2. The Origins and Evolution of Syria’s Shadow State
Circles of power during the rule of Hafez al-Assad
To fully understand the changes in the Syrian state’s methods of – and capacity for – control today, it is important to examine the origins of the current regime’s power model. When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1971, he created a new security-based state structure in which loyalty was often more important than capacity or official powers. This ‘shadow state’ – so named because the real levers of power operated behind the scenes – was effective enough to keep the president in power for 30 years. James T. Quinlivan argues that the purpose of the shadow state model was to render a regime ‘coup-proof’. In particular, Quinlivan lists three characteristics of coup-proofing in Syria under Hafez al-Assad. These were:
(1) the effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-critical positions balanced with wider participation and less restrictive loyalty standards for the regime as a whole; (2) the creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; (3) the development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another with independent paths of communication to critical leaders.9
Not only were favouritism and nepotism key in deciding who got what in the state system, but Assad also maintained his authority by ensuring that loyalists infiltrated business, religious, social and tribal circles.10 The power structure that he designed was not a simple hierarchy that can easily be represented in an organizational chart, but rather a complex matrix of circles of influence that sometimes interconnected and at other times competed.
Assad had inherited the basics of the state, and what came to be his regime, from the Baath Party’s early years between 1963 and 1970. He then structured the levers of power in accordance with local factors.11 He was highly knowledgeable about the tribal, sectarian, regional and socio-economic layers of Syrian society, and he used this knowledge to divide and conquer – not only spreading fear in society, but also instilling mutual suspicion among competing actors. As a result, no single interest group gained ascendancy. Each group monitored other groups, reporting on their activities to the highest point in the chain of command – Assad himself.
In securing his own power in this way, Assad planted the seeds of transactionalism as a characteristic of the Syrian state. Following his promise to overthrow the ruling post-colonial oligarchy, his ‘correctionist movement’ in 1973 created syndicates to promote labourers’ rights (such as the Peasants’ Syndicate and Merchants’ Syndicate). He also both appealed to the traditional bourgeois families and enabled the rise of a nouveau riche. These actors and others became part of Assad’s power network.
Superficially, the structure of the state in Syria included the typical pillars of representative government that one might expect to find in an election-based republic.12 But these institutions were largely a façade, existing in name only. In reality, the only meaningful control of the state – at least, until the current conflict changed the picture – was principally exerted by a ruling elite abetted by compliant security agencies. Presidential elections were invariably rigged.13 State institutions, judicial, parliamentary and political bodies, and the security services and army all gave the appearance of being functioning independent authorities that conducted their duties in accordance with the law and the constitution. However, a closer look reveals that a great imbalance existed between them.
Among the above-mentioned institutions, the state security apparatus and, behind it, the army were the key bodies ensuring the power system remained secure and solid. Their method of rule was based on brutality and spreading fear among the population. The security apparatus, in particular, directed the functions of all other state institutions.
The structure of state institutions built by Hafez al-Assad exists to this day. It consists of four main security agencies: the General (formerly State) Intelligence Directorate, the Political Security Directorate, the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate. The first two nominally fall under the control of the Ministry of Interior (though in reality they are stronger than it); similarly, the latter two are theoretically subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. All four agencies nominally report to the Bureau of National Security of the Baath Party. In addition, Syria has a military police force, a military security force, and a presidential security force. Each of the security agencies has a head who coordinates closely with the president. Each main agency, in turn, has several branches with sub-branches clustered around cities, towns and villages. The president defines the role of each body. Their roles rarely overlap, but they are often in competition with each other.
Table 1: Major security agencies in Syria
|
Agency |
Branches |
Character |
|---|---|---|
|
Bureau of National Security of the Baath Party |
– |
Civilian |
|
General Intelligence Directorate |
Internal branch External security Counter-espionage |
Civilian |
|
Political Security Directorate |
Political party Students and student activities Surveillance and pursuit City |
Civilian |
|
Military Intelligence Directorate |
Palestine Commando police Military interrogation Military intelligence in Lebanon |
Military |
|
Air Force Intelligence Directorate |
– |
Military |
|
Military Police |
– |
Military |
|
Military Security |
– |
Military |
|
Presidential Security |
– |
– |
Source: Taken from Quinlivan (1999), ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, pp. 131–65, p. 152.
As originally conceived by Hafez al-Assad, this power structure was designed so that the agencies monitored not only the public but also each other, the aim being to keep the balance of power in the hands of the president. So if one agency or branch got more power than another, the president could intervene, remove its head, or shift heads’ roles.
The chain of command in these institutions consisted of carefully selected loyalists (for example, the defence minister, Moustafa Tlas, a Sunni, remained in office for three decades). However, the security apparatus was always ultimately dominated by Alawites – the minority sect of the Assad dynasty – and some members of other minorities. Apart from sensitive senior positions, appointments in the security services and the army were generally based on nepotism, favouritism and familial relations rather than on ability and professionalism. Privileges were also granted on the basis of membership of favoured minorities (above all, the Alawites), rather than according to ideological orientation. This created a system in which recipients were motivated mainly by the desire to preserve their position and benefits.
As originally conceived by Hafez al-Assad, this power structure was designed so that the agencies monitored not only the public but also each other, the aim being to keep the balance of power in the hands of the president.
While token political plurality existed in the form of parties such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Socialist Unionists Party, the Communist Labour Party and others, the dominant political force since 1971 has been the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Power and privileges were granted to personnel approved and supported by the security apparatus. Thus, even though the country would go through the democratic motions, holding party and parliamentary elections, anyone running for election – whether at party or parliamentary level – would have to be vetted by state security.
This operation was replicated in all syndicates in the country – for doctors, teachers, artists, engineers, peasants and so on. All vetting was done behind closed doors. The security apparatus controlled almost all aspects of society. Almost any activity needed a security clearance at some stage, even a wedding party if it was held in a public place. This process was not purely sectarian – i.e. consisting of favouritism towards Alawites in government institutions – but was also based on loyalty and influence on the ground. Some Sunni businessmen and Christians were also given privileges in different parts of the country, in order to maintain a balance between competing interests.14 Assad drew on his deep study of Syrian society to structure the provision of power in accordance with local factors.15 For example, the power template implemented in Damascus could be adapted to other governorates such as Aleppo or Latakia by localizing particular political and bureaucratic functions. Equally, power was allocated in a certain way in the suburbs of Damascus and differently in the city itself.
The leadership in effect created a social map of its constituents, monitored and observed to ensure loyalty at every level. Assad managed to infiltrate and erode the social structure by selectively building alliances with business communities for certain purposes, and with religious or tribal ones for others.16 Economic neglect of peripheral districts and regions often meant that the more distant the governorate was from the central command in Damascus, the less privileged it was in terms of access to services for its residents. But the chain of command was always designed to fit the local structure while ensuring that the network of loyalty remained functional. For example, in distant governorates and rural areas power was exercised through tribal and patriarchal networks, whereas in key cities and governorates – especially industrial cities such as Aleppo and the capital, Damascus – control was exerted through social, business and religious networks.
Circles of power would differ in size and influence. Smaller interest groups sometimes allied to form bigger groups, which in turn might seek to consolidate their position by connecting with more powerful circles. All the while they were monitored by the top command. If one circle or entity grew bigger than the regime allowed, the alliances around it would be withdrawn. In this way, perceived threats to the primacy of Assad’s regime could be dismantled with minimal disruption to the running of the state: the void would swiftly be filled by a new circle or entity, and the overall network would continue to function. The rule of the game was: One mistake and you are out. Implementing this rule depended on maintaining the chain of command and levering the particular part of the structure to which each actor belonged. Minorities – with Alawites at the top of the chain – were given more chances to progress in this system than the majority Sunnis.17
In religious circles, power was not based along lines of religious authority (Syria does not have an equivalent to Egypt’s al-Azhar, for example). Rather, it came from the granting of approval by the security apparatus to religious figures to head mosques and religious schools, on the understanding that preachers would show loyalty to the state and not spread messages that could jeopardize the overall power system. Despite the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood following the Hama massacre in 1982, Assad gave permission for the construction of hundreds of mosques and religious schools across the country – these were all controlled by the security apparatus.18 The security apparatus also undermined the position of the Grand Mufti and nationalized religious funds.
Notable figures and families related to Assad relied on the ‘Shabiha’ – a group of thugs that engaged in intimidation, extortion and other illegal activities – to maintain and extend their authority, even as ultimate power remained in the hands of Assad and was exercised through the shadow state.19 And while state institutions gave the appearance of functioning in Syria, the shadow state in fact was pulling the strings at Assad’s direction.
The shadow state under Bashar al-Assad before 2011: continuation and seeds of weakness
The shadow state continued to control Syria when Bashar al-Assad succeeded Hafez al-Assad in 2000. The new president kept the power structure installed by his father. At the beginning of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, the young, Western-educated ophthalmologist offered some hope for political and societal liberalization and reform. The internet was introduced, mobile phones became available, and other superficial trappings of modernity started to appear. But the state’s underlying intolerance of dissent did not change. In 2000, the Damascus Spring started with some opposition figures gathering and discussing issues of public interest away from state-controlled and -authorized venues. This initially went unchallenged by the state. But when a lecture critical of business monopolies and an email with a cartoon mocking Assad came to the attention of the authorities, the two people behind these commentaries – an Alawite and a Christian – received lengthy prison terms. Later on, key members of the Damascus Spring movement were also imprisoned, some for several years.20
Despite similar authoritarian instincts, the approach of Bashar al-Assad differed from that of his father in one key respect: its lack of continuity. Hafez al-Assad had kept favoured commanders in their respective circles of power for long periods, ensuring that they gained knowledge, expertise and privileges. He had also allowed somewhat decentralized decision-making, allocating power to trusted (though closely watched) people around him. In contrast, Bashar al-Assad shuffled people in and out of his power network so often that he caused a cumulative disturbance in the system.21 As a key opposition figure observed, commenting on the weakness and inexperience of Bashar al-Assad compared to his father, Syria under the son became a dictatorship without a dictator.22 While this did not fundamentally alter the shadow state, it meant that the ‘coup-proof’ system was not as resilient as it once was.
Bashar al-Assad wanted to bring in his own people and inject new blood into the system, but he did not trust them enough to provide the support they needed to be effective. He replaced some faces in the old guard with new personnel, and switched from his father’s decentralized system of control to centralized decision-making reliant on him alone. He brought in members of his family, as well as younger personnel from the security agencies and the army, to form a close circle around him. These figures included his uncle, Mohammad Makhlouf; and Makhlouf’s sons Rami (responsible for running the family’s business affairs) and Hafez (head of one of the state security agencies). Despite their privileged position in his inner circle, however, the final decision was always Bashar al-Assad’s.
A further change was the president’s focus on economic liberalization, which increased inequality between the periphery and the centre and created opportunities for the privileged at the expense of the poor. Although prosperity appeared to spread more widely across society, the gains remained limited to the president’s inner circle and those with connections to it.23 Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, surfaced as the new face of economic modernization in the 2000s, with some privileges also granted to people associated with him, such as Muhammad Hamsho, a Sunni from Damascus and a member of Syria’s upcoming generation of young businessmen. In short, the ‘modernization’ introduced by Assad was tailored to the prosperity of a certain class of society. It presented an image of change and modernity rather than offering real reform in itself.24
This situation was in marked contrast to the practice of patronage in the days of Assad’s father. Under Hafez al-Assad, the Sunni bourgeoisie of Damascus – though very much under the thumb of a coercive system – still enjoyed some real privileges. Favours were offered to members of this cohort on the understanding that if they showed loyalty and paid their dues, their businesses would be spared. In short, it was a system of give and take that accommodated interests outside the regime’s immediate circle. However, once Bashar al-Assad came to power, the existing patronage networks were partially reconfigured, as the privileges long granted to select groups now also went to members of newly established elites acting as fronts for regime players. This shift caused significant disruption to the economic status quo. Many court cases were lost, businesses closed and companies taken over simply because owners refused to give a significant percentage of their assets or earnings to Rami Makhlouf.25
Of the changes to the Syrian state, those affecting the security apparatus would prove among the most consequential. Although the new president did not fully purge the system, the removal of some members of the old guard who had protected his father’s interests26 reduced its effectiveness. In some cases, the new recruits were too inexperienced to run things as before, seldom remaining in position for long enough to achieve the regime’s agenda. The security agencies continued to act as important mechanisms of state control, stronger than the army or the Ministry of Interior. But while the shadow state persisted in outward form, Assad had planted the seeds of weakness. The extent to which the system was now fundamentally compromised would be exposed as the Syrian conflict unfolded from 2011 onwards.
Assad’s response to the regional context further undermined the shadow state by damaging relations with the US. Assad had opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Syrian regime was later linked with the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, an event that led the US to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus in 2005. Assad briefly came in from the cold in July 2008 after the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, invited the Assads to Paris in an effort to restore a measure of diplomatic respectability to Syria. However, Bashar al-Assad’s rehabilitation in the eyes of the international community was halted by the regime’s hard-line response to the outbreak of the Syrian uprising.
‘Keep it in the family’: state control at the outbreak of the Syrian uprising
The Arab Spring had a major impact on Syria’s shadow state. Syrians were closely watching as events unfolded in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, and were debating what would happen at home. Early on during the anti-government protests, Assad seemed relatively receptive to popular criticism: he opened up internet and social media channels, hitherto restricted, and promised the release of political prisoners and the writing of a new constitution. These actions and statements were taken by some as reassurance that the unrest erupting elsewhere in the region would be avoided in Syria.
Yet despite Assad’s public declaration that Syria was ‘different’ from other Arab countries in turmoil, protests did take place.27 Assad’s response to the protests in the city of Deraa – where the uprising originated – was to order his military to encircle the city and to send members of the security services to shoot protesters. As the civilian death toll in Deraa mounted, members of Assad’s inner circle and some of his advisers took a hawkish position, advocating further crackdowns and that anyone proposing reconciliation should be punished. While a few advocates of a more dovish approach tried to find a middle ground and bring calm to the streets, within weeks it was clear which camp had prevailed.
The crackdown was managed by the president’s office. Assad himself commanded the operation, with Mohammad Makhlouf and Rami Makhlouf managing at least 500 military and security personnel. Mohammad Dib Daaboul, known as Abou Salim, was in charge of the president’s office and liaised with military and security personnel, taking orders directly from the president. The minister of presidential affairs, Mansour Azzam, managed a further network of up to 1,500 people distributed between various government institutions. Assad and his brother, Maher al-Assad (the head of both the elite Fourth Armoured Division and the Republican Guard), managed brutal army operations that evolved, as the conflict progressed, into tactics such as barrel-bombing of opposition areas.
Table 2: Main Syrian armed land forces
— Source: Based on information from Holliday, J. (2013), The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle, Institute for the Study of War, published February 2013 and updated in 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
Table 2: Main Syrian armed land forces
In May 2011, Rami Makhlouf gave an interview to the New York Times implying that the Assad family and the ruling elite had become closer as a result of the conflict. He intimated that policy decision-making was a ‘joint’ process, albeit conceding that Assad still had the final say. Makhlouf added: ‘As a person, each one of us knows that we cannot continue without staying united together.’28 In effect, the security apparatus still had a largely free hand, under the president’s supervision. However, this arrangement – a legacy of Hafez al-Assad’s rule – had not been tested by the political and social conditions that confronted his son. As his father had done in suppressing any organized movement against him, Bashar al-Assad sought to rely on competition between the security agencies to handle the uprising he was facing. His measure of success was the number of demonstrations taking place. If one security agency did not quell demonstrations, he would hand leadership of the crackdown to another.
As the conflict escalated and spread across the country, different actors rose and fell in prominence. One day Ali Mamlouk, head of the General Intelligence Directorate, would be the one in charge. The next, it would be Jamil Hassan, head of the feared Air Force Intelligence Directorate. Members of the old guard who did not show complete obedience to the regime were sidelined or lost privileges. They included Ali Habib, dismissed as defence minister in August 2011. Meanwhile, some old-guard retirees – such as Ali Douba, the former head of Military Intelligence, and Bahjat Suleiman, Syria’s former ambassador to Jordan – were reappointed as advisers.29
Despite all its efforts, the security apparatus was unable to stop the demonstrations, as the shadow state model inherited and modified by Bashar al-Assad proved much less effective than it had been pre-2011. Army officers began to defect to the opposition. They established what came to be known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which would later include former civilians who had taken up arms. The effect on government forces was significant: although the continued presence of key decision-makers ensured that the army did not break down,30 it was weakened by the loss of personnel.
The hollowing out of the shadow state’s security and military capacity
As the conflict unfolded, the army became increasingly fragmented and the security apparatus lost the ability to maintain centralized command. As a result, the shadow state that had enabled Hafez al-Assad to exercise and maintain power became less effective. The consequences of this continue to be felt, even as the conflict has entered a more recent stage in which the regime once again has the military advantage. The Syrian army’s combat capacity – already weak before 2011,31 its ranks plagued by corruption and nepotism32 – has been significantly diminished since the start of the conflict. Moreover, the regime’s forces today must contend with the effects of recent further reductions in capacity33 – due in part to defections and battle losses, but also reflecting the large numbers of soldiers who have refused to fight (and who, in many such cases, have been executed).34
The army is trying to increase its numbers. It has raised the maximum age for voluntary conscription to 42, and is conducting forced conscription.35 As government forces have retaken rebel-held areas, the regime has used what it calls ‘reconciliation treaties’ to recruit people into the Fourth or Fifth Corps established by Russia to boost army capacity. In reality, the ‘treaties’ are coerced agreements. The regime uses siege tactics to starve residents to the point of surrender, sometimes bombarding neighbourhoods or using chemical weapons to force compliance. Former rebels who choose to stay in areas recaptured by government forces are left with one choice: renounce the opposition, pledge allegiance to Assad, settle their security status, and then join government forces to fight against the very rebel groups they used to belong to.36
The army is also sometimes refusing to discharge reservists upon completion of their legal term of service.37 Prior to 2011 – both during the Hafez al-Assad era and after Bashar al-Assad took power – reserve service was uncommon. Upon completion of military service, men were discharged and provided with an ID for the reserve service, to be kept in case of recall. Very rarely, men with specialized military skills were called for service in the reserves for a period of between six months and one year. Since 2011, however, some reservists have been kept on active duty for several years.
The regime’s efforts to increase military manpower have had mixed results. Recruitment has had been of limited benefit because most new recruits lack military experience and have thus contributed minimally to the army’s combat capacity.38 Sectarianism is also a major challenge. A large number of Syrian army conscripts hail from the majority Sunni population. Conditions in the army are not ideal. Soldiers are poorly paid, and during seven years of war many Sunni soldiers have remained in front-line areas for months – sometimes years – under harsh conditions without adequate supplies. This is stoking sectarian tension as Alawi soldiers (belonging to the same minority sect as the Assad family) are now mainly kept away from the front lines and are thus perceived as the beneficiaries of preferential treatment. The situation is not helped by the fact that corruption in the army has become even more widespread than before the war: soldiers with connections to high-level officers, or with financial means, are able to bribe their way out of front-line duties.
The conflict has also put a strain on the shadow state’s model of relying on branches of the security agencies in different areas of Syria. The agencies have lost a good number of their own members during the war, which has weakened their capacity. Just as importantly, the conflict has severed the top-down lines of command between the president’s inner circle and many of the local sub-branches of security agencies. As a consequence, these sub-branches have come to operate almost independently. In Damascus and elsewhere, different districts are controlled by different security sub-branches. These actors enforce their authority through brutal treatment of the resident population.
In this way, the challenges encountered by the army and the security apparatus have altered the country’s power dynamics. Military losses and capacity constraints have paved the way for the rise of state-sponsored and state-aligned militias. These new actors have been tolerated or encouraged by the regime on the understanding that their role is to help the regular army and security agencies, with the army coordinating militia operations.39 But what was meant in effect to be a solution to a resourcing problem has merely depleted the shadow state’s military and security capacity further, in turn obliging the regime to rely on propaganda to cover up for its weaknesses. There have also been some structural and functional changes as state institutions have had to accommodate the new actors.
The rise of pro-regime militias can be traced to the government’s engagement with the Shabiha, a network of criminal gangs initially mobilized by the regime to go down to protest areas and beat up demonstrators.40 Later on, the Shabiha became more organized and gained more power as they were integrated into what came to be known as ‘popular committees’. Popular committees were mainly formed from the minorities loyal to President Assad: Alawites, Christians, Shia and Druze. These groups started popping up in neighbourhoods, towns and cities around the country. Under the pretext of providing local protection, the popular committees were armed from the early days of the uprising. Their demographic composition reflected the regime’s tactic of spreading fear among minorities by warning of the danger from ‘Sunni jihadist’ (as the regime described them) protesters.41 As the protests expanded, the violence increased and more personnel were needed to support the regime’s official forces. The popular committees were thus recruited to accompany the forces of the security agencies tasked with going to beat up and/or shoot protesters.
An additional consequence of the hollowing out of the shadow state was the room it created for Iranian-backed paramilitary groups to enter the Syrian theatre (Iran’s wider foreign policy agenda in the country is covered in Chapters 4 and 5). Iran saw that the Syrian regime was incapable on its own of winning the war militarily or regaining control over cities and towns taken by the opposition.42 After initially sending its advisers to help with cyber crackdowns on demonstrators at the start of the uprising, Iran dispatched military advisers to Syria to draw up the war strategy in 2011. These were followed in 2012 by Shia fighters sent to support the regime’s forces.43 The first arrivals were from Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mercenaries followed from 2013 onwards,44 including fighters from al-Nujaba’ and the Abou’l Fadl al-Abbas Brigade – both militias from the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq.
Iran’s response also took advantage of Article 10 of the Syrian Military Service Law of 2003, which permits the creation of ‘other forces as obligated by necessity’ to supplement the regular army.45 As the numbers of Syrian army and security personnel continued to decrease, this article was put into action around 2013, when Iran decided to build a paramilitary force from minorities loyal to Tehran, using a model similar to that associated with the PMU.
Members of this new auxiliary militia, known as the National Defence Forces (NDF), fought alongside Syrian government troops. Funded by Rami Makhlouf, and trained and overseen by Iran, the NDF was conceived as an entity that could grow into a cell in Syria, deriving state legitimacy from a token mandate of providing defence. In this way, Iran hoped that the NDF would acquire a status similar to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon.46 Although, under Syrian law, the army, internal security forces and ‘additional forces’ such as militias are all treated as part of the regular armed forces, the NDF differentiated itself by paying recruits much higher salaries. NDF salaries ranged between US$100 and US$400 a month in 2018, compared with an average of around US$50 a month for regular soldiers in the Syrian army.47
Iran continued to boost the numbers of Shia militias in Syria, later sending personnel from Afghanistan (the Fatimiyoun militia), Yemen and Pakistan (the Zeinabiyoun) to fight for the regime.48 At times, the increased role of irregular militias in the conflict created complications for the regime’s relationships with allied combatants. For example, in some battles, state-aligned militias made key military gains only to see the credit go to the Syrian army. In 2014, controversy was caused when presidential adviser Buthaina Shaaban expressed anger that ‘friendly media’ were claiming victory for Syria’s allies and denying the Syrian army’s role. She soon withdrew her statement, and it was erased from the internet. The reference was to coverage of battles in which gains had been made by Hezbollah, as journalists from the Hezbollah media outlets al-Manar and al-Mayadeen had been allowed into battle towns to broadcast the news while the Syrian army and its media had been left behind. On other occasions, al-Manar and al-Mayadeen would broadcast Hezbollah’s victories live, but although it was obvious that the Syrian army was not present, credit for the victories would later be given to the Syrian army.49 One reporter claimed that, at some battles, journalists had to wait for several days until Syrian army battalions and media had arrived before they could cover the hostilities. At that point, moreover, regime propaganda would start to appear claiming that the Syrian army had cleared towns of opposition or ISIS forces.50
A final factor contributing to the diminishment of the shadow state’s military and security capacity was its military tactics. As cities and towns had fallen to the rebels earlier in the conflict, the regime relied on the tactic of pulling out its forces and encircling and bombing these areas. The removal of state security and military institutions from inside towns and cities left a void that was subsequently filled by armed opposition groups or Islamists.51 Today, with the regime having taken back many of these areas from the rebels, the Syrian state does not have the capacity to exercise full military and security control over them. A similar phenomenon is even occurring in areas that have remained under regime authority throughout the conflict, due to the reduction in state technical military capacity and the snowballing influence of pro-regime militias and branches of the security agencies described above.
Today, the pro-regime actors in the conflict all have different interests and are vying to maintain their power. This contest not only involves battalions and brigades within the Syrian army, pro-regime Syrian militias, and branches of the security agencies. It also encompasses Iranian-backed foreign militias with an agenda to maintain their presence in the country, keep control of key areas in the hands of Shia, and push the Sunni opposition out of Sunni-held areas. Evidence that this rivalry between myriad actors is hollowing out the shadow state can be seen, for instance, in the occasions when Iranian-backed militias (mainly Hezbollah) have denied Syrian army officers access to towns and villages without the militias’ consent. Among these locations have been towns such as Zabadani and Madaya, bordering Lebanon, which Hezbollah considers of strategic importance. Residents and opposition fighters recall Hezbollah and Iran exercising full control in both towns. For example, when negotiations were under way over a deal that would allow fighters and civilians to leave Zabadani and Madaya, the regime approached civilians in an attempt to persuade them to stay (in an effort to prevent Hezbollah from controlling the area). However, the Syrian army was unable to prevent the population-exchange deal from taking place.52
9 Quinlivan (1999), ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, pp. 131–65, p. 133.
10 Wedeen, L. (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11 Batatu, H. (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
12 Abboud, S. (2016), Syria, Cambridge: Polity Press.
13 The Economist (2014), ‘A Bit of Theatre: An Election in Syria’, 24 April 2014, https://www.economist.com/pomegranate/2014/04/24/a-bit-of-theatre (accessed 27 Aug. 2018).
14 Hinnebusch, R. (2001), Syria: Revolution from Above, New York: Routledge.
15 Quinlivan (1999), ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’.
16 Perthes, V. (1997), The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London: I.B. Tauris.
17 Van Dam, N. (1979), The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1978, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
18 Lefèvre, R. (2013), Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19 Al-Warraq, S. (2013). ‘The Shabiha in Syria: From Mafia to Militia’, As-Safir al-Arabi, 2 January 2013, http://assafirarabi.com/ar/3312/2013/01/02/الشـبـيـحـــة-فـــي-ســـوريـا-مــ/ (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
20 Human Rights Watch (2009), ‘The Forgotten Damascus Spring’, 23 February 2009, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/23/forgotten-damascus-spring (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
21 Leverett, F. L. (2005), Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
22 Interview with one of the authors, Istanbul, spring 2017.
23 Haddad, B. (2012), Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
24 Cooke, M. (2016), Dancing in Damascus: Creativity, Resilience, and the Syrian Revolution, London: Routledge.
25 Holmes, O. and Al-Khalidi, S. (2012), ‘Syria moneyman is target of anti-Assad hatred’, Reuters, 18 July 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-assad-moneyman/syria-moneyman-is-target-of-anti-assad-hatred-idUSBRE86H0ON20120718 (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
26 Eyal, Z. (2007), Commanding Syria: Bashar Al-Asad and the First Years in Power, London: I.B. Tauris.
27 Wall Street Journal (2011), ‘Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’, 31 January 2011, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894 (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
28 Shadid, A. (2011), ‘Syrian Elite to Fight Protests to ‘the End’’, New York Times, 10 May 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/world/middleeast/11makhlouf.html (accessed 29 Jul. 2018). In the same interview, Makhlouf said: ‘If there is no stability here, there is no way there will be stability in Israel.’ At the time, many outside Syria dismissed his comments as bravado, but his words were proven right almost eight years into the conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared this year that Israel has no problem with Assad remaining in power and regaining control over all of Syria. In the same month that Makhlouf gave the interview to the New York Times in 2011, he was put on the European sanctions list for his role in funding the regime’s violence against demonstrators.
29 Ali Douba was added to the European sanctions list in 2011 with the note: ‘Responsible for killings in Hama in 1980, has been called back to Damascus as special advisor to President Bashar Al-Assad.’ See Official Journal of the European Union (2012), ‘COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011’, 19 January 2012, p. 15, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
30 Phillips, C. (2018), ‘The World Abetted Assad’s Victory in Syria’, The Atlantic, 4 August 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/assad-victory-syria/566522/ (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
31 Kaplan, F. (2003), ‘Assad’s Situation: Syria’s Military Machine May be Hollow—but It Isn’t Harmless’, Slate, 14 April 2003, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2003/04/assads_situation.html?via=gdpr-consent (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
32 Khaddour, K. (2017), ‘Despite its Weakness, the Syrian Army Remains Central to the Regime’s Survival – Syrian Expert’, The Syrian Observer, 13 February 2017, http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Interviews/32329/Despite_Weakness_the_Syrian_Army_Remains_Central_the_Regime_Survival_Syrian_Expert (accessed 29 Jul. 2018). See also Khaddour, K. (2016), ‘Strength in Weakness: The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 March 2016, http://carnegie-mec.org/2016/03/14/strength-in-weakness-syrian-army-s-accidental-resilience-pub-62968 (accessed 27 Aug. 2018).
33 For an overview of the structure of the army pre-2011, see Holliday, J. (2013), The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle, Institute of the Study of War, February 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
34 For an account of losses of armoured vehicles, see Janovský, J. (2018), ‘Seven Years of War — Documenting Syrian Arab Army’s Armoured Vehicles Losses’, Bellingcat, 27 March 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/03/27/saa-vehicle-losses-2011-2017/ (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
35 Forced conscription is frequently cited by male refugees as a reason for fleeing the country. See Fabbe, K., Hazlett, C. and Sinmazdemir, T. (2018), ‘Persuasive Peace: Syrian Refugees’ Attitudes Towards Compromise and Civil War Termination’, Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Working Paper No. 18-049, 30 April 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182484 (accessed 27 Aug. 2018).
36 Haid, H. (2018), ‘Joining the Enemy: How the Syrian Regime Reintegrates Former Rebel Fighters’, Chatham House, July 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/joining-the-enemy-how-the-syrian-regime-reintegrates-former-rebel-fighters (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
37 Interviews with army recruits, Damascus countryside, May 2018.
38 Danish Immigration Service (2017), Syria: Recruitment Practices in Government-controlled Areas and in Areas under Opposition Control, Involvement of Public Servants and Civilians in the Armed Conflict and Issues Related to Exiting Syria, August 2017, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/995176/download (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
39 Interview with Kheder Khaddour by Jihad Yazigi. The Syrian Observer (2017), ‘Despite its Weakness, the Syrian Army Remains Central to the Regime’s Survival – Syrian Expert’, The Syrian Observer, 13 February 2017, http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Interviews/32329/Despite_Weakness_the_Syrian_Army_Remains_Central_the_Regime_Survival_Syrian_Expert (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
40 BBC (2012), ‘Syria Unrest: Who Are the Shabiha?’, 29 May 2012, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14482968 (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
41 Stolleis, F. (ed.) (2015), Playing the Sectarian Card: Identities and Affiliations of Local Communities in Syria, Beirut: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/12320.pdf (accessed 5 Sep. 2018).
42 See Bassiri Tabrizi, A. and Pantucci, R. (eds) (2016), Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict, Occasional Paper, London: Royal United Services Institute, August 2016, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201608_op_understanding_irans_role_in_the_syrian_conflict_0.pdf (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
43 See Constable, P. (2018), ‘Recruited by Iran to fight for Syrian regime, young Afghans bring home cash and scars’, Washington Post, 29 July 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/recruited-by-iran-to-fight-for-syrian-regime-young-afghans-bring-home-cash-and-scars/2018/07/29/ecf9e34c-64e0-11e8-81ca-bb14593acaa6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6947a47a1034 (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
44 Al-Sharq al-Awsat published a list of the main Iran-supported militias in Syria in 2017: ‘Mapping Iranian Militias in Syria’, 23 August 2017, https://aawsat.com/home/article/1006036/%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%C2%AB%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B6%C2%BB (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
45 The full text of the Syrian Military Service Law of 2003 can be found on the Syrian parliament’s website, http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=5571&cat=16006 (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
46 Iran later set up small localized militias, in Sweida and Damascus, known as the Local Defence Forces, which report to the 15th Division and the Republican Guard, respectively.
47 Interview with Syrian military expert, Damascus, May 2018.
48 Dehghanpisheh, B. (2015), ‘Iran recruits Pakistani Shi’ites for combat in Syria’, Reuters, 10 December 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-pakistan-iran-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210 (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
49 See various news items about tensions related to Shaaban, al-Manar and al-Mayadeen on Asharq al-Arabi’s website: http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%AB%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%8A-1442014_ad-id!70072.ks (accessed 29 Jul. 2018).
50 Interview with a Syrian journalist, Damascus, April 2018.
51 Sometimes this was deliberate, as the regime released 1,500 jihadists from Seydnaya and other prisons in 2011 to help prove to the world that it was fighting Islamist terrorism and not cracking down on an uprising. See, for example, Kassab, R. Y. and Al-Shami, L. (2018), Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War, London: Pluto Press. But the regime for the most part continued to pay salaries to civil servants in areas it had vacated on the security level, such as in Raqqa during the rule of ISIS.
52 Interview in Zabadani, March 2018.