Chatham House exterior.
Politics and Society
The Unpredictable States of America
The political fractures that facilitated Donald Trump’s rise are systemic, will outlast his tenure, and present short-, medium- and long-term risks.
Since the 2016 election, there has been a tendency to conflate the person of the 45th president of the United States with the whole of the US political system. But the near-obsessive focus of the commentariat on Donald Trump – helped along, it has to be said, by the president himself – also obscures geopolitical risks from the parlous state of US politics that go beyond those associated with the current presidency.
Trump is often blamed for the polarization and hyper-partisanship of today’s US political milieu. But while he has done little to address those problems, the trends predate his presidency88 and – regardless of the length of his time in office or the identity of his successor – are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon.
Discord in the federal government carries obvious risks for the US itself. Given the centrality of the US to the current world order and the degree to which other actors predict and react to American signals, there are also significant risks for other states both aligned with and opposed to it. These risks can be categorized as short-term, medium-term and long-term.
Short-term risk: strategic incoherence/miscalculation
One immediate risk is that the signals the US sends are misinterpreted by other parties, leading to miscalculation and confrontation. While this has happened before (notably in the run-up to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990),89 and while there are always differences within the federal government, the problem has become especially acute of late.
The obvious demonstration is the degree to which President Trump has been openly at odds to an unprecedented degree with his own administration, the federal bureaucracy and Congress.90 But there was also considerable foreign policy push and pull between Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, and a Republican-controlled Congress over Syria, Cuba and Iran – notably in the 2015 open letter, co-signed by 47 senators, aimed at undermining the negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme, subsequently abrogated by the Trump administration.91
Absent a significant realignment in inter-party politics, the trend points to a near future in which the US system struggles to send unambiguous foreign policy messages. Its inability to do so decreases the coherence of American action and, in turn, increases the chances of miscalculation by others.
Medium-term risk: institutional degradation
The US government is also seeing the erosion of its institutional ability to manage crises. This is especially relevant for the State Department, where numerous top jobs remain empty a year and a half into the new administration. It is also true to some degree across government.92 Part of this problem is unique to Trump – the disdain he has for civilian government expertise (not to mention the hostility felt for him by the bulk of the foreign policy establishment) has been a difficult obstacle for his administration to overcome, especially in the mid to senior ranks of political appointees. But the wider context is just as important, as non-partisan civil service is increasingly fraught: all too often, apolitical civil servants are seen by elected officials as untrustworthy ‘holdovers’ from prior administrations.93
The pressure on the civil service creates cascading problems: with holes in the organizational structure of key departments, action to address issues or crises is deferred or passed up to top officials, who are already overstretched. At the same time, the dwindling number of entry-level applicants for the civil service means that there will be fewer qualified candidates in the future for crucial mid- and senior-level roles.94 These factors will continue to impinge on the federal government’s ability to manage foreign relationships and crises alike.
The growing gap between the parties rests atop a range of social, economic and cultural fractures in American life, hobbling coalition-building and increasing the likelihood of backlash elections
Long-term risk: cyclical backlash
Underneath all this is the possibility that the US may simply be unable to find a stable political equilibrium in the foreseeable future. The growing gap between Republican and Democratic parties rests atop a range of social, economic and cultural fractures in American life.95 Those fractures both increase the likelihood of backlash elections and hobble constructive coalition-building – potentially encouraging politicized solutions that make little policy sense, such as the widely disparaged 2013 ‘sequester’ deal on federal spending.96
The risks here don’t merely apply to American allies, though the downsides of an unreliable ally are obvious. A US that vacillates between non-interventionist and aggressively nationalist might create what seems to be a permissive space for an adversary, then overcorrect following a change of government and take more confrontational action than it might have done otherwise. Unfortunately, unless US politics moves in a more internally coherent direction, the result is likely to be unpredictability and all the risks that entails.
Jacob Parakilas is deputy head of the US and the Americas Programme.
New Avenues for Civil Society Action
Despite challenging legal and operational environments, civil society organizations are engaging with a broader range of actors as well as developing novel workarounds to further the human rights agenda.
The rise of populist politics and authoritarianism has disrupted traditional dynamics of international cooperation and leadership on human rights. Against this backdrop, socially progressive civil society organizations (CSOs)97 are increasingly facing state repression, including in established democracies. Nevertheless, a number of recent trends – such as the use of technology to facilitate public engagement and the innovative use of partnerships across sectors – provide an opportunity for such CSOs to engage strategically on human rights issues.
Increased digital connectivity has led to growth in informal networks that are able to share information and assemble people in large numbers and across geographic and social divides. The UN’s #HeForShe campaign has initiated over 1.3 billion conversations online,98 while the 2017 Women’s Marches, instigated by an individual on Facebook,99 attracted approximately 2 million protesters across 161 cities worldwide.100 For CSOs these numbers represent a considerable resource, which can be used to expose human rights abuses and precipitate corrective action. For example, Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia repealed long-standing rape-marriage laws last year.101 This was perceived by some actors to be largely the result of the CSO-led #Undress522 campaign’s ability to capitalize on the current public appetite for addressing women’s rights abuses.102
One of the main challenges to such movements is that the loose, unstructured nature of informal networks renders causes susceptible to co-option by elites103 as well as by socially conservative groups with regressive agendas.104 Additionally, the extent to which the benefits of informal civil society are likely to translate into positive results will depend on its resilience in the face of state repression, including rollbacks of internet freedoms. Greater synergy between established CSOs and informal civil society would go some way towards addressing the limitations of the latter, while providing a vehicle for channelling public disquiet and the interests of marginalized groups. This could improve popular trust in CSOs – damaged in many cases by the perception that they have lost touch with the public.105 By broadening the base of human rights proponents, such efforts could also make CSOs less vulnerable to state repression.106
Collaboration is also providing new strategies for CSOs and shifting their relationship with other sectors. For example, the Humanitarian Corridors initiative, which involves a partnership between faith-based CSOs and the Italian government, has been providing an alternative legal route to Italy for vulnerable refugees at no cost to the government. Encompassing a wide range of actors, including private citizens, the initiative represents a new approach to providing safe and legal pathways for refugees and to integration. Following success in Italy, the French government entered into a similar agreement in 2017,107 and there is the potential for further roll-out in other EU states and beyond.
If handled carefully, the greater involvement of private citizens through CSO schemes in this space can help build solidarity and support among the public for refugee protection
It should be noted that government efforts through official resettlement programmes fall far short of the places required for the 1.19 million refugees considered in need of resettlement by the UN,108 and that the opportunities provided by complementary pathway schemes are currently limited. Responsibility for refugees and asylum-seekers ultimately rests with states, and the involvement of CSOs is not a substitute for state action. However, if handled carefully, the greater involvement of private citizens through CSO schemes in this space can help build solidarity and support among the public for refugee protection. This, in turn, can encourage governments to re-examine their own resettlement programmes and other complementary pathways.
The challenging legal and operational environment in many countries for human rights actors has resulted in an increasing number of CSOs engaging in partnerships with businesses and adopting private-sector models.109 These partnerships and models demonstrate potential to mitigate the shrinking of space for civil society, as well as to offer new ways of addressing human rights issues. For example, when the government of Cambodia violently repressed wage protests by garment workers in 2014, international garment retailers entered an informal partnership with CSOs and international labour movements to, among other things, push back against the crackdowns and encourage formal decision-making on a minimum wage. For the CSOs and protesters, business involvement in this case reduced the risk associated with the exercise of freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and contributed to the raising of the minimum wage by over 50 per cent.110 Meanwhile, the Fair Employment Agency – a non-profit social enterprise – is challenging the practices of unscrupulous recruitment agencies in Hong Kong. By providing ethical and transparent services, it offers an alternative to arrangements that drive foreign domestic workers into debt bondage. Having placed more than 2,000 individuals and helped workers avoid an estimated US$3 million in recruitment debt as of early 2018, the enterprise is reducing the risk of exploitation and making inroads in a matter that has resisted traditional forms of advocacy.111
The increasing involvement of the private sector in governance and human rights spaces needs to be closely monitored, however: business practice varies in its adherence to human rights principles; alliances with businesses lack traditional oversight mechanisms; and the unequal power of large corporations puts civil society partners in such arrangements at risk of co-option. Additionally, the growth of business influence in the human rights arena needs to be carefully promoted alongside, and not to the detriment of, the meaningful participation and influence of CSOs.
The year ahead offers two inflection points that stand to affect the potential impact of civil society innovation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has played a critical role in the pushback against restrictions on the formation, registration, operations and funding of CSOs, and the OHCHR’s roadmap for 2018–21 prioritizes the expansion of civic space.112 However, the delivery of this priority will turn on the ability of the new UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to balance the competing responsibilities of acting as the UN’s human rights conscience and winning the political support necessary to engage governments in improving their human rights practices. The anniversaries of the adoption of several key human rights instruments,113 including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, meanwhile, will serve as a rallying point for action on gaps in human rights protection. These moments will also provide an opportunity to consider where political and social dynamics are heading with respect to the shrinking space for civil society.
Chanu Peiris is a research assistant and coordinator with the International Law Programme.
How America is Responding to Washington’s Failings
A broad array of actors – from local communities to state governments – are filling the void in political and moral leadership left by inaction at the highest levels of government.
The US’s deep political and societal divisions have contributed to a historically low level of trust in the federal government.114 The void left by this absence of unifying leadership has created an opportunity for politically engaged groups across civil society, local government and the corporate sector to shape national debates, promote causes and offer alternative solutions. In a number of cases, these movements are gaining considerable public support, and proving their effectiveness – though not necessarily their durability. By capitalizing on this political moment, groups across the US have a real chance to shape policy and governance.
This activism is engaging on major issues, from immigration to climate change. For example, following President Donald Trump’s announcement of the US’s planned withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, governors from New York, California and Washington established the United States Climate Alliance. This bipartisan coalition has the explicit intention of ensuring adherence – through state-level actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – to the US’s pre-existing commitments under the Paris Agreement.115 A number of other states quickly joined the Alliance, and with the addition of New Jersey in February 2018 it now comprises 16 states and the territory of Puerto Rico.116 The Alliance claims to be on track to meet its emissions pledges by 2025. Perhaps as importantly, its members report that clean-energy policies have helped to create 1.3 million jobs.117 This is an attractive argument for climate-friendly policy reform as many states face job losses from economic pressures such as automation.
Much to the frustration of the current administration, California is also resisting federal efforts to diminish its unique influence over US vehicle emissions policy.118 Under the 1963 Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates air pollution across the US but must allow California to set its own emissions standards if certain conditions are met. This reflects California’s long-running emissions regime and its historic problems with pollution. California’s market size means that carmakers nationwide are in effect compelled to follow the state’s stringent standards or comply with competing sets of domestic regulation. The EPA is challenging California’s waiver but faces a tough battle. States’ rights are strongly protected in the US, and their collective leverage – including support from entities abroad119 – has created a durable platform for challenging the federal government. That said, California’s opposition to the Trump administration makes the state a political target for federal reform that – if successful – would eliminate its special waiver on emissions.
While issue groups are not unique to this political moment, what has changed is the visibility – and potential political capital – they are achieving through social media and collective action
At a more local level, community leaders are mounting pressure campaigns and using the courts to oppose the president’s policies towards ‘sanctuary cities’. Sanctuary cities – localities which limit cooperation with the federal government in enforcing immigration policy120 – became a politically divisive issue during the 2016 election campaign. Five days after taking office, Trump signed an executive order which sought to render sanctuary cities that defied federal law ineligible for federal funding.121 To date, courts in California, Philadelphia and Chicago have blocked the order, criticizing executive overreach.122 However, the communities in which these challenges have occurred have recourse to limited options, beyond the judiciary, for resisting federal power. If the administration can reframe the debate along issues of national security rather than civil liberties, it stands a good chance of quashing this resistance.
Whether in response to specific policies or broader issues, a number of companies and CEOs have also capitalized on public discontent with government. For example, shortly after the chaotic start of Trump’s first travel ban in January 2017, the CEO of Airbnb took to Twitter to offer free housing to refugees and others affected by the ban.123 And after the president controversially refused to denounce far-right protesters at a violent rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017, a number of his business council advisers resigned. Ever image-conscious, these private-sector representatives aren’t looking to reshape policy or influence government, but are seizing on opportunities to cast their brands as alternatives to unpopular moral positions.
A number of grassroots civic movements have also emerged to fill the void in political leadership and shape the national debate. Black Lives Matter grew from concerns over unchecked violence in black communities at the hands of vigilantes and the police.124 Groups of coders – such as Data Refuge – have established networks to monitor government websites for fear that politically sensitive data (for example, on climate change) will be wilfully discarded.125 The #MeToo movement erupted in October 2017 to highlight the prevalence of sexual harassment across society. March For Our Lives, a national youth movement against gun violence, emerged following the Parkland school shooting in February 2018.126 While issue groups are not unique to this political moment and their impact is difficult to quantify, what has changed is the visibility – and potential political capital – they are achieving through social media and collective action. For this reason, some of these movements could exercise greater leverage over policy than those of the past.
The unanswered question concerns the extent to which the different strains of activism outlined above represent an aggregate change. Civic and political mobilization is commonplace in the US, with established channels at each level of the government – from local municipality to the executive – through which to engage. In that sense, the latest advocacy movements may simply be manifestations of a tradition of civic consciousness, in some cases refined for and empowered by the digital age. At the same time, the sense of more concerted responses to a political dysfunction many years in the making, but thrown into its sharpest relief yet by the Trump-era indignities, is hard to ignore. While no single entity can stand in for the federal government or mend the divisions in American society, groups across many sectors of public life are seizing the opportunity to promote political and moral alternatives to the messages (or lack thereof) from Congress and the White House. Of these groups, those with capital and institutional backing – particularly where they have backing from local or state authorities – stand a better chance of shaping policy. Until the void in political leadership in the US is filled and a more constructive spirit of bipartisanship emerges, ever more inventive constituencies across the political spectrum will seek to make their voices heard.
Courtney Rice is the manager of the US and the Americas Programme.
Uzbekistan – Opening Up?
Among an uninspiring cast of authoritarian Central Asian states, Uzbekistan is emerging as an unlikely exemplar of economic and policy reform – albeit still to a very limited degree.
Opportunities for meaningful change do not occur very often in the area once covered by the USSR. This is especially so in Central Asia. In 27 years of post-Soviet rule, there have only been six changes of leader across all five countries.127 Three of those were in Kyrgyzstan (two through revolution, but most recently in a semi-democratic process). The other ‘new’ leaderships were due to the sudden death of the incumbent, followed by a well-orchestrated succession. Only in Uzbekistan, however, is tangible reform being explored.
Uzbekistan had long been one of the least likely candidates for transformation of almost any kind. In 27 years of demagogic misrule until his death in September 2016, President Islam Karimov did almost nothing for his country’s prosperity. Yet his successor, Shavqat Mirzioyev, once thought another hardliner, may be cut from different cloth: there has been more change in Uzbekistan in the past year and a half – albeit not fully supported by legislation – than in the other four Central Asian countries in the past quarter of a century.
Three positive developments stand out in particular. The most noticeable change has been in the economic sphere, with the liberalization of currency regulations and the devaluation of Uzbekistan’s som – which is no longer pegged to the US dollar. Foreign tender can now be bought, and some economic privileges for government institutions have been curbed. The devaluation was a shock to the population,128 yet also popular – and an obvious boon for investors. To some degree, Mirzioyev has opened his country for business.
The contrast with neighbouring Kazakhstan is conspicuous. Although still the region’s premier economic power, Kazakhstan is likely worried about future competition from Uzbekistan, its traditional but weaker supposed rival.129 Both countries share the same key foreign investors – Russia and China – but Kazakhstan’s economic prospects do not look good, as the country has reached the end of what the leadership considers to be politically tolerable reform (for now). Uzbekistan’s economic potential is the greater. It has by far the largest population in the region, 32 million to Kazakhstan’s 18 million (one in three Central Asians is Uzbek), with 70 per cent aged 30 or under. It enjoys a more central location. It may, in the long run, benefit more from Chinese investment in transport infrastructure as part of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.130 Uzbekistan is also, by its continuing refusal to join Moscow’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), resisting Russian efforts to inhibit its trade and political relations with other partners. Staying out of the EAEU was conceivably Karimov’s only notable achievement. Kazakhstan, though an initial proponent, reluctantly signed up to that anachronistic grouping (then under a different name) in 2010. The economic benefits have been negligible.
The second positive development has been Mirzioyev’s easing of some political, media and social restrictions and his reorganization of key government positions. He dismissed the other two members of the triumvirate of power: the deputy prime minister, Rustam Azimov, in June 2017; and, more significantly, the powerful head of the National Security Service, Rustam Inoyatov, in January 2018.131 A large number of political prisoners have since been released, and no new ones have been arrested. Forced labour in harvesting cotton has declined somewhat,132 and the state has taken a softer approach towards Sunni Muslims. The BBC has been permitted to broadcast in the country for the first time since the massacre in Andijan in 2005, and Voice of America now has accreditation too.
Foreign policy is the third and (so far) final arena of Uzbekistan’s transformation – mostly directed towards its neighbourhood. Tashkent has halted its objections to energy projects (especially hydropower), resumed natural gas supplies, increased rail and air links, and initiated regional defence cooperation.133 Uzbekistan was traditionally the ‘difficult neighbour’, but that is changing. Most importantly, relations with Kazakhstan have improved and bilateral trade has grown.134 The success of regional diplomacy has reinforced the improvement in the economy. Uzbekistan has also increased its involvement in international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Progress in diplomacy outside this still-limited geographical radius has been less evident, although Mirzioyev made a successful visit to the US in May.
Despite the encouraging early signals, Uzbekistan is not about to become anything remotely resembling a liberal democracy, even in the medium term
Despite the encouraging early signals on these three fronts, caution is vital. Uzbekistan is not about to become anything remotely resembling a liberal democracy, even in the medium term. Change has started from a low base. The depth and breadth of the leadership’s intent are largely unknown, and significant political reform would weaken Mirzioyev’s hold on power. That most of the country’s elite alliances still have to be maintained – and balanced against each other – makes reform of government institutions unlikely. Even the removal of Inoyatov, which has already upset that balance, can be seen as a consolidation of control as much as a progressive move. Reforms are not being driven from the bottom up, as in, say, Ukraine, but through a coercive, top-down approach.
As a rule, autocratic systems do not die out with their long-serving leaders. It is likely, for example, that Putinism will outlast Putin’s presidency. The Soviet legacy and Western preference for a ‘better the devil you know’ approach have worked in the Central Asian regimes’ favour. Yet change is spreading, inexorably, through the wider region. From west to east, political transformation has come to the Baltic states, then Georgia and Ukraine. Most recently, a forcible readjustment has reached Armenia, though that is far from consolidated. Uzbekistan can conceivably be added to the list. Uniquely for the post-Soviet space, its shift has not come from revolution, yet the direction of travel remains positive.
James Nixey is head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme.
88 Desilver, D. (2013), ‘Partisan polarization, in Congress and among public, is greater than ever’, Pew Research Center, 17 July 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-ever/.
89 Sciolino, E. and Gordon, M. (1990), ‘Confrontation in the Gulf: U.S. Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault’, New York Times, 23 September 1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-us-gave-iraq-little-reason-not-to-
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90 This phenomenon was perhaps most notably on view in the crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Middle East states, with Trump publicly undercutting statements from his secretaries of state and defence. See Worth, R. (2018), ‘Can Jim Mattis Hold the Line in Trump’s War Cabinet?’, New York Times, 26 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/magazine/can-jim-mattis-hold-the-line-in-trumps-war-cabinet.html.
91 New York Times (2015), ‘Letter from Senate Republicans to the Leaders of Iran’, 9 March 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/middleeast/document-the-letter-senate-republicans-addressed-to-the-leaders-of-iran.html.
92 Lewis, D. (2017), ‘Trump’s slow pace of appointments is hurting government – and his own agenda’, Washington Post, 3 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/03/six-months-into-his-presidency-trump-continues-to-be-exceptionally-slow-at-appointing-officials-heres-why-that-matters/?utm_term=.804b358f4b02.
93 Toosi, N. (2018), ‘Emails reveal conservative alarm over ‘Obama holdovers’ in Trump Administration’, Politico, 15 March 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/15/emails-trump-administration-alarm-over-obama-holdovers-465528.
94 Mohammed, A. (2017), ‘Top ranks of career U.S. diplomats thin under Tillerson: union’, Reuters, 8 November 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy/top-ranks-
of-career-u-s-diplomats-thin-under-tillerson-union-idUSKBN1D839F.
of-career-u-s-diplomats-thin-under-tillerson-union-idUSKBN1D839F.
95 Florida, R. (2018), ‘America’s Polarization Threatens to Undo Us’, CityLab, 25 January 2018, https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/americas-polarization-threatens-to-undo-us/551483/.
96 Matthews, D. (2013), ‘The Sequester: Absolutely everything you could possibly need to know, in one FAQ’, Washington Post, 20 February 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/02/20/the-sequester-absolutely-everything-you-could-possibly-need-to-know-in-one-faq/?utm_term=.cea7d635eeed.
97 While CSOs have a range of agendas, this article focuses on actors working towards the promotion, protection and advancement of human rights. The World Bank defines CSOs as ‘the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life and express the interests and values of their members or others…’. World Bank (2007), Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook, Civil Society Team, World Bank, p. 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/ConsultationsSourceboo….
99 Lapowsky, I. (2017), ‘The Women’s March Defines Protest in the Facebook Age’, Wired, 21 January 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/01/womens-march-defines-protest-facebook-age/; Stein, P. (2017), ‘The woman who started the Women’s March with a Facebook Post reflects: ‘It was mind-boggling’’, Washington Post, 31 January 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2017/01/31/the-woman-who-started-the-womens-march-with-a-facebook-post-reflects-it-was-mind-boggling/?utm_term=.42f26bf57c7c.
100 Khomami, N. (2017), ‘Protests around world show solidarity with Women’s March on Washington’, Guardian, 22 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/21/protests-around-world-show-solidarity-with-womens-march-on-washington.
101 Anani, G. (2017), ‘Abolishing Lebanon’s “Rape Law”: Spotlight on ABAAD’s Campaign’, Girls Not Brides, 22 September 2017, https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/abolishing-lebanons-rape-law-spotlight-on-abaads-campaign/.
102 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (2017), ‘#Undress522 is finally naked!’, 17 August 2017, https://wilpf.org/undress522-is-finally-naked/.
103 CIVICUS (2011), Bridging the gaps: Citizens, organisations and disassociation, Civil Society Index summary report: 2008–2011, p. 5.
104 Anti-rights groups are increasingly using such vehicles as well as infiltrating spaces traditionally associated with human rights advocates. See Sanders, R. (2018), ‘Norm spoiling: undermining the international women’s right agenda’, International Affairs, 94, 2 (March): pp. 271–72; CIVICUS (2017), Year in Review: Top 10 Trends, CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report 2018, p. 12.
105 Lock, B. (2017), ‘Regaining Trust in Civil Society is Vital to Helping the World’s Most Vulnerable’, Edelman, 12 July 2017, https://www.edelman.co.uk/magazine/posts/regaining-trust-in-civil-society-is-vital-to-helping-the-worlds-most-vulnerable/.
106 Kreienkamp, J. (2017), ‘Responding to the Global Crackdown on Civil Society’, University College London Global Governance Institute, 25 September 2017.
107 Note also private sponsorship arrangements in Canada for refugees. See ‘Meeting Summary: Forum on Refugee and Migration Policy – Responsibility sharing for large-scale population movements: are safe and legal pathways part of the solution?’, Chatham House, 2 February 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/forum-refugee-and-migration-policy-0.
108 UNHCR (2018), ‘Resettlement at a Glance: 2017 in review’, 28 May 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/5a9d507f7.
109 CIVICUS (2017), Thematic Overview: Civil Society and the Private Sector, CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report 2017, p. 80.
110 Agrawal, S., Reed, B. and Saxena, R. (2016), Beyond Integrity: Exploring the role of businesses in preserving the civil society space, Charities Aid Foundation, pp. 20–21, https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/caf-beyondintegrityreport-web-oct16v2.pdf.
111 Carvalho, R. (2018), ‘Domestic helper agency in Hong Kong places more than 2,000 Filipino maids without charging them fees’, South China Morning Post, 21 April 2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2142752/domestic-helper-agency-hong-kong-places-more-2000-filipino.
112 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018), United Nations Human Rights Appeal 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/HumanRightsAppeal2018.pdf.
113 This year also marks the 25th anniversary of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and the 20th anniversary of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
114 Pew Research Center (2017), ‘Public Trust in Government: 1958-2017’, 14 December 2017, http://www.people-press.org/2017/12/14/public-trust-in-government-1958-2017/.
115 Governor Jay Inslee (2017), ‘Inslee, New York Governor Cuomo, and California Governor Brown announce formation of United States Climate Alliance’, 1 June 2017,
https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-new-york-governor-cuomo-and-california-governor-brown-announce-formation-united.
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116 United States Climate Alliance (undated), ‘U.S. Climate Alliance Fact Sheet’,
https://www.usclimatealliance.org/us-climate-alliance-fact-sheet/ (accessed 21 May 2018).
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117 United States Climate Alliance (2017), ‘2017 Annual Report: Alliance States Take the Lead’, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5a5e7f169140b79e6fe04f50/1516142359401/USCA_Climate_Report-V2A-Online-RGB.PDF.
118 United States Environmental Protection Agency (undated), ‘Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations’, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations (accessed 21 May 2018).
119 Davenport, C. and Nagourney, A. (2017), ‘Fighting Trump on Climate, California Becomes a Global Force’, New York Times, 23 May 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/california-engages-world-and-fights-washington-on-climate-change.html?_r=1; and Under 2 Coalition (undated), ‘Under 2 Coalition’, http://under2mou.org/ (accessed 21 May 2018).
120 Kopan, T. (2018), ‘What are sanctuary cities, and can they be defunded?’, CNN, 26 March 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/index.html.
121 The White House (2017), ‘Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States’, 25 January 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executiveorder-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united-states/.
122 Kopan, T. (2018), ‘Trump and Sessions lose another sanctuary cities case’, CNN, 19 April 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/19/politics/court-rules-against-trump-sessions-sanctuary-cities-chicago/index.html.
123 Chesky, B. (@bchesky) (2017), ‘Airbnb is providing free housing to refugees and anyone not allowed in the US. Stayed [sic] tuned for more, contact me if urgent need for housing’, tweet, 29 January 2017, https://twitter.com/bchesky/status/825517729251684352 (accessed 21 May 2018).
124 Black Lives Matter (undated), ‘Herstory’, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/ (accessed 21 May 2018).
125 Molteni, M. (2017), ‘Diehard Coders Just Rescued NASA’s Earth Science Data’, Wired, 13 February 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/02/diehard-coders-just-saved-nasas-earth-science-data/.
126 March For Our Lives (undated), ‘Mission Statement’, https://marchforourlives.com/home/ (accessed 21 May 2018).
127 The five countries are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
128 RFE/RL Uzbek Service (2017), ‘Uzbekistan Devalues Currency As It Emerges From Decades-Long Isolation’, 5 September 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-devalues-currency/28718291.html.
129 Uzbekistan’s GDP in 2016 was $66.7 billion, while Kazakhstan’s was $133.7 billion. IMF (2018), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2016&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=68&pr1.y=7&c=916%2C927&s=NGDPD&grp=0&a=.
130 Overland, I. and Vakulchuk, R. (2018), ‘China’s Belt and Road Gets a Central Asian Boost’, The Diplomat, 3 May 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/chinas-belt-and-road-gets-a-central-asian-boost/.
131 Inoyatov is now, apparently, one of three individuals responsible for the development of Uzbekistan’s fishing industry. The country is landlocked.
132 Pannier, B. and Tahir, M. (2018), ‘Majlis Podcast: Will There Be Forced Labor In Uzbekistan’s Cotton Fields This Year?’, RFE/RL, 3 June 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-will-there-be-forced-labor-in-uzbekistan-s-cotton-fields-this-year-/29268440.html.
133 Egamov, A. and Sattarov, R. (2018), ‘A New Era for Uzbekistan’, Atlantic Council, 10 April 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-new-era-for-uzbe….
134 UzDaily (2018), ‘Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan intend to increase bilateral trade to US$5bn by 2020’, 14 March 2018, https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-43098.htm.