partially a consequence of the delay in announcing mobilization in 2022, which led to the formation of a variety of volunteer, paramilitary and regular units in response to Russia’s manpower shortage. Russia now has a disparate force. This includes the 1st and 2nd Army Corps – previously part of the Russian proxy Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics – which have now been formally incorporated into the Russian Ground Forces. There are also BARS reserve units, volunteer battalions, Storm Z and V units made up of convicts, and varied paramilitary units, some of which operate under the aegis of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. The organization and subordination of these units often change.
This has contributed to a lack of standardization across Russia’s ground forces, and units are often sent piecemeal to different parts of the front; this exacerbates coordination and command and control issues. Russia’s elite naval infantry, Airborne Forces (VDV) and spetsnaz (special operations forces) units are still a priority for the supply of equipment; they also receive higher-quality soldiers who are given more training before deployment into combat. Even though these units incorporated newly mobilized personnel in 2022–23, and their overall quality has decreased, they remain effective. It is a similar picture for some motorized rifle and tank units. However, a significant share of Russia’s ground forces consists of regiments of territorial troops; these regiments were initially formed with mobilized soldiers and are a lower priority for receipt of training, experienced leaders and high-quality equipment. Battalions and companies from territorial regiments have been attached piecemeal to regular motorized rifle units; in some cases, such units are used to replenish the ranks of motorized rifle regiments that have incurred combat losses.
Equipment losses have become the greater problem. Russian assaults are often limited in size by the number of soldiers who can fit on top of tanks or armoured vehicles.
Heavy attrition among officers has also forced Russia to rapidly promote junior officers and condense the training for cadets. These factors, along with limited individual and unit training, have exacerbated the inability of Russian units to conduct effective combined-arms operations above the company level. The military leadership has responded by introducing greater specialization through the establishment of semi-permanent and permanent assault and storm units, which receive more training and better equipment. Initially, this programme involved the introduction of storm detachments or companies in each regiment or brigade, and then the assignment of one company per battalion to assault operations. But Russia has also formed assault battalions and is now reportedly forming assault brigades. This was in part a response to the varied quality of Russian forces in 2023, many of which were insufficiently trained or equipped for assaults. Naval infantry and VDV units remain more capable of assault operations, but they are too few in number to meet Russia’s offensive demands and have also been used for defending key parts of the front line. As a result, Russia continues to rely on Storm Z and V convict units as well as territorial-troop formations for assaults as well, often in conjunction with more elite VDV or regular storm units. Given these force quality issues, Russian units typically require a significant advantage in manpower, artillery and aviation to overcome Ukrainian defences. Although Russia has been able to sustain its personnel losses since the autumn of 2023, the war’s demands limit the amount of training that new units receive.
Equipment losses have become the greater problem. Russian assaults are often limited in size by the number of soldiers who can fit on top of tanks or armoured vehicles. Significant armour losses have resulted in Russian units relying on older T-62 and T-55 tanks for transporting infantry into assaults. Western officials estimate that Russia can likely ‘generate’ an additional 100–125 tanks per month, but this primarily consists of refurbishing Soviet-era tanks and armoured vehicles retrieved from storage. In contrast, Russia produces perhaps only 15 T-90M tanks – a more modern design – per month. Russia still has armour in its stockpiles, but the longer the war progresses, the more shortages are likely further to constrain the size and number of assaults that Russia can conduct across the front line. In some cases, Russia has responded to this problem by forming motorized rifle battalions and other units equipped with unarmoured vehicles. In other cases, Russian units will have to be supported with armoured vehicles from adjacent units for assaults. This trend is likely to continue.
The Russian Ground Forces are still an artillery-dominant force, and their quantitative advantage in ammunition and number of artillery pieces available remains a critical factor on the battlefield. The reconnaissance-fire complex has also improved. The Russian military began the war with too few uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision-guided munitions, and struggled with dynamic targeting. But greater quantities of Orlan, Zala and Supercam-series UAVs now provide persistent coverage behind Ukrainian lines, while widescale adoption of commercial UAVs (mostly DJI Mavics) has drastically improved Russian surveillance of the front line. Krasnopol laser-guided artillery rounds are also being employed in larger quantities, along with Orlan-30 UAVs that can laser-designate targets for them.
For targets at operational depths, Russia is achieving greater success pursuing dynamic targets with Iskander-M ballistic missile systems, Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket systems and Lancet loitering munitions, the latter of which have increased range. Russia has increased production of missiles for the Iskander-M system and continues to improve the Lancet, which has become Russia’s primary counterbattery weapon. Lancets were initially only employed by units from Russia’s Special Operations Forces (SSO), but they are now available to a variety of conventional forces, and their production has expanded. In 2023, Russian forces also began to procure and employ kamikaze first-person-view (FPV) UAVs at scale, and this led to Russia achieving a quantitative advantage in such UAVs along key parts of the front line by the autumn of 2023. These strike UAVs provide a greater capability in terms of organic precision fires at the tactical level, complementing the use of artillery and enabling ground units to defeat armour and other targets. Russia will likely continue its procurement of UAVs in larger quantities, while improving their capabilities and battlefield employment. Overall, Russia’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and precision fires capabilities have improved at the operational and tactical level, and will likely continue to develop.
Other branches of the Russian Ground Forces continue to play an important role in the war. The engineer troops build robust defences, extensively using mines, as well as employing pontoon bridges and ferries in support of manoeuvre forces. After coordination problems at the beginning of the war, the Ground Forces Air Defence Troops (PVO-SV) have improved. They have had success countering HIMARS GMLRS munitions and other missiles; however, friendly fire against Russian aviation has been a critical problem, and continued losses of Buk- and Tor-series air defences could degrade the PVO-SV’s capabilities. Russian logistics were a significant problem at the beginning of the invasion as well; this, too, was largely a result of the lack of time to prepare and the number of axes of advance. Russia’s material-technical support troops have adapted throughout the war, including to the threat posed by HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems, and this has enabled Russian artillery to sustain a very high expenditure rate. Electronic warfare (EW) troops provide an important capability as well. EW jamming of GPS capabilities has reduced the effectiveness of Western-provided precision-guided munitions such as the Excalibur, GMLRS and JDAM. EW systems play a critical role in locating targets for Russian fires, disrupting Ukrainian tactical communications, and – arguably most importantly – countering Ukrainian FPV and other UAVs. Notably, personnel from support branches such as EW troops and the PVO-SV generally sustain fewer casualties and are a higher priority for receiving technically capable recruits, and so will likely continue to improve and institutionalize lessons from the war.
Structural changes and regeneration prospects
The regeneration of Russia’s ground forces will be highly dependent on how and when the war in Ukraine ends. Aside from conscripts, the majority of Russia’s ground units are deployed to Ukraine or near the Russia–Ukraine border. The longer the war lasts, the longer most of Russia’s ground forces will be tied down in or near Ukraine, and the more difficult it will be to regenerate them given higher casualties and limited time to conduct unit training at the battalion level or higher. Russian ground forces now have a large pool of manpower, but the quality of this pool varies. Many mobilized men and volunteers are in their 40s or older, and many are in poor physical shape or have health problems. Furthermore, it is unclear how long financial incentives will be sufficient to recruit large numbers of volunteers each month. At some point, Russia may need to conduct another round of mobilization, particularly if the military leadership intends to sustain the current pace of costly offensive operations. As with equipment, manpower could become a limiting factor in the coming years, hindering future offensives. Russia is experiencing a national labour shortage, with the unemployment rate at less than 3 per cent. Furthermore, heavy losses from the current pace of offensive operations will make it more difficult for Russia to form newly announced units.
The length of the war will also affect how the ground forces continue to develop. This will partly determine structural changes, as well as priorities for defence production and spending. For example, the semi-permanent structure of assault units may make sense during wartime, but not necessarily in a peacetime military. Additionally, future procurement will likely give preference to quantity over quality given high rates of losses from the war and the need to equip new units. Instead of procuring the Armata, Kurganets-25 and Bumerang families of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers in large numbers, Russia will likely opt to prioritize procurement of larger quantities of existing vehicles such as the T-72B3, BMP-3 and BTR-82, but with additional modernizations. Similarly, Russia’s artillery will be dominated by Soviet-era systems, in preference to the new Koalitsiya-SV, for the foreseeable future given the need to make up losses and equip new units. The share of light units equipped primarily with unarmoured or lightly armoured vehicles is likely to grow.
Many of the new or reinforced formations will be based in the Leningrad, Moscow or Southern military districts, but it is unclear if or when Russia can assemble sufficient manpower, leadership and equipment to actually form these units.
Announced structural changes include: the re-establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow military districts; the ending of the independent status of the Western Military District and Northern Fleet; the reinforcement of the 11th and 14th Army Corps into armies; and the formation of the 18th and 25th Combined Arms Armies and the 3rd and 40th Army Corps. In March 2024, Shoigu announced that another new army corps (likely the 44th, which is already in action in Kharkiv), two additional combined-arms armies, a motorized rifle division, 14 other divisions and 16 brigades would be formed this year. Many of the new or reinforced formations will be based in the Leningrad, Moscow or Southern military districts, but it is unclear if or when Russia can assemble sufficient manpower, leadership and equipment to actually form these units. Russia may transfer personnel from territorial-troop regiments to create the new formations, but these would not be properly equipped to serve as motorized rifle or tank units. Russia is continuing to prioritize the creation of divisions and regiments instead of brigades. It is forming or strengthening tank units, and reinforcing or forming new artillery units, including five high-power artillery brigades with heavy 2S7M Malka artillery and 2S4 Tyulpan mortars.
The Russian military is likely to have drawn the lesson that this war has been manpower-intensive, and to have identified the lack of well-trained infantry as a key problem. The authorized strength of Russian motorized rifle battalions was reduced before the war, and each tank regiment had its motorized rifle battalion reduced to a company. Each regiment and brigade is supposed to be able to form two battalion tactical groups (BTGs) using contract soldiers, but many battalions began the war significantly under-strength. This meant that Russian BTGs were often unable to perform their tasks, especially after sustaining losses. Furthermore, Russian motorized rifle units struggled to perform in a dismounted role, and BTGs lacked sufficient command and control to properly employ their combined-arms assets. Ultimately, this forced Russia to rely heavily on naval infantry, VDV and even spetsnaz units to perform these missions, but they were too few in number. Russia responded to this problem by increasing the size of squads and battalions, and by adding a fourth battalion to some regiments. Compared to the apparent authorized strength of approximately 345 personnel before the invasion, some new motorized rifle battalions have more than 500 personnel. BTGs proved to be too small to handle losses and remain in the fight, and they lacked sufficient command and control to employ their attached assets properly. Russia is likely to re-evaluate the BTG concept after the war.
Russia is also strengthening the naval infantry and VDV. In 2022, as defence minister, Shoigu announced plans to turn each of Russia’s five naval infantry brigades into divisions – the 55th Naval Infantry is already in the process of being formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. Compared to brigades, the shift to divisions will improve command and control, logistics and organic artillery capabilities. The VDV is also being strengthened, with plans under way to form two air assault divisions (the 104th Air Assault Division has already been established, based on the 31st Air Assault Brigade), add a third regiment to the 106th and 98th Airborne Divisions, and establish an artillery brigade. The purpose of the VDV is being rethought as well. The airborne-capable BMD armoured vehicles are insufficiently armoured for ground combat, and VDV units have been receiving BMPs and forming additional tank battalions. Russia has brought back plans to strengthen the VDV with a helicopter brigade equipped with Ka-52M, Mi-28MN and Mi-8AMTSH-VN helicopters. Russia has also begun re-establishing air assault brigades in the Ground Forces; these brigades are capable of conducting helicopter-based operations. While heliborne air assault remains a priority, the VDV may deprioritize its airborne capabilities in order to better structure itself for assault operations. Of course, expanding the size of elite units risks lowering their standards and quality.
Lessons and policy implications for Western military planners
For Western military planners and others seeking to anticipate potential future Russian threats, a key question regarding the likely trajectory of Russian ground-based capabilities is how the Russian leadership intends to identify and correct weaknesses. Russian ground units executed a poor strategy during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This was partly due to the fact that they were deployed with minimal warning. However, Russian forces were also generally slow to adapt to the realities of combat, and their decision-making remained excessively centralized. A culture of reinforcing failure and of lying is also pervasive. In many cases, Russian units adapted to local battlefield conditions at the tactical level, but those innovations were not institutionalized across the force.
The effectiveness of Russia’s ground forces in the future will likely depend substantially on changes in leadership.
The effectiveness of Russia’s ground forces in the future will likely depend substantially on changes in leadership. Valery Gerasimov, the current chief of the General Staff, and Oleg Salyukov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces, have been in their respective positions for more than a decade. In contrast, the commanders of the military districts have all changed multiple times during the war, and Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has commanded the VDV only since 2022. Moreover, Sergei Surovikin, arguably Russia’s most effective senior commander in the war, was replaced as overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in early 2023 before being relieved of his position as commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) after the Wagner Group mutiny. The Russian military now has many officers with substantial combat experience, but if promotions are determined by loyalty or political considerations rather than by merit, this may prevent institutionalization of lessons from the war. Further changes at the Ministry of Defence are also likely given the recent appointment of Andrei Belousov as minister of defence.
Over the medium term, Russia’s ground forces will likely continue to increase in size, but their quality will vary and equipment shortages will persist. Russia may have to rethink its manpower policies in order to increase the size of these forces sufficiently, but high personnel costs resulting from labour shortages and from the use of greater financial incentives could become an issue in the long term as well. However, the Russian Ground Forces will likely continue to strengthen their reconnaissance fire and strike complexes by procuring larger quantities of improved UAVs and munitions. Russian EW counter-UAV and counter-precision-guided-munitions capabilities will likely continue to grow in quantity and quality as well; traditional capabilities such as artillery, armour and others will also remain a priority. But even with improved capabilities, much will depend on how well these capabilities are employed together on the battlefield, as Russian commanders are struggling to employ battalion and higher elements.
Lastly, a better understanding of Russian morale is necessary if Western policymakers and military planners are to anticipate Russian military strengths and weaknesses more accurately. Despite the chaotic mobilization in 2022 and numerous anecdotal accounts of poor leadership, Russian forces did not capitulate last summer, and they have continued to conduct assaults across the front. Many Russian servicemen appear to be content fighting in Ukraine if they receive a high enough salary. Russia’s offensive capabilities may continue to deteriorate, but its forces can still make it difficult for Ukrainian units to advance from strong defensive positions. In other words, expecting that the Russian ground forces will simply collapse at some point due to heavy losses is not a safe assumption.
